

 Open access • Journal Article • DOI:10.1177/1473095209346499

Theorizing Practice and Practising Theory: Outlines for an Actor-Relational-Approach in Planning — [Source link](#)

Luuk Boelens

Institutions: Utrecht University

Published on: 21 Jan 2010 - Planning Theory (SAGE Publications)

Topics: Rational planning model, Environmental design and planning, Transportation planning, Land-use planning and Regional planning

Related papers:

- [Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory](#)
- [Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies](#)
- [Actor-network theory and planning theory: A response to Boelens](#)
- [Self-organization in urban development: towards a new perspective on spatial planning](#)
- [Using Actor–Network Theory to understand planning practice: Exploring relationships between actants in regulating low-carbon commercial development](#)

Share this paper:    

View more about this paper here: <https://typeset.io/papers/theorizing-practice-and-practising-theory-outlines-for-an-523iy9qhh>

1 Theorizing practice and practicing theory; 2 Outlines for an actor-relational-approach in planning

3
4 **Prof.dr.ir. Luuk Boelens**

5 6 ***Abstract***

7 Not only in the Netherlands, but also elsewhere, a stalemate has occurred between
8 modern and post-modern/post-structural planning, or between state-controlled and
9 neo-liberal planning. The modernist, state-controlled planning is since at least the
10 eighties fundamentally debunked as a highly regulatory and prescriptive operation,
11 resulting in syrupy planning processes, very costly, inflexible and inefficient, even
12 suppressing all new and creative initiatives, that do not fit within the framework set
13 before. Postmodern and post-structural alternatives developed since then have been
14 very effective in counter attacking the alleged virtues of that planning strategy, but
15 less fruitful at promoting effective and/or sustainable practices. The article assumes
16 that this has something to do with the fact that time and again these alternatives are
17 still formulated from within the existing planning framework; from a specific
18 governmental, or at least a government related view on planning: inside-out. From
19 here, the article describes the possible outlines, for a practical outside-in, actor-
20 relational-approach. It has been developed from experimental case studies in
21 concrete planning practices, of which for instance the case study in Southern
22 Limburg of the Netherlands. On the other hand it has also been derived from a
23 fundamental interaction with behavioral, urban regime and actor-network theories,
24 vice versa, evaluating the latter one extensively. The article concludes with a call for
25 a new fundamental, but pro-active reassembling of spatial planning in an actor-
26 oriented, instead of government-oriented way.

27 28 ***Key words:***

29 Regional planning, Actor-Network-Theory, Relational geography, Associative
30 Democracy, Behavioural planning, Urban Regime Planning.

31 32 ***Author:***

33 Luuk Boelens is extraordinary professor Regional Planning and Urban Design at the
34 Department of Human Geography and Urban and Regional Planning of the Utrecht
35 University, the Netherlands, and managing director of the Dutch Planning-
36 consultancy firm Urban Unlimited.

1 Theorizing practice and practicing theory;

2 Outlines for an actor-relational-approach in planning

4 Introduction

5 Something unusual seems to be going on in Dutch spatial planning. On the one
6 hand, the international professional community has often regarded Dutch spatial
7 planning system of high standards. For instance, Alterman (1997) had described the
8 Netherlands as a country with *'one of the world's most successful systems of*
9 *planning and land management'*. Peter Hall (1997) even claimed that the
10 Netherlands had the *'worldwide lead'* in the coordination of spatial planning with
11 traffic and transport planning. The Japanese Mori (1998) in his turn regarded the
12 Netherlands as having a *'superbly efficient'* system of spatial planning and building
13 production compared with the United Kingdom and Japan. The American Bolan
14 (1999) was *'impressed by the spatial planning achievements'* of the Netherlands.
15 And in Germany, reference was made to *'ein gut funktionierendes System der*
16 *Baulandbereitstellung'* and *'ein geschickt ausgestaltetes Enteignungsrecht'* (Schmidt-
17 Eichstaedt 1999). But what was it that made Dutch planning so attractive for these
18 foreign scholars? Apparently and according to Andreas Faludi and Arnold van der
19 Valk (1994) it had something to do with highly successful spatial concepts and
20 planning strategies (such as the Randstad or the Green Heart), which were carefully
21 constructed and maintained by the planners themselves. Moreover Dutch planners
22 would have constructed a useful prescriptive institutional framework of national,
23 provincial and local planning, which would sufficiently address how governments
24 could pursue their policies in the face of mounting pressure. And finally, the system
25 would have so much public and business support, that it could effectively coordinate
26 the various (investment) strategies of the departments of housing, traffic, agriculture,
27 economics, ecology and the like.

1

2 On the other hand, more than ten years before Faludi and van der Valk proudly
3 announced their '*Dutch Planning Paradise*', the critical part of Dutch planning
4 profession itself spoke likewise of a fundamental crisis. Already as far back as the
5 early eighties, reference was made to the double failure of the future perspective of
6 modern planning, either to promote a human environment or to achieve an overall
7 vision coupled with a comprehensive social ideal (Bolte and Meijer 1981). Comments
8 were made about a remarkable proliferation of the planning institutions, coupled with
9 declining planning success (Wigmans 1982), about the superfluousness of urban
10 development and planning itself in the coordination of governments spatial policy (de
11 Jong 1985) and about the widening gap between planning and its implementation
12 (van der Cammen 1986). Partly in conjunction with the (post)modernity debate at that
13 time, the reality of Dutch urban planning was described as 'an early modern practice
14 through and through'. Following Jürgen Habermas, a call was issued for a
15 'completion of spatial planning and urban design' (Boelens 1990).

16

17 However, such a call turned out to be not so easy to realise in planning practice.
18 There were some experiments with regional design, in order to add local precision to
19 the more or less abstract strategic planning issues and render those things visible,
20 which could only be rendered visible by design (Taverne 1989). At this moment it is
21 executed again in the Strategic Spatial Structure Plan of Antwerp: *Antwerpen*
22 *Ontwerpen* (Designing Antwerp, Secchi/Vigano 2007). Next to that, some
23 experimented with a so-called 'layered approach' – addressing the different issues in
24 prioritizing layers of time and space to deal with contemporary complexity of
25 planning: first water management and ecology in a '*longue durée*', then infrastructure
26 in a planning time span of 20-80 years, and finally dwelling with relatively fast
27 changes (Boelens 1993). The method was introduced in the Fifth White Paper on
28 Dutch Planning (VROM 2000-2001). And thirdly, others dealt with a kind of relational,

1 place bound planning (the casco-concept) in order to introduce more specific and
2 area dependent elements - as opposed to generic and comprehensive - into Dutch
3 planning (HNS 1998). It was for instance used in the price-winning 'Plan Ooievaar',
4 which opted for specific acupuncture interventions in order to stimulate a highly self-
5 organizing process of sustainable development. These ideas were also derived from
6 new theoretical planning perspectives at that time, like for instance the discursive or
7 collaborative planning (Dryzek 1990, Ines 1995, Healey 1997), entrepreneurial (Rast
8 2001, Sellers 2002) or smart growth approaches (Wiegand 1997, Smutney 1998).
9 But after few initial successes, the familiar regulatory, process-oriented planning
10 returned. The alternative approaches all failed to institutionalise sufficiently. At the
11 same time, profound neo-liberal changes occurred within public housing,
12 infrastructural and (agricultural) zoning policies, which permanently undermined the
13 traditional coordinating Dutch planning system based on linked interests between
14 these sectoral policies (Spit 1995, Dieleman et al. 1999). The malaise was expressed
15 in wider-ranging terms in the white paper 'Ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsplanologie'
16 (Spatial Development Planning) from the Scientific Council for Government Policy
17 (WRR 1999). Here the diminishing effectiveness of Dutch spatial planning was
18 attributed not just to the decreasing relevance of linked interests, but also to the rise
19 of the network society, the need for multi-level and multi-actor governance and the
20 changing, cross border dynamic (not only geographically, but also thematically)
21 between spatial developments within ongoing processes of globalization. It promoted
22 the need for a more active, development-oriented attitude, as opposed to the
23 traditional passive, permission-based attitude of the Dutch planning system.

24

25 In fact this plea was since then implemented within the governments policy with
26 regard tot the National Spatial Planning (Report on Space 2004-2006). Instead of
27 setting limitations (permission-based planning), the emphasis is put on stimulating
28 development (development-based planning) by primarily the government, with help of

1 other stake- and shareholders in the civic and business community. According to
2 Hans van der Cammen and Riek Bakker it is characterised by
3 a) an integrated approach to an area,
4 b) on the basis of a shared quality vision, in which
5 c) public, private and individual (i.e. public, business and civic society) supplement
6 and reinforce one another in co-production arrangements, with
7 d) explicit attention to financing.

8 Reference is made to the need for all participants to sense the urgency of achieving
9 development and for the equally great need for the partners to be able to build up a
10 long-term relationship of trust (v.d. Cammen 2006).

