THE URBANIZATION OF INSURGENCY

THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGE TO U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS

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PREFACE

This report was prepared as part of a three-phase project titled "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)." The purpose of this project is to assess how demographic changes will affect future conflict (limited conventional fighting, as well as unconventional fighting, i.e., insurgency), and U.S. Army combat (conventional and counterinsurgency) and noncombat missions (peacekeeping, civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, etc.). It also will examine the range of potential new Army deployments in the less-developed world, including

- Army roles and missions in support of either unilateral or multinational deployment efforts
- Army roles and missions in postconflict reconstitution and reconstruction
- Army roles and missions as part of, or in support of, peacekeeping operations.

This report is a product of the first phase of the project. It evaluates the effects of urbanization and population growth on the conduct of insurgency and/or counterinsurgency operations. It also assesses the ability of the United States to effectively support foreign nations' counterinsurgency activities. Two other drafts have been produced for the project's first phase, one illustrating the extent of urbanization and population growth in the developing world and the other examining the effects of these demographic trends on the stability and security of the Middle East.

The project's second phase includes several case studies representing the range of missions and requirements the United States is likely to face in the future. The studies pay particular attention to the following: Army roles and missions in providing relief and humanitarian assistance to refugees; involvement, and the implications of intervening, in internal ethnic conflicts; and peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in urban settings.

The project's third and final phase will analyze how changing demographics will affect U.S. Army doctrine, training, and equipment for future missions, and will make specific recommendations regarding force structure (including active/reserve mix) and operational requirements for military operations on urban terrain, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, peace support operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, and coalition warfare.

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SUMMARY

The likelihood of urban insurgency—irregular (i.e., guerrilla or terrorist) warfare in cities—is increasing as the dual demographic trends of rapid population growth and urbanization continue to change the face of the developing world. Whereas cities once provided a relatively better standard of living for people migrating from the countryside, they are now overcrowded and overburdened. Generations are growing up in the slums that surround the capital cities of many of the world's developing countries, and infrastructures are proving incapable of serving the massive urban populations. And the situation is getting worse. Moreover, insurgents are entering this ripe environment.

Unable to maintain operations among the dwindling rural population, insurgents are following their followers into the cities. In countries as diverse as Peru and Turkey, insurgents are setting up "liberated zones" in urban shantytowns. Such zones, which are nearly impenetrable, afford the insurgents many of the same advantages they enjoyed in the jungles of the rural areas. Perhaps most important, urban insurgencies are frequently linked to broader insurgent movements in the countryside. Using terrorist tactics, urban insurgents tie up the government's security forces in the cities, giving their brethren in the rural areas room to maneuver.

Although urban insurgencies have traditionally been the easiest kind to defeat, that may no longer be the case. The decreasing standard of living in the cities, the dispersion of security forces among increasing numbers of cities, and the development of impassable slums within cities have changed the three-way dynamic among the government,

the population, and the insurgents: The government can no longer provide adequate services even to the urban areas, the population is faced with few opportunities and little hope, and the insurgents can operate relatively securely within the cities while maintaining ties to the countryside.

No longer able to simply rely on their urban counterterrorist or rural counterinsurgency strategies, governments will have to develop a hybrid strategy that prepares them to fight a broad-based insurgency across rural and urban environments. They will require tactical capabilities ranging from counterterrorism to conventional urban warfare (i.e., fighting between standing, regular armies) techniques. Most important, they will not be able to afford the mistakes of past counterinsurgency efforts: Human intelligence must be improved to allow for early identification of budding insurgencies; police and military forces must train together and coordinate their counterinsurgent strategies; and governments must walk the fine line between overlooking or ignoring the development of insurgent movements on the one hand, and overreacting with repressive legislation and brutal counterattacks on the other.

The United States can provide only limited support in such efforts. It has neither the resources nor the will to become directly involved in foreign counterinsurgency efforts, especially with the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of the perceived threat of communist expansion in the developing world. Even if it wishes to provide limited support to foreign counterinsurgency efforts, however, the United States will need to improve its own counterinsurgency capabilities. Neither U.S. doctrine, nor training, nor equipment is designed for urban counterinsurgency.

Finally, the U.S. government must realize that there are factors over which it has no control, such as a foreign country's counterinsurgency strategy, its civil-military relations, external support for the rebels, or the legitimacy of the insurgents' concerns. The United States' huge effort over ten years in El Salvador—millions of dollars of support, the provision of advanced technology, and extensive U.S. military training of the Salvadoran armed forces—was not sufficient to conclude a decisive victory over the rebels there. Moreover, that insurgency was based mostly in the countryside rather than in the cities. Had the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front rebels

effectively operated from within the cities earlier in the insurgency, it is questionable how much the United States could have done to help maintain even the stalemate between the government and the insurgents.

Before committing its support to a counterinsurgency effort, especially an urban counterinsurgency effort, the United States will have to determine how much it is willing to spend, how much it can control, how its efforts will be perceived at home and abroad, and the minimum outcome it will accept—whether a stalemate, as in El Salvador, or an outright victory. Such determinations can help the United States realistically assess, from the outset, the potential costs and benefits of involvement in a foreign counterinsurgency.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPX/FTX	Command Post Exercise/Field Training Exercise
FID	Foreign internal defense
FLN	*Front de Libération Nationale*
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
HUMINT	Human intelligence
IDAD	Internal defense and development
MBA	Main battle area
MILES	Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MOUT	Military operations on urban terrain
PSYOP	Psychological operations
RAF	Red Army Faction
SOF	Special operations forces
TTP	Tactics, techniques, and procedures
UNITA	*Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*
URNG	National Revolutionary Unity (Guatemala)
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

A demographic upheaval of unprecedented proportions is today transforming almost the entire developing world—known during the Cold War as the Third World—from a predominantly rural society to an urban one. For the first time, because of unimpeded population growth and a related shift from rural-based to urban-based societies,[1] more people live in cities in the developing world than in cities in the industrialized world.[2] Despite a slowing of the worldwide rate of population growth, the populations of 37 of the world's most populous countries—all of which are located in the developing world—are growing more than 3 percent annually.[3] Accordingly, by

[1]Demographic change and population growth have long been staples of studies on fertility, health, economics, and sociology, but their effects on international politics or their potential as catalysts for intra- and transnational conflicts has not been scrutinized to the same degree. Exceptions are Choucri, Nazli, *Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics*, New York: United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Policy Development Studies, No. 8, 1983, and Choucri, *Population Dynamics and International Violence: Propositions, Insights, and Evidence*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974; and Sarkesian, Sam C., "The Demographic Component of Strategy," *Survival*, November/December 1989, pp. 549–564.

[2]Rogers, Andrei, "Sources of Urban Population Growth and Urbanization, 1950–2000: A Demographic Accounting," in Andrei Rogers and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., *Urbanization and Development in the Third World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 483; and Yeung, Yue-man, and François Belisle, "Third World Urban Development: Agency Responses with Particular Reference to IDRC," in Drakakis-Smith, David, ed., *Urbanisation in the Developing World*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 99.

