

The Wartime Origins of Postwar Democratization:
Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes

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ABSTRACT

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Despite widespread depiction of civil war as a pathway to autocracy or state failure, the empirical record shows significant variation in post-civil war states' regime trajectories. While some states settled into durable authoritarianism, others went on to enter the ranks of electoral democracies shortly after belligerents laid down their arms. What explains this variation? In the extreme, how is it that a state that is staunchly autocratic at the war's outbreak can emerge from it a nascent democracy?

This study proposes that post-civil war regime outcomes have *wartime* origins. Differences in the nature of rebel governance of civilians generate different social and institutional legacies across civil wars. These legacies can endure into peacetime politics, affecting the latter in often unintended ways. The theory centers on two wartime transformations that result from different forms of rebel governance. First, where rebels depend heavily on civilian material support, civilians become mobilized as a political force. Widespread social mobilization can in turn create political pressures on postwar elites to respond with a democratization strategy. Second, where rebel groups engage in extensive wartime "statebuilding," they create formal and informal institutions of governance which they can carry over into postwar politics should they prevail in the war. Because institutions are sticky, how they govern civilians in times of war can affect how they will govern in times of peace.

These arguments are tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. An original cross-national dataset on rebel governance for all civil wars ending between 1950 and 2006 serves as the basis, first, for a novel empirical analysis of rebel governance in civil war, then for statistical tests of the theory. To further probe the theory's causal claims, the study engages in an in-depth analysis of the Nepalese civil war and its political aftermath based on field interviews. The theory is further tested in a comparative analysis of the Ugandan, Tajik, and Mozambican civil wars. Together, empirical findings show that rebel governance in civil war can catalyze significant social and political change, with enduring impacts on postwar political regimes. The study offers theoretical and practical implications for our understanding of, and response to, the politics of violent rebellion and its effects on regime development.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADFL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance) (El Salvador)
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army (Papua New Guinea)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPN-M	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
DP	Democratic Party (Uganda)
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
ERP	Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Workers' Revolutionary Party) (Argentina)
FARF	Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (Armed Forces for a Federal Republic) (Chad)
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) (Algeria)
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Angola)
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) (El Salvador)
FNLC	Front for the National Liberation of the Congo
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FROLINAT	Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (National Liberation Front of Chad)
FRUD	Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy) (Djibouti)
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) (Nicaragua)

FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)
FUNK	Front Uni National du Kampuchéa (National United Front of Kampuchea) (Cambodia)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) (Indonesia)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group) (Algeria)
GNR	Government of National Reconciliation (Tajikistan)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IRP	Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan)
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) (Sri Lanka)
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq)
KDPI	Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Iran)
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDJT	Mouvement pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)
MFDC	Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) (Senegal)
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) (Bolivia)
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Pakistan)
NGO	Non-governmental organization

NLF	National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NRC	National Resistance Committee (Uganda)
NRM	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
OLS	Ordinary least squares
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) (Indonesia)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samit (United People's Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts) (Bangladesh)
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PFT	People's Front of Tajikistan
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey)
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Morocco/Western Sahara)
PRRI	Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)
RC	Resistance Council (Uganda)
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)
SIP	Scalar Index of Politics

SNM	Somali National Movement
SPA	Seven Party Alliance (Nepal)
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization (Namibia)
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
UML	Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist
UN	United Nations
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNLF	Uganda National Liberation Front
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNTOP	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
UTO	United Tajik Opposition
VIF	Variance inflation factor
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Can civil war give rise to democracy? On the face of it, this seems an implausible proposition. Much of the academic and popular literature in recent years has emphasized the destructive force of civil conflict on all aspects of state and society: it can incite human rights and humanitarian atrocities, destroy institutions and infrastructure, drain the economy, unravel social networks, threaten regime survival, inundate countries with small arms, encourage extremism, and breed fear and mistrust; such consequences appear directly inimical to the conditions needed for the emergence of a democratic state. Indeed, conventional wisdom holds that civil war tends to prod already unstable states down the path to “state failure,” creating serious security concerns not only for citizens within those states but also for the region and even the world (see e.g. Helman, 1992/1993; Rotberg 2002; Krasner and Pascual 2005; Patrick 2006). The enormity of the challenges that now confront countries such as Haiti, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and Iraq lend credence to these claims, so that to speak of democratization in the face of civil strife does seem far-fetched, if not outright naïve.

And yet, even a cursory survey of the dozens of states that have experienced civil war since 1950 shows that there is a remarkable variation in the fates of these states following conflict. While some became “trapped” in a seemingly intractable cycle of war and state weakness, others settled into relatively stable authoritarianism with varying degrees of political openness, and still others went on to enter the ranks of electoral democracies just shortly after belligerents laid down their arms. What explains this

variation in post-civil war regime outcomes? In the extreme, how is it that a state that is staunchly autocratic as it enters into a civil war can emerge from it a nascent democracy?

The aim of this study is to explain the variation in political regime outcomes in the aftermath of civil war. It is motivated by both theoretical and practical insights. In the past two decades, scholars have devoted significant attention to the causes and resolution of violent conflict, making major contributions to our understanding of the determinants of durable peace. However, existing studies rarely examine what *kind* of peace might emerge from civil war; the predominant concern has been the maintenance of peace, democratic or otherwise. Yet, we know there are vast differences between a democratic peace and an autocratic peace after civil war, with implications for domestic and international security. Meanwhile, the promotion of democracy in war-torn states by the United Nations, the United States, and other international actors has been a prominent feature of international politics since the end of the Cold War. There is thus a need to develop theoretical and empirical bases for understanding when, why, and how civil war paves the way to democratization, with or without external intervention.

Furthermore, to the extent that studies have examined post-civil war political regimes, they have done so largely from an interventionist angle. By this, I mean that discussions have disproportionately focused on evaluating the effectiveness, capacity, strategies, and political will of external actors who intervened in war-torn states with the aim of establishing peace and democracy.¹ While this literature has offered useful analyses, incisive critiques, and practical ways forward for actors like the United States and the UN in an era of “new interventionism,” it tended to sideline the most important

¹ See, e.g. Chesterman (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Paris (2004); Marten (2004); Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002).

actors in the narrative of post-civil war politics: the state's leaders, other domestic political actors, and ordinary citizens. There are at least two consequences. First, although we now have a better understanding of the challenges and dilemmas confronting international actors intervening in post-conflict states, the goals and preferences of domestic actors remain relatively little understood. And second, we have few theoretical tools with which to think about the counterfactual of how these states would fare without external interventions. The presumption that they will fail or consolidate into dictatorships remain, for the most part, a presumption, yet to be systematically tested.

This study departs from the familiar approach of focusing on international interventions or on the terms and implementation of peace settlements to explain post-civil war democratization. The "post-conflict" setting is not an institutional tabula rasa in which actors, whether domestic or international, can realize their vision of a new state from scratch. Rather, legacies of past events linger to shape the postwar context. Understanding how postwar regimes form requires revisiting the war itself and examining how it affected political structures and political actors. Thus, a central assertion in this study is that the variation in postwar regime outcomes has wartime origins. "Post-conflict" politics is endogenous to wartime politics.

In terms of policy, ongoing debates on whether, when, and how international actors should attempt democratic statebuilding in war-torn states can be greatly informed by a deeper understanding of the domestic politics of the civil war. A study of how the state, rebels, and civilians interact and change through the experience of a civil war is, in a simplified sense, a study of the lay of the land. Only when we have a better picture of the lay of the land can we even begin to discuss appropriate policy responses.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides an empirical basis for the central puzzle of this study. The following section summarizes the study's core arguments. The chapter then turns to a brief description of the research design before providing an overview of the chapters to come.

PATTERNS OF CIVIL WAR AND REGIME CHANGE

How have states' political regimes been affected by the occurrence of a civil war historically? Just how common is postwar democratization? One way to answer these questions is to use a quantitative measure of political regimes to discern any patterns in civil war and regime change across a set of cases. The Polity IV index provides an annual measure of political regimes on a scale from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic) for all states in the international system.² In Figure 1.1, states that emerged from civil war between 1950 and 2006 (127 cases in all)³ are broken down into those that saw regime *score increases* from before to after the war; those that saw *no score changes*; and those that saw *score decreases* from before to after the war. Prewar scores are measured just prior to the start of the war,⁴ while postwar scores are measured at 3, 5, 10, and 15 years after the war.

As the graph shows, not only is there a variation in how regimes changed (or did not change) through the experience of a civil war; the majority of states saw score *increases*, regardless of which of the postwar measuring points are used. That is, over

² On Polity IV, see Marshall and Jaggers (2005).

³ Missing observations in Polity make the actual number of cases slightly lower, as indicated on the graphs.

⁴ More specifically, for each state I use the average of the scores from the three years prior to the start of the war. On this and other coding details used in this project, see Chapter 3 and 4.

half of the states emerging from civil war displayed more democratic qualities *after* the war than they did just prior to the war.⁵

To omit the cases with negligible score changes, we might use a more stringent categorization that requires a greater score change to count as a move toward democracy or autocracy. This is done in Figure 1.2, which breaks the states down into those that saw at least a three-point increase in the regime score from before to after the war, those that saw less than a three-point change, and those that saw at least a three-point decrease. As shown, the proportion of states that saw little (i.e. less than a three-point) change from before to after the war increases with this breakdown. Nevertheless, over one third of the cases were at least three points more democratic in the war's aftermath than they were before the war. In contrast, only 16 to 24 percent of the cases saw moves toward autocracy. This pattern continues to hold using a five-point-change breakdown: 27 to 31 percent of the cases saw moves toward democracy as compared to 10 to 19 percent moving toward autocracy. Finally, in Figure 1.3 histograms of the prewar to postwar regime score changes at 3, 5, 10, and 15 years out show greater densities on the positive half of the regime change spectrum than on the negative half in each of the four graphs.

The evidence above clearly points to two empirical observations: 1) civil war and democratization have often come hand in hand; many states have in fact emerged from civil war more democratic than they were before the war; and 2) there is a variation in how political regimes change through the experience of civil war; some democratize, some autocratize, and some exhibit little change in their regime type, at least going by Polity scores. To be clear, the evidence does *not* show that states become full-blown

⁵ See also Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) who make the same observation, also based on Polity scores.

democracies by the hordes following a civil war. For instance, even among those making the greatest pre- to postwar leaps in regime scores, states such as Mozambique, Mali, and El Salvador bore a closer resemblance to “hybrid” regimes in the war’s aftermath than to mature democracies.⁶ Nevertheless, the evidence shows that a significant proportion of states that experienced the “chaos” and “anarchy” of civil war has historically democratized through the experience. Civil war has not incontrovertibly been a precursor to autocracy and state failure.

Can the puzzle be explained away by international peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions? After all, since the end of the Cold War the UN and other international actors have fielded expansive peace operations aimed specifically at bringing democratic order to war-torn states. In the well-known cases of Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were tasked not only with keeping the peace, but also with reforming the executive, legislature, police force, courts, legal systems and other state institutions in accordance with democratic principles, organizing elections, and providing human rights training. If these interventions account for most of the variation in postwar regimes, we would need to go no further.

Systematic analysis of the effects of peacekeeping on postwar democratization, however, shows that peacekeeping has little, if any, discernible effects on democratization when compared to cases without peacekeeping (Fortna 2008b; Fortna

⁶ Indeed, five years following the conclusion of their respective civil wars, these states each had a regime score of 5 or 6 – lower than the score of 7 or higher that is usually considered to constitute a democracy in the literature. On mixed or hybrid regimes, see Levitsky and Way (2010). On the other hand, other states that made large score leaps, such as Guatemala (+11 points), Peru (+9), and Nicaragua (+16), each had a score of 8 or higher five years into peace time.

and Huang, forthcoming).⁷ Case studies of peacekeeping are themselves pessimistic that it can help create democratic societies. For Paris (2004) only two out of eleven cases qualify as a success in terms of achieving a liberal peace, while for Sens (2004) the rate is just three out of twenty-two. Others question the very notion that democracy can be externally imposed on states torn apart by civil war, at least not with the means currently employed (Chesterman 2004; Marten 2004).⁸

Meanwhile, a longstanding argument – discussed at greater length in the following chapter – holds that there is in fact an intimate relationship between political violence and the emergence of democracy. “The history of almost all democracies has been filled with turmoil, conflict, and even violence,” writes Berman (2007: 30). In England, for instance, “without the violence and disruptions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries...the peaceful development of democracy during the nineteenth century would not have been possible” (ibid., 38). In more recent times, over half of the electoral democracies formed after 1945 emerged either in the immediate aftermath of war or as a means of bringing war to an end (Bermeo 2003). These empirical observations are consistent with the idea, running through generations of political thought, that “only popular mobilization will pave the way for the establishment of a free government” (Walzer 1980: 220). These insights suggest that something other than the post-1989 spate of peacebuilding interventions – something more germane to the conflict states themselves – is at work in generating the divergent regime trajectories among post-civil

⁷ As Fortna (2008b) shows, this is true even for “multidimensional” peacekeeping missions, the very type of mission in which peacekeepers are involved in a gamut of democratic reforms.

⁸ Furthermore, foreign aid more generally has been found to have no effect on democratization in recipient states (Knack 2004).

war states.

ARGUMENTS IN BRIEF

I make several key arguments in this study, ranging from the broad to the specific. At the broadest theoretical level, I argue that an understanding of post-civil war politics requires an understanding of wartime politics. Analysis of the immediate outcomes of the war, such as the form of war termination, terms of a political settlement, or the presence or absence of third-party interventions, while important, provides an insufficient account of the type of political regime that emerges after civil war. Warfare generates political, social, and institutional legacies that can affect peacetime politics, making the political context in the war's wake endogenous to the war itself.

Second, post-civil war regimes have their origins in the business of war-making conducted by rebel groups. As armed actors who seek to overturn the status quo, rebel groups must not only recruit fighters but also secure war-fighting resources. Some groups may have ready access to external patrons, natural resources, remittances, contraband, and the like; others, in the absence of such funding options, may need to wage political campaigns locally to attract supporters. Depending on how rebels "fundraise," their relations with civilian populations will differ. This creates a variation in what I refer to as *rebel governance* – a political strategy of rebellion in which rebels forge and manage relations with civilians – across civil wars. The manner in which rebel groups secure their war resources therefore affects not only the state that is attempting to quash the rebellion, but also civilian populations, first in the areas where the rebels operate, and later, more widely. In short, rebel governance can affect state-society

relations. The nature of state-society relations, in turn, is what fundamentally characterizes a political regime.

Finally, and specifically, I argue that democratization is more likely to follow wars in which the rebels rely heavily on civilians for survival. Conversely, wars in which the rebels have ample funds from foreign supporters, natural resource rents, or other sources are less likely to lead to democratization. When rebels extract widely from civilians for wartime resources, a significant social change takes place: civilians become politically mobilized. Participation in the rebellion, whether voluntary or coerced, provides civilians with new information on their political rights, on ways the state is purportedly impinging on those rights, and on the availability of alternatives to the status quo; it also makes those alternatives appear to be within reach, creating expectations of radical breaks with the autocratic past in a new postwar regime. This mass mobilization places significant pressures on postwar political elites to cater to the bottom-up demands in order to ensure regime survival. In contrast, where rebels have non-civilian resources for war-making, civilians remain relatively untapped as a wartime resource (though they will certainly be affected by the politics and violence of the war). In this case, the end of the conflict is unlikely to be accompanied by significant mobilization from below, making autocratic reinforcement less costly for postwar political elites. I call this the *civilian mobilization hypothesis*.

I also develop and test an alternative argument for why rebel dependence on civilians might be linked to postwar democratization. While the civilian mobilization hypothesis centers on the effects of rebel war-making on civilians, the *rebel statebuilding hypothesis* focuses on the rebels themselves as possible future political elites. Among

rebel groups that come to depend on civilians for survival, many will develop wartime “governance” institutions both to legitimate their authority and to regularize resource extraction from civilians. In effect, they may be building a microcosm of a social contractual governance system in the midst of warfare. The hypothesis posits that should these “statebuilding” rebels prevail in the war, they will build on the wartime experience and continue to engage in democratic governance in the postwar period. I find no support for this argument, however, which suggests that rebel statebuilding is more an exercise in violent coercion and less a benevolent social contract between the rebel governors and the governed. Rebel governance may equip the rebels to build stronger states in the war’s aftermath, but strong states can be as conducive to authoritarianism as they can be to democratic systems.

These arguments are inspired by, and build on, a confluence of ideas in international relations, comparative politics, and political sociology. Rebel war-making and postwar democratization are two concepts that are relatively distant in both time *and* substance. As such, connecting them requires a correspondingly wider array of building-block theories than would be the case with a more causally proximate set of independent and dependent variables. But the connection, far from being forced, has long existed in various branches of political science scholarship. An additional aim of this study is therefore to synthesize these disparate bodies of research in developing a theory of post-civil war democratization.

RESEARCH DESIGN

I use both quantitative and qualitative analysis to test the proposition that the variation in postwar regime outcomes can be explained by how rebel groups make war. Each type of analysis serves important purposes. Statistical analysis helps to establish evidence of a correlation between rebel governance and postwar democratization. This itself is not as straightforward a task as it might first appear. First, there was no ready-made dataset on rebel governance I could take off a shelf and input into a software. I therefore gathered my own data, which, as it turned out, entailed one year of full-time reading of the cases in search of details on rebel activity. The result is a dataset on rebel income sources and rebel institution-building for all civil wars ending between 1950 and 2006.

Second, since rebel governance itself has, at least until recently, received relatively little scholarly attention, it was worth taking this new dataset “out for a drive,” as it were, before using it in regression analysis. For a rigorous statistical test of my hypotheses, furthermore, this was more than an intellectual detour: understanding rebel governance is essential for testing its causal effects on postwar regimes. The quantitative test of the theory is therefore broken down into two parts. The first part (Chapter 3) examines rebel governance as a dependent variable, treating it as an important political phenomenon in its own right. The second (Chapter 4) uses that analysis to inform hypothesis tests on the *effects* of rebel governance on postwar democratization.

Case studies, on the other hand, are indispensable for testing the causal story that is at the heart of my theory. Causal mechanisms are processes that convert inputs to outputs. There is nothing mechanistic about these mechanisms, however. The link between rebel governance and postwar regimes, rather, is formed by human action. Case

studies bring human actors into the narrative and allow for a test of the actual processes that underlie the hypotheses. I examine four cases in depth; each was carefully chosen to maximize inferential leverage. The first is the 1996-2006 civil war in Nepal. This case contains all of the “inputs” and “outputs” of interest: the Maoist rebels relied heavily on civilians for resources, and also established their own governance institutions in the territories under their control; the postwar period has also seen significant democratization. The case is therefore ideal for testing the causal story that purports to link these inputs and outputs. To gather the micro-level evidence needed to for process-tracing, I conducted six weeks of field interviews and consulted existing sources.

Uganda’s war against the National Resistance Army, Tajikistan’s war against reformist opposition groups, and Mozambique’s war against Renamo constitute the remaining cases. Uganda is often referenced as an exemplary case of rebel statebuilding leading to democratization. I thus use the case to conduct a “hard” test of the civilian mobilization hypothesis. Was bottom-up mobilization epiphenomenal in this case, given the prominence of rebel statebuilding? Tajikistan represents a “negative” case: the war paved the way not to democratization, but to autocratic reinforcement. If the theory is correct, this outcome should correspond with relatively little rebel reliance on civilians and hence few pressures on postwar elites to pursue democratization. Finally, Mozambique is a “deviant” case in that my theory would not predict postwar democratization, but that is in fact what occurred. Why was this so, and in what ways, if any, did the legacies of the war affect postwar politics? I use the secondary literature to explore these questions. The aim is both to test the hypotheses on the effects of rebel governance on the postwar regime for each case, and to comparatively examine the

differential inputs and outputs across the cases. Collectively, the case studies comprise an important counterpart to the statistical analysis and offer further evidence with which to evaluate the strength of the theory.

DISSERTATION OVERVIEW

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 situates this project among existing scholarly works and presents the study's theory and hypotheses. It first engages in a fairly extensive review of several distinct but related research streams in international relations, comparative politics, and political sociology. I do so, first, to nestle this study among existing scholarship and to highlight the study's unique contributions; and second, to show how disparate strands of research from the various subfields of political science in fact rather coherently speak to each other on the question of post-civil war democratization. I argue for the profitability of drawing on an eclectic amalgamation of theories. Additionally, I show that both structural conditions that prevail at the end of the war, as well as the interests of specific state and social actors, matter in the formation of post-civil war regimes. I then lay out the civilian mobilization hypothesis and the rebel statebuilding hypothesis in full.

Rather than dive straight into statistical tests of the hypotheses, I first examine the study's main explanatory concept, rebel governance, in greater detail in Chapter 3. Since rebel governance itself remains understudied, it is worth devoting a chapter to an empirical exploration of the phenomenon before using it as an independent variable in Chapter 4. The chapter also serves an additional important purpose. This study uses rebel governance to account for the variation in post-civil war regimes, and yet rebel

governance is not exogenous. Rather, it is related to features of the civil war that may in turn be related to postwar regimes. Thus, the empirical analysis serves to address the endogeneity issue head-on. The chapter first presents the new cross-national dataset on rebel governance, detailing not only the variables contained therein, but also some of the challenges of constructing a dataset of this sort. I then turn to examining some of the empirical nuts and bolts of rebel governance. What are the most common sources of funding for rebel groups? How common is rebel statebuilding? How many rebels established their own tax systems or courts? How many instituted popular elections during war time? Are rebel groups that depend on civilians more likely to engage in institution-building? Descriptive and statistical analysis using the dataset provides preliminary answers to these questions. By shedding light on the determinants of rebel governance, it also sets the stage for the analysis in the following chapter. Chapter 4 then puts the civilian mobilization and rebel statebuilding hypotheses to a series of statistical tests.

Tests of the hypotheses continue through qualitative case studies in Chapter 5 and 6. Chapter 5 is devoted to the case of Nepal. Through new and existing documentation of the country's 1996-2006 civil war, I trace the causal process from rebel governance to post-civil war democratization. I find significant evidence to support the civilian mobilization hypothesis; on the other hand, I find that post-civil war democratization took place despite the notable absence of any direct effect of rebel statebuilding on post-civil war politics.

Chapter 6 examines the cases of Uganda, Tajikistan, and Mozambique. I find that Yoweri Museveni's policies in postwar Uganda poses a challenge to the rebel

statebuilding model despite the fact that this case is often used as a foremost example of the model at work. Meanwhile, civilian mobilization played more than a marginal role in shaping the postwar regime. In the case of Tajikistan, the rebels displayed little interest in wartime governance. Although the rebels initially launched a war in the name of political liberalization, the war quickly turned into one of factionalized clan-based violence. Following the war, in the absence of popular mobilization state elites were able to create a “super-presidential autocracy” at little political cost. Finally, in Mozambique, I show that the heavy international intervention in the transition from war to peace completely overrode any effect of rebel governance. Furthermore, the intervention itself was a path-dependent effect of a war that had been designed, implemented, and financed overwhelmingly by external actors on the side of both the government and the rebels. The dominance of external actors in both war time and peace time has left a distinct mark on Mozambique’s postwar regime trajectory.

Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the findings, a discussion of the study’s implications for both theory and policy, and suggestions on ways forward for future research.

CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX




Figure 1.1. Prewar to Postwar Changes in Polity Scores




Figure 1.2. Prewar to Postwar Changes in Polity Scores (Minimum 3-Point Change)




Figure 1.3. Histograms of Prewar to Postwar Changes in Polity Scores

CHAPTER 2

REBEL GOVERNANCE, WAR LEGACIES, AND POSTWAR DEMOCRATIZATION: A THEORY

When do states emerging from civil war enter the path toward democracy? When do they instead become authoritarian? What explains the divergence in political regime trajectories among post-civil war states? The search for the causes of democracy and autocracy has a long and venerable pedigree in political science, and lively debates on the issue continue along various theoretical lines. The question of democratization in the specific context of post-civil war states, however, takes on a new urgency at this point in our historical and scholarly development due to a peculiar convergence of phenomena in the realms of knowledge, ideas, and practice. In terms of *knowledge*, a large corpus of research has examined what factors allow the elusive peace to stick and endure after violent internal conflict. Some of these factors, such as peacekeeping, could be directly translated into domestic or international security policy. At the same time, there has been a recognition that not all peace is created equal; that more than the mere absence of war, what is of normative importance in these fragile states is that there be a peace in which citizens enjoy basic political and socioeconomic rights (and thus we enter the realm of *ideas*). Aside from the security implications of different types of internal peace, this emphasis on rights, liberties, and democratic governance has emerged as part of a broader post-WWII, largely Western normative discourse on human rights. Systematic research that goes beyond the examination of the durability of peace to explore the determinants of specific types of peace, however, remains as yet under-developed. Finally, in the domain of *practice*, the past two decades have seen a series of large-scale international interventions in conflict and post-conflict states. These interventions aimed not only at

keeping the peace, but also at building stable and democratic institutions – such institutions were believed to be crucial for solidifying the peace, and also deemed valuable in their own right. However, academics and policymakers continue to debate the fruitfulness of these interventions from both instrumental and normative standpoints. Remarkably, even in the absence of international interventions leaders in post-conflict states have often chosen to hold multiparty elections and invite external election monitors, seeing that there are certain benefits to be reaped by creating at least the trappings, if not the genuine institutions, of democracy. In short, international policy and practice have moved ahead of knowledge, making research on the question of postwar democratization more than simply an academic exercise. Meanwhile, as I discuss in detail below, academic research is for its own theoretical and empirical reasons ripe for studies on this subject.

In this project, I bring the search for the determinants of postwar democratization to wartime dynamics. *Postwar* regime developments have *wartime* origins. Specifically, I examine the variation in the business of war-making among rebel groups, and how this variation affects civilian populations. All rebel groups need resources in order to wage war against the state. Some groups come to rely heavily on civilians for the needed materiel while others draw primarily on foreign funding, natural resource rents, or other sources to fund their anti-regime campaigns. Rebel reliance on civilians, I posit, generates an impetus for democratization because it mobilizes the masses to make contentious claims against the state. In turn, postwar power-holders have incentives to cater to their demands as a means of maintaining their positions of power, and they do so through a strategy of measured political liberalization. The transition from war to peace

marks a definitive break on many fronts, but the repercussions of civilian mobilization are among the wartime legacies that are carried over into peacetime politics, affecting the latter in unintended ways. Thus, the main actors in this theory are, first, the rebel groups that challenge the state; second, the postwar political elites; and third, the citizens, who are the critical transmitters of the causal effects of rebel war-making on postwar politics.

Why the focus on rebels and civilians? As the size of the literature attests, democratization is a complex process with many purported causes, preconditions, triggers, and obstacles. Lebow (2000: 558) cautions that “in retrospect, almost any outcome can be squared with any theory unless the theory is rigorously specified,” and this rings all the more true for complex and multi-dimensional outcomes like democratization. The focus on the role of civilians in rebel war-making is not the result of an ad hoc search for a new causal variable with which to explain a phenomenon for which there is already a long list of candidate causes. As I argue below, distinct strands of literature in political science have long suggested an important relationship between civilian mass mobilization, conflict, and regime change. My theory in a sense amalgamates these scattered ideas from various branches of the discipline into a theory of democratization in the specific post-civil war context, and thus explicitly builds on the existing state of knowledge. Thus, one aim of this project is to show the ways in which relatively self-contained theories and findings from international relations, comparative politics, and political sociology connect with and in fact rather coherently speak to each other on this subject. Given that my theory straddles the micropolitics of rebellion, civil war dynamics and outcomes, and regime change, the theoretical eclecticism involved should in fact be anticipated.

In this chapter, I first review the literature relevant to the question of democratization after civil war. This review of existing works is important not only for highlighting research gaps, but also because the present work builds directly on existing theories. I then present the theory and hypotheses. While the overarching theory centers on the causal effects of rebel governance of civilians, I develop two hypotheses pertaining to two different mechanisms through which rebel governance may affect postwar regimes. The first hypothesis stresses the impact of rebel war-making strategies on civilians, while the second focuses on the ways in which rebel reliance on civilians changes the rebels themselves as they turn into “governors” of the territories and people that come under their control. In each, I focus on identifying the *processes* through which rebel-civilian relations during the war affect postwar political regimes. Finally, I consider alternative arguments that may also account for the variation in postwar regime outcomes.

CIVIL WAR AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THEORIES, DEBATES, AND ACTORS

Observers and theorists have long proposed the notion that war is a catalyst for fundamental change in domestic and international political systems. U.S. admiral Stephen Luce (1891: 672, 673) wrote in the late 19th century that “war is one of the greatest agencies by which human progress is effected,” and “but for war the civilization we now enjoy would have been impossible.” More recently, at the level of the international system Gilpin (1981: 15) wrote that “the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war,” with the settlement of war creating a new equilibrium that reflects the redistribution of power in the system. Huntington (1968: 123) argued

that “war was the great stimulus to state building,” as it necessitated large armies, bureaucracies and increases in state revenue. Similarly, for Tilly (1990) war-making gave rise to nothing less than the formation of modern European states. At the domestic level, Scheve and Stasavage (2010) attribute the growth of progressive taxation to the occurrence of mass warfare. Keen (2005: 297) writes that the civil war in Sierra Leone “has been an engine of change” for that country. At the individual level, Blattman (2009) finds a surprising link between wartime abduction and greater postwar political participation.

But if war brings about significant systemic, domestic, and individual change, what explains variations in the kinds of changes we see? If war disrupts the existing equilibrium, why do states reach different postwar equilibria? If war is an opportunity for citizens to dislodge the old, why are citizens successful in some cases but not in others? More specifically for the purposes of this project, given civil war occurrence why do some states’ political regimes undergo extraordinary transformations toward democracy while others remain staunchly autocratic as they emerge from civil war?

Since the outcome to be explained is democratization, a logical starting point in the search for answers is the large comparative literature on transitions to democracy. The bulk of the foundational texts in this literature emerged as the “third wave” of democratic transitions swept up much of Latin America and Southern Europe starting in the mid-1970s and through the 1980s. Directly influenced by unfolding events in its largely inductive mode of theorizing, this literature displayed two general patterns. First, scholars identified elites as the main actors, and peaceful negotiation as the main process, in the transition “game.” Successful democratic transitions resulted from bargaining,

compromise, and pacts between regime and opposition elites, or between regime “soft-liners” and “hard-liners.” The role of non-elites remained ambiguous in these theories while non-pacted transitions were deemed more likely to fail. Second, focused as it was on peaceful bargaining, this literature stressed the need to limit radical organization from below and certainly viewed violence as being detrimental to democracy. Thus according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 11), “where the *vía revolucionaria* is taken, or when violence becomes widespread and recurrent, the prospects for political democracy are drastically reduced.” Similarly, Huntington wrote (1991: 207):

The leaders of authoritarian regimes can successfully use violence to sustain their rule; their radical opponents may successfully use violence to overthrow those regimes. The former action prevents democracy from coming into being; the latter kills it at birth. Throughout history armed revolts have almost never produced democratic regimes.⁹

This literature, then, still leaves us with the puzzle with which we began. The arguments about the detrimental effect of violence sheds little light on why, empirically, many states are more democratic as they emerge from civil war than when they entered it, and why some states even make the leap from war to nascent democracy. That is, given civil war, the claim that violence between the regime and opponents augurs ill for democracy offers no explanation for the wide variation in postwar regimes types that we actually observe.

Yet, there have been important contrarian voices over the decades. These scholars accept that regime transitions are ultimately managed by elites, but argue that ordinary people, workers, and even armed groups play a far more important role in shaping elites’ decisions than prevailing theories allowed. Bermeo (1997) shows that in a

⁹ For similar remarks, see Dahl (1971: 42-44); Karl (1990: fn.3); Linz and Stepan (1996: 71-72; 108).

number of countries democratic transitions proceeded alongside widespread and sometimes violent mobilization from below. Collier and Mahoney (1997) argue that in a number of cases democratic transitions took place not despite, but in part because of, intense and sustained protests by labor movements. Examining armed insurgents in El Salvador and South Africa, Wood (2000) shows that civil war and mass-based collective action directly fed into elite calculations, eventually making democratic compromise more strategically appealing than repression. In an analysis of post-Cold War democratic experiments in Africa, Bratton and van der Walle (1997) likewise find that mass mobilization was an important precursor to liberalizing reforms. In fact, “mass political demonstrations were always accompanied by reform; there was no country in Africa in which protest occurred where incumbent elites failed to make at least a token political opening” (185). These scholars thus broadened the canonical narratives of democratization by pointing out that mass mobilization, even violent radicalization, was often critical and causally prior to elite decisions to concede democratization.

The set of historical events that most directly challenged the “dominant paradigm,”¹⁰ however, were the regime transitions in the newly independent states of the former Soviet empire in the early 1990s. While regime outcomes among these states were uneven, Bunce (2003) shows that the most successful democratic transitions all began with mass protests. Mass mobilization was in turn instrumental in creating a coherent opposition and bringing authoritarian elites to the bargaining table. As McFaul (2003: 221) puts it, it was “revolutionary transitions – the mode of transition thought to

¹⁰ Critics of the elite-centered theories of O’Donnell and Schmitter and others have referred to their collective works as “the reigning wisdom” (Bunce 2003: 170) and the “dominant paradigm” (Collier and Mahoney 1997: 285) of democratization studies.

be least likely to facilitate democratic outcomes by third-wave theorists – that have actually produced the most stable and consolidated democracies in the postcommunist world.” In what he calls the “fourth wave” that swept through this region, the confrontational tactics used by mass actors “promoted rather than impeded democratic change” (223) while elite pacts played only a minor role and produced uncertain outcomes.

Alongside these works, but working from a distinct theoretical angle, political sociologists have also long suggested a tight linkage between mass mobilization and democratization. Starting with Tilly (1978), these scholars emphasized in particular the effects of *contentious* collective action, defined broadly to include protests, riots, demonstrations, and even civil wars, on regime stability and regime change (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).¹¹ While the comparative democratization literature has on the whole neglected these contemporaneous works in the contentious politics school, the latter offers many insights into both the nature of mass movements and their effects on elite power-holders, insights that are in fact quite consistent with arguments in the former. Tilly, in particular, has repeatedly expounded the argument that domestic confrontations and revolutions “undermine self-producing systems of control” by authoritarian elites and “open up room in which ordinary people can negotiate consent to newly emerging systems of rule” (2007: 40). These ideas – of mass uprisings dislodging the old equilibrium and posing a threat to elites – are, as discussed, common themes in the separate literature in comparative politics.

¹¹ Contentious politics is more specifically defined as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 4).

The latest generation of research on democratization marks a distinctive turn from its predecessors on two fronts. First, it is assiduously deductive in its methodology. Rather than updating theories as events unfold, scholars begin with a set of rationalist assumptions, model actors' interests and available strategies, and map out the contingent regime outcomes. Second, in a conscious move away from prominent structural theories (such as modernization theory), it affords political agency a central role in explaining democratization. In these works, democratization takes place when: 1) disaffected citizens decide to actively oppose the regime, and 2) elites, threatened by popular mobilization, deem the cost of conceding democracy to be lower than the cost of suppressing the rising opposition. These rationalist accounts of regime change therefore take squarely into account both elite and non-elite interests, and formalize their strategies in game-theoretic models of regime outcomes (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Weingast 1997).

In general, the move away from specific cases has tightened the nature of the debate, away from descriptive patterns and case explorations to a discussion of the choices available to the main players within the confines of a set of given assumptions. In turn, the strength of these theories could be tested against case-based, cross-national and sub-national data. However, this literature has less to offer on the more specific question of democratization after civil war. To begin with, these studies adopt the rationalist model of war as a bargaining failure (Fearon 1995) and therefore leave war itself as something of a black box.¹² For example, Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006)

¹² For Boix (2003: 23) only the outcome of the war can reveal what form the postwar regime will take. For Weingast (1997) the political outcome of civil war should be democracy, since war allows citizens to overcome collective action problems and enforce limits on rulers' behavior. Yet since clearly not all civil wars result in the installation of democracy, his model may be

model of democratization takes civil wars and revolutions to be “off the equilibrium path” because rational actors should prefer to acquiesce to opponents’ demands than face the costly outcome of warfare. Broadly, the marginal treatment of civil war as something of an aberration in an otherwise non-violent bargaining process sheds little light on why some states democratize through civil war and others do not. In the theory I offer below I take civil war as a continuation of politics, as Clausewitz, Blainey (1973), and later Wagner (2000) would have it. Wartime political interactions between rulers, rebels, and civilians directly affect postwar regime outcomes.¹³

In another distinct strand of research, IR and civil war scholars have recently begun to engage in precisely the question at hand. Rather than drawing from the democratization literature, they have tended to be more attuned to the issue of power. Thus, the form of war termination – which is fundamentally a question of postwar power distribution – has played a prominent role in this literature. This may be a useful starting point for this young and growing body of research, but collectively, findings have been contradictory. Thus, a set of scholars argue that negotiated settlements are particularly conducive to postwar democratization compared to other outcomes, because they reflect a democratic compromise between political opponents (Gurses and Mason 2008; Joshi 2010; Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; Wood 2000).¹⁴ Others directly challenge the

capturing the pathway to but one possible outcome of civil war among others. On this, see Malhotra and Carnes (2007).

¹³ Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 357) themselves assert that “developing a better understanding of what happens in revolutions and how institutions subsequently evolve is an important topic that may generate new predictions about the creation and consolidation of democracy.”

¹⁴ Licklider (1995) and Walter (2004) similarly posit that victory by either side makes power-sharing agreements less likely, as the victor typically proceeds to consolidate power and assert full and exclusive control over the state.

prevailing wisdom on negotiated settlements and suggest instead that rebel victory is the outcome most favorable to postwar democratization. Successful rebellion requires institutional capacity, and this war-fighting capacity can later serve as an institutional basis for postwar governance following rebel victory (Toft 2010). War-fighting, in fact, can generate not just institutions, but *representative* institutions that channel the exchange of revenue for rights between rulers and the ruled (Weinstein 2005: 13). Meanwhile, Fortna and Huang (forthcoming) find that the war outcome matters less than do structural variables such as the level of economic development and state dependence on oil exports.

Underlying the focus on war outcomes is the idea that in the post-civil war setting, it is the actors who prevail in the war who can claim the wherewithal to steer postwar politics. What is less clear, however, is whether the *military* outcome of the war alone determines the *political* distribution of power in the wake of a war. If regimes are shaped by elites whose survival in turn depends on the degree of support (or threat) from the population, then it follows, for instance, that even among victors there are qualitative differences between those that win with a large civilian backing and those that win with little such support. The narrow focus on war outcomes, then, circumscribes our understanding of power dynamics at play in postwar states and provides only a partial explanation of the variation in postwar regimes.

Clearly, there remains much room for further theorizing, data collection, and analysis on the relationship between civil war dynamics and outcomes and post-civil war regimes. In particular, the foregoing discussion shows that there are significant theoretical and empirical merits in conducting a deeper dialogue between the distinct strands of literature, each of which, with little reference to the others, offers useful and

often mutually consistent insights into the determinants of postwar democratization. Regimes are shaped by an interaction of elite calculations at the top, contentious mobilization from below, the legacies of preceding institutions, and prevailing power balances. Mapping out the nature of the interaction between these disparate factors is the task of the rest of this dissertation.

Specifically, from existing knowledge in democratization studies I take note of the importance of both elite and non-elite actors in shaping regimes; from contentious politics scholars, the tight linkage between popular mobilization and democratization, and between war and statebuilding; from rational-choice and game theoretic models, the rationalist assumptions and the bargaining framework for regime change; from IR and civil war scholars, the role of the war outcome in shaping the postwar structural environment; and from comparative historical studies, the idea of path dependence and historical legacies in explaining institutional outcomes. I therefore build on and interweave existing knowledge from the comparative, contentious politics, IR, and security studies literatures to formulate a deductive theory of how different modes of rebel governance affect postwar political regimes.

While this may seem a jumbled theoretical *mélange*, there is no inherent contradiction or incompatibility between many of the theories we tend to view as alternatives. To the contrary, there are many logical linkages between these theories so that to neglect such linkages is to seriously limit our understanding of political phenomena. Thus, Lichbach (1998) urges that we synthesize rationalist agentic theories with macro-level structural theories to understand contentious politics; Weingast (2002) demonstrates the compatibility between rational-choice institutionalism and historical

institutionalism, and the benefits of uncovering the microfoundations of macropolitical change; King (2004) applauds works that “resist the monocausal temptations of research drawn from a single theoretical paradigm” and finds crucial connections between ethnic politics and contentious politics; Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point to an intimate relationship between the rationalist idea of self-interest and the constructivist idea of norms in the study of international political change; and Fioretos (2011) highlights the utility of historical institutionalism, developed by comparativists and Americanists, in studying international relations. More generally, there are intellectual gains to be had from embracing analytic eclecticism and thinking beyond traditional theoretical confines (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

This dissertation offers a theory of post-civil war democratization that focuses on the political economy of rebellion, by which I mean the politics of rebel financing and rebel governance. As it happens, the focus of this project also coincides with two explicit scholarly calls on the substantive direction of future research on civil wars. The first is a call for further studies of the internal workings of rebel groups. For Blattman and Miguel (2010: 8), among “the most interesting directions for research” are “the internal organization of armed groups” and “rebel governance of civilians.”¹⁵ This project thus follows works by Wood (2001, 2003), Kalyvas (2006), and Weinstein (2007), among others, who have prominently paved the way in this regard and have steered our attention toward the microdynamics of rebellion. Second, in making a path-dependent argument about the effects of wartime institutions and mobilization on postwar politics, this project addresses a gap in our knowledge about the lingering effects of warfare. Wood (2008)

¹⁵ See also Wood (2008); Kalyvas and Balcells (2010).

points to the “social processes of civil war,” by which she means the range of social, political, and institutional transformations that occur during war, and their enduring postwar legacies, as an under-explored research area. Blattman and Miguel (2010: 42) concur in seeing “the social and institutional legacies of conflict” as “arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts.” That new regimes are shaped by the institutional legacies of preceding regimes is hardly a new idea,¹⁶ but few studies have explored the ways in which legacies of *wartime* transformations may be carried over into peacetime politics. War destroys institutions, but it also creates new ones. Postwar actors must therefore choose their political strategies in light of these enduring social and institutional vestiges of warfare.

A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIZATION AFTER CIVIL WAR

In aiming to understand how political regimes are altered by internal warfare, I adopt a very broad definition of democratization. Conceptions of democracy have often made a distinction between its institutional, procedural, “minimalist,” or “Schumpeterian” aspects, and its more substantive or “maximalist” aspects. The former tend to focus on electoral institutions and procedures (or in Schumpeter’s own words, whether “positions of power are filled through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”) (1947: 269); the latter is more concerned with the rights and liberties a state affords its citizens.¹⁷ In this study, I conceptualize democratization loosely as a process

¹⁶ Historical institutionalists in particular have dealt with the issue of institutional legacies in depth (see Thelen 1999). For empirical explorations of the idea, see, for instance, Bratton and van der Walle (1997) on regime transitions in Africa; and Rubin and Snyder (1998) and Ekiert and Hanson (2003) on post-communist transitions.

