Waddington, I. (2016). Theorising unintended consequences of anti-doping policy. *Performance Enhancement & Health, 4*, 80-87.

Dette er siste tekst-versjon av artikkelen, og den kan inneholde små forskjeller fra forlagets pdf-versjon. Forlagets pdf-versjon finner du her:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2016.03.004

This is the final text version of the article, and it may contain minor differences from the journal's pdf version. The original publication is available here:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2016.03.004

Theorising Unintended Consequences of Anti-doping Policy

Ivan Waddington

Norwegian School of Sport Sciences.

Email: ivan.waddington@ntlworld.com

Theorising Unintended Consequences of Anti-Doping Policy

Abstract

There is a growing recognition of the fact that unintended consequences are a commonplace feature of everyday social life, not just in sport but in all aspects of social life (for a dramatic example, consider the many unintended consequences of Western involvement in the Middle East). In relation to doping, the most obvious unintended consequences – in this case, collateral harms – include the fact that existing anti-doping policy has (i) constrained athletes to use more dangerous but less detectable drugs and (ii) to use additional masking drugs to conceal their use of performance-enhancing drugs; (iii) driven drug use underground, thereby making it more difficult to control the quality of drugs and (iv) making it more difficult for athletes, especially below elite level, to obtain medical monitoring of their drug use. The increasing recognition of the ubiquity of unintended consequences is to be welcomed. But we need to go beyond merely listing and describing unintended consequences. We need to develop a theoretical understanding of how unintended consequences occur and why they are so commonplace. This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the ways in which social scientists have used the concept of unintended consequences and similar concepts. Attention is focused, in particular, on the American sociologist Robert K Merton's classic conceptualisation of "the unintended consequences of purposive social action" and on Norbert Elias's concept of "blind social processes". This is followed by a case study which draws on Elias's game models to analyse some of the unplanned outcomes of the 1999 Lausanne Conference which established the World Anti-Doping Agency. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the practical implications of this analysis for the development and implementation of policy.

Introduction
There is a growing recognition of the fact that unintended consequences are a commonplace feature of everyday life, not just in sport but in all aspects of social life (for an ongoing and dramatic non-sporting example, consider the many unintended consequences of Western intervention in the Middle East). By way of illustration, consider the following sporting examples, all health-related:

(i) In boxing, it has taken a long time to recognise that the development of boxing gloves, which were ostensibly designed to protect the facial features of the person being punched, actually offer much greater protection to the hands of the puncher, thus enabling boxers, without damaging their hands, to deliver more, and harder, punches to the opponent's head, with a commensurate increase in the risk of brain damage (Murphy and Sheard, 2008).

(ii) In Rugby Union in recent years there has been growing concern about the long-term health risks associated with concussion. In order to protect players' health, the International Rugby Board (IRB) has adopted a precautionary policy which requires that any player sustaining a concussion must abstain from playing and training "for a minimum period of three weeks" and should only resume "when symptom free and declared fit after a proper medical examination" (Malcolm, 2009: 196). However, one consequence of the IRB rule is that any diagnosis of concussion will automatically deprive the club of the player's services for three weeks. Within this situation, the resistance of players and coaches to a diagnosis of concussion has led "to a rejection of treatment protocols". Thus Malcolm found that most club doctors have effectively rejected the IRB guidelines and their underlying precautionary philosophy, and that many go to considerable lengths to avoid offering a diagnosis of concussion, with the loss of the player's services which this would entail. Malcolm (2009: 205) notes that a rule which was designed to protect players' health has actually had "the unintended consequence of leading clinicians to avoid the diagnosis of concussion" and he concludes that clinicians "come to diagnose concussion in a way that they know will be acceptable to others" (Malcolm, 2009: 201), i.e. to coaches and players.

(iii) In relation to anti-doping policy, several writers have identified collateral harms associated with unintended consequences of anti-doping policies. For example, Dr Robert Voy, a former Chief Medical Officer for the United States Olympic Committee, long ago identified what he called a "sad paradox" of anti-doping policy. Voy noted that although anti-doping organizations had tried to control the use of performance-enhancing drugs partly because of their potential health risks to athletes, they had "in a sense steered the athletes toward more dangerous drugs". He pointed out that "the types of drug testing programs used by doping control authorities … have unintentionally created a greater health danger in that athletes are now using the shorter acting, more toxic forms of drugs to avoid detection" (Voy, 1991: 19). In other words, the implementation of a policy which is justified partly in terms of a desire to protect the health of athletes has, paradoxically, had the effect of constraining athletes to place more importance on the detectability of drugs and less importance on their safety; as a consequence it has constrained athletes to use drugs which are likely to be more, rather than less, damaging to their health. It is reasonable to suppose that this outcome was not intended by those responsible for developing anti-doping policies in sports and that it is not a consequence which they welcome. Other health-related collateral harms associated with the unintended consequences of anti-doping policy include the fact that such policy has: constrained athletes to use additional masking drugs to conceal their use of performance-enhancing drugs; made it more difficult for

athletes, especially below elite level, to obtain medical monitoring for their drug use; and driven drug use underground thereby making it more difficult to control the quality of drugs (Dawson, 2001; Waddington, 2000; Waddington and Smith, 2009; Smith and Stewart, 2008; Stewart and Smith, 2015).