[3]"Squeezing in the Next Five Billion," *The Economist*, January 20, 1990.

the year 2020, the developing world will have accounted for 90 percent of the world's population growth since 1930.[4]

The countries experiencing the greatest population increases are among the poorest, least developed, and most economically deficient in the world and therefore are largely incapable of feeding and providing for their increasingly impoverished populations.[5] Within the next decade, at least 65 countries (including 30 of Africa's 51 countries) will be completely dependent on food imports.[6] The imposition of this additional financial burden is likely to strain anemic national economies, increase the developing world's indebtedness, and thus widen the chasm already separating "haves" from "have nots" and the Northern from the Southern Hemisphere.[7]

Admittedly, problems of population growth, poverty, and hunger are not new to the developing world; they have long been the fulcrum for war, revolution, and subversion. What sets the present situation apart is the manifestation of these perennial problems in concert with the urbanization process. This convergence is changing fun-

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[4]The projected world population of 8 billion in 2020 will be double the population of 1976 and quadruple that of 1930. By comparison, it took from the dawn of time until 1830 for the world to acquire just 1 billion people. See Green, Marshall, *Population Pressures: Threat to Democracy*, Washington, D.C.: Population Crisis Committee, 1989, p. 2.

[5]Africa, for example, currently accounts for 28 of the world's 42 poorest countries and will experience a threefold population increase within the next 35 years. See "Squeezing in the Next Five Billion," 1990, and Crossette, Barbara, "The 42 Poorest Nations Plan a Campaign for Help," *New York Times*, February 12, 1990.

[6]Crossette, 1990.

[7]In arid regions, such as the Middle East, this problem may be compounded over disputes involving water access. Turkey's construction of the Ataturk Dam (one of the world's largest)—which will divert about half the annual volume of water in the Euphrates River now flowing to Syria and Iraq—has already led to increased regional tensions and saber rattling. A similar dispute is brewing among Syria, Jordan, and Israel over Israel's plans to divert water from the Yarmuk River. And in North Africa, Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi is attempting to have the Nile River declared an "Arab resource," supposedly to counter Israeli influence in Ethiopia. Egyptian officials, accordingly, speculate that "water, not oil, could be the Middle East's next cause for war." Quoted in Cowell, Alan, "Water Rights: Plenty of Mud to Sling," *New York Times*, February 7, 1990. See also "Terrorism and Water in Turkey," *Foreign Report*, No. 2086, November 2, 1989; "Qaddafi Takes to Water," *Foreign Report*, No. 2097, February 1, 1990; Haberman, Clyde, "Dam Is Watering Hope of New Fertile Crescent," *New York Times*, March 30, 1990; and Richards, Charles, "Conflict over Water Threatens Near East," *The Independent*, November 10, 1990.

damentally the developing world's demographic patterns and exacerbating already-problematic conditions.[8] In addition to acquiring the world's largest population share, the developing world is also rapidly acquiring the world's largest urban population.[9] Indeed, as rapidly as the developing world's total population is growing, its urban population is growing at more than twice that rate.[10] By the turn of the century, 264 of the world's 414 million-plus-inhabitant cities will be located in the developing world.[11] Africa, the world's poorest continent, will have more than 50 of these cities (compared with only 19 in 1980 and just 6 in 1950);[12] by the year 2025, its urban population will be three times the size of North America's.[13] The number of million-plus-inhabitant cities in Asia will double by the turn of the century, from 81 to 160.[14] Although less-dramatic urban growth rates are projected for Latin America, by the year 2000 more than three-quarters of its population will live in urban areas—accounting for the highest proportion of urban dwellers in the

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[8]See Foster, Gregory D., "Conflict to the Year 2000: The Challenge for Military Reform," *Air University Review*, September/October 1985, p. 14.

[9]By the year 2000, for example, 50 percent of the world's population will be urban, compared with 30 percent today and just 17 percent in 1950. See Rogers, Andrei, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Migration, Urbanization, and Third World Development: An Overview," in Rogers and Williamson, eds., 1982, p. 1; and Rogers, Andrei, "Sources of Urban Population Growth," in Rogers and Williamson, eds., 1982, pp. 466, 486. See also McAuslan, Patrick, *Urban Land and Shelter for the Poor*, London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 1985, p. 127. Although slightly different figures are cited, the same general pattern is identified in Yeung and Belisle, 1988, p. 99.

[10]Yeung and Belisle, 1988, p. 99; Rogers, Andrei, "Foreword," in Rogers and Williamson, eds., 1982, p. iii.

[11]Rogers, Andrei, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Migration, Urbanization, and Third World Development," in Rogers and Williamson, eds., 1982, p. 1. Some 58 of the world's largest metropolitan areas, for example, are now located in developing countries. See Camp, Sharon, *Cities: Life in the World's 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas*, Washington, D.C.: Population Crisis Committee, 1990, p. 1.

[12]McAuslan, 1985, p. 127. Indeed, by 2025, Africa will have 36 cities of four million or more residents, with an average of nine million, more than greater London today. By contrast, forty years ago, no African city between Johannesburg and Cairo had even one million inhabitants. "Squeezing in the Next Five Billion," 1990.

[13]See Camp, 1990, p. 1.

[14]McAuslan, 1985, p. 127.

world.[15] In sum, the developing world's total urban population will be almost twice the industrialized world's in the year 2000—a figure expected to quadruple by 2025.[16]

Unlike the symbiotic industrialization-and-urbanization process that gradually transformed the West a century ago, urbanization in the developing world is occurring more rapidly (with a doubling time of less than 20 years compared with the 50 years or more for the industrialized world), irrespective of industrial development, economic progress, or employment opportunity. Accordingly, rural immigrants are arriving in the developing world's cities and finding that, rather than having escaped from the hunger, despair, and crushing poverty they fled, even worse conditions await them. Most cannot afford even the simplest, cheapest accommodations these cities have to offer; they live instead as squatters in the unplanned, haphazardly built slums and shantytowns that now ring the developing world's urban centers.

As fast as cities in the developing world are growing, their slums and shantytowns are growing twice as fast. Lacking adequate protection from the elements as well as an urban infrastructure (sanitation facilities, transportation, and government services), the inhabitants of these communities form a large, expanding, and increasingly restive pool of idle, frequently uneducated and unskilled young people trapped in their native lands and bereft of hope or employment. According to one recent study, the populations in 53 of 57 cities in the developing world live in conditions that would be regarded as intolerable in the industrialized world.

To ameliorate these conditions, national expenditure on building and maintaining an urban infrastructure would need to increase 65 percent during the next decade, according to World Commission on Environment and Development estimates—an unlikely prospect

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[15]McAuslan, 1985, p. 129; *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, June 1988, p. 12; and Yeung and Belisle, 1988, p. 100.

[16]Camp, 1990, p. 1; Yeung and Belisle, 1988, p. 104; and McAuslan, 1985, p. 127.

given the existing socioeconomic problems and foreign indebtedness under which developing nations already labor.[17]

Into this volatile mix is added the proliferation of weapons—including small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives, as well as weapons of mass destruction. Such weapon proliferation throughout the developing world is a factor that facilitates the growth of insurgency—internal war—and heightens the potential for other forms of political violence, such as terrorism.

PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report examines the effects of these enormous demographic changes on the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the developing world. Among the issues addressed are the increased likelihood of urban insurgencies, the changing methods of conducting urban insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the level of assistance the United States can provide in support of foreign nations' counterinsurgency activities. This report is divided into four chapters and an appendix. Chapter Two assesses the changing nature of subnational conflict in the developing world; Chapter Three analyzes the requirements for effective counterinsurgency operations against an opponent based partly or wholly in an urban environment; and Chapter Four evaluates whether the United States' training, doctrine, equipment, and will are adequate for effectively supporting foreign countries' counterinsurgency efforts. The Appendix provides a brief annotated bibliography of publications about conventional military operations on urban terrain, which will also increase in the face of the above-mentioned demographic trends, but which are not addressed in the body of this document.

