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The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects

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OF ALL POSSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIONS the voting decision has received the most attention from behavioral political scientists. Probably we have compiled and analyzed more data on candidate choice and turnout than on any other form of political behavior. Of course, this heavy emphasis comes as no surprise. The voting act is the fundamental political act in a democracy. It is the most widespread political act. Furthermore, on the surface, at least, the voting act would appear to be one of the simplest (and therefore, most understandable) political acts. A heavy scholarly focus on the voting act follows naturally from these considerations.

While our data base expands, however, our theoretical superstructure remains far from finished. It is fair to say that political science has relied chiefly on models rooted in the sociological, and later the social-psychological tradition.[1] These models hold that

* I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Nicholas Miller, whose constructive suggestions greatly improved the exposition of the theoretical portion of this paper. Professor Miller suggested the inclusion of Figure 3. I also thank Professor Kenneth Shepsle for his comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

[1] Bernard, Berelson, et al. *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

citizens choose their preferred candidate on the basis of long-term factors such as party identification and enduring group loyalities, and more ephemeral influences such as candidate qualities and the issues. Similarly, the decision to participate (i.e. vote) depends on psychological variables such as political interest, political efficacy, sense of citizen duty, and psychological cross-pressures.[2]

In recent years revisionists have questioned the adequacy of the mainstream social-psychological model. They argue that certain components (e.g. issues) always were or have become more important than generally believed, while other components (e.g. candidate personalities) or long-term forces (e.g. party identification) always were or have become less important than generally believed.[3] With V. O. Key, Jr. the revisionists maintain that the voter is a reasonably rational fellow.[4]

On the theoretical level the revisionists find allies in scholars who advocate "rational choice" explanations of voting behavior. Typically, the latter are applications of theories of decision making under uncertainty. For example, Downs argues that in two candidate plurality elections one supports one's more preferred candidate, where preference results from a comparison of the alternative social states (i.e., platforms) the two candidates promise to implement.[5] And one votes if

$$pB - c > 0 \qquad (1)$$

where

p = the probability of affecting the outcome
B = the difference between the citizen's utility for the platform of his more preferred candidate and his utility for the platform of his less preferred candidate
c = the cost of voting.

[2] *Ibid.* In addition, political scientists have found that various demographic variables such as age, income, race, etc., are weakly related to turnout.

[3] This literature is growing very rapidly. A good guide to it is provided by the articles and accompanying citations in the June 1972 *American Political Science Review*.

[4] V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[5] *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), esp. Chapters 3, 13, 14.

The Downsian model is not very satisfactory. If the party differential is conceptualized broadly enough, the candidate choice prediction is simply that the citizen votes for the candidate he likes better. Nor is the turnout aspect of the model convincing. As Downs realized, in mass elections one would expect p to be so small that the slight costs of voting (time, effort, travel costs, etc.) normally will outweigh the expected benefits of doing so. Gordon Tullock expresses similar misgivings.[6] And, indeed, recent presidential elections find 60,000,000 or so Americans voting, a fact not very well accounted for by (1).

In dealing with such objections, Downs suggests that rational citizens will realize that the consequence of near universal abstention will be the destruction of democracy.[7] Thus, he argues, rational citizens will vote in order to insure the larger goal of preserving the system. But his own intellectual camp provides the counterargument here. Preserving the system is a classic example of a collective good, and voluntary provision of this good runs squarely into the problem of collective action as discussed by Olson.[8]

Riker and Ordeshook attempt to improve the Downsian model by blending some social-psychological ingredients into it.[9] They propose that a citizen votes if

$$pB - c + D > 0 \qquad (2)$$

where D = the fixed benefits of voting.

Riker and Ordeshook contend that fixed benefits as well as fixed

[6] *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), Chapter 7. I do not wish to imply that (1) has no relation to reality. Barzel and Silberberg offer some evidence that turnout increases with closeness of the election. The cost of voting certainly affects turnout, although there are disagreements about particulars. And finally, variations in the size of the party differential are associated with variations in turnout. The particular predictions implied by (1) probably tend to hold, but as a total explanation (or even a significant one) (1) falls far short. See Yoram Barzel and Eugene Silberberg, "Is the Act of Voting Rational?" *Public Choice* 13 (1972), 113-122. Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "Indifference, Alienation and Rational Decisions: The Effects of Candidate Evaluations on Turnout and the Vote," *Public Choice* 15 (1973), 1-18.

[7] *An Economic Theory*, 261-262.

[8] *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken, 1968).

[9] "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968), 25-43.

costs accompany the act of voting. D summarizes these benefits. An example of the elements contained in D might be an individual's sense of citizen duty. By voting, the citizen fulfills the duty to which he has been socialized and thereby experiences a psychological satisfaction which may outweigh the costs of voting.