11

12 But it is precisely at this point that the model proves unconvincing. The exemplary
13 cases - put forward by van der Cammen and Bakker in consultation with the state
14 government and the provinces¹ - suggest a kind of compensation strategy. It is the
15 price paid - in ecology, nature or water - by a specific part of the private sector (e.g.
16 the project developers) to push through lucrative developments – housing, offices or
17 retail - of its own. Worse still, instead of demonstrating the lasting reinforcement of a
18 long-term structure or the core values of the areas in question, it gives rise to the
19 suspicion that it functions for the private party only as a kind of one-sided, temporary
20 trade-off. It provokes a kind of ‘hit & run’ mentality, with no sufficient exploitation,
21 management and durable involvement with the collaboration what so ever. Once the
22 project has been completed, the project developers have disappeared. Moreover,
23 after all, there is no reason to suppose that a subsequent and comparable public-
24 private ‘compensation process’ will be initiated in the same area again, with all the
25 feared muddle and fragmentation that it would entail. It is the folly of these
26 collaborative and smart growth proposals that weak (green) functions often lack
27 behind or are diminished in last instance. Like in the case described recently by
28 Patsy Healey (2007) – especially the South Axis of Amsterdam, but in my view also

1 the Milan Region and the East England Plan for Cambridgeshire – they remain often
2 the exclusive responsibility of the public parties, while the private parties go for the
3 more lucrative functions. Instead of the sustainable and win-win perspective they
4 advocate, the proposals remain therefore mostly government-driven or at least
5 government-initiated, self-fulfilling in itself.

6

7 **New impulses in spatial planning**

8 So where does Dutch spatial planning stand now? Although the 2008 financial crisis
9 puts old-fashioned governmental bravura back on the political agenda, it seems to
10 make no sense returning to the modernistic, visionary but prescriptive spatial
11 planning doctrines of the pre-eighties. To that end, the criticisms of the postmodernist
12 are too convincing: a central rule or process approach failed in the area of strategic
13 efficiency, comprehensiveness and 'emancipating knowledge interest'

14 (Adorno/Horkheimer 1947, Foucault 1969/1975, Feyerabend 1975, Lyotard 1979).

15 But on the other hand the subsequent promoted place-bounded, bottom-up
16 proposals in the course of regional design or casco planning (Bohigas 1987, Secchi
17 1989, HNS 1998), discursive or collaborative planning, the entrepreneurial or smart
18 growth approaches (Janssen-Jansen 2004) prove to be less effective at promoting
19 convincing practical alternatives. All these alternatives mostly stay focused on the
20 improvement of governmental planning, and coped with other private parties and
21 members of the civic society inside-out. But even back in the eighties social engaged
22 scholars already stressed that planning was not the sole, or even exclusive preserve
23 of government. Many other stake- and shareholders play an equal, if not greater role
24 in planning; and have done so throughout history (Kreukels 1985, De Klerk 1998). It
25 gave rise to a kind of 'behavioural science based approach', which derived its
26 principles, amongst others, also from Susan and Norman Fainsteins *Regime*
27 *Strategies* (1986), John Logans/Harvey Molotch's *Urban Fortunes* (1987) Clarence

1 Stones *Regime Politics* (1989) et al. It put stake- and shareholders of the business
2 and civic society as major planning actors themselves back on the agenda, although
3 it also remained very much analytical, implicit and not practically pro-active.

4
5 Against this background, the last five years a number of new modest and backstage
6 attempts are made in Dutch planning to deal with these behavioural ideas that a
7 multitude of leading actors can be involved, instead of excluded from, spatial
8 planning. Unlike the theoretical and/or primarily analytical views described earlier,
9 these attempts are actually derived from an intensive interchange between planning
10 practice and planning theory. They are actually backed up by real planning
11 interventions, trying to reframe strategies in order to attract new markets in a
12 sustainable way: *Heerlijkheid Heuvelland* (Hillside Delight, Limburg 2004-2005),
13 *Stedenbaan* (CitiesRail, Zuid-Holland 2006), *Nieuwe Vrije Tijd Amsterdam* (New
14 Leisure Amsterdam, Amsterdam 2006-2007), *Reframing South Limburg* (Zuid
15 Limburg 2007), *Nieuwe Markten voor het Brabants Land* (New Markets for the
16 countryside of Brabant, 2007-2008), *Terug naar de kust* (Back to the coast, Zeeland
17 2008), *Integrated Care Communities* (Orbis 2008) etc. However, on the other hand,
18 these interventions did not operate only in practical circumstances. There was an
19 intense input and inspiration of parallel case studies and analysis based on
20 connecting behavioral, urban regime and governance theories, vice versa. In fact
21 they became theorized practices and/or practiced theories, and by doing so evolving
22 step-by-step, almost incrementally, towards a new kind of actor-relational approach.

23 In this contribution, I will explain how that worked. So what I want to do here is

- 24 • firstly, to outline the basics features and motives of these new impulses,
- 25 • secondly, to link them not only to existing ideas with regard to behavioural
26 planning approaches, but also to the more ontological, Actor Network Theory,
- 27 • thirdly, to outline where the presented new impulses take their own stand in these
28 debates, resulting in a new model for planning action,

- 1 • fourthly, to present a case how it worked out with regard to a specific planning
- 2 issue in the South of the Netherlands (South-Limburg) and
- 3 • finally to wrap up the arguments in an outline for a trans-modern approach,
- 4 beyond the ineffective dialectics between state-focused and neo-liberal planning.

5

6 **Basic features of an actor-relational view of planning**

7 Theoretically, the starting-point of the new impulses mentioned above, has thus been

8 the need to get around the impasses between modernism and post-modernism.

9 Because neither a reversion to the supposed absolute accuracy of big visions and

10 holism, nor an emphasis on the day-to-day, the here and now and fragmentary

11 projects represents a promising course for the practice and science of planning

12 (Boelens 1990). At the same time, the resulting communicative, interactive and

13 collaborative approaches are seen as too idealistic or centred around traditional

14 processes to actually play a significant role in actual planning (Boelens et al 2000).

15 Instead, the approaches of the urban and regional regime methodology, and the

16 behavioural approach are being taken seriously, along with the critiques that have

17 been formulated about them in recent years. An attempt is being made to bring these

18 into line with one another in a kind of 'actor-relational approach' so that they become

19 both effective in reality and justifiable in theory (Mommaas/Boelens 2005).

20

21 The central theme of this kind of 'actor-relational-approach' is first of all an attempt to

22 **develop beyond 'the plan'**. Instead of present-day revisionistic approaches focusing

23 on 'a plan that works' (e.g. Hajer/Sijmons 2006), the actor-relational approach does

24 not focus on a particular plan or a particular formal institution as the given central

25 objective, respectively subjective. A behavioural actor-relational view (Boelens, Spit,

26 Wissink 2006) demands a prominent role for a more neutral moderator and an open

27 medium to sketch opportunities. The focus is turned around: outside-in instead of

1 inside-out. The point is not to formulate an objective, vision or plan, which then has to
2 be implemented in trade-offs, whether or not in a public-private partnership, but to
3 identify possible actors, stake- and shareholders who may be ready to associate and
4 invest around common opportunities, possibilities and/or themes from the ground up.

5

6 Secondly, the approach is not about actors as such, in the broad sense of interactive
7 planning (all affected parties), but about **leading actors**, who are primarily
8 encountered in the human world of action. The symmetrical perspective of discourse
9 analysis is rejected, as in planning practice, because it will lead to process overkill
10 and insufficient value-adding consultation. The definition of those 'leading or focal
11 actors' is - in line with the evolutionary economic and urban sociological approach
12 (De Langen 2003, Yeung 2005, Boschma/Frenken 2006) - 'those actors who have
13 the capacity and incentive to invest in their local environment, doing so, moreover, for
14 reasons of more or less self-interest'. Here we distinguish between leading actors
15 within the *business society* (with primarily focus on profit-making), within the *public*
16 *society* (with primarily focus on representational vote-winning) and within the *civic*
17 *society* (with primarily focus on specific partnership-interests). Although they have
18 thus various focal points, we shall see it is also possible to coincide their interests on
19 specific planning items. The more coinciding, the more durable it will be. Moreover, it
20 is acknowledged that the focus on *leading* actors also introduces a certain power
21 connotation or subjectivity into this actor-relational approach. But in principle this is
22 always the case, even with the seemingly more symmetrical communicative,
23 collaborative and discursive approaches (see for instance '*Die Diktatur des*
24 *Sitzfleisches*', Weinrich 1987). Furthermore this evolutionary approach always
25 departs from embedded actors in broad networks of economic, political and civic
26 interconnectivity; and need therefore base their dominance on that interconnectivity.

27

28 Thirdly, the concept of **sustainability** in particular is central to this actor-relational

1 approach, but in a complex sense. It refers equally to sustainable economic (i.e.
2 profit-generating) solutions, sustainable social (i.e. broadly supported) solutions,
3 sustainable spatial (i.e. well embedded from an evolutionary viewpoint) solutions and
4 sustainable environmental (i.e. climate-neutral) solutions, etc. (Mommaas 2006). The
5 commonly discerned unique core values or unique selling points of a specific
6 landscape, port design, social community, spatial constellation, etc. are included not
7 as a trade-off – as in the smart growth approach – but as meaningful, dominant
8 (f)actors of mutual concern, that as such, constantly enjoy a central position in the
9 actor-relational-approach. In fact, they become the central focal points, against which
10 the planning associations are continually measured in terms of their objectives,
11 development and results.