[17]Camp, 1990, p. 1.

Chapter Two

EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ON SUBNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

The combination of explosive population growth and rapid urbanization throughout the developing world is likely to alter the nature of subnational conflict in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, with consequent substantially greater civilian death, dislocation, and property destruction than have already occurred. As rural populations, uprooted by poverty, hunger, and conflict, continue to migrate to the cities, the guerrilla forces dependent on them for food, information, concealment, and support will have no choice but to follow, adjusting their strategies and tactics along the way. Thus, the future killing grounds of the developing world will not be the impenetrable forests or remote mountain areas where guerrilla wars have traditionally been fought; rather, they will be the crowded, built-up areas in and around the less-developed world's burgeoning urban centers, whose residents will become inextricably enmeshed in insurgent-government conflict as rebels attempt to topple or replace existing governments.

Neither urban insurrection nor urban-based terrorist campaigns are new phenomena. Whether as catalyst or triumphant endpoint, the city historically has been the cynosure of all revolution. Its place in the revolutionary continuum was more often than not predetermined by the demographic character and population density of a particular country or region. In the industrialized West, for example, the city took on an all-encompassing role as birthplace of, crucible for, and ultimate prize awarded to revolutionaries. A progression of revolutionary movements—from the Bolsheviks in Tsarist Russia and the *Freikorps* in post–World War I Bavaria to more contemporary organizations such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany and the

Red Brigades in Italy—made the city the exclusive focus of their struggles. If the countryside figured at all, it was as a place for escape and evasion until the main battle in the city was won; in any other context it was little more than an abstract space over which control would be easily consolidated once the urban centers were secured and the new government was put in place.

In the predominantly agrarian developing world, however, the city traditionally was viewed as the distant horizon toward which the revolution ultimately aimed—the seat of power, lynchpin of commerce, and last outpost of governmental authority. Subjugation of the city was possible only after the rural masses had been mobilized, the countryside conquered, and the urban fifth column put in place for the final, decisive blow. Isolated acts of urban terrorism might occur, but they were mostly for purposes of harassment (to tie down security forces that might otherwise be deployed to the countryside) or publicity (to intimidate the urban populace, undermine confidence in the government, and focus both domestic and international attention on the rebels and their cause). From Pancho Villa in turn-of-the-century Mexico to Mao Tse-tung in pre- and postwar China, and Castro in 1950s Cuba, the city represented the revolution's culmination—the crowning achievement earned and awarded at the end of an ineluctable rural trajectory.[1]

This began to change, however, following the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in 1967 and the defeat of the revolution in Bolivia.[2] At a time when Latin America was emerging as the region with the most highly urbanized society in the less-developed world, it was perhaps inevitable that the hitherto mostly rural focus of insurgency there

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[1]Similarly, the uprisings against British imperial rule in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus during the 1940s and 1950s; the FLN's (*Front de Libération Nationale*) revolt against French rule of Algeria; and, more recently, the guerrilla wars fought in Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, and Mozambique, to cite but a few, have been primarily rural.

[2]Jenkins, Brian Michael, *The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Challenge of the 1970s*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-4670, 1971; Jenkins, *An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-4670/1, 1972; Jenkins, *Soldiers Versus Gunmen: The Challenge of Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-5182, 1974; and Laqueur, Walter, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study*, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1976. See also Rice, Edward E., *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988, pp. 53–59.

would shift to include, and later emphasize, the cities. Revolutionary theorists thus sought to apply the Cuban-inspired *foco* model of rural guerrilla insurrection to an urban environment.[3]

Urban guerrilla movements, such as the *Tupamaros* in Uruguay, the *Montoneros* in Argentina, and the Action for National Liberation in Brazil, consequently arose, attempting to implement a strategy that would seize control of the cities first and then carry the movements to the countryside.

Despite initial fears that Latin America would be submerged in a rising tide of urban violence, this new generation of insurgents was no more successful than their rural predecessors.[4] In each case, urban populations seemed impervious to the claims of the insurgents and would not be mobilized: Indeed, the insurgents found themselves marginalized by populations that would not accept their violent measures.

Logistical and security complications in the cities also made insurgent operations difficult to maintain over a prolonged period. For example, the sheer concentration of government forces often placed in and around the city—the government's bastion and the country's political and commercial nerve center—inhibited insurgent activity. Such forces would be sufficient to contain, if not defeat, any urban-based insurgency.[5] Although individual instances of bombing, hit-and-run attack, and kidnapping might occur, most governments—unless they were completely inept or totally powerless—could handily suppress any serious attempt at urban insurrection.[6] The guerrillas' difficulties in the city were further

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[3]For detailed examinations of these campaigns, see Burton, Anthony M., *Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice, and Response*, London: Leo Cooper, 1975; Mallin, Jay, ed., *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents*, Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1975; and, Moss, Robert, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," *Conflict Studies*, London: Institute for Conflict Studies, No. 8, October 1970.

[4]See, for example, Hoehn, Andrew, and Carlos Weiss, "Overview of Latin American Insurgencies," in Georges Fauriol, ed., *Latin American Insurgencies*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Defense University, 1985, pp. 15–16; and, Rice, 1988, p. 58.

[5]Laqueur, 1976, p. 404.

[6]See, for example, the three seminal studies on the urban insurrection written in the early 1970s by Brian Michael Jenkins: 1971, 1972, and 1974.

exacerbated by the fact that their numerical strength in cities is necessarily reduced from combat unit to small conspiratorial cell, thus limiting the potential for decisively engaging, much less defeating, the government's forces.[7]

One contemporary RAND analysis explained these failures in the familiar terms of the insurgent force's basic weakness compared with the government's strength (i.e., in manpower, firepower, and control over the masses). But more important, perhaps, was the observation that "the insurgents failed to develop a rural component to complement their urban strategy."[8] The failure to generate popular support was explained in sociological terms: The Latin American urban populace was seen as unready for, or at least apathetic toward, revolution in general, and the revolutionaries themselves were characterized as "romantic intellectuals and students who lacked discipline and competence at revolutionary action." The bottom line, however, was that individual terrorist incidents, numerous as they might have been, did not themselves threaten the government: "Despite the volume of violent terrorist tactics, the revolutionary insurgents do not appear to be gaining a strategic advantage for themselves, whether measured by organized populist support, elite fragmentation, or institutional disruption."[9]

On a broader level, the prospects of urban-based revolutions in the developing world (either independently or in concert with armed insurgencies) were also dismissed. "Throughout Latin America and in much of Asia and Africa," Samuel Huntington wrote in 1968, "the slums grew larger in size and little better in living conditions, and yet with rare exceptions the expected social violence, riots, and insur-

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[7]As Walter Laqueur (1976, pp. xi, 403) notes, the "distinction is of more than academic importance; there have been guerrilla units of ten thousand men and women but an urban terrorist unit seldom, if ever, comprises more than a few people."

[8]Ronfeldt, David F., and Luigi R. Einaudi, *Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-924-ISA, 1971, pp. 8–9. The exceptions to this rule, including South Yemen (1967), 1940s Palestine, and 1950s Cyprus, where urban guerrilla campaigns, if not completely successful, at least succeeded in forcing dramatic political change, were each ruled by Britain, which eventually proved willing to make political concessions not only where it faced urban insurgencies, but where it faced any form of insurgency (e.g., Malaya, Kenya).