Various critics have expressed uneasiness with the Riker-Ordeshook reformulation. Empirically, most of the action appears to be in the D term.[10] So, if citizens vote simply because D outweighs c, why bother with decision theoretic models, symbols, rational choice terminology and other trappings which add little to the standard social-psychological explanation? Logically, if p(B) is insignificant, (2) may come perilously close to the realm of tautology, or at least triviality.

Despite these problems with the Riker-Ordesbook reformulation, I believe that they have made a valuable theoretical contribution. At least implicitly they remind us that the voting decision has both instrumental and expressive components.[11] The Downsian formulation, (1), is purely instrumental: the citizen's vote has value only insofar as it helps push his preferred candidate over the top. In contrast mainstream political science, at least the older tradition, has made us aware of the expressive component of the voting decision. One may vote to express solidarity with one's class or peer group, to affirm a psychic allegiance to a party, or simply to enjoy the satisfaction of having performed one's civic duty.[12] Clearly, in changing (1) to (2), Riker and Ordeshook create a hybrid model which includes both instrumental and expressive aspects.

In this paper I will discuss an example of a class of hybrid voting models which differ in one important respect from the Riker-Ordeshook model: the expressive payoff varies across strategies.[13]

[10] For example, Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1970), 13-19.

[11] David Butler and Donald Stokes have used this distinction in their analysis of British voting behavior. See their *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), esp. 35-37.

[12] Of course, one might argue that a vote on these grounds is instrumental in the expression of solidarity, the affirmation of party allegiance, or the satisfaction of civic duty, respectively. The fact remains, though, that a decision to vote on such grounds is not based solely on the immediate instrumental grounds of affecting the outcome of the election.

[13] Let me emphasize that the model which follows is "an *example* of a class"

This contrasts with the Riker-Ordeshook D term which is common to all voting strategies. The example I discuss is a hybrid model which conceptualizes the Downsian expected party differential as an instrumental factor and the social psychological conception of party identification as an expressive factor. This simple model produces several rather interesting hypotheses. For example, the Downs-Riker-Ordeshook hypothesis that turnout increases as closeness of the election increases does *not* hold for all citizens. For some the reverse is true. Moreover, the model illustrates an interesting theoretical convergence: the hybrid rational choice model produces hypotheses reminiscent of those produced by a theory of cross pressures. However, the mechanism underlying the latter theory—psychological tension reduction—is completely absent from the hybrid model.

Structure and Components of the Model

The analysis to follow pertains to two candidate plurality elections. I assume that a citizen acts as if he is an expected utility maximizer. He has three possible actions: vote for candidate 1 (V_1), vote for candidate 2 (V_2), and abstain (A). In a two candidate plurality election there are five mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of nature. These are as follows:

States	*Definition*	*Description*
S_1	$n_1 > n_2 + 1$	C_1 wins by more than one vote regardless of the citizen's vote
S_2	$n_1 = n_2 + 1$	C_1 wins by exactly one vote without the citizen's vote
S_3	$n_1 = n_2$	C_1 ties C_2 without the citizen's vote
S_4	$n_1 = n_2 - 1$	C_1 loses by exactly one vote without the citizen's vote
S_5	$n_1 < n_2 - 1$	C_1 loses by more than one vote without the citizen's vote

as stated in the text. I am not claiming that this model is a complete model of voting. Rather it is a stripped down model which contains only two factors. It is perfectly possible to expand the model to include other variables, but the number of voter types to be analyzed proliferates rapidly with each additional variable. Even this stripped down model, however, illustrates the main characteristics of the class of hybrid models.

where C_i = candidate i, i = 1, 2

n_i = the number of votes for C_1 *exclusive* of the citizen under consideration

Assume that citizens have subjective probabilities $p_1, \ldots, p_5$ defined over $S_1, \ldots, S_5$. Thus, p_2, p_3 and p_4 constitute the citizen's estimate of a very close election.

Define the citizen's party differential as $B = [U(C_1) - U(C_2)]$, i.e. the difference between the utility for the platform of candidate 1 and the utility for the platform of candidate 2. In the event of a tie assume the citizen expects B/2. Consider Figure 1.

Assuming that the party differential, fixed benefits and fixed costs are additive, Figure 1 yields the Riker-Ordeshook formulation (2) if $c>0$, $D>0$, and the Downsian formulation (1) if $c>0$, $D=0$. Action V_1 dominates action V_2 if the citizen is not completely indifferent between the candidates, and the citizen votes if $EU(V_1) > EU(A)$, which implies

$$[(p_3 + p_4)\frac{B}{2} - c + D] > 0 \qquad (3)$$

In the analysis to follow I will define the net fixed benefits of voting, N, as $N = D - c$. Thus, N will summarize the fixed costs and fixed benefits of voting as discussed by Downs and Riker-Ordeshook. Clearly N may be positive, zero or negative, and the larger is N, the greater the incentive to vote, *ceteris paribus*.