12
13 Fourthly, the actor-relational-approach also has a primary focus **beyond the**
14 **confines of government**. In line with the urban and regional regime approach, this
15 arises from the conviction that the model of the welfare state or representative
16 democracy does not work, or has seen better days (Stoker 1994, Pierre 2000, Purcell
17 2008), as well as from the conviction that the government is not the only actor within
18 spatial planning, and often not even the dominant one (Kreukels/Van Vliet 2001).
19 Moreover, it is concluded that a lasting emphasis on central government negotiations
20 leads to planning that lacks sustainability and is depending on, for example,
21 subsidies or more and more volatile political commitment (Mommaas/Boelens 2005).
22 Accordingly, in actor-relational practice a search is conducted from the start for
23 commissioning bodies in the private or semi-private/semi-public sphere, in order to
24 circumvent these problems. Of course, the government always has an important
25 framework-setting or facilitating role. But this does not take away the fact that
26 –especially in the Netherlands – we have to put first and for all extra focus on the
27 specific embeddedness of actor-relational actions by and through stakeholders in the
28 business and civic society.

1

2 Finally the actor-oriented approach is also **associative** through and through. This
3 primarily consists of building effective actor-network associations around meaningful
4 things, themes or issues as a starting-point, working method and objective. But it also
5 ultimately ties in with the plea for an associative democracy made by Cohen, Rogers,
6 Hirst and Bader and others (Cohen/Rogers 1992, Hirst 1994, Hirst/Bader 2001).

7 Instead of, or preferably alongside, the representative social democracy, but also
8 instead of neo-liberal economically oriented regimes, this associative democracy sets
9 out from the conviction *'that individual liberty and human welfare are both best*
10 *served, when as many of the affairs of society as possible are managed by voluntary*
11 *and democratically self-governing associations'* (Hirst 1994, p.19). In their terms
12 associative democracy therefore has two distinguishing characteristics compared
13 with all other possible forms of state:

- 14 1) it bridges the widening gap between the state and civic and business society and
15 transforms it into a situation that is actually more workable by *'pluralising'* the
16 former and making the latter more *public and transparent* and
- 17 2) it seeks to promote the democratic governance of collective entities in both public
18 and private spheres by offering, instead of hierarchical management, a bottom-up
19 model of organisational self-efficiency (Cohen/Rogers 1992, Hirst 1994).

20

21 **Actor Network Theory and beyond**

22 As such, and although it had been developed pragmatic within certain concrete
23 planning practices, the Actor-Relational-Approach (ARA) also evolved very close to
24 many features of the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), with which Callon, Law and
25 Latour have recently created a considerable furore (Callon & Latour 1981, Latour
26 1993, Callon 1995, Law 2004, Latour 2005). Because, ARA also starts off with actors
27 and relations (or networks) – not only amongst each other but also between the
28 human actors and the specific characteristics and entities of the locality - in order to

1 reassemble them in such a way that they would become more innovative,
2 enforceable and associative. On the other hand, it does have some deviant
3 characteristics too. I will explain that later. Because ARA and ANT agree that
4 technical, social or spatial artefacts are not outside or opposed to society, but are in
5 fact the results of it. ANT argues that the world is made up of heterogeneous
6 networks of actors (Bos 2004). Or, as Latour puts it: *'sociology is best defined as the*
7 *discipline where participants explicitly engage in reassembling the collective'* (Latour
8 2005, p. 247). Not only is every (social) action thus fundamentally relational, it can
9 also only occur as a consequence of the specific connection between people, entities
10 and resources concerned. At the same time, those people, entities and resources
11 only have a meaning in networks (Law 1986). Or, in other words: *"What there is and*
12 *how it is divided up should not be assumed beforehand. Instead it arises in the*
13 *course of interactions between different actors..... Actors are entities, human or*
14 *otherwise, that happen to act. They are not given, but they emerge in relations."* (Law
15 2004, p. 102). Here – and this is possibly the most controversial assumption – ANT
16 assumes that there exists in principal symmetry between objects and subjects,
17 nature and sociology, the human and the non-human. It cannot be presumed in
18 advance who or what is most important for the action: a person, an entity or a
19 resource. For example, relevant people could reach agreement about a plan, or all
20 the elements to put a plan into practice could be present, but there may still exist
21 insufficient financial resources available. In this case, no action or actor-network
22 association will arise. However, ANT claims that it is possible for a specific actor
23 subsequently to become more dominant than others, by seducing actors to behave
24 according to its own prerogatives. In the given example, the people may involve other
25 people with more money to enable the plan to be put into practice, or the limited
26 financial resources may give rise to a less ambitious plan, less elements involved
27 and hence to an adapted link between the people and entities. This is in principle
28 what ANT calls 'the translation of the objectives, limitations and opportunities of other

1 actors' so that these can start 'behaving' to their own accord, but in line with the
2 wishes/characteristics of the dominant actor; in ANT-terms 'the actant'. (Latour
3 1997). Thus as a result, this actant – who/which dominates or organises the
4 association or network – may consist for ANT of either human or non-human entities.
5 As such, the concept spans all rationally attributed differences between (conscious)
6 subjects and (passive) objects, culture and nature, the technical and the social, the
7 modern and the post-modern. It is not '*a sociology of the social, but a sociology of*
8 *associations*' (Latour 2005 p. 9) in all kinds of assemblages between human, non-
9 human and even lifeless entities.

10

11 Although the actor-network-theory may thus be characterised as a form of
12 sociological epistemology, or perhaps even as a new '*a-modern monistic ontology*'
13 (Latour 1993), the actor-network theoreticians have also commented on space and
14 the planning of space. Thus Jonathan Murdoch can refer to '*notions of space in a*
15 *Latourian actor-network theory*' (Murdoch 2006 p. 73). Crucial elements of such
16 notions are that there exists no absolute time-space – just as there is neither
17 absolute nature nor society – but only specific time-space configurations, which are
18 conditioned by motives and relations in networks. The attribution of any significance
19 to scale or any idea of micro- or macro-issues is in fact superseded. In principle, one
20 ought rather to follow the actors, or better still the actor-networks, which condition
21 specific time-space frames in the way they do. The point here is not to analyse
22 specific places within specific times. Instead, geography (and its application,
23 planning) becomes the science or skill of the analysis (and/or planning) of
24 heterogeneous associations or actor-networks in time and space. Spatial relations
25 are reduced to network relations and spatial planning is understood as a process of
26 network building in which entities of various kinds are assembled in ways that allow
27 networks to undertake certain functions (Murdoch 1997). Even more strikingly, on the
28 basis of his famous case study looking at improvements in scallop cultivation

1 methods on the Normandy coast, Michel Callon actually distinguishes four steps in
2 the translation of actor-networks (Callon 1986):

3 1. *Problematization*

4 What is the issue, which requires a solution? Who are the relevant actors? Can
5 spokespeople be identified who can represent specific groups?

6 2. *Interest*

7 Can these relevant actors be interested in the solution to the issue? What 'terms
8 of commitment' are there, and/or how can they be convinced that their own
9 interests will be served?

10 3. *Enrolment*

11 How can these common interests be converted into potential associations? Do
12 the different actors also accept their role, or can they be geared to the available
13 resources?

14 4. *Mobilisation of allies*

15 Is there wide support for the expected outcomes? Do the spokespeople actually
16 represent their respective constituencies effectively, or how can the actor-network
17 association be embedded in a wider setting?

18

19 Thus ANT appears at first sight to offer attractive prospects for contemporary spatial
20 planning. The pitfalls of the (post)modernity debate are elegantly circumvented, by
21 assuming neither the need for alternative thinking as a matter of principle (Foucault
22 1968), nor the need for an emphasis on the small discourses, the so-called
23 '*micrologies*' (Lyotard 1979) nor an absolute desirability of a structure, holism or
24 political interest imposed from the top or from the outside (Frieling 1987 et al).

25 Instead, the focus is put on the actors themselves, especially those who are capable,
26 in networks, of developing meaningful spatial connections – albeit heterogeneous
27 ones. At the same time, it sidesteps the stifling duality between macro and micro.

28 Because the presumptions '*think global, but act local*', its converse or even its

1 contamination '*glocal*' (McLuhan 1964, Drewe 1997, Swyngedouw 2004) do not
2 really add anything new to our operational spatial knowledge. In principle, according
3 to ANT, the actor-network associations in this network society cut right across
4 different levels and layers. And finally, ANT offers a subtle extension to the
5 discursive, entrepreneurial or growth management approaches, by also including
6 things and entities as autonomous (not passive) forces or (f)actors of importance.
7 The environment, the landscape, the cultural and historical heritage, the unique
8 fauna and flora etc. can indeed assume a structuring or even dominant role of their
9 own in actor-network oriented planning.

10

11 **ANT critiques**

12 Even so, ANT comes in for fierce criticism from many theoreticians on the grounds
13 that it incorrectly assumes a symmetrical *tabula rasa* between the relevant (human
14 and non-human) actors, that there is in fact always a certain (inherent) power
15 discrepancy in evidence, that it confuses science as a research subject and as an
16 authoritative source, and the like (Bijker 1995, Hagendijk 1996 etc.). Law, Callon and
17 Latour have reacted to these critiques in numerous polemics, and in this way
18 improved and refined certain aspects of ANT (Callon/Law 1997, Latour 2005).
19 Nevertheless, I continue to maintain three serious objections with respect to the
20 present subject of enquiry – planning.