The increasing recognition of the ubiquity of unintended consequences is to be welcomed, together with the clear implication that policy formation and implementation are complex processes which almost invariably have unintended consequences. But we need to go beyond merely listing and describing unintended consequences. In particular, as social scientists, we need to develop a theoretical understanding of how unintended consequences occur and why they are so commonplace. And we need to address some important questions in relation to policy formation and implementation. If policy almost invariably has unintended – and often unwanted – consequences, is the attempt to develop effective policy an inevitably fruitless task? Does the development and implementation of policy – and the regulation which it implies – inevitably do more harm than good? Should we just give up policy formation as an impossibly complex and difficult task, doomed to failure?

This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the ways in which social scientists have used the concept of unintended consequences and similar concepts. Attention is focused, in particular, on the American sociologist Robert Merton's conceptualisation of "the unintended consequences of purposive social action" and on Norbert Elias's concept of "blind social processes". This is followed by a case study which draws on Elias's game models to analyse some of the unplanned outcomes of the 1999 Lausanne Conference which established the World Anti-Doping Agency. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the practical implications of these analyses for the development and implementation of policy.

Theorising unplanned outcomes
The idea of unintended or unanticipated consequences of social action has a long history. As Robert Merton has noted, the idea is to be found in the work of many writers, including Machiavelli, Marx, Pareto, Max Weber, Cooley and Sorokin (Merton, 1936: 894). In economics, the most famous example is probably to be found in Adam Smith's concept of an "invisible hand", a process which, according to Smith, ensured that the pursuit of individual self-interest would, through the operation of the "invisible hand" of market forces, increase public wellbeing.

Merton noted that, despite these references to the idea of unintended consequences in the work of many writers, the diversity of context – ranging from theology to technology – and the variety of terms by which this problem has been known, have been so pronounced that "not only has the substantial identity of the problem been overlooked, but no systematic, scientific analysis of it has as yet been effected" and he added that "though the process has been widely recognized and its importance appreciated, it still awaits a systematic treatment" (Merton, 1936: 894).

Merton himself sought to address this issue in his classic paper, "The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action" (1936) and in a later essay (1949) and, within modern sociology, the idea of unanticipated consequences is still closely associated with Merton's work. In his early essay, Merton defined *purposive* action as action which involves motives and consequently a choice between various

alternatives, and he outlined five major limitations to the correct anticipation of the consequences of action. Firstly, he pointed to the partial knowledge or ignorance in the light of which action is commonly carried out which may give rise to a range of unexpected outcomes of action. Secondly, he identified error – for example in the appraisal of the situation or in the selection or execution of the action chosen – as a major limitation. Thirdly, Merton referred to what he called the "imperious immediacy of interest", where the actor's paramount concern with the anticipated immediate consequences – that is the satisfaction of the actor's immediate interests – effectively excludes the consideration of further or other consequences of the action. Fourthly, he identified the possible influence of basic values, for example the actor's religious values, which may mean that there is no consideration of further consequences because of the felt necessity of a given action which is required by adherence to certain fundamental values. Finally, he suggested that public predictions of future outcomes might themselves give rise to unanticipated consequences because the prediction itself becomes a new element in the situation (Merton, 1936: 898-904). In his later and longer essay on unanticipated consequences, Merton developed this last point in considerable detail, focusing specifically on the self-fulfilling prediction, with passing mention of the converse "self-contradicting prediction", as particular types of unanticipated consequences (Merton, 1949).

Mennell (1989) has suggested that although Merton's work has done much to popularize the idea of unintended consequences, his particular focus on the self-fulfilling prophecy in his later essay "has led to too narrow an interpretation of their sociological significance". Self-fulfilling prophecies may have a certain fascination but they are, suggests Mennell, fundamentally a trivial diversion, because they are simply an unusual and rather special case of something which is not only much more common, but also of considerably greater theoretical significance. In this regard, Mennell points to what he sees as the major difference between Merton and Elias:

> unanticipated consequences are not a curious footnote to sociology but nearly universal in social life. For Merton, the self-fulfilling prophecy is like a boomerang: the consequences of men's (sic) actions rebound upon their initiators. For Elias, the analogy is much less exotic and much more commonplace; like the effect of a stone dropped into a pool, the consequences of people's actions ripple outwards through society until they are lost from sight. Their effects are felt, not at random but according to the structure of the figuration in which they are enmeshed, by people who may well be quite unknown to each other and unaware of their mutual interdependence (1989: 258).

There is another, and perhaps more fundamental, difference between Elias's work and that of Merton. If Merton's emphasis on the self-fulfilling prophecy in his later essay placed undue emphasis on one particular and rather unusual type of unintended consequence, it may also be argued that his earlier and more general discussion of unintended consequences was largely individualistic. Thus while Merton does refer to the limited social fund of knowledge which may limit actors' understanding of the situation, the primary emphasis is on processes which focus on the actor as an individual: the actor's ignorance; errors on the part of the actor; the actor's focus on the satisfaction of immediate or short term interests thus ignoring other longer term consequences; or the actor's commitment to basic values which may lead them to

carry out certain actions without consideration of the consequences. In marked contrast to Merton, Elias's focus was on pluralities of people, for Elias was concerned not with single acts but with aggregates of intentional acts. The largely individualistic character of Merton's position was explicitly recognised by Merton himself in his early classic article in which he acknowledged that one limitation of his paper was that it dealt mainly with "isolated purposive acts rather than with their integration into a coherent system of action" (1936:895). Elias's approach, by contrast, focuses far more systematically, not on isolated individual acts, but on the complex interweaving of the actions of many people, not all of whom will even be known to each other.