Additionally, however, I will introduce another expressive factor: the utility or disutility of satisfying or violating one's party allegiance. Some political scientists have argued that party identification is a deep-seated psychological tie relatively independent of an individual's issue positions.[14] One need not hold this relatively

Figure 1

Downs-Riker-Ordeshook Version of the Voter Decision Problem

	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5
V_1	B − c + D	B − c + D	B − c + D	B/2 − c + D	− c + D
V_2	B − c + D	B/2 − c + D	− c + D	− c + D	− c + D
A	B	B	B/2	0	0

[14] *The American Voter*, Chapter 6. But, cf. Arthur Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969), 5-25.

extreme position to recognize that party identification seems to capture something more than just an individual's current issue stands, something at least in part expressive rather than purely instrumental. Thus, I postulate that a vote which affirms an individual's party identification produces some psychic satisfaction, $a>0$, while a defection from party identification produces some psychic cost, $d>0$. Define a *partisan* as a citizen from whom $a>0$, or $d>0$, and define an independent as a citizen for whom $a=d=0$. As an expressive factor, attaining a or suffering d depends only on the action chosen, not on the state of nature which holds. But, in contrast to the Riker-Ordeshook D term, *the new expressive factor is not identical for both voting strategies.* This aspect of the model will produce several very interesting results.

Clearly, we can now make a distinction between two classes of citizens. The first class, *consistents*, contains those whose party identification and party differential are mutually reinforcing—their party offers the more attractive platform. (Independents are a degenerate case of consistents.) The second class, the *cross-pressured*, contains those whose party identification and party differential conflict—their party offers the less attractive platform.[15]

To be more precise, consider Figure 2.

FIGURE 2

VOTER DECISION PROBLEM—HYBRID MODEL

	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5
V_1	$B+a+N$	$B+a+N$	$B+a+N$	$B/2+a+N$	$a+N$
V_2	$B-d+N$	$B/2-d+N$	$-d+N$	$-d+N$	$-d+N$
A	B	B	B/2	0	0

In Figure 2 I assume without loss of generality, that Candidate 1 is the candidate of the citizen's party. Then, if $B>0$, the citizen is *consistent*; if $B<0$ the citizen is *cross-pressured* (unless he is an independent). In the remainder of this paper I will compare the theoretically expected and empirically observed voting behavior of consistent and cross-pressured citizens.

[15] Note that this conceptualization defines cross-pressures as an inconsistency between the expressive and instrumental components of the voting decision. I take no position on the question of inconsistency within the instrumental factor (party differential). As yet the model takes the party differential as given; how it is calculated is a separate question.

ANALYSIS

Considering first the consistent citizen one sees that the decision for whom to vote is trivial. Strategy V_1 dominates strategy V_2 so long as the citizen is not *both* an independent *and* a complete indifferent about the issues, excluding this degenerate case:

H−1: consistent citizens vote for the candidate of their own party if they vote. (Independents vote for the candidate favored by the party differential.)

The turnout predictions are the usual ones. A consistent citizen votes if $EU(V_1)>EU(A)$ which implies

$$[a+(p_3+p_4)\frac{B}{2}+N]>0 \qquad (4)$$

Thus

H−2: The greater the fixed benefits of voting the more likely is a consistent citizen to vote.

H−3: The greater the party differential, the more likely is a consistent citizen to vote.

H−4: The greater his expectations for a close election, the more likely is a consistent citizen to vote.

H−5: The more partisan he is, the more likely is a consistent citizen to vote.

Hypotheses 2-4 express the Downs-Riker-Ordeshook conclusions. Hypothesis 5 is supported in the large by common data from voting studies.[16] Note that from (4) completely indifferent independents ($B=0$, $a=0$, $d=0$) vote only if $N>0$, i.e. that fixed benefits of voting exceed the fixed costs.

Now consider the decision problem of the cross-pressured citizen. He votes for the candidate of his own party rather than that of the opposition if $EU(V_1)>EU(V_2)$ which implies

$$[a+d+(p_2+p_4)\frac{B}{2}+p_3(B)]\geq 0 \qquad (5)$$

Expression (5) suggests three hypotheses about the candidate choice decision of the cross-pressured citizen. Two of these are commonsensical, the third is a little less so.

[16] Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), Chapter 2.