¹⁷ On various conceptions of democracy, see, e.g. Diamond (1999) and Levitsky and Way (2010).

in which a state moves toward a system of full electoral, procedural and substantive rights, regardless of whether the move is along the procedural dimension, the substantive dimension, or along both dimensions. The extension of the franchise would thus constitute democratization, as would the granting of freedom of association, for instance. Conversely, I use the term autocratization to mean any degree of movement toward a system of limited political pluralism and limited rights, and in which the central leadership “exercises power within formally ill-defined limits” (Linz 1964: 297). This broad conceptualization is justified by the fact that the study is interested first and foremost in regime *changes* that result from civil war, rather than in identifying whether a particular state is a democracy or an autocracy following the war. A political regime, in turn, is simply “the system of relations between the civil society and the state” (Przeworski et al. 2000: 18). The aim here is to examine how, and in what ways, civil war affects that system of state-society relations.

It is not surprising that studies that directly address the question of democratization after civil war tend to converge on the war outcome as a central explanatory variable. The logic is intuitive: regimes are made through the political choices of those in power, and it is precisely those who managed to avoid defeat in civil war who can claim that power in the war’s aftermath. Having won a violent conflict, victors will proceed to amass all state authority under their control, thereby creating an authoritarian state. A “draw,” formalized in a settlement involving all sides, implies compromise, concessions, and the future sharing of power, paving the way to democratization. The losers, for their part, must relinquish all claims to state power and

either retreat into the political backwater or continue their claim-making through legal channels.

What is more surprising is the narrow conceptualization of power implicitly employed in these studies. The war's military outcome may dictate the cast of postwar power-holders, but these actors' interests and strategies will be shaped by more than the mere fact of their prevailing in war. Actors who prevail militarily get to that point through a heterogeneity of pathways, and how they rule as they emerge from war will be influenced in significant ways by these past trajectories. In accounting for postwar regimes, then, what matters is not just *who* prevailed, but also *where* they came from and *how* they got there. These particular histories shape postwar rulers' sources of power, and therefore their choices, as much as does the outcome of the war.

A fuller explanation of postwar regime variations therefore requires that we broaden our temporal and theoretical horizons. It is analytically neater and more tractable to view civil war as a "shock" that sweeps away the old, so that once the dust has settled the state starts rebuilding anew. The postwar setting, however, is not an institutional tabula rasa, no matter how destructive the war and how sweeping its political and social consequences. Even if the war ends with the toppling of the old regime, the new postwar regime does not start "from scratch;" rather, it must contend with a host of formal and informal holdover institutions. If international actors attempting to "reconstruct" postwar states have begun to grapple with this messy reality, social scientists must heed a parallel lesson at the theoretical level. The proximate causes of postwar democratization may be found in the postwar power equation, but the deeper

causes, I argue, have *wartime* origins.¹⁸ We must therefore cross over the war-peace boundary and open up the possibly less neat and less tractable “black box” of warfare so as to trace the ways in which the legacies of warfare affect postwar politics.¹⁹

I argue that an important determinant of postwar democratization is to be found in the business of war-making conducted by rebel groups. In addition to fighters, all rebel groups need funding, equipment, and materiel in order to wage war against the state. The various ways in which rebel groups organize, fund, and sustain themselves shape the nature of their relations with civilian populations. These wartime developments, in turn, create political and institutional momentums in ways that bear on regime formation once the war has come to an end. In short, what at the outset arises as a question of rebel fundraising – where to find the wherewithal with which to fight – generates a wartime logic significant enough to affect peacetime politics following the conclusion of the war.

Specifically, I argue that postwar democratization is more likely following wars in which rebel groups derive significant material support from civilians, compared to wars in which the rebels rely largely on external resources.²⁰ At one extreme, some rebel

¹⁸ On causal proximity vs. causal depth, see Kitschelt (2002).

¹⁹ While I use the terms “postwar,” “post-conflict,” and “peace time” frequently in this study, they are meant more as a conceptual shorthand to denote the period following a war’s formal termination or the period in which most of the fighting has ended (in cases where the war saw no formal ending). A reading of the cases makes it clear that in many “postwar” contexts low-level violence, banditry, and “warlordism” persist, so that “peace time” is actually not very neatly so. On this, see, in particular, Autesserre (2010). The Tajik civil war, discussed in Chapter 6, is an example of a case in which the “postwar” period saw ongoing clan-based violence in parts of the country.

²⁰ I use a standard negative definition of a civilian as an individual who is neither a member of the state armed forces nor a member of an armed rebel group. In a civil war an individual may aid a rebel group by providing information, food, shelter, cash, or other resources, but so long as he (or she) is not a formal member, fighter, official, or a rank-and-file of the rebel group, he remains a civilian despite his role in aiding the rebel movement.

groups have relatively easy access to such revenue sources as profits from the sale of natural resources, foreign military and economic aid, and remittances. If sustained and sufficient, such sources of funding can obviate the need for rebels to fundraise internally. In Angola, UNITA received extensive South African and American material support and, as the Cold War dwindled, turned to capturing near total control of the state's diamond economy to sustain the war into the 1990s. For the GAM of Aceh, Indonesia, the importance of the Acehnese diaspora in supplying the needed weapons and funds "can hardly be overemphasized" (Aspinall 2009: 119). At the other extreme, some rebel groups have little else but ordinary civilians to turn to for material provisions. While sporadic acts of extortion can bring in some needed funds, some of these rebels begin to build institutions of governance in order to regularize resource extraction from civilians. They turn into the metaphorical "stationary bandits" who recognize that institutionalizing a system of extraction is more efficient than "roaming" banditry (Olson 1993). Empirically, in countries ranging from El Salvador and Ethiopia to Sudan and Sri Lanka, rebel groups established fairly elaborate governance institutions in their respective areas of control.²¹ These institutions enabled rebel interactions with civilians to be more systematic and sustained: through them, rebels provided varying degrees of order, protection and welfare to civilians in return for vital inputs in the form of intelligence, war taxes, shelter, and logistical aid, all obtained through a mix of coercion and consent. For these rebels, political organization became part and parcel of the military

²¹ See Chapter 3 for an investigation of this variation in rebel funding and rebel governance. On why some rebel groups successfully establish wartime governance institutions but others do not, see Mampilly (2011).

mobilization for war. Finally, between the two extremes we find rebel groups that secure funding from a combination of civilian and non-civilian sources.

Against this backdrop of wide variation in modes of rebel fundraising and organization across civil wars, I theorize about two distinct causal pathways through which the political economy of rebellion affects postwar regime development. In both, the critical driver of causal effects is the nature of rebels' relations with civilian populations. Civilians, far from being mere victims caught in the middle of armed conflict between the two sides, are strategic actors who make choices about survival, support, and the pursuit of their own political interests.

The Framework

In presenting a theory of post-civil war democratization, I follow the rationalist tradition of modeling actors' interests and explaining regime outcomes based on their contingent choices. The theory begins with the basic premise that regime change is ultimately an elite affair; on this much existing studies readily converge. As Slater (2010: 46) writes, "it is ultimately the collective action of elites that makes authoritarianism durable, and the defection of elites that makes democratization possible."²² Elites are the last movers in regime struggles, and their goal in these

²² Similarly, in a study of democratic breakdowns Bermeo (2003) writes: "Democracies will only collapse if actors deliberately disassemble them and the key actors in this disassembling process are political elites." See also Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), McFaul (2002), Wood (2001).

struggles is to remain in power. In post-civil war settings, they additionally have an interest in avoiding a costly return to war.²³

Who, then, are the “elites” who hold this power in the aftermath of a civil war? I use “postwar elites” as a shorthand to refer to those lawfully wielding significant political power at the national level in the immediate aftermath of a civil war.²⁴ Simply put, postwar elites are those state and/or rebel group leaders that prevailed in the war, whether through outright military victory or in a settlement. Thus, if the incumbent regime wins the war so that the regime stays intact, postwar elites are synonymous with incumbent regime elites. If a war ends in a negotiated settlement that allots positions of power to both incumbent and rebel leaders, then postwar elites consist of both incumbent leaders and rebels-turned-politicians since both groups of actors have “earned” their right to influence national politics. In contrast, belligerents who lose in war are assumed to be excluded from state-level politics by virtue of their loss in the military contest, and therefore are excluded from the composition of postwar elites as well. “Elites,” in other words, are the actual faces that comprise what we otherwise call “the state.”

Democratization involves providing formal channels for opposition groups to participate in political competition; autocratization involves limiting or disabling such participation. Neither option is costless for postwar elites. Democratization, and the political pluralism it invites, is very costly if postwar elites are uncertain about their

²³ So long as war entails losses (of human and material resources, for instance), war is costly (“inefficient” in the bargaining framework) because participants to a conflict could otherwise bargain and reach the same outcome that would be obtained through fighting (Fearon 1995).

²⁴ This definition is therefore no different than that used in other bargaining models of regime change (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; also Wood 2000; Bermeo 1997), save for the fact that the definition here is specific to the postwar context. Also, I note that elites must wield power “lawfully” because war losers or non-state actors can still wield significant political power extra-legally, but these groups are obviously not part of the postwar elite.

political survival under such a system; under the alternative of autocracy they could simply repress the opposition and stay in power without having to formally compete for it. Autocratization, however, is very costly if opposition to the regime is active and widespread and repression therefore has to be heavy and possibly bloody; under the alternative of democracy elites could hope to peacefully and legitimately attain power through the ballot.

Given these costs on the one hand, and postwar elites' interest in maintaining power and averting a return to war on the other, elites will choose democratization if and only if the cost of "tolerating" democracy is lower than the cost of suppressing opposition groups.²⁵ That is, elites will choose democratization if they believe doing so is a way to remain in power while autocracy comes at a high cost. In contrast, they will choose autocratization if opposition can be easily quieted while political competition threatens to unseat them from power. To model the conditions under which elites will choose democratization or autocratization, we must therefore examine the factors that affect elites' calculations of the respective costs of "toleration" and "suppression."

The non-elites, or the masses, enter the framework as actors with a significant potential to sway elite decisions. They possess this potential because their behavior directly figures into elite calculations. To see this, note that it follows from the above that postwar elites will favor democratization under two conditions. First, they will choose to democratize if there is a high and potentially threatening level of popular demand for liberalization such that acquiescence to such demands is preferable to repression. In the unique postwar context, the existence of such mass mobilization makes

²⁵ This general insight was first proposed by Dahl (1971) and subsequently developed by rationalist scholars of democratization.

democratization all the more preferable for elites because the alternative, a resort to the suppression of this widespread political activism, raises the risk of a renewed outbreak of war (that is, the cost of suppression is especially high in postwar settings).

Second, postwar political elites find democratization more palatable if they perceive their chances of political survival under a democratic system to be high (that is, the cost of tolerating democracy is low). This condition prevails when they believe they have a reasonable chance of doing well in the first or subsequent postwar elections (Przeworski 1991; Wantchekon and Neeman 2002) – democratization in this scenario is a way for elites to respond to their constituents and gain domestic and international legitimacy while still remaining in power. In contrast, elites will choose authoritarianism if they face little popular pressure for liberal reforms (the cost of suppression is low) or see minimal chances of surviving in democratic elections (the cost of toleration is high). Whether it is the rise of mass mobilization or the probability of winning votes, elites are thus highly attuned, and even beholden, to ordinary people’s beliefs, attitudes, and collective capability vis-à-vis the existing regime.

Civilian Mobilization Model

Given this elite calculus in the immediate aftermath of civil war, I develop two distinct models of the way in which the political economy of rebellion affects postwar regime outcomes. The first is what I call the *civilian mobilization model*. Where rebels rely extensively on civilians for war support, the latter become altered in a politically significant way as a result of rebel war-making: they become politically mobilized. Importantly, this war-induced change does not vanish with the end of the conflict, but

carries over into the postwar period, with consequences for postwar elites. The model posits that rebel reliance on civilians has the effect of increasing the weight of civilians as a political force, tipping the power equation in their favor in the war's wake.

As McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 34) put it, mobilization is about "how people who at a given point in time are not making contentious claims start doing so." There are several ways in which civilians become mobilized as a political force as a result of their providing aid to the rebels. First, it increases their *political awareness*. By participating in an anti-regime armed rebellion, civilians become more politically informed about the very nature of the civil conflict and of the position of the state and its opponents. This informational effect is particularly acute on two fronts. One is that mobilized citizens become more aware of their *political rights*, as well as the ways in which the state is purportedly impinging on those rights. Emphasis on collective grievances lies at the heart of all rebel groups' ideological and discursive formulations aimed at winning popular support. The substantive content of rebel (and state) propaganda is immaterial in this argument; the critical effect here is that citizens become informed of their perceived plight and of the failings of the regime. In Aceh, "in the final months of 1998, GAM orators began to give *khotbah* (sermons) in villages and small towns throughout Aceh. According to one journalist, 'Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of Acehnese gathered in mosques and open-air courtyards to hear rebel accounts of Aceh's glorious independent history and its wealthy future once it is liberated from 'Javanese colonizers'" (quoted in Aspinall 2009: 154). In Moldova's civil war against the Russian-supported Trans-Dniestrians, Dniestrian elites "used their control over the local media to stir up hostility and fear" against the state. "The Tiraspol newspaper, for

example, repeatedly alleged that the [pro-Moldovan] language law was only the first step in a grander chauvinist Moldovan scheme to reduce Russians to second-class citizenship and deprive them of human rights” (Kaufman 1996: 127). A byproduct of the radicalization of politics that is civil war is that civilians on the receiving end of rebel propaganda gain new “information” on their purportedly unjust political status within the state.

The other effect is that by supporting a rebellion, citizens become aware of the presence of *political alternatives* and the possibility of departures from the status quo. The rebellion itself signals to civilians that the regime is not unassailable and can in fact be openly challenged, at a great risk though it may be. Tocqueville in his study of the French Revolution captured this idea of war’s awareness effect when he wrote, “evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested” (1955 [1856]: 177). Bunce (2003: 172) writes that in Eastern Europe, popular mobilization “signaled the breakdown of the authoritarian order; created a widespread sense that there were alternatives to that order;...[and] created a mandate for radical change.” Once Tunisians had taken to the streets en masse against the Ben Ali regime in the spring of 2011, an Egyptian analyst noted that “what happened in Tunisia has definitely created a different atmosphere [in Egypt]. It convinced people that they can revolt in the streets, and that these regimes are not as strong or as mighty as they appear” (quoted in El-Naggar and Slackman 2011). In Bueno de Mesquita’s (2010) model of revolutionary mobilization, the mere presence of anti-regime violence has an informational effect: the more violence rebels create, the more

anti-regime sentiment citizens believe there is in society, and thus the more willing they are to join the rebellion.

The second way in which rebel reliance on civilians mobilizes the latter is that it increases their level of *political engagement*. It galvanizes into action citizens who may otherwise have remained detached from active politics. Civilians may engage in rebel war-making voluntarily or under threats of punishment for non-cooperation. Either way, by virtue of their involvement these civilians become “exposed” to active politics: they gain experience in collective claim-making, coordinating with others in a broad common effort, and perhaps articulating shared (if not internalized) demands.²⁶ Together with greater political awareness, this wartime exposure equips civilians to engage contentiously with the state to determine the shape and form of the new regime once the war has come to an end. This argument seems to be consistent with the surprising finding that individual exposure to war violence is associated with greater postwar political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2006; Blattman 2009). Indeed, if wartime violence is more widespread where the insurgents depend on civilians for support (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004), then the exposure-to-violence finding might be subsumed under the more general claim that individual exposure to the politics and violence of warfare stimulates later political activism. Once people become politically

²⁶ Violent rebel movements are far from the social clubs and community associations that were the focus of a once lively debate on social capital in democratic societies, but involvement in a rebellion *may* have effects similar to that of involvement in more peaceful communal groups. Certainly, the content of the claim-making will differ vastly between a peaceful social group and a violent rebel organization, and this difference no doubt affects the levels of trust, cooperation and tolerance that are fostered as a result. In general, the effect of warfare on social capital is a nascent research agenda and remains contested, since it takes little to recognize that war can destroy trust, communities, institutions, and social networks just as it can foster them. It would, however, be a fruitful avenue for further research.

mobilized, they are likely to continuously engage with the state using the tools and methods of contention gained from earlier experiences (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1993).

Third, civilian involvement in a violent rebellion raises their *expectations* of favorable reforms. This directly follows from the previous two points. With greater political awareness and engagement, mobilized citizens will expect significant breaks from the autocratic status quo in the form of increased political rights. Thus, Keen (2005: 297-298) writes of “the dangers in going back to the status quo ante...given that [the civil war in Sierra Leone] brought about changes in people’s expectations and in their levels of awareness.... Indeed, even those elements of the old system that were considered acceptable might not be today.” Along the same lines, there is a longstanding argument in international relations that when states mobilize their populations for mass warfare, they also feel compelled to extend greater political rights to these same citizens (see Scheve and Stasavage 2010; Goemans 2000; Rousseau and Newsome 1999). There is nothing in the logic that would preclude its application to civil conflicts. Having risked involvement in a violent conflict, citizens will expect the postwar regime to deliver favorable changes. In postwar Zimbabwe, “what peasants hoped for when they voted for ZANU [the victorious rebel group led by Robert Mugabe] was that it would compensate them for the sacrifices – the loss of resources, labor time, and lives – forced upon them by ZANU guerrillas” (Kriger 1982: 165). Moreover, such expectations may be all the greater where state or rebel forces recruited soldiers based on a promise of some future reward. In the so-called Caste War of the Yucatan in the mid-19th century, Yucatecan elites enlisted the help of the Mayans in the armed revolt against Mexico by promising them land and tax reduction. When the elites failed to deliver on their promises after

successfully securing Yucatan's independence, the Mayans turned against them in a new round of warfare in which their primary aim was to acquire precisely what had been promised them – land and lower taxes (Dumond 1997; Reed 2001).

If this is how civil war ends – with a significant segment of the population politically mobilized, informed, engaged, and seeking and indeed expecting concrete change – then postwar elites face serious pressures to address these bottom-up demands. Civil war is the most intense and violent form of political contention, and elites are well aware that wartime politics continues even after the fighting has come to an end. If the demands of mobilized citizens are not at least partially addressed, citizens are unlikely to back down even after their armed counterparts have done so. Resort to repression is costly because it creates further instability. Concerns over domestic and international legitimacy also heighten the costs of repression. Postwar elites will therefore have incentives to make at least token moves toward political liberalization as a way to appease mass demands and ensure their own political survival. In South Africa, for instance, as negotiations to end the conflict between the apartheid regime and the ANC began, “the army certainly retained the ability to repress, but at a high cost to both the opposition and themselves. Blacks and whites both had an interest in preserving the state and its economy” (Marx 1998: 211). According to Nelson Mandela, in the end President de Klerk caved in to mass demands for reform not “with the intention of putting himself out of power...[but] to ensure power for the Afrikaner in a new dispensation” (quoted in Marx 1998: 208).

In short, the civilian mobilization model holds that where rebels tap into civilians as a significant war resource, the latter become mobilized. Consequently, wartime

popular mobilization makes democratization more likely by *bringing the cost of suppression for elites to a high level*. Mobilization on the one hand raises citizen demands for political change, and on the other hand creates incentives for elites to supply it in the form of political liberalization. Civilian engagement in war-making activates the citizenry, creates new ideas about how their state ought to govern, and makes those political alternatives appear to be within reach. It is in this sense that we can understand why Mexico's Reform War of 1858 "made possible the construction of a new, more inclusive, more participatory concept of citizen:" it "challeng[ed] rural communities to become involved in politics" and "provided an opportunity for country people to bargain for their interests" (Wasserman 2000: 109). Where rebels rely extensively on civilian inputs, as they did in rural Mexico in this war, civilians as a whole become politically mobilized. Where civilians have been mobilized, postwar elites are likely to choose democratization out of their own interest in political survival; the alternative of suppressing the restive masses is very costly in the postwar context.

Note that while civilian mobilization is undoubtedly a feature of every civil war, the key in this model is that mass-based rebel movements bring such mobilization to a markedly higher level. In comparison, civilian mobilization will be at a less threatening level where rebels have ready access to external sources of income such as foreign funding or rents from mines and minerals. One historian describes the post-civil war situation in Laos in this way:

Though politically and militarily victorious, the new leadership had to face the immense task of reconstructing a country wracked by bombing and artificially sustained by the millions of U.S. dollars of economic assistance that were poured in during the war. But the challenges were not only socio-economic. The leaders of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) were in effect unknown figures to most Lao when they came to power. The Party's seizure of power had not been

preceded by a popular uprising in either the urban areas or in the countryside. The Pathet Lao [the communist rebels-turned-LPRP] had not mobilized an exploited peasantry with promises of land reform. The civil war had left a disoriented population for whom communism was little more than a name. In effect, the political revolution took place in a virtual vacuum. (Pholsena 2006: 3)²⁷

In the absence of widespread rebel efforts to directly involve civilians, the level of mobilization will remain comparatively low; with low levels of demands and threats from below, postwar elites will have fewer incentives to choose democratization as a governance strategy after civil war.

Note, also, that for all three causal processes above I have referred to “civilians” as those mobilized by the rebels for war-making. This limited focus on the rebel side, however, leaves the model’s causal narrative incomplete. This is because mass-based warfare conducted by one side in a civil war tends to make the war a mass-based warfare for all. Where civilians are heavily involved in the war operations of one side, the war inevitably becomes one of attempts by both sides to compete for loyalty, prevent defections, and control populations (Kalyvas 2006). Thus, where rebel-supporting civilians become politically mobilized, state-supporting civilians undergo the same processes for the same reasons.²⁸ The result is that where rebels rely heavily on civilians, the state’s population as a whole becomes politically activated, raising the level of mobilization, contention, and expectations of change within the polity. Thus, broadening the scope of the model to include the effects of rebel mobilization on the entire civilian

²⁷ As Pholsena herself points out, however, the Pathet Lao did in fact depend heavily on civilians in certain parts of the country during the war. On the “liberated zones” of the Pathet Lao, see Stuart-Fox (1997) and Zasloff (1973). At the same time, the group also received extensive support from North Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, China and the Soviet Union.

²⁸ And indeed, as Kalyvas (2006: 106) points out, defection is common in civil wars, so that the composition of “civilian supporters” of either side is usually continually in flux, at least at the margins.

population does not alter the model's prediction: post-civil war democratization is more likely where rebels relied heavily on civilians for war support.

Rebel Statebuilding Model

The *rebel statebuilding model* captures the second process through which the political economy of rebellion affects postwar regimes. As before, we begin with the premise of elites as the last movers in the regime struggle that takes place at the end of a civil war, then consider ways in which rebel statebuilding affects elite preferences. In contrast to the civilian mobilization model which focuses on the effects of rebel war-making on civilians, the statebuilding model traces the impact of rebel statebuilding on the rebels themselves as future politicians. Thus, an additional premise for the operation of this model is that the rebel group prevails in the war, be it through military victory or in a negotiated settlement. That is, in this model the postwar elites consist at least partially, if not entirely, of the rebels-turned-politicians themselves. What we ask in this model, then, is: given the rebels prevailing in the war and becoming a part of the postwar elite, how does rebel statebuilding affect the latter's strategic calculations in the postwar period?

It is a great irony of warfare that in the attempt to destroy opponents, one builds. As discussed in depth in the next chapter, rebel statebuilding is a common feature in civil wars. It is a way for rebels to establish their authority, secure war support from ordinary citizens, and prevent defections. In the midst of war, rebels may variously provide leadership, social organization, ideology, physical security, and social services such as education and health care in return for civilian collaboration in the war. Through their

efforts at resource extraction, these rebel groups in time become statebuilders in areas where the state had failed, or never managed, to exert a presence.

The implications of rebel statebuilding extend well beyond its intended purpose of establishing authority and raising war-making funds. First, as some have argued, this rebel wartime statebuilding is a specific kind of statebuilding, one in which rebels forge mutually dependent relations with civilians. Wickham-Crowley (1987) argues that as it forms, the rebel governance system “becomes subject to the social-contractual obligations of all governments” in what he calls “an implicit social contract” between rebel rulers and the population under their control (477, 478). Rebels who rely on civilians provide them with material security, police their support base areas, and in more developed stages establish institutions associated with formal government, including executive and judicial power; in return they receive from civilians money, materiel and manpower. What we see in these cases, then, is the development of “a reciprocal set of obligations” and a “set of interlocking rights and duties for both governors and governed” (483). Wickham-Crowley’s use of Rousseauian language here is undoubtedly deliberate, since his claim is that rebel statebuilding is fundamentally organized around the notion of consent of the governed. Indeed, the argument here may be seen as a domestic adaptation of Tilly’s well-known thesis that the modern state emerged as a byproduct of war-making. Successful war-making necessitated “would-be power holders to concede protection and constraints on their own action,” leading to “an internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled” (Tilly 1985: 170, 186). This, then, is the sort of institutions with which some rebel groups emerge from civil war. They often display basic elements of a self-enforcing agreement between the rulers and the people, which, as

it happens, is precisely what constitutes the bedrock of democracy according to new institutionalist democratic theorists (e.g. Weingast 1997; North and Weingast 1989).²⁹

But if the rebels created a nominally democratic set of governing institutions during the war, what incentives do they have to pursue this mode of statebuilding in the postwar period? The rest is a narrative of path dependence. For the rebels, whatever their source of authority as they emerge from the war, they will seek to maintain it as they assume state control; to do otherwise is to lose a significant sunk cost and necessitates an uncertain search for new sources of power. Having obtained wartime power through a relationship of mutual exchange with civilians, statebuilding rebels would want to maintain civilian support and prevent the growth of a large-scale opposition to its new postwar regime. Thus, rebels' wartime statebuilding facilitates postwar democratization to the extent that, seeking to maintain their civilian support base, rebels have incentives to opt for pro-liberalization policies that cater to their supporters' interests.

Second, sunk costs accumulate not only from rebels' investment in building wartime relations with civilians, but also from their investment in building the wartime institutions themselves. Having established a loosely representative set of institutions during the war, rebel politicians may simply opt to transfer these institutions into peace time as a basis from which to build the postwar state; these institutions are what the

²⁹ Weinstein (2005) and Toft (2010) also posit a relationship between rebels' wartime statebuilding and postwar democratization based on a similarly logic. Weinstein goes on to caution against hasty external intervention, suggesting that "autonomous recovery" led by statebuilding rebels may at times achieve better postwar results. Toft (2010: 36) goes further in arguing that "support in pursuit of victory, especially victories by rebels, may be a worthy objective." These arguments echo earlier works which, with suggestive titles, made a provocative case for allowing the belligerents to "fight it out" to the end rather than induce negotiated settlements. See Luttwak (1999: "Give War a Chance"); Ottaway (1999: "Keep Out of Africa"); and Herbst (2003: "Let Them Fail").

rebels-turned-elites have, and these are also what they are familiar with. An oft-used example among studies that make a similar argument is Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by Yoweri Museveni. The victorious NRM took the Resistance Councils, a wartime system of governance with elected heads, and expanded the system nationwide following the war (Weinstein 2005; Toft 2010; Gilley 2009). But the Tigrayans of Ethiopia did something similar: having defeated the Derg, the TPLF leadership that led the rebels to victory proceeded to draft the new Transition Charter based on its wartime rebel charter (Ofcansky and Berry 1993: 19, 246). Institutionalists explain the "stickiness" of institutions as a form of path dependence (Pierson and Skocpol 2002), but in this model such path dependence is being driven by micro-level incentives, namely rebels' interest in expediency and resource efficiency.

Third, aside from creating institutional legacies, rebel statebuilding also bestows some level of popular legitimacy on the rebel leadership. A perception of legitimacy of the rebels aids democratization to the extent that democracies operate on "reservoirs of legitimacy and support" (Haggard 1995: 7). Scholars have in fact afforded significant attention to the role of regime legitimacy in understanding democratization. What they have missed is that legitimacy can emerge not only in peaceful circumstances, but also under protracted violent conflict as well. Thus, Dahl (1971: 43) expresses pessimism that violent conflict can lead to democratization because "a sudden collapse of the old regime leaves the new without a legacy of legitimacy." Yet, he ignores the well-documented statebuilding activities of rebel organizations during warfare that may over time lend them a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the supporting population. In his study of Latin American insurgencies, Wickham-Crowley (1987: 482) writes that there is "massive

evidence...that people came to perceive [insurgent movements] as legitimate, governing authority in certain regions,” and this legitimacy was generated precisely through the building of rebel governance institutions. Furthermore, even if during the war widespread civilian support does not necessarily imply that citizens view the insurgents as legitimate (Kalyvas 2006: 93), rebel assumption of state control in the aftermath of war serves to heighten this view.

Indeed, rebel statebuilding may even be seen as a case of isomorphic mimicry, in which rebels deliberately replicate state institutions in order to attain the legitimacy attached to formal institutions of governance.³⁰ The irony should not be lost here, of course, since the rebels are attempting to imitate the very set of institutions they set out to destroy. Nonetheless, this would help explain why many rebel groups create “ministries” of finance, internal affairs, education, defense, and the like. After the RCD rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo established their own “ministries” in the east, they even claimed to be administering their territories in accordance with Congolese law (Tull 2007: 122). To sum, having attained legitimacy, the rebel group would have incentives to maintain it for both domestic and international audiences, and ultimately as a means of consolidating its rule.³¹ Since the source of legitimacy for these groups lies in their civilian supporters, they will seek to retain this support base in the postwar period by accommodating their demands politically.

Together, the statebuilding model posits that rebel statebuilding makes postwar democratization more likely by creating wartime legacies that *lower the cost of tolerating*

³⁰ On institutional isomorphism, see DiMaggio and Powell (1983).

³¹ See Stanton (2007) on other ways through which rebel groups attempt to gain domestic and international legitimacy.

democracy for the rebel politicians. Having secured civilian support through a social contract, rebels would seek to maintain their support after the war by catering to their political demands. Having established a set of nominally representative institutions, rebels would find it expedient to transfer these wartime institutions into peacetime politics to facilitate postwar statebuilding. Finally, having demonstrated their institutional capacity, gained governance experience, and obtained some level of political legitimacy, the rebel leaders have fewer reasons to fear political competition and more reasons to believe they could succeed at the ballot box. Each of these mechanisms predicts postwar democratization so long as the rebels prevail in the war.

A major caveat is in order. Note that the statebuilding logic hinges entirely on the actual existence of a rebel “social contract,” implicit though it may be, with civilians. At the core of the model is the idea that statebuilding rebels turn into wartime “democrats” (or at least relatively benign autocrats) out of a resource imperative, so that they emerge from war with nominally representative institutions, mass-based support that could be turned into votes, and popular legitimacy. A critical component of this social contract is that the rebels exercise constraints on their own behavior so as not to destroy the very resource base – namely, civilians – that is necessary for waging war (Tilly 1985). But suppose instead that civilians aid the rebels not based on a positive-sum contract with them but rather under sheer coercion and fear of punishment for non-cooperation. Olson’s stationary bandit, after all, is an “autocrat,” a “violent entrepreneur” who aims to maximize expropriations without completely depleting citizens’ resources (1993: 568). Under this scenario, rebels would still build states for war-making purposes but their wartime institutions would be more oppressive than representative, popular support

would be more coerced than voluntary, and any legitimacy would be built on shaky (perhaps completely performance-based) ground. This type of rebel statebuilding is unlikely to catalyze postwar democratization since the rebels would not be confident that, once given an actual choice in the form of a secret ballot in postwar elections, citizens would still choose to support them. In the 2002 presidential election in Sierra Leone, for instance, the RUF candidate received just 33,000 votes, “a figure indicating that even many of its own former fighters failed to vote for the organization’s standard-bearer” (Reno 2008: 145). Neither would the transfer of repressive wartime institutions into peace time foster democratization.

Rebel statebuilding per se, then, has an overall indeterminate effect on postwar regimes. For those steeped in the statebuilding scholarship this may be no surprise, since that literature itself has equivocated on this issue (see Rousseau and Newsome 1999). Wartime statebuilding does bestow the rebels with governance capacity, institution-building experience, and a set of governance institutions, all of which are conducive to the building of a stronger postwar state. But “strong states facilitate authoritarian consolidation as surely as they facilitate democratic consolidation” (Slater 2010: 36). Authoritarian regimes require capacity, institutional strength, and legitimacy as much as do their democratic counterparts. Absent a clear indication that it was one of mutual consent, mutual constraint, and mutual exchanges of rights and duties between the rebels and civilians, rebel statebuilding leaves an overall ambiguous legacy on postwar regimes.

One way to further theorize about whether rebel statebuilding leads to democratization or autocratization is to make the model contingent on the nature of rebel governance itself. If rebel governance had indeed rested largely on voluntary support and

consent of the governed, the path dependent logic of rebel statebuilding would predict democratization, as described above. Conversely, if the rebels had employed greater coercion than consent, essentially foreclosing any “exit” options for citizens, then we would expect autocratization – citizens would likely exit once given the choice under a democracy. The problem with this approach is that we can derive the theoretical implications in this way, but far more challenging is to derive *observable* implications for comparative research. As I discuss further in the next chapter, civilian motivations for supporting a rebel group are not readily observable; we can observe civilian support, but cannot infer from it as to whether the support arises from threat and duress, from voluntary consent, or most likely, from some mix of both motivations.³² Since we are unable to extract observable implications from modeling the nature of rebel-civilian relations, I leave the predictions of the statebuilding model as being indeterminate. What *can* be done empirically is to test the hypothesis that rebel statebuilding fosters postwar democratization, then examine which of the model’s mechanisms actually operate in specific cases. This is the approach I take in the empirical chapters.

To sum, the rebel statebuilding model proposes that conditional on rebels’ prevailing in the war, rebel wartime statebuilding will aid postwar democratization by turning rebel-politicians into more experienced, capable and legitimate future governors, thereby increasing their prospects in competitive politics. However, such qualities can be theoretically linked to both democratization and autocratization, leaving the effect of rebel statebuilding indeterminate in the absence of further information about the actual nature of wartime rebel-civilian relations.

³² See Kalyvas (2006).

OTHER EXPLANATIONS

Several alternative explanations may also account for the variation in post-civil war regimes. I examine three in particular: the war's outcome; international peacekeeping interventions; and rebel ideology. Note that these are not "alternative" arguments in the strict sense of being in competition with my own theory. For example, the rebel statebuilding model operates conditional on the rebels prevailing in the war. Likewise, rebel ideology may be related to my own theory if, for instance, rebels with a particular type of ideology are more likely to depend on civilian support. It is nonetheless theoretically useful to identify their possible independent effects on postwar regimes. In the statistical analysis, I test for their independent effects but also examine their relations with rebel governance.

War Outcome

As discussed above, one way in which scholars have theorized about postwar regime variations is by focusing on war outcomes. The assumption shared across these studies is that the power balance between the belligerents at the end of the war determines how postwar politics will play out. In these accounts, what occurs during the war is outside the scope of the theory, or only matters to the extent that the war outcome may be endogenous to various aspects of belligerents' wartime behavior. While I submit that the war outcome is important, and in particular make the rebel statebuilding model contingent on the rebels' prevailing in the war, it is the consideration of wartime factors

that most distinctly sets my theory apart from those focused more narrowly on how the war ends.

Some scholars argue that negotiated settlements are conducive to postwar democratization. “Civil wars that end in some form of negotiated settlement can produce a new set of more inclusive (and democratic) institutions” (Gurses and Mason 2008: 318). A negotiated settlement also implies the future sharing of power (Licklider 1995). Note, however, that the argument borders on tautology in the sense that a negotiated settlement and its attendant features – the inclusion of opposition in decision-making, sharing power with the opposition, etc. – are precisely the features that characterize a democracy. This problem is compounded if the terms of the settlement mandate the holding of post-conflict elections, as has often been the case in post-Cold War cases (Brancati and Snyder 2011). Empirically, we would therefore expect any measure of regimes that incorporates the degree of political inclusion to be positively correlated with the occurrence of a negotiated settlement to end civil war. In terms of hypothesis testing, we would expect settlements to be correlated with democratization in the short term, as their occurrence and implementation create a spike in regime levels. A more critical test of the settlement hypothesis, then, would examine whether settlements have any longer-term effects on democratization once the effect of the creation of the settlement itself has ceased to affect regime measures.

The corollary hypothesis to the settlement hypothesis is that victory leads to postwar autocratization. Having won the war, the victor is likely to pursue “a more exclusionary polity marked by authoritarian features” (Gurses and Mason 2008: 318). On the other hand, in an argument on which my own rebel statebuilding model is built,

some hypothesize that rebel victory is more conducive to postwar democratization than other outcomes because successful rebels build institutions of mutual exchange with civilians in order to wage war (Weinstein 2005; Toft 2010).³³

International Intervention

One distinctive feature of the post-Cold War international political landscape has been the series of large-scale foreign interventions in war-torn states that are carried out in the name of the twin goals of peace and democracy. Led most prominently by the UN, interventions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Angola, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and other states featured both military missions aimed at preventing renewed fighting and political missions aimed at facilitating democratic elections and liberalizing reforms. The underlying assumption motivating these interventions is that the counterfactual of no intervention would result in less favorable outcomes on both fronts.

Studies have examined the overall effectiveness of these missions, but findings have been mixed at best. Scholars agree that peacekeeping missions do help keep the peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008), but are less convinced that they help install democracy (Fortna 2008b; Fortna and Huang, forthcoming) or that they should even attempt such a task (Marten 2004).

My theory based on the political economy of rebellion suggests that, if the theory holds, post-civil war states will move towards democratization under a certain set of

³³ The important difference between these accounts and my own, to reiterate, is that the former hypothesize that rebel victory is conducive to democratization while I hypothesize that victory (or settlement) not by any rebels, but by statebuilding rebels, is conducive to democratization, though it may also be conducive to autocratization, depending on the nature of rebel governance during the war.

conditions without direct external intervention. It is therefore instructive to test the alternative argument that democracy-promoting peace operations have their intended effect irrespective of the nature of rebels' wartime relations with civilians.

Rebel Ideology

In the rationalist framework presented above, political elites pursue democratization out of a self-interest in political survival and stability, and not because they necessarily want democracy for democracy's sake. Thus, an alternative explanation is that postwar democratization occurs where postwar power-holders are democrats. If this is true, then wartime rebel governance is epiphenomenal to postwar regime outcomes. This is a plausible alternative argument because many rebel groups have in fact touted democratic, anti-elite, and "liberation" ideologies to mobilize for war. Outside of the civil war context, McFaul (2002) argues that among post-Soviet states, those led by leaders with "a normative commitment to democracy" became democratic; "if the powerful believed in democratic principles, then they imposed democratic institutions. But if they believed in autocratic principles, then they imposed autocratic institutions" (224).

However, there are also theoretical and empirical grounds to suppose that ideology in fact plays a fairly insignificant role in shaping postwar regimes. For example, Saul (2007) observes the willing abandonment on the part of victorious Southern African rebel movements (e.g. ZANU of Zimbabwe, SWAPO of Namibia) of their Marxist liberation ideology and their ready embrace of global capitalism upon victory. In Afghanistan, "for all their reputed fanaticism... Taliban commanders will

leave the movement and shift allegiances if the conditions are right” (Christia and Semple 2009: 37). Kasfir (2005: 274) writes, “An ideology may provide direction, but its imperatives often have to be modified as guerrillas learn how to stay alive and how to use their immediate environment.”³⁴ Historical cases are in fact rife with instances of rebels’ pragmatism trumping their doctrinarism. Nevertheless, since the role of ideology constitutes a distinct explanation for postwar democratization, it is worth examining empirically.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I developed the idea that regime variations in the aftermath of civil war have wartime origins. I presented two distinct models of how the legacies of rebellion affect postwar politics. The civilian mobilization hypothesis proposes that when rebels rely heavily on civilians for material support, the latter undergo political “activation;” this activation and mobilization create pressures on postwar elites to cater to their demands for liberalizing reforms. The rebel statebuilding hypothesis posits that rebel governance during the war bestows the rebels with civilian support, a set of governance institutions, and popular legitimacy, each of which can facilitate democratization for postwar rebels-turned-state elites. However, they can also facilitate autocratization depending on the actual nature of rebel-civilian relations during the war.

The next chapter introduces an original dataset on rebel governance. Using the dataset, the chapter explores some basic empirics about rebel governance in civil war before engaging in statistical tests of the hypotheses and alternative arguments in Chapter

³⁴ See also Driscoll (2012); Staniland (2012).

4. The remaining chapters conduct comparative case studies to test the specific causal processes proposed in each of the two theoretical models.

CHAPTER 3

REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR: A NEW DATASET AND ANALYSIS

In the next three chapters, I conduct quantitative and qualitative tests of the study's main hypotheses on the effects of rebel governance on postwar political regimes. Before doing so, I devote this chapter to examining the theory's main explanatory variable, rebel governance. While the outcome variable, democratization, has been the subject of generations of theoretical and empirical research, rebel governance – that is, rebel groups' efforts to build political relations with civilians during civil war – has largely escaped the kind of abiding attention needed to bring an issue to intellectual light. In this chapter, and indeed in this project as a whole, I aim to contribute to the budding research agenda on what actors – and in this particular case, the rebels and civilians – *do* during internal conflict. Civil war is a continuation of politics, and as I will show, actors expend ample efforts on political organization, mobilization, contention, and legitimation in its course. Rebel governance is a significant force in civil war, with a potential to change its dynamics, outcomes, and even subsequent developments once the war has ended.

In this chapter, I first reflect on the state of rebel governance in scholarly works. Defining the term, I argue for the usefulness of serious theoretical and empirical work on the subject. The main material with which I explore the empirical nuts and bolts of rebel governance is a newly created dataset documenting rebel governance for all civil wars that ended between 1950 and 2006. I describe the dataset and its variables; importantly, I also discuss some of the challenges of constructing a dataset of this sort. I use this dataset first to descriptively examine the various sources of rebels' wartime income, then

to analyze what factors lead rebels to rely on civilian contributions as opposed to other funding sources. I then turn to rebel “statebuilding” during civil war. I examine what rebels do with their funds in terms of political organization and governance of civilians, and how widespread rebel governance has been in the civil wars since 1950. Note that the chapter’s aim is by and large empirical; I document variation in rebel governance but do not develop a theory to account for it, drawing instead on existing works to identify some hypotheses. The empirical questions raised in this chapter, while substantively important on their own terms, also help us better understand what will become the main independent variables – namely, rebel funding sources and rebel statebuilding – in the next chapter. The analysis in this chapter thus serves as a crucial first stage in a two-stage empirical analysis of the relationship between rebel governance and postwar democratization.