At this stage it may be useful to turn to a more detailed examination of Elias's game models in order to see how these can help us better understand the complex interweaving of the actions of large numbers of people, and how these almost invariably generate unplanned outcomes.

Elias's game models
Elias (1978:73) sees game models as a means of isolating in close focus the intertwining of the aims and actions of pluralities of people, thereby making these complex processes of interweaving more easily understandable. On a theoretical level the game models, like Elias's more general process-sociological approach of which they are a part, are designed as a way of helping to move towards a resolution of a key problem within sociology which has variously been described as the relationship between the individual and society, personality and social structure or, in its currently popular formulation, the agency/structure debate. In this regard, Elias's approach recognises that human action is, to a greater or lesser degree, consciously directed towards achieving certain goals and that all human action necessarily involves both cognition and emotion, and in this sense it fully takes into account the fact that humans are thinking and feeling animals and that, in the highly individualized societies of the modern world, we each have our own more-or-less individual pattern of intentions, preferences and desires. At the same time, however, Elias also emphasizes that the outcomes of complex social processes cannot be explained simply in terms of the intentions of individuals; indeed, it is important to recognize that the *normal* result of complex processes involving the interweaving of the more-or-less goal-directed actions of large numbers of people includes outcomes which no-one has chosen and no-one has designed. Social processes of this kind, involving outcomes which were unplanned and unforeseen, Elias called "blind social processes" (Elias, 1987: 99).

Elias developed the game models as simplified analogies of more complex social processes and they focus attention, in particular, on changing balances of power, or power-ratios, as a central aspect of the web of human relations; in this context, it should be borne in mind that games are contests and that all the game models are based on two or more people measuring their strength against each other. Power, conceptualized as a structural characteristic of all human relationships, is central to Elias's approach. Within the context of understanding the development and implementation of anti-doping policy, the game models are useful precisely because they demonstrate that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of the actions of different players in the game, even where these actions are more-or-less consciously directed towards the attainment of certain goals, may include – in the case of complex games almost certainly will include – outcomes which no single player or group of

players intended. Within the context of doping, the "game" is, of course, the game of implementing – and resisting the implementation of – anti-doping policy.

Elias's most simple game model involves just two people, one of whom is a much stronger player than the other. The stronger player can, to a very considerable degree, constrain the actions and limit the options of the weaker player to make certain moves, whereas the weaker player is much less able to constrain the actions of the stronger player. However, the weaker player does have some degree of control over the stronger for, in planning his or her own moves, the stronger player has at least to take the weaker player's moves into account. In other words, in any game the participants always have, though in considerably varying degrees, some control over each other. Where the differential between the players' strengths in the game (that is the balance of power or their power-ratio) is very great, the stronger player has not only a higher degree of control over his or her opponent but also a higher degree of control over the game as such. The stronger player is thus able significantly to control the course of the game, not only by winning, but also by determining the manner of the victory and perhaps the length of time taken. In a very simple game of this kind, we are able to understand the course of the game largely in terms of the goals and plans of the stronger player.

However, let us now consider a two-person game in which the two players are of roughly equal ability (i.e. of roughly equal power). As the differential between the strength of the players decreases, so the ability of the stronger player to force the weaker player to make certain moves diminishes, as does the stronger player's ability to determine the course of the game. Correspondingly, the weaker player's control over the stronger player increases but, as the power balance between the two players becomes less unequal, so the course of the game increasingly passes beyond the control of either. As Elias put it:

> Both players will have correspondingly less chance to control the changing figuration of the game; and the less dependent will be the changing figuration of the game on the aims and plans for the course of the game which each player has formed by himself. The stronger, conversely, becomes the dependence of each of the two players' overall plans and of each of their moves on the changing figuration of the game – on the game process. The more the game comes to resemble a social process, the less it comes to resemble the implementation of an individual plan. In other words, to the extent that the inequality in the strengths of the two players diminishes, there will result from the interweaving of moves of two individual people a game process *which neither of them has planned* (1978: 82; original emphasis).

Elias considers a variety of game models from, in increasing order of complexity, multi-person games at one level (e.g. in which one player may be playing simultaneously against several other players, or in which two sides each containing several players compete against each other) through to multi-person, multi-level games. In this latter group of game models, the number of players increases and the structure of the game becomes increasingly complex. In particular, in multi-level games, not all the players play directly with each other and moves may be made by specialist functionaries such as leaders, delegates, representatives, committees and governments, on an upper tier. In addition, while each side continues to struggle

against the opposition, there may be more than two sides – indeed there may be many sides – involved in these games. Part of the increased complexity of the game relates to the fact that there are now several different balances of power which have to be taken into account: among the top-tier players; between the top and lower-tier players; and among lower-tier players. The balance of power between the upper-tier and lower-tier players may be relatively unequal, in which case there is a relatively oligarchic game structure, or it may be relatively equal, in which case the game is relatively democratic. It is these more complex game models which are most useful for shedding light on complex processes in modern societies, such as the processes involved in, for example, planning and implementing anti-doping policies.