H−6: The more partisan a cross-pressured citizen, the more likely he will remain loyal to his party if he votes.

H−7: The greater the party differential, the less likely is a cross-pressured citizen to support his own party if he votes.

H−8: The greater his expectations for a close election, the less likely is a cross-pressured citizen to support his own party if he votes.

(Hypotheses 7 and 8 follow from the fact that $B<0$ for cross-pressured citizens.) Hypothesis 6 is consistent with existing data about cross-pressured citizens.[17] Hypothesis 7 seems eminently plausible given that the issues favor the opposition. Hypothesis 8 is rather interesting. It asserts that *closeness of the election affects the decision for whom to vote as well as the decision whether to vote at all.* Even more interesting, though, are the turnout predictions.

Define as *loyalists* all those citizens who satisfy (5), i.e. all consistents and a subset of the cross-pressured. In complementary fashion *disloyalists* are the subset of the cross-pressured who violate (5). Loyalists vote for their own party if they vote; disloyalists defect from their party identification if they vote at all. Consider first the turnout decision of the loyalist. The behavior of the consistent loyalists is described by Hypotheses 2-5. The cross-pressured loyalist votes if $EU(V_1)>EU(A)$, which implies

$$[a+(p_3+p_4)\frac{B}{2}+N]>0$$

as in (4), but now, however $B<0$. Thus, the following hypotheses hold:

H− 9: The higher the net fixed benefit of voting, the more likely is a loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

H−10: The more partisan a loyalist cross-pressured citizen the more likely he is to vote.

H−11. The greater the party differential, the *less likely* is a loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

[17] Richard Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969), 498-514.

H−12: The greater his expectations for a close election, the *less likely* is a loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

In hypotheses 11 and 12 one begins to see the effects of postulating expressive rewards unique to particular strategies rather than common to several as is the Riker-Ordeshook D-term. Evidently, the conclusions conveyed by hypotheses 11 and 12 represent a large departure from previous formulations. *For a loyalist cross-pressured citizen, the greater the party differential, the more likely he is to abstain.* Moreover, *the loyalist cross-pressured citizen is more likely to stay home when he believes the election is close than when he believes otherwise.*

Hypotheses 11 and 12 provide an interesting contrast to hypotheses 3 and 4. Another interesting contrast is that between the loyalist and disloyalist cross-pressured citizen. The disloyalist cross-pressured citizen (i.e. 5 is violated) turns out if $EU(V_2)>EU(A)$, which implies

$$[-(p_2+p_3)\frac{B}{2}+N-d)]>0 \qquad (6)$$

Keeping in mind that $B<0$ for this group, the following propositions hold:

H−13: The higher the net fixed benefit of voting, the more likely is a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

H−14: The more partisan a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen, the *less likely* he is to vote.

H−15: The greater the party differential, the *more likely* is a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

H−16: The greater his expectations for a close election, the *more likely* is a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote.

In a nutshell, the disloyalist cross-pressured citizen behaves much like a consistent citizen insofar as his decision to participate goes. The important exception is that his partisanship *discourages* rather than encourages turnout.

Although the preceding propositions derive from simple algebra, their sheer number may be somewhat confusing. Thus, in Figure 3 I have attempted to illustrate the geometrical structure which underlies them. The figure treats a, d, and N as parameters with

values 1, 3 and 0 respectively. Also, I make the simplifying assumption that $p_2 = p_3 = p_4$. Thus, the bracketed parts of expressions 4, 5, and 6 may be re-written as

$$[a+N+pB] \quad (4')$$
$$[a+d+2pB] \quad (5')$$
$$[-pB+N-d] \quad (6')$$

The graph then shows how the candidate choice and turnout decision vary as pB varies.

To interpret, all citizens to the right of the vertical axis (nonnegative B values) are consistents, while all to the left (negative B values) are cross-pressured. All citizens whose pB values place them above the pB axis on the line representing expression (5′) are loyalists, all below, disloyalists. Finally, consider the "V" formed by the intersection of the lines representing expression (4′) and (6′). Those citizens whose pB values place them on the left arm of the V, above the pB axis, loyalist voters, and on the point of the V, below the pB axis, nonvoters. Other facts also are evident. An increase in N shifts the V upwards, an increase in a shifts it northwestwards (roughly, greater range of loyalty, more participation), while an increase in d shifts it southwestwards (roughly, greater range of loyalty, less participation). The reader may find it helpful to compare the algebraic and geometric presentations.[18]