[9]Ronfeldt and Einaudi, 1971, pp. 8–9.

rections did not materialize."[10] He cites four factors to explain the absence of such insurrection:

- The urban slum-dweller's improved living conditions compared with his previous rural lifestyle and accommodations
- Rural values and attitudes of social deference and political passivity that militate against an awakening political consciousness among urban immigrants
- Preoccupation with immediate benefits, such as food, jobs, and housing, at the expense of politics and other peripheral concerns
- Patterns of social organization, i.e., mutual distrust and antagonism, that make political organization or the common articulation of grievances problematic.[11]

Today, however, migrants to the cities find conditions that rival or surpass the squalor and hopelessness they fled. They live in areas known variously as *callampas* ("mushrooms" because of the way they suddenly appear) throughout Latin America, as *favelas* (squatter towns) in Brazil, as *villas miserias* ("miserable villages") in Argentina, as *pueblos joveneses* ("young towns") or *invasiones* ("invasions") in Peru, or as *gecekondu* (literally, "to set up overnight") in Turkey. These slums and shantytowns have become breeding grounds for revolution and subversion in countries already plagued with rural poverty and unrest.

Indeed, following close behind the urban migrants in the developing world are the guerrillas. As rural populations dwindle, some insurgent movements have had no choice but to adjust their traditional rural guerrilla strategies. Insurgent strategy has long been described in classic Maoist terms as that of the fish swimming in a friendly sea. Thus, effectively harried in largely depopulated rural war zones by

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[10]Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 278.

[11]Huntington, 1968, pp. 279–280. Douglas Bravo, leader of the insurgency in Venezuela, also believed that recent immigrants to cities are resistant to insurgent appeals and remain rural in their mind-set and political views. McLaurin, R. D., and R. Miller, *Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and Implications for U.S. Military Forces*, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Technical Memorandum 14-89, 1989.

numerically superior government forces, the guerrillas have increasingly been forced to adapt—and apply—their rural insurgent strategies to urban environments. "The common denominator of most insurgent groups," a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication titled *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* explains, "is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country."[12]

Like the Latin American revolutionaries of the 1960s, urban insurgents today have similarly seized control over defined geographic areas in the band of slums and shantytowns ringing such cities as Lima and San Salvador. They have established, in some cases, alternative shadow forms of government, which exercise a crude form of sovereignty and provide public services or scarce commodities while repulsing government efforts to reassert its control over these so-called liberated zones.

A variety of hospitable conditions enables today's guerrillas to more effectively adapt their rural insurgency strategy to an urban environment. Guerrillas have the same benefits and advantages that they have traditionally enjoyed in rural areas: control over territory, the allegiance (whether voluntary or coerced) of a considerable part of a country's population, inaccessibility to security forces, and a reasonably secure base for operations around the heart of the government and its administrative and commercial infrastructure. They also potentially have opportunities for media coverage and international attention that would be unobtainable in the tortuously traveled jungles or isolated mountains of these countries.

Because of their warrenlike alleys and unpaved roads, the slums have become as impregnable to the security forces as a rural insurgent's jungle or forest base. The police are unable to enter these areas, much less control them. The insurgents thus seek to sever the government's authority over its urban centers, thereby weakening both its resolve to govern and its support from the people. Their aim is to

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[12]Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d., p. 2.

eventually take power, first in the cities and then in the rest of the country.

Abimael Guzman, the founder and leader of Peru's Shining Path, for example, states that his group's strategy is to "lay the groundwork to ensure that the action of the People's Guerrilla Army converges with the insurrection in the cities.... Just as combatants and communists initially moved from the cities to the countryside [they must now begin] to move from the countryside to the cities."[13] Captured Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) documents from 1988 similarly speak of "radical and violent actions . . . [having] a growing role" in urban areas.[14] Given that nearly half the total populations of both Peru and El Salvador, for example, live in and around those two countries' capitals, it is perhaps not surprising to find that roughly the same percentage of both Shining Path and (until the 1991 cease-fire) FMLN operations has occurred in those two cities.[15] The Guatemalan insurgent umbrella organization, called National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), similarly turned to urban operations, following the Salvadoran FMLN model, to strengthen its hand at the negotiating table.[16]

Nor is this phenomenon restricted any longer to Latin America. As other regions of the less-developed world begin to sustain the same higher rates of urbanization that occurred in Latin America two or more decades ago, they are experiencing the same—arguably inevitable—phenomenon of urban insurgency. The renewed guerrilla warfare in Angola, for example, has been fought in and for that country's urban centers. The most vicious combat has taken place in the resource-rich cities of Huambo, Uige, Menongue, Kuito, and Luanda. Using a strategy of capturing some urban areas while bottling up government forces within others, UNITA (*Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*) has now effectively deprived

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[13]Quoted in McCormick, Gordon, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3781-DOS/OSD, 1990, p. 24.

[14]Quoted in LeMoyne, James, "The Guns of Salvador," *New York Times Magazine,* February 5, 1989, p. 53.

[15]Statistics taken from Control Risks Ltd., Inc., subscription publications, a private London, England, risk assessment and analysis corporation.

[16]Ring, Wilson, "Guatemalan Guerrillas Take Fight Close to Cities," *Washington Post,* April 17, 1990.

the government of control in three-quarters of the country. Similarly, insurgents in Liberia have focused their efforts in the capital city of Monrovia; guerrillas in Sierra Leone have battled the government repeatedly for the diamond-mining hub, Koidu; and Shi'ite rebels in Afghanistan have brought their conflict with government troops into the heart of Kabul.

The massive urban terrorist campaign that wracked Turkey during the 1970s may provide a model for future urban-based campaigns. During the 1970s, urban insurgents in Turkey seized control over defined geographic areas (located in the *gecekondu*), established alternative forms of government, exercised a crude form of sovereignty in those areas, and repulsed government efforts to reassert its control, creating in effect liberated zones. The long-term goal driving this process was to sever the government's authority over its urban centers and thereby weaken both its resolve to withstand the terrorist onslaught and the support it received from the population. Eventually, the terrorists hoped to take all power from the government. Although the insurgents ultimately were defeated in a 1980 army crackdown, the short-term success of their urban efforts increased the counterinsurgency's cost in lives and resources.

Such an urban strategy has been made possible by increased urbanization and the concentration of large populations of immigrants in clusters in and around the cities. The terrorist groups were thus able to obtain critical support and attract recruits from the transplanted villagers' extended family and friendship ties. The displaced and culturally alienated migrants from small towns and villages in the countryside were also susceptible to manipulation by the terrorist group's largely educated leadership, who provided promises of economic gain and improved living conditions in return for allegiance. Moreover, the lucrative income derived from such terrorist activities as bank-robbing, extortion, and drug-trafficking provided a further powerful attraction to the unemployed, alienated, and disaffected *gecekondu* youth. Finally, the terrorists gave the *gecekondu* populace what the government could not: The terrorists rewarded their followers with essential goods and various community services, including food distribution.

Turkey's urban-based terrorist problem thus has many parallels to those of other developing countries similarly undergoing processes

of rapid urbanization and population growth and provides a representative example of how the traditional insurgent strategy of first seizing control of the countryside before turning to the cities was reversed.[17]

Even if insurgents choose not to base their operations in urban areas, they can nonetheless take advantage of urbanization. Rural-based insurgencies are finding cities increasingly lucrative targets. Whereas cities were once the culmination of the revolution, the proliferation of urban areas—and the inability of governments to defend them all—has made cities relatively simple targets that can yield substantial political rewards for relatively little effort. Insurgent groups can disrupt energy and telecommunications facilities, draw international attention, demonstrate the inability of the government to protect its people, and recruit from among the disaffected population. Even those insurgencies that remain based in rural areas can take advantage of urbanization by increasing their reliance on terrorism against urban targets.