21

22 At first sight ANT stands out – like so many post-structuralist and post-modern
23 planning analyses, incidentally – mainly for its analytical power. In all analyses and
24 case studies, the main focus is on how things have got this way and how they work,
25 not on how we can make them better and under which conditions. On the contrary,
26 the actor-network theorists are very much reluctant and cautious to take any
27 normative, pro-active stance (see for instance the Interlude in Latour 2005, pp. 141-

1 156). Even Callon's multi-step scheme is based on a contemplative, albeit
2 operational analysis of the phases in the cultivation of scallops, and finishes at step 4
3 (mobilisation of allies), without providing further concrete detail in subsequent steps
4 about the implementation. For a proactive skill and science such as planning, this is
5 an insuperable shortcoming. Because the point here is not just to survey and analyse
6 plans, but also to facilitate or ensure improvements, execute and implement them,
7 which then in turn, incidentally, changes the composition of affected actors and their
8 networks. The actors, networks and their actions - i.e. the stake- and shareholders,
9 their specific (institutional) organisations, and the featured planning strategies - form
10 an essential, indispensable triple classification for planning (Wissink 2007).

11

12 Secondly – and partly related to the first point – it is difficult to assign a comparable
13 proactive value within planning to non-human and/or non-living entities as to
14 conscious, possibly negotiating human subjects. Of course the climate or
15 environment, the landscape and specific planning concepts, likewise functions such
16 as housing, cars, stations, the available budget, materials, instruments etc., are
17 significant *f*actors of importance. And it is correct that they should be involved in
18 spatial actor-network associations at a far earlier stage. But in actual negotiations or
19 the proactive formation of specific associations, they tend to be involved in a
20 mediated form, via their representatives. The environment or the climate, the existing
21 cultural heritage, available budget does not actually sit at the negotiating planning
22 tables or on the planning forums itself. At best, the representatives and spokesmen
23 of the environmental movement or those troubled by 'an inconvenient truth', cultural
24 deprivation, wasted money etc. bring in their interests. In ANT terminology, these
25 things or non-human entities can therefore rather be proactively classified as
26 intermediaries (who convey meaning without doing anything about it) or preferably as
27 mediators (who convey meaning, but at the same time change, add or adjust
28 something) (Latour 2005). Proactively, however, they can scarcely be regarded as

1 leading actors, only as mediated **f**actors of importance.

2

3 Thirdly, even in ANT, democratic legitimacy is still not a point of concern. It is true
4 that Callons fourth step is aimed at broadening support for the planned actor-network
5 association, or for ensuring sufficient communication about the planned action with
6 the public, but how this ought to be guaranteed and how the specific actor-network
7 associations can be embedded in a broader setting, ANT does not say in so many
8 words. Yet this too is crucial for planning, because even the smallest, most marginal
9 actions of planners often involve surprising and unexpected effects and interests.

10 Likewise, planning should – in view of its long-term orientation – keep sight of the
11 interests of those who are not yet born and those who cannot be addressed. Actor-
12 networks ‘in the blind’, these are called, mainly consisting of what Latour
13 characterises as ‘*the background plasma, namely that which is not yet formatted, not*
14 *yet measured, not yet socialized and not yet engaged in metrological chains*’ (Latour
15 2005), as well as that which is still *in statu nascendi*. Probably that’s why Louis
16 Albrechts, amongst others, calls for permanent ‘*performance monitoring and quality*
17 *care*’ (Albrechts 2003, cited in Hillier 2007 p. 307). Although his Structure Plan of
18 Flanders view is – whilst consumer and stakeholder sensitive – still highly
19 government-focused, inside-out also.

20

21 **New practical and theoretical impulses**

22 In any case, partly in reference to these more or less theoretical reflections and partly
23 in a somewhat incremental, learn-as-you-go manner, the following seven-step
24 operational working scheme has been developed in the course of theorizing practice
25 or practicing theories. After the planning issue has been formulated or the problem
26 has appeared (in ANT terms the so-called perplexity or problematization phase) this
27 seven step scheme may receive its own interpretation and elaboration for each case

1 (postmodern), but has nonetheless already demonstrated its effectiveness for a
2 variety of themes and planning issues, with varying success (modern):

3
4 *1. Interpreting the problem by determining the focal actors and unique core values*

5 The first step consists of a) the identification of the primary problem- or stake-
6 holder(s) and b) an analysis and joint determination of a region's, an issue's or an
7 entity's unique core features. The last ones we can call the focal factors of
8 importance. This step is fundamental, as planning issues are still sometimes
9 formulated without clear focal (f)actors; not only in the public, but especially in the
10 business and civic society. Moreover, these unique core values and their
11 incorporation by these actors – not least on the basis of self-interest – will have
12 the effect of imparting meaning to the whole of the subsequent planning process.
13 Should such unique core values or focal actor(s) not be present (not only in the
14 public, but mainly in the business and civic society), then in a relative sense and
15 in ANT terms, the controversy and the planning issue are non-existent. However,
16 we do not rule out the possibility that in a specific case, with a view to possible
17 future stakeholders, the government may still decide to approach the issue as an
18 exclusively matter for government attention. But in view of the requirement for
19 broad sustainability described earlier, it should only be considered in last
20 instance, after other options have proved unworkable.

21
22 *2. Actor identification and actor analysis*

23 After the unique core values and any controversies about them have been
24 settled and (civic/business/public) focal actors have internalised them, the next
25 step is the identification of other possible leading actors (actants) who feel
26 connected or contented with these core values, or who see new chances and
27 possibilities for themselves. They may be actants who live, spend time or work
28 within the locality, or who seem to have some fundamental involvement with the

1 issue in question. However, actants who view the planning issue from a distance,
2 or indeed far stretched, may also be involved. The only criterion here is, if those
3 actants are able and willing to act like a leading actor, in accordance with the
4 definition given earlier. This is consistent with the view that actor-network
5 associations and hence the actor-relational-approach cut across the different
6 scale levels, sectors and institutionalised fields of expertise. Innovation often
7 emerges precisely from these crossovers. Moreover, identification occurs on the
8 basis of a careful analysis of the internal motives, objectives and drives of the
9 actants concerned. All kinds of resources may be used for this analysis, including
10 ethnographical or anthropological studies, economic surveys based on annual
11 reports and historic development, socio-cultural studies of past behaviour, etc.,
12 where necessary supplemented with bilateral talks.

13

14 3. *Opportunity maps and developmental possibilities*

15 The third step consists of compiling opportunity maps and/or developmental
16 possibilities on the basis of the analysed internal motives and drives of the
17 identified focal and other actants, with a view to the conservation, reinforcement
18 or harnessing of the unique core values of the issue or region concerned. In
19 principle, we suggest that all available urban development and planning
20 instruments should be used here: preliminary research and analysis, rough draft,
21 elaboration of detail and plan proposals, cost/benefit analyses, appropriate
22 regulations and jurisprudence, attractive designs, 3-D models, photo
23 manipulation, films etc. The only criterion is that instead of the tracing surveys in
24 step 1, these need to be pro-active, future oriented proposals, enticing and
25 convincing, to secure the commitment of the identified actants. It is here, then,
26 that the professionalism of the urban development experts and planners will really
27 need to come into play. As well as extending their expertise, which is often
28 confined to a few sets of instruments, they will also need to become proficient in

1 communication skills. Often, these opportunity maps are therefore created in a
2 team setting.

3

4 *4. Bilateral talks and round tables*

5 The next step is then to discuss the opportunity maps compiled in this way in
6 bilateral, trilateral and small round table discussions involving, something
7 between 5 and 15 people. In principle, this is where the focal and other actants
8 first come face to face. The objective is to see how far the compiled opportunity
9 map, illustrating the course of development, meets expectations, and whether a
10 willingness to invest (and to distribute roles in this respect) can be achieved. This
11 is the first real test of the process, because the actual amount of interest is often
12 revealed from this indication of willingness to invest. Investment is interpreted
13 here in a broad sense; money, expertise, manpower, the promotion of
14 commitment etc. (with reference to the stakeholders in the business, civic and
15 public society). However, extensive talks often bring to light a distinction between
16 so-called pullers and pushers. Pullers take the initiative and are often more active
17 and enthusiastic about elaborating an opportunity map further in accordance with
18 their own and surrounding viewpoints (according tot the identification of leading
19 actors), whereas pushers, partly in view of their status and/or orientation, take a
20 somewhat more passive, more facilitating and/or more 'wait and see' approach.
21 Even so, the actor-network-association, which could be established over here, is
22 the basis for the rest of the process. Where necessary, the opportunity map is
23 adapted accordingly.