REBEL GOVERNANCE IN THE STUDY OF CIVIL WARS

Rebel governance is a phenomenon familiar to students of guerrilla warfare and scrupulously theorized by its practitioners. While rebel governance in theory and practice has been closely associated with guerrilla warfare, the two are distinct phenomena. Guerrilla warfare is a *military technology* in which fighting groups use light weapons and operate primarily from rural bases (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75).³⁵ As a technology, it has been employed by all “types” of rebel groups including communist guerrillas, Islamic extremists, ethnic nationalists, and war-profiteers (ibid). In contrast, I

³⁵ The term “insurgency” is used synonymously with “guerrilla warfare” in the literature and in this project. I use the term “rebel group” and “rebels” to refer more broadly to the belligerent opposition in civil war, irrespective of whether they fight guerrilla wars or conventional wars.

define rebel governance as a *political strategy* of rebellion in which rebels use political organization to forge and manage relations with civilians. As a political strategy it can vary in both quantity and quality – rebel governance can be patchy or elaborate, highly functional or barely at all, and successful or less so; rebel political organization takes place in myriad ways. As a wartime phenomenon, it only exists in tandem with, or as part of, a military strategy; rebel governance without fighting is simply peaceful organization. Note that this definition is broader than Weinstein’s (2003: 164) definition of a “rebel government,” in which rebels not only set up political institutions but also control territory and establish a taxation system. As I show below, rebel governance can emerge very rapidly with only tenuous territorial control, and I consider rebel taxation of civilians to be just one part of rebel governance rather than a feature that defines it. Just as guerrilla warfare has been employed in different types of civil wars, so rebel governance, as defined here, has appeared in ethnic, revolutionary, and secessionist (in terms of rebel aims) as well as guerrilla and conventional (in terms of warfare technology) wars. Likewise, the absence of rebel governance – that is, the absence of significant efforts on the part of rebels to forge sustained relations with civilians as a wartime strategy – has also been a common occurrence among various types of rebel groups.

Guerrilla warfare is as old as warfare itself.³⁶ Given the operational and tactical proximity between guerrilla warfare and civilian life, successive military strategists of the 18th and 19th centuries produced copious volumes on guerrilla operations with instructions on the treatment of civilians. It was the “revolutionary” wars of the 20th

³⁶ See Laqueur (1976) for a review of the history and theory of guerrilla warfare.

century, however, that thrust rebel governance into the theoretical and operational limelight and made it a central feature of insurgent warfare. Wars in which civilians were deemed the bedrock of successful rebellion emerged with Mao Zedong in the 1930s and soon became fully theorized, operationalized, implemented, and adapted, first in the wars of resistance against colonial powers in China and Vietnam, then in the wave of “liberation” struggles that swept across the developing world during the Cold War. As these wars unfolded, the writings of guerrilla visionaries such as Mao, Vo Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara and Amilcar Cabral inspired thousands of sympathizers and formed the core of an international intellectual enterprise on revolutionary war (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Wickham-Crowley 1993: 4). In this flurry of activity, the idea of a “people’s war,” in which rebels establish close ties with civilians through political organization, became “mainstreamed” among rebel leaders and supporters.

It is curious, then, that rebel governance has received relatively little attention in the resurgence of civil war studies over the past two decades. While the writings of the prominent guerrilla theorists inspired dozens of rebel leaders in various countries and directly affected their choice of war strategies, consideration of such historical influences has been negligible in recent scholarship. Even the substantial literature on counterinsurgency, which developed in tandem with major guerrilla warfare and in direct response to insurgent strategies, has made few appearances in civil war studies in political science and has remained quite distinct from it.

Certainly, there have been notable exceptions. Laqueur (1976) wrote a comprehensive review of the history, theory and practice of guerrilla warfare in what was likely the first of its kind. Political sociologist Wickham-Crowley (1993) conducted a

critical survey of Latin American revolutionaries, amply focusing on insurgent relations with peasant supporters. The bulk of the contemporaneous studies of rebellions, however, adopted either a macro-structural approach, as exemplified by the works of Skocpol (1979) and later Tarrow (1998) and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), or a micro-level approach to collective action aimed at understanding individuals' decisions to rebel. In the former approach, scholars argued that rebellions and revolutions could be explained by the structure of peasant communities, the strength of the armed forces, the nature of international economic and military competition, and by political opportunities available to potential rebels. In the argument that "revolutions are not made; they come" (Skocpol 1979: 17), little theoretical space is allotted to the political agency of the revolutionaries themselves. In the latter approach, the obvious contradiction between Olsonian rational choice theory and the reality during the Cold War years of widespread participation by ordinary individuals in risky collective behavior was explained by individual cost-benefit calculations, with little reference to political context or to the goals and identity of the actors.³⁷ Moreover, aside from the question of why men [and women] rebel and why violent revolutions occur, scholars gave little attention to what rebels and revolutionaries *do* once rebellion was underway.

More recently, a sustained research agenda on the causes and resolution of civil war has burgeoned in the context of prominent international efforts (and lack thereof) to diffuse major outbreaks of violence in places such as Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia in the early to mid-1990s. Here, most of the early debate centered on a statist and structural

³⁷ See Lichbach (1998) for a review of this literature.

paradigm, even as the question of civil war causes was cast as one between greed and grievance of those who *rebelled*. “Greed” (later dropped in favor of “opportunities”) referred to the economic and geographical structures of the state (e.g. levels of economic development, availability of natural resources, and the presence of mountainous terrain), while “grievance” pointed to the state’s social, ethnic, and class compositions (e.g. level of social inequality and fractionalization, degree of political rights) (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 2004).³⁸ With its emphasis on state structures, this debate paid little heed to the rebels themselves – who they are, how they mobilize and fight, and to whom they appeal. The literature on war termination developed in a similar manner: scholars explored how and when wars end using a surprisingly unchanging set of explanatory variables including the size of the state’s armed forces, the level of democracy, per capita GDP, degree of ethnic fractionalization, the number of war deaths, and the presence or absence of third-party intervention, among others. These variables thus captured aspects of state strength, demography, war consequences, and international involvement. Rarely did any aspect of the other party in the war – the rebels – directly figure into these analyses.

Partly in response to this conspicuous absence of the rebel side in scholarly works, some of the most prominent studies in recent civil war research have focused squarely on rebel behavior. For example, Wood (2003) provides an ethnographic account of the FMLN and its relations with its supporters in El Salvador; Weinstein (2005) examines insurgent organization to account for the variation in rebel treatment of civilians; and Kalyvas (2006), in a study of violence in civil war, directly theorizes about rebel objectives and relations with civilians in the context of irregular warfare. Many

³⁸ For other works in this this debate, see Fearon and Laitin (2003); Henderson and Singer (2000); Sambanis (2001).

other works focusing on the characteristics of insurgents have recently emerged or are currently underway.

Nevertheless, in this growing literature on the internal dynamics of rebellion what is still lacking is a systematic data-gathering effort across civil wars that would enable us to make general observations and causal inferences about rebel governance. When it comes to rebel groups, there is rich case-specific and anecdotal material on individual civil wars – remarkably so, given the usually covert and cryptic nature of insurgency, almost by definition; historians, journalists, and social scientists have been able to amass a significant amount of micro-level data on rebel activities, often through ethnographic work in challenging wartime environments. Yet, because the focus of these studies is the specific civil war or rebel group, the case studies literature struggles to be cumulative on both theoretical and empirical fronts. The result is that many assumptions and assertions are made about rebel governance, but there is little empirical material with which to either endorse or challenge them. Thus, for instance, common knowledge has it that serious rebel statebuilding is an attribute exclusive to communist insurgents; yet, my data shows that the “high-institutionalists” include non-communist rebels while not all communist rebels engage in high levels of institutionalization. While we can easily ascertain the average GDP of war-prone states or their level of dependence on foreign aid due to relatively good data availability, we are hard pressed to come up with such ready numbers for the frequency of diaspora funding for rebel groups or the proportion of civil wars in which the rebels establish their own shadow taxation systems. It is worthwhile, then, to systematically gather data on rebel governance, first for pure descriptive knowledge, then as a basis for deeper analyses of the causes and effects of different types

of rebel organization. The remainder of this chapter describes the newly constructed Rebel Governance Dataset, 1950-2006, and uses it to establish some basic empirics about rebel governance in civil war.

REBEL GOVERNANCE DATASET

Consistent with the definition of rebel governance provided above, the fundamental objective driving the construction of the Rebel Governance Dataset is to systematically gather data on rebel groups' wartime relations with civilian populations. Toward this end, I operationalize rebel governance by focusing on two aspects of rebels' wartime behavior vis-à-vis civilians. The first is the source of rebel income. All rebel groups need funding and resources in order to fight against the state, and the sources of these funds vary among groups. Notably, some rebel groups extract extensively from local civilian populations while others obtain funds largely in the form of foreign support, natural resource rents, or remittances from the diaspora. Clearly, rebel relations with local civilians will differ markedly depending on the degree of rebel reliance on civilian contributions. The second way in which I capture rebel relations with civilians is by examining the extent to which rebel groups engage in wartime "statebuilding" as part of their wartime political strategy. Some groups engage in extensive political organization, holding leadership elections and "legislative" meetings, setting down roots locally through village councils, imposing war taxes, and providing social services, essentially creating full-blown bureaucracies as if they were actual states. Others attempt few such institution-building activities, leaving their engagements with civilians more ad hoc and less deliberate.

The dataset is cross-national and covers all civil wars – 127 cases in all – ending between 1950 and 2006.³⁹ The list of civil wars is adapted from the Doyle and Sambanis (2006) dataset (hereafter DS2006).⁴⁰ I opted to use a preexisting list of wars and war outcomes that had been generated for a different purpose so as to preclude the need to create selection criteria unique to my study.⁴¹ For wars ending between 1999-2006 that are coded as ongoing in DS2006, I consulted secondary sources and other datasets to determine the wars' end dates; these are so noted in the coding supplement. DS2006 requires a substantial number of deaths in the first three years as well as sustained violence throughout the war for a conflict to be coded as a civil war.⁴²

To gather data on rebel groups' income sources and statebuilding activities, I conducted a fairly extensive search of secondary sources for each civil war. Consequently, an important component of this dataset are the supplementary coding notes, which document for each civil war all of the sources, together with mostly direct text excerpts and all with the relevant page numbers, that led to the particular coding

³⁹ See Table 3.1 in this chapter's appendix for a list of civil wars included in this dataset.

⁴⁰ Note that I made a series of corrections to the DS2006 coding of start/end years and war outcomes based on my own case-by-case research. The reason is that their dataset contains a number of what appear to be simple data-entry errors and a few unexplained coding decisions that contradict other datasets. All changes, together with the sources that informed the recoding process, are detailed in the supplementary coding notes.

⁴¹ The pooling together of disparate types of conflict (ethnic, secessionist, conventional, guerrilla, etc.) into a single dataset has been questioned by some as amounting to comparisons of very distinct phenomena (e.g. Lyall and Wilson 2009). However, one of the very points I make in this study is that rebels forge and manage relations with civilians not only in guerrilla warfare, as is sometimes asserted, but in a range of conflict types; furthermore, these wartime relations can have enduring effects on the state's political development regardless of the type of war in which it takes place.

⁴² See Doyle and Sambanis (2006) for their coding details. The omission of lower-level conflicts or relatively bloodless coups is apt for the present study because my theory centers on the issue of rebel resource exigencies, an issue which is generally less acute in such cases.

decision for each variable pertaining to rebel governance. The aim was to maximize transparency and ensure replicability. While a list of all background sources consulted would be too lengthy to include, the bibliography in the supplement lists all of the sources directly used to arrive at each coding decision.

Rebel governance is operationalized in two ways, as just described. *Source* measures the degree to which rebels relied on civilian aid as opposed to other sources of funding such as foreign support or profits from natural resources. The variable is a simple composite index constructed from a number of binary variables that indicate rebel sources of funding, and which together generally exhaust the range of possible sources of rebel material assets. These individual components of the index consist of the following.

1) Civilian aid is coded 1 if the rebels derived significant material support from civilians. Forms of civilian contributions include, but are not limited to, the payment of rebel “taxes” or other voluntary or coerced financial giving, or the regular or systematic provision of in-kind support such as food, clothing and shelter. It excludes isolated incidences of extortion by individual rebels that are not part of a broader pattern of extraction from civilians. 2) Foreign aid is coded 1 if the rebels received support from another state or, in some cases, from other rebel groups operating in another state.

Foreign support could be in the form of economic or military aid, including the provision of sanctuary;⁴³ it excludes political support short of material aid as well as rebel training in another state.⁴⁴ 3) Natural resource funding is defined broadly and includes profits

⁴³ For a dataset that distinguishes between different types of foreign aid, see Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). My case narratives also describe, to the extent possible, the type of support and identify the supporter.

⁴⁴ “Neutral” aid is not coded for either the rebels or the government. For example, the US/UN intervention in Somalia in 1992 is not coded under foreign aid for either side. Where information

from the production or trade of various minerals, metals, oil, and the like, as well as from narcotics trading and other contraband activities.

4) Some rebels secure their fighting resources simply by usurping state resources to which they have access because of their affiliations with the state.⁴⁵ The coup variable defines coups very broadly to encompass not only civil wars resulting from the actual or attempted overthrow of the government by existing members of the regime, but also such acts committed by former members of a regime and its military or militias. The idea here is to mark cases in which the rebels relied on state resources, such as arms amassed during their current or former time in office. An example is the 1993-1997 war in Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo). The rebels in this war consisted of ex-president Sassou-Nguesso and his private militia, known as the Cobras, who were equipped to fight because they had certain resources deriving from their earlier position in power.

Similarly, 5) the autonomy variable marks cases in which the rebel group relied on sub-state resources deriving from territorial autonomy. In such cases, rebels tend to have relatively easy recourse to the use of the territory's funds, as well as to pre-established institutions of governance, distinguishing them from rebel groups that must start out "from scratch." An example is the Croatian war for independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Croatia had full-fledged state institutions and control over its own budget, hence greatly facilitating the mobilization for war compared to most other cases.

on foreign aid was lacking in secondary sources, I used the Regan (2002) data and noted this in the supplement. I exclude rebel training abroad because rebels can obtain training for reasons other than the host state's support for the rebels, as with the diverse group of fighters who trained in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war and then fought in their home states' civil wars upon return.

⁴⁵ On rebel acquisition of arms from government sources more generally, see Jackson (2010).

6) While all civil wars involve coercion and threats of violence against civilians, some rebel groups are distinguished by a predominant reliance on such activities as the kidnapping of prominent figures for ransom, or robbery of banks or of other public or private assets, as a strategy of income generation. Where consulted sources consistently emphasize such behavior, the crime variable is coded 1. Renamo of Mozambique is an example: “Looting of household goods, government stores and cooperatives, schools, and health posts was a consistent element of Renamo attacks after 1982” (Weinstein and Francisco 2005: 172), prompting one study to call its finances a “pillage economy” (Vines 1991: 87). It is important to stress, again, that much of what gets coded under “civilian aid” does occur under severe coercion. “Liberation taxes,” such as those implemented by the Vietcong, may simply have been euphemism for extortion, though there appears to have been many voluntary contributors as well (Elliott 2003: 729-730). The distinction between the civilian aid and crime variables nonetheless points to a qualitative difference between a policy of systematic “giving” or “taxes,” even under coercion, versus the robbing of banks and cooperatives in terms of the kinds of relations forged between rebels and civilians.

7) The variable for the taxation of goods and services denotes cases in which the rebel group collected “taxes” from domestic or international businesses, on the trade of goods (excluding natural resources), and on services such as road checkpoints, visas, and the like. The Kurds fighting the Iraqi government in the 1985-1996 civil war imposed heavy custom duties on Turkish traders entering their territory (Gunter 1992: 94) while the Maoists of Nepal levied taxes on trekkers on popular climbing routes during their civil war (International Crisis Group, October 27, 2005: 17). Finally, 8) the remittances

variable is coded 1 if the rebel group received significant financial or other material support (such as weapons) from its diaspora populations.

Source, the composite index, is an ordinal variable indicating minimum to maximum reliance on civilians. It is derived from the above binary variables based on a simple coding rule. *Source* is coded 1 if rebels did not rely on civilian aid; 2 if rebels relied on a mix of civilian aid plus one or more of the other sources of income, or if it is a case of prewar autonomy; and 3 if rebels relied exclusively on civilian aid.⁴⁶

The second way in which I operationalize rebel governance captures the degree to which a rebel group engaged in wartime statebuilding, whether as a way of channeling resources to itself, as a form of territorial control, as a strategy of legitimation, or for other motives. A variable denoted *govern* records the number of rebel institutions established by the main rebel group in each civil war. The variable ranges from 0 to 11, indicating no institutions to all eleven possible institutions established.⁴⁷ The institutions recorded under *govern* cover the most fundamental governance institutions associated with a formal government: 1) an executive; 2) a legislature or regional councils; 3) a court or a legal system; 4) a civilian tax system; 5) mandatory boycott of state taxes; 6) a police force; 7) an education system; 8) a health care system; 9) a humanitarian relief system; 10) media or propaganda; and 11) foreign affairs.⁴⁸ The codebook contains

⁴⁶ Prewar autonomy cases are coded as 2 based on the rationale that rebels have at least some preexisting institutions that lessen their need to find special financing for the war, while at the same time those institutions themselves may be dependent on civilian support, for instance through official taxes on the territory's residents.

⁴⁷ In the dataset, the maximum attained by any rebel group is 10 institutions.

⁴⁸ These do not exhaust the range of "statebuilding" activities attempted by rebel groups in war time. For instance, the TPLF of Ethiopia conducted extensive land reform (Young 1998: 43). The Naxalites of India, the Maoists of Nepal, and the Supervisory Council of the North in

specific coding rules for each of these institutions. For example, the civilian tax variable is coded 1 for regularized or institutionalized collection of money or materiel from civilians, but not for random collections by errant rebel fighters or unsystematic or sporadic giving by citizens. An example of a “tax”-collecting rebel group is the New People’s Army (NPA) active in the Philippines in the 1970s and 80s. Sources provide evidence that villagers were expected to pay regular “revolutionary taxes,” in addition to providing food and materiel, in rebel-held territories (Magno and Gregor 1986: 505-508). Foreign affairs is coded 1 if the rebel group engaged in “diplomacy” by sending emissaries abroad or to international organizations for political missions, or opened offices abroad. SWAPO of Namibia positioned representatives in the US, Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, Eastern Europe and the United Nations (Leys and Saul 1995: 41). The legislature variable is coded 1 if the rebel group had a legislative body or consultative council at the center, or councils at the town or village level in more decentralized systems. The village committees established by ZANU of Zimbabwe during its civil war each had “a chairman, secretary, treasurer, security officer, organizer, ‘logistics’ representative and a political commissar,” all of whom were elected (Kriger 1992: 118).

CHALLENGES OF DOCUMENTING REBEL GOVERNANCE

Despite these hard-and-fast coding rules the challenges of documenting rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding are many, and they should be described upfront. First, rebel activity, especially rebel *political* activity, is difficult to document because of

Afghanistan all reportedly provided banking services (see, respectively, Navlakha 2006: 2188; Sharma 2004: 46; Rubin 2002: 259).

its inherently clandestine nature: rebels (especially insurgents) typically organize underground, meet in secrecy, are based in remote regions with limited access to reporters and researchers, and operate where state institutions are weak or absent. Thus, rebel political activity is generally overshadowed by rebel military activity in both academic research and media reports, on which the coding is overwhelmingly based. Rebel governance is therefore likely to be under-reported, leading to false negatives in the data, i.e. institutions are coded 0 because I did not find evidence of their existence, when in fact they existed.⁴⁹ Complicating matters, the presence of such false negatives may be correlated with some aspects of the war: some wars are more prominent and incite more international interest, resulting in better documentation, and this usually has to do with geopolitics and the politics of foreign intervention. Thus, it is possible that the coding of rebel governance is associated with the degree of international interest in the particular civil war. It is no coincidence, for instance, that there is a wealth of information on the RUF and its war against Sierra Leone which ended with a large UN peace operation, while documentation of the MDJT's war against Chad, which took place around the same time but lacked any foreign intervention (save Libyan support for the rebels), is desultory.⁵⁰

Second, rebel governance is often in the eye of the beholder, just as "terrorism" remains laden with politics no matter how technically defined. Thus, some consulted

⁴⁹ Note, however, that a coding of 0 does not necessarily indicate that I found no evidence of a rebel institution having existed. Rather, it could be based on reliable evidence that rebels did not engage in that particular activity.

⁵⁰ In fact, the MDJT (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad) is an extreme case in terms of the coding: I did not find any relevant information on the internal organization of this rebel group. It is therefore the only case in the dataset for which most of the rebel governance variables are coded as missing and therefore are omitted from the analysis.

sources manifestly adopt the “terrorism” lens, stressing the rebel group’s illegitimacy and acts of violence while downplaying its political relevance and organization. Conversely, others give deliberate emphasis to rebels’ mass-based popularity, political sophistication, and social service provision while deemphasizing their identities as violent actors. More often than not, however, such analytical differences are more subtly couched in the descriptive details, or simply result from a lack of sufficient information about the case. Whatever the cause, such biases and conflicts of both opinion and information can complicate data coding. For example, on the 1978-1992 Afghan civil war, one scholar writes of “a political and administrative infrastructure under the SCN [Supervisory Council of the North] umbrella,” led by the formidable rebel leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. This extensive administration “included sub-councils consisting of commanders, religious leaders, and village elders. There were six functional committees” which “dealt with finance, health, education and culture, political affairs (including Kabuli affairs) and information. Each of the sub-committees employed hundreds of people” (Rasanayagam 2003: 134). In contrast, another scholar writes of the very same set of institutions with greater caution, noting that “some of this organization existed on paper – or in Massoud’s mind – more than in reality” (Rubin 2002: 237), though he does not discuss why he reaches this conclusion. Referring to the territory’s main rebel group, Aspinall (2006: 154) writes that in Aceh, Indonesia “GAM meant different things to different people.” As Ian Lustick reminds us, “the work of historians is not...an unproblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and testing theories.” Instead, it “represents a picture of ‘what happened’ that is just as much a function of his or her personal

commitments, the contemporary political issues with which s/he was engaged, and the methodological choices governing his or her work” (quoted in George and Bennett 2005: 95). The problem is not limited to historical documents on which much of the coding is based. The coding process itself “is never divorced from the particular context in which it occurs, whether the ‘coder’ is in the middle of a civil war or the middle of a political science department” (King 2004: 453).

Academics and writers, of course, have been sometimes excoriated for their analytic leanings one way or the other, not least because their insights can directly motivate policy decisions.⁵¹ International governmental and non-governmental actors, for their part, have tended to shy away from overt rebel-focused research altogether or have exercised great circumspection in doing so. Mampilly (2007: 90) quotes an international NGO representative as stating: “My impression is that nobody, not national governments, multilaterals, bilaterals, INGOs and so on, want to be seen to be legitimizing rebel groups by collecting data on their service delivery.” Thus, in addition to the problem of under-reporting, even where there is good documentation the inherent nature of the topic can make navigating this secondary literature difficult.

Third, some of the challenges of coding rebel governance simply stem from the now familiar difficulty of coding a cross-national dataset on civil war. For example, since the main dependent variable in this project is democratization at the national level, I use the civil war as the unit of analysis. For the coding of rebel governance, this means there is one main rebel group for which I code rebel governance for each case. While in

⁵¹ The supposed influence Robert Kaplan had on Bill Clinton’s policy toward intervention in Bosnia has been widely reported, but see also, for instance, Lemarchand’s (2003) take on Phillip Gourevitch’s “breathless tribute to Kagame and the Tutsi cause,” and its effect on US policy toward post-genocide Rwanda.

many cases there is a readily identifiable rebel group against which the state mobilizes its armed forces, in some cases determining which actors constitute “the rebels” is far from straightforward. As anyone who has dealt with civil war datasets are aware, some wars have several rebel factions that sometimes fight alongside, and sometimes fight against, one another. FROLINAT of Chad and its splinter groups is one example. Other groups are initially more coherent, but over time splinter into new groups, and the researcher must make a decision about whether the new group constitutes a new civil war or is a continuation of the same war. The Moro National Liberation Front of the Philippines splintered in the midst of war, with one of its factions founding the Moro Islamic Liberation Front while the strength of the rump organization declined.⁵² I am likewise aware that rebel groups are hardly the unitary actors into which the coding process simplifies them. Descriptive depth is compromised for breadth, but such compromises are a part of any empirical analysis and can be beneficial if they lead to new insights.

A final challenge in coding a cross-national civil war dataset is that most variables of interest to researchers are not static, but change over the course of the war; this certainly goes for rebel governance, as it does for the size of state and rebel forces, rates of economic growth, demography (especially with internal and cross-border displacements), and the degree and type of foreign intervention, to name a few common variables in civil war studies. Thus, it appears that Renamo of Mozambique initially showed little interest in institutionalization, awash as it was with funding first from Rhodesia, then South Africa. It was only in the later years of the war, when its erstwhile foreign patrons had largely ceased to support it, that Renamo attempted more serious

⁵² This is an out-of-dataset example, since the Moro war is coded as ongoing as of 2006.

statebuilding. Such longitudinal data is lost in the process of cross-sectional quantification, though to the extent possible it is noted in the narrative supplement.

Despite these challenges, there is a remarkable amount of case-based information on rebel governance and sufficient variation across the cases to believe that the variation is real, and not simply an artifact of international geopolitical interests or researchers' reporting biases. While rebel groups such as the FMLN in El Salvador are well known for their level of political sophistication, others, such as the post-1996 RUF in Sierra Leone, have received equally serious scholarly attention for their *lack* of efforts at political organization (see Abdullah 1998). Methodologically, I have also sought to consult as many sources as possible for each case to overcome these potential documentation biases.

In addition, I conducted an intercoder reliability test by having undergraduate research assistants recode a total of ten randomly chosen cases using my codebook. This exercise showed that most of the variables I coded could be reliability re-coded even when the sources consulted by the two coders only partially overlapped. It also identified two less reliable variables, however: among the sources of rebel income the "crime" variable, and in rebel statebuilding the "police" variable, had more than one or two discrepancies among the ten recoded cases. I take this directly into account through robustness checks of quantitative tests in this and the next chapter.

The challenges associated with coding a cross-national dataset have not prevented civil war scholars from engaging in such work, and their efforts have been at the center of lively scholarly debates. Given the challenges described above, what is of utmost importance in the coding process is to make it as transparent as possible; doing so allows

researchers themselves to determine its reliability, facilitates future coding changes should further evidence emerge, and also encourages a cumulative effort in knowledge building. I have sought to achieve transparency by taking extensive notes of coding decisions and sources consulted in the supplementary document. Ultimately, the coding will have been a fruitful endeavor if it spurs further debate and leads to improved versions of the dataset in an aggregative learning process.

REBEL GOVERNANCE: BASIC EMPIRICS AND SOME MYTH-BUSTING

Rebel Sources of Income

Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for all of the variables that together measure rebel governance. Figure 3.1 summarizes the data for the individual components of *source* in graphical form, while Figure 3.2 summarizes the composite *source* variable.

Two basic observations can be made about rebel sources of income. First, civilian aid and foreign aid have comprised the most common forms of funding for rebels; 60 and 65 percent of rebel groups have obtained such aid, respectively. This demonstrates one aspect of the way in which post-WWII civil wars have been considerably internationalized, with funding flowing in as much from foreign as domestic civilian sources.⁵³ Twenty percent of rebel groups have been funded by profits from natural resources, and the same percentage by diaspora remittances. Revenue generation through rampant criminal activities, taxation of businesses and commodities, coups, and territorial autonomy have been relatively infrequent.

⁵³ This is consistent with Salehyan's (2009) findings on the transnational nature of many rebel movements. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000: 618) likewise observe that "external intervention in civil war is nearly ubiquitous."

Second, of the 65 percent of rebel groups that relied at least partly on civilian aid (or had prewar autonomy), 80 percent (or 52 percent of all cases) relied additionally on other income sources (Figure 3.2).⁵⁴ This evidence seems to contradict the notion that foreign aid or natural resource rents obviate the need for rebels to raise funds from the population; in fact, at least half of all rebels accrued funds from a mix of civilian and non-civilian sources. The PCJSS of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh received the “full support” of the Indian government but also taxed villagers as part of its extensive administrative network and additionally engaged in “hijacking, kidnapping, dacoity and looting” in order to raise funds (Mohsin 2003: 13; Bertocci 1989: 163; Zaman 1982: 78; and Barua 2001: 109). Only 13 percent of all rebel groups relied exclusively on civilian aid, attesting to the difficulty of waging war with such funds alone, as well as to the wide availability of other sources of revenue. Note that, contrary to the (guerilla-inspired) notion that rebel groups must rely on civilians for survival, a significant proportion of rebel groups – about one in three – fought without systematic reliance on civilian contributions. Of those lacking civilian aid, 70 percent had access to

⁵⁴ The prewar autonomy cases require some explanation with respect to whether or not the rebels in these cases systematically extracted from civilians. On the one hand, sources consulted for these cases tend not to emphasize civilian contributions, focusing instead of rebels’ use of pre-existing institutions to mobilize for war. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had respectively been a Georgian oblast and autonomous republic within the Soviet Union, each fought a civil war against post-Soviet Georgia in the early 1990s. On this, Zürcher (2007: 133) writes, “Decisively, the Abkhaz and Ossets already had their own autonomy and were equipped with political institutions and symbols that facilitated mobilization and secession.” On the other hand, civilians are funneling resources to the leadership of these autonomous regions in the sense that they are paying taxes, if not also directly providing funds and resources for the war effort. Thus, Zürcher (2007: 141) writes of the Abkhazian war: “The war was financed primarily by Abkhazians with budget funds of the Abkhazian ASSR.” In the main version of the civilian aid variable, I code the seven autonomy cases as a 0, consistent with the former logic. In a second version of the variable, they are all coded 1 for civilian aid, consistent with the latter logic. As mentioned, the *source* variable puts the autonomy cases in the “mix of civilian and non-civilian sources” category, that is, *source* = 2.

foreign support, 30 percent had income obtained through coups, and about a quarter had access to profits from natural resources (Figure 3.3). Civilian material support has *not* been a sine qua non for violent rebellion against the state.

What, then, determines which rebels turn to civilians for money and materiel? To answer this, I conduct a logistic regression analysis with the civilian aid dummy variable as the dependent variable. As independent variables I include the other possible sources of rebel funding in order to assess their relationships with civilian aid.⁵⁵ As a control variable I include the length of the war, since longer wars allow rebels more time to explore alternative funding sources. Rebels espousing a Marxist-inspired ideology (1 in 4 cases in the dataset) may be more likely to seek civilian aid, since it is these rebels who heed the Maoist doctrine that guerrilla warfare must be supported by the people (Mao 1961). Alternatively, it may not be so much the ideology, but the technology, of rebellion that determines whether rebels rely on civilian populations. Rebel groups engaged primarily in guerrilla warfare are more likely to depend on civilians, hiding among them and relying on them for food, shelter, and information, than are groups fighting conventional wars in the open.⁵⁶ Finally, rebels fighting for territorial autonomy or secession may be more likely to depend on the people, since it is these very people whom the rebels aspire to govern should they be successful on the battlefield. Thus, I control for rebels proclaiming a Marxist ideology, rebels fighting with the technology of

⁵⁵ Since prewar autonomy “predicts” the lack of civilian aid perfectly, I do not include the autonomy dummy in the regressions presented in Table 3.3. Using the alternative version of civilian aid (which codes a 1 for autonomy cases, see previous footnote) or excluding these cases in various regressions in this chapter made no substantive difference to any of the results. Such robustness checks are noted in the text where relevant.

⁵⁶ For an early work that emphasizes this, see Johnson (1962). See also Kalyvas (2006) and Weinstein (2007).

guerrilla warfare, and rebels aiming for political “exit,” in successive regression models.⁵⁷

Table 3.3 presents the results in odds ratios, where coefficients greater than one indicate a positive relationship and those less than one indicate a negative relationship with civilian aid.⁵⁸ Although any particular rebel group is likely to depend on a heterogeneity of funding sources, I find nonetheless that rebels receiving foreign aid are nearly five times ($1/0.21$, based on Model 5) less likely to systematically rely on civilians compared to those that lack foreign supporters. Likewise, rebels with funds obtained through coups are highly unlikely to depend on civilians for material support.⁵⁹ The coefficients for natural resources and crime are also less than one (though not statistically significant), indicating that all of these variables serve as possible alternatives to civilian sources of funding.

As expected, both espousing a Marxist ideology and fighting guerrilla warfare are significantly associated with rebel reliance on civilians aid, though the relationship between ideology and civilian aid is much greater than that between war technology and civilian aid. Marxist rebels are 11 times more likely to obtain civilian support compared

⁵⁷ Data on Marxist rebels and guerrilla warfare are from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). I code as guerrilla warfare those cases which Kalyvas and Balcells code as irregular or symmetric non-conventional warfare. In both of these kinds of wars, the rebels use light weapons, as opposed to heavy armor and artillery, to fight against the state. Data on rebels’ war aims are from Fortna and Huang (forthcoming).

⁵⁸ The prewar autonomy and tax on goods variables are omitted from this analysis because the lack of civilian aid predicts the failure of these variables perfectly (that is, whenever autonomy and tax on goods take the value of 1, so does the civilian aid dummy).

⁵⁹ The very low odds ratio for coups results from the fact that only two out of 17 cases of coup-funded rebels relied on civilians.

to non-Marxist rebels.⁶⁰ Rebels fighting guerrilla wars with light weapons are about 4 times more likely to rely on civilians than are those engaged in more conventional wars against the state.⁶¹ Even controlling for guerrilla warfare, Marxist ideology continues to drive whether or not rebels depend on civilian contributions. The war aim of the rebels, on the other hand, is not related to their degree of reliance on civilians. In short, whether or not the rebels rely on civilians depends on the availability of other income sources, particularly foreign aid, as well as their ideology and their war-fighting technology.

Rebel Statebuilding

Turning now to rebel statebuilding, Figure 3.4 summarizes the *govern* variable, showing the frequency of rebel statebuilding efforts. Wickham-Crowley asserts that rebel governance in civil war requires “documentation, not assumption” (1993: 185), and the evidence corroborates his statement. First, as seen by the leftward skewness of the graph, most rebel groups engage in little institution-building; the mean is 3.6 institutions across all cases. Forty-four percent of rebel groups built two or fewer institutions; 19 percent take on a 0 for the *govern* variable, indicating minimal political organization and a lack even of centralized political leadership. The so-called “dissident” rebels in the Matebeleland conflict in Zimbabwe were, according to one source, a heterogeneous group that was “ultimately leaderless” (Catholic Commission 2007: 54). Second, Figure 3.5 shows that the institutions rebel groups built with the greatest frequency are the

⁶⁰ There are only two Marxist rebel groups that did not rely on civilian aid, which explains the large odds ratio.

⁶¹ The Marxist and guerrilla war dummy variables are correlated at 0.21, and therefore are entered separately in Models 2 and 3. Note that all results remain substantively unchanged.

bodies expected of any operative organization seeking to attract supporters – an executive leadership (70 percent) and a propaganda machinery (62 percent); the establishment of these bodies can hardly be called statebuilding. Thus, while it may be that in insurgent warfare “state building is the insurgents’ central goal and renders organized and sustained rebellion...distinct from phenomena such as banditry, mafias, or social movements” (Kalyvas 2006: 218), the data suggest that across all civil wars extensive rebel statebuilding has been more the exception than the norm. Likewise, “rebel governments,” as defined by Weinstein, have seldom been established. Most rebels either do not seek, or fail to achieve, elaborate statebuilding, and yet manage to wage war and generate significant casualties.

Nevertheless, we see that about 25 to 35 percent of all groups have engaged in each of the various statebuilding activities including the formation of legislative bodies, courts or laws, police forces, schools, and health clinics, and the imposition of taxes on civilians. Thirty-six percent engaged in active diplomacy, attempting to gain international support or formal recognition. During the course of its war Polisario of Morocco/Western Sahara declared its own state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR was recognized by over 70 states by the late 1980s and Polisario proceeded to open embassies in most of the African states that recognized it (Saxena 1981: 85). Sixteen rebel groups (13 percent) built eight or more institutions, creating something akin to full-blown states-within-states (though with varying degrees of functionality). The high institutionalists comprise a motley group, ranging from the FMLN in El Salvador, the Anya Nya in Sudan, and the Maoists in Nepal, to secessionist rebels such as the Kurds in Iraq and Croatians in the disintegrating Yugoslavia (see Table

3.4). While there is a variation in their war aims, ideology and geographic region, one striking feature they share is the length of the war. Most of these groups fought for many years against the state, much longer than the mean duration of about 7 years across all cases. The two cases in which the war lasted less than one year – China vs. Tibet, and Yugoslavia vs. Croatia – are the two cases on this list in which the rebel territories enjoyed prewar autonomy, allowing them a significant “head start” in wartime statebuilding.⁶²

Which rebels, then, govern civilians through wartime institution-building? In particular, the foregoing discussion raises questions about the relationship between rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding. Studies suggest that rebels engage in statebuilding precisely where they depend on civilians for material and political support, and that the causal arrow may run in both directions (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). Rebel statebuilding is a form of control, and enables rebel groups to elicit voluntary or coerced collaboration from the people under their authority. It is for this reason that the “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency often involves socioeconomic development projects aimed at luring the people away from supporting the rebels.⁶³

Thus, a simple hypothesis is that rebel statebuilding is more likely where rebels receive material support from civilians. Having assessed bivariate relationships, I now use multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between rebel income sources and

⁶² In fact, in most of the prewar autonomy cases, most rebel institutions had already been established prior to the war, and hence they are not “wartime” institutions as such.

⁶³ See, for example, Johnson (1986); Krepinevich (1986).

rebel statebuilding.⁶⁴ The dependent variable is the *govern* variable which records the number of institutions established by each rebel group. In some models below, I reduce the *govern* variable to a more blunt ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3. This reduces the sensitivity of this variable to false negatives while also reducing skewness and kurtosis.

The independent variables include the various sources of rebel income. Rather than civilian funding per se, it could, again, be the Marxist ideology exhorting rebels to forge political ties with civilians, or the waging of guerrilla warfare, that motivates rebel statebuilding. Since these two variables are, as we have seen, significantly associated with rebel reliance on civilians, including them in the model also serves to lessen the chance of omitted variable bias. I also control for the length of the war: it may simply be that longer wars allow more time for rebels to organize and build institutions, irrespective of the source of rebel income. Finally, I control for the percentage of the conflict area covered by mountainous terrain,⁶⁵ as studies suggest that such terrain facilitates rebel mobilization by providing physical cover (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2009).

Table 3.5 displays the results. Model 1 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression.⁶⁶ Subsequent models exclude the seven prewar autonomy cases. In each of these cases the rebels had wartime recourse to institutions they had established prior to the start of the war, institutions that are counted in *govern* but were not *wartime*

⁶⁴ An obvious caveat is that more sophisticated statistical techniques, such as matching or the use of an instrumental variable, are needed to make valid causal inferences; in the regressions below, endogeneity, particularly the direction of causality, remains an issue.

⁶⁵ Data from Lujala (2010).

⁶⁶ In all estimations, I cluster cases by country and report robust standard errors. Doing so corrects for any heteroskedasticity and accounts for the fact that cases from the same country may not be independent of each other.

institutions per se. It would therefore be misleading to conclude that the rebels in these cases built wartime institutions. Because the *govern* variable accounts for whether or not the rebels collected civilian taxes, which is also captured by the civilian aid variable, the dependent variable in Model 2 excludes rebel tax systems in counting the number of governance institutions (*govnotax*).

One concern with simply counting the number of institutions built is that some institutions may be inherently more “difficult” to establish than others, so that, say, we would expect any rebel group that managed to build a healthcare system (probably a fairly challenging endeavor) to also have built a more basic institution such as a rebel “executive” (easier to create, and possibly a precondition for the creation of social service institutions like healthcare). One way to test whether this diverse range of institutions can be logically welded together into a variable like *govern* is to conduct a Mokken analysis. The Mokken procedure identifies the extent to which any pair of items (i.e. rebel institutions) counted in *govern* violates a common latent hierarchy among them. Using this procedure, I find that the humanitarian relief variable and the state tax boycott variable do not meet the Mokken criteria for inclusion.⁶⁷ Thus, in Model 3 the dependent variable is a variant of *govern* that does not count these two component variables (*govmokken*). Model 4 uses this same dependent variable but excludes two independent variables shown to be insignificant in previous models, namely the guerrilla warfare and mountainous terrain variables.⁶⁸ Rather than OLS, in this model I run a tobit regression

⁶⁷ I also find that diplomacy constitutes a “weak scale” (Loevinger $H = 0.36$), police a “medium scale” (0.46) and all other institution variables a “strong scale” (>0.5) based on the standard H score criteria. See Hardouin and Bonnaud-Antignac (2011).

⁶⁸ Doing so increases the number of cases because these each contain a handful of missing observations.

which accounts for the censoring of the dependent variable at both the lower and upper bounds – that is, it accounts for the fact that by design the number of institutions cannot be lower than 0 and higher than 9 (after excluding humanitarian aid and state tax boycott). In Model 5 the dependent variable is the reduced form of govern (*govern2*) ranging from 0 to 3. I run an ordered logistic regression in this case and report results in odds ratios.⁶⁹ Finally, in Model 6, I use the composite *source* variable that combines the various sources of rebel funding into a measure ranging from 1 to 3, as discussed earlier, in lieu of the individual source variables.

Results are largely consistent across model variations. Rebel reliance on civilian contributions is significantly correlated with greater rebel statebuilding. According to Model 1, rebel groups that rely on civilian material support build 2.3 more institutions than do rebels without civilian aid, all else equal. This may not seem particularly large an effect, but is non-negligible when we recall that the mean number of institutions across all cases is 3.6 (with a standard deviation of 3). In fact, a simple cross-tabulation of civilian aid and high institutionalization (arbitrarily defined as cases with 6 or more institutions built) shows that rebels relied on civilian aid in each of the 32 cases of high institutionalization (see Table 3.6).⁷⁰ Analysis using the composite source variable in Model 6 shows that rebels relying exclusively on civilian aid build more institutions than those relying on a mix of civilian and non-civilian aid or on non-civilian sources alone. Again, the causal arrow may be pointing both ways: civilian aid may

⁶⁹ I tested the validity of the proportional odds assumption for ordinal logistic regressions using the “*omodel*” function in STATA. I find that the reduced govern variable does not violate the assumption, and that therefore ordinal logistic regression is an appropriate estimation method in this case.