To return to the main lines of the analysis, consider for a moment the empirical implications of the hybrid model. By the use of inequality (5) one can divide the cross-pressured into two groups in which three variables (party identification, party differential, and closeness of the election) work in exactly opposite fashion. The model predicts that the turnout effects of B (Hypotheses 11 and 15), p (Hypotheses 12 and 16), and party identification (Hypotheses 10 and 14) will be diametrically opposed within subgroups of the cross-pressured. Moreover, the effects

[18] The diagrammatic analysis suggests an important caveat to the algebraic analysis. Namely, one must limit the range of applicability of Hypotheses 6-16. To see why, consider the loyal cross-pressured citizen. By H–12 the closer the election the less likely he is to vote (graphically, he is proceeding southwest towards the tip of the V). But by H-8, the closer the election the less likely he is to be loyal (graphically, he is proceeding southwest on the line representing expression (5′)). But by H–16, if he becomes a disloyalist, the closer the election the more likely he is to vote (graphically, he begins to proceed northwestward on the V). Thus, the hypotheses must be restricted to descriptions of behavior *within* classes of the cross-pressured. At the boundaries of the classes reversals occur.

FIGURE 3

GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE HYBRID MODEL



of B (Hypotheses 3 and 11), p (Hypotheses 4 and 12) and party identification (Hypotheses 5 and 14) will be diametrically opposed between consistent citizens and one or the other subgrouping of the cross-pressured.

How plausible are the preceding hypotheses? Let us embed them in a real political context. In 1964, for example, we know that there existed two major classes of cross-pressured citizens. Many moderate Republicans could not support Barry Goldwater's issue positions. Similarly, some lifelong Southern Democrats found Lyndon Johnson's platform less attractive than Goldwater's. What does the model suggest about the behavior of these cross-pressured voters? Take the Republicans for example.

The stronger the Republican's party identification the more likely was he to remain loyal to Goldwater and to vote if he did (Hypotheses 6 and 10). Yet if his distaste for Goldwater's platform was so great that he preferred Johnson (i.e. violated 5) then the stronger the Republican citizen's party identification the less likely was he to vote (Hypothesis 14).

Similarly, the greater Johnson's issue advantage, the more likely was the Republican citizen to desert his party and actually to vote for Johnson if he did (Hypotheses 7 and 15). But if party loyalty was great enough to induce the citizen to prefer Goldwater (i.e. satisfy 5), then the size of Johnson's issue advantage worked to keep the voter at home on election day (Hypothesis 11).

Finally, Johnson's huge lead in the polls should have worked to keep cross-pressured Republicans loyal (Hypothesis 8) and, surprisingly enough, to vote if they remained loyal (Hypothesis 12). But if they preferred Johnson, his huge expected victory depressed turnout for him among Republicans (Hypothesis 16). Thus, we find something of an underdog effect among cross-pressured citizens: Johnson's huge lead encouraged turnout among those Republicans who preferred Goldwater (Hypothesis 12) and discouraged turnout among those who preferred Johnson (Hypothesis 16).[19]

Sadly, plausible scenarios do not confirm theories. Let us now conduct a more systematic confrontation between theory and data.

[19] In more elaborate models with which I have worked one finds both bandwagon and underdog effects occurring simultaneously among different subclasses of citizens.

Some Data

Preference Predictions

The predictions about voter preferences are contained in Hypotheses 1, 6, 7, 8. If partisanship, party differential and closeness of the election are measurable on some objective scale, these hypotheses predict the patterns given in Table 1 for each level of partisanship.

Table 1

Percent Favoring Own Party Candidate over Opposition Party Candidate (Theoretical)



To explain, the right side of the table contains only consistent voters for whom voting for their own candidate is a dominant strategy. Thus, the right side of the table should contain no variation—all entries should be 100 percent. In contrast, the left side of the table contains cross-pressured voters. Hypotheses 7 and 8 specify that support for one's own party should decrease as we follow the columns downward and the rows leftward. To take account of the suppressed partisanship dimension, party loyalty in every cell of the table's left side should increase as partisanship increases (the right side entries, of course, should stay constant at 100 percent).

Recent election surveys conducted by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies include questions about party identification, perceived closeness of the election, and perceived most important issues. Thus, the raw materials for a rough test of the

hybrid model exist. In this section I will report some preliminary results, although they are not as conclusive as I would like.[20]

Because of the limited number of cases I have collapsed perceptions of closeness of the election into two categories: close, not close.[21] Similarly, I have collapsed the measure of the party differential into five categories: strongly unfavorable to one's own party, moderately unfavorable, neutral, moderately favorable, strongly favorable.[22] Finally, because the hypotheses about the party differential and closeness of the election seem more crucial to the model than hypotheses about partisanship (which political scientists have studied intensively), I have not differentiated strength of partisanship. The analysis considers together all those classified as strong, weak or independent Democrats, and only differentiates them from the strong, weak and independent Republicans.