It is important to note that, as the number of players and the complexity of the game increase, and as the power differentials between the players diminish, so the course of the game becomes increasingly unpredictable and increasingly beyond the ability of any single individual or group of players to control. We noted earlier that, in the case of a simple two-person game played between players of very unequal ability, the course of the game can be explained largely in terms of the plans and goals of the stronger player. However, as the number of interdependent players grows, it also becomes clear how little the game can be controlled and guided from any single player's or group's position; indeed, the opposite is the case, for it becomes clear how much the course of the game – which is actually the product of the interweaving moves of a large number of players – increasingly constrains the moves of every single player. The development and direction of the game become more and more opaque to the individual player and, within this context, it becomes increasingly difficult for any player or group of players to put together an accurate mental picture of the course of the game as a whole. However strong the individual may be, he or she will become less and less able to control the moves of other players and the course of the game and, from the point of view of the individual player, an intertwining network of more and more players functions increasingly as though it had a life of its own. In summary, the game models, and in particular the more complex models:

> indicate the conditions under which players may slowly begin to encounter a problem: that a game process, which comes about entirely as a result of the interweaving of the individual moves of many players, takes a course *which none of the individual players has planned, determined or anticipated* (1978:95. Italics in original).

Sociologists working within an Eliasian framework have sought to analyse a variety of unplanned outcomes both within sport (Benn and Benn, 2004; Murphy and Sheard, 2008; Malcolm, 2009) and outside the sporting context (Dopson and Waddington, 1996). Within the context of doping, Waddington (2010) has analysed some unplanned outcomes of the introduction of the World Anti-Doping Agency's (WADA) whereabouts system, but the most detailed example of the use of Elias's game models to analyse processes within the doping context is the analysis of the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) by Hanstad, Smith and Waddington (2008). In order to illustrate how Elias's game models may be used, it may be useful to examine that case study in some detail.

Case study: the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency
The context of the decision by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to convene the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne in 1999 – which led to the establishment of the WADA – was a series of major doping scandals culminating in the 1998 Tour de France scandal. By the late 1990s, the reputation of the IOC as the upholder of high sporting ideals and the defender of drug-free sport was coming increasingly under attack. These scandals had led to a growing loss of confidence in the commitment of the IOC to anti-doping which, coupled with allegations of corruption in relation to the bidding process for the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, left the IOC facing a progressive decline of its moral authority. In brief, the IOC faced a legitimacy crisis which posed a major threat to its status and authority (Houlihan, 1999: 184; MacAloon, 2001: 206).

"The best laid schemes o' mice and men ..."
Hanstad et al. (2008) argue that the Lausanne conference was the IOC's response to this crisis and it was clearly designed to re-establish the IOC on the moral high ground of sport and to re-affirm the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization in world sport. That the leadership of the IOC was clearly aware of both the threat and the opportunity is suggested by the very great care which it took in the planning of the agenda and in all other aspects of the conference. This detailed planning was designed to try to ensure that the IOC retained full control of the conference proceedings, to minimize any criticism of the IOC and to re-assert the IOC's claim to pre-eminence in anti-doping in world sport. However, the IOC was just one player – albeit the central player – in a very complex game with many players and, as is common in such situations, the IOC, despite its detailed planning, found it impossible to control all aspects of the game with the result that the conference led to certain outcomes which the IOC had not planned and which it almost certainly did not want (Hanstad et al., 2008).

The World Conference on Doping in Sport was convened by the IOC and was held on its "home ground", Lausanne, where the IOC headquarters are located. The agenda was drawn up exclusively by the IOC so that, despite the growing tide of criticism of the IOC, no outside organization was able to place on the agenda items which were critical of the IOC. In addition, the IOC drew up, in advance of the conference, a set of regulations which were designed to ensure that all aspects of the conference remained firmly under the control of the IOC and to minimize the opportunities for critics to express opposition to IOC policy.

These regulations specified that the conference was to be chaired by the President of the IOC (IOC, 1998a). The organizing committee was appointed by the President. The opening speech was to be given by the President. Four working groups had been appointed by the IOC in advance of the conference and the reports and recommendations from these working groups were to constitute the agenda for the conference. Each working group was chaired by an IOC Vice-President and the four working groups were packed with representatives of the Olympic Movement, thus ensuring that each group was firmly under IOC control, so that the only reports and recommendations to be brought to conference were those emanating from the IOC itself. On the face of it, any possibilities for organized opposition seemed very limited (Hanstad et al., 2008).

And what were the IOC's intended outcomes from this conference? The reports from the four working groups make it clear that, in convening the conference, the leadership of the IOC had three major aims: to restrict the involvement of outside agencies such as governments, police and other public bodies in the regulation of doping in sport and to reserve this function to sports organizations; to re-establish and enhance the authority of the IOC as the leading regulatory body within sport; and to re-establish and enhance the personal authority of the IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch.

The report from one IOC working group made it unambiguously clear that a central objective was to reserve to the Olympic Movement all key aspects of the regulation of drug use in sport; by contrast, the responsibilities of public authorities were largely confined to broader, non-sporting aspects of drug regulation, such as imposing criminal sanctions on those convicted of trafficking in doping substances (IOC, 1998b).