⁷⁰ This explains the very high odds ratio for civilian aid in Model 5 of Table 3.5.

motivate rebels to reciprocate by building governance institutions, and as rebel institutions develop and cater to civilian interests, civilians may provide further support to the rebels. Rebels emboldened by successful statebuilding may also have more military and political leverage with which to coerce civilian support. Whatever the causal process, the evidence broadly suggests the presence of a significant relationship between how the rebels govern, and whether or not the governed contribute to the rebel group.

Aside from rebel reliance on civilian aid, few other income sources affect the extent of rebel statebuilding. Rebels that obtain funding by taxing businesses, trades, and services build about 2 more institutions than do those that do not engage in such activities, but this is not surprising if we consider such a tax system to be itself a statebuilding institution. Thus, those that build other kinds of institutions are also capable of, or likely to, impose taxes on goods and services. There is some evidence that diaspora funding is positively associated with rebel statebuilding. Further theorizing is needed to understand why this may be so. On the one hand, we can view remittances as having an effect similar to that of foreign aid or natural resources – they could diminish the need for rebels to depend on local civilians, and hence also decrease their incentives to govern (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). On the other hand, those in the diaspora are co-ethnics and co-religionists; receiving funding from them may incentivize the rebels to build states locally as a way of indirectly demonstrating their responsiveness and accountability to their overseas supporters. The results here are consistent with the latter logic.

Consistent with the bivariate analysis above, war duration is positively associated with rebel statebuilding. Longer wars allow more time for rebels to build institutions,

while successful institution-building may also prolong wars by increasing rebels' capacity to fight. Marxist rebels engage in greater statebuilding, though the difference is just one more institution built than non-Marxist rebels. Neither the technology of rebellion nor the amount of mountainous terrain in conflict areas is associated with rebel statebuilding, contrary to expectations.

Next, I examine the impact of these variables on the *kinds* of institutions rebels build rather than on the degree of institutionalization. Do the effects of funding sources, war duration, and ideology differ between different institution types? To answer this, I create three new binary variables. The first captures whether or not the rebels instituted a system of leadership accountability in the form of popular elections. The variable, *elect*, is coded 1 if the rebel group had either an executive or a legislature whose members were popularly elected. Election of the “elite” by the “elite” – for instance, a “central committee” voting on the membership of a “politburo”⁷¹ – does not constitute a popular election. The other two variables are created out of data already coded for the *govern* variable. A variable, *law*, captures whether or not a rebel group sought to create at least a modicum of “law and order.” It is coded 1 if the rebels created either their own laws or courts, or their own police or self-defense forces. Finally, the variable *service* is coded 1 if the rebels engaged in any of the social service activities described above, namely the building of schools or hospitals or the delivery of humanitarian aid.

As shown in Table 3.2, a fair number of rebel groups – 18 percent in all – introduced an electoral system in which the people voted for their leaders at some level of the rebel organizational hierarchy. In the “village democratization” efforts of the EPLF

⁷¹ These are common “executive” bodies within communist rebel organizations.

of Eritrea, “village elections were held as often as every three-to-four months as people learned to evaluate the performance of their new officials and to oust those who didn't measure up” (Connell 2001: 355). Thirty-seven percent created “law” or “order” institutions, and 36 percent provided at least one of the three social services. Further analysis readily demonstrates close associations between rebel reliance on civilian aid and the creation each of these types of institutions (see Table 3.7). In fact, cross tabulations show that there is not a single case in which rebels held elections without also depending on civilian material support.⁷² Similarly, there are only two cases in which rebels delivered social services without relying on civilian aid.⁷³ Likewise, logistic regression analysis shows that rebels receiving civilian aid are 3.5 times more likely to attempt law and order than are those without civilian aid. In short, while rebels will tend not to create law and order institutions without civilian aid, they are almost certain not to provide social services or attempt “democratic” wartime elections if they do not depend on civilian contributions for the war. Rebel statebuilding is intimately linked with rebel funding sources.

To sum, I have shown that rebels are funded as often by foreign aid as by civilian aid, and that most rebel groups secure income from a mix of these and other sources. Nevertheless, rebel groups that receive no foreign support are significantly more likely to turn to civilians for material support. While many rebel groups engage in extensive political organization, full rebel governance, where rebels take on the spectrum of state-

⁷² Note, though, that the reverse does not hold – there are plenty of rebels that relied on civilians but did not hold elections. But because the lack of civilian aid predicts the lack of *elect* perfectly, I do not conduct regression analysis for *elect*.

⁷³ Again, this explains the large odds ratio for civilian aid in Model 1 of Table 3.7.

like functions, is an atypical phenomenon in civil war. Statebuilding rebels tend to be those that depend on civilians for money and materiel, suggesting that rebel governance involves a two-way relationship between the rebel governors and the governed. In practice, this means that where rebels obtain money and goods from civilians, whether through “taxes,” “donations,” or through outright coercion, rebels are more likely to create a (sometimes elected) leadership body, dispatch representatives to towns and villages as well as overseas, set down rules, disseminate messages, and open schools and health posts even as they destroy those run by the state. In wars in which the rebels are provided for by other funding sources, rebel leaders are much less likely to expend even their ample sums for political organization of this sort.

In terms of the dataset, I have shown that this new data enable novel descriptive and statistical analysis on the causes (and, in the next chapter, the effects) of rebel governance. Note that the qualitative supplement, which contains narrative micro-level data on each case, offers further descriptive data to enhance, or add nuance to, conclusions drawn from quantitative analysis. For example, while statistical analysis suggests a positive link between war duration and rebel statebuilding, the narrative data show that rebel governance can nonetheless emerge with unexpected rapidity, and with great spontaneity, in some instances. As sociologist Charles Kurzman (2004: 155) writes of the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing civil war, and as excerpted in the narrative supplement,

As the state retreated from its everyday duties, the Islamists developed shadow state institutions. In Hamadan, at the end of November [1978], religious leaders organized a group of night watchmen that evolved into a full system of local governance. In January [1979]...Islamists created “Islamic police forces” around the country to perform basic duties – deterring crime, directing traffic – that were no longer being performed by the state. Neighborhood councils also organized

food distribution during the general strike and then branched out into pharmaceuticals, fuel, and winter clothing.⁷⁴

In this way, the qualitative data can be used in conjunction with the quantitative data to shed new analytical light on the internal dynamics of rebellion.

REBEL GOVERNANCE AS A RESEARCH AGENDA

This chapter aimed to introduce both the concept of rebel governance in civil wars and the new dataset that helps to document the phenomenon. In terms of the larger project, this chapter serves to set the stage for an analysis of the causal effects of rebel governance on postwar political regimes in the next chapter. That is, while it is worth examining rebel governance in its own right, as I have done here, understanding what *is* and what *causes* rebel governance becomes critical as we move on to engaging the components of rebel governance as explanatory variables in the analyses to come.

In addition to the substantive findings of this chapter, this brief survey of rebel governance also offers at least two implications for the study of rebel organizations more generally. First, rebel governance requires documentation. While some rebels strive for and achieve high levels of institutionalization, others are barely organized, let alone institutionalized, and yet all are able to fight against the state (by definition; otherwise the

⁷⁴ Similarly, in the anti-Qaddafi demonstrations that began in Libya in February 2011, opposition forces were quick to assert political authority. Already by late February reports noted that “the Libyan revolution is only a week old, but in eastern Libya, where the state apparatus has completely collapsed, people are setting up a local authority. [Opposition groups in] Benghazi have formed committees to oversee food distribution, services, humanitarian aid and garbage collection” (see “Libyan Rebels Plan Offensive Against Tripoli,” NPR, available at <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/134034855/In-Libya-Defectors-Organize-In-Benghazi>, accessed 2/28/2011). By late February, these groups had formed a national council to coordinate activities and to present “a political face” against the weakening regime (see “Libya Opposition Launches Council,” Al Jazeera English, available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/02/2011227175955221853.html>, accessed 2/28/2011).

conflict would not constitute a civil war). The necessity of documentation goes not only for behavior, but also for motivation: not all rebel groups achieve wartime statebuilding, and not all may even attempt to do so. While some “low-institutionalists” may have failed to build states, others may have had little such interest. At a minimum, our starting assumption should therefore be heterogeneity of rebel motives *and* behavior. In particular, we should abandon the unfounded assumption that all rebel groups aim to build full alternative governments as they wage war. Just as James Scott’s (2009) hill people of Zomia are, as he argues with deliberate irony, “barbarians by design,” so rebel groups may choose to remain relatively unorganized and uninstitutionalized for fully strategic reasons.

Second, we should also assume heterogeneity of rebel funding sources. In particular, there appears to be a dichotomy emerging in the literature between the disciplined, ideological rebel statebuilders who cater to the interests of local civilians, versus the undisciplined, profiteer rebel criminals seeking to usurp access to natural resource endowments. However, evidence shows that more than half of all rebel groups obtained civilian material support *and* additionally had access to contraband, external aid, and other sources; rare is a group relying exclusively on one source of funding. Thus, “resource determinism” may be one critique lodged against arguments that attribute certain rebel behavior to natural resource endowments, but in reality the presence of other funding incentives makes nuance important for both the argument and its critique.

CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX

Table 3.1: List of Civil Wars, 1950-2006

Country	Start year	End year	Conflict
Afghanistan	1978	1992	PDPA v. Mujahideen
Afghanistan	1992	1996	Burhanuddin Rabbani v. Taliban
Algeria	1962	1963	Post-independence strife
Algeria	1992	2002	FIS, AIS, GIA, GSPC
Angola	1975	1991	UNITA
Angola	1992	1994	UNITA
Angola	1997	2002	UNITA
Angola	1994	2006	FLEC (Cabinda)
Argentina	1955	1955	Anti-Peronists
Argentina	1975	1977	Montoneros, ERP
Azerbaijan	1991	1994	Nagorno-Karabakh
Bangladesh	1974	1997	Chittagong Hill Tracts/Shanti Bahini
Bolivia	1952	1952	MNR rebellion
Bosnia	1992	1995	Rep. Srpska/Croats
Burundi	1965	1969	Hutu uprising
Burundi	1972	1972	Hutu uprising
Burundi	1988	1988	Org. massacres on both sides
Burundi	1991	2006	Hutu groups (Palipehutu)
Cambodia	1970	1975	FUNK; Khmer
Cambodia	1979	1991	Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC
Central African Republic	1996	1997	Anti-Patassé mutinies
Chad	1965	1979	FROLINAT
Chad	1980	1994	FARF; FROLINAT
Chad	1997	2002	MDJT
China	1950	1951	Tibet re-annexation
China	1956	1959	Tibet uprising
China	1967	1968	Red Guards
Colombia	1948	1966	La Violencia
Congo-Brazzaville	1993	1997	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso
Congo-Brazzaville	1998	1999	Cobras v. Ninjas
Congo-Zaire	1960	1965	Katanga mutiny
Congo-Zaire	1967	1967	Kisangani mutiny
Congo-Zaire	1977	1978	FLNC; Shabba 1 & 2
Congo-Zaire	1996	1997	ADFL (Kabila)
Congo-Zaire	1998	2002	RCD
Croatia	1992	1995	Krajina, Eastern Slavonia

Cuba	1958	1959	Castro revolution
Cyprus	1963	1967	GC-TC civil war
Djibouti	1991	1994	FRUD
Dominican Republic	1965	1965	Pro-Bosch rebels
El Salvador	1979	1992	FMLN
Egypt	1994	1997	Gamaat Islamiya; Islamic Jihad
Ethiopia	1974	1991	EPLF (Eritrea)
Ethiopia	1978	1991	TPLF (Tigray)
Ethiopia	1976	1988	Ogaden; Somalis
Georgia	1991	1992	South Ossetia
Georgia	1992	1994	Abkhazia
Guatemala	1966	1972	Communists
Guatemala	1978	1994	Communists; Indigenous
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1999	Vieira v. Mane
Haiti	1991	1995	Cedras v. Aristide
India	1984	1993	Sikhs
Indonesia	1950	1950	South Moluccas
Indonesia	1953	1953	Darul Islam (Aceh)
Indonesia	1956	1960	Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta
Indonesia	1976	1978	OPM (West Papua)
Indonesia	1975	1999	East Timor
Indonesia	1990	1991	GAM (Aceh)
Indonesia	1999	2005	GAM (Aceh)
Iran	1978	1979	Anti-Shah coalition
Iran	1979	1984	KDPI (Kurds)
Iraq	1959	1959	Shammar/Mosul Revolt
Iraq	1961	1970	KDP (Kurds)
Iraq	1974	1975	KDP (Kurds)
Iraq	1985	1996	Kurds (Anfal)
Iraq	1991	1993	Shiite uprising
Israel	1987	1997	Intifada
Jordan	1970	1971	Fedeyeen
Kenya	1963	1967	Shifta war (Somalis)
Laos	1960	1973	Pathet Lao
Lebanon	1958	1958	Chamoun v. Nasserites
Lebanon	1975	1991	Lebanese Front; Lebanese National Movement
Liberia	1989	1997	NPFL
Liberia	1999	2003	Anti-Taylor resistance/LURD
Mali	1990	1995	Tuaregs
Moldova	1991	1992	Transdnistria
Morocco/Western Sahara	1975	1991	Polisario

Mozambique	1976	1992	Renamo
Myanmar/Burma	1948	1951	Karen rebellion 1
Myanmar/Burma	1948	1988	Communists
Myanmar/Burma	1960	1995	Karen rebellion 2
Namibia	1973	1989	SWAPO
Nepal	1996	2006	Maoists
Nicaragua	1978	1979	FSLN
Nicaragua	1981	1990	Contras
Nigeria	1967	1970	Biafra
Nigeria	1980	1985	Maitatsine rebellion
Oman	1971	1975	Dhofar rebellion
Pakistan	1971	1971	Bangladesh secession
Pakistan	1973	1977	Baluchistan
Pakistan	1994	1999	MQM (Mohajirs)
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	BRA (Bougainville)
Peru	1980	1996	Sendero Luminoso
Philippines	1950	1952	Huks
Philippines	1972	1992	NPA
Russia	1994	1996	Chechnya 1
Rwanda	1963	1964	Tutsi uprising
Rwanda	1990	1993	RPF
Rwanda	1994	1994	RPF
Senegal	1989	2004	MFDC (Casamance)
Sierra Leone	1991	1996	RUF
Sierra Leone	1997	2001	post-Koroma coup violence
Somalia	1988	1991	SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)
South Africa	1976	1994	ANC; PAC
Sri Lanka	1971	1971	JVP
Sri Lanka	1983	2002	LTTE
Sri Lanka	1987	1989	JVP II
Sudan	1963	1972	Anyanya
Sudan	1983	2005	SPLA/M
Syria	1979	1982	Muslim Brotherhood
Tajikistan	1992	1997	UTO
Thailand	1966	1982	Communists (CPT)
Turkey	1984	1999	PKK (Kurds)
Uganda	1966	1966	Baganda rebellion
Uganda	1978	1979	Tanzanian war; UNLA, UNLF
Uganda	1981	1987	NRA
Uganda	1990	1992	LRA
United Kingdom	1971	1998	Northern Ireland
USSR	1944	1950	Ukraine/UPA
Vietnam	1960	1975	NLF

Yemen	1994	1994	South Yemen
Yemen AR	1962	1970	Royalists
Yemen PR	1986	1986	Pro-Ismail rebels
Yugoslavia	1991	1991	Croatia/Krajina
Yugoslavia	1998	1999	Kosovo
Zimbabwe	1972	1979	ZANU
Zimbabwe	1983	1987	Ndebele guerillas

Table 3.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Rebel Sources of Funding</i>					
<i>source</i>	126	1.82	0.69	1	3
Civilian aid	126	0.60	0.49	0	1
Foreign aid	127	0.65	0.48	0	1
Natural resources	126	0.20	0.40	0	1
Remittances	126	0.20	0.40	0	1
Coup	126	0.13	0.34	0	1
Crime	126	0.18	0.39	0	1
Tax on goods/services	126	0.13	0.34	0	1
Prewar autonomy	127	0.06	0.23	0	1
<i>Rebel Statebuilding</i>					
<i>govern</i>	126	3.57	2.98	0	10
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	126	1.44	1.00	0	3
Executive	126	0.70	0.46	0	1
Legislature/regional councils	126	0.35	0.48	0	1
Courts/laws	126	0.28	0.45	0	1
Tax on civilians	126	0.28	0.45	0	1
Mandatory exemption from state taxes	126	0.03	0.18	0	1
Police	126	0.25	0.44	0	1
Education	126	0.30	0.46	0	1
Health	126	0.29	0.46	0	1
Humanitarian aid	126	0.07	0.26	0	1
Propaganda/media	126	0.63	0.48	0	1
Diplomacy	126	0.38	0.49	0	1
<i>elect</i>	126	0.18	0.39	0	1
<i>law</i>	126	0.37	0.49	0	1
<i>service</i>	126	0.37	0.48	0	1
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Ideology = Marxist	127	0.24	0.43	0	1
Technology = guerrilla	118	0.65	0.48	0	1
Rebel aim = exit	127	0.35	0.48	0	1
War duration (months)	127	83.63	87.43	1	478
War duration (ln)	127	3.69	1.45	0	6.17
% Mountainous terrain in conflict area	119	0.34	0.30	0	1

Figure 3.1




Figure 3.2





Figure 3.3

Table 3.3: Determinants of Rebel Reliance on Civilian Aid⁷⁵

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	----- Civilian aid (logit) -----				
Foreign aid	0.27* (0.183)	0.18** (0.135)	0.22** (0.155)	0.17** (0.134)	0.21** (0.155)
Natural resources	0.76 (0.415)	0.50 (0.321)	0.68 (0.415)	0.43 (0.277)	0.79 (0.516)
Coup	0.03*** (0.027)	0.05*** (0.055)	0.04*** (0.047)	0.04*** (0.045)	0.05*** (0.055)
Crime	1.07 (0.607)	0.72 (0.475)	0.55 (0.377)	0.69 (0.429)	0.55 (0.389)
Remittances	0.87 (0.433)	1.03 (0.595)	1.02 (0.624)	1.00 (0.571)	0.93 (0.612)
War duration (ln)		1.82*** (0.378)	1.79*** (0.354)	2.03*** (0.407)	1.56* (0.380)
Marxist		11.16*** (8.626)			11.47*** (8.795)
Guerrilla			4.21** (2.563)		3.94** (2.622)
Exit wars				0.74 (0.378)	
Constant	6.19*** (3.786)	0.71 (0.643)	0.36 (0.306)	0.81 (0.696)	0.43 (0.395)
Observations	126	126	117	126	117

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁷⁵ Results reported in odds ratios.

Figure 3.4




Figure 3.5




Table 3.4: List of High-Institutionalist Rebels

Country	Conflict	<i>Govern</i>	Marxist	Prewar autonomy	War aim	War duration
China	Tibet	9	0	1	3	7
El Salvador	FMLN	9	1	0	1	148
Ethiopia	EPLF (Eritrean)	10	1	0	3	209
Ethiopia	TPLF (Tigrayan)	8	1	0	2	159
Iraq	Kurds	10	0	0	3	142
Israel	Intifada	9	0	0	3	121
Jordan	Fedeyeen	9	0	0	1	18
Laos	Pathet Lao	9	1	0	2	149
Lebanon	National Movement/PSP	9	1	0	1	198
Nepal	CPN-M (Maoists)	9	1	0	1	129
Peru	Sendero Luminoso	8	1	0	1	198
Sri Lanka	LTTE	9	1	0	3	223
Sudan	Anya Nya	9	0	0	2	101
Uganda	NRA	8	0	0	1	73
Vietnam	NLF	9	1	0	1	184
Yugoslavia	Croatia/Krajina	9	0	1	3	8

Notes:

- 1) A “high-institutionalist” rebel group is defined in this table as a group with a *govern* value of 8 or greater.
- 2) War aim: 1 = control of central government; 2 = mixed/ambiguous; 3 = autonomy/secession (data from Fortna and Huang, forthcoming).
- 3) War duration is counted in months.

Table 3.5: Determinants of Rebel Statebuilding

VARIABLES	(1) <i>govern</i> (OLS)	(2) <i>govnotax</i> (OLS)	(3) <i>govmokken</i> (OLS)	(4) <i>govmokken</i> (tobit)	(5) ⁷⁶ <i>govern2</i> (ord. logit)	(6) <i>govern</i> (OLS)
Civilian aid	2.26*** (0.447)	2.02*** (0.407)	2.26*** (0.413)	2.78*** (0.544)	14.20*** (8.347)	
Foreign aid	-0.31 (0.456)	-0.27 (0.435)	-0.16 (0.428)	0.23 (0.500)	1.36 (0.619)	
Natural resources	0.21 (0.441)	0.23 (0.419)	0.26 (0.437)	0.24 (0.524)	1.26 (0.606)	
Coup	-0.80 (0.513)	-0.75 (0.474)	-0.71 (0.498)	-1.63* (0.825)		
Remittances	0.37 (0.397)	0.47 (0.360)	0.40 (0.402)	1.05** (0.531)	4.01*** (1.528)	
Crime	-0.50 (0.509)	-0.57 (0.486)	-0.42 (0.496)	-0.51 (0.558)	0.66 (0.288)	
Tax on goods	2.41*** (0.644)	1.54** (0.685)	1.98*** (0.676)	2.26*** (0.740)	7.34*** (4.936)	
Autonomy	4.10*** (0.551)					
<i>Source</i>						1.57*** (0.328)
War duration (ln)	0.46*** (0.124)	0.43*** (0.128)	0.43*** (0.123)	0.46*** (0.163)	1.55*** (0.180)	0.57*** (0.124)
Marxist	1.16* (0.596)	1.18** (0.548)	1.11** (0.550)	0.92 (0.589)	1.85 (0.966)	1.15* (0.606)
Guerilla	-0.40 (0.429)	-0.41 (0.411)	-0.35 (0.427)			
Mountainous	0.32 (0.632)	0.48 (0.717)	0.42 (0.726)			
Constant	0.07 (0.466)	0.08 (0.397)	-0.07 (0.445)	-1.10 (0.703)		-1.68*** (0.579)
Observations	110	103	103	119	119	126
R-squared	0.624	0.582	0.606			0.354

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁷⁶ Results reported in odds ratios.

Table 3.6: Cross-Tabulation of Civilian Aid and High Institutionalization

Civilian aid	1 if <i>govern</i> > 5		Total
	0	1	
0	43	0	43
1	44	32	76
Total	87	32	119

Table 3.7: Types of Rebel Institutions⁷⁷

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	<i>service</i>	<i>law</i>
Civilian aid	13.59*** (10.120)	3.53* (2.379)
Foreign aid	0.99 (0.526)	2.05 (1.148)
Natural resources	1.37 (0.878)	0.90 (0.616)
Remittances	0.88 (0.581)	1.18 (0.623)
Crime	0.43 (0.263)	0.65 (0.369)
Tax on goods	1.72 (1.184)	4.81** (3.225)
War duration (ln)	1.72*** (0.318)	1.68** (0.377)
Marxist	2.23 (1.205)	1.20 (0.697)
Constant	0.01*** (0.009)	0.01*** (0.012)
Observations	119	119

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁷⁷ Results reported in odds ratios.

CHAPTER 4

REBEL GOVERNANCE AND POSTWAR DEMOCRATIZATION: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

When rebel groups establish their operational bases and political structures among civilian populations, tapping into their labor, income, possessions, and information for their war efforts, two kinds of transformations occur. One is that it results in a set of politically mobilized citizens who are aware of the regime's shortcomings and are seeking and expecting change. Evidence presented in Chapter 3 showed that rebels are most likely to solicit civilian contributions where they lack funding from other sources, especially foreign support. The other transformation is that in order to effectuate and sustain this extractive relationship with civilians, some rebel groups become "statebuilders" over time, essentially replacing some of the state's authority with their own. We found that this is most likely to occur where rebels rely extensively on civilians and lack other funding sources, and where wars are long-lasting. In contrast, when rebels enjoy the full backing of a foreign patron, or are awash with cash from mineral rents or other sources, they tend to draw less on civilians and build fewer, if any, governance institutions.

Each of these wartime transformations, I hypothesize, has enduring political effects that carry over into postwar politics. Civilian mobilization makes it politically costly for postwar elites to ignore the restive public, creating incentives to introduce liberalizing reforms as they solidify the new postwar regime. Rebel statebuilding leaves the actual wartime institutions – their systems, norms, and practices – for postwar rulers to contend with. Should the rebels prevail in the war, they may inherit these institutions and adapt them to postwar politics to facilitate the war-to-peace transition. Just how

these wartime institutions will affect postwar regime dynamics will depend on the actual nature of these institutions.

This chapter assesses these theoretical propositions through statistical analysis using the 1950-2006 Rebel Governance Dataset described in the previous chapter. Democratization in the post-civil war context, I contend, will be shaped by more than the “usual suspects” that explain democratization in peaceful contexts – it will have wartime origins. The chapter first lays out the empirical strategy, describing the inference issues and how they will be addressed. Before testing the effects of rebel governance on postwar regimes, the second section examines whether rebel governance affects how the war ends. This is an important step in sorting out the effects of rebel governance and untangling its relations with other variables. The third section subjects my hypotheses and alternative arguments to statistical tests. The final section discusses the findings.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

The previous chapter provided a brief survey of rebel governance. The chapter’s objective was first to examine the basic empirics of rebel governance as a significant wartime outcome in its own right; additionally, the analysis served to create the building blocks for testing the *effects* of rebel governance on postwar regimes, which I take up in this chapter. Analysis in Chapter 3 underscores the importance of carefully selecting an empirical strategy when using rebel governance to explain an outcome. As discussed, rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding are not exogenously determined, but are related to certain aspects of the war or to the rebels’ own characteristics (for instance their ideology and technology of rebellion). It is plausible that these variables that are

associated with rebel governance also explain postwar regime variations. If a number of variables are associated with both rebel governance and regime outcomes, then this raises a concern about the possible endogeneity of rebel governance in models of postwar regimes. If such endogeneity issues are not directly addressed – that is, if rebel governance is taken as exogenous – then estimates of the effects of rebel governance on postwar regimes could be biased, leading to misleading conclusions.

I address this concern by directly employing the results of the previous chapter in setting up multiple regression analysis. Having identified some of the variables that are associated with rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding, I use these variables as controls in models of postwar democratization. By controlling for these measurable confounding factors, I can reduce the bias in the estimated effects of the main variables of interest.⁷⁸ The strength of the method I adopt is that the selection of the appropriate statistical model will be based on both theoretical guidance and on empirical findings about the sources of endogeneity.

This method is not without its weaknesses. While I have identified some of the factors that are associated with rebel governance, there are certain to be others, and some of these may be associated with postwar democratization as well. Some of the determinants of rebel governance may be simply unobservable and unmeasurable, such as private information on the part of rebels or civilians. It is therefore practically infeasible to control for every variable that may be correlated with the endogenous variables.

⁷⁸ This is the approach most commonly adopted by studies that come closest to my own, though some are less explicit about the endogeneity issues underlying their works and fewer still conduct theoretically grounded hypothesis tests of the determinants of their endogenous variables.

Controlling for a long list of variables, moreover, can itself raise new methodological issues and may or may not improve the estimation of parameters.⁷⁹

A potentially superior way to address the endogeneity concern is to use an instrumental variable in a two-stage regression analysis. However, the success of this strategy hinges entirely on the instrument being valid and sufficiently strong. Short of these characteristics, the instrumental variable approach may yield results that are no less, and possibly more, biased than those of ordinary least squares. In the case at hand, the identification strategy requires that there be at least as many instruments as there are endogenous variables. Finding at least two, let alone a single, valid instrument to account for the two endogenous variables (*source* and *govern*) will be a serious challenge. Furthermore, the exclusion restriction that the instrument has no effect on democratization other than through its effect on rebel governance is a tough criterion to meet theoretically and, in any event, is also untestable.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See Achen (2005). Degrees of freedom would also be of concern in such a model, given the relatively small number of cases that comprise the set of post-1950 civil wars.

⁸⁰ We might think of the war's duration and Marxist ideology, both of which were found in Chapter 3 to explain rebel statebuilding. However, scholars have found links between the war's duration and postwar regime outcomes, and I find later in this chapter that a Marxist rebel ideology is also directly associated with postwar democratization. The more successful instruments in recent social science scholarship have tended to be based on naturally occurring phenomena such as amounts of rainfall or wind speed and direction, that is, variables that are clearly exogenous to the model (see Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009). Along such lines, we might think of the amount of rugged terrain as plausibly explaining rebel statebuilding while also being uncorrelated with changes in political regimes. In the dataset used in this study the Spearman correlation between the amount of mountainous terrain in the conflict territory and the reduced form of *govern* is 0.21. However, regression analysis in Table 3.5 showed the mountainous terrain variable to be an insignificant predictor of rebel statebuilding. The correlation between the percentage of the conflict *country* covered by mountainous terrain (*mtnest* – from Fearon and Laitin 2003) and rebel statebuilding is even lower, at 0.07. While theoretically mountains and forest cover may serve a similar purpose in providing the rebels cover, the correlation between the amount of the conflict territory covered by forest (*frst*, from Lujala 2010) and rebel statebuilding is close to 0, again making it an invalid

Given these limitations, I proceed with the least squares method, being diligent about reducing omitted variable bias based on findings from existing studies and from the previous chapter. I also conduct numerous robustness checks, introducing variations in both model specifications and in the variables used.

REBEL GOVERNANCE AND WAR OUTCOMES

As a last step before testing the main hypotheses on postwar democratization, this section briefly examines the determinants of civil war outcomes. The reasons for this analysis are threefold. First, existing studies of post-civil war democratization uniformly focus on the war outcome as a key explanatory variable (see Chapter 2). I therefore treat the war outcome as an important alternative explanation to the one proposed in this project, and also make the rebel statebuilding hypothesis contingent on the rebels prevailing in the war. As with the rebel governance variables, understanding the determinants of various war outcomes is a part of preparing the building blocks of hypothesis testing. Second, it is evident from the literature on civil war outcomes that outcome itself is endogenous. To estimate the effect of certain outcomes on postwar regimes, we need to investigate the determinants of war outcomes and then consider whether those determinants also explain postwar regime variations. Examining how wars end, then, is again crucial for designing appropriate statistical models in the regression analyses to follow. Finally, it is particularly worth examining whether the war's outcome itself is affected by wartime rebel governance. If rebel governance has a significant effect on how the war ends, then any analysis of the effects of the war outcome on

instrument. With a low correlation with the endogenous variable mountainous terrain would thus constitute a weak instrument, and would offer no improvement over OLS.

postwar regimes would need to control for rebel governance, as excluding it will yield biased estimates. Figure 4.1 depicts the potential endogeneity of war outcomes to rebel statebuilding and/or rebel reliance on civilians. By first examining whether rebel governance affects war outcomes, we are testing for the presence of a possible indirect effect of rebel governance on democratization, one that runs through the war outcome (the dotted arrows). Then, by including in a single regression equation the two rebel governance variables and a variable for war outcomes, we are estimating the direct effect of each of these three variables of interest on democratization, conditional on the other controls included in the model (the solid arrows). In short, uncovering the determinants of war outcomes is an essential part of untangling the causal relationships between key variables and of systematically isolating the effects of each variable on postwar regimes in as unbiased a fashion as possible.




Figure 4.1: Relationship Between Rebel Governance, War Outcome, and Democratization

This figure depicts the possible relationships between the two rebel governance variables, war outcomes, and postwar democratization. The first set of statistical analysis in this chapter examines whether and how rebel governance affects civil war outcomes (the dotted arrows). The second set of analysis tests the hypotheses on the effects of rebel governance on postwar democratization, controlling for any effect it has on the war outcome (solid arrows). The solid two-way arrow between rebel statebuilding and rebel reliance on civilians indicates the positive relationship between these variables found in Chapter 3.

We typically think of civil wars as ending in four possible outcomes – a government victory, rebel victory, negotiated settlement, or a ceasefire. To examine the relationship between rebel governance and war outcomes, I conduct a multinomial logistic regression analysis with a categorical war outcome variable (indicating one of these four possible war outcomes) as the dependent variable. Using government victory as the comparison category, I estimate the correlations between the independent variables and the remaining three war outcomes.

The independent variables of interest are the two rebel governance variables introduced in the previous chapter, namely, rebel sources of income and rebel statebuilding. Since we have found that the war duration, rebels claiming a Marxist ideology, and the technology of rebellion are associated with one or both of the rebel governance variables, and since it is plausible that any of these features of the war could also affect how the war ends, I include them in the model as control variables. There are theoretical reasons to control for them as well. Existing studies have found that longer wars are less likely to end in a decisive victory by one of the parties (e.g. Mason and Fett 1996; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). Rebels' use of guerrilla strategies may provoke state forces to respond with conventional weapons, usually to the latter's detriment (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Lyall and Wilson 2009). Examining the effects of a Marxist rebel ideology, however, is a more novel endeavor with few theoretical or empirical precedents to guide us.

Each of these variables captures military and political characteristics of rebel groups. To assess the determinants of war outcomes we must consider similar

characteristics of the government as well.⁸¹ Thus, I include the state's prewar regime type, measured as the average of the state's Polity IV scores from the three years prior to the war.⁸² We might think of this regime variable as roughly corresponding to the rebel statebuilding variable on the rebel side – they are each meant to capture the nature of (rebel and state) governance, though of course they are necessarily measured in different ways. And if rebel income sources might affect the war outcome, so might the state's income sources. States with access to profits from natural resources or to a steady stream of foreign aid for the war effort, for instance, may accumulate more war revenue and military capacity than those that must tax the citizens in order to wage war. Thus, I control for the state's oil wealth, denoted by a dummy variable coded 1 if oil exports are valued at more than 30 percent of the state's GDP.⁸³ I also include a dummy variable for states that received foreign military or economic aid specifically for the war effort. This is a variable I coded as part of the Rebel Governance Dataset. The coding rule for foreign aid to the state mirrors that used for coding foreign aid to the rebels – it excludes political aid short of material or financial aid. To the extent possible, it seeks to distinguish between “routine” economic or military aid, and aid provided specifically for

⁸¹ Of course, most existing studies of war outcomes have approached the issue from the opposite angle, focusing mostly on state attributes and features of the war (such as battle deaths and duration), to the neglect of rebel attributes. See Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) for an exception – as captured in the title of their paper, “it takes two” to end a civil war.

⁸² Existing studies have not yielded consistent findings on the relationship between regime type and civil war outcomes. For example, De Rouen and Sobek (2004) find no significant relationship while Lyall and Wilson (2009) find a negative correlation between regime scores and incumbent victory for post-1945 wars.

⁸³ Data is from Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

the war against the rebels, and codes only the latter.⁸⁴ According to the data, 62 percent of the states in the dataset received such foreign support – roughly equivalent to the percentage of rebel groups that received foreign support (65 percent). I also control for the state’s level of economic development, as wealthier states, once engaged in civil war, may be better equipped to defeat the rebels.⁸⁵ Finally, I include a dummy variable for wars ending in the post-Cold War era (defined as 1989 or later), as negotiated settlements have increased in number after the Cold War while outright victories by either side have declined (Fortna 2009).

The results are shown in Table 4.2. It reports odds ratios, with values greater than 1 indicating greater odds of that particular outcome compared to government victory, and values less than 1 lesser odds. Model 1 uses the *govern* variable ranging from 0 to 11 and includes each of the possible sources of rebel income, in addition to the control variables. While the results may be instructive, the odds ratios for the various rebel income sources must be taken with caution since there are very few cases that fall into some of the income source categories (for instance, there are only seven cases of prewar autonomy, and these cases are dispersed among the four war outcomes).⁸⁶ Model 2 replaces the various income sources with the composite *source* variable which measures the *degree* of rebel reliance on civilians. It also uses the reduced form of *govern* ranging from 0 to 3. I place more emphasis on these results and less on those of Model 1.

⁸⁴ Where I found insufficient information, I consulted the Regan (2002) dataset to code this variable. All coding decisions are documented in the Rebel Governance Dataset coding notes.

⁸⁵ Development is measured as the log of electricity consumption per capita in the year of war termination or the closest available year. Data from Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

⁸⁶ The “crime” variable is omitted from the model because it perfectly predicts rebel defeat – that is, there are no cases in which the rebels relied on “criminal” activities and also won the war.

The results suggest that rebel statebuilding during the war indeed affects how the war ends: rebel statebuilding makes rebel victory more likely compared to government victory. This result is highly statistically significant when using *govern* (Model 1), but only weakly significant when using the reduced form of *govern* in Model 2. It is, however, robust to model variations.⁸⁷ Using the *Clarify* software, I find that going from minimum to maximum rebel statebuilding increases the likelihood of rebel victory by 29 percent - not an overwhelming percentage, but non-negligible.⁸⁸ Rebel statebuilding, while it may directly leave institutional legacies for postwar politics, can already shape it indirectly at war's end by first affecting who emerges victorious. More broadly, this finding suggests that rebel statebuilding is a political strategy of rebellion with repercussions for military outcomes – wartime politics and battlefield outcomes are interlinked. If rebel statebuilding is a political weapon of the weak that gives relative advantage to the rebels in the realms of civilian support and intelligence, the finding is theoretically and empirically consistent with studies that demonstrate guerrilla tendencies to defeat states deploying conventional forces (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Lyall and Wilson 2009).

Rebels' degree of reliance on civilians, on the other hand, does not affect the war outcome; neither does rebel ideology or war-fighting technology. As for characteristics

⁸⁷ The inclusion of a variable measuring the percentage of the conflict territory covered in mountainous terrain (which is itself not statistically significant, but increases the statistical significance of rebel statebuilding) and the log of per capita size of the state's armed forces (which is weakly positively associated with negotiated settlements) does not alter the substantive findings.

⁸⁸ The 90 percent confidence interval is at 1 to 59 percent. This estimate was obtained using first differences when *govern* (reduced) equals 0 (minimum statebuilding) and when it equals 3 (maximum). Ordinal variables were set at their median and continuous variables at their mean, with $K = 1000$ simulations. The same settings apply to any subsequent analyses using *Clarify*. King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2003).

of the state, oil wealth significantly tips the scales in favor of the government, making rebel victory and negotiated settlement significantly less likely than government victory. *Clarify* simulations show that state oil wealth increases the chances of government victory by 15 percent (90 percent confidence interval at 0 to 34 percent) while decreasing the likelihood of a negotiated settlement by 32 percent (90 percent confidence interval at -50 to -14 percent). I find similar effects for state reliance on foreign economic and military aid, though the effect is weaker. As might be expected, government riches from natural resources and foreign aid are both boons to its capacity to win the war. The state's level of economic development and prewar regime type, in contrast, do not significantly affect war outcomes.

Consistent with other studies, I find that longer wars are less decisive, and thus more likely to result in a ceasefire or a settlement agreement. Finally, the post-Cold War period has made for a difficult time for governments trying to defeat violent oppositions – all other outcomes are significantly more likely compared to government victory. In fact, government victory is a remarkable 45 percent less likely in the post-Cold War period compared to the four decades preceding it (90 percent confidence interval at -63 to -25 percent). In contrast, negotiated settlements are 27 percent more likely in the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War (3 to 48 percent confidence interval).

Having examined the relationship between rebel funding sources and rebel statebuilding in the previous chapter, and between these variables and war outcomes in this section, we are now equipped with the empirical basis needed to test the hypotheses on the effects of rebel governance on postwar democratization.

REBEL GOVERNANCE AND POSTWAR REGIMES

In this section, I test the two hypotheses on the effects of rebel governance on postwar democratization. Note that the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; it is plausible that we would see both a civilian mobilization effect and a rebel statebuilding effect on postwar regimes, just as it is plausible that neither, or one but not the other, explains regime variations. Rather than state the broader hypothesis that the political economy of rebellion affects postwar democratization, the two hypotheses go one explanatory level deeper and propose two distinct causal processes through which such war-to-peace transformations may occur.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is postwar democratization. Recalling the main research question helps with conceptual clarity: given civil war occurrence, why are some states more democratic after the war than when they entered into the war, while others are more autocratic? Because what we want to know is how wartime developments affect a state's political regime, the basis of comparison is the nature of that state's regime before the war began. Thus, democratization is measured as the difference between a state's democracy level after the war and the level immediately prior to the war's outbreak. I measure postwar regime levels at 3, 5, 10 and 15 years after the war, using the same prewar baseline level for each of these four points of analysis. These are arbitrary points at which to measure the degree of regime change, but by measuring it at four different points in states' postwar trajectories and reporting the results collectively, we can look for any consistent patterns.

States' regime levels and their changes are measured using the Polity IV index of political regimes (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Polity scores range from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic), and covers the period up to 2008. Polity measures and combines two aspects of a state's political regime to generate the index: the nature of the executive and the nature of political participation.⁸⁹ To check that results are not being driven by this particular measure of regimes, I use the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) (Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand 2006) as an alternative measure. The SIP retains the components of Polity that measure the competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the executive, but replaces Polity's measures of political participation with the Polyarchy dataset compiled by Vanhanen (2000). The reason for this replacement is that parts of Polity's measure of political participation take into account the presence of political violence in the country. Should such a "contamination" exist in the actual data, it would befuddle any causal analysis of political violence or civil war that uses the Polity index (see Vreeland 2008). The Vanhanen measure of political participation, in contrast, steers clear of references to political violence.⁹⁰ The SIP measure of regimes is scaled to range from 0 to 1, indicating minimum to maximum democracy.

⁸⁹ I deal with missing observations in Polity (i.e. periods of "transition," "interregnum," and "foreign occupation") in the following manner. For scores at 3 and 5 years after war, if missing, use the score from the previous year; if previous year is missing, use the score from the following year; and if both are missing, then code as missing. For scores at 10 and 15 years out, use the value from the closest available year within 2 years, and otherwise code as missing. Breakaway states that gain independence as they emerge from civil war lack prewar Polity scores. For these states, prewar scores are based on those of their contiguous metropolises (e.g. Bangladesh's prewar score is based on Pakistan's). For post-colonial states emerging from Western or Japanese colonialism, their prewar scores are coded as the mean prewar score for all cases; in alternative specifications I code them as 0 (the median score in the Polity index, and considered "neutral" in the literature) or simply as missing. My coding notes contain further details and identifies the countries to which these coding rules apply.

⁹⁰ It measures the fraction of the population that participated in an election.

Explanatory and Control Variables

The two main independent variables respectively capture the two hypotheses on rebel governance. I use the composite *source* variable to measure rebel groups' degree of reliance on civilian aid relative to other sources of income. The reduced form of *govern* measures the degree of rebels' wartime statebuilding. I include these two variables jointly into the statistical models because we have found in the previous chapter that they are correlated with each other: rebels that rely more on civilians for their war effort also tend to build more wartime institutions. Omitting one or the other variable may therefore result in biased estimates of their independent effects on postwar regimes.