Given all these compromises one can create an empirical table with a rough correspondence to Table 1, namely Table 2.

Table 2 shows a reasonably close correspondence to our preference predictions, at least for everyone except 1964 Republicans. The prediction of a dominant strategy (rightmost two columns) fares rather well. Among 1964 Democrats, for example, 98 percent who gave their candidate *any* issue advantage favored Johnson. In general, more than 95 percent of those partisans who gave their party a strong issue advantage expressed a preference for their

[20] The data analyzed in the table were made available by the inter-university consortium for political research. The data were originally collected by the SRC political behavior program. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for my interpretation of the data.

[21] Respondents' perceptions of closeness of the election are coded into four main categories ranging from landslide to tie. I have collapsed these categories into not close (win by landslide, or win by quite a lot) and close (win by a little, even). I assume that p tends to be lower for the first category of respondents.

[22] The party differential is constructed from the "What do you think is the first (second, third) most important problem facing the country today?" questions. Answers are assigned scores of 3, 2, 1, weighted by the respondent's degree of concern over the issue, then assigned a polarity according to which party can best handle the problem. The neutral category includes both those who have no explicit issue concerns and those for whom pro-Republican and pro-Democratic perceptions balance out. Future analyses might try differentiating between the two classes of neutrals. Cf. Footnote 15.

TABLE 2

PERCENT FAVORING OWN PARTY OVER OPPOSITION, 1964, 1960

	Party Differential			
	Unfavorable*	Neutral	Favorable	Strongly Favorable
Democrats 1964				
Not Close	66%	92%	98%	100%
	(32)	(123)	(207)	(49)
Close	37	90	95	100
	(54)	(106)	(154)	(33)
Republicans 1964				
Not Close	14	21	65	92
	(42)	(33)	(40)	(24)
Close	17	48	77	94
	(23)	(22)	(57)	(64)
Democrats 1960				
Not Close	36	69	67	94
	(22)	(35)	(18)	(35)
Close	18	66	77	92
	(60)	(152)	(184)	(213)
Republicans 1960				
Not Close	81	100	90	100
	(16)	(24)	(20)	(23)
Close	69	82	97	98
	(29)	(123)	(152)	(159)

* Cross-pressured categories collapsed because of dearth of cases.

own candidate. Thus, a dominant strategy premised only on party identification and the issues (*not* candidate qualities) predicts rather well.

Turning now to the cross-pressured side of the table (leftmost column) we again find the hypotheses of the model performing well. In conformance with Hypothesis 7, support for one's own party candidate declines sharply when the party differential favors the opposition. More impressively, the rather novel Hypothesis 8 also finds support in the data. Cross-pressured citizens were more inclined to desert their party if they believed the election was close than if otherwise. The number of cross-pressured citizens is small, but the differences predicted by Hypothesis 8 appear in

three of four cases. Differences in the predicted direction of 29 percent, 18 percent, and 12 percent contrast with a 3 percent difference not in the predicted direction. Given the original and unexpected quality of this hypothesis, the data are somewhat encouraging.

In sum, there is nothing in the data which would lead one to reject the candidate choice predictions of the model, despite the fact that the model does not explicitly include candidate personalities or personal qualifications.[23]

Turnout Predictions

Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the predicted turnout patterns of loyal and disloyal partisans respectively.

TABLE 3

PERCENT VOTING AMONG LOYAL PARTISANS
(THEORETICAL)



Consider Table 3. The right side of the table contains the consistent citizens for whom the traditional predictions hold. Turnout increases with size of the party differential and perceived closeness of the election (Hypotheses 3 and 4). The left side of the table contains loyal cross-pressured partisans. For them the *opposites* of the traditional predictions hold. Turnout should *decrease* as perceived closeness of the election increases and as the party differential increases.

[23] On the importance of candidate qualities in Presidential elections see Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966), 19-28.

TABLE 4

PERCENT VOTING AMONG DISLOYAL PARTISANS
(THEORETICAL)



Table 4 contains the *disloyal* partisans. From Hypothesis 1 (largely verified above) we expect no cases on the right side of the table: none of the consistent citizens should be disloyal. On the left side we have the disloyal cross-pressured citizens. For them, turnout increases as the party differential increases and as their perceived closeness of the election increases (Hypotheses 15 and 16.)

Needless to say, the crucial contrasts from the standpoint of our model are (1) that between the left and right sides of Table 3, and (2) that between the left sides of Tables 3 and 4. If the voters who fall in the left side of Table 3 truly are predictably out of synchronization with their fellow citizens elsewhere, then indeed we would be strongly encouraged to continue investigating hybrid models of the type examined in this paper.

