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**TIME'S CYCLE AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:
THE CASE FOR CONTINUITY IN A TIME OF CHANGE**

David Jablonsky

June 1, 1995

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FOREWORD

Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Dr. David Jablonsky, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Army War College, posits that the current challenge is to understand the role of both change and continuity in the dual aftermath of the end of the Cold War and a great military victory in the Persian Gulf War. The seeming end to the threat posed by the East-West confrontation of the past fifty years notwithstanding, the international community still looks to the United States, the world's only superpower, for leadership. But, argues Dr. Jablonsky, the U.S. military is caught between having to trim its size and force structure on the one hand, while preparing for a plethora of nontraditional missions on the other.

Dr. Jablonsky makes the case that despite the vastly changed world order, basic principles of international relations still apply, and the United States would be ill-served by abandoning those principles. The current U.S. national security strategy and its derivative national military strategy are, indeed, products of change and continuity resulting from the dynamics established in inter-state relations over the past fifty years as well as by the end of the Cold War. For whatever else may have changed, national security remains the primary duty of the nation-state and the responsibility for achieving that mission still belongs to the military.

Change is always unsettling and subject to controversy. The Army is well served during this period of change by a vigorous and informed debate concerning the direction and dynamics of change. To that end, the Strategic Studies Institute presents Dr. Jablonsky's views for your consideration.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“What do we do now?” is the incredulous question posed by Robert Redford as senator elect at the victory celebration in the movie, *The Candidate*. It is a question still germane for the United States 6 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 3 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Historically, the answer has been slow in coming in times of great change. In the first 100 years of the American nation’s existence, the confluence of geographic insularity and the primitive state of war technology contributed to free security. But what was simply fortuitous in this state of affairs came to be perceived as permanent, and when conditions changed at the beginning of the 20th century, policies did not. Instead, nearly half of this century passed before the American people recognized the nature of global developments and the need to become engaged in dealing with them.¹

The challenge today is to understand the role of change and continuity in looking to the future in the wake of a great victory. The correct answer to this challenge can prevent the United States from spending half of the next century trying to create an effective strategy for a changing world. In particular, it is important to distinguish between those aspects of the Cold War that were anomalies capable of distorting future perceptions, and those that should be retained. “We need to make sure, as we put the Cold War behind us,” John Lewis Gaddis points out in this regard, “that we do not also jettison those principles and procedures that allowed it to evolve into the longest period of great-power rivalry without war in the modern era. If a long peace was in fact the offspring of the Cold War, then the last thing we should want to do, in tossing the parent onto the ash heap of history, is to toss the child as well.”²

Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle.

Stephen Jay Gould in his geological studies of what he calls “deep time” refers to both “Time’s Arrow” and “Time’s Cycle” as ways to look at historical events. Time’s Arrow treats history as “an irreversible sequence of unrepeatable events. Each moment occupies its own distinct position in a temporal series, and all moments considered in proper sequence, tell a story of linked events moving in a direction.”³ This is the principal metaphor of biblical history. From God’s creation of the world to the dispatch of His Son to a particular place to die for man and rise again, that history is Time’s Arrow. In the afterglow of the Cold War victory, more than one analyst applied this metaphor to the triumphant victory of western democracy as proof that history had come to an end. That obituary, as Michael Howard concludes, is premature.

The failure of rival creeds does not mean that our own is bound to succeed, only that it has been given another chance. Both fascism and

communism emerged in Europe because liberal democracy failed to live up to its expectations. If we fail again, we may expect new and similar challenges, both in our own continent and throughout the world.⁴

With Time's Cycle, on the other hand, fundamental states are "always present and never changing. Apparent motions are parts of repeating realities of the future."⁵ Thus, Thucydides could write that given human nature, past events "will at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."⁶ And over two millennia later, Arnold Toynbee was struck by the same metaphor even as he examined the Greek historian's account of the Peloponnesian War.

The general war of 1914 overtook me expounding Thucydides to Balliol undergraduates . . . and then suddenly my understanding was illuminated. The experience that we were having in our world now had been experienced by Thucydides in his world already. I was rereading him now with a new perception—perceiving meanings in his words, and feelings behind his phrases, to which I had been insensible until I, in my turn, had run into that historical crisis that had inspired him to write his work. Thucydides, it now appeared, had been over this ground before. He and his generation had been ahead of me and mine in the stage of historical experience that we had respectively reached; in fact, his present had been my future. But this made nonsense of the chronological notation which registered my world as "modern" and Thucydides' world as "ancient." Whatever chronology might say, Thucydides' world and my world had now proved to be philosophically contemporary.⁷

From this cyclic perspective in the current transition period, international politics freed from Cold War constraints will return to earlier post-war patterns. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, for instance, there was a decade of social misery and disruption with order on the continent only maintained by the police of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. And after 1918, only the false light of the Locarno era illuminated the wretched and confusing darkness of the interwar years. In a similar manner after the crusade of World War II, there was renewed disillusionment and despair as the Soviet threat began to emerge.⁸ More recently, like the other post-war periods of the early 1920s and mid-1940s, there have been wholesale changes in governments around the globe. In the United States, the recent overturn of the Democratic majority that had run Congress for 40 years was reminiscent of the 1946 Republican landslide. In Italy, the Christian Democrats that had ruled since World War II were voted out of power, as were the Japanese Liberal Democrats for the first time since 1955. At the same time, the French Socialists were also eliminated in parliamentary elections; and in Canada, the ruling Tories suffered such a decisive defeat that they no longer even rank as an official parliamentary party.⁹