Because the dependent variable measures change, it is important to include the baseline level from which the change occurs. Thus, as a control variable I include the state's three-year average prewar Polity score. This is the same score that is used as the baseline from which to measure changes in regime levels at various years after civil war. Since regime changes occur within a bounded range of regime scores, we can expect an inverse relationship between the baseline regime score and postwar democratization: states that were more democratic before the war will tend to democratize less (because there is less "room" for score increases) and those that were more autocratic before the war will tend to democratize more, and vice versa.⁹¹

Most of the remaining control variables are by now familiar. First, I include the war outcome. The leading explanation for postwar regime variations holds that war outcomes determine regime outcomes. By including a variable for the war outcome in

⁹¹ The expected inverse relationship could also be due to regression towards the mean. See Fortna and Huang (forthcoming).

the model I can test the validity of this argument. Furthermore, the rebel statebuilding hypothesis is contingent on the rebels prevailing in the war, making it doubly important to include the war outcome as a control. Note that, having found the war outcome to be itself endogenous to rebel statebuilding, a proper analysis of the effects of the war outcome on postwar regimes would require the inclusion of rebel statebuilding in the model. Without it, we could erroneously attribute some of the effects of rebel statebuilding on postwar regimes to the war outcome. To control for the war outcome, and to test the prevailing argument that negotiated settlements are conducive to postwar democratization, I enter a dummy variable for wars ending in a negotiated settlement. In alternative specifications, I enter a dummy variable for the rebels prevailing in the war (defined as rebel victory or negotiated settlement).

Aside from the political economy of rebellion, we have also seen that the political economy of the state also matters in shaping war outcomes – states with significant oil wealth and foreign material support are more likely to win the war than those without. In addition to their effects on the war outcome, oil wealth and foreign aid may be directly related to a state's political regime as well. Existing studies find that oil wealth is strongly correlated with more repressive states and with authoritarian stability, and tends to impede democratic transition and consolidation (e.g. Ross 2001; Smith 2004; and Wantchekon and Jensen 2004). The most common explanation for this oil “curse” is the so-called rentier effect: reliance on oil revenues obviates the need for states to develop strong bureaucratic institutions, since their aims could be achieved without having to extract taxes from citizens. With oil wealth, states could also more easily repress or “buy off” the opposition (see Wantchekon and Jensen 2004). It is plausible that this same

argument applies to foreign aid as well: when states engaged in fighting internal rebel groups have sufficient funding, weapons and materiel provided by foreign governments, they may see little need to strengthen their bureaucratic institutions and may also have a greater capacity for suppressing the rebellion. Thus, to test their direct effects on political regimes and to control for their effects on the war outcome, I include the dummy variables indicating states' oil wealth and receipt of foreign support for the war.

The positive relationship between the level of economic development and the likelihood of democracy has been touted as being one of the few “stylized facts” in the literature on regime transitions (Geddes 1999: 117).⁹² I therefore control for a state's GDP per capita, measured at the end of the war.⁹³ Furthermore, to account for secular trends in democratization as well as the significant associations we have found between particular civil war outcomes and the periods before and after 1989, I also include the post-Cold War dummy variable as a control variable.

To address the endogeneity of rebel governance, I also include in the model the three variables that were found in the previous chapter to be associated with *source* and/or *govern*: the war duration, Marxist rebel ideology, and guerrilla war technology. The inclusion of the variable for Marxist ideology, furthermore, allows us to test the alternative argument, discussed in Chapter 2, that rebel ideology affects postwar democratization. Like states, rebel groups claim adherence to many different ideologies and doctrines, including Marxism, ethnic nationalism, religious ideologies, and others.

⁹² For instance, Boix and Stokes (2003) find that economic development significantly increases the likelihood of a democratic transition, while Przeworski et al. (2000) show that, having emerged for whatever reason, democracy is more likely to survive in countries with higher levels of economic development.

⁹³ Data are from Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). GDP per capita is measured at 2005 constant prices.

Controlling for a Marxist ideology is therefore just one of many ways one could test whether and to what extent rebel ideology affects postwar politics. It is also unclear just what effect an ideology like Marxism would have on postwar democratization. Rather than develop a theory about the possible direction of its effect, I leave a fuller discussion of this variable to a later section on the overall findings. Should it be the case that a Marxist rebel ideology is in fact correlated with postwar regimes, the finding would open up an avenue for further research on how this particular ideology, as well as others, affects regime outcomes. Little systematic research has as yet been done on this question.

Empirical Analysis

I thus begin with this full model and run OLS regressions (see Table 4.3). Cases are clustered by country to account for the fact that wars in the same state may not be independent of each other. Table 4.4 shows the results of a “base model” which omits the control variables for foreign aid to the state and economic development; doing so does not significantly alter the results of the remaining variables.⁹⁴ Because the base model regressions include a more complete set of cases, I base the discussion below, as well as subsequent model variations and robustness checks, on this model rather than on the full model.

⁹⁴ The variable for foreign aid to the state has no significant correlation with democratization in any regression discussed in this chapter. The variable for economic development contains many systematically missing observations (systematic because most of the missing observations are from the 1950s), thus reducing the number of cases. I ran all of the regressions discussed in this chapter with the development control included, and checked that the results did not alter in substantively significant ways. The most notable difference stemming from its omission is that the effect of *source* is sometimes slightly weakened at 10 years out.

As proposed by the civilian mobilization hypothesis, the degree of rebels' reliance on civilian aid is significantly associated with postwar democratization (see Table 4.4). The results are consistent across all four postwar years examined (though not statistically significant at 3 years out, with $p=0.10$) and across model variations introduced below. The coefficient for *source* at 5 years after civil war indicates that going from no civilian sources of funding to a mix of civilian and non-civilian sources is associated with a 1.73-point increase in the Polity score over the prewar baseline. Stated differently, wars in which the rebels rely exclusively on civilian aid are followed by a 3.5-point greater increase in the Polity score compared to wars in which the rebels rely entirely on non-civilian sources of income.⁹⁵

In chapter 2, I had left the rebel statebuilding hypothesis as being overall indeterminate. Rebel statebuilding could plausibly lead to postwar democratization as much as it could to autocratization absent further information on civilian motivations. The results in Table 4.4 offer initial evidence that greater rebel statebuilding leads to postwar *autocratization*. The coefficient at the 5-year analysis shows that going from no statebuilding to maximum statebuilding results in a nearly 3-point decrease in the state's Polity score. While coefficients are negative across all four postwar points of analysis,

⁹⁵ An underlying assumption here is that the intervals between the three values of *source* are evenly spaced and I could therefore treat *source* as an interval variable. An alternative that is not constricted by this assumption is to treat *source* as an ordinal categorical variable. When I enter into the model two dummy variables for the two values of *source* (leaving the third out as a comparison category), I obtain similar results, and the difference between no civilian aid and exclusive reliance on civilian aid is statistically significant. All results discussed but not shown are available from the author.

they are statistically significant only at 3 and 5 years out. The evidence is thus less consistent than that for rebel sources of income.⁹⁶

The rebel statebuilding hypothesis, however, more specifically states that rebels' wartime statebuilding will affect postwar politics only when the rebels prevail in the war, so that the wartime institutions and their legacies survive the war-to-peace transition. That is, the hypothesis is predicated on the rebels' successfully avoiding defeat. To test the statebuilding hypothesis, I create a dummy variable for rebel "survival" which takes the value of 1 if the war ends in rebel victory or in a negotiated settlement – in both of these outcomes the rebels survive as a political force – and 0 if it ends in government victory or a truce.⁹⁷ I then interact this variable with the reduced *govern* variable.

The results, presented in Table 4.5, suggests that even when the rebels prevail and become a part of the postwar ruling regime, their wartime statebuilding has no effect on how they govern.⁹⁸ The coefficients for the interaction term are all negative, which suggests an autocratizing effect and is consistent with the results of the base model above, but none is statistically significant. On the flip side, as expected, neither does the degree of rebel statebuilding have a bearing on postwar regimes when the rebels face

⁹⁶ Since rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding are highly correlated (0.46), it is important to check that multicollinearity is not affecting the results. A check of the variance inflation factors (VIF) at the 5-year analysis show that no variable has a VIF greater than 1.8, and the mean VIF for the model is 1.4. The VIF is similar in the other three postwar points of analysis. Going by the rule of thumb that VIF values greater than 10 may indicate multicollinearity, it does not appear to be an issue in the models used here.

⁹⁷ Truces (and ceasefires) are agreements to lay down arms and do not include a political settlement. After signing a truce, a rebel group typically does not gain a seat in the executive and hence continues its claim-making from without.

⁹⁸ In this and successive models, I drop the control variable for foreign aid to the state, since is consistently insignificant in all models when it is included. Its inclusion/exclusion does not alter the substantive findings of any other included variable.

outright defeat or end the war in a truce (i.e. when rebel survival equals 0). Upon victory in civil war, a government most likely dissolves rebel institutions along with the rebel group itself, leaving little in the way of institutional legacies of the rebellion. Goodhand (2010: 351) argues, for instance, that since the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 the Sri Lankan government has been enforcing a “victor’s peace” by constructing extensive security institutions, administrative structures, roads, and government buildings in areas that had been LTTE strongholds. Together, the results of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggest that rebel statebuilding has either no effect or a short-term autocratizing effect on postwar regimes.

Before I introduce further model variations, consider the results of the remaining variables, starting with those that test the alternative arguments. Consistent with other studies, negotiated endings to civil wars are strongly correlated with democratization. At 5 years out using the base model, states that agreed on a negotiated settlement with a rebel group are 3.4 points more democratic than those that ended their wars through other forms of termination. As hypothesized, however, the effect appears to be fleeting: by 10 years after the war the coefficients are not statistically significant, indicating that negotiated settlements are by then not markedly different from the other outcomes in their effects on political regimes.

The contrary argument to the received wisdom on negotiated settlements holds that rebel victory is the outcome most conducive to postwar democratization. Replacing settlement with a dummy variable for rebel victory in the base model, I find that rebel victory has no significant effect on postwar regimes for any analysis year, and the sign of the coefficient is consistently negative.⁹⁹ Including the settlement, rebel victory, and

⁹⁹ One important reason why my finding differs from that of Toft (2010) is that the latter only uses bivariate analysis to support her argument that rebel victory promotes postwar

truce variables in the model so that the comparison category is government victory, I obtain the same results (Table 4.6): negotiated settlements have a short-term positive effect while neither rebel victory nor truces is significantly different from government victory for any year of analysis. I therefore find support for the prevailing argument on settlements, and no support for the opposing hypothesis that rebel victory is conducive to democratization.¹⁰⁰

We have seen that rebel statebuilding affects the war outcome, and that the war outcome in turn affects postwar regimes. To examine whether the war outcome variables are capturing some of the effects of rebel statebuilding on postwar regimes, I run the base model omitting the settlement variable (results not shown due to space constraints). As expected the size of the coefficients for rebel statebuilding increases, since now that variable is capturing both its direct and indirect effects on postwar regimes. However, the differences are negligible and all variables maintain the same substantive results as those of the base model in Table 4.4. Rebel statebuilding has a slight indirect effect through the war outcome, but most of its effect on postwar regimes appears to be a direct one toward autocratization in the short term.

Surprisingly, I find that wars against rebel groups espousing a Marxist ideology are followed by greater democratization than those involving non-Marxists. This result is robust across model variations I introduce below. According to the base model, at 5 years out wars that involved Marxist rebels are followed by a 2.5-point greater move

democratization (see Fortna and Huang, forthcoming). This chapter shows, however, that multiple regression analysis is essential for testing that relationship.

¹⁰⁰ Note that in Table 4.5, the positive and significant coefficient for rebel success can be entirely explained by the positive effect of negotiated settlements. When I include the settlements dummy into the model used in Table 4.5, negotiated settlements are again positive and significant at 3 and 5 years, while the rebel success variable loses statistical significance.

toward democracy than wars that involved non-Marxist rebels. Since this result is obtained after controlling for rebels' reliance on civilians and rebel statebuilding (both of which are positively associated with Marxist rebels), this finding merits further research, and I discuss possible explanations later in this chapter.

Neither the length of the war nor the use of guerrilla technology is associated with postwar democratization.¹⁰¹ The remaining control variables perform as expected. States with higher prewar Polity scores see smaller score increases (or greater score decreases) in their regime scores. Oil wealth is consistently negatively correlated with postwar democratization. Depending on the year of analysis, oil wealth is associated with about a 2 to 4-point decrease in regime scores compared to oil-poor states. In contrast, foreign military and economic aid to the state does not affect postwar regime developments. It appears that the rentier effect operates through oil, but not through foreign military or economic war support for the state. Economic development is consistently positively associated with postwar democratization: states with higher per capita GDP at the end of the war make larger moves toward democracy. Finally, the international political context that changed at the end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on states emerging from civil war. States that ended their wars in the post-Cold War era have seen substantially more democratization (or less autocratization) than those that terminated their conflicts during the Cold War. The difference is sizable, ranging from about 4 to 7 points, depending on the analysis year.

¹⁰¹ The insignificant result for the war duration is consistent with findings in Gurses and Mason (2008) and Joshi (2010).

FURTHER ANALYSIS

I introduce a series of modifications to the model and variables used above to check for robustness of the results. First, I run the base model using the SIP measure of regimes. In the present dataset, Polity and SIP scores are correlated at about 0.93. The SIP index measures political regimes up to the year 2000, so the number of cases will necessarily be smaller than that in the analyses using Polity.¹⁰² Despite these differences, the results are remarkably consistent with those obtained with Polity (Table 4.7). Once again, there is strong evidence to support the civilian mobilization hypothesis. States in which the rebels relied exclusively on civilian aid are about 20 percent more democratic than states in which the rebels relied entirely on non-civilian sources of funding; this result is consistent across the four points of analysis.¹⁰³ And again, we find some evidence that rebel statebuilding fosters autocratization. At 5 years out, states that fought against full-blown rebel statebuilders are 15 percent less democratic than those that fought against non-statebuilding rebels. As before the evidence is generally weak, with statistical significance at 3 and 5 years out only. The substantive results are similar to the Polity version when I include the interaction of rebel success and rebel statebuilding in the model: the coefficients of the interaction term are consistently negative and not statistically significant. In other words, rebel statebuilding has no effect on postwar regimes even when rebel statebuilders prevail in the war. Note that the results of the remaining variables are also consistent with the Polity results.

¹⁰² The post-Cold War dummy variable gets dropped in the 15-year analysis because all wars included will have ended by 1985 (since the SIP only covers up to 2000).

¹⁰³ Because SIP scores range from 0 to 1, we can interpret the coefficients as percentage differences.

A separate concern is that in the base model and its variations above, the number of cases decreases as we move farther out into the postwar years. This is due to the fact that, for instance, at the 15-year analysis only wars ending in or before 1993 (15 years before the 2008 cutoff in the Polity dataset) will be included, while at 5 years out the analysis covers cases ending in 2003 or earlier. The inclusion of different cases will generate different results. Thus, it is worth examining the results when the same cases are included in each of the four postwar points of analysis. When I run the base model using only those cases that remain in all four analysis points – that is, wars ending in or before 1993 (74 cases) – the results for all of the included variables are consistent with the results of the base model that uses the universe of post-1950 civil wars.

I now examine some of the variables in more detail. First, as described earlier, the *source* variable used here is a composite index ranging from no civilian aid, some mix of civilian and other sources, to exclusive reliance on civilian aid. Because intercoder reliability tests showed the variable capturing rebel income obtained through “criminal” activities (rampant kidnapping, robberies, etc.) to be possibly less reliable, the *source* variable used so far omitted this variable in combining the various sources of rebel income into the composite index. Thus, I use a variant of *source* that incorporates the “crime” variable and run the base model (results not shown). The results of all of the variables remain the same, with rebel reliance on civilians significantly associated with democratization at all four analysis points.

Second, rather than use the composite *source* variable, we could examine the effects of the individual components of that variable as well. Note that doing so, while imparting information about individual sources of rebel income, constitutes a deviation

from the original hypothesis test. The civilian mobilization hypothesis is not that rebel reliance on civilians per se fosters democratization, or that foreign aid to the rebels per se invites autocratization, but that the degree of rebel reliance on civilians *relative* to other possible sources of income affects postwar regimes. It is for this reason, for instance, that the *source* variable puts in the same ordinal category rebels relying on a combination of civilian aid and foreign aid, and those relying on civilian aid, natural resources, and remittances. The theoretical underpinning here is that in either case, the degree of civilian mobilization will be tempered by rebels' access to other, non-civilian sources of income.

The results, in Table 4.8, show that individual sources of rebel income do not have a significant bearing on postwar democratization. Although the coefficients for civilian aid are consistently positive, and that for foreign aid consistently negative, for instance, these income sources by themselves do not have significant effects on political regimes (though foreign aid is weakly significant at 5 and 10 years out).¹⁰⁴ Having found in the previous chapter that civilian aid and the other sources of income serve as resource alternatives (that is, civilian aid is negatively associated with each of the other possible sources of income), it is not so surprising that the individual income sources do not have an effect. But once put into a more theoretically appropriate variable capturing the

¹⁰⁴ It is interesting to note that while their coefficients are not statistically significant, coups and remittances are consistently negatively associated with postwar democratization. The relationship between remittances and postwar regimes, in particular, would be a worthwhile topic for further research. The results here suggest that, *ceteris paribus*, if members of a diaspora hope to see postwar democratization in their war-torn countries of origin, they would do well to withhold financial support to the rebels and instead allow the rebels and their *local* supporters to “fight it out” for themselves.

overall “pie” of rebel income, they have the expected effect on postwar regime developments.

A third issue is the baseline from which to measure change in regime scores.¹⁰⁵ Because the central motivation of this project is to examine the effects of certain wartime factors on political regimes, measuring changes in regime scores from before to after the war is a logical empirical strategy. In experimental language, we can think of prewar regime scores as the pre-test (or pre-treatment) measurement, rebel governance as the intervention of interest, and postwar scores as the post-test measurement, taken at different postwar points in time. The problem is that some of the variables included in the models above take their measurements mid-intervention. The war outcome and peacekeeping (discussed below) are two of the more problematic variables in this respect. Since these events are introduced into the cases well after the pre-test, especially in long-lasting civil wars, we may be attributing to them effects on regime scores that in fact took place well before there even was a war outcome or a peacekeeping operation.¹⁰⁶ To address this concern, I run the base model using the *year before war ended* as the baseline from which to measure regime score changes. Note that doing so alters the nature of the analysis for my key independent variables. Instead of asking why some wartime factors make states more democratic after the war than when it entered it, the new model is structured to ask why certain variables make states more democratic in a state’s postwar trajectory. The new baseline does, however, allow a closer inspection of

¹⁰⁵ On issues arising from using change as a dependent variable, see Allison (1990).

¹⁰⁶ Of course, without a theory of what happens to political regimes *during* civil war, we cannot gauge the direction of any such biases in the effects of these variables.

the effects of the war outcome variable by bringing this particular “intervention” temporally much closer to the pre-test measurement.

Table 4.9 shows the results using the alternative baseline. Overall the substantive results are quite stable. Negotiated settlements still have a positive effect in the short run, as does rebel reliance on civilians at all four points of analysis. As to be expected the sizes of the coefficients are smaller using this new baseline, since less time has elapsed since the “pre-test” measurement compared to the models that use the prewar score as the baseline. Furthermore, the fact that, for instance, the coefficient for negotiated settlements at 5 years out has dropped from 3.43 to 2.86 does suggest that there is some extraneous (wartime) noise that biased earlier results in favor of finding an effect of settlements on postwar regimes. Likewise, the coefficient for *source* drops from 1.74 to 1.23. Nevertheless, the substantive findings for these variables using the alternative baseline remain quite robust.¹⁰⁷

The most notable difference stemming from the use of the alternative baseline is found in the results for rebel statebuilding. While coefficients are still consistently negative, they are not statistically significant for any year of analysis. The decrease in the size of the coefficients is rather large as well: at 5 years out, it drops from 0.97 to 0.20. What this plausibly suggests, as depicted in Figure 4.2 below, is that rebel statebuilding tends to provoke a repressive response from the state even *during* the war

¹⁰⁷ Additional robustness checks (results not shown) included running the base model using tobit regression to account for the censoring of the dependent variable at both the lower and upper bounds; using a different method for accounting for missing scores in Polity; and including other variables such as a dummy for identity-based wars and an alternative measure of economic development into the base model (identity war has a negative and sometimes significant effect; alternative measure of development perform similarly to GDP per capita). None of these alternative methods significantly changed the findings reported here.

and not just after it ends, and that such wartime responses may be doing more to move the state closer to autocracy than any *postwar* effects of rebel statebuilding on political regimes. This would explain why coefficients are not statistically significant when the baseline is placed just prior to the end of the war, but are significant (in the short term) when placed just prior to the start of the war.¹⁰⁸ In this new causal story, one based on state responses to rebel statebuilding, war outcomes are less relevant since rebel statebuilding affects political regimes even before the outcome of the war has been determined.




Figure 4.2: Wartime vs. Postwar Effect of Rebel Statebuilding

This figure illustrates the wartime vs. postwar effect of rebel statebuilding on regime outcomes. Regression analysis using an alternative baseline (placed immediately prior to the end of the war) suggests the possibility that rebel statebuilding has an autocratizing effect on political regimes even during the war, and not just after it. The size of the respective effects (-0.96 and -0.20) are taken from the coefficients for *govern* at 5 years out from Tables 4.4 and 4.9. While merely illustrative, they show the respective size of the change in regime scores when the baseline is at the start of the war and when it is at the end of the war.

¹⁰⁸ The results for rebel reliance on civilians and rebel statebuilding using the new baseline are no different from those using the original baseline when I use the model that includes the interaction between rebel statebuilding and rebel success: rebel reliance on civilians has a consistently positive and significant effect, while rebel statebuilding has no significant effect.

Finally, aside from the war outcome and rebel ideology, a third alternative explanation holds that postwar democratization results from international interventions aimed at keeping the peace and fostering democracy. To test this argument, I include in the base model a dummy variable for the presence of an international peacekeeping operation by any external party. The variable thus includes the range of peace operations, including observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement missions.¹⁰⁹ Using this blunt measure of international peacekeeping, I find no effect on postwar democratization. International interventions aimed at enforcing or keeping the peace on the whole do not contribute to democratization of the country. However, it may be that it is not any peacekeeping operation, but those that specifically aim to foster democratization in the host country, that would have the intended effect. Thus, I replace the peacekeeping variable with a dummy variable marking the deployment of “multidimensional” peace operations. This type of peacekeeping, in addition to its military mission aimed at establishing and maintaining security, also includes a political mission directly aimed at institutional and democratic development.¹¹⁰

Table 4.10 displays the results of various models at 3 and 5 years out only, as multidimensional peacekeeping has no effect on democratization at 10 and 15 years out in any model. Using the base model, I find that multidimensional peacekeeping has no significant effect on democratization (Models 1 and 2). The coefficient is close to

¹⁰⁹ Data from Doyle and Sambanis (2006), supplemented by my own research in the most recent cases.

¹¹⁰ On various types of peacekeeping operations, see, inter alia, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008a); Paris (2004).

statistical significance at 3 years out ($p=0.11$), indicating a 2.5-point greater increase in Polity scores compared to cases without this type of peacekeeping. However, any positive effect is short-lived. By 5 years after the end of the war multidimensional peacekeeping will have made no difference in postwar regimes. I obtain similar results using the alternative baseline discussed earlier (Models 3 and 4) – multidimensional peacekeeping has no significant effect. Including the interaction of rebel success and rebel statebuilding, however, I find a more robust positive effect at 3 years out (Models 5 and 6). At most, peacekeeping interventions appear to promote democracy only when they include a democracy-promotion component, and even then, only in the very short term – possibly for only as long as peacekeepers remain in the country. Five years into peacetime politics, their deployment will have made little difference in terms of democratization.¹¹¹

DISCUSSION

Statistical analysis offers strong evidence in support of the civilian mobilization hypothesis. Where rebels rely heavily on civilians and less or not at all on other sources of funding, postwar democratization becomes more likely. This result is obtained after accounting for confounding factors such as the form of war termination, rebel ideology, and the deployment of democracy-promoting peace operations. The analysis also suggests that rebel statebuilding during the war has little effect on postwar regimes, even when the rebels prevail in the war and become part of the postwar government. Indeed,

¹¹¹ These findings are broadly consistent with existing studies. See Doyle and Sambanis (2006, especially their results on “participatory peace”); Fortna (2008b); Gurses and Mason (2008); and Fortna and Huang (forthcoming).

any effect it has is toward postwar autocratization. It is possible that the two hypothesized tendencies of rebel statebuilding are both present among different rebel groups and hence are canceling each other out in the data. “Social-contracting” type of rebels may be more likely to pursue democratization, while others might use their governance capacity to create stronger, but not necessarily more democratic, states. But again, any such effects are difficult to discern without more fine-grained data on the nature of rebel-civilian relations. The evidence of a short-term autocratizing effect, however, suggests that rebel statebuilding is less a set of representative institutions that assigns “interlocking rights and duties for both governors and governed,” and more an exercise in institutionalizing coercion. Coercive wartime institutions would lead to postwar autocratization if the rebels carry over these institutions into peace time, or choose to avoid electoral accountability out of fear that citizens would vote them out of power once given the choice. In general, the analysis shows that between the two transformations that occur when rebels tap into civilian resources, it is the transformation that occurs within the society that experienced the war, rather than that which occurs within the rebel organization, that leaves the more enduring legacies on post-conflict states.

Statistical tests lend support to the findings of some existing studies on war outcomes while casting doubt on others. Even after accounting for rebel income sources, rebel statebuilding, the post-Cold War period, and the deployment of international peacekeeping, negotiated settlements have a democratizing effect. However, this finding may only be reflecting the fact that many settlement agreements mandate the holding of postwar elections. In fact, we find that the positive effect of negotiated settlements is

short-lived; by 10 years after the war, negotiated endings are no different from other war endings in their effects on postwar democratization. Nevertheless, at least for the short term, the prevailing argument on settlements is well supported by the evidence. Contrary to some claims, I find that rebel victory, even that by politically sophisticated statebuilding rebels, does not portend democratization.

The previous chapter showed that Marxist rebels are more likely to draw on civilian aid and build more wartime institutions than non-Marxist rebels. Given the importance Marxist theories of warfare afford to civilian participation, these findings are not surprising insofar as self-proclaimed Marxists actually follow the practical dictates of their ideologies. In this chapter, I have additionally found that Marxist rebellions are more likely to be followed by democratization than non-Marxist ones. Why this is so is not clear, and would benefit from further research. On the one hand, many self-proclaimed Marxist rebels have espoused the Marxist-Leninist principle of “democratic centralism” as they fought against the state. While far from a maximalist conception of democracy as typically understood, democratic centralism does stipulate elections at all levels of a party hierarchy as well as periodic accountability (see Waller 1981: 12).¹¹² The village democratization project of the EPLF of Eritrea, for example, was apparently founded on the idea of democratic centralism (see Pool 1998). On the other hand, the “centralism” embraced by the principle insists on strict organizational hierarchy and the subordination of lower organs to the central leadership – hence a tendency, according to

¹¹² However, if we examine the variable on rebel elections discussed in the previous chapter, we see that Marxist rebels were not the only ones to hold popular elections in war time. Out of the 23 cases in which the rebels held wartime elections, only 10 were “Marxist” rebels. The correlation between rebel elections and Marxist rebels is 0.22.

Waller (1981: 5), for scholars to treat democratic centralism as synonymous with autocracy or totalitarianism.

Its precise meaning aside, self-proclaimed labels are just that – self pro-claimed – so that in practice it remains unclear to what extent these rebel groups internalized or adhered to the principles first developed and test-driven by the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution; most rebel groups examined here, after all, were well removed from the ideology’s origins in both time and space, though it is also the case that many were recipients of Soviet aid throughout the war and hence may have received ideological directives from their patron. Given that the data on Marxist rebels used here are coded based on self-identification rather than on any observed behavior, I treat the results of the Marxist variable with some caution. It is possible that the variable is capturing not Marxist principles, but something else shared among these groups that declare themselves to be Marxists. For instance, it appears from my reading of the cases that many Marxist rebel groups were led by highly educated leaders, promoted literacy among civilian supporters, and encouraged the participation of women in both war fighting and political organization. Future research on this issue would be worthwhile not only to clarify what the Marxist label actually represents, but also because “Marxist” rebels, despite the Cold War having ended, continue to be active in many parts of the world. We will see an instance of this in the following chapter on Nepal’s Maoists.

Finally, the alternative argument that postwar democratization occurs where peacekeepers intervene is supported only under the conditions in which we would most expect it: under multidimensional peacekeeping operations, and only in the very short

term when peacekeepers are still present. Under other conditions, peacekeeping does not affect postwar regime trajectories.

CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables¹¹³

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Prewar Polity	127	-3.18	5.29	-10	10
Government victory	127	0.34	0.48	0	1
Rebel victory	127	0.20	0.41	0	1
Settlement	127	0.29	0.46	0	1
Truce	127	0.16	0.37	0	1
Rebels prevail	127	0.65	0.48	0	1
govern*rebprevail	126	0.65	0.98	0	3
Foreign aid to state	126	0.62	0.49	0	1
GDP per capita (ln)	116	7.32	1.06	5.26	10.26
Oil	127	0.24	0.43	0	1
Peacekeeping	127	0.41	0.49	0	1
Multidimensional PK	127	0.07	0.26	0	1
Post-Cold War	127	0.55	0.50	0	1

¹¹³ For summary statistics of the rebel income sources and rebel statebuilding variables, and other explanatory variables introduced in the previous chapter, see Table 3.2.

Table 4.2: War Outcomes (Multinomial Logistic Regressions)

VARIABLES	War outcome					
	Rebel Victory		Settlement		Truce	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<i>govern</i>	1.66*** (0.308)		1.16 (0.226)		1.03 (0.282)	
<i>govern</i> (reduced)		1.82* (0.617)		1.05 (0.401)		0.88 (0.419)
<i>source</i>		0.61 (0.343)		0.84 (0.410)		0.99 (0.520)
Civilian aid	0.37 (0.311)		0.42 (0.464)		0.41 (0.570)	
Foreign aid	2.10 (1.644)		1.31 (1.070)		0.91 (0.578)	
Natural resources	0.24 (0.238)		0.09*** (0.077)		0.10* (0.130)	
Remittances	0.33 (0.294)		0.15 (0.193)		0.27 (0.347)	
Coup	7.59** (6.981)		0.39 (0.520)		0.00*** (0.000)	
Tax on goods/serv.	0.13** (0.133)		0.64 (0.768)		0.64 (0.774)	
Prewar autonomy	0.06* (0.090)		0.00*** (0.000)		0.36 (0.876)	
War duration (ln)	0.77 (0.194)	0.74 (0.164)	2.11* (0.934)	2.01* (0.749)	2.14** (0.819)	1.70* (0.539)
Marxist rebels	1.85 (1.420)	1.45 (0.994)	0.42 (0.374)	0.44 (0.369)	1.39 (1.688)	1.34 (1.456)
Guerrilla rebels	1.35 (1.046)	1.46 (1.022)	0.42 (0.390)	0.55 (0.372)	0.32 (0.321)	0.31 (0.236)
Foreign aid to state	0.31* (0.206)	0.54 (0.379)	1.17 (0.927)	1.82 (1.349)	1.44 (1.273)	1.42 (1.020)
Prewar Polity	0.89* (0.060)	0.94 (0.058)	1.05 (0.081)	1.05 (0.068)	1.16* (0.098)	1.14 (0.095)
Development	0.88 (0.196)	0.87 (0.167)	1.18 (0.292)	1.02 (0.207)	0.92 (0.294)	0.94 (0.259)
Oil	0.12** (0.101)	0.19** (0.141)	0.12*** (0.087)	0.17*** (0.113)	2.01 (1.821)	1.65 (1.251)
Post-Cold War	36.19*** (36.376)	6.94*** (4.594)	53.87*** (63.325)	11.36*** (8.114)	64.62** (105.612)	21.75*** (20.739)
Constant	0.27 (0.377)	1.98 (2.828)	0.03* (0.059)	0.04** (0.059)	0.04 (0.102)	0.03** (0.055)
Observations	116	116				
Log-likelihood	-99.97	-115.07				
Prob. > chi-squared	0.0000	0.0000				
Wald chi-squared	(48) 4415.34	(30) 91.18				

Odds ratios; robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.3: Full Model

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	1.440 (0.945)	1.689** (0.770)	1.192 (0.917)	3.126*** (1.109)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.890** (0.428)	-0.930** (0.433)	-0.531 (0.565)	-1.779** (0.849)
Prewar Polity	-0.477*** (0.0833)	-0.597*** (0.0915)	-0.765*** (0.123)	-0.701*** (0.133)
Settlement	3.097*** (1.012)	3.018*** (1.068)	0.107 (1.370)	2.901 (2.149)
Foreign aid to state	-0.787 (1.084)	0.237 (1.142)	-0.228 (1.257)	-0.758 (1.603)
Oil	-2.875* (1.521)	-4.169*** (1.365)	-6.161*** (1.508)	-4.425* (2.262)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.606 (0.565)	1.273** (0.526)	2.005*** (0.670)	2.023** (0.846)
Post-Cold War	5.196*** (0.949)	5.361*** (1.018)	6.586*** (1.247)	6.116*** (1.894)
War duration (ln)	-0.201 (0.339)	-0.0780 (0.352)	-0.357 (0.488)	-0.183 (0.594)
Marxist	2.565*** (0.959)	1.782 (1.125)	0.488 (1.565)	0.408 (2.067)
Guerrilla rebels	0.127 (1.171)	0.281 (1.108)	0.875 (1.404)	0.920 (1.686)
Constant	-8.347** (3.351)	-14.55*** (3.204)	-17.50*** (4.958)	-19.17*** (5.774)
Observations	96	92	84	61
R-squared	0.527	0.601	0.587	0.545

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.4: Base Model

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	1.44 (0.863)	1.73** (0.73)	1.54* (0.888)	2.70** (1.171)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.97** (0.427)	-0.96** (0.413)	-0.67 (0.585)	-1.39 (0.843)
Prewar Polity	-0.50*** (0.0928)	-0.60*** (0.108)	-0.78*** (0.138)	-0.65*** (0.136)
Settlement	3.39*** (0.985)	3.46*** (0.988)	1.06 (1.288)	3.23* (1.809)
Oil	-1.72 (1.167)	-2.33** (0.911)	-3.99*** (0.935)	-2.43 (1.469)
Post-Cold War	4.80*** (0.976)	5.08*** (1.047)	6.60*** (1.278)	7.28*** (1.758)
War duration (ln)	-0.39 (0.336)	-0.36 (0.355)	-0.55 (0.417)	-0.39 (0.447)
Marxist rebels	2.56*** (0.807)	2.67*** (0.923)	1.06 (1.169)	0.56 (1.780)
Guerrilla rebels	0.21 (1.044)	0.07 (1.083)	0.61 (1.224)	0.99 (1.224)
Constant	-3.88** (1.518)	-4.61*** (1.506)	-3.73* (2.091)	-5.11** (1.945)
Observations	106	102	94	70
R-squared	0.473	0.524	0.518	0.486

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.5: Interaction of Rebel Success and Rebel Statebuilding

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	1.60* (0.834)	1.94** (0.742)	1.57* (0.888)	2.78** (1.230)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.71 (0.580)	-0.62 (0.672)	-0.22 (0.903)	-1.57 (0.965)
Rebels prevail	3.53** (1.446)	2.89* (1.609)	1.35 (1.500)	1.54 (2.144)
<i>govern*rebprevail</i>	-1.12 (0.951)	-1.35 (1.076)	-1.11 (1.198)	-0.09 (1.449)
Prewar Polity	-0.48*** (0.092)	-0.58*** (0.112)	-0.77*** (0.137)	-0.62*** (0.137)
Oil	-1.62 (1.316)	-2.73*** (0.983)	-4.23*** (0.994)	-2.26 (1.507)
Post-Cold War	4.80*** (1.013)	5.19*** (1.115)	6.65*** (1.233)	7.52*** (1.746)
War duration (ln)	-0.13 (0.325)	-0.06 (0.370)	-0.46 (0.419)	-0.09 (0.406)
Marxist rebels	2.36*** (0.868)	2.45** (0.962)	1.16 (1.217)	0.52 (1.881)
Guerrilla rebels	0.20 (1.030)	0.08 (1.124)	0.60 (1.192)	0.52 (1.329)
Constant	-5.38*** (1.771)	-6.02*** (2.041)	-4.30* (2.501)	-5.63** (2.190)
Observations	106	102	94	70
R-squared	0.457	0.494	0.520	0.463

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.6: Various War Outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	1.47 (0.896)	1.68** (0.770)	1.47 (0.930)	2.67** (1.241)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-1.03** (0.447)	-0.88* (0.450)	-0.58 (0.589)	-1.34 (0.922)
Prewar Polity	-0.48*** (0.088)	-0.61*** (0.108)	-0.79*** (0.135)	-0.65*** (0.137)
Rebel victory	0.52 (1.389)	-0.97 (1.555)	-0.97 (1.401)	-0.61 (1.691)
Settlement	3.40*** (1.170)	3.17** (1.191)	0.71 (1.469)	2.89 (2.118)
Truce	-0.48 (1.382)	-0.02 (1.541)	-0.30 (2.105)	-0.73 (2.643)
Oil	-1.56 (1.287)	-2.53** (1.037)	-4.16*** (1.022)	-2.52 (1.559)
Post-Cold War	4.84*** (1.029)	5.21*** (1.140)	6.78*** (1.376)	7.54*** (2.106)
War duration (ln)	-0.34 (0.362)	-0.43 (0.427)	-0.61 (0.427)	-0.41 (0.410)
Marxist rebels	2.61*** (0.826)	2.66*** (0.910)	1.10 (1.159)	0.59 (1.809)
Guerrilla rebels	0.07 (1.089)	0.19 (1.236)	0.69 (1.358)	1.04 (1.285)
Constant	-4.03** (1.697)	-4.19** (1.798)	-3.31 (2.303)	-4.84** (2.045)
Observations	106	102	94	70
R-squared	0.476	0.527	0.520	0.487

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.7: Base Model Using SIP

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	0.10** (0.045)	0.09** (0.043)	0.10 (0.065)	0.14** (0.067)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.04* (0.023)	-0.05** (0.025)	-0.01 (0.034)	-0.05 (0.052)
Prewar Polity (SIP)	-0.55*** (0.100)	-0.59*** (0.122)	-0.63*** (0.131)	-0.70*** (0.204)
Settlement	0.16*** (0.057)	0.17*** (0.053)	0.05 (0.072)	0.23 (0.157)
Oil	-0.15*** (0.046)	-0.14** (0.052)	-0.12 (0.077)	-0.14* (0.079)
Post-Cold War	0.22*** (0.053)	0.25*** (0.060)	0.31** (0.116)	
War duration (ln)	-0.03* (0.018)	-0.04 (0.022)	-0.01 (0.025)	-0.02 (0.031)
Marxist rebels	0.09* (0.048)	0.09* (0.050)	-0.05 (0.091)	0.10 (0.125)
Guerrilla rebels	0.02 (0.068)	0.04 (0.068)	0.04 (0.089)	0.09 (0.088)
Constant	0.02 (0.093)	0.06 (0.111)	0.01 (0.128)	-0.03 (0.095)
Observations	96	86	63	47
R-squared	0.489	0.522	0.425	0.400

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.8: Sources of Rebel Income

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
Civilian aid	1.52 (1.356)	1.15 (1.437)	1.49 (1.677)	2.87 (2.080)
Foreign aid	-0.70 (0.878)	-1.56* (0.889)	-2.03* (1.066)	-1.46 (1.670)
Natural resources	0.35 (1.281)	1.27 (1.395)	2.81* (1.587)	-0.69 (2.149)
Coup	-1.19 (1.530)	-2.38 (1.628)	-2.84* (1.647)	-3.39 (2.101)
Remittances	-0.98 (1.034)	-1.88* (1.096)	-2.61 (1.570)	-2.19 (1.335)
Tax on goods/services	0.75 (1.502)	-0.12 (1.769)	-3.00 (2.431)	3.12 (2.587)
Crime	1.38 (1.505)	1.08 (1.646)	-1.08 (1.924)	1.06 (2.566)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-1.11** (0.512)	-0.91* (0.519)	-0.51 (0.670)	-1.97** (0.783)
Prewar Polity	-0.50*** (0.105)	-0.58*** (0.114)	-0.75*** (0.142)	-0.62*** (0.145)
Settlement	3.26*** (1.006)	3.24*** (1.105)	1.12 (1.315)	3.36* (1.909)
Oil	-1.87 (1.228)	-2.57** (1.086)	-4.35*** (1.029)	-2.15 (1.639)
Post-Cold War	4.25*** (1.189)	4.46*** (1.174)	6.48*** (1.312)	6.59*** (1.997)
War duration (ln)	-0.45 (0.351)	-0.52 (0.366)	-0.67* (0.354)	-0.48 (0.562)
Marxist rebels	2.52*** (0.861)	2.73*** (0.991)	0.69 (1.191)	0.59 (1.782)
Guerrilla rebels	0.11 (1.045)	0.06 (1.062)	0.57 (1.053)	0.79 (1.384)
Constant	-1.08 (1.176)	0.01 (1.407)	0.69 (1.947)	0.74 (2.829)
Observations	106	102	94	70
R-squared	0.482	0.548	0.568	0.529

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.9: Alternative Baseline

VARIABLES	(1) 3 years	(2) 5 years	(3) 10 years	(4) 15 years
<i>source</i>	0.83 (0.656)	1.23** (0.607)	1.36* (0.805)	2.51** (1.197)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.18 (0.329)	-0.20 (0.390)	-0.09 (0.531)	-0.79 (0.859)
Polity at end of war	-0.33*** (0.082)	-0.45*** (0.100)	-0.56*** (0.117)	-0.57*** (0.124)
Settlement	2.07** (0.794)	2.86*** (0.927)	0.64 (1.133)	2.09 (1.864)
Oil	-0.85 (0.828)	-1.22 (0.886)	-3.01*** (0.861)	-1.15 (1.458)
Post-Cold War	2.82*** (0.669)	3.66*** (0.916)	5.15*** (1.437)	6.53*** (1.763)
War duration (ln)	-0.23 (0.308)	-0.24 (0.325)	-0.38 (0.407)	-0.28 (0.461)
Marxist rebels	1.50** (0.688)	1.79* (0.898)	0.91 (1.203)	0.42 (1.733)
Guerrilla rebels	-0.40 (0.874)	-0.35 (0.955)	-0.60 (1.318)	0.79 (1.232)
Constant	-2.70* (1.349)	-3.98*** (1.465)	-3.08 (2.089)	-5.65*** (1.757)
Observations	100	96	88	65
R-squared	0.322	0.407	0.410	0.425

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.10: Multidimensional Peacekeeping

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	3 years	5 years	3 years	5 years	3 years	5 years
			(Alternative baseline)			
<i>source</i>	1.31 (0.851)	1.74** (0.725)	0.77 (0.656)	1.26** (0.588)	1.39* (0.826)	1.85** (0.747)
<i>govern</i> (reduced)	-0.89** (0.407)	-0.97** (0.413)	-0.13 (0.332)	-0.23 (0.372)	-0.52 (0.571)	-0.53 (0.670)
Prewar Polity	-0.50*** (0.094)	-0.60*** (0.109)	1.75** (0.781)	3.12*** (1.045)	-0.48*** (0.093)	-0.59*** (0.112)
Polity at war end			-0.33*** (0.083)	-0.44*** (0.100)		
Settlement	2.85*** (1.050)	3.48*** (1.064)	1.75** (0.781)	3.12*** (1.045)		
Rebels prevail					3.13** (1.486)	2.67 (1.652)
<i>govern*rebprev</i>					-1.16 (0.944)	-1.37 (1.080)
Oil	-1.59 (1.166)	-2.34** (0.928)	-0.78 (0.837)	-1.25 (0.892)	-1.46 (1.313)	-2.66*** (0.995)
Post-Cold War	4.47*** (1.021)	5.09*** (1.106)	2.63*** (0.699)	3.79*** (0.930)	4.31*** (1.059)	4.97*** (1.152)
War duration (ln)	-0.34 (0.341)	-0.36 (0.359)	-0.19 (0.317)	-0.26 (0.333)	-0.12 (0.332)	-0.06 (0.372)
Marxist rebels	2.13*** (0.774)	2.69*** (0.975)	1.21* (0.643)	2.00** (0.977)	1.81** (0.807)	2.20** (0.977)
Guerrilla rebels	0.19 (1.034)	0.08 (1.093)	-0.43 (0.866)	-0.32 (0.976)	0.23 (1.004)	0.08 (1.126)
Multidimensional PK	2.49 (1.517)	-0.12 (1.484)	1.87 (1.220)	-1.34 (1.785)	3.45** (1.481)	1.63 (1.869)
Constant	-3.70** (1.544)	-4.62*** (1.518)	-2.62* (1.352)	-4.02*** (1.463)	-5.00*** (1.833)	-5.82*** (2.075)
Observations	106	102	100	96	106	102
R-squared	0.483	0.524	0.333	0.410	0.478	0.498

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CHAPTER 5

WAR AND CHANGE IN NEPAL

On April 24, 2006, ten years after a Maoist rebel group had launched an insurgent war against the state, the king of Nepal capitulated to widespread demands to hand power back to the people. In the face of mass demonstrations in the capital, the king conceded the restoration of parliament, which he had suspended in a royal coup in 2005, along with plans to form an elected constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution. This event was merely the first in a string of surprising developments: within months the existing political parties and the Maoists signed a peace agreement, turning the rebel group into a political party; once democracy had been restored, Nepalese citizens voted overwhelmingly for the Maoists in the 2008 constituent assembly elections; and the new assembly promptly voted to abolish the monarchy once and for all. The composition of the postwar assembly was also unprecedented: groups that had been historically marginalized in the government, including women, ethnic minorities, and members of the lower castes, now had seats specifically allocated to them. To put it starkly, a civil war that claimed over 13,000 lives resulted in the elimination of the royal dictator, the creation of a republic, and the establishment of a nascent multiparty democracy in which individuals enjoyed greater political rights than ever before in the country's history.