24

25 *5. Business cases and pilots*

26 Step 4 was about a first possibility of developing new opportunities, which
27 may be endorsed, but still need to be proved in reality. To this end, step five is the
28 proof of the pudding; the associated opportunity map is put into concrete form in

1 one or more business cases, respectively pilots for specific project components.
2 This is the second real test of the process, as the ultimate division of roles is now
3 determined far more concretely. Where necessary a contract sets out what each
4 actant is prepared to invest and when, and/or where and to what extent the
5 backing of representative constituencies is guaranteed. Each actant will undergo
6 his/her own internal weighing-up and decision-making process in this regard. But
7 it is precisely here that the project's make or break point lies. If there is failure at
8 this point, it will be hard to come back to discussing the identified core values
9 again in a hurry, but if there is success it often turns out that there are further
10 implications and even spin-offs in other areas. This means that the project may
11 have far broader effects and associations than originally expected.

12

13 6. *Regime development and general plan outlines*

14 If the previous step has led to a range of successful and promising cases, the
15 next question is whether it is possible to achieve project-transcending spatial
16 added value that corresponds to the unique core values of the issue or region in
17 question. We use the term 'regime' for this concept, referring to the broader and
18 durable planning networks described in Fainsteins urban regime theories.
19 Whether this is initiated by the original focal actor, or another dominant
20 stakeholder, consideration is given to the reinforcing potentials of the separate
21 cases, or the mutual inducement of some form of mutual project-transcending
22 planning strategy. This must primarily be done with a view to enhance the value
23 of the cases and projects as such. It amounts to the old planners holism, but not
24 for its own sake or on the basis of an absolute concept of space, but on the basis
25 of the cases and the related actor-network associations. If the focal actor or other
26 public-private actants succeed here, the foundations are laid for a new,
27 sustainable spatial regime, ready to adapt to changing circumstances. Expressed
28 even more strongly, the spatial reality is again redefined and the unique core

1 values from the relevant region re-confirmed, re-strengthened or re-developed.

2

3 7. *Democratic anchoring in special district*

4 As a final step it is then necessary to see how far this new spatial
5 development regime can be anchored in associative democracies. Partly in
6 reference to an adaptive and improved model of the special district planning in
7 the USA², the focus here is not on elaborating a generic representative
8 democracy. In accordance to Hirst, Cohen and others, this step focuses on
9 parallel made-to-measure democratic organisations to which the affected
10 households, businesses and institutions can affiliate of their own free will.

11 Because they will benefit from it by doing so. These organisations can also raise
12 financial resources themselves and/or demand membership fees, set public rules,
13 formulate a programme for a specific project and appoint an authority, which
14 could be held accountable for its achievements and revenues at periodic
15 intervals. It is regarded not as an alternative but as a supplement to the current
16 centrally organised institutions and representative democracy. Here however,
17 many spatial questions are left to voluntary democratic organisations; more so
18 than is currently the case, especially in the Netherlands. From the political
19 viewpoint, this fits more closely with the ambition of the current National Report
20 on Spatial Planning: *'do what has to be done centrally, but leave what could be
21 done decentralised'* (VROM 2004-2006)

22

23 The key difference vis-à-vis a run-of-the-mill government taskforce or the cooperative
24 public-private-ventures critiqued earlier, is that it focuses itself from the beginning
25 outside-in, instead of inside-out. It starts not from a governmental viewpoint about
26 planning, nor the need for a periodic renewal of existing plans. On the contrary, it
27 starts from a problematization ventured by stake- and shareholders in the business
28 and/or civic society themselves. Moreover space (and its proactive facilitator:

1 planning) is here not considered as a container, but as an assemblage, which
2 emerges step by step in relation between actors and factors of importance. Next to
3 that – and instead of the discursive or pure actor-network approach – it starts with
4 leading actors, defined as those actors with the capacity and incentive to invest in
5 their local environment, and therefore being embedded in the interest of other
6 networks and institutions, out of pure self-interest. I will explain this in more detail in
7 the case below. Because, especially those planning interventions seem to be most
8 successful and/or durable, which are able to facilitate an intensive coinciding of the
9 leading actor interests of the involved business, civic and public society in innovative
10 cross-overs, embedded in unique local features. These interventions could be the
11 basis for democratic self-organizing associations in sustainable regimes (in broad
12 economic, ecologic, spatial, social etc. terms) and special districts of self-
13 organization around specific themes and proposals.

14

15 **The case ‘Hillside Delights’ South-Limburg (2004-2008)³**

16

17 *Problematization*

18 Since 2004 these evolving ideas about an actor-relational-approach have been in
19 some ways constituted by and been structuring for a specific planning puzzle in
20 South Limburg. It is the only region in the south of the Netherlands, which has hills
21 over 300 meters above sea level (see figure 1). Therefore, from the early start of
22 tourism in the post-war area, this region became a major vacation area for the Dutch.
23 After the end of coal mining in the early seventies, it became even one of the main
24 economic sectors of South Limburg. Its 20,000 laborers nowadays contribute to
25 nearly 10% of the total employment of the region and almost to 20% of the gross
26 regional product (Province of South Limburg 2008). Moreover it has a major social
27 impact, because the sector is embedded in the social structure through its human-

1 scale, hospitable and small-family structure. However, since the nineties, especially
2 after the advent of Low Cost Carriers, the market of South Limburg for domestic and
3 foreign tourism dropped dramatically. At the same time, as a result of the diminishing
4 subsidies of the EU-government, the small-scale farming in the area went through
5 hard times as well. It evoked a process of economies of scale in both the agricultural,
6 and the tourist sector, accompanied by a degradation of the rural and urban
7 environment and the regional quality of leisure. In turn, this resulted in a further
8 decline in tourist stays. A continuing negative spiral was established. That was the
9 reason for businesses, main stakeholders in the Limburg civic society and protectors
10 of the environment and cultural heritage to act together and consider how this
11 negative spiral could be redirected in an upward direction again. It was facilitated by
12 the Limburg Development and Investment Company (NV Industry LIOF), backed up
13 by the EU program *TouriSME*, who granted the contract to a consortium of planners,
14 leisure experts and two affiliated universities to develop a sustainable new markets
15 perspective, in order to give a new boost to both an economic development in the
16 area, as to the preservation of the landscape and cultural heritage. This was
17 managed according to the actor-relational approach described before.

18

19 *Actants-identification*

20 In accordance with that program, the consortium started its work in an effort to
21 determine the unique selling points of the region. Various (map and field) surveys
22 were carried out to discover that the region, in comparison to its surroundings, could
23 be characterized by large concentrations of therapists and wellness facilities, high-
24 quality restaurants, beautiful square-farms and well situated castles, with an
25 extensive catholic religious heritage, residual watermills and extensive hike and bike
26 trails and a fine tourist car network. These more or less urban and/or cultural
27 highlights are bountiful flanked with not only the present hills and gentle stream
28 valleys, but also beautiful wooded slopes, with fruit trees, gardens and ‘hollow roads’

1 in an imaginative small-scale setting. One of the researchers even claimed that 'if
2 Walt Disney would have had to invent a landscape of his own, South Limburg would
3 have been it.' Next to that an overall analysis and referential study was developed to
4 discover potential new markets for the area in applicability and momentum, to
5 stimulate a combination of embedded market value and local qualities. These
6 combination of the different themes resulted in some preliminary sketches of possible
7 opportunities: *Magnificent Gardens* (Retail with and around Castle Gardens), *Linked*
8 *Fields* (informative WIFI facilitated by the extensive catholic heritage network),
9 *Healing Hills* (care & cure with leisure), *Elementary Heritage* (New energy with
10 Industrial Heritage), *Taste cooperative* (Agri-leisure and Slow Food) and *Style Traffic*
11 (New, sustainable leisure mobility, see figure 2). On this basis, potential leading
12 actors were identified, according to an additional analysis of their year reports,
13 ambitions and motives. These concerned potential investors from both inside as
14 outside the area, and - in line with previous definitions - actors from the business and
15 from the civic society, which could be interested in investing in these local
16 surroundings in broad terms and by pure self-interest. By motivated reasons (to
17 prevent traditional planning situations en dependencies) the regular actors within the
18 public society were for the moment passed by.

19

20 *Bilateral talks, Opportunity Maps and Round Tables*

21 Subsequently, various bilateral talks were organized with the identified, potentially
22 interested leading actors; investors, project developers, tourist entrepreneurs, other
23 businessman, retailers, agrarians, representatives of interest groups etc. It resulted in
24 the conclusion that some of the proposals lacked sufficient support (eg. *Magnificent*
25 *Gardens*, *Linked Fields*, *Elementary Heritage* and *Style Traffic*), others were
26 embraced and expanded (eg. *Healing Hills* and *Taste Cooperative*), while other
27 issues were even added by the interviewees, enthusiastically stimulated by the
28 initiative; such as *Wellness in Luxury* (wellness facilities extended with sport, multi-

1 media and health food) and *Glorious Life* (integrated pension communities preserving
2 cultural heritage and beautiful landscapes, figure 3). Opportunity maps were created
3 for each of these embraced themes, referring to both the distinct, unique selling
4 points of the region, and the possible new and sustainable features of the future.
5 They were discussed in five round tables with the identified and potentially leading
6 actors on each of those themes. Especially the theme *Healing Hills* (a crossover
7 between health care, leisure and landscape) and *Taste Cooperation* (a crossover
8 between the agricultural sector, agri-leisure, gourmet restaurants and retail) came to
9 the fore as key issues involving a large readiness for a comprehensive and
10 sustainable investment. At that time (spring 2005) the consortium presented its first
11 report of the results and recommendations, for a full LIOF meeting of circa 50
12 stakeholders in the business and civic society, including those of the public society
13 for the first time.