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[17]For a more detailed discussion of the Turkish experience, see Sayari, Sabri, and Bruce Hoffman, *Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976–1980*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3228-USDP, 1991.

Chapter Three

COMBATING URBAN INSURGENCY

Governments have been significantly more successful at combating urban insurgencies than at combating either strictly rural insurgencies or rural insurgencies with urban components. As Chapter Two explains, most urban insurgencies that took place in Latin America in the 1960s were unsuccessful. Rural-based insurgencies, however, have been more prolonged and have more frequently achieved their goals. Those guerrilla wars fought or being fought in the jungles or mountains of Bangladesh, Burma, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Malaya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, and Vietnam have proven how tenacious rural insurgencies can be. Many have resulted in partial or complete victories for the insurgents.

In Kenya, Rhodesia, and Vietnam, the insurgents ultimately gained control of their countries, despite the claims of the British, Rhodesians, and Americans, respectively, that the rebels had lost the wars. In El Salvador and Mozambique, the insurgents won significant concessions and political power, and the same appears to be happening in the Philippines. In each case, the insurgents benefited from operating in the countryside, where difficult terrain and distance from security-force bases suited their hit-and-run tactics and otherwise worked to their advantage. Many times, for example, in Rhodesia and El Salvador, the rural areas abutted international borders. The guerrillas could, therefore, establish bases in the neighboring countries but still penetrate into their own countryside with relative ease.

A 1971 study that compared the success and failure of urban versus rural insurgencies found that governments' counterinsurgency efforts succeeded against each of the four urban insurgent movements examined, prevailed against only 15 of 26 (58 percent) of the rural insurgencies, and had the most difficulty against mixed rural/urban insurgencies, winning in only three of 14 cases (21 percent).[1]

Urban areas will never be able to offer insurgents the widely dispersed sources of food, shelter, munitions, and recruits that the agrarian countryside provides. The latter allows the guerrillas to expand their area of operations without reliance on lines of communication or baggage trains.[2] Nor can urban insurgents aggregate or operate in large formations as on a battlefield.

The activities of urban insurgents are therefore usually restricted to terrorist activities, sabotage, infiltration of the security forces, and heavy recruitment from the urban populace. Although they can go so far as to set up shadow governments in the slums and operate virtually parallel infrastructures, none of these urban insurgent activities has so far proven sufficient to overthrow a government.

Nonetheless, insurgents have recognized the value of moving their revolutions into the cities. Urban areas are dense with potential human and fixed targets for sabotage and terrorism, including government officials, power plants, military installations, and telecommunications facilities. As Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo wrote in the 1960s,

> In the urban areas, the revolutionary movement has also its greatest potential in political and organizational resources, fighting traditions, mass influence, etc. . . . The repercussions of our urban actions are still greater in the short term than those of our actions in the countryside.[3]

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[1]Condit, D. M., *Modern Revolutionary Warfare: An Analytical Overview,* Jensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1973, p. 114; cited in McLaurin and Miller, 1989, p. 16.

[2]Rice, 1988, pp. 52–59.

[3]Burton, 1975, pp. 88–89.

Bravo recognized the value of combining a rural approach and an urban approach, using the urban cadres to foment crisis in the cities while pursuing a longer-term, more-systematic approach to building the revolution in the countryside.[4] Although the insurgency failed, in part because the population never fully supported the insurgents, populations today could prove easier to mobilize in support of antigovernment operations. As mentioned above, urban infrastructures are less capable than ever of supporting the migrants from rural areas, and unemployment and poverty show no signs of abating. The disaffected and disillusioned populations living in these conditions are clearly volatile. The riots in Senegal (1988), Thailand (1992), and India (1993),[5] for example, took place in urban areas, where long-simmering resentments and popular concerns led people to be quickly mobilized over a political flashpoint. Such opportunities can be exploited if insurgent infrastructures are already in place to take advantage of them.

Such activities can prove immensely costly to governments. Nor can such activities be easily checked, because governments' political and military options in the cities are severely circumscribed. The government may attempt to avoid military action by relying on legislation against the insurgents. Such legislation can take the form of limits on the rights of public assembly, demonstration, possession of arms, or membership in subversive organizations. Provisions for incarceration without trial and property searches without warrants might also be made. But such repressive legislation often results in precisely the outcome it is intended to preclude: The population becomes alienated and thus more willing to harbor the insurgents. Sources of intelligence dry up. And the government begins to be perceived precisely as the oppressive and incompetent machine the insurgents claim it to be.

Governments choosing to augment political efforts with military action against urban insurgents face numerous constraints. In most

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[4]For a discussion of the linkage between urban counterinsurgency and rural counterinsurgency, see O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, New York: Brassey's (U.S.), 1990, pp. 45–47.

[5]Or, for that matter, in Los Angeles, California (1992), which, although not a developing country, clearly suffers from many of the same problems with poverty, resentment, and disenfranchisement as other urban areas.

cases, the difficulty of avoiding civilian injuries or deaths rules out the use of massive firepower, indirect fire, or air power in populated urban environments. Indeed, urban insurgents deliberately use the population as cover, trading the concealment of the jungle for the anonymity of crowds of people.

In the past, neither governments nor security forces have been prepared for insurgencies. This was true in 1960s Latin America as well as in colonial Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Governments have tended to respond too slowly, then too repressively, to insurgencies. Britain's counterinsurgency efforts during the 1940s and 1950s in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus, for example, were much more costly in terms of manpower and economic drain than was necessary. British colonial governments repeatedly underestimated the threat posed by the insurgent movements and then responded with unpopular and counterproductive states of emergency when they finally recognized the danger they were in. The colonies' security forces were not adequately prepared for insurgencies, nor did they have sufficient intelligence capabilities to either warn them in advance or allow them to respond to unrest early. The security forces also had very limited presence in the rural areas, and much more concentrated presence in the cities, so that they were initially unable to prevent the insurgents from recruiting and/or terrorizing the rural citizenry.

REQUIREMENTS FOR URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Given that urbanization and population growth in most developing countries are creating the conditions that can lead to revolutions, governments today should be better prepared to make every effort to forestall the development of full-blown insurgencies and, failing that, to at least be schooled in the political and military requirements of successful counterinsurgency.[6] Security forces in developing coun-

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[6]Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3506-DOS, 1992, and *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4015-A, 1991; Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3998-A, 1991; Mockaitis, Thomas R., *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960*, New York: St. Martin's

tries will thus need to be prepared to respond with appropriate measures in both the cities and the countryside. Such response will require a diversity of capabilities, as well as appreciation for the causes of insurgency and the political requirements of countering an insurgency.

Urban counterinsurgency requires a unique combination of the doctrine, training, and equipment appropriate for military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), counterterrorism, and traditional counterinsurgency operations. On the one hand, troops must be prepared for the kind of urban offensive that took place in San Salvador in 1989, which required conventional combat skills tempered by stringent rules of engagement. On the other hand, effective use of intelligence, civic action, psychological operations (PSYOP), and population protection could perhaps prevent urban insurgency from developing to the point it did in San Salvador. Such activities must be supported by appropriate doctrine, training, and command and control arrangements, and must be undertaken in support of a broader political and legislative effort.