Central to the objective of re-establishing the authority of the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization was the proposal to establish a new agency to coordinate the worldwide fight against drug use in sport; significantly, this new agency was described in IOC documents as the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency (Teetzel, 2004). The IOC documents suggested that the proposed new agency should be established in the home city of the IOC, Lausanne, and that it should be funded by the IOC. The twin aims of re-establishing the authority of the IOC and of its President were brought together in the proposal that the agency should be governed by a council to be presided over by the IOC President. The involvement of governmental organizations, under these proposals, was to be kept to a minimum; they were to have only three members on an eighteen-member council and their functions were to be largely confined to the control of trafficking in prohibited substances (IOC, 1998b). Not only was the proposed new body to reserve virtually all anti-doping functions within sport to itself, but it was to take on new powers which the IOC had never before had. Thus whereas the IOC had previously been responsible only for drug testing at Olympic Games, the new body was to be actively involved in the organization of out-of-competition testing all year round. The proposed new agency was to be, in effect, a body set up by the IOC, funded by the IOC, based in the IOC's home city, packed with representatives of the Olympic Movement and presided over by the IOC President, and with wider powers than the IOC had previously ever had. Under this proposal, the authority of the IOC would be not just re-established but greatly enhanced. But as the Scottish poet Robbie Burns long ago observed, "The best laid schemes o' mice an' men …"

"…Gang aft a-gley"
On the first morning of the Lausanne conference, the IOC's tight control of proceedings appeared so effective that Duncan Mackay, writing in the *Guardian* (February 3 1999) suggested that for "the first two hours the convention resembled the Communist Party conference in the former Soviet Union as a succession of speakers demurred to Samaranch". But the IOC leadership increasingly lost control of the conference shortly before lunch when representatives of several governments criticized the IOC for alleged corruption, a lack of internal democracy, accountability and honesty and argued that the proposed new international anti-doping agency should not be run by the IOC but by a separately established agency (Houlihan,

1999:17). What was planned as a public relations triumph for the IOC and its president turned rapidly into a public relations disaster played out before the assembled world's press.

The second day saw renewed criticism of the IOC and its proposals for the new anti-doping agency. Speaking on behalf of the 15 European sports ministers and with the support of government representatives from the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, the British sports minister, Tony Banks, said "it was their unanimous opinion that we cannot accept the composition of the agency as drafted by the document", or that its president should be Samaranch (*Daily Telegraph* 5 February 1999).

The formal outcome of the conference was the Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport. The key element of this document was the declared intention to establish a new international anti-doping agency but the major proposals from the IOC working party about its composition and its presidency had all been rejected by the conference and a further key proposal – to locate the new agency in Lausanne – was also to be rejected in the bargaining which took place in the months following the conference.

If the IOC plan was to use the Lausanne conference to restore its public image and that of its president – as was clearly the intention – the conference equally clearly failed to achieve these objectives. Observers at the conference were unanimous in the view that not only had it not restored the image and authority of the IOC, but it had actually had the reverse effect. There was general agreement that the conference had, as the *Daily Mail* (5 February 1999) put it, "done nothing to enhance the IOC's reputation for leadership", while the *New York Times* (2 February 1999) described Samaranch as presiding "over a session in which government officials from around the world sharply criticized his organization". The *Guardian* (5 February 1999) suggested that the "most humiliating aspect for Juan Antonio Samaranch … was that he was not named as the head of the new agency" and it added that the conference "has not offered Samaranch the platform to re-establish himself as a strong leader". It concluded that the outcome of the conference was "a further blow to the IOC and its beleaguered president". The fact that this had all taken place in the home city of the IOC was not lost on some commentators, with *The Independent* (6 February 1999) pointing out that Barry McCaffrey, who had led the US government's critique of the IOC, had "shaken up" the IOC "on its home turf".

It is clear that the outcome of the Lausanne Conference – so carefully set up by the IOC – did nothing to re-establish the authority of the IOC in relation to anti-doping policy; indeed, it might be said that it effectively ended the IOC's policy leadership role in this regard. Every key proposal of the IOC concerning the organization of the new body was defeated. What was originally proposed as an Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency became the World Anti-Doping Agency. The president of the new body was not Samaranch but Dick Pound. It was not to be funded exclusively by the IOC, as the IOC had proposed, but jointly by the IOC and governments. Its Council was not to be dominated by Olympic representatives with minority representation from governments, as originally proposed, but both groups were to be equally represented. And it was not to be located in Lausanne, but in Montreal. The IOC had, since the 1970s, increasingly assumed the policy leadership role in the anti-doping movement, but in convening the Lausanne conference the IOC triggered a

process that resulted in the effective transfer of this leadership role away from the IOC and towards a newly established body which it did not control and which was to be independent of the IOC. And finally, the outcome of the conference did nothing to enhance the battered image of the IOC President; indeed, the refusal to accept the nomination of Samaranch as the president of the new agency was widely seen as a personal humiliation for him. How, then, did a process which was initiated by the IOC and which was designed to re-establish the authority of the IOC and its president have so many outcomes which were the very opposite of those which the IOC had intended? To understand this, it will be helpful to return to Elias's game models.