14

15 *Business cases and pilots*

16 The report and presentations received enthusiastic support. Especially because the
17 proposals were specific, (partly) derived from the ambitions of the leading actors
18 themselves, put in a new and creative setting of innovative crossovers, which
19 promised mutual value adding in both an economic, tourist, social, as spatial and
20 ecologic perspective. Already during the meeting, involved stakeholders agreed to
21 elaborate the most promising opportunity charts in real business cases.

22 The first concerned a proposal for recovering-holidays as part of the theme *Healing*
23 *Hills* (figure 4). The intention was to move patients after surgery as soon as possible
24 to one of the hotels in the local area to recover under daily supervision of hospital
25 nurses (and doctors at distance). In this way the hospital would profit, because it
26 could decimate its waiting lists, as well as offer an attractive care & cure program for
27 patients from outside the region. It is cheaper for the health insurance company,
28 since a hotel bed is less expensive than a hospital bed. And at last, it is lucrative for

1 the innkeeper, because hotel occupancy is also guaranteed off-season. One agreed
2 that part of the surplus profit should be used for improvements in the surrounding
3 countryside. At present several three-star-packages (free for patient and partner) and
4 one five-star-package (free for patients, with an additional payment of partner) are
5 offered by a coalition of Orbis Medical Service Provider, Camille Oostwegel Chateau
6 Hotels, Heuvelland Hotels and several health insurance companies.

7 The second business case concerned the delivery of a highbrow daily fresh-food-
8 market in the inner city of Maastricht, with particular focus on the sale and promotion
9 of the regional agricultural production. The market should also give a boost to
10 regulate the entire chain from production, via distribution and retail to consumer more
11 efficiently. At the same time, the fresh-food-market should also serve as a kind of
12 front-office for the related agrarians, who, in addition to their farming, want to offer
13 new attractions with regard to regional cooking, dining and residence. This was
14 combined with the periodically tasting event *Fine Food Fair*, with a presentation of
15 the star-cooks in and around the region. It offered a new (economic) perspective for
16 the preservation of the small-scale agricultural production in the region.

17

18 *Regional regime*

19 The two pilots and especially the resulting boost in the area were so catchy that it
20 also led to many new cases on issues such as *Wellness in Luxury* (including a Spa
21 Boulevard Valkenburg), *Glorious Life* (including, for example, the development of
22 integrated care communities in the western mining region of the area) and even a
23 restoration of the initial ideas on a region-wide wireless network: *Linked Fields*
24 (including the project *My Limburg*). It resulted in a comprehensive network of,
25 whether or not interconnected, projects and stakeholders (see figure 3). From here
26 on, the leading actors themselves - linked in the so-called *Zwarte Ruiteroverleg*
27 (*Black Horseriders Talk*, named after the cafe where they periodically met) – felt the
28 need to develop and promote the various projects in a more jointly profile. Upon

1 request, this was partly also facilitated by the aforementioned consortium. Moreover,
2 in order to gain greater support and a more sustainable regime alliance, the
3 operation was directly linked to the more industrial, high tech and educational
4 innovations, facilitated by the provincial innovation agenda in the area; like for
5 instance *Life Tech A2* (including r&d alliances between Philips, Medtronic, University
6 Maastricht et al), *Chema-Energy Valley* (including new alliances between DSM,
7 Solland, Sabic et al) and Health Valley Campus (including the cooperation of the
8 cardiology departments of the University Medical Centers of Maastricht and Aachen).
9 It resulted in a broad image of the region, with respect to

- 10 a) life tech innovation and production,
- 11 b) quality gastronomy and leisure,
- 12 c) a caring and healing living environment,
- 13 d) of small-scale european character:

14 In sum *High Life Hills* (figure 5).

15 That commitment has by now been transformed into a broad regional private-public
16 branding project, which includes at this moment approximately 40 stakeholders from
17 the business and civic society and 20 from the public society, with actual participating
18 investments (see www.maastrichtregion.com).

19

20 *Associating in special districts*

21 Last but not least, some elements of that regime are being anchored and
22 institutionalized within the Limburg society in a more innovative way. Here one can
23 refer to the impact of the integrated care project, which is now being elaborated by
24 the Orbis Medical Care Concern in cooperation with alternating partners. The original
25 objective is to offer attractive alternatives for the current migration of elderly people to
26 Mediterranean countries. Orbis opts for various markets: rich and middleclass, health
27 care or health guaranteed settings, in a social more open urban context or in a more
28 rural, familiar social setting. To compensate the disadvantages of the cold climate in

1 northwest Europe, extra attention is given to high quality (care and other) services,
2 integrated in a high quality historical and cultural landscape setting. The aim is to
3 actually invest in the development and/or preservation of that environment. To that
4 end, next to the completely renewed Orbis Medical Park, six integrated care projects
5 for corresponding six markets, are now being developed in an intensive coalition
6 between Orbis, other (care) providers, investors, developers, housing corporations,
7 leisure retailers, landscape and culture foundations (see figure 6). The goal is an
8 Integrated Care Community (ICC), in which involved habitants no longer give their
9 contribution to health insurance companies, but directly to Orbis and the related
10 health care providers. In turn, they provide adequate and specific care & cure.

11 Avoiding too much overhead, some savings can be made, which are then used to
12 realize extra services, such as gardening, repairing, crèche, after-school services,
13 food and mail delivery services, free taxi or car-sharing services etc. The ICC's would
14 then also attract younger and double income families, while they would profit from a
15 stress-free living environment. In this way gated or single-issue communities are
16 being avoided. On the other hand, with the direct premium payment of care services,
17 one opts to a greater accountability and democratic involvement of the residents in
18 the quality, size and type of the services delivered. As a result it promotes not only a
19 greater alignment of supply and demand, but also a better bonding of the residents,
20 with hopefully ongoing voluntary work and self-organization on the long run. In fact, a
21 new kind of special care district would than be institutionalized.

22

23 **Conclusions: the long road out of planning paradise**

24

25 Dutch 'planning paradise' is a pain in the neck. Although international scholars pay
26 tribute to Dutch planning, seemingly embodying a kind of successful version of a
27 highly regulatory, prescriptive, coordinating and visionary planning system, it has

1 always appeared to me more of a burden than a pleasure. Because Dutch planning
2 is mostly a highly regulatory and prescriptive operation, resulting in syrupy planning
3 processes, very costly, inflexible and inefficient, even suppressing all new and
4 creative initiatives, that do not fit within the framework set before. Nevertheless, due
5 to its visionary, abstract promises, it still remains very attractive for main parts of the
6 discipline and social-democratic politicians too. Even now some advocate a return to
7 the strong dirigiste government policy from before the eighties (Geuze et al. 2003),
8 while others stress the direction-setting position of the planners through 'telling the
9 right stories' (Hemel 2004/2007) or emphasise the importance – correct in itself, but
10 not exclusively so – of strict planning rules and spatial legislation (Needham 2005). In
11 this respect Dutch planning suffers in my view from a kind of 'law of the inhibitory
12 lead', while time and again we are redirected to the old, social democratic way of
13 doing things by massive, sometimes institutionalised or even opportunistic
14 (architectural) powers. But on the other hand the socially more committed and
15 engaged planners need to take the blame too. Because the post-modern, neo-liberal
16 and/or post-structural alternatives developed since the nineties were very good at
17 theorizing and undermining the foundations of that old planning system, but were
18 less effective at promoting new practical solutions. This 'paradox' seems to be not
19 only a Dutch problem, but also an important international topic as well. Because,
20 especially in Anglo-Saxon countries the behavioural, relational and poststructural
21 views on planning have been popular, while at the same the developed practical
22 proposals are hardly convincing; with new urbanism and smart growth ideas being
23 very disappointing (especially in respect to long term planning and sustainability).
24 Most of these practical planning proposals are highly government driven or at least
25 government oriented, inside out, and therefore in one way or another stating to know
26 what's good for the people and how businesses should act.

27

1 Not pretending to have found the only and best answer, we have taken a more
2 facilitating, instead of steering or discursive planning role in the Limburg case;
3 supporting, promoting, or attracting associations between stake- and shareholders,
4 with a sensible incorporation of the discursive criticisms which are in themselves
5 justified (Weinrich 1987, Imbroscio 1998, Davies 2002). Despite still numerous
6 imperfections, this first round of actor-relational-planning looks promising for the
7 reinvention of spatial planning. Indeed ARA is still highly fragile. While the other ARA-
8 impulses mentioned before are at their best only half way, the urban regime
9 association in the Limburg case is still exclusively focused on region branding, not on
10 preserving a holistic, interactive view on the various business cases. At the same
11 time, the recent financial crisis have also led to a more prudent attitude of the Orbis
12 Medical Care Concern, with regard to the further development of the integrated care
13 communities. Next to that the actor-relational experiments still have to cope with lock-
14 in reactions of existing public spatial planning institutions, a continuous clear
15 mismatch between the different sectors and departments of government and the re-
16 instalment of numerous state-regulations, which put its relationship with the
17 stakeholders of the business and civic society again in a kind of dependent, subsidy
18 driven association.