Alongside developing the specialized skills required by each environment (urban and rural), the security forces must be trained to treat the civilian population with respect, to prevent popular alienation from the government, and to improve the conditions for gathering human intelligence. They will also have to coordinate police and military responsibilities with the civilian government's political countermeasures. Indeed, in those countries where civil control is exerted over the military, such civil authority must be maintained if the counterinsurgency itself is not to fundamentally damage the government. To suppress the urban insurgency in Uruguay, the government ceded authority to the military, which crushed the insurgency but then took over the government. The civil-military tensions in the Philippines since the late 1980s stem from much the same problem: The Philippine military resists the government's counterinsurgency program and fights for the right to impose its own

Press, 1990; Beckett, Ian, and John Pimlott, eds., *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; Paget, Julian, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, London: Faber & Faber, 1967; Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., "Regular Armies and Insurgency," in Ronald Haycock, ed., *Regular Armies and Insurgencies*, London: Croom Helm, 1979.

more-brutal response. And in Thailand, fighting the communist insurgency until recently was considered justification for the military's political and economic power. *Security forces in democracies must be prepared in advance to support counterinsurgency operations rather than to run them; military responses must support, but not supplant, political efforts.*

Most counterinsurgency efforts in the past did not meet the requirements outlined above. They suffered from insufficient foresight, lack of command and control, lack of coordination between the military and police, inadequate intelligence, and an inappropriate emphasis on combat operations rather than political actions. These liabilities can have particularly acute consequences in an urban environment, where combat operations can be extremely counterproductive. Moreover, in the cities, where police have a comparative advantage over the military, issues of coordination are critical: Inadequate intelligence can prevent early identification and response to a problem, and poor command and control can endanger troops caught in an environment where decisions must frequently be made at the small-unit level.

Chapter Four

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. READINESS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN

If the United States becomes involved in urban counterinsurgency efforts, it can be safely assumed that such involvement will be in support of a host nation's efforts and will take place on foreign soil. Operations in support of foreign countries' counterinsurgency efforts are known as foreign internal defense (FID).[1] In this context, the U.S. role will usually be limited to one or a combination of support activities, including training, shared intelligence, civil-military operations, humanitarian or civil assistance, logistical support operations, support for the host nation's populace- and resource-control operations, counterdrug operations, advisory assistance, provision of equipment and materiel, financial assistance, and/or postconflict civic action and nation assistance.[2] It is unlikely that U.S. combat troops will be directly involved, although such involvement is not precluded by doctrine.[3] Thus, although the U.S. military may well require special-

[1] *Foreign internal defense* is "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, 1989, p. 150.

[2] *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1990, pp. 2-20–2-25.

[3] Since the development of the Nixon doctrine toward the end of the Vietnam War, it has been U.S. policy to let foreign troops fight their own battles: The United States will provide support and assistance, but not the manpower. This is fairly explicit in Army/Air Force low intensity conflict doctrine (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1990, p. 2-15). However, some U.S. military advisers who served in El Salvador during the 1980s are now claiming that they were involved in actual combat in that country, suggesting that the line may become blurred.

ized urban combat skills for future regional contingencies, it is unlikely that it will employ those skills in the context of urban counterinsurgency. Moreover, it is not clear that U.S. military doctrine, training, equipment, or other capabilities can effectively contribute to host nations' counterinsurgency efforts.

DOCTRINE

U.S. military doctrine does little to prepare U.S. troops for a role in support of host-nation counterinsurgency efforts, nor does it offer much practical information to governments fighting urban counterinsurgencies. Under the assumption that any U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies will be in support of host nations, the Army/Air Force doctrine (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20) for low intensity conflict includes a chapter on support for insurgency and counterinsurgency. That chapter provides an introduction to the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, offers a broad framework for preventing insurgencies by means of internal defense and development (IDAD) strategies, outlines the organization of U.S. efforts in support of counterinsurgency and insurgency (clarifying that the military will operate strictly in support of broader political and economic efforts), and then describes, very generally, the kinds of foreign internal defense operations the U.S. military might be expected to undertake.

The only tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) doctrine related to counterinsurgency is a joint manual on foreign internal defense published for the first time in June 1993. Unless the joint FID TTP provides information specifically on *urban* counterinsurgency, doctrinal reference to that subject will continue to be limited to a page and a half of general observations in an appendix of FM 100-20/AFP 3-20.[4] The prospect for exporting U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in support of foreign efforts remains slim. Three appendices to FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 offer analytical tools for understanding and planning for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. None of the services has produced a TTP manual expressly for counterinsurgency.

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[4]FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1990, pp. E-8–E-9.

EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL

In addition to the limited doctrine available for guiding counterinsurgency operations, little U.S. equipment and materiel are appropriate for counterinsurgency operations, especially in urban areas. For example, the United States can provide weapons capable of precision strikes, but those may not be precise enough for urban counterinsurgency combat operations, especially in the ramshackle and overcrowded slums of the developing world. The United States should be able to provide much of the off-the-shelf equipment and relatively simple technologies required for many counterinsurgency operations (e.g., detection). However, past experience has indicated that while insurgents simply purchase or steal such items, the United States is encumbered by a lengthy procurement process that can prevent timely provision of weapons and materiel.[5]

INTELLIGENCE

Another area in which the United States falls short is intelligence. The emphasis of U.S. intelligence capabilities is on highly technical battlefield intelligence rather than on human intelligence (HUMINT). Yet the latter is much more important for counterinsurgency operations, especially in urban areas. The United States has neither the manpower, the budget, nor the will to develop HUMINT capabilities in all the developing countries that might face insurgencies. Moreover, U.S. doctrine and training do not optimize the use of intelligence in counterinsurgency. Both doctrine and training fail to sufficiently link intelligence operations, psychological operations, and civic action in urban counterinsurgency efforts, even though the effectiveness of each type of operation can be multiplied by coordination with the others.[6]

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[5]Discussion, Low Intensity Conflict Technology Workshop, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, February 24–28, 1992.

[6]McLaurin, R. D., and R. Miller, *Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and Implications for U.S. Military Forces*, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1987, pp. 142–143 (distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.).

FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

Despite the lack of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. foreign military training and advisory assistance have proven helpful to host nations combating mostly rural insurgencies: The Salvadoran armed forces' counterinsurgency capabilities improved markedly with U.S. training, for example. Whether the United States can usefully train foreign military personnel in *urban* counterinsurgency tactics and techniques is questionable.[7] The U.S. doctrine and training for even conventional MOUT is limited (see Appendix). Furthermore, the U.S. military is prohibited from training foreign police forces; urban counterinsurgency responsibilities ideally fall to civil police, with the military in support. U.S. training thus automatically omits an important element of counterinsurgency preparation.