Both Time's Arrow and Time's Cycle are present in the current preoccupation

with chaos as the defining concept of the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, the spread of global instability and environmental decay in the developing world is perceived as the result of a series of unique events in this century concerning global interdependence and transnational forces.¹⁰ The resultant anarchy, like the events preceding it, is considered unique in the arrow of linked historical events and constitutes, in Robert Kaplan's estimation, "*the* national security issue of the early twenty-first century."¹¹ At the same time, Time's Arrow is also perceived as moving the developed world out of the zone of military risk, by making war between modernized, western nations "subrationally unthinkable."¹² On the other hand, there is the broad cyclic perception that the spread of chaos will eventually undermine the nation-state system, returning the world to a pre-Westphalian, anarchical medieval paradigm of international relations.¹³ Whatever the perception, the concept has caught on. Last fall, the U.S. Institute of Peace sponsored a heavily attended conference on "Managing Chaos" that featured speakers ranging from Henry Kissinger to Les Aspin and Ted Koppel. And Brian Atwood, the head of the Agency for International Development, recently argued that "disintegrating societies and failed states . . . have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability" and constitute a "strategic threat."¹⁴

The Fox and the Hedgehog.

The Greek poet Archilochus observed that "the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."¹⁵ The "many things" in the current transition period are the strategic fads and fashionable theories that tend to overwhelm the cumulative understanding of history, making it difficult for the strategist to distinguish the ephemeral from the persisting and structural. The focus on global chaos and anarchy in the developing world is an example. To elevate this to the highest level of primary national security concern ignores larger, more fundamental threats, while assuming much too prematurely the declining importance of great powers and nation states. "In fact," Jeremy Rosner points out,

while many ethnic, environmental and other humanitarian problems do cross borders, it is nation states, with their armies, governments, laws and legitimacy that are—and will remain—the dominant force in world affairs. And from the Balkans to the Mideast to Asia, the greatest threat to peace remains the ambitions of nation states and leaders who are hostile to democracy and norms of international behavior.¹⁶

The strategist, therefore, must remain the hedgehog, focused on one big thing: the response to the danger of unbalanced power as the central organizing structure in an anarchical, self-help, state-centric world. Seen in this light, the current transition in international politics can take on the appearance of an interwar or even a pre-war period. This is not to succumb to either cynicism or pessimism. It is simply to acknowledge that this century in Time's Cycle has produced three major balance of power wars, two hot,

one cold. Certainly, there is nothing in this current period to suggest the obviation of what Colin Gray calls the golden rule in world politics: “bad times return.”

The possible fact that one might peer into the future from the vantage point of today and find no threats of major substance, is quite beside the point. One can occasionally look upward and see only blue sky. Few would draw far-reaching conclusions from that empirically unchallengeable observation of the moment. Certainly, one would not give away all of one’s bad weather clothing.¹⁷

The strategist, then, is like the doctor, who while acknowledging the multidimensional aspects of human behavior, chooses in effect to focus on one big single, overarching vision as the governing mechanism that rests on a firm understanding of professional essentials. For a strategist, a miscalculation concerning the essence of his profession, the relationship of ends and means, can prove politically or physically lethal for entire communities. This does not mean that there is not more in collective life than pure political or military security, just as physical health is not all there is to individual health. Nevertheless, both the strategist and the doctor remain hedgehogs who maintain that the core of their professional focus must be treated well enough if everything else is not to remain of secondary interest.¹⁸

In other words, first things first. The primary concern of American strategic hedgehogs is the survival of the United States with its fundamental values and political institutions intact. But two other core national interests have traditionally been involved: economic prosperity and promotion of values. The purpose of this report is to examine how well U.S. strategists will be able to maintain the focus on “one big thing,” while dealing with other complex national security problems resulting from the interaction of all three core national interests. The vehicles for the examination are two key unclassified U.S. documents: the President’s national security strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s derivative national military strategy. Together, these documents deal with the primary national security issues facing the United States in the post-Cold War era: the role of America in the world, and the priority of effort and use of force necessary for that role if the United States is to continue to achieve its three core national interests. The basis for the examination is the assumption that the future will be marked somewhere between the poles of Time’s Arrow and Time’s Cycle by change and continuity with the past. It is not, as Gary Wills notes, an easy position to find or to maintain.

Insofar as we steer rationally toward the future, we do so by our rear-view mirror. There is no windshield because there is nothing to “see” up ahead. We go forward by seeing backward. By tracing the trajectory of past events we extrapolate to future positions. But if we trace only one trend, the chances of steering well are slim; too many other things will jostle and interact with the simple arc we are imagining. That is why so many simple

reforms or five-year plans or platform pledges are bound to go away, even with the best of wiles. The best guides to the future are those whose knowledge of the past is broadest and deepest, who are most cautious and aware of complexity, least confident that they can “see” something up ahead.¹⁹

CHAPTER 2

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY—THE ISSUES

Core national interests, described by Lord Palmerston in 1848 as the “eternal” and ultimate justification for national policy, can be divided into three categories: physical security, economic prosperity, and promotion of values.²⁰ Physical security refers to the protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact. This category dominated U.S. focus for most of the Cold War, with containment of the Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass as the justification for the buildup of forces and institutions that came to make up the national security state. In terms of the second category