19

20 Nevertheless the actor-relational-approach is making itself also felt in a more
21 weighted, actor-relational way. Because the first attempts to develop an effective,
22 coordinating and associative planning are broadly recognised as new innovative and
23 possible sustainable crossovers. They bypass in an up-to-date version, the recurrent
24 nostalgic call for more visionary viewpoints, regulations and plans that should work,
25 given that those things are simply no longer possible in this age of ongoing
26 globalisation, individualisation and borderless re-collectivisation in numerous specific
27 social-economic interests. At this moment they can also rely on a broad theoretical
28 and scientific basis in the area of relational planning and actor-network associations,

1 which has mainly been developed mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries. Practicing these
2 theories and theorizing the forthcoming behavioural practices, could give those
3 relational views a new operational translation too. Finally, they offer a sensible basis
4 for a more locally and regionally embedded form of sustainable development, in the
5 broad (and the political) sense of the word. The Limburg case shows that it could be
6 possible to arrange a sustainable economic, social, ecologic, cultural etc. regime of
7 various stakeholders in the business, civic and public society. But what is needed
8 now is to stimulate more cases, extensive evaluations, and the organisation of better
9 institutional and associative frameworks in which the actor-network-coalitions in statu
10 nascendi could prosper. Associative democracies, paralleled to an adaptive system
11 of representational democracy, seem to be the focal course over here. And as such,
12 next to ongoing theorizing practices and practiced theories, we need to refocus
13 ourselves with regard to the basic planning orientation and instruments:
14 reassembling planning outside-in.

1 **References**

2

3 **Adorno, Theodor & Horkheimer, Max (1947)** *Die Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Amsterdam: Querido
4 Verlag.

5 **Alterman, R. (1997)** The Challenge of Farmland Preservation: Lessons from a Six Nation
6 Comparison, *Journal of the American Planning Association* 63, 220-243.

7 **Amin, Ash & Thrift, Nigel (2002)** *Cities: Reimagining the urban*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

8 **Boelens, Luuk (1990)** *Stedebouw en planologie - een onvoltooid project: naar een communicatieve*
9 *benadering van de ruimtelijke planning en ontwerppraktijk*, Delft: Delft University Press.

10 **Boelens, Luuk (1993)** *De patroonloosheid van de Randstad: Het probleem van de gespleten*
11 *werelden*, in: Agricola, ed et al. (Eds.): *Archipolis – over de grenzen van de architectuur*; Delft:
12 Eburon.

13 **Boelens, Luuk (Ed.) (2000)** *Nederland Netwerkenland: Een inventarisatie van de nieuwe condities*
14 *van planologie en stedebouw*, Rotterdam: NAI.

15 **Boelens, Luuk (2006)** Beyond the plan: Towards a new kind of planning, *DISP* 4, 25-40.

16 **Boelens, Luuk & Spit, Tejo & Wissink, Bart (Eds.) (2006)** *Planning zonder overheid*, Rotterdam:
17 O10.

18 **Bohigas, Oriol et al. (1991)** *Barcelona – City and Architecture 1980-1992*, New York: Rizzoli.

19 **Bolan, Richard (1999)** *The Dutch Retreat of the Welfare State and its implications for metropolitan*
20 *planning*, Amsterdam: AME.

21 **Bolte, Wouter & Meijer, Johan (1981)** *Van Berlage tot Bijlmer: Architectuur en stedelijke politiek*,
22 Nijmegen: SUN.

23 **Bos, Bram (2004)** *Een kwestie van beheersing: over de rol van planten, dieren en mensen in*
24 *technologische systemen*; phd-thesis Amsterdam: VU.

25 **Boschma, Ron & Frenken, Koen (2006)** Why is Economic Geography not an Evolutionary Science,
26 in: *Journal of Economic Geography*, Vol 6 no.3, 273-302.

27 **Bijker, Wiebe (1995)** *Of bicycles, bakelites and bulbs: Towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change*,
28 MA: MIT press.

29 **Callon, Michel (1986)** *Some elements in a sociology of translation*, in: Law, John (ed.): *Power, Action,*
30 *Belief*, London: Routledge en Kegan Paul.

31 **Callon, Michel (1995)** Agency and the hybrid collectif; *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 94/2, 481-507.

32 **Callon, Michel & Latour, Bruno (1981)** *Unscrewing the big Levithian*; in: Knorr, K & Cicourel A.:
33 *Advantages in Social Theory*, New York: Routledge pp. 277-303.

- 1 **Callon, Michel & Law, John (1997)** After the individual in society; in: *Canadian Journal of Sociology*
2 22, pp 505-522.
- 3 **Cammen van der, Hans (1986)** De moderne ruimtelijke planning: een situatieschets, in: *Stedebouw*
4 *en Volkshuisvesting* 12.
- 5 **Cammen, van der, Hans (2006)** *Gebiedsontwikkeling: kansen en condities voor maatschappelijke*
6 *meerwaarde*, Den Haag: NIROV.
- 7 **Cerfontaine, Gerlach (2006)** *Governance in de Randstad: oratie*, Utrecht: Utrecht University.
- 8 **Cohen J. & Rogers, J. (1992)** Secondary associations and democratic governance, in: *Politics and*
9 *Society* 20/4, 393-472.
- 10 **Coleman, James S. (1990)** *Foundations of Social Theory*, Berkeley: Harvard University.
- 11 **Davies, J.S. (2002)** Urban regime theory: a normative empirical critique, in: *Journal of Urban Affairs*
12 24, 1-17.
- 13 **De Klerk, Len (1998)** *Particuliere plannen*, Rotterdam: NAI Uitgevers.
- 14 **Dieleman, F.M. & Priemus, H. & D. Clapham (1999)** Current Developments in Social Housing
15 Management, Introduction to Special Issue, in: *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built*
16 *Environment*, vol. 15 211-223..
- 17 **Drewe, Paul (1997)** *In search of new spatial concept inspired by information technology*, Delft: DUP.
- 18 **Dryzek, John (1990)** *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science*, Cambridge:
19 University Press.
- 20 **Faludi, Andreas & Van der Valk, Arnold (1994)** *Rule and Order: Dutch Planning Doctrine in the*
21 *Twentieth Century*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publications.
- 22 **Fainstein, Susan S. & Fainstein, Norman I. (1986)** *Regime Strategies Communal Resistance, and*
23 *Economic Forces*, in: Fainstein S. et al. (Eds.) (1986) *Restructuring the City: The political economy*
24 *of Urban Redevelopment*, 245-282.
- 25 **Feyerabend, Paul (1975)** *Against Method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge*, London:
26 Humanities Press.
- 27 **Frieling, D.H. et al. (eds.) (1987)** *Nederland Nu als Ontwerp*, Den Haag: SDU.
- 28 **Foucault, Michel (1968)** *L'archeologie du savoir*, Paris: Editions de Minuit.
- 29 **Foucault, Michel (1975)** *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la Prison*, Paris: Gallimard.
- 30 **Geuze, Adriaan et al. (2003)** Crisis, richtingloze planologie; in: *Stedebouw en Ruimtelijke Ordening* 2.
- 31 **Giddens, Anthony (1984)** *The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration*,
32 Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 33 **Giddens, Anthony (1998)** *The third Way: The renewal of social democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

- 1 **Graham, Stephen & Healey, Patsy (1999)** Relational concepts of space and place, in: *European*
2 *Planning Studies* 7/5 623-646.
- 3 **Hagendijk, Rob (1996)** *Wetenschap, constructivisme en cultuur*, Amsterdam: Luna Negra.
- 4 **Hajer, Maarten & Sijmons, Dirk & Feddes, Fred (2006)** *Een plan dat werkt*, Rotterdam: NAI.
- 5 **Hall, Peter (1997)** The Future of the Metropolis and its Forms, in: *Regional Studies* 31, 211-220.
- 6 **Healey, Patsy (1997)** *Collaborative planning: Shaping places in a fragmented society*, New York:
7 Macmillan.
- 8 **Healey, Patsy (2007)** *Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a relational planning for our*
9 *times*, Oxford: Routledge.
- 10 **Hemel, Zef (2004)** *De Creatieve Stad*, Den Haag: VROM.
- 11 **Hemel, Zef (2007)** Happiland, in: *Stedebouw en Ruimtelijke Ordening* 4.
- 12 **Hillier Jean (2007)** *Stretching beyond the horizon: A multiplanar Theory of Spatial Planning and*
13 *Governance*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- 14 **Hirst, Paul (1994)** *The Associative Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 15 **Hirst, Paul & Bader Veit (eds.) (2001)** *Associative Democracy: The real third way*, London, Frank
16 Cass.
- 17 **HNS (1998)** *Landschap*, Amsterdam: Architectura & Natura Pers.
- 18 **Imbroscio, David (1998)** Reformulating Urban Regime Theory; in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20, 233-
19 248.
- 20 **Innes, Judith (1995)** *Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative action and interactive*
21 *practice*; *Journal of Planning Education & Research* 14, 140-143.
- 22 **Janssen-Jansen, Leonie (2004)** *Regio's uitgedaagd: Growth management ter inspiratie voor nieuwe*
23 *paden van pro-actieve ruimtelijke planning*, phd-thesis, Utrecht: Universiteit van Utrecht.
- 24 **Jong de, Arie (1985)** Planologie: Een toekomst met minder pretenties; in: *Stedebouw en*
25 *Volkshuisvesting* 4.
- 26 **Kreukels, Ton (1985)** Planning als spiegel van de westerse samenleving; in: *Beleid en Maatschappij*
27 12.
- 28 **Kreukels, Ton & van Vliet M. (2001)** *Een verruimd perspectief*, Gouda: Habiforum.
- 29 **Kuijpers, Crhis (2007)** Een volle agenda voor de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling van Nederland; in:
30 *Stedebouw en Ruimtelijke Ordening* 5.
- 31 **Langen, P.W. de & Nijdam, M.H. (2003)** *Leader firms in de Nederlandse Martitieme cluster: Theorie*
32 *en praktijk*, Delft: Delft University Press.
- 33 **Latour, Bruno (1993)** *We have never been modern*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University
34 Press.