Another problem with U.S. training and advisory assistance is that many countries (e.g., Thailand, the Philippines) consider their own independently developed counterinsurgency doctrine and training superior to those of the United States. Such countries are unlikely to adopt U.S. counterinsurgency practices and would not accept U.S. advisory assistance. Nor is this refusal altogether unreasonable: The United States has a poor record with counterinsurgency and operations other than war. The war in Vietnam, the disastrous peacekeeping operation in Beirut, the failed Desert One operation to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran, and the inability of the United States to guarantee El Salvador a victory over the FMLN despite ten years of massive financial, advisory, and security assistance do not inspire confidence in U.S. military abilities for less than total war.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. financial assistance to beleaguered governments is usually welcome, but frequently difficult to justify at home. For example, the huge costs associated with supporting the Salvadoran government's efforts against the FMLN are unlikely to be repeated, especially since

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[7]Taw, Jennifer Morrison, and Robert C. Leicht, *The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4201-A, 1992; McLaurin and Miller, 1987, p. 142; and Waghelstein, John D., "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Military Review*, May 1985, pp. 42–49.

the Cold War rationalization for such spending has disappeared. Similar problems also plague U.S. involvement in postconflict civic action and nation-building. The U.S. Congress has never appropriated the full funding needed for rebuilding Panama in the aftermath of Operation Just Cause; it is unlikely that it will accept the massive expenditures involved in helping host nations rebuild following their own internal conflicts.

Reluctance to assume the costs of nation-building is all the more true given the slow growth of the U.S. economy following the recession. The U.S. public has made it clear that it does not approve of foreign assistance. The president is even finding it difficult to raise support for aid to Russia, a country where political and security concerns clearly justify significant aid outlays.[8]

OTHER FACTORS

Finally, there are factors affecting the outcome of insurgencies over which the United States can exert no control. To limit an insurgency's growth and deny insurgents the initiative, a government must identify an insurgent movement very early and take it seriously. The United States does not have sufficient manpower or HUMINT skills to help provide countries with the intelligence required for such early warning.

The police and military forces of the country must be both sufficiently capable and motivated to effectively combat urban insurgency, another factor over which the United States, as a supporting player, has little control.

Most important, the military aspect of the counterinsurgency must be in support of a broader political effort. Although the United States can offer advice and incentives for appropriate political responses, it has no control over a foreign government's development of counterinsurgency strategy.

This lack of control can prove problematic not only for the success of the counterinsurgency efforts, but for the image of the United States.

[8]"Kind Words, Closed Wallet," *The Economist*, 27 March 1993, pp. 26, 29.

If it commits itself to supporting a foreign government's counterinsurgency efforts, and that government responds to the insurgents typically—with repressive legislation and brutal military actions—such actions can tarnish the United States' reputation at home and abroad. Nor is this merely hypothetical: U.S. support for the Salvadoran government during that country's ten-year insurgency is still being probed by legislators and the media. Questions regarding the efficacy of providing U.S. military training to the Salvadoran armed forces, for example, continue to be raised months after the war in El Salvador has ended.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The problems associated with population growth and urbanization are worldwide: Insurgencies with urban components are rocking Angola and Bosnia, Mozambique and the Philippines, Peru and Nagarno Karabach, to name just a few. In the face of such widespread instability, it will be tempting for the United States to offer support for some beleaguered governments. But the United States is not in an ideal position for assisting foreign counterinsurgencies. Its own doctrine, training, and equipment are not geared to counterinsurgency, particularly urban counterinsurgency. It cannot offer the kinds of support foreign governments are most likely to need, i.e., early identification of the problem, intelligence-gathering and -dissemination once the counterinsurgency effort has begun, and organization and coordination of the country's armed forces and police effectively for counterinsurgency.

Before committing itself to supporting a foreign government's counterinsurgency efforts, the United States must determine how much it is willing to spend, how many of the factors affecting the success or failure of the counterinsurgency effort it can control, how its efforts will be perceived at home and abroad, and the end-state it will accept—nothing less than an outright victory, or a stalemate, as in El Salvador. The U.S. military must also consider whether it should develop increased capabilities for foreign internal defense: more doc-

trine, increased training, improved equipment, and greater emphasis on urban terrain in each of these.[9]

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[9]Little attention has been paid in this report to the forces responsible for foreign internal defense. In most cases, special operations forces (SOF) are the most appropriate for undertaking FID operations. They are educated in language and cultural skills, and are trained in psychological operations, civil-military operations, and a host of other military operations other than war that are appropriate in FID efforts. Moreover, FID is a legislated and primary mission for the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). See Doherty, Terry, "FID in the 90s," *Special Warfare,* March 1992, pp. 39–41.

Appendix

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN

Whereas it is unlikely that the United States will become involved directly in combat in foreign counterinsurgency efforts, it is likely that U.S. troops will be deployed for combat in regional contingencies and, moreover, that such combat will take place on urban terrain. The studies listed below describe requirements for conventional military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) and offer recommendations for the U.S. military. Although they vary in detail and emphasis, the studies conclude that, while urban battles are expensive and intensive, they will be unavoidable in the future and, therefore, that the U.S. Army must better prepare itself to conduct operations in urban environments. The studies also agree that in the past the Army has not emphasized MOUT in its doctrine, training, or equipping, and that its capabilities for conventional operations on urban terrain are arguably inadequate. Furthermore, the analyses note that existing Army MOUT capabilities emphasize the U.S. advantage in massive firepower. Little doctrine or training is relevant to combat in the developing world's heavily populated urban areas, where strict rules of engagement are likely to limit the utility of the Army's firepower advantage.

More specifically, the studies offer recommendations on the tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of MOUT, including suggestions for updating doctrine, equipment, and training. They frequently mention the need for combined arms, artillery, snipers, and armor, for example; address the difficulty and costliness of offensive operations on urban terrain; and identify many of the skills required for operating successfully in an urban environment.

O'Connell, James W., *Is the United States Prepared to Conduct Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain?* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 13 February 1992. Distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.

O'Connell begins this short, but comprehensive, paper on the U.S. military's ability to conduct MOUT operations by suggesting that the likelihood of urban warfare is increasing concomitantly with world-wide urbanization. He then offers a brief historical survey of MOUT from which he draws lessons learned. Finally, he assesses the U.S. military's preparedness for such battles in light of these lessons.

O'Connell suggests that international urbanization not only increases the probability of urban warfare by sheer chance, but has related consequences that can themselves lead to conflict, including dissatisfaction that grows as cities' infrastructures prove increasingly incapable of supporting rapid influxes of people. He also points out that combatants are naturally attracted to centers of political and economic activity, where destruction or control of key assets can control populations at large.

In the second section of the paper, O'Connell draws eight lessons from past MOUT battles:

- Urban battles are usually more intense and costly than are conventional, open-terrain battles.
- MOUT battles are often unavoidable.
- Political pressure is usually exerted to terminate urban battles as soon as possible.
- Rules of engagement are usually tightened in MOUT operations.
- Urban terrain is a great equalizer for less-skilled and -equipped forces.
- Competent use of combined arms is of paramount importance in MOUT.
- Civil affairs activity assumes unusual importance.
- Training is especially critical to ensuring success at a reasonable cost.

O'Connell also assesses the U.S. military's capabilities to conduct MOUT in light of these lessons. He concludes that U.S. forces are not adequately trained for MOUT. U.S. MOUT doctrine must be updated, and munitions inventories—especially those of light infantry units—are insufficient for MOUT.

In his conclusions, O'Connell offers detailed suggestions for improving doctrine, training, and munitions and reasserts the importance of preparing U.S. forces effectively for military operations on urban terrain. His conclusions and recommendations do not vary significantly from those of earlier works, mentioned below, but they provide a useful and up-to-date summary of the kinds of capabilities required for MOUT and point out which of these the United States lacks.

Dewar, Michael, *War in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khafji*, Newton Abbot, Devon, England: David & Charles, 1992.