Table 5 presents the data which correspond to the theoretical predictions contained in Table 3.[24] As is evident, the results are

[24] The dependent variable in Tables 5 and 6 is the percent expressing an intention to vote among registered voters. Previous analyses have not differentiated abstention among the legally eligible from that among the legally ineligible. Unless one views the turnout and registration decisions as identical (which I do not), only abstention among the legally eligible is relevant when testing a model such as that under consideration here. Regarding the use of vote intention rather than vote report—both have weaknesses. Vote intentions overstate turnout. Vote reports are biased towards the winner. I have used vote intention because this data is collected at the same time as the data used to operationalize p and B, whereas vote reports refer to behavior occurring

ambiguous, particularly in view of the small number of cases in many cells.

TABLE 5

TURNOUT OF LOYAL PARTISANS, 1964, 1960

	Party Differential			
	Unfavorable*	Neutral	Moderately Favorable	Strongly Favorable
Democrats 1964				
Not Close	95%	89%	97%	100%
	(19)	(93)	(178)	(41)
Close	83	92	96	94
	(18)	(77)	(110)	(32)
Republicans 1964				
Not Close	100	86	100	96
	(4)	(7)	(22)	(22)
Close	100	90	100	98
	(4)	(19)	(37)	(60)
Democrats 1960				
Not Close	100	100	88	100
	(4)	(16)	(8)	(25)
Close	100	99	96	96
	(9)	(77)	(122)	(177)
Republicans 1960				
Not Close	100	77	100	100
	(9)	(17)	(16)	(23)
Close	80	96	95	98
	(20)	(89)	(127)	(142)

* Cross-pressured categories collapsed because of dearth of cases.

One immediately focuses on the leftmost column to ascertain the accuracy of H−12, that cross-pressured citizens who remain loyal to their party should be *less* likely to turn out the closer they

from 1 to 7 weeks later. In 1960, for example, a citizen interviewed in early October might not have expected the election to be as close as it was ultimately. In 1964 a voter who expected a close election when interviewed might very well have changed his expectations after seeing the final pre-election polls. In short, to use vote report as the dependent variable would require the doubtful assumption that p and B remain constant from the time of the pre-election interview to election day.

believe the election to be. Actually, the proposition does not fare too badly: it holds for 1964 Democrats and 1960 Republicans and at least is not rejected for the other two groups in which *all* of a very small number of cross-pressured voters turn out, close election or not. The effects of closeness of the election in the rest of the table are so slight and unsystematic, however, that one hesitates to put too much stock in the tentative corroboration of H−12.

As for the other hypotheses, H−3 tends to hold: turnout increases as one moves from a neutral party differential to one favorable to one's party. The evidence for H−11, however, is mixed, tending toward the unfavorable: in five to eight rows loyalists are more likely to turn out even if the party differential moves from neutral to unfavorable, contrary to the hypothesis. And, as mentioned, H−4, the traditional closeness prediction, is neither confirmed nor accepted.

For the disloyalists the evidence is again ambiguous. Table 6 contains the data which correspond to the theoretical predictions in Table 4. In this table the party groups are combined because of the few cases available for analysis. Evidently, this table tells us little one way or the other.

TABLE 6

TURNOUT OF DISLOYALISTS, 1964, 1960

	Party Differential	
	Unfavorable	Neutral
1964		
Not Close	100%	92
	(38)	(24)
Close	90	92
	(30)	(25)
1960		
Not Close	93	33
	(14)	(3)
Close	97	94
	(31)	(31)

On the whole these preliminary cross-tabulations are not conclusive for or against the turnout part of the model, although the slight glimmer of support for H−12 is encouraging. I am hopeful

that more extensive analysis of more data sets may yield a clearer picture. Even this preliminary analysis raises a few points, however.

First, the candidate choice predictions appear to fit the data better than the turnout predictions. Perhaps this is simply a function of noise canceling out with more cases, but it also raises an important question. Perhaps the candidate choice and turnout decisions are two separate processes rather than one, in contrast to the typical assumption of decision theoretic voting models. Perhaps a citizen does decide to vote on the basis of such non-instrumental factors as citizen duty, but then chooses a candidate on relatively more instrumental grounds. Such a bifurcated decision process is less elegant theoretically than a unified one, but given the data we must keep an open mind.

Another point worth noting is the extremely high (intended) turnout rate which prevails among registered voters who express a candidate preference. Tables 5 and 6 simply do not contain much variance to explain. Empirically, intentional abstention among eligible voters appears to be a rare form of political behavior. Now, given reasonable estimates of p, the expected party differential for most people should be trivial compared to various expressive factors such as citizen duty and party loyalty. Thus, the real power in a theory of turnout must lie in these expressive factors. Expressive rewards might become relatively less important as p rises; for example, in low turnout local elections the basic expected utility model *sans* expressive terms should work better than it does on the presidential level.[25] But at any level, expressive factors probably dominate instrumental factors as an explanation of turnout.