As a senior government official put it, “democracy is a byproduct of the war. It wasn't a goal of the Maoists. The Maoists had launched a war against a democratic system” (Interview, Kathmandu, January 25, 2011). How, then, did violent conflict between a country's own citizens result in democratization, the sharing of power between erstwhile opponents, increased political rights, and improved representation?

The previous two chapters provided statistical evidence of a positive correlation between the degree of rebel reliance on civilians and post-civil war democratization. The analysis also showed that the extent of rebels' wartime institution-building has little or no bearing on postwar regimes, and that if anything, the effect is toward postwar autocratization. While correlations between the study's main independent and dependent variables are one important type of evidence, they alone do not constitute a satisfactory test of the *causal* story encapsulated in each hypothesis. Both the civilian mobilization hypothesis and the rebel statebuilding hypothesis point to a specific series of changes that follow from the nature of rebel relations with civilians, changes that eventually affect postwar regimes. Having established the correlations, this chapter delves into an in-depth analysis of one case – the Nepalese civil war of 1996-2006 – in order to examine whether or not the business of war-making by the rebels in fact had the proposed effects on postwar politics. That is, I use the case study as a way to explore the question of causality left open by statistical analysis. If the evidence provided in this (and the next) chapter corroborates the statistical findings, it lends further credence to the causal argument put forth in the theory.

For the purposes of this project, the Nepalese civil war is a “good” case to examine because all of the variables of interest take high values: the rebels relied heavily on civilians; they built extensive wartime institutions; and the postwar period has seen significant democratization, as described below.¹¹⁴ Thus, process-tracing can be used to

¹¹⁴ In the statistical analyses of the last two chapters, the Nepalese civil war appears only in the analyses at two years out, since the dataset ends at 2008. In terms of Polity scores, Nepal, being a nascent democracy, had a score of 5 at the start of the war, but quickly saw it plunge to -6 following the 2001 royal takeover. Following the signing of the peace agreement in 2006, its score increased by 12 points, and it has since stood at 6. While according to Polity Nepal's pre-

test whether in fact the explanatory variables and postwar regime outcome are causally related, or are instead merely spurious correlations.¹¹⁵ On a more practical level, this is a relatively recent civil war. Given that the two rebel governance hypotheses each tell a story about elite and civilian behavior and motivations as the drivers of political change, the freshness of the case makes it conducive to field interviews in which people are asked to reflect on individual, group, party, and/or state views and experiences pertaining to the conflict. Questions about a party's specific wartime decision, or on individual motivations for voting for a particular party, for instance, are easier to recount a few years following the event than, say, 10 or 15 years later.¹¹⁶

I draw both on existing studies and documentation of the Maoist insurgency, as well as on semi-structured interviews I conducted in Nepal during six weeks in January-February 2011. Interviewees consisted of representatives of the three major political parties (Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist [UML], and the Maoists, officially known as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist), many of whom are also members of the postwar Constituent Assembly; those

and postwar scores differ only by 1 point, I show below that qualitatively, the nature of the country's pre- and postwar democracy differs in some fundamental ways.

¹¹⁵ See Collier (2011).

¹¹⁶ A third reason to study Nepal stems less from the logic of theory-testing, and more from the observation that the Nepalese civil war has received relatively less scholarly attention than the many other civil conflicts that took place around the mid-1990s and early 2000s. This *may* have to do with the intensity and the level of international engagement and interest in these various wars. At about 13,000 deaths (in a country of 29 million), the Nepalese civil war was comparatively less bloody; and while both the Maoists and government forces engaged in major abuses against civilians, they did not engage in the kind of mass atrocities that attract the attention of international media. Whatever the cause, there are potential dangers in relying disproportionately on a particular region or set of cases, or on wars with particular features (such as high levels of brutality or fatality), to build knowledge that is intended to be generalizable across broader sets of cases.

who identified themselves as mediators in the peace process or as civil society leaders; staff of local and international research organizations; journalists and writers; and ordinary citizens, both in Kathmandu and its surrounding towns and in the headquarters of the rural Gorkha District, which had been a Maoist stronghold throughout the war. Rather than provide a detailed historical account of the war and its outcomes, I conduct the case study with the aim of establishing causal inference. The focus is therefore on identifying the sequence of developments, if any, that connect rebel governance with postwar democratization.

The findings provide a robust qualitative counterpart to the results of the statistical analysis. Consistent with the civilian mobilization hypothesis, I find that the Maoists' extensive wartime engagement with civilians had the effect of galvanizing the latter into political action. This created a strong bottom-up pressure for democratization which elites could not ignore as they jockeyed for power at the end of the war. In contrast, I find little evidence to support the rebel statebuilding hypothesis in this case. Maoists' wartime statebuilding, as elaborate as it had been, played no discernible role in motivating postwar elites to pursue democratization.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first two sections respectively provide a brief overview of the Nepalese civil war and of the rebels' wartime governance. Since quantitative measurements of the key variables used in the previous two chapters are arguably blunt, descriptive analysis in these sections allow for a more meaningful understanding of what is meant by democratization and rebel governance in this specific case. The next two sections engage in a test of the two hypotheses on postwar

democratization. In concluding, I consider, and refute, a direct counter-argument to the mobilization account.

THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL, 1996-2006

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)¹¹⁷ chose a strategy of violent rebellion just as parliamentary democracy was starting to take root in Nepal. In 1990, a mass uprising known as the People's Movement had forced the king to agree to constitutional reforms replacing the autocratic no-party system with an elected multiparty parliament. Yet, fundamentally dissatisfied with the compromise between the king and the mainstream political parties, the Maoists declared a “people's war” with the ultimate aim of capturing state power in a communist revolution. In opting for war, the Maoists were splintering from the more moderate communist parties that eschewed violence and chose to participate in democratic politics. At the beginning of the insurgency in 1996, the Maoists thus comprised an obscure group with little following and few weapons who proclaimed an ideology most others had abandoned at the end of the Cold War.¹¹⁸

As detailed below, the “people's war” strategy proved effective in garnering popular support in the countryside and inflicting serious losses on the police and military. King Gyanendra Shah, the parliamentary parties, and the Maoist rebels – the key players in this tripartite conflict – reached ceasefire agreements in 2001 and 2003, but these

¹¹⁷ The CPN-M joined with another Maoist group, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified-Maoist) (CPN-UM), in January 2009 and has since used the name the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), with the CPN-M chairman, Prachanda, as the head of this united group. For simplicity, I refer to the Maoist rebels-turned-political party as “the Maoists” in this chapter.

¹¹⁸ The Maoists reportedly had only a few dozen fighters in 1996, and grew to having an estimated 30,000 fighters by the end of the war in 2006. On Maoist recruitment strategies, see Eck (2010).

quickly broke down and fighting continued. In February 2005 the king finally lost patience: he sacked the prime minister, dismissed the parliament, and declared a state of emergency, thereby assuming all executive power in an attempt to defeat the insurgency. But this move clearly backfired on the king. Rather than leading to a royal victory, it compelled the Maoists and the political parties to form an alliance *against* the monarch. In November 2005, the Maoists and a coalition of seven dominant political parties (the “Seven Party Alliance,” or SPA) reached an agreement which reflected mutual compromise but also signaled major gains for the Maoists. In the agreement, the Maoists indicated their willingness to participate in a multiparty system, in effect acknowledging that a military takeover of the capital was beyond their capacity. On the other hand, the political parties conceded to key Maoist demands to bring an end to the “autocratic monarchy” and create a republic, an interim government, and a constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution, propositions these status-quo players had long opposed. The common foe that united these war opponents was the increasingly dictatorial king.

Acting on this new alliance and the growing public opposition to the monarchy, the SPA and the Maoists organized a countrywide demonstration and general strike starting on April 6, 2006. In a clear signal of mounting public anger at the palace and its fecklessness, what was intended to be a four-day strike continued for 19 days, reportedly bringing hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of Kathmandu and other towns. While the parties, and especially the Maoists, used some logistical muscle to bring supporters into the capital, observers concur that there was also great spontaneity on the part of the people in turning the occasion into a formidable movement against the king. Not only was the level of participation in this movement unprecedented, far surpassing

the People's Movement of 1990; participants also came from all segments of society, including professional associations, civil society groups, the civil service, the business community, and even the government (Riaz and Basu 2007: 170-171; Vanaik 2008: 67; International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006; Ogura 2008: 29).

As with most autocrats in the face of acute popular threats, the king's initial response was to call in the army to quell the demonstrators, arrest leaders, journalists, and activists, and impose curfews. When these moves failed to quiet the public (in fact they had the opposite effect), he offered what he believed was enough of a concession to appease the demonstrators without stripping himself of his core powers: he invited the SPA to nominate a prime minister, a move intended to return executive power to the people. But this was too little, too late. Crucially, the king explicitly rejected the parties' proposal for a new constituent assembly, a core component of the SPA-Maoist agreement. The SPA thus decisively rejected the offer while people took to the streets in even greater numbers in the following days (International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006, 13). Finally, three days later, on April 24, the king capitulated and accepted the Maoist-SPA demands, including the election of a constituent assembly.

In a swift turn of events, in May an interim SPA government was duly restored, and its members voted to curtail the powers of the king and bring the army under civilian control; it also declared Nepal a secular state, thus ending its age-old status as a Hindu kingdom. The government and Maoists also opened talks, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (nom de guerre Prachanda) in November, bringing the war to a formal end. The interim government proved highly unstable in the rocky

transition from war to peace, but the elections for the Constituent Assembly was finally, and peacefully, held in April 2008. Though short of winning a majority, the Maoists secured by far the largest number of seats in the assembly; the Nepali Congress, traditionally the dominant party, won only half as many seats. In its first session in May, the Constituent Assembly formally abolished the monarchy, declared the country a republic, and ordered the royal family to vacate its Kathmandu palace within 15 days (Sharma 2010: 57). In July the assembly voted for Prachanda, the erstwhile Maoist rebel leader, to become the first prime minister of the Federal Republic of Nepal.

Note that the democracy that emerged after the war was not simply the reinstatement of pre-war democracy. Although Nepal had been a nascent democracy from 1990 until the first royal suspension of parliament in 2001, the civil war had catalyzed fundamental changes to the nature of Nepalese politics in a way many characterize as a “deepening” of democracy (Interview, Kathmandu, January 17, 2011). Aside from the fall of the monarchy and with it, the elimination of the threat of royal coups, arguably the most notable difference between pre- and postwar democracy was the degree of inclusiveness. In the post-1990 version of democracy, politics had continued to be dominated by upper-caste, urban educated males of the traditionally influential Hill Hindu group (Bennett 2005: 5; Lawoti 2007). Women had never obtained more than 5 to 6 percent of the seats in either the lower or the upper house of parliament; ethnic minority groups had fared no better while members of the Dalits, or the “untouchable” caste, had had virtually no representation (*ibid*). In the postwar Constituent Assembly, by contrast, women obtained 32 percent of the seats, Dalits 8 percent, the Madhesi ethnic group 34 percent, and other indigenous groups a total of 35 percent, in accordance with the

representation quotas stipulated in the interim constitution. As an analyst observed, women and other previously marginalized groups had become “clear winners” of the civil war (Interview, Kathmandu, January 11, 2011).

INSURGENCY, MOBILIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIZATION

How did civil war give way to democratization? The above overview of the political developments might lead one to conclude that it was the mutual compromise between the seven parties and Maoists in 2005 that opened up political space for multiparty politics. But the argument that democracy resulted from a democratic compromise borders on tautology and sheds no light on why former adversaries chose to settle on a democratic outcome to begin with. The political parties, after all, had persistently opposed the Maoists’ agenda for constitutional change while the Maoists had initiated the insurgency with the aim of creating a one-party communist regime. Neither was there a clear military stalemate that necessitated a settlement. The Maoists had been on a “strategic offensive” between 2003 and 2005. By the time they entered into an alliance with the SPA in late 2005 they had conducted their largest-ever military offensive, in Beni; had expanded their military structure to include two divisions, seven brigades and 19 battalions; had made significant progress in establishing parallel power structures in many parts of the country; and, even during the April 2006 demonstrations, had been ready to take military action in response to any violent repression by the king (Ogura 2008; International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006). Nor was there a concerted international pressure on the belligerents to settle on inclusive democratization for the future of Nepal. To the contrary, in keeping with their post-September 11 exigencies, the

United States and India had been strongly opposed to the political parties compromising with the rebel group they each labeled a terrorist organization. Washington's and Delhi's preference, rather, had been for the preservation of a constitutional monarchy alongside a parliament consisting of the preexisting parties, combined with the elimination of the Maoist militants – in other words, a return to the status quo ante (Upreti 2010; Thapa 2004: 189-191). Nor was a large-scale international peacekeeping mission deployed to Nepal with the express purpose of fostering democracy, such as those seen in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Instead, the mission that was deployed – the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) – was a political mission with a limited mandate to monitor the ceasefire. The mission was additionally tasked with providing technical support in the constituent assembly elections, but the assembly and its elections themselves were outcomes of domestic negotiations rather than emerging from UNMIN- or donor-led proposals (see International Crisis Group, December 15, 2006).¹¹⁹

Given that the form of war termination, belligerents' armed strength, diplomatic pressures, and international peacebuilding interventions each constitutes an unsatisfactory explanation of postwar democratization in Nepal, I turn to a consideration of wartime factors that may help account for the observed outcome. A test of the civilian mobilization hypothesis requires that I use the evidence to answer three sequential questions. First, did the rebels' reliance on civilians alter the latter in politically

¹¹⁹ India, long the regional hegemon with significant influence in Nepal's domestic politics, did host and facilitate the peace talks between the SPA and the Maoists. After the April 2006 demonstrations ended the king's direct rule, Delhi also shifted its position from pressing for a constitutional monarchy to calling for a peace settlement between the parties and the Maoists. Indian blessing of the peace talks and the final peace settlement was important to the parties and the Maoists, both of whom sought to be on Delhi's good side. However, Delhi's actual involvement in the final outcome was little more than that it "quietly helped shape the settlement framework" (International Crisis Group, May 15, 2006: 22).

significant ways – that is, did it mobilize them? Second, did this mobilization create bottom-up pressures for democratization? And third, did these pressures affect elites' decisions regarding the form of postwar governance?

A test of the rebel statebuilding hypothesis presents its own set of questions. First, did wartime statebuilding bestow the Maoists with political institutions, popular support, and legitimacy? Second, did the rebels transfer wartime institutions into peace time to facilitate their transformation into a political party? And third, did the popular support and legitimacy make democracy a relatively “easy” or costless option for the Maoists – that is, were they confident of doing well in electoral competition?

In the following sections, I first describe rebel governance in the Nepalese civil war, then put each of the hypothesis to the test.

Maoists and Civilians

One of the most striking features of the Nepalese civil war is the extent to which the rebels engaged with, and upended, the everyday lives of ordinary people throughout the country. Restructuring societies in accordance with a communist vision was, of course, a central component of the Marxist-Maoist ideology to which the rebel group claimed adherence. However, the Maoists' deliberate engagement of civilians as a war strategy was also driven by a more pragmatic concern. Unlike many other rebel groups across the world, the Maoists had neither an external supporter providing funding, weapons, and fighters, nor access to lucrative minerals or other natural resources that

would bring in the needed war-making funds.¹²⁰ They were essentially fighting independently and unaided against a formidable group of opponents, which consisted of the monarchy and the Royal Nepalese Army, the parliamentary parties, and their external backers, most prominently India and the United States, both of which provided substantial military, financial and political support to the state (see Vanaik 2008; Upreti 2010). To raise the financial and political capital needed to wage war, the rebels therefore turned to an obvious resource they had at their disposal: the Nepalese people. Their decision to launch a “people’s war” against the state thus served to fulfill both their ideological mandate and their resource imperatives.

To secure civilian loyalty and support the Maoists implemented a strategy of extensive political organization, at the core of which was the goal to establish a full alternative political and administrative power structure throughout the country. While a complete structure never came into being, there is significant evidence that the Maoists succeeded in dismantling state authority and instituting their own governance systems in many areas. With varying degrees of functionality, the Maoists created a “people’s government” in 21 of the country’s 75 districts and exercised “complete control” in seven of them (Sharma 2004: 42-43). In these areas, the Maoists created “people’s committees” at the ward, village and district levels, with representation for all segments of society including women and members of ethnic minority and lower caste groups (Sharma 2004; Vanaik 2008). They also created, again with varying degrees effectiveness, community hospitals, health clinics, and schools, and meted out their own

¹²⁰ Even China was wary of the new rendition of “Maoism” emerging within its neighbor to the southwest. Prioritizing stability, it chose to maintain favorable relations with the monarchy. See Upreti (2010).

form of justice in “people’s courts” (Devkota and Teijlingen 2009; Ogura 2007; Onesto 2005; Verma 2001; Sharma 2004). Most importantly for fundraising purposes, the Maoists imposed regular income and in-kind “taxes” on local residents (Sharma 2004; International Crisis Group, October 27, 2005), with some paying double taxes (to the rebels and the state) while in other areas the Maoists brought government taxation to a standstill (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). They also placed a heavy emphasis on propaganda work, running their own FM radio stations and publications, and holding “orientation” sessions at schools and public arenas to disseminate their ideology and mission (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). Overseeing all of this work was a highly structured Maoist administration headed by a Standing Committee, below which were a Politburo and a Central Committee, and the structure reached down to the sub-regional, district, and village levels. Members of these “people’s governments” were elected by the local people (Sharma 2004). So extensive was the Maoist organization in these areas that government officials and police chiefs posted in these areas, according to one observer, could be described as “ambassadors” of the Kathmandu government to the “Maoist nation” (Sharma 2004: 44).

Motivation for supporting the Maoists appears to have varied widely among individuals, locales and periods during the insurgency, but collectively, it involved some degree of both consent and coercion. Many found appeal in the Maoist rhetoric of anti-feudalism and social equality. An interviewee belonging to the Magar ethnic group stated that she supported the Maoists because they, unlike the parliamentary parties, recognized and sought to address the issue of minority ethnic groups (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). A young Maoist who had worked as a courier in the bush during the

war explained that he had had “a good impression of Baburam Bhattarai [the Maoists’ second in command]. He was intelligent, had a good education, but came from a poor village.... I thought that if [the Maoists] could be successful, conditions in the villages would improve” (Interview, Gorkha, February 4, 2011). Others described the prevalence of fear and resentment over the regular “donations” the Maoists demanded (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). In the village of Deurali, in Karki District, “families were asked to pay enormous amounts of money, or to let the Maoists have their child” (Lecomte-Tilouine 2010: 125). There were reports of civilian targeting, intimidation, and extortion committed by both Maoist and state forces; the Maoists also abducted children from schools for forced recruitment (Human Rights Watch, October 7, 2004). Some supporters described Maoist courts as being effective in settling village-level disputes and more accessible to villagers than government courts, which could take several days to reach by foot. Others saw them as a coercive system dispensing arbitrary justice (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011; Haviland 2006). As Sharma (2004: 48-49) wrote, “people may be dissatisfied with the way the Maoists operate but no one dares risk opposing them.”

In this way, the Maoists made the people a centerpiece of the political offensive they waged alongside their military campaigns. They depended heavily on the people for funds, food, shelter, materiel, information, and fighters while introducing an ideology of radical social reform and creating at least the elemental structures of order and governance in the territories they occupied.¹²¹

¹²¹ While the focus here is on the Maoists’ wartime governance and institutions, this is not to neglect the well-known fact that the Maoists attacked and destroyed state-run schools, hospitals, and infrastructure even as they built their own.

War and Civilian Mobilization

Evidence suggests that these insurgent activities had a significant and enduring impact on the individuals and communities in the Maoist territories and, eventually, on the country as a whole. As detailed below, each of the three dimensions of civilian mobilization outlined in the theory chapter finds support in the development of the Nepalese civil war. Yet, much of the wartime transformation that occurred in the remote areas under Maoist control was likely lost on the power-holders in Kathmandu, at least in the initial stages of the war. The state's highly centralized political structure meant power was concentrated at the center; political parties gave relatively little emphasis to party-building in the periphery (Hachhethu 2004: 61; International Crisis Group, November 28, 2005: 4). The Maoist strategy of first driving out the police and other state authorities as part of the groundwork for establishing their own parallel governments exacerbated this disconnect between politics at the center and (insurgent) politics in the rural hills. When rebel violence increased, furthermore, the state persistently treated the insurgency as a law and order problem requiring police action; the army was not deployed until five years into the war, and even then proved ill-prepared to contain the rebels (Hachhethu 2004; Mehta and Lawoti 2010).

Far from the capital and largely undetected, the Maoist strategy of involving the people in war-making was having a particular set of effects on the people. First, the insurgency greatly increased people's awareness of the politics of rights, and their ability to seek those rights. This was certainly a direct and deliberate result of the Maoists' spread of "revolutionary" ideas, but it was also an indirect and perhaps unintended result

of the very existence – hitherto unthinkable – of an active and sustained rebellion against the king and the entrenched political powers. Clearly in line with Maoist indoctrination efforts, one resident of Gorkha stated, “The Maoists raised a good agenda in favor of the poor and the lower castes. They were very organized....[Because of them] we are now very aware of our rights as indigenous peoples, and know how to demand them”

(Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). According to one ethnographic study of the “people’s government” in Dolakha district, “while many villagers had never heard of Mao Zedong or the results of Maoism in China, when they were asked what the Maoists [of Nepal] stood for they immediately answered ‘reclaiming our land’ or ‘bringing the exploiters to justice’” (Shneiderman and Turin 2004: 93). One leader of the Nepali Congress party lambasted the Maoists’ ideology and violent modus operandi, and yet conceded that, though lamentable, the war has also had some positive effects on the people:

War educated the masses about politics, about standards of good governance, about the tax system, about policies. Although the Maoist rhetoric only served to justify their communist ideology, it also educated the people and built political awareness. Such education gives people the capacity to judge what is right and wrong with a government. People also became more aware of their rights, about human rights, and about what constitutes a responsible government (Interview, Kathmandu, January 25, 2011).

And likewise, virtually every person interviewed, regardless of party affiliation or social status, spoke of a sea change the war had wrought on people’s awareness of politics and their status within it.

Along with increased awareness about rights and good government, the insurgency also presented a radical political alternative and made it appear to be within reach. The very idea of a Nepalese state without a monarch was a novel one to most, but

one which quickly expanded the realm of what people believed was possible. One Gorkha resident admitted that he had understood early on that “the Maoist agenda...was the establishment of a republican state,” but that he “didn’t know what that meant” and was fearful of what such a change might entail (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011). Figures from national surveys are likewise indicative of the extent to which the idea of a republic undercut the political norm and presented a new alternative. Nationwide opinion polls conducted in 2005 and 2006 showed that only 5 to 6 percent of the population favored a state without the king, even after the 2005 royal coup (Sharma and Sen 2005; 2006). By late 2005, however, civil society groups were speaking out against autocracy, whether royal or Maoist, while observers surmised that “the end of Nepal’s monarchy...is increasingly likely” (International Crisis Group, September 15, 2005: 10). As discussed below, by 2006 the idea of a republican state had saturated mainstream political debate and had been adopted by ordinary people as a specific objective through which to seek a fundamental political change.

Second, along with increased political awareness, the Maoists’ reliance on civilians also increased the latter’s *political engagement*. By drawing on ordinary people for war support, the rebels galvanized into action those who otherwise may have remained detached from active politics. One study argues that the very fact that the Maoists visited, engaged with, and recruited these populations had a powerful effect: “By addressing the villagers, discussing their problems, and requesting their assistance, the Maoists encouraged the villagers to be active political agents, a radical departure from villagers’ previous experiences of marginalization” (Eck 2010: 44). Likewise, “villagers felt that they were empowered agents shaping and creating their country’s destiny, not

passive spectators watching from the political sidelines” (Schneiderman and Turin 2004: 88). This engagement effect directly follows the awareness effect: having gained greater awareness of their rights, the people also became more active in demanding those rights. As such, the effect appears to have been the strongest among those populations around whom the Maoists concentrated their activities: ethnic minorities, women, and members of the lower castes. Speaking of the improvement in the status of women in the postwar period, one interviewee attributed it to “the remarkable and historic” fact that the Maoists had recruited women into their guerrilla army (Interview, Kathmandu, January 28, 2011). One Gorkha resident stated, not without a hint of resignation: “Before [the war], members of the lower castes couldn’t touch the same water tap as those of upper castes. Now, if an upper-caste member denies this right, the lower castes will file a complaint with the authorities!” (Interview, Gorkha, February 3, 2011).

Finally, by embedding themselves among the people and promising future political dividends, the Maoists fomented widespread *political expectations* of favorable reforms. As part of its recruitment strategy the Maoists employed a variety of means to disseminate its goals and beliefs, including the use of mass meetings, the print media, radio talks, door-to-door visits, and cultural programs (Eck 2010; Interview, Gorkha, February 4, 2011). Through these media, the Maoists “made it extremely clear that should they come to power, the peasantry would have access to a multitude of political, economic, and social goods currently unavailable to them” (ibid.: 44).

A powerful byproduct of the Maoist insurgency, to sum, was that it informed the population about political alternatives and incited them to seek those alternatives. By treating the people as a central resource base for the insurgency, the Maoists raised the

level of political awareness, engagement, and expectations among the people. The Maoists' rhetoric of radical change certainly contributed to these outcomes; however, it was, at its core, the very existence of an anti-regime rebellion that depended on the people for survival that effected these political changes.

Mobilization and the Foreclosing of a Return to Prewar Politics

Nevertheless, even with this widespread mobilization, an eventual shift to democratic politics was by no means a foregone conclusion. In fact, what the political parties continued to seek until the last stages of the civil war was a return to the status quo ante: they envisioned that the Maoists would eventually be neutralized with the aid of the United States and India, and that the king would return power to the parties by reinstating parliament while retaining his constitutional role. The king, however, remained recalcitrant, refusing to relinquish the power he had usurped in the 2005 royal coup, and which he had in fact been gradually amassing since his ascent to the throne in 2001.

There is significant evidence that once the king began to betray his authoritarian tendencies, a growing segment of the population became increasingly ready to oppose his authority and press for major political changes. Notably, it was not the political elites who spearheaded a movement for change; rather, it originated with popular dissatisfaction, debate, and mobilization. Thus, even while the parties maintained their pro-status-quo orientation, their rank and file and the general public were beginning to publicly express their disapproval of a restoration of the 1990 constitution that preserved a role for the king. "The youth especially was not satisfied with compromises with the

king. The general feeling was that we should change the system, adopt a constitutional assembly, and move toward republicanism” (Interview, Kathmandu, January 26, 2011). Whereas a move toward republicanism had never been viewed as more than an extremist proposition supported by a radical flank of society, eight years into a civil war republicanism had become a household word – or, according to one analysis, the idea had been “Mao-streamed” (Thapa and Sharma 2009: 214). In fact, “the longer the king kept the parties out of power, the more the Maoist agenda began to be discussed openly” (International Crisis Group, November 28, 2005: 9). In a clear sign of mounting public expectations for change, by 2004 civil society groups were discussing ethnic and caste issues, the merits of proportional representation (another Maoist proposal), and the failures of the 1990 constitution. “Not all these supported royal rule, and none advocated the Maoist cause. Yet, they were all discussing points of the Maoists’ agenda” (ibid). Ideas initially championed by a violent rebel organization and sold to the peasantry had come to appeal to a wider audience, leading to the mobilization not only of those in Maoist territories, but of much of the country’s population, urban and rural. Given the war’s awareness and engagement effects, it may not be so surprising that civil society around this time turned out to be “more active and influential than many predicted” (International Crisis Group, September 15, 2005: 6).

How did this growing social mobilization affect elite politics at the center? Analysts interpret the 2005 agreement between the SPA and the Maoists as their response to this rising level of popular disaffection and expectations for change. According to one account, the parties within the SPA recognized that they had lost touch with their support bases during the conflict, especially in rural areas. Given the increasing appeal of the

Maoist agenda among the general public, party leaders saw that they could regain popular trust, legitimacy, and hence political strength by engaging in a dialogue with the Maoists and agreeing to some of their demands (International Crisis Group, November 2005: 4-8). Put in stronger terms, given the Maoists' increasing appeal the parties "had no choice but to unite with the Maoists" if they hoped to remain relevant (Interview, Kirtipur, January 26, 2011).¹²² The Maoists expressed a similar reason. Asked why the Maoists did not ride on their successes and seize state power militarily in 2005, Prachanda explained that he believed the Maoists could gain domestic and international legitimacy, and hence longer-term political leverage, by abandoning their armed struggle and negotiating with the parties (Vanaik 2008: 65). Recognizing that they could not win the war militarily, the Maoists saw that they could win popular approval and further their agenda by demonstrating openness to peaceful negotiation and political compromise (International Crisis Group 2006, 17). Thus, the parties' and Maoists' agreement to weaken the king and form a constituent assembly followed, and was consistent with, observable changes at the mass level. By taking stances in line with popular sentiments, both the parties and the Maoists saw that they could stand to gain politically. As an analyst put it, it had been "an alliance of convenience" for both the SPA and the Maoists (Interview, Kirtipur, January 26, 2011).

It was in this context that the April 2006 demonstrations took place. Mobilized citizens, dissatisfied with the status quo and seeing that alternatives were within reach, took to the streets en masse. The show of force in the 19-day demonstration surprised

¹²² Of course, despite the political parties' calculated move they could not have foreseen that the Maoists would become so successful in a multiparty system. The parties were willing to enter into an alliance with the Maoists in part because "no one quite thought the Maoists would dominate the [postwar] elections the way they did" (Interview, Kathmandu, January 13, 2011).

even the political parties and the Maoists who had organized the initial 4-day strike (International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006). Furthermore, the response of the king and the parties to the unfolding events is indicative of the political weight the mobilized masses had gained by this time: each made a calculated move based on an assessment of popular demands. The king's initial offer to reinstate the parliament can be understood in this light. He believed that by returning formal authority to the people, he could achieve the two objectives of quieting the demonstrators and retaining his power in a constitutional monarchy. Yet, the king clearly miscalculated the level of popular dissatisfaction. The parties and demonstrators promptly rejected the offer, and three days later he capitulated to the calls for a constituent assembly and a restoration of parliament.

With the people discussing political alternatives and now agitating on the streets, the range of choices available to the parties in the Seven-Party Alliance had also narrowed. When the king's offer merely involved a return to the prewar political setup, the parties "judged the country's mood well and made a principled and practical stand" in rejecting the offer. "Their refusal of the king's offer earned them renewed popular trust" (*ibid.*: 10). In this crisis moment, the people on the streets appeared to be all but dictating the course of events. This explains why observers were unanimous in viewing the outcome of the demonstrations as "a victory for the Nepali people" and "a victory for democracy;" they noted that it was "the people at large, rather than purely party- or Maoist-organized action, [that] forced the king's final climb down" (International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006: *i*).

Nationwide popular opinion polls conducted shortly after the April demonstrations show significant approval of what has come to be called the "Second

People's Movement" and of the parties that led it. Results of the polls thus serve as further evidence that the parties and the Maoists acted in accordance with popular sentiments in pushing for the king's surrender and calling for a constituent assembly. Seventy-four percent of those surveyed said they agreed with the aims of the demonstrations, and 80 percent indicated willingness to accept the Maoists as a political party if they lay down their arms. Meanwhile, a whopping 87 percent agreed that the king had become unpopular in the eyes of the people (Sharma and Sen 2006b). Whereas in 2004 only 13 percent believed the Maoists were committed to restoring peace, following the demonstrations in 2006, 68 percent believed the Maoists were committed to peace. Finally, among those who had heard about the constituent assembly (61 percent of those surveyed), an overwhelming majority – 97 percent – approved of its eventual creation.

The results of the 2008 constituent assembly elections provide a final piece of evidence of the extent to which the war had embedded in the mind of the electorate the idea that major political changes were desirable and obtainable. While the Maoists did use intimidation and coercion to win votes in certain regions, elections monitors deemed the elections to be "generally successful" and "orderly and in accordance with the established procedures" (Carter Center 2008). In this context, analysts concur that the Maoists' electoral victory was first and foremost a result of the people voting for change (Lawoti 2010). "That they were hitherto untried and that they stood for 'new Nepal' was the main justification given by those who had voted for the Maoists" (Sharma 2010:

57).¹²³ Fully aware of the popularity of the Maoists' political platform, most of the other parties had actually campaigned on a Maoist agenda. Yet, "people voted for the Maoists rather than for their carbon copies" (Thapa and Sharma 2009: 214). One interviewee, explaining why he voted for the Maoists, stated: "We were all tired of the political parties; we wanted change" (Interview, Kathmandu, January 23, 2011).

The civil war had thus impelled a political outcome whose eventuality had not been viewed as possible by any save a radical minority of Nepali citizens. By embroiling the people as the primary resource in the war, the Maoist insurgency had the effect of mobilizing the people to demand and expect a specific set of democratic changes. These changing demands and expectations from below were expressed most clearly through a popular movement during the war and at the ballot box once the war had ended, but they also found expression in public debates and private discussions. Ultimately, mass mobilization precipitated the demise of the monarchy, compromises between former belligerents, and the creation of a new, more inclusive political regime.

Wartime Statebuilding and Postwar Politics

In contrast to the civilian mobilization account of democratization, the rebel statebuilding account is not neatly borne out by the evidence in the case of Nepal. The first reason rebel statebuilding is not a convincing explanation for the postwar regime outcome is that although the rebels prevailed in the war, they did not carry over their wartime institutions of governance into peace time. Rather, in keeping with the

¹²³ The Maoists had in fact campaigned on this very idea, with their campaign slogan asking voters to consider that "others have received opportunity many times; give the Maoists an opportunity this time" (Lawoti 2010: 291).

November 2005 agreement with the SPA, the Maoists duly dissolved their “people’s governments” and “people’s courts” throughout the country once they joined the interim government in January 2007.¹²⁴ Thus, even if their wartime institutions had been nominally democratic – itself a debatable notion given reports of fear and coercion as described above – postwar institutions and governance system were not holdovers from the insurgency. Indeed, in discussions of Nepal’s postwar political situation with interviewees, I found a consistent and conspicuous *absence* of mention of rebels’ wartime institutions as being a relevant factor. While rebel statebuilding had been a significant political development during the war, it had no direct impact on postwar governance.

Apart from the actual institutions, wartime statebuilding of the “implicit social contract” type also bestows the rebels with some degree of popular support and legitimacy. According to the hypothesis, these can make democratization less costly, and hence more likely, because the rebels-turned-politicians can be more confident of winning votes if they enter postwar politics with such mass-based support. While establishing the degree of support and legitimacy the Maoists enjoyed is difficult, there is clear evidence that the Maoists were *not* confident of electoral victory in the lead up to the 2008 elections. In fact, fearing they would fare badly next to the well-oiled, well-funded traditional parties, the Maoists pulled out of the interim government just months prior to the scheduled elections, thus nearly derailing the entire electoral process. They believed that the odds of victory were stacked against them in the mixed electoral system to which they had initially given their consent. They thus threatened mass protest if the parties did not agree to replace it with a full proportional representation system, which

¹²⁴ “Maoists Dissolve ‘People’s Governments,’ Kangaroo Courts,” Indo Asian News Service, January 18, 2007.

they believed would yield an outcome more favorable to themselves. It was only when the Maoists saw that the parties were unwilling to give in to this last-minute demand, and that the Maoist agitation was eroding their domestic and international credibility, that they agreed to rejoin the interim government and proceed with the elections.¹²⁵ This nervousness on the part of the Maoists themselves in the months leading up to the elections explains why analysts consistently describe the electoral outcome as a surprise (International Crisis Group, July 2008; Lawoti 2010). According to an interviewee close to the Maoist chairman, Prachanda called the Maoist electoral victory nothing short of a “miracle” (Interview, Kathmandu, January 13, 2011). Whatever the level of political legitimacy and support the Maoists had garnered through wartime governance, it had not been sufficient to make the Maoists readily embrace electoral competition.

The rebel statebuilding hypothesis also posits that wartime governance bestows the rebels with organizational capacity, which can facilitate their transformation into a political party. The Maoists certainly gained experience in political organization, planning, party-building, propaganda, and administration through the war years. Their elaborate organizational structure and implementation of a wartime governance system, as well as the relative ease with which they have adapted to the changes associated with their transformation from outlawed militants to a political party, all attest to this political capacity. The effect of this capacity on postwar politics, however, has not been to incontrovertibly aid democratization. Rather, the Maoists have used their capacity both to pursue democratic reforms *and* to attempt to stymie the peace process. Thus, on the

¹²⁵ See “Nepal Deadlock Delays Elections,” BBC News, October 5, 2007; ‘Maoists ‘Short of Options’ in Nepal,” BBC News, September 18, 2007; “Nepali Leaders Agree to Hold CA Election by Mid-April 2008,” Xinhua, December 16, 2007; and Vanaik (2008: 49).

one hand Maoist leaders engaged in negotiations with other parties, campaigned for and competed in elections, embedded themselves in local organizational structures, and are now, at the time of this writing, working with other parties in the Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. On the other hand, they have also used their organizational muscle to build up a nascent youth paramilitary wing (called the Youth Communist League) that has at times threatened violence; and even while participating in the peace process, the Maoists frequently threaten destabilization through a “people’s revolt” if their various demands were not met.¹²⁶ They even announced the resumption of “people’s courts” in one town in an attempt to bully the government into accepting their demands.¹²⁷ The Maoists’ organizational capacity, gained through years of wartime political organization, has therefore done much more to create a Janus-faced political party than it has to encourage a linear move toward democracy and multiparty politics.

There is thus little evidence that the Maoists’ wartime statebuilding directly motivated them to pursue democratization in the aftermath of the war. They did not transfer wartime institutions into peace time, balked at the prospect of electoral competition, and used their organizational capacity both to act as a cooperative player and to attempt to thwart the peace process and threaten revolt when political developments diverged from their own plans. Significant democratization took place in postwar Nepal, but it was not because the Maoists readily embraced all that democratic politics entailed. To the contrary, despite extensive wartime statebuilding the Maoists displayed considerable anxiety over their ability to survive in a democratic system.

¹²⁶ See, for instance, International Crisis Group, September 29, 2010.

¹²⁷ “Nepal Maoists to Resume ‘Kangaroo Courts,’” *The Times of India*, November 22, 2007.

Rather than being an elite- (or Maoist-) led process, democratization in Nepal occurred as a result of war-induced social mobilization. As the war came to a conclusion, state elites, concerned with political survival, found that catering to popular demands for democracy, inclusion, and greater rights was the most assured way to remain in power and avoid the fate of the king.

CONCLUSION

In Nepal, a war launched against democracy by a communist insurgent group resulted in the deepening of democracy. In this chapter, I have argued that this unexpected outcome can be attributed to widespread popular mobilization that pressured elites to opt first for a democratic compromise, then for specific democratic reforms in the new regime. The emergence of this mobilization itself can be traced back to the rebel group's extensive wartime dependence on civilians. By using the people as its economic and political base, the Maoist insurgency introduced, first to its supporters and later to the wider public, the notion that a radical break from autocracy was within reach. Once this notion had spread, elites in control of the transition to peace had few options but to heed popular calls for change.

This chapter has also shown that the alternative account focusing on the rebels as statebuilders finds little support in the evidence. Democratization took place despite the fact that the Maoists dismantled their wartime institutions of governance at the end of the war; despite the fact that they feared the outcome of elections; and despite the fact that they often used their organizational capacity to destabilize the democratization process

itself. The evidence is therefore consistent with the bottom-up account centering on popular mobilization, but not with the top-down story of statebuilders-turned-state elites.