The game models revisited
Elias outlines two models of multi-person games which are particularly relevant to understanding the changing pattern of relationships between the IOC and governmental organizations and the way in which these changes led to the establishment of WADA. The first of these models helps us to understand the longstanding dominance of the IOC in relation to anti-doping policy in the years prior to the Lausanne conference, while the second model helps us to understand how the dominance of the IOC was increasingly challenged by governments – most notably and most successfully at the Lausanne conference – leading to the creation of WADA and the loss of the IOC's leadership role in anti-doping.

In the first of these models, Elias (1987: 82-3) describes a game in which one player, A, is playing simultaneously against several other players, B, C, D etc. under the following conditions: A is superior in strength to any single opponent and is playing against each one separately. Thus B, C, D etc. are not playing jointly but separately, and the only connection between them is the fact that each individual is playing privately against the same equally superior opponent. This is, in effect, not a single game but, rather, a series of games for two people, with each game having its own balance of power and developing in its own way, so that the courses taken by the several games are not directly interdependent. In each of the games, A is considerably more powerful and is able to exert a high degree of control over his/her opponent and over the course of the game itself. In each of these games, the distribution of power is relatively unequal and stable. In this situation, the only significant limiting factor on A's power is the number of opponents he/she plays against, for there is a limit to the span of active relationships independent one from another which A can pursue simultaneously.

Elias contrasts this with another model in which A plays simultaneously against several weaker opponents, not separately but against all of them together. In this situation, A is playing not against a single opponent but against a group of opponents, each of whom, on their own, is weaker than A. However, because B, C, D etc. have formed a group directed against A, the group as a whole is able much more effectively to challenge the power of A so that the balance of power is much less stable and there is much less certainty about the control of the game and therefore less certainty in predicting the outcome of the game. Armed with these two models we are in a better position to understand some of the key processes surrounding the Lausanne conference. The key players in these games were, on the one hand, the IOC (player A in Elias's model) and, on the other, governments and governmental organizations (players B, C, D etc).

Game models, the IOC and the establishment of WADA
During the 1960s and 1970s, few governments showed much interest in the control of drugs in sport. And rather than themselves seeking leadership of the anti-doping movement within sport, those few governments which did express an interest in anti-doping work actively encouraged the IOC to adopt a policy leadership role (Houlihan, 2002: 157).

By the late 1980s, a number of national governments were becoming more involved in doping control within their own countries, largely as a response to major drug scandals. For example, in Australia, a Senate Committee of Inquiry was established in 1987 to examine allegations of drug use at the Australian Institute of Sport and this led to the establishment of the Australian Sports Drug Agency. In Canada, the Dubin Inquiry led to the establishment of the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport, while in Britain, a report in 1987 from the then Sports Minister, Colin Moynihan, and the athlete Sebastian Coe, led, in 1988, to the establishment of the Doping Control Unit within the British Sports Council (Houlihan, 2002: 162-166). These initiatives were, however, largely confined to the national level and, although the Council of Europe had expressed an interest in anti-doping work, there was little evidence of governmental co-operation on an international level. Thus throughout the 1980s, those governments which were becoming more involved in developing anti-doping policies were working largely independently of each other and did not pose a collective threat to the leadership of the IOC.

This situation began to change in the 1990s with the development of a series of anti-doping agreements between governments. In 1996, the Nordic group of countries signed an agreement which committed signatories to the harmonisation of penalties and doping control procedures. Of particular significance was an agreement, which later became known as the International Anti-Doping Arrangement, which was signed by the UK, Canada and Australia in 1990 and which by 1998 – just one year before the Lausanne Conference – had also been signed by New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands. Several other bilateral governmental agreements were also concluded in the 1990s. The Council of Europe also increasingly provided an arena within which some governments pressed for improved standards of doping controls within member states (Houlihan, 2001: 130). As Houlihan has noted, these agreements represented an "important advance" not just because they involved the gradual construction of an international policy network, but because this was an intergovernmental network which – very significantly – did not include sports bodies like the IOC (Houlihan, 2001: 131).

During the 1990s, therefore, one can see the beginnings of a fundamental change in the nature of the game between the IOC and governmental organizations. In the 1970s and 1980s, most governments were unconcerned about drug use in sport, and the few that were concerned worked largely independently of each other. There was little evidence of inter-governmental co-operation and no single government, on its own, sought to challenge the authority of the IOC. Within this situation, which approximated to Elias's first model outlined above, the dominance of the IOC as the leading anti-doping organization went largely unchallenged.

In the 1990s, however, there were, as noted above, significant moves to develop anti-doping agreements on an intergovernmental level. These agreements not only by-

passed the IOC but also constituted, in effect, public recognition by governments both of the ineffectiveness of IOC policy and of the need for governments to work together to introduce more stringent anti-doping controls. This situation began to approximate more closely to Elias's second model as governments began to join together and elements of a more organized inter-governmental challenge to the IOC began to appear.

But although there were signs of a developing alliance between governments, and a growing recognition in the 1990s of the ineffectiveness of IOC policy, there was, until the Lausanne conference, no overt collective challenge offered by governments to the IOC. One reason for this is that, although there was in the 1990s growing inter-governmental contact in relation to anti-doping work, there was no forum within which governments could collectively meet with, and challenge, the IOC; as Houlihan (2001: 131) has noted, despite the growth of inter-governmental agreements in the 1990s there were hardly any meetings which brought together governmental organizations and sporting bodies on an international level. That was to be the key role played by the Lausanne conference.