A final implication of the high turnout rates among the registered is that the *primary* explanation for voting participation must be pushed back at least to the registration decision. Of course, this is not a new argument—Stanley Kelley and his colleagues nicely

[25] In comparing gubernatorial and presidential elections Hinckley, Hofstetter and Kessel find party identification to be more important than issues and candidate qualifications in presidential elections, while the opposite is true for gubernatorial elections. See Barbara Hinckley, Richard Hofstetter and John Kessel, "Attitudes and the Vote in Subpresidential Elections," forthcoming, *American Politics Quarterly.*

demonstrated it years ago—but it has received too little emphasis.[26]

Some Theoretical Connections

The kind of hybrid model described in the preceding section has the potential to create relationships among several heretofore distinct areas of research on voting behavior. The model represents a convergence of two strands of theory: the rational calculation theory common to economics and the cross-pressure, stress-reduction theory common to psychology. Let me elaborate.

Take the cross-pressured citizen, one whose party identification is inconsistent with his estimated party differential. Such situations do not trouble economists; one simply adds up the positives and negatives and takes the net. As mentioned, however, psychologists differentiate such decision contexts from those in which all relevant factors point in the same direction. According to some psychologists, inconsistent decision contexts produce (unpleasant) psychic stress which the decision maker attempts to alleviate by various mechanisms.[27] In the case of the voting decision these mechanisms include eliminating the conflict by changing one's party identification, one's party differential (or both), or withdrawing from the conflict by losing interest in the election, and ultimately failing to participate.[28]

Obviously, the model discussed in this article is set within the economics tradition. The citizens calculate expected values, maximize subjective expected utility, and pay no attention to tension reduction. Yet several of the predictions of the model would not be altogether unfamiliar to researchers working within the psychological paradigm, because surprising kinds of interactions occur. We find that for some cross-pressured citizens an increasing probability that they will decide the election makes them less likely to turn out, whereas their non cross-pressured neighbors are stirred

[26] Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard Ayers, and William Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967), 359-379.

[27] For a survey of such models see Roger Brown, "Models of Attitude Change," in *New Directions in Psychology,* Roger Brown et al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 1-86. For an excellent critique and reformulation of such models see Peter Sperlich, *Conflict and Harmony in Human affairs* (New York: Rand McNally, 1973).

[28] See Sperlich for elaboration.

to greater turnout levels (cf. H−4 and H−12). Interestingly, however, if a citizen is sufficiently cross-pressured to desert his party preference, he behaves similarly to the non cross-pressured citizen (cf. H−4 and H−16).

Thus, not only might hybrid economic models incorporate the kinds of hypotheses derived from vastly different models, the hybrid models might even improve on such hypotheses by specifying more precisely the conditions under which they hold. For example, the hybrid model specifies that the loyal and disloyal (condition 5) cross-pressured citizens behave completely differently, whereas heretofore, their behavior has been lumped together and examined simply as the behavior of the cross-pressured.[29] I might add that other, more elaborate hybrid models I have examined illustrate similar phenomena only with greater complexity: classes, subclasses and their accompanying behavior patterns proliferate.[30] In short, the hybrid models present a clear opportunity for disciplinary cross-fertilization, or indeed, paradigm cross-fertilization.

Of course, some unresolved theoretical questions remain. First, we know little about the relationship (which surely exists) between various expressive factors, party identification in particular and the party differential. Simply treating them as functionally independent (as I have done) no doubt ignores an interesting chunk of the voting decision. Second, much recent research finds a significant role for issues in explaining recent electoral behavior. Yet it is difficult to find any great impact of closeness of the election. Does the party differential enter the voting decision without being discounted for a citizen's personal impact on the outcome?[31] Should we abandon all instrumental variables and focus exclusively on the expressive aspects of voting?

In sum, although hybrid voting models present an opportunity to merge the deductive power of economic models and the empirical richness of political science research, there remain important

[29] E.g., Boyd, "An Explanation of Voting Defection."

[30] In a model which includes both party identification and retrospective voting, for example, there are eight classes of voters, six of which bifurcate into subclasses. This model produces 76 predictions over the eight classes of citizens.

[31] For a model which considers this possibility see John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 69 (1974), 525-536.

theoretical questions for which we have no good answers. But by continuing to build models and confront them with data we can hope to progress, both by accepting some ideas and by burying others.