One direct and compelling counterargument to the civilian mobilization account in the case of Nepal is that in the final analysis, what toppled the dictatorial king was not the legacy of violent rebellion, but a peaceful mass movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). While chronologically this is correct – the April 2006 demonstrations comprised the final event before the king’s capitulation – the argument falls prey to the pitfalls of searching for temporal proximity in drawing causal inference (Kitschelt 2002). At least in the case of Nepal, I have shown that the April 2006 demonstrations were clearly endogenous to the Maoist insurgency that preceded it: people were mobilized squarely on the Maoist agenda, including the abolishment of the monarchy, an idea which the insurgency had popularized. Democratization resulted not because people took to the streets for 19 days, but because the decade-long insurgency had introduced a political alternative and had mobilized people to seek fundamental changes to the political system. As Pierson (2004: 45) puts it, “‘small’ events early on may have a big impact, while ‘large’ events at later stages may be less consequential.”

None of this is to imply that Nepal is now a perfect democracy. Far from it, the state displays telltale signs of the challenges of running a political system forged out of compromises between former belligerents. For instance, five years since the signing of the peace agreement there remains a high level of mutual mistrust and suspicion between the three main political parties (Nepali Congress, UML, and Maoists). According to Nepali Congress and UML officials, the Maoists are intentionally disrupting the functionality of the parliament; are not serious about democratization; have not delivered

on their promises; lack honesty; and are creating a “crisis of confidence” in the government (Interviews, Kathmandu, January 11, 2011; January 20, 2011; January 26, 2011). The Maoists believe the other parties are maneuvering to render the Maoist party weak, marginalized, and irrelevant (International Crisis Group, April 7, 2011). The result is a political process marked by constant, often petty squabbles between (as well as within) these parties, and only incremental progress on pressing substantive issues like the drafting of the new constitution (which remains incomplete at the time of this writing, despite multiple extensions of the now obviously meaningless “deadlines”). Along with this is the classic post-revolutionary problem of rising popular disillusionment at the slow pace of reform and failure of the parties to fulfill their wartime promises. As a senior UML official put it, the people “haven’t yet enjoyed any peace dividends.” Aware of popular frustrations, he expressed the need for patience: “People should know that there are no miracles. Democracy is a gradual process; people must know this” (Interview, Kathmandu, January 26, 2011). Nepal thus remains a nascent democracy struggling to bring the peace process to a conclusion.

Despite these concerns, the reality of a dramatic difference between the country’s pre- and postwar political regime still stands. On the rebel side, a group of radical leftists waged war against a budding democracy and ended up bringing about a deepening of democracy. On the incumbent side, parties that had been closely aligned with the monarchy came to stand against it, while the centuries-old monarchy itself came to symbolize an outmoded autocracy and was, at the end of the war, abolished. The civil war was the critical intervening event linking these prior conditions and outcomes. But more than the mere occurrence of a civil war, the evidence presented in this chapter

points to the causal centrality of civilian mobilization, itself generated by the rebels' reliance on civilians, in the narrative of how the war paved the way to democratic politics.

CHAPTER 6

WAR AND POSTWAR REGIME FORMATION IN UGANDA, TAJIKISTAN, AND MOZAMBIQUE

This chapter engages in further empirical tests of the rebel governance thesis through a comparative study of three cases – the civil wars in Uganda, Tajikistan, and Mozambique. The case of Nepal in the previous chapter provided an illustration of a causal link between the political economy of rebellion and postwar regime change. Crucially, the case showed that the Maoists' heavy reliance on civilians during the war led first civilians, then elites, to behave in the specific ways predicted by the civilian mobilization model. Process-tracing showed that rebels' mode of wartime fundraising was connected to postwar democratization through the actions of mobilized citizens and political elites. The chapter also showed that rebel statebuilding had no direct effect on the postwar regime in the case of Nepal. While wartime governance had increased the rebels' political capacity, it had not made postwar democratization an easy choice: whatever legitimacy and support they may have enjoyed, the Maoists still feared electoral defeat. Neither did political capacity translate neatly into the pursuit of democracy; rather, the Maoists often used their war-tested capacity to threaten democratization itself.

This chapter broadens the scope of the analysis by introducing variation on both the independent and dependent variables. Whereas the Nepalese Maoists relied heavily on civilians for lack of other income sources, rebel groups in the Tajik and Mozambican civil wars had easy access to external funding and did little to attract civilians support. Whereas the Maoists dismantled their wartime institutions as part of the peace agreement, the Ugandan rebels preserved theirs into peace time. Whereas the Nepalese, Tajik, and Mozambican civil wars ended in a negotiated settlement between the government and the

rebels, the Ugandan rebels defeated the government and formed their own regime in the war's wake. Whereas in Nepal and Uganda the transition from war to peace was managed largely by domestic elites, in the Tajik and especially Mozambican cases, foreign actors intervened with their own agendas to steer the transition in particular directions. Finally, whereas the wars in Nepal, Uganda, and Mozambique each paved the way to radical political change toward democracy, the war in Tajikistan did much to reinforce the autocratic status quo. My theory will be strengthened to the extent that the nature of rebel governance serves as a common explanatory thread across these different combinations of explanatory variables and regime outcomes.

The three cases were not chosen randomly; rather, each serves to introduce variation on either some key independent variable(s) or the dependent variable. Specifically, I use the case of Uganda to conduct a "hard test" of the civilian mobilization hypothesis. Uganda's NRA is a familiar case among civil war scholars precisely because it appears to be an exemplary case of the rebel statebuilding model at work. Thus, I examine the case to test whether the bottom-up civilian mobilization story has any causal force in accounting for Uganda's postwar democratization, or whether in fact the top-down statebuilding story sufficiently captures how that outcome eventuated. Tajikistan constitutes a "negative case:" the civil war did not result in democratization, but rather in a deepening of autocracy. Theory-testing in this case involves examining whether this postwar autocratization is associated with a low level of rebel reliance on civilians and, hence, an absence of strong pressures on elites to pursue political liberalization in the aftermath of the war. Finally, Mozambique represents a "deviant case." The building of political relations with civilians was largely an afterthought for the rebels in this war, and

yet, the belligerents made a leap from fighting one of the most brutal wars of the time to laying down their arms and competing in peaceful democratic elections within a matter of a few years. The analysis for this case goes beyond the well-known account of heavy UN and donor interventions in postwar Mozambique. It shows that the postwar foreign intervention was essentially a continuation of the wartime politics of foreign intervention, and that in turn this externally-led transition from war to peace left its own definitive mark on the nature of Mozambican democracy.

I glean the secondary literature for the case studies in this chapter. The evidence mustered here will therefore differ in its nature from what could be gathered from field interviews. However, more time has passed since the termination of these three conflicts and a larger body of studies is available for them than is the case with the Nepalese civil war. While the chapter does not offer first-hand accounts of how the civil war raised individuals' political awareness, for instance, I believe sufficient collective evidence exists to shed light on the connections, if any, between wartime and peacetime politics. As in the previous chapter, rather than provide a detailed historical background for each case, I focus the analysis on identifying the causal chains that link rebels' wartime activity with post-civil war regime outcomes. For brevity's sake many important details of each case are omitted, but can be found in the cited sources.

UGANDA

Scholars of civil wars, insurgencies, and post-civil war political regimes have often turned to the case of Uganda with some fascination. There are good reasons for this. The National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, was arguably as

disciplined as contemporary rebel armies go, and even as it fought, the group attracted civilian support by engaging in a unique and effective grassroots democratization project in the territories it controlled. After defeating the regime of Tito Okello in 1986 and storming into Kampala,¹²⁸ Museveni led the country on an unprecedented course of political and economic development, the strategy of which combined further democratization at the village level with an ingenious defense of one-party rule at the center. Few would dispute that postwar Uganda under Museveni offered to its citizens vast improvements in terms of political freedoms and economic development over any other time since the country's independence.

Indeed, Uganda has become something of a poster child for scholars making some version of the rebel statebuilding argument. Museveni won the war with popular support and legitimacy, a set of nominally democratic governance institutions, and with political capacity. This provided him with the political and institutional tools needed to extend the village democratization project throughout the country, engage in popular consultations when it came time to draft a new constitution, ensure stability, and become a favorite among international donors. This account tells a top-down story of a capable and benevolent strongman who had the political wherewithal deriving from military victory to pursue policies that catered to the interests of the people (see Toft 2010, Weinstein 2005; Ottaway 1999; Gilley 2009). So striking were the differences between this “*Pax*

¹²⁸ Okello, who had been an army commander, had led a coup in July 1985, ousting president Milton Obote who had been ruling the country since 1980.

Musevenica’ and the oppressive regimes that came before it that observers and analysts heaped many praises on Museveni’s vision, skills, and post-civil war accomplishments.¹²⁹

With the wealth of information now available on Uganda’s civil war and the years since its termination, I conduct a (re)examination of the case in light of the two hypotheses proposed in this study. As in the case of Nepal, it is clear that postwar Uganda was freer and more democratic than any other time since its independence in 1962. And as with Nepal’s Maoists, absent access to other funding sources the NRA relied heavily on civilians for material and political support while engaging in extensive institution-building during its five-year guerrilla war. Unlike the Maoists, the NRA eventually militarily defeated the government and installed its own regime. It did so, furthermore, by directly employing the institutions and the political capacity it had built up during the war. Why did a violent civil war pave the way to a period of democratization? More specifically, how did features of the war itself affect postwar political development?

I find, first, that despite the clear case of institutional transfer, the mechanisms specified in the rebel statebuilding hypothesis did not unfold as proposed. In the aftermath of the war, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) sought legitimacy rather than emerged from the war with it; despite significant popular support it displayed electoral anxiety rather than electoral confidence; and it used some wartime legacies to pursue liberalization and others to limit it. Overall, evidence suggests the NRM’s wartime statebuilding facilitated postwar regime *consolidation*, but had a more

¹²⁹ See, for instance, Cullimore (1994); Ottaway (1999); Gilley (2009). Some referred to Museveni as “Africa’s other statesman,” second only to Nelson Mandela in his embrace of a reformist vision. See McKinley (1997).

ambiguous effect on regime *type*. Second, I find that, contrary to existing accounts, bottom-up pressures played an important role in shaping Museveni's political decisions.

The National Resistance Army and Civil War in Uganda

Following the disputed 1980 national elections, the NRA launched a war against the new regime of Milton Obote with merely a handful of men and few resources. Needing food, recruits, arms and supplies, and lacking other sources of funding, the rebels turned to the people, concentrating their recruitment and operations in an area lying north and northwest of Kampala, known as the Luwero Triangle.¹³⁰ The NRA began by contacting local villagers and creating clandestine committees with their aid. As they gained control over territory, they replaced these committees with Resistance Councils (RCs), each of which was tasked with managing the affairs of its own village while supplying material and political aid to the NRA (Ngoga 1998; Kasfir 2005). For these rebels, wartime institution-building was directly motivated by a pragmatic and dire need to collect resources for the war's cause.

The RCs soon developed into a highly organized governance system. In each RC, nine committee members were directly elected by the villagers to oversee village affairs. Remarkably, these elections "created the first democratic governments ever instituted in Ugandan villages" (Kasfir 2005: 271). Above this committee was the parish RC, elected by all of the village committee members. And this system was replicated at the sub-county, county, and district levels. Aside from village-level elections, another novel

¹³⁰ Consequently, the Luwero Triangle also became a major target of government offensives. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that at least 300,000 people died in the Luwero Triangle due to the war (Ofcansky 1995: 55).

feature of this system was “the radical notion” of electing women and youths as officials (Kasfir 2005: 287). The NRA also gave the elected committees some judicial powers and generally refrained from intervening in villagers’ decisions (ibid). While this democratic mode of local governance was unprecedented in the history of Uganda, Kasfir (2005) argues that the NRA’s introduction of village-level democratization was to a great extent motivated by pragmatism. Not only did the RCs channel food, supplies, and political support to the rebels; they also allowed the rebels to avoid responsibility for any unpopular decisions made by village committees (286).

As far as rebel movements go, the NRA was a notably disciplined army. It had a code of conduct which forbade fighters from stealing anything from the people, “not even somebody’s *kikajo* (sugarcane) or *menvu* (sweet bananas),” and spelled out punishments including summary trials and executions for serious violations (quoted in Kasfir 2005: 284; see also Tripp 2000: 55; Ngoga 1998: 102). Perhaps more indicatively, the NRA appears to have exercised deliberate restraint in targeting civilians. Acts of destruction were rare, while looting involved sacking government stores rather than civilian villages (Weinstein 2007: 212). Even so – even with this wartime governance system that would seem the epitome of the implicit social contract – it is difficult to establish the relative degree of coercion and consent involved in civilian aid to the NRA. While scholars argue that many, perhaps most, peasants gave willingly to the rebels, Kasfir nevertheless surmises that civilian motivations for aiding the rebels were mixed. “Most peasants probably felt an underlying sense of coercion, even if they were not open about it,” since all of their activity was under surveillance by the NRA (2005: 285). Nevertheless, by the

time the NRA guerrillas took over Kampala in 1986, it could claim sizable popular support in much of the Luwero Triangle.

From Civil War to Democratization: Identifying the Causes

Why did Uganda democratize following a devastating civil war? The rebel statebuilding hypothesis proposes that wartime institution-building lowers the cost of democratization by bestowing the rebels-turned-state leaders with a set of institutions, political capacity to pursue democratic statebuilding, popular legitimacy, and confidence at the postwar ballot box. With the significant support base that comes with a successful rebellion, the new regime in effect has little to lose by liberalizing, and thus does so to shore up further support for the new regime. Given the facts of the case, Uganda would in fact seem to be a textbook example of the rebel statebuilding model at work. As widely documented, upon seizing power in 1986 the NRM expended considerable efforts extending its village democratization project throughout the country.¹³¹ By utilizing this wartime system the NRA could quickly set up the country's organizational and administrative structure and thereby avoid postwar instability, all the while granting all villagers a taste of popular democracy (Rubongoya 2007: 56). Mamdani (1996: 215) calls this expansion of the RCs "the single most important political achievement of the NRA/M." The expansion of participatory governance at the village level, received with widespread enthusiasm during the war, would also serve to bring some "badly needed legitimacy" to the NRM government (Rubongoya 2007: 56). In a demonstration of his political capacity and openness, Museveni also set out on an ambitious and multi-year

¹³¹ By 1987 there were about 40,000 RCs at the village level (Ofcansky 1995: 60).

effort to engage in nationwide consultations with individuals, local councils, schools, and various organizations on the content of the new constitution (Cullimore 1994: 707-708). The NRM's "Ten-Point Programme," which was written during the war and included the restoration of democracy, security, political education, and national unity, became its postwar manifesto. Furthermore, to assuage fears of a NRM domination and ensure popular support, Museveni formed a "broad-based" coalition government by appointing leaders of rival political parties to high-level cabinet positions. These moves in the immediate postwar period, combined with Museveni's rhetoric of inclusiveness, unity, and economic growth, inspired significant optimism for the new regime both domestically and internationally. Museveni was in fact one of a handful of African leaders whom observers believed constituted a "new breed" of leadership in the 1980s and 1990s. "Depicted as Davids who struck down gerontocratic and monolithic Goliaths, the members of the new breed were generally young, dynamic, determined, no-nonsense, development-minded, and progressive" (Tripp 2004: 30). But "the guru and chief mentor of the group was undoubtedly Yoweri Kaguta Museveni....He came to symbolize much of what was characterized as new, both within the politics of his own country Uganda, in the Greater Horn and across the continent as a whole" (Tripp 2004: 33). Gilley (2009: 138) writes that Museveni pursued a "moral cause" with "moral courage" upon coming to power, thereby creating a "virtuous cycle of legitimation" in the Ugandan polity. In this first-image analysis, it was Museveni himself as the driven, war-tested, reform-minded guerrilla-turned-president in whom one could locate the answer to the puzzle of post-civil war democratization.

Compelling as this may be, further analysis of the postwar regime shows that the rebel statebuilding model provides at best an incomplete explanation for Uganda's postwar democratization. First, although successful insurgency and the wartime creation of the RCs demonstrate the NRM's significant political astuteness and capacity, in the post-1986 period Museveni used this capacity both to pursue liberalization and to stifle actual democratic politics. Thus, while committee members of each village-level RC were popularly elected, above the village level the RCs were by design "ever more indirectly representative of the villagers acting at the bottom level, and are chosen by ever smaller electorates" (Kasfir 1998: 54).¹³² According to Dicklich (1998: 151), the RCs were increasingly "bureaucratized and limited by state policy from above." The village-level RCs, for instance, "had little power and influence beyond the very local level. Often, directives come from above (District level), and are filtered through to the village level, rather than rising from the grassroots upwards." When a 1987 commission of inquiry proposed that villagers be allowed to directly elect officials at all levels of the RC hierarchy, the NRM rejected the idea on the grounds of anti-sectarianism (Kasfir 1998). Within the NRM itself, the leadership persistently avoided internal democracy: until so mandated by the 1995 constitution, "the NRM had never held an election for any of its officers, never convened a body to deliberate or vote on its policies, nor even written a charter for itself" (Kasfir 1998: 61).

More tellingly, the NRM used its newly acquired power to create a no-party "movement" in which political parties were allowed to exist but were barred from fielding candidates in elections. Claiming that multi-partyism was sectarian and divisive

¹³² The Resistance Councils were renamed Local Councils (LCs) in the 1995 constitution. For the sake of consistency, I refer to them as RCs throughout the chapter.

and had destabilizing consequences for the country in the 1960s, Museveni insisted on the no-party system as a transitional device to be used until the country was ready for multiparty politics. In practice, this guaranteed the NRM's de facto single-party rule for some time: in 1989, the parliament (the National Resistance Council), bypassing any debate, passed a bill that extended the transitional NRM government for another five years, much to the ire of opposition parties (Ofcansky 1995: 61).¹³³ As for the "broad-based government" that included members of other political parties in high-level positions, all of these members, dissatisfied with the government's performance, eventually withdrew from the coalition and the practice faded within a few years (Ofcansky 1995: 60; Kasfir 1998: 59; Tripp 2010). All told, "the NRM objective has been to entrench and elevate the regime and only secondarily to liberalize the political system" (Rubongoya 2007: 178). "By 1995 it was clear that the NRM had tightened its grip in a way that left little room for meaningful power-sharing" (Tripp 2000: 58). Far from being a new breed, observers noted that Museveni's policies "reveal a pattern of control typical of post-independence one-party states" (Tripp 2000: 59). On balance, then, while the NRM's wartime experiences and military victory facilitated postwar institution-building and the consolidation of power in the hands of the NRM, their effect on the nature of the postwar regime was more varied and far more uneven than the laudatory remarks heaped on the NRM suggested.

Second, when it came to elections and the possibility of losing some of its hold on power, the NRM displayed far more anxiety than confidence. In 1988, for instance, the

¹³³ Indeed, the no party system was sustained until it was abolished by a 2005 referendum. All the same, Museveni continues to serve as president. He was most recently reelected in the 2011 presidential elections, deemed fraudulent by Museveni's opponents and international observers.

Democratic Party (DP), a major political party during the second Obote regime, held a majority of the seats in two-thirds of the district councils and hence in all lower RCs as well (Kasfir 1998: 55). Given this situation, in the 1989 elections for the NRC (which served as the national legislature between 1986 and 1989), the NRM “designed an electoral scheme that would be quick, cheap, and (last but not least) hard to lose” (Kasfir 1998: 56). In fact, the NRM by then had become sufficiently organized to be able to win a majority at every level in the 1989 and subsequent elections (Kasfir 1998: 58).

Likewise, in the 1996 parliamentary elections “the Movement had a few inbuilt mechanisms for ensuring a majority of seats,” prompting opposition party members to boycott the elections altogether (Rubongoya 2007: 125).¹³⁴ For Rubongoya (2007: 126), the elections once again betrayed the NRM’s “lack of confidence;” “the NRM had not institutionalized its ideology, vision, or programs beyond the personality of its leader.” Electoral democracy clearly did not come “easily” to the NRM – while the institutional facades of democracy were in place, the NRM used its powers to circumvent actual democratic politics.

Third, these behaviors strongly suggest that the NRM did not emerge from the war with political legitimacy, but actively *sought* legitimation in the war’s aftermath. After all, when it ascended to power in 1986 the NRM had only acquired a limited political base, having fought mostly in Buganda and recruited among southerners. In

¹³⁴ On the other hand, the presidential elections that preceded the parliamentary elections in 1996 were more rigorously contested and saw high voter turnout. Although (to no one’s surprise) it led to Museveni’s victory, Rubongoya (2007: 124) describes it as “a major step forward in regime legitimation.”

particular, northerners viewed Museveni's victory with some alarm (Kasfir 1998: 53).¹³⁵ Having won the war, the NRM thus had to work to win a much broader base of support. For Gilley (2009), politics in post-1986 Uganda can be understood only in light of the overarching premise that Museveni sought (and, in his analysis, succeed in) regime legitimation. Even successful wartime governance hence did not bestow the NRA with the "reservoir of legitimacy" democratic theorists believe is necessary for the functioning of democracy.¹³⁶

The point here is not to highlight all of the deficiencies of Uganda's democratization process. As stated earlier, postwar Uganda was on multiple fronts more democratic than it had ever been. Rather, the argument is that references to Museveni's personal inclinations toward democracy, progressive rhetoric, political capacity, wartime institutions transferred to peace time, and electoral confidence neither accurately capture nor sufficiently explain the state's more complex and uneven post-civil war political trajectory. Museveni rhetorically embraced democracy and implemented it at the grassroots level, but took significant measures to consolidate a de facto one-party state at the center. He instituted a no-party electoral system and yet, fearing election results, took steps to ensure the NRM would prevail. Rather than resting on the laurels of legitimacy he actively sought it, recognizing that military victory did not ensure electoral victory or regime security. And while Museveni demonstrated considerable political capacity in pursuing political and economic reforms, this capacity did not neatly translate into the

¹³⁵ In fact, six months after NRM victory the Museveni regime was confronted with rebellions in parts of the east and north. In the north, the violent rebellion would persist for many years, first in the form of the Holy Spirit Movement, and later the Lord's Resistance Army. On the latter, see Dunn (2007).

¹³⁶ See Haggard (1995: 7).

pursuit of democracy. The overall picture that emerges is one in which the NRM pursued democratization where it was relatively costless (at the grassroots level), but stifled it where doing so empowered regime challengers and threatened its own position of power (at the national level). In short, wartime statebuilding facilitated postwar statebuilding – the creation of political stability, a relatively effective central government, and regime consolidation – but had a more mixed effect on democratization.

The civilian mobilization hypothesis proposes that rebel dependence on civilians for wartime support mobilizes the latter to demand greater political rights. Precisely because of Museveni's dominant role in Ugandan politics, the bulk of the literature on post-1986 Uganda consists of descriptive analysis of his and his regime's goals, strategies, and decisions. Yet, broadening the analytical focus away from the NRM strongman to include the rest of Ugandan society yields a more complete account of postwar regime developments. The Ugandan people were certainly not silent observers during these years. To the contrary, there is considerable evidence that they asserted and leveraged their positions vis-à-vis the Museveni regime, affecting the latter's policies.

First, there is evidence of the war's awareness effects: it presented an alternative to autocracy and catalyzed people to seek fundamental political changes. Such effects could be seen both in the rural areas in which the NRA operated and beyond it as well. Within the NRA's operational areas, "particular emphasis was placed on political education." Museveni viewed political education as a daily exercise in which NRA recruits and villagers would learn about "the reasons for the war, the objectives of the NRA, the importance of Ugandan national unity and, most importantly, the need to maintain good relations between the NRA and the civilian population" (Ngoga 1998: 99).

NRA troops heard “daily lectures on such topics as African and Uganda history, colonialism, law and justice, democracy, the practicalities of the [RC] system..., civic rights and responsibilities, women’s rights and economic development” (Rubongoya 2007: 63). Beyond the Luwero Triangle, Mahmood Mamdani (1990: 369) writes of an increase in society’s engagement with political issues that resembles the social bustles that eventually spread through Nepal’s urban streets, civic associations, and media during the height of the Maoist insurgency:

As the guerrilla war waged in the countryside, the urban middle classes rallied to support the intelligentsia in a struggle for more information and discussion that raged throughout the schools and institutions of higher learning (including the University), and in the press. For those who remained in the towns, there was very little beyond an occasional press conference that the opposition political parties could offer by way of resistance. On the other hand, newspapers like *Weekly Topic* and *Munansi*, magazines like *Forward*, and forums like *Mawazo*, became a public arena for lively criticism of the regime and a discussion of the necessity for an alternative to the growing authoritarianism of Milton Obote.

In other words, while the NRA mobilized resistance committees and peasant recruits in the countryside to fight against the state, in the cities people were also mobilizing through their own peaceful avenues.

This social organization and political engagement – what I have called mobilization – outlasted the war and affected Uganda’s postwar democratization in a direct, targeted manner. An example can be seen in the way the media, which channeled alternative views and enabled discussion during the war, continued its activism after the war to ensure that the new regime would in fact present an alternative to the status quo. Following the NRM takeover of Kampala, “overnight, the streets were inundated with competing newspapers eager to feed a population starved of alternative points of view and genuine news coverage” (Tripp 2000: 59). According to Mamdani (1990: 369), after

1986 “it was this press which became the first effective barrier in the path of hegemonic tendencies within the ranks of the National Resistance Movement.” In fact, throughout the postwar years “some of the fiercest resistance to NRM domination has come from the media” (Tripp 2000: 59). It was therefore no coincidence that there was significant media activism during the war despite repression by the Obote regime, *and* that after the war, Museveni conceded greater press freedom despite serious reservations about doing so.¹³⁷ As Mamdani (1990: 369) argues, “the fact is that Uganda’s continuing freedom of expression has been won as the result of a lengthy struggle from below and not as the gift of any regime from above.”

More generally, the Ugandan people at large, but particularly workers, youths, and women’s groups, played important roles in curtailing the newfound powers of the NRM.¹³⁸ Their mobilization did not take the form of large-scale demonstrations in the capital, as occurred in Nepal, but were in their own ways effective in capturing the regime’s attention. An example is the case of women and their role in shaping postwar politics under Museveni. One byproduct of the NRA’s wartime recruitment of women into its ranks was that the latter had earned “considerable respect” for their active and widespread participation in the rebellion in a range of capacities including armed fighters and elected village officials. Tripp (2000: 110) argues that this had a “profound effect” on both male and female perceptions of women’s capabilities and social roles – people saw “what women could do.” Following the war (and even prior to its end) women became increasingly more organized in asserting their demands on the government. “The

¹³⁷ See Tripp (2000, 60) on Museveni’s attempts to curtail media freedom, especially in the 1990s.

¹³⁸ See Mamdani (1990: 371); Rubongoya (2007: 177-178); and Tripp (2000: 59-61).

years of internal warfare...gave women activists leverage in pressuring the NRM to put women in top leadership positions. It thrust women into new roles and situations that fundamentally transformed their consciousness” (ibid). For instance, since the NRM had no established policy on women’s issues at the time of the takeover in 1986, women’s organizations, with their war-tested credibility, “were well positioned at this critical juncture to help shape the regime’s policy” (Tripp 2000: 69).

This question of women’s political representation has been a contentious one; critics argue that for Museveni, acceding to parliamentary quotas and cabinet appointments for women was an easy way to ensure NRM popularity among the female half of the population. It is certainly likely that, conveniently for Museveni, his own political interests and those of women’s associations converged in this case. As Rubongoya (2007: 79) writes, after the introduction of the RCs, the incorporation of women into the NRM government was “the second most important agent used to recapture political legitimacy in Uganda after 1986. Simply put, the NRM could not have begun the process of democratization without the participation of the majority of the population.” Nonetheless, it was also the case that the NRM engaged with the significant organizational political activity from below, so that the outcome – the active role of women in the government – was a result of an interactive process between the regime and grassroots actors.

Underlying all of these changes was the fact that the insurgency also had the direct effect of generating widespread optimism and high expectations of the new regime among Ugandans. The NRA had become the first African insurgent group to successfully take over an incumbent government (Ngoga 1998: 91). During the war, the

RCs had been received with “enormous popular enthusiasm” (Kasfir 2005: 290) – the participatory system represented a mode of local governance “wholly new to Ugandans,” who had always been ruled by chiefs or male elders (Kasfir 1998: 54). Furthermore, the NRA had placed particular emphasis on political education during the war, stressing to villagers and fighters that “it is the people who matter” (quoted in Ngoga 1998: 99); “leaders shouldn’t be corrupt;” “people should be able to talk freely;” and “we have brought you peace” (quoted in Kasfir 2005: 290). The mounting expectations of positive change under NRM rule, together with expressions of optimism emerging from international donors, were not lost on the guerrilla-turned-president (Powers 1986). In his inaugural speech on January 29, 1986, Museveni declared that his ascent to power signaled “not a mere change of guards” but a “fundamental change” in Ugandan politics (Rule 1986: A3). These promises, and popular expectations that they would be fulfilled, compelled Museveni to shape his new regime in a way that at least to some degree satisfied his domestic and international audiences. In this sense the RC system, while a convenient holdover from the war, also served as an ideal tool with which to legitimate his new regime and increase popular support for it: not only did it introduce participatory democracy to all villages; the whole system – its emphasis on individual merit and the empowerment of both men and women – was “unprecedented” and “unique in Uganda’s political history,” and offered that fundamental change people had come to expect (Rubongoya 2007: 65). This context of progressive promises and expectations also helps to account for the extensive popular consultations conducted for the new constitution, a relatively free press, and the cabinet and parliament seats allocated to women, as described above. As a Ugandan journalist remarked, “the NRA did not begin to

democratize as a gift.” Rather, it pursued democratization “because ordinary people had paid the price for the overthrow of Obote 2 and had been the largest element in the NRA force” (quoted in Hansen and Twaddle 1995: 141-142).

To sum, the Ugandan case shows that post-civil war democratization took place less as a result of regime commitment to a democratic social contract, and more centrally at the intersection of regime interests and popular mobilization. Despite military victory, statebuilding capacity, and war-derived popular support, democratization proved a costly option for the NRM. Thus, it allowed it at the village level where it was relatively easy to do so, but sought regime entrenchment at the national level where potential challengers threatened NRM domination. Meanwhile, the insurgency and its victory over a repressive regime had created widespread popular expectations of a major break with the past. The open armed rebellion in the countryside had also spurred a concomitant urban mobilization in the form of public discussions, media defiance, and budding civic associations. All of these war-induced changes had created a force for change which the newly-installed, legitimacy-seeking regime could not ignore. To the extent that Uganda democratized after the civil war, much of the changes could be attributed to Museveni’s engagement with these social forces that pushed him toward particular courses of action while foreclosing others.

TAJKISTAN

Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war came to an end in a political context which, based on some simple facts of the case, may appear to have been relatively favorable to postwar democratization. First, regime opposition groups that emerged at the time of

independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 had initially made democratization a central ideology around which to mobilize supporters. Though disparate, “all of the members of the opposition shared the goal of changing Tajikistan’s political system, so that the Communist Party would no longer enjoy a monopoly of power and government policies would reflect the wishes of the governed” (Atkin 1997: 283). Second, the war had ended in a negotiated settlement between the government of Imomali Rahmon and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), an umbrella organization representing the main opposition groups. The peace agreement, a culmination of UN-led negotiations between the belligerents, contained what might appear to be a sensible combination of institutional ingredients for democratization: power-sharing in national and local governments along a 70:30 split between the government and the UTO; a process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ex-UTO fighters into the armed forces; the lifting of all restrictions on opposition parties following this process; the creation of a joint Central Election Commission that would manage postwar elections; and a Commission on National Reconciliation, composed equally of government and UTO members, to oversee the implementation of the agreement. Third, the war had ended at a time when the UN had declared, and was test-driving, a new commitment to liberal peacebuilding and interventionism,¹³⁹ the debacles of Somalia and Bosnia notwithstanding. The UN Secretary-General had responded to the violence in Tajikistan by sending a special envoy in 1993, while the Security Council had endorsed the creation of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in 1994, which would be succeeded by the UN

¹³⁹ See Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*.

Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) in 2000. In short, the Tajik conflict was squarely on the radar screen of the international peacebuilding community.

Yet, democratization did not take place in postwar Tajikistan. The country's postwar Polity score stood at -1, which was hardly an improvement over the score of -2 before the war began (though it was an increase over the -6 score during the civil war); by 2003 it had slipped to -3. These scores are consistent with the general observation that the Tajik civil war did not have the kind of galvanizing effect on the state's political system that could be observed in the cases of Nepal and Uganda. Instead, while the peace has generally held, observers concur that the state has become increasingly authoritarian since the end of the war (Heathershaw 2009: 2). Rubin's (1998: 130-131) list of the immediate political outcomes of the war include: 1) a weak state dependent on Russian financial support and troops; 2) an authoritarian regime backed by Russia and the distribution of rents from illicit sources; 3) a political elite drawn more and more exclusively from one region of the country, and 4) the absence of any social forces for liberalism or democracy. The overall picture is a far cry from the radical political break that characterized the postwar period in the two cases examined above.

Tajikistan thus represents a "negative" case, that is, a case of non-democratization after civil war. Examination of such cases is important for avoiding potential biases in causal inference associated with selecting on the dependent variable. Why did autocratization follow the war in Tajikistan? If my theory on the effects of civilian mobilization is right, we should be able to observe that this non-democratization corresponds with a low value on the explanatory variable, that is, a low level of rebel reliance on civilians. Furthermore, as with the other cases the analysis should uncover

evidentiary signposts that causally connect rebels' wartime organization with the form of the postwar regime. Specifically, it should show that an absence of bottom-up mobilization made autocratization a relatively costless option for the postwar regime.

The Civil War in Tajikistan

With the demise of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan, one of the poorest of the Soviet republics, gained independence on September 9, 1991. The country's first presidential election in October that year put Rahmon Nabiev, a pro-Soviet elite from the Khujand region north of Dushanbe, at the helm. At the same time, a variety of regionally and ideologically based opposition movements emerged. These groups soon coalesced around issues of democratization, the rule of law, and a constitutional referendum, and staged demonstrations in the capital that continued for 50 days (Atkin 1997: 288).¹⁴⁰ The government countered by organizing its own demonstrations, the participants of whom would eventually form the core of a pro-government militia called the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT). As Collins (2003: 276) points out, the demonstrators were "less 'democratic' or 'communist' coalitions than regionalist cliques," and this complex interplay of regionalism, ideology, and clan-based elite networks would come to define

¹⁴⁰ The most important and enduring of these groups was the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), a largely moderate Islamic party proclaiming democratic ideals and parliamentarianism. The Rastokhez ("Renaissance") Party sought a revival of Tajik culture and touted democratic ideas, and consisted of nationalists, secularists, and anti-colonialists among the intelligentsia and educated elite. The Democratic Party of Tajikistan opposed communism and called for the establishment of a secular democratic government. Finally, the Lale Badakhshan sought greater autonomy for the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region and found support among the Pamiri population in that region. Each of these groups had its own reformist agenda and, often, regional ties. For more on these parties-turned-rebels, see Heathershaw (2009), Shirazi (1997), and Rubin (1998).

much of the political context of the civil war.¹⁴¹ When these demonstrations escalated into violence in May 1992, Nabiev distributed weapons to the pro-government militias to form a “presidential guard.” The opposition, now with its own militias, attacked government sites, leading to a collapse of the government and the intervention of Russian troops on the side of the incumbent regime. The belligerents reached a compromise in forming a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) on May 11, but amidst continuing violence on the streets, the GNR quickly broke down. When opposition fighters forced Nabiev’s resignation, the country was left without an effective government between September and December 1992. Following a period of intense power struggles between multiple, largely clan-based factions, a session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, boycotted by many in the opposition, elected Emomali Rahmon chairman of the parliament and acting head of government. Rahmon was a Kulobi (from the Kulob area south of Dushanbe) and a candidate of the PFT. In November 1994, Rahmon went on to defeat an opponent from Khujand in a presidential election involving “massive and blatantly obvious falsification of the vote” (Collins 2006: 279). In a country in which political power is often associated with regional connections, Rahmon’s ascent to the presidency signaled a transfer of power within the pro-government coalition from Khujand to Kulob – a fact that would remain significant in the years to come (Heathershaw 2009: 29).

Meanwhile, from 1992 onwards the government, now heavily backed by Russian and Uzbek forces, drove its military campaigns southward, in time forcing most of the opposition fighters across the border into Afghanistan. There, opposition groups

¹⁴¹ The conflict thus defies tidy labels such as “ethnic,” “ideological,” “Islamic,” or “anti-communist.” See Collins (2006); Heathershaw (2009: 19-24).

consolidated into the UTO and fought against pro-government and Russian troops at the border and in southern Tajikistan. Though the country had seen the worst of the violence in 1992, fighting continued through 1993-1997. The conflict came to a formal close with the signing of the peace agreement on June 27, 1997 by Rahmon and UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri.¹⁴²

Both government and rebel forces were significantly abetted by foreign actors throughout the war. Russia, keen to broaden its sphere influence, sent forces to fight alongside the PFT against the rebel forces, stationed troops along the Tajik-Afghan border, and led a CIS “peacekeeping” force numbering 20,000 at its height to support the preservation of the Rahmon regime (Heathershaw 2009: 31). In fact, “Russia’s continued patronage became the main source of the [Rahmon] regime’s capacity to survive after 1995” (Collins 2003: 293). So substantial was the Russian intervention that some characterized Tajikistan as a “protectorate” or a “garrison state” (quoted in Heathershaw 2009: 31).¹⁴³ Uzbek forces also fought on the side of the government, in addition to using air strikes against UTO forces in Afghanistan (Horsman 1999). The opposition, for its part, found refuge in Afghanistan once government offensives forced it – along with hundreds of thousands of refugees – to escape southward. There, the UTO received the support of mujahidin leaders (most notably Ahmad Shah Massoud) and field commanders in northern Afghanistan, as well as indirect support from Iran.¹⁴⁴ In

¹⁴² Nevertheless, “mafialike conflict,” political assassinations and other forms of violence involving various anti-government factions and warlords persisted in the period after 1997. See Collins (2003, 268) and Nourzhanov (2005).

¹⁴³ For a discussion of Russian motivations for the intervention, see Rubin (1998: 154-156).

¹⁴⁴ See Rubin (1998: 153); Collins (2003: 280); Johnson (2007: 80-95). The IRP also sought support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Johnson 2007: 84).

addition, militants of both sides found a lucrative income source in heroin trafficking from Afghanistan; “the drugs-weapons nexus became a much fought-over trade during the war” (Lezhnev 2005: 59).

Meanwhile, ordinary people, while certainly significantly affected by the politics and the violence of the war,¹⁴⁵ appear to have played a relatively muted role as a source of political strength for either side. While there is no reliable information on the size of the memberships of the parties that came to form the rebel alliance, Atkin (1997: 286-287) surmises that the support base for these groups was likely limited: not only was there a climate of repression that prevailed; these groups would have faced difficulties trying to disseminate their messages given the media censorship, especially after December 1992. Even the Islamic Renaissance Party, which had the greatest mobilizing potential owing to its “ready-made organizational network in the shape of the mosques to be found in every village,” in fact found only limited support confined to certain parts of the country (Anderson 1997: 175). Furthermore, as protests escalated into violence and as the violence spread beyond Dushanbe in 1992, the conflict took on a new character wherein “a partly political and ideological struggle” had transformed into “more of a regional warlord battle” (Lezhnev 2005: 58). According to Collins (2006: 203-204),

As the war flowed from the Dushanbe intelligentsia to the rural peasant population, ideological motives receded or disappeared altogether. Likewise, the mass opposition movements disintegrated, and small, clan-based factions became the units of resistance. Their leaders were generally driven by a desire for increased resources and power, and their militias and support were mobilized through kin and fictive-kin networks.

¹⁴⁵ By the end of 1993, between 50,000 to 100,000 people had been killed and 500,000 refugees had fled to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other neighboring countries. A total of about one million people, nearly one-fifth of the population, had been internally displaced (Collins 2006: 205).

By 1993 the opposition movement “had essentially collapsed,” based as it was on only a small intelligentsia-based membership, a weak social mandate and little popular support (Collins 2006: 280). What support the opposition may have enjoyed, they lost after committing a range of atrocities in the countryside including group killing, kidnapping, arson, and hostage-taking in the summer and fall of 1992 (Lezhnev 2005: 58). Yet, the rebel groups did not stop the fighting. “[M]ilitias increasingly formed along localistic and clan lines, led by local warlords or clan elites” in a war that became increasingly factionalized (Collins 2006: 287). Easy access to weapons and to the narcotics trade increased militia leaders’ desire to perpetuate low-level conflict while establishing their own powerful patronage networks.¹⁴⁶ According to one analyst, these militia commanders “put on political badges when they needed to but didn’t really believe in a particular cause” (quoted in Lezhnev 2005: 57-58). Furthermore, none of the numerous sources consulted for this study give any indication that the UTO or any of the opposition groups sought to engage in institution-building during the war, whether in Tajikistan or in exile in Afghanistan. In contrast, a variety of sources report of a war whose brutality had become “legendary;” “neither side distinguished itself by humanitarian conduct in the war,” and in fact the war appears to have been fought “without rules” (Human Rights Watch 1993).

In short, compared to the Maoists of Nepal and the NRA of Uganda, the various rebel groups of Tajikistan displayed little interest in investing political capital in ordinary Tajiks; there is little evidence that they viewed them as an important political or material resource base for war-fighting. These groups, as well as the incumbent regime itself,

¹⁴⁶ See Collins (2006: 288); Lezhnev (2005: 57).

drew instead on foreign support, contraband, and well-established patronage networks to fight what increasingly became a war of clan-based power struggles. Comparatively, this civil war was marked by an absence of rebel efforts to build coherent political relations with civilians.

From Civil War to Autocratic Reinforcement

Since the civil war formally ended in 1997, President Rahmon has taken a series of steps to bolster his own regime and to weaken regime challengers. A 1999 national referendum extended the president's term from five to seven years; another referendum in 2003 won him two more consecutive seven-year terms. In November 1999 he won over 97 percent of the vote in "farcical presidential elections where he was, for most of the campaign, the only candidate standing" (Heathershaw 2009: 88). He has decreased the power of the parliament while increasing that of the executive (Collins 2006, 277), all the while continuing to exercise "a virtual monopoly" over the media (Akiner 2010: 359). To be sure, there were "gestures toward 'multiparty politics'" such as the lifting of the ban on political parties and the institution of regular presidential and parliamentary elections. However, for critics these were little more than a "simulation of 'democratization'" intended to please the international community (Heathershaw 2009: 93). What Rahmon in fact created was a "super-presidential autocracy" that has enabled him to impose the hegemony of his own clan (Collins 2006: 277, 278).