Lausanne revisited
As Marx and Engels (1962 [1848]) noted in *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, it was the development of the factory system which, by bringing together large numbers of workers in one place, created the very conditions favourable to their collective organization and thereby enabled them to challenge the power of the bourgeoisie. In much the same way it may be argued that, in convening the Lausanne conference, the IOC gathered together all its critics under one roof, thus creating the opportunity for a collective inter-governmental challenge to the authority and leadership of the IOC, with consequences which the IOC had clearly not anticipated.

As we have seen, there was some evidence of a growing inter-governmental challenge to the IOC before the Lausanne conference. However, the conditions for an effective challenge had not fully existed before the conference. For example, some of the most effective work on an international level had been done by governmental organizations which had a limited geo-political remit. The Council of Europe, for example, had played an important role in encouraging European governments to develop anti-doping policies, but its remit did not extend beyond Europe (Houlihan, 2001: 128). The USA was a particularly strong critic of the IOC at Lausanne, but the US was of course not part of the Council of Europe and the Lausanne conference provided a unique opportunity for the most powerful governments in Europe, North America and Australasia – who also represented some of the most successful Olympic nations – to come together to challenge the IOC. And of course, this was done not in private but, humiliatingly for the IOC, in the full glare of worldwide media coverage.

It is not known to what degree there was a collective pre-planned strategy on the part of governments, but it is known that there was contact before the conference between some member governments of the International Anti-Doping Arrangement with a view to coordinating their policy demands at the conference (Hanstad et al., 2008). What is clear is that there was a remarkable consistency and unity in the criticisms of the IOC expressed by governments both during and after the Lausanne Conference. In effect the IOC, in convening the Lausanne conference, unwittingly created the conditions for its own ambush by governmental organizations.

Conclusion
One of the main objectives of this paper has been to set out an approach which more adequately helps us to understand what is a common aspect of policy development and implementation, namely unplanned outcomes.
However, it might be argued that this approach inevitably raises a further problem: does the fact that policy planning and implementation almost invariably have unplanned outcomes mean that the development and implementation of planned policy is a futile process which is doomed to failure? This might be taken to be the implication of what might be interpreted as a sceptical view of policy outlined in this paper.

I would suggest, however, that what has been set out above should be seen not as a sceptical, but as a realistic, view of planned policy. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that, as Elias pointed out, our knowledge of and our ability to control "natural" processes are considerably more developed than are our knowledge of and our ability to control social processes. Furthermore, it is important – and it is perhaps especially important for those involved in developing policy – to be realistic about the limitations of our ability, within the constraints imposed by our current knowledge, to control social processes. To recognise the limits of our ability to control planned processes is not, however, to suggest that we have no control, nor does it undermine the case for planned policy any more than a recognition of, for example, the limited effectiveness of radiotherapy as a means of treating certain forms of cancer indicates that we should abandon radiotherapy altogether. In each case, the appropriate course of action is not to abandon those strategies which currently have limited effectiveness, but rather to seek to make them more effective. I hope that this paper will be seen as a contribution of this kind.

Given what has been said about unplanned outcomes, it is clearly imperative that a systematic process of monitoring is built into all policy implementation from the outset; if we do not monitor the consequences of the implementation of policy then we can have no clear idea of the degree to which, if at all, we are achieving our policy goals and, as has been indicated elsewhere (Waddington and Smith, 2009: 15), it is certainly foolish to assume that a policy designed to achieve certain goals actually achieves those goals and that it does not have other consequences which may, perhaps, be the very reverse of what was intended. This may seem little more than a statement of the obvious but one cannot but be struck by the lack of systematic monitoring which is often characteristic even of large-scale planned projects, and of the tendency, perhaps when funding becomes tight, to assume that the monitoring process can safely be cut back without any significant damage to the project. It may be argued that, on the contrary, any economies which may be sought by cutting back on the monitoring are likely to be false economies, and that monitoring should be at the very heart of policy implementation. Only by systematic monitoring can we know whether or not, or the degree to which, the policy goals are being achieved, and also whether the policy is generating any unplanned outcomes and only then, armed with this knowledge, can we initiate appropriate remedial action.

The above comments about the necessity of monitoring the effects of policy implementation are as relevant to anti-doping policy as to any other area of policy. In regard to anti-doping policy, Houlihan (2002) has noted that one of the major problems is that there has been little clarity regarding objectives of such policy. He adds:

> it must be asked whether the ultimate objective is the complete elimination of drug use in all sport, in certain sports, or only in sport at certain levels. One might also ask whether the objective is elimination or simply the containment of the extent of drug use (Houlihan, 2002: 113).