Dewar begins his book by outlining the nature of both offensive and defensive operations in urban combat, then illustrates his points using historical examples of urban combat during and following World War II and, more recently, in the Gulf War. Dewar then offers more detailed analyses of offensive and defensive operations in contemporary urban combat, including specific information about appropriate weapons and equipment, the use of artillery and armor, and the tactics and techniques of counterterrorism and riot control in urban environments. He then applies his analysis to the case of Northern Ireland and concludes with a warning that urban warfare is likely to persist and the need for appropriate skills and capabilities is ongoing.

Although ambitious, this book does not offer as sophisticated an approach to the understanding of MOUT as does some of the professional literature. It also contains some factual errors.

McLaurin, R. D., Paul A. Jureidini, David S. McDonald, and Kurt J. Sellers, *Modern Experience in City Combat*, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, March 1987. Distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.

This report examines 22 historical accounts of combat on urban terrain in an attempt to identify and examine the dominant factors influencing the outcomes of these conflicts. Based on the selected cases and recent literature on MOUT, general principles were identified and then were independently validated for each case-study battle.

The testing resulted in a number of findings:

- American forces should avoid cities where feasible.
- Nonetheless, well-conceived attacks on urban terrain can be successful, and may not be overly expensive.
- Such attacks will be time-consuming.
- Isolating and encircling a city may prevent fighting for control of a city from slowing the overall offensive.
- Where attackers had an advantage in personnel of 4:1 or more, attacks on even major cities did not usually require more than two weeks' time.
- The 4:1 ratio may not be necessary if the attacker can achieve a quality of intelligence, degree of surprise, and degree of superior firepower (air, armor, artillery) higher than the degree of sophistication with which the defender has prepared the city. (This conclusion differs from the results of the Reiss et al. survey [1983], which maintains that the attacker might need as much as eight or nine times more manpower than the defending force.)
- Other factors include the defenders' relationship with the local population and the effectiveness of their communications system.
- Defense of cities offers unique advantages to the defender, simply in terms of the amount of time it can cost an attacker.
- Armor is especially useful on the perimeter in operations to isolate a city, although defenders will place greater emphasis on anti-tank missiles. Tanks and armored personnel carriers are also useful—and can be invaluable—inside a city, as long as they are defended by dismounted infantrymen.

- Artillery is of special value in cities, where it can provide direct-fire support. Because it must be concentrated in volume against a small target area, indirect artillery fire has more psychological effect than practical effect.
- Only in general or relatively unlimited wars does the attacker have a favorable advantage over the defender in MOUT. When the attacker is subject to such constraints as minimizing friendly military or civilian casualties and/or minimizing collateral destruction, the defender has a better chance of winning or at least prolonging the battle and raising the attacker's costs.
- Both attacker and defender must have well-trained personnel and the ability to control military operations in highly decentralized circumstances.
- Combined-arms operations are critical, especially for the attacker, and doctrine, planning, and training should be carried out together.

Latimer, John C., *Considerations for Operations on Urban Terrain by Light Forces*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Command and General Staff College, 1985. Distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.

Latimer suggests that urbanization guarantees that combat operations will take place on urban terrain. He argues, however, that current doctrine and tactics governing MOUT are insufficient. His study, therefore, is intended to assess the needs of infantry forces employed in MOUT. He examines three past MOUT battles, representing conflicts spanning 40 years. His tactical findings include the following:

- Light forces can defend against armor-heavy forces for a significant period of time, even if the armored forces have total air superiority and overwhelming fire support.
- Mutually supporting strong points along major axes are valuable.
- Snipers are valuable and require durable and efficient sniper weapons.
- Local counterattacks are valuable.

- Effective anti-armor weapons, efficient indirect-fire systems, anti-tank mines, an array of grenades, lightweight radios, night-vision devices, the best and lightest body armor available, protective masks that do not degrade weapon usage or accuracy, a tremendous amount of demolitions, and a first-aid kit similar to a medic's surgical kit, are important.
- Skills in engineering, manufacturing improvised weapons, administering first aid, acquiring city intelligence, calling for and adjusting fire support, and building analysis are valuable.

In addition to these findings, Latimer draws operational and strategic implications of urban warfare from his three historical examples, concluding that

- conflicts may have more significance than is immediately apparent
- major military commanders must be able to look beyond the tactical level of the conflict to the operational and strategic levels
- commanders at all levels must respect the power of media representation
- political and military leaders must understand the nature of the conflict in which they are involved.

Reiss, David W., et al., *Survey of Current Doctrine, Training, and Special Considerations for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)*, Fort Benning, Ga.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1983. Distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.

Like the above reports, Reiss and his coauthors make the case that increased military emphasis on fighting in, around, and through urbanized areas is the result of increasing urbanization throughout the world, especially in Western Europe. This report reviews U.S. MOUT doctrine and training as of 1983. Entry-level U.S. soldiers received questionnaires and interviews were conducted with all grades within the U.S. Army on familiarity with MOUT doctrine and training. U.S. MOUT training and doctrine were then compared with those of West Germany, Britain, and France.

The authors identified several researchable MOUT issues, including the need to

- update the review of MOUT doctrine
- determine an optimal map scale for MOUT operations
- explore incorporation of live-fire training
- give more emphasis to urban terrain
- conduct a detailed task analysis of MOUT
- expand the use of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)
- examine the role of snipers more closely
- develop Command Post Exercise/Field Training Exercise (CPX/FTX) MOUT scenarios
- identify and emphasize related training without the use of a MOUT facility
- identify weapons suitable for MOUT
- evaluate the equipment needs of the individual soldier
- determine whether simulation would be a cost-effective alternative to training exercises.

Since this report was written in 1983, steps have been taken to meet a number of these requirements: the MILES system is in greater use, some live-fire training has been incorporated, light infantry MOUT doctrine is in the process of being revised, and some of the weapons and equipment needs of light infantrymen in MOUT have been identified. However, the keystone MOUT doctrine (FM 90-10) has not been updated since 1979; there are too few trained snipers in the U.S. military; and although some MOUT-appropriate weapons have been identified, they have not been made sufficiently available.

Mahan, John J., *MOUT: The Quiet Imperative*, Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 20 May 1983. Distributed by Defense Technical Information Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va.

Mahan begins by demonstrating that despite sporadic articles on the subject of military operations on urban terrain since the close of Vietnam in the early 1970s, the U.S. Army has not been overly interested in MOUT issues. Perhaps because of this lack of interest, training in MOUT has also been insufficient, with the few MOUT training facilities frequently overbooked and, in any case, inadequate for training forces realistically for operations in urban areas larger than small villages. Mahan also points out that there are weapons and equipment difficulties associated with MOUT. All this, he suggests, is problematic, given increasing worldwide urbanization, and the increased likelihood that combat operations will take place in urban areas.

Mahan therefore recommends that the U.S. military be familiar with, and prepared to defend against, Soviet doctrine on parachute assaults and operational maneuver groups. He also recommends that Combat Service Support units be better trained for urban operations. In terms of AirLand Battle (which was new doctrine at the time of Mahan's writing), Mahan argues that "economy of force measures in the MBA [main battle area] requires that maximum advantage be taken of *man-made* as well as natural terrain features to splinter, fragment, disrupt and delay the attacking forces."

Mahan cautions that maneuver and fire defenses must not be overemphasized in lieu of using an urban area as the great force multiplier it can be. He writes that urban areas can be altered or manipulated to provide several functions: by equipping them as support for maneuver forces, by building a defense in depth through a corridor, and by using strong points for retaining an important urban area.

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