- 1 **Latour, Bruno (1997)** *On actor network theory*; Paper to the actor network and after conference,
2 Keele, Staffordshire: Keele University.
- 3 **Latour, Bruno (2005)** *Reassembling the social*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 4 **Latour, Bruno et al. (eds.) (2006)** *Making Things Public*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- 5 **Lauria, Mickey et al. (eds.) (1997)** *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating urban politics in*
6 *a global economy*; London: Sage.
- 7 **Law, John (1986)** On power and its tactics; in: *Sociological review* 34 1-34.
- 8 **Law, John (2004)** *After method: Mess in social science research*, Oxford: Routledge.
- 9 **Little Hoover Commision (2000)** *Special Districts: Relics of the Past or Resources for the Future?*
10 Sacramento: State of California.
- 11 **Logan, John & Molotch, Harvey (1987)** *Urban Fortunes - The Political Economy of Place*, Berkeley:
12 University of California Press.
- 13 **Lyotard, Francois (1979)** *La condition post-moderne*, Paris: Editions de Minuit.
- 14 **Pierre, Jon et al. (Eds.) (2000)** *Debating Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 15 **Purcell, Mark (2008)** *Recapturing Democracy: Neoliberalization and the struggle for alternative Urban*
16 *Futures*, New York/London: Routledge.
- 17 **Massey, Doreen et al. (eds.) (1999)** *Human Geography today*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 18 **McLuhan, Marshall (1964)** *Understanding the media: The extensions of man*, MA: MIT.
- 19 **Mommaas, Hans & Boelens, Luuk (2005)** *De nieuwe markten benadering in het Heuvelland*, in:
20 Aarts, Noelle & During, Roel & Van der Jagt, Pat (eds.) (2005) *Land te Koop*, Wageningen:
21 Universiteit en Researchcentrum
- 22 **Mommaas, Hans (2006)** *Duurzaamheid biedt Brabant nieuwe kansen*, Tilburg: TELOS.
- 23 **Mossbeger Karin en Stoker, Garry (2001)** The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The challenge of
24 conceptualization, in: *Urban Affairs Review* 36, 810-835.
- 25 **Mori, H. (1998)** *Land, Conversion at the Urban Fringe*, in: *Urban Studies* 9 1541-1558.
- 26 **Murdoch, Jonathan (1997)** Towards a geography of heterogeneous associations, in: *Progress in*
27 *Human Geography* 21, 321-337.
- 28 **Murdoch, Jonathan (2006)** *Post-structuralist geography*, London: Sage.
- 29 **Needham, Barry (2005)** *Planning, Laws and Economics: The rules we make for using land*, New
30 York: Routledge.
- 31 **Pool, M.S. & DeSanctis, G. (1990)** Understanding the use of group decision support systems – the
32 theory of adaptive structuration, in: J. Fulk and C.W. Steinfield (eds) (1990) *Organizations and*
33 *communication Technology*, Newbury: Sage.

- 1 **Province of South Limburg (2008)** *Toeristische Trendrapportage Limburg 2007-2008*, Maastricht:
2 Kenniscentrum Toerisme & Recreatie.
- 3 **Rast, Joel (2001)** Manufacturing industrial decline - the politics of economic change in Chicago 1955-
4 1998, in: *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23 175-190.
- 5 **RPB (2005)** *Nieuwbouw in beweging*, Den Haag: SDU.
- 6 **Sartori, Giovanni (1991)** *Social science concept: Systematic analyses*, Beverly Hills: Sage
7 Publications.
- 8 **Schmidt-Eichstaedt, G. (1999)** Baulandbereitstellung nach dem niederländischen Modell, in:
9 *Grundstückmarkt und Grundstückswert 2*.
- 10 **Secchi, Bernardo (1984)** *Il racconto urbanistico: La politica della casa e del territorio in Italia*, Torino:
11 Einaudi.
- 12 **Secchi, Bernardo & Viganò, Paola (2007)** *Antwerpen Ontwerpen: Strategisch Ruimtelijk*
13 *Structuurplan*, Antwerpen: Dienst Stadsontwikkeling.
- 14 **Sellers, Jeffrey (2002)** The Nation State and urban regime building, in: *Urban Affairs Review* 37 611-
15 642.
- 16 **Smutney, G. (1998)** Legislative support for growth management in the Rocky Mountains; in: *Journal*
17 *of the American Associations* 64/3- 311-323.
- 18 **Stoker, Garry & Orr M. (1994)** Urban regimes and leadership in Detroit, in: *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 1
19 48-73.
- 20 **Spit, T.J.M. (1995)** De ambities van het ruimtelijk planningstelsel, in: *Bestuurswetenschappen* 5 314-
21 324.
- 22 **Stein, Jay (1993)** *Growth management: The planning challenge of the nineties*, London: Age.
- 23 **Stone, Clarence (1989)** *Regime politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988*, Lawrence: The University
24 press of Kansas.
- 25 **Swyngedouw, Eric (2004)** *Glocalisations*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- 26 **Taverne, Ed (1989)** Sleutelen aan een draaiende motor: Bernardo Secchi's plan voor Siena, Een
27 vraaggesprek met Bernardo Secchi, *Archis* 12 pp. 15-27.
- 28 **Teisman, Geert (2005)** *Publiek Management tussen chaos en orde*, Den Haag: Academic Service.
- 29 **Thrift, Nigel & Crang, Mike (eds.) (2000)** *Thinking Space*, London: Routledge.
- 30 **Vrom (1993)** Vierde Nota Extra, Den Haag: Ministerie Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
31 Milieubeheer.
- 32 **Vrom (2000-2001)** Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening, Den Haag: Ministerie Volkshuisvesting,
33 Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer.

- 1 **Vrom (2004-2006)** Nota Ruimte, Den Haag: Ministerie Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
2 Milieubeheer.
- 3 **Yeung, Henry Wai-chung (2005)** Rethinking relational economic geography, in: *Transactions of the*
4 *Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol.30-1 37-51.
- 5 **Weeber, Carel et al. (2007)** *Bouwmeesters*: Het podium aan een generatie, Rotterdam: NAI.
- 6 **Wienrich, H. (1987)** System, Diskurs und die Diktatur des Sitzfleisches; in: *Merkur* 8 .
- 7 **Whatmore, C. (2002)** *Hybrid Geographies*, London: Sage.
- 8 **Wiegand, J.C. (1997)** Highlights of the 1999 Land Use Institute; in: *Environmental and Urban Issues*
9 24/3 9-34
- 10 **Wigmans, Gerrit (1982)** *Het stedelijk plan*; Staat, stad en stedelijke planning, Delft: Delft University
11 Press.
- 12 **WRR (1998)** *Ruimtelijke Ontwikkelingspolitiek*, Den Haag: SDU.
- 13

1 **Figures**

2

3 Figure 1: Overall view of South Limburg

4 Figure 2: Interaction between new markets, usp's and possible themes for Suth Limburg

5 Figure 3: Alliances South Limburg, spring 2007

6 Figure 4: Image Healing Hills

7 Figure 5: Image Mutual Regional Regime South Limburg

8 Figure 6: Overview Integrated Care Communities Western Mine Region South Limburg

9

¹ See also: http://project.vrom.nl/lijstweergave.asp?code_prgm=4

² Special Districts are bottom-up organizations formed to fulfill a specific need or service for the benefit of those involved. They are already nearly two centuries an important part of the American planning system. Although special districts are mostly characterized by a large direct involvement of the citizens, over the years also several malfunctions have run into the system. Sometimes there is a real accumulation of overlapping districts, sometimes a lack of oversight and duplication of functions. Therefore, in the USA one increasingly opts for a better integration of the special district system in that of the representative democracy (Little Hoover Commission 2000). In the Netherlands, however, this problem is not apparent. While here one starts of from a state-controlled, sometimes even over-regulated system, which could be very precise and selective to decide which parts of government could be better organized in special districts.

³ (see also:

[http://www.urbanunlimited.nl/uu/downloads.nsf/10/67ECA4A232D65D26C1256FBE006ECE40/\\$file/english+light.pdf](http://www.urbanunlimited.nl/uu/downloads.nsf/10/67ECA4A232D65D26C1256FBE006ECE40/$file/english+light.pdf))