It is important to answer such questions, not least because until they are answered, it is difficult to know what criteria should be used in monitoring and measuring the success of anti-doping policy. As Houlihan goes on to note, given that the objectives of anti-doping policy have never been clearly defined – and the development of WADA has not led to any significant clarification in this area (indeed, it might be argued that by the inclusion of "recreational" drugs such as marijuana on the banned list WADA has actually made the policy goals even more diverse) – it is not altogether surprising that "techniques for measuring progress towards policy objectives are poor, relying mainly on trends in the number of positive test results" (Houlihan, 2002: 119). However, as numerous authors have noted, the incidence of positive test results is a poor – indeed, almost worthless – index of the extent of drug use by athletes (Dubin, 1990; Yesalis et al, 2001; Waddington and Smith, 2009; Stewart and Smith, 2014). There is clearly a pressing need to define more clearly the objectives of anti-doping policy, and to specify more clearly the criteria for monitoring the success of that policy. In this regard, it might be argued that a critical weakness of anti-doping policies has been the failure even to try to monitor properly – and also the failure, for public relations purposes, to admit publicly – the prevalence of drug use in sport.

It was noted above that effective monitoring raises the possibility of taking remedial action in order to improve the likelihood that policies will actually achieve the goals they were designed to achieve. Of course it is not assumed that such remedial action is any less problematic than the implementation of the original policy, for any remedial action is itself also likely to have unplanned outcomes. However, the recognition that this process is a complex one, and that our ability to control outcomes is limited, does not constitute a legitimate reason for abandoning the planning process. Indeed, it may be suggested that a recognition of our currently relatively limited control over social processes is, insofar as it represents a relatively detached and more adequate appraisal of the situation, a first step towards improving that control.

References

Benn, T. & Benn, B. (2004), "After Olga: developments in women's artistic gymnastics following the 1972 'Olga Korbut phenomenon' ", in E. Dunning, D.

Malcolm & I. Waddington (eds.), *Sport Histories: Figurational Studies of the Development of Modern Sports,* London and New York, Routledge, 172-190.

Dawson, R. T. (2001), "Drugs in sport: the role of the physician", *Journal of Endocrinology*, 170 (1), 55-61.

Dopson, S. and Waddington, I. (1996), "Managing social change; a process-sociological approach to understanding organisational change within the National Health Service", *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 18 (4), 525-550.

Dubin, Charles L. (1990), *Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance*, Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing Centre.

Elias, N. (1978), *What is Sociology?* , London, Hutchinson.

Elias, N. (1987), *Involvement and Detachment*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Hanstad, D. V., Smith A. & Waddington, I. (2008), "The establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency: A study of the management of organizational change and unplanned outcomes", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 43 (3), 227-249.

Houlihan, B. (1999), "Anti-doping political measures: the new approaches after the Lausanne meeting on doping", Scientific Workshop, The Limits of Sport: Doping, Institut d'Estudis Catalans, Barcelona, 27-18 June.

Houlihan, B. (2001), "The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success", in J. O'Leary (ed.), *Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives*, 125-45, London, Cavendish.

Houlihan, B. (2002), *Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy*, 2nd ed., Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

International Olympic Committee (1998a), *World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne, 2-4 February 1999: Regulations*. Lausanne: IOC.

International Olympic Committee (1998b), *Report of the Working Group on the Legal and Political Aspects of Doping*. Lausanne: IOC.

MacAloon, J. (2001), "Doping and moral authority: sports organizations today", in W. Wilson and E. Derse (eds.) *Doping in Elite Sport*, 205-224, Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Malcolm, D. (2009), "Medical uncertainty and clinical-athlete relations: the management of concussion injuries in Rugby Union". *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 26, 191-210.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1962 [1848]), "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp.34-65, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Mennell, S. (1989), *Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Merton, R. K. (1936), "The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action", *American Sociological Review*, 1, 6, 894-904.

Merton, R. K. (1949), *Social Theory and Social Structure*, chap. 10, pp. 421-436. Glencoe, Free Press.

Murphy, P. & Sheard K. (2008), "Boxing blind: unplanned processes in the development of modern boxing", in D. Malcolm & I. Waddington (eds.), *Matters of Sport: Essays in Honour of Eric Dunning*, London and New York, Routledge, 40-56.

Smith, A. & Stewart, B. (2008), "Drug policy in sport: hidden assumptions and inherent contradictions", *Drug and Alcohol Review*, 27: 123-29.

Stewart, B. & Smith, A. C.T. (2014), *Rethinking Drug Use in Sport: Why the War will Never be Won*, London and New York, Routledge.

Stewart, B. & Smith, A. C.T. (2015), "Revisiting the drugs-in-sport problem: a manifesto for a new deal", in V. Møller, I. Waddington & J. Hoberman (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Drugs in Sport*, London and New York, Routledge.

Teetzel, S. (2004), "The road to WADA", Seventh International Symposium for Olympic Research, October, 213-224.

Voy, R. (1991), *Drugs, Sport and Politics*, Champaign, IL, Leisure Press.

Waddington, I. (2000), *Sport, Health and Drugs*: *A Critical Sociological Perspective*, London and New York, E & F N Spon.

Waddington, I. (2010), "Surveillance and control in sport: a sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system", *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 2 (3), 255-274.

Waddington, I. & Smith, A. (2009), *An Introduction to Drugs in Sport: Addicted to Winning?*, London and New York, Routledge.

Yesalis, C., Kopstein, A. & Bahrke, M. (2001), "Difficulties in estimating the prevalence of drug use among athletes", in W. Wilson and E. Derse (eds.) *Doping in Elite Sport*, Champaign, Ill. Human Kinetics.