Why did the war result in autocratic reinforcement? Part of the answer lies in the way the war itself was concluded – that is, in the nature of the peace agreement. In a clear indication that not all negotiated settlements – not even the internationally brokered

ones – are created equal, the 1997 peace deal left out key players, including the largest opposition, the Khodjenti clans that had been ousted from power following Rahmon’s 1994 ascent to the presidency. It therefore legitimated an “exclusivist government of southern Tajiks,” especially of Kulobis and those belonging to the president’s clan (Collins 2006: 286).¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, no space had been provided for popular participation in the negotiation process or popular ratification of the final peace agreement (Barnes and Abdullaev 2001: 10). And while the agreement stipulated power-sharing between Rahmon and the UTO it was only patchily implemented, despite the presence of UN monitors deployed to oversee its implementation. For instance, the regime refused to turn over the full 30 percent of seats to the UTO, while allotting it only token positions with little actual power.¹⁴⁸ Although the Ministry of Defense was given to the UTO, for instance, the office had only formal powers and no actual control over troops or weapons (Collins 2006: 283). Finally, overshadowing these internal developments was the continued “hegemonic role” of Russia in Tajik politics in the war’s aftermath (Collins 2003: 281). Over 25,000 Russian troops remained in the country after the signing of the peace agreement, while Russian subsidies paid for 50 to 70 percent of the state budget (Rubin 1998: 130). Whereas the transition from war to peace, I argued, was essentially driven “from below” in Nepal, in Tajikistan it was to a large extent dictated “from above” by Russia. The Russian presence ensured the effective suppression of any further threats from Islamic or democratic movements as well as the stability of the Rahmon regime.

¹⁴⁷ Indeed, despite multi-party politics Rahmon remains in power as president today, 15 years since the signing of the peace agreement.

¹⁴⁸ See Collins (2006: 286) and (2003: 281; 286).

However, this focus on inter-elite power struggles, as dominant a feature as they are in Tajik politics, offers only a partial account of the regime outcome and obscures an important but under-analyzed counterpart issue: the *absence* of an organized demand for democratization from below. Political repression, electoral manipulation, corruption, and media restrictions have not entailed any serious domestic (or, for that matter, international) censures, and certainly have not led to leadership accountability. Nor is there significant grassroots political activity aimed at pressuring the regime toward reform, as seen among media, labor, and women's organizations in postwar Uganda. The circularity of the phenomenon certainly must be acknowledged; individuals will hesitate to agitate when agitation will be met with repression. Yet, the signing of the peace agreement had provided a political opening during which opposition groups and citizens could have made their claims heard. They did not do so. A major part of the reason Rahmon and his clans have been able to amass and maintain their exclusivist hold on power is that it has been relatively costless for them to do so.

What *can* be observed in postwar Tajikistan is that there is “little sign of the popular ferment of ideas and debate that marked the 1989-1991 period” (Akiner 2002: 175) while “ordinary Tajiks are loath to dwell on the events of [the] conflict” (Heathershaw 2009: 2). A 2004 report by the Freedom House notes that “little energy is left for political debate and organization” when ordinary people are focused on basic survival (5). The report attributes Tajikistan's lack of strong democratic opposition groups to the civil war itself, “which discouraged many from political activity” (ibid). The popular (non)response to the country's first multiparty parliamentary elections held in February 2000 is an illustration of the lack of bottom-up political mobilization, or what

others have labeled “political apathy” (Olcott 2005: 170). The campaign period was “severely marred by government threats to the opposition” while OSCE monitors declared the vote itself to be highly problematic (Collins 2003: 283).¹⁴⁹ And yet, there was no strong or sustained protest by either the opposition groups or the population at large (ibid). NGOs do exist in the country, but the most active ones are funded by international agencies (Akiner 2002: 173). More generally, civil society suffers from “lethargy and self-censorship” (Freedom House 2010: 535). Compared to the Soviet era when “publications were cheap and plentiful (and widely read),” there has been “an extraordinary shrinking of the public space” in post-conflict Tajikistan (Akiner 2002: 169); most people simply do not have access to information, let alone to the kind of information that would enliven public discourse and debate. There is also an “absence of any project of civic nationalism, liberalism, or democracy” (Rubin 1998: 131). The country also lacks charismatic leaders who could potentially breathe change into the political status quo (Akiner 2002: 167). While it may be the case that “Tajiks resign to authoritarian government not because they value it but because there are no plausible alternatives” (Heathershaw 2009: 176), since the end of the conflict neither have Tajiks actively sought to identify or present a plausible alternative.

The civil war in Tajikistan was one in which political elites vying for power saw little need to entice ordinary people’s support beyond their pre-established clans, and yet ordinary people suffered devastating consequences to their lives and livelihoods.

Although early demonstrations called for a break from the past in the form of democratization, the war increasingly became defined by elite-level competition and

¹⁴⁹ The result of this election was that Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan won a majority of the seats.

patronage. As a result, the war did not mobilize ordinary Tajiks to demand real political alternatives once it had ended. There were certainly openings in which they could have done so without risking serious repression, especially in the early postwar years when the international donor community insisted on political and economic liberalization. Yet, this did not occur. Far from marking a watershed event in their short post-independence history, the civil war in fact appears to have reinforced the status quo ante. As Atkin (1997: 277) writes:

Independent Tajikistan is not a democratic country nor is it in the process of becoming one. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists and the Communist Party of Tajikistan no longer enjoys a monopoly of power, the current political system in Tajikistan bears a fundamental resemblance to the old Soviet order in the sense that a narrow circle of people dominates and uses methods, ranging from control of the mass media to the imprisonment or killing of opponents, that were highly developed in the Soviet era.

Since civil wars elsewhere had the effect of informing, equipping, and mobilizing ordinary people to demand concrete changes from the autocratic past, it was not the occurrence of the civil war per se, as the Freedom House report suggested, but rather the manner in which it was conducted that contributed to the reinforcement of autocracy. Rather than seek popular support, both state and rebel forces turned to external patrons and the narcotics trade for sustenance. Rather than rally the people to their respective causes through ideological messages, the war increasingly became one of clan-based leaders fighting for power and resources. There were two consequences. First, the absence of wartime popular mobilization directly fed into the absence of peacetime popular mobilization despite the installation of an increasingly exclusivist authoritarian regime. Rather than mark a break with the past, the political economy of the civil war has in many ways enabled the perpetuation of existing power structures. And second, the

postwar regime continues to rely heavily on Russia for stability and survival, and on the drugs trade for economic profit. The “garrison state” label thus still holds,¹⁵⁰ while the “narco state” label has become increasingly apt.¹⁵¹

MOZAMBIQUE

On most scores, Mozambique was not an obvious candidate for democratization when its civil war began winding down in the late 1980s. For one, the war had been a notoriously brutal one. Renamo rebels engaged in widespread massacres, mutilations, rape, looting, and abduction, and applied these methods largely indiscriminately against civilians. This rampant brutality, combined with Renamo’s lack of a coherent political ideology,¹⁵² appeared to make the group’s entry into participatory politics highly improbable. Moreover, even after the General Peace Agreement had been signed by the leaders of Renamo and Frelimo in 1992, it was not clear that the peace would hold.¹⁵³ Two years later, at the time of the 1994 elections “disarmament was incomplete, the new, unified army had not been fully formed, Renamo still continued to resist integrating its territory into that of the government’s, there were several challenges to the government’s sovereignty, and both the government and Renamo hid weapons and retained soldiers” (Bekoe 2008: 25-26) – in short, the immediate postwar situation did not augur well for

¹⁵⁰ On Russia’s continued backing of Rahmon, see Collins (2006: 294-295). Russia, which currently has between 5,000 to 7,000 of its troops in Tajikistan, has shown a strong interest in maintaining a long-term presence in the country. See Marat (2011).

¹⁵¹ Experts believe the bulk of Tajikistan’s economy now relies on the drugs trade. See Collins (2006: 292).

¹⁵² See Hall (1990).

¹⁵³ For a gloomy *New York Times* assessment published shortly after the signing of the accord, see Perlez (1992).

internal stability, let alone for the creation of a democratic system in which the main players were to be erstwhile war opponents.

Neither did the politics of the civil war itself lay the ground for later democratization. In contrast to Nepal's Maoists and Uganda's NRA, Renamo (as well as the government, run by Frelimo) had been the beneficiary of significant foreign military and financial largess for the better part of the war. This allowed Renamo to wage war and sustain itself without systematically relying on the civilian population. When in the final years of the war foreign aid dissipated, Renamo did turn to civilians but primarily to violently coerce physical and material support. Very little of its wartime behavior inspired the notion that it could transform itself into a political party and play by the rules of the game.

And yet, what transpired in the early 1990s in Mozambique was not only the emergence of a "surprise peace" (Bekoe 2008: 25), but also of a surprisingly smooth transition from war to democratic politics. In terms of Polity scores, Mozambique made a gigantic 14-point leap toward democracy (measured from right before the war to 5 years after it ended), the greatest pre- to postwar increase of all cases in the dataset used in Chapters 3 and 4. This leap is in part a result of the low prewar starting point – Mozambique at the time of the civil war's outbreak was a fragile, newly independent autocratic state governed by a party, Frelimo, which had itself just concluded a war of decolonization against Portugal; the state's prewar score was a -8.¹⁵⁴ But the large score increase also reflects a definitive political sea change that took place when the civil war ended. Mozambique had essentially gone from nearly two decades of war to a period of

¹⁵⁴ Its Polity score remained at -8 or -7 throughout the war.

peaceful political competition and bargaining between the very same groups that had fought against one another on the battlefield.

The case of Mozambique therefore represents a “deviant” case:¹⁵⁵ based on the political economy of rebellion one would not expect postwar democratization, but that is what in fact occurred. In other words, Mozambique’s regime outcome “outperforms” vis-à-vis what one would expect based on the nature of the rebels’ wartime relations with civilians. The task at hand is to explain this theoretically unexpected outcome.

That Mozambique’s transition from war to peaceful democratization was designed, financed, implemented and managed by international actors is well known. I do not diverge from existing studies in pointing to the heavy international intervention in postwar Mozambique as the predominant factor that accounts for the state’s regime outcome. It is, for instance, a factor that distinguishes the Mozambican case from the Nepalese and Ugandan cases where domestic actors were the primary drivers of the process of postwar political development. However, an analysis of this case using the theoretical approach offered in this project yields several unique insights on the intervention and its effects. Below, I make the case for the following: 1) While it is tempting to treat the external intervention as an “exogenous shock” that explains Mozambique’s deviance from the theoretical prediction, in fact the postwar intervention was itself a legacy of the wartime politics of intervention; and 2) despite “successful” democratization, the heavy-handed role of international actors in the transition has itself left a particular imprint on Mozambican democracy.

¹⁵⁵ See Gerring (2007: 105-108).

Renamo and the Political Economy of Rebellion

From its inception, the Renamo insurgency was inextricably linked with regional politics and the politics of the Cold War. Having won Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1974, Frelimo gave support to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and Robert Mugabe's ZANU in Rhodesia, both of which were fighting their own white-ruled governments. Rhodesia's response was to build up a Mozambican guerrilla group – the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR; later Renamo) – to fight against Frelimo. The Mozambican civil war thus began in 1976 as a conflict between Frelimo and the Rhodesian government. When Mugabe's victory in 1980 signaled the end of Rhodesian sponsorship of Renamo, the apartheid regime in South Africa stepped in to take over the role of external patron. Thus trained, equipped, and financed, Renamo waged a campaign of destruction inside Mozambique with the goal of eliminating the Marxist Frelimo government. Frelimo, for its part, received troop support from Tanzania and Zimbabwe, in addition to Soviet and East German aid in the form of military advisers and materiel (Aldren 2000: 22).

Two observations can be made about rebel governance in this conflict. First, as widely reported, Renamo conducted a sustained campaign of violence against ordinary people. In direct contrast to the Nepalese Maoists or the NRA, both of which reportedly followed a code of conduct, Renamo troops “rarely showed restraint;” in fact, “the distinguishing characteristic of Renamo's actions was the abuse of noncombatants” (Weinstein 2007: 230). And while much of the violence appears to have been indiscriminately applied, the consistent use of violence against civilians suggests it was instrumental and “consciously cultivated” to achieve various tactical and strategic

objectives (Hall 1990: 52). For internal fundraising Renamo also looted widely from government stores, health posts, schools, and households, creating for itself what Vines (1991: 87) called a “pillage economy.”¹⁵⁶

Concomitant to this violent *modus operandi* was a notable lack of emphasis on ideological education within its ranks as well as for the broader noncombatant audience. Renamo “lack[ed] all the features we have come to associate with successful insurgencies in Africa, such as a charismatic leadership or easily identifiable ideology” (Hall 1990: 39). Recruitment was overwhelmingly forced rather than voluntary, and Renamo made little effort to indoctrinate its new recruits (Weinstein 2007: 114; Hall 1990: 45).

Although Renamo is cast here (and in other studies) in comparatively negative terms – for instance, the NRA’s discipline versus Renamo’s apparent indiscipline; discriminate versus indiscriminate violence; institutionalized extraction versus pillage; political versus apolitical insurgency, and so on – it should be stressed that none of this should be taken to imply a lack of strategy or leadership on the part of Renamo. To the contrary, Renamo’s ability to destabilize, destroy, and at the same time survive and coerce civilian provisions suggests an effective organization capable of adapting to changing military and political circumstances. Scholars have in fact taken note of the “overall coherence of Renamo military action” and of the existence of a “centralized and coordinated decision making” within its leadership (Hall 1990: 45; Vines 1991: 82). As mentioned above, observers believe even its rampant violence was at least to an extent strategically motivated (Vines 1991: 90).

¹⁵⁶ It also obtained some income from cross-border trade in ivory (Weinstein and Francisco 2005: 172-173; Vines 1991: 89).

Second, this coincidence of sustained foreign sponsorship of the rebels and widespread rebel violence against civilians was likely due not to chance, but to the presence of an actual causal link between the two phenomena. Weinstein (2007) makes this case with rich data on Renamo behavior over the course of the war. Furthermore, what little attempt Renamo did make to forge more benign relations with civilians suggests that things may have transpired quite differently had Renamo had to secure its own domestic means of war financing. Here, variation across regions and over time lend suggestive evidence. While Renamo violence was sustained throughout the war, scholars have noted that its incidence was markedly higher in the south, where Frelimo had a strong base, than in the center and north of the country where Renamo had established a presence; the south was also where Renamo committed its most horrific massacres (Hall 1990: 53; Manning 2002: 42). And where Renamo had established a presence, it also made some efforts to garner support among the rural population (Vines 1991: 93; Manning 2002: 42; Hall 1990: 53). In the Gorongosa region, for instance, “there was a reasonably good and cooperative coexistence with the civilian population and little apparent fear” (Hall and Young 2003: 60). Even more telling is evidence that Renamo governance was the most elaborate and benign in areas where the civilian population could reliably supply them with the needed resources. In these areas,

Renamo operated an administrative regime which was neither particularly intrusive nor violent, and which provided very basic health and educational services and allowed for some market activity. The key to this relatively benign state of affairs (in relation to other parts of the country) was probably the ease with which an agricultural surplus could be produced locally to support the Renamo soldiers, and the existence of a social base which allowed for voluntary local recruitment....[In these areas, Renamo] created a more civil-based administration which tried to mobilize the support of the people. (Hall and Young 2003, 65)

Furthermore, what little institution-building and governance Renamo attempted appears to have been largely a phenomenon of the mid- to late-1980s. It thus coincided with the weakening of South African sponsorship following the signing of a non-aggression pact between South Africa and Frelimo in 1984. South Africa did not immediately disavow Renamo in accordance with the agreement, but it appears that by 1986 Renamo was searching for new means and areas of support (see Vines 1991: 89). It was also at this time that Renamo, which had until then been “an almost purely military organization,” began to alter its strategy by recruiting educated people, creating more functional “liberated zones,” and building up its political core (Hall and Young 2003: 61; Manning 2002: 91). In addition, the late 1980s was also a time when both Frelimo and Renamo began to consider engaging in talks to end the war. The international community had thus also become an audience to be taken seriously. Such considerations no doubt played a role in Renamo’s decision to hold its first congress in June 1989, thirteen years into the civil war. There, Renamo openly called for peace talks with Frelimo and broadcast to its domestic and international audiences its intention of becoming a political party capable of negotiating effectively with Frelimo (Manning 2002: 92-93). In short, when South Africa left Renamo to its own devices Renamo altered its political behavior, if not its violent methods. Prompted by a newfound need to shore up domestic and international political backing, it began to make efforts to recast itself as a political party and to act accordingly, particularly in front of its international audiences.

Yet, this point should not be overemphasized. Throughout the war and in most parts of the country, Renamo was first and foremost a violent and coercive organization that engaged in far more killing and destruction than it invested in building political

relations with civilians. What political and administrative structures it created, it did so late in the war and only in certain pockets of the country. And while it may have received some voluntary support in such areas, the reality was such that Renamo may simply have been viewed as the more palatable of the two forces; most of the rural population was probably ambivalent towards both Frelimo and Renamo and chose to support “which ever side will protect them, in order to save their own skin” (Vines 1991: 94-95). There was little reciprocity in these areas; the only apparent compensation for supporting Renamo was “religious tolerance, access to ICRC emergency food aid and the opportunity to remain alive” (Vines 1991: 93).

New External Patrons: The Transition from War to Peace

Changes in global politics in the final years of the Cold War directly affected Mozambique’s foreign-financed civil war. Just as Renamo began to make overtures toward peace talks following South Africa’s withdrawal of aid, so Frelimo became more inclined to pursue peace when the Soviet Union announced an impending end to its aid to the Mozambican government in 1989.¹⁵⁷ These changes, together with a failing economy, a devastating famine, and a military stalemate after nearly 15 years of fighting helped to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

After multiple rounds of negotiations in Rome between 1990 and 1992, President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama finally signed the General Peace Agreement in October 1992. One of the major sticking points in the talks had been Renamo’s insistence that it be accepted as a political party that would participate in

¹⁵⁷ In keeping with the times, Frelimo also dropped its Marxist-Leninist designation and, in 1990, adopted a liberal constitution allowing for multiparty politics.

elections, and Frelimo's refusal to treat the group as such. Having gained recognition as a political party in the agreement (in return for agreeing to lay down arms), Renamo set out on the task of political transformation. The United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), a 6,800-strong peacekeeping and observation mission, was to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.

According to Manning's (2002) detailed study of Mozambique's transition from war to peace, Renamo faced two pressing challenges in transforming itself from a guerrilla army to a political party: raising the funds needed to operate as a party, and building up its political and administrative apparatus. Between these, Renamo prioritized the former. For Dhlakama, the pursuit of peace was primarily about the pursuit of money. He put it this way:

This transition is a hard task, because the means we need have changed. During the war, we could attack an enemy position and capture enough material. In this work of transition things have changed; we need offices, fax machines, financing. And the means we have are not sufficient. The only problem we have in transforming ourselves is this one, of resources. (Quoted in Manning 2002: 105)

Raul Domingos, Renamo's chief negotiator, perhaps summed it best by stating: "There is no democracy without money" (quoted in Vines 1998). Propitiously for him, Dhlakama very quickly found that an entirely new set of foreign sponsors committed to ending the conflict were willing to dole out the resources he claimed he needed for a successful transition. Renamo thus demanded millions from Western governments (with Italy leading the effort, having already spent \$20 million by the time of the agreement) and commercial interests as a precondition for cooperating in the peace talks, then as a precondition for signing the final agreement (Vines 1998). Seeing that Renamo cooperated whenever its (exorbitant) resource demands were met, the international

community was willing to oblige. An Italian official recounted that “with Renamo it was simple. We found out what they wanted, and then provided it with conditions attached. For example, Dhlakama wanted a satellite telephone. We purchased it, put it in a cupboard and showed it to him. We made it clear that he would get it in return for signing one of the protocols. He came back several times to have a look at it before deciding to sign” (quoted in Vines 1998, 73). Following the signing of the agreement, the UN and Western capitals saw that the transformation of Renamo into a viable party was a key condition for the successful implementation of the agreement and, ultimately, for lasting peace in the country. The UN was also seeking to redeem itself at this time from its failure in Angola, where UNITA had resumed fighting after losing to the MPLA in the 1992 UN-sponsored elections. It was therefore doubly keen to ensure that Renamo did not follow UNITA’s path. By May 1993 a UN trust fund had been established to manage the \$17.5 million that would eventually be raised by the international community to support Renamo’s war-to-peace transition. Agreeing with Dhlakama, UN special representative Aldo Ajello stated: “Democracy has a cost and we must pay that cost” (quoted in Lyons 2002: 227). Seeing that the international community was willing to go to great lengths to see this transformation through, Dhlakama played on this situation to the fullest by threatening to derail the peace process on multiple occasions in order to obtain the funds, housing, office equipment, vehicles, and other resources he demanded. The UN mission in turn used the financial inducements to keep Renamo engaged in the peace process (see Manning 2002: 108-110).

Even as the termination of the war marked the start of a pivotal new phase in Mozambican politics, a certain continuity thus underlay the transition from war to peace.

As a Mozambican journalist observed in 1994, “our war was organized by foreigners and now our peace is being organized by foreigners” (Carlos Cardoso, quoted in Alden 2000: 35). That external sponsors essentially underwrote both the war and the newfound peace, furthermore, was hardly a coincidence; rather, wartime foreign sponsorship had created a condition in which a new peacetime sponsorship would be necessary were Mozambique to take the course of peaceful democratization. During the war Renamo had depended on foreign support and focused on military organization, largely neglecting political development. It emerged from the war seeking new financial incentives for participating in peacetime politics, and with an immediate need to replace its military organization with a political one. Put differently, Renamo’s immediate peacetime pursuits were symptomatic of the way it had fought during the war: through the aid of foreign sponsors, and without an established base of support, a coherent political platform, or an administrative structure. The years of rebellion had thus done little to prepare or encourage Renamo’s transformation into a political party. Given Renamo’s disregard for establishing political relations with civilians for most of the war, neither were there reasons to expect the kind of bottom-up demand for democratization as seen in Nepal, or an interactive process of regime legitimation as seen in Uganda, to emerge on its own in Mozambique. This perspective is consistent with the numerous studies that argue that peace and democratization took place in Mozambique as a singular result of the heavy external intervention, and that conversely, without the intervention the same outcome would not have prevailed. For example, Stedman (1997) argues that it was the UN’s deft management of a potential “spoiler” of the peace in the form of Renamo that explains the successful peace process in Mozambique; for Bekoe (2008) it was the UN and donors’

ability to ensure “mutual vulnerability” between Frelimo and Renamo at every step of that process; and for Manning (2002: 7-8) it was broadly the “unusually sustained donor interest in Mozambique” that accounts for its postwar successes. To sum, external sponsorship of the belligerents during the war had made external sponsorship following the conflict all but necessary for achieving peace and democratization as an outcome. Postwar intervention, rather than being an exogenous “shock” that explains the surprise peace, was instead an endogenous outgrowth of the wartime politics of foreign intervention. *Given* that the international community sought a democratic outcome in Mozambique, it could not stand by the sidelines and hope that the desired outcome would emerge on its own.

Importantly, just as the politics of rebellion shaped the nature of the postwar regime in traceable ways in Nepal, Uganda, and Tajikistan, so in Mozambique this externally induced democratization left a specific imprint on the state’s postwar political development. One consequence of the democratization “from above” was that elite-level politics remained at the elite level, largely disconnected from the demands of ordinary citizens. As Manning (2002: 8) writes, the dominance of the “triad” of Renamo, Frelimo and the international community in shaping the state’s postwar politics has “permit[ted] the continued exclusion of the population from playing a central role in the political process. Renamo has extremely poor institutionalized links to any mass base.” This is related to a second consequence, which is that Mozambique has become a democracy in which, ironically, the people play a decidedly passive role in politics. A 2007 Afrobarometer study characterizes Mozambique as a “low-information” democracy peopled by “uncritical citizens,” that is, a society lacking the traits identified by

democratic theorists as necessary for the healthy functioning of a democracy. It finds that “relatively high proportions of Mozambicans are consistently unable to answer many key questions about the performance of government or the democratic regime, or to offer preferences about what kind of regime Mozambique ought to have.” Furthermore, “those Mozambicans who are able to offer opinions exhibit some of the lowest levels of commitment to democracy measured by the Afrobarometer across 18 African multi-party systems.” The report concludes that “there exist *high levels of satisfaction with the supply of democracy* juxtaposed with *low levels of demand for democracy*” (Mattes and Shenga 2007). This peculiar incongruence between the supply and demand for democracy parallels, and, as I have argued, can in fact be largely explained by, the coupling of an externally-led democratic engineering project with a virtual absence of bottom-up political mobilization in postwar Mozambique.

One final consequence of the top-down mode of democratization is that “the international community was and continues to be a core constituency for both major political parties, far more important than any domestic constituency” (Manning 2002, 159). Not only is this consistent with the parties’ lack of strong domestic political bases, the low-information environment and the absence of popular mobilization. It is also an unsurprising result of a civil war fought with the aid of external backers, followed by a peace process in which the state became “virtually a protectorate of the United Nations” (Newitt 2002: 233) and an economic recovery effort “brought about by the wholesale adoption of free-market measures prescribed by the World Bank and IMF” (ibid.: 227). Since 1994 Renamo has continued to be dependent on foreign support. It has also resisted party institutionalization, focusing instead on the personalized leadership of

Dhlakama (Manning 2002: 153). This has resulted in a “well-known organizational incompetence” even years into its existence as a political party (ibid.). Likewise, Frelimo “is keenly aware of its dependence on donors, and it has become adept at the game of give-and-take” that it plays with the donor community (Manning 2002: 162). In sum, although the political economy of rebellion in Mozambique’s civil war would, left to itself, have made the state an unlikely candidate for democratization, in fact new external patrons emerged and proved willing to see to it that peace and democratization were achieved. Postwar democratization occurred where theory would not predict it because external actors with liberal agendas helped to create that particular outcome. And because that outcome was obtained in a peaceful manner the UN and observers have often characterized Mozambique’s war-to-peace transition as a success. Nevertheless, this mode of democratization – externally-led and with minimal input from below – has left a distinctive mark on the nature of Mozambique’s postwar governance. In fact, given “a growing Frelimo monopoly on power at all levels” and the country’s “slide into one-party rule” in more recent years (Manning 2010: 151), Manning questions the very future of Mozambican democracy.¹⁵⁸

CONCLUSION

In each of the four cases examined in this and the previous chapter, the nature of rebel governance affected the nature of the postwar political regime. Consistent with the civilian mobilization model, rebel dependence on civilians for wartime resources in Nepal and Uganda led to mobilization at the mass level. As the war gave way to peace,

¹⁵⁸ Meanwhile, after the defective October 2009 general elections, Freedom House dropped Mozambique from its list of “electoral democracies.” See Manning (2010).

this mobilization, whether displayed in the form of large-scale demonstrations or associational activity by specialized interests, pressured the nascent postwar regime eager for legitimacy to take concrete courses of action toward a more democratic form of government. In these cases, postwar democratization was therefore a byproduct of the particular mode of rebel war-making. It was *not* a result of enlightened rulers choosing democracy out of ideological conviction, their rhetoric to this effect notwithstanding. In each case of postwar democratization, evidence suggests serious regime resistance to democracy where it presented a threat to its survival. Democratization was much more a result of an interactive process between the state and society than it was a result of purely elite-level politics.

Where rebels did not depend heavily on civilians for wartime resources, the war did not catalyze the series of changes laid out in the civilian mobilization model. In Tajikistan, the relative weakness of social mobilization meant the postwar regime had much freer reign to consolidate an autocratic government; indeed, it faced almost no real opposition or public censure for creating an exclusionary regime that offered few political freedoms. In Mozambique, democratization resulted from an overriding international political and financial commitment to instituting multiparty democracy in that country. The outcome of that effort has been a relatively functional two-party system, but one marked by a curious mismatch between the supply of democracy from above, and the (absence of) demand for it from below. In both cases, we find continuity in the role of foreign sponsors in war time and in peace time, with both states being called “protectorates,” the former of Russia, the latter of the United Nations and the donor community. This link between the nature of rebels’ wartime relations with civilians and

the postwar political regime therefore carries explanatory force across the cases examined, despite the variation in war outcomes, levels of wartime rebel statebuilding, and nature of foreign military and diplomatic interventions.

In contrast, there is little evidence to support either version of the rebel statebuilding hypothesis. In Nepal, postwar democratization resulted despite the dismantling of rebel institutions at the end of the war. In Uganda, postwar democratization was in part facilitated by the transfer of wartime rebel institutions into peace time. However, in both cases postwar elites used their war-tested political capacity to pursue liberal reforms where they were relatively costless, and to obstruct such reforms where doing so appeared to threaten the regime. More broadly, the evidence suggests that any attempt to explain the variation in post-civil war regimes through an analysis of elite-level power politics will be found wanting. Rather, the key to accounting for the variation, I have argued, is found in the capacity of ordinary citizens for political mobilization and collective claim-making vis-à-vis postwar elites. In turn, an assessment of this capacity requires that we look back to the war and examine the extent to which civilians played a role in the political economy of rebellion.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Democratization can, and often does, follow on the heels of violent internal conflict. How is it that in the aftermath of a civil war citizens would find themselves with improved channels for political participation, greater political rights, and more equal representation? In this study, I have shown that under certain conditions democratization takes place not despite, but as a result of, internal warfare. A critical factor is the extent to which rebel groups engage politically with civilians as part of their war-fighting strategy. Rebel engagement with civilians matters for democratization not because it demonstrates the rebels' political deftness or capability as future state leaders, but because it alters the civilians themselves and the society at large. Specifically, where rebel groups rely heavily on ordinary people for material support, a byproduct of the war is that people become politically mobilized. Rebel dependence on civilians impels the latter to become more involved in active politics, such that a large segment of the population will come to demand and expect a major break with the autocratic past. These changes at the mass level in turn pressure postwar elites to concede liberal reforms as a way to establish their own legitimacy and ensure stability. Where rebels depend largely on foreign support, natural resources, or other "unearned" income, in contrast, they rely less on civilians, and the war is less likely to have this mobilizing effect on the population. With little resistance from below, postwar rulers face fewer constraints in establishing autocratic governance.

In a sense, this is a retelling of a classic narrative of democratization, one in which ordinary people act collectively and contentiously against formidable rulers to

demand greater rights. But it is a classic narrative with an important twist, because the source of this social mobilization is organized violence. In the end, the narrative connects two substantively and temporally distant variables – rebel war-making and postwar democratization – by tracing the ways in which warfare changes societies, and hence state-society relations. In a different sense, then, it is an unexpected narrative, one in which earlier choices by violent rebels on how to meet their resource imperatives have later effects on how a state governs.

A second finding is that wartime “statebuilding” by rebel groups can facilitate postwar *statebuilding*, but its effect on the postwar *regime* is less straightforward. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is good evidence that some rebels engage in a “democratic” experiment, however skeletal or nominal, as part of their wartime political strategy. For all its brutality the Khmer Rouge instituted the first free local elections in Cambodian history in the midst of its civil war (Kiernan 1985: 317); likewise, rebel groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and elsewhere systematically “taxed” the people but in return provided governance and social services and held local-level elections. Whatever the degree of voluntary reciprocity between these rebel governors and the governed, what is clear is that some rebels do engage in institutional innovations in their efforts to govern civilians and win their support. Yet, empirical analysis in this study has shown that rebel institution-building has no direct effects on postwar democratization. What it does is to bestow the rebels with political and organizational capacity, as some of the case studies showed. Uganda’s NRA, with wartime governance experience under its belt, was far better prepared for state leadership than was Renamo at the end of their respective civil wars, despite the fact that the latter had been fighting as an organization for more than

twice as many years as the former. Political and organizational capacity, however, can be used as much to bolster authoritarian governance as it can to promote democratization, as shown in the Nepalese and Ugandan cases. The absence of a significant correlation between rebel statebuilding and postwar democratization in the statistical analysis may therefore be indicating less the absence of any effect, and more the *net* effect of rebel statebuilding: postwar leaders can use their wartime political capacity in the pursuit of either autocratic or democratic objectives.

Evidence of a link between rebels' wartime statebuilding and postwar state *capacity*, however, is only preliminary in this study. No statistical analysis was conducted to test its links; the evidence instead emerged in the process of tracing the links between rebel statebuilding and postwar regime outcomes. Nevertheless, the evidence was fairly clear in the Nepalese and Ugandan cases, where the rebels displayed significant political and organizational capacity as they made their dramatic transition from the bush to the capital. For both the Maoists and the NRA, wartime governance served as useful training for peacetime governance as political parties. The claim continues to hold when these cases are compared to the Tajik and Mozambican cases, where both state and rebel dependence on foreign support appeared only to prepare the state for continued external dependence in peace time. Together, the findings suggest that while rebel statebuilding has no net effect on postwar democratization, it increases postwar state capacity when the rebels become part of the postwar political elite. Its effect on state capacity would be well worth testing more systematically in future studies.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This study offers broader theoretical implications for the study of both civil wars and post-civil war politics. First, wars create social and institutional legacies. The findings of this study suggest, for example, that rebel access to foreign aid, natural resource rents, state coffers, and other non-civilian sources of income can affect later political development by impeding social mobilization. In such cases, postwar democratization is likely to be more challenging, or less sustainable, than cases in which the war has created a social demand for democracy. Furthermore, if foreign aid plays a large role in rebel survival, one implication is that ironically, further foreign aid would be needed in the war's aftermath to generate a democratic outcome, as seen in Mozambique. In cases where the rebels depend heavily on natural resources, this study points to yet another avenue through which the "resource curse" operates:¹⁵⁹ once civil war is underway, rebel access to resources enables them to wage war with relatively little dependence on civilians. This can stifle the kind of mass mobilization that would pressure elites, making autocratization relatively less costly for elites after the war. Finally, rebels are less likely to engage in wartime institution-building when external income sources abound. Should these rebels prevail, they will be less politically organized and equipped than rebels who used the wartime years to gain "governance" experience. Foreign support for rebels can thus impede statebuilding.

¹⁵⁹ Existing studies on the resource curse has revolved around three claims: that natural resource abundance 1) stunts economic growth (eg. Sachs and Werner 1995, 1999; de Soysa 2000); 2) makes states more prone to violent internal conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; Snyder and Bhavani 2005; Lujala et al. 2005) and 3) stifles democratization (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004).

This study has focused on the enduring effects of rebel war-making on postwar regimes, but other channels through which warfare affects subsequent political development would merit further research. For example, the violence and polarization generated by warfare may leave their own legacies on postwar politics. Conversely, any study of post-civil war politics would do well to consider the ways in which particular features of the postwar context might have been shaped by wartime (or even prewar) political developments. To take the postwar context as a given is to miss the causally important backstory of how that very context came to be.

But just how enduring are wartime legacies? Comparativist scholars have long found utility in the idea of critical junctures – that an important “turning point” can prod a political unit down a particular direction.¹⁶⁰ Macro-historical studies sometimes attribute a particular phenomenon, such as variation in levels of economic development, to events that occurred centuries prior, such as patterns of colonialism (see Mahoney 2003). Closer to this work, one study finds a link between patterns of violence in the Spanish civil war and voting patterns in Catalonia four decades later (Balcells, cited in Wood 2008). Gilley (2009) insists that Museveni’s victory in 1986 was a critical juncture that started a “virtuous cycle” that has kept Uganda’s democratization process alive even 20 years later. Marx (1998: 213) writes that in South Africa, despite the end of apartheid “the legacy of past divisions would not be easily or quickly overcome...[A]ntagonisms had been long entrenched by prior institutional rule.” My own statistical findings show fairly consistent results for rebels’ dependence on civilians across the 15 postwar years

¹⁶⁰ There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on critical junctures and, more broadly, on path dependence. See, for instance, Thelen (1999); Collier and Collier (1991); North (1990); Mahoney (2003); and Pierson (2004).

examined. All of these pieces of evidence suggest that politics often unfolds in the shadow of long-lasting historical legacies.

At the same time, a large and growing body of studies models actors' micro-level incentives, often through formal models, and offers significant explanatory potential for a range of political issues with hardly a reference to historical legacies. "History matters" is an unassailable claim; what these studies contend, instead, is that actors' behavior can be understood only in light of the immediate cost-benefit calculations that confront them. All of this points to two important ways forward for research. First, this study has examined the effects of wartime rebel governance on peacetime politics, but we would benefit from studies of other ways through which the legacies of civil war affect states, societies, and institutions. Such studies might also examine why some events leave enduring legacies while the effects of others dissipate more quickly. Second, while the macro-historical and the micro-level analytical approaches might at first appear to be in tension, there may be fruitful ways to draw on the insights from both. The theory of postwar democratization offered in this study drew inspiration from a range of theoretical traditions, not so much based on principle but largely because the nature of the research question necessitated a wide search for answers. On a purely theoretical level, further efforts to interweave disparate strands of theories and approaches may lead to many new and creative ways to study conflict and other political phenomena.

Another way to directly extend the present study is to examine how war-induced democratization fares vis-à-vis peaceful democratization. This study suggests that states that democratize through civil war will exhibit features particular to this belligerent mode of political development, just as externally-led democratization leaves its distinct

imprints, as seen in the case of Mozambique. For example, it is possible that leaders who come to power through the belligerent path will continue to exploit the legacy of their revolutionary success to hold on to power. It may not be a coincidence, for instance, that in post-civil war Mozambique, Tajikistan, Uganda, Namibia, and Ethiopia, a single party – and, in Uganda, a single leader – has been continuously in power since the war’s end, any rhetoric of multiparty democracy notwithstanding. States that undergo war-induced democratization may therefore face a unique set of challenges to democratic consolidation. At the same time, single-party regimes are certainly not exclusive to post-civil war states. Meanwhile, El Salvador stands out as a case in which war-induced democratization has withstood the test of time. There, the former rebels, the FMLN, won the presidency for the first time in 2009, ousting the incumbent party, ARENA, that had continuously controlled the executive since the end of the civil war in 1991.¹⁶¹ War leaves distinct legacies on political development, but whether and how patterns of political development differ from states that experience peaceful democratization is a worthwhile question for future research.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

My findings on why some post-civil war states democratize and others do not also has some practical implications for international actors concerned with the outbreak and resolution of civil wars in the developing world. I will focus the discussion on two implications. The first addresses the dilemmas of foreign intervention in civil wars. States choose to intervene or not to intervene in a civil war on a range of grounds, from

¹⁶¹ For some scholars, such regime “alternation” is the defining characteristic of a democracy (see Przeworski et al. 2000).

instrumental reasons such as geopolitical or geostrategic calculations, to historical or ideological commitments, to humanitarian concerns. Whatever the motivation, this study suggest that there are longer-term consequences to wartime decisions to support one side or the other. Specifically, foreign support for the rebels may undermine the potential for later democratization if such support obviates the need for the rebels to mobilize the local population. It may also forestall later statebuilding if it frees the rebels from having to build wartime institutions to attract local support. Furthermore, the path dependence that underpins my theoretical argument suggests that such consequences are typically unforeseen by actors who choose to intervene in the conflict. Postwar democratization, as theorized in this study, is an unexpected byproduct of a particular form of war-making. For actors for whom democratization is an objective, the findings suggest that intervention itself may undermine their ability to achieve that objective. Scholars have questioned, on both instrumental and normative grounds, the ability of international actors to forge democracy through military intervention. Most of these scholars are concerned that the interventions are instrumentally inadequate or normatively inappropriate (Chesterman 2004; Marten 2004; Richmond 2004). My findings, in contrast, highlight concerns much more germane to the *domestic* politics of the conflict state: that foreign intervention in civil war can impede local mobilization for democracy; and that it can prevent war-induced statebuilding – the type of statebuilding that has historically catalyzed the emergence of strong states – from taking place.¹⁶² These are in a way more fundamental concerns, since international actors' level of interest and investment in war-torn states waxes and wanes, but the states themselves are here to stay.

¹⁶² For works that advocate bottom-up, domestically-led statebuilding, see Engleburt and Tull (2008) and Reno (2008).

Second, direct military intervention aside, this study has implications for diplomatic responses to violent conflicts as well. The findings suggest that the most fruitful diplomatic measures are those that align with, or reinforce, preexisting domestic pressures on political elites. Wood (2000) argues that in both El Salvador and South Africa, international diplomacy served to reinforce the pressures toward a negotiated settlement that had already been generated by wartime mobilization. The costs of continuing the war had already become very high for Salvadoran elites when the United States chose to condition its military aid to the government on good-faith negotiations to end the war. In South Africa, economic sanctions further pushed the regime, already weakened by domestic mass mobilization, toward the negotiating table.

In contrast, in Nepal we find an instance of a diplomatic intervention that went against prevailing domestic currents, and which quickly proved not only futile but also damaging to diplomatic credibility. When the king extended his offer to restore parliament in the midst of the April 2006 demonstrations, the reaction of the major embassies in Kathmandu, including those of the United States, India, and a handful of European states, was to immediately welcome the king's proposal and pressure the political parties to accept it. For these states, the proposal was at last an opening which they could exploit to restore the king and the parties to their "rightful" places. As described in Chapter 5, however, both demonstrators and the political parties chose to flatly reject the proposal. People demonstrated in even greater numbers in the following days, until the king relinquished his power a few days later. For the international community, the result of this misstep was a serious loss of authority and legitimacy. A prominent commentator stated, "There is no reason for us any more, if there ever was, to

feel that our international friends and partners are wiser and smarter than us just because they have money to distribute....The concerned donors and diplomats...exposed their lack of knowledge and sensitivity about this country, its history and its people and their aspirations so thoroughly that they have little right to expect us to listen to their misplaced messages that will no doubt come our way again and again (quoted in International Crisis Group, May 10, 2006: 11). Likewise, another wrote that the “disconnect between domestic politics and international pressure is starker than it has ever been” (ibid). Clearly, this was hardly the precedent that the diplomatic community sought to create for itself at a critical turning point in Nepalese politics.

These examples, to sum, demonstrate the importance of having a clear understanding of internal political dynamics, and especially of popular engagements with the regime, in crafting diplomatic measures in conflict states. The insight is consistent with the findings of this study which highlight more generally the often unexpected political weight that popular mobilization can have in shaping the course of political development. At such times, diplomacy can go far when it reinforces preexisting dynamics, but can backfire when it does not.

A similar implication holds for post-conflict interventions. This study suggests that some post-civil war contexts are more ripe for democratization than others. Where social mobilization for democracy already exists, international assistance to create the structural condition for democracy, such as electoral assistance, may be a worthwhile engagement. Where the demand from below is weaker, any effect of such interventions may be more short-lived. More broadly, the study suggests that at times, the key to successful postwar statebuilding may be found less in the tool box of international actors,

and more in prevailing domestic factors. Uganda and Nepal (at least so far) have fared better than many states that played host to foreign-led peacebuilding efforts elsewhere. Any intervention aimed at democratic peacebuilding would therefore do well to identify and support, rather than supplant, any domestic moves toward democratization that may already be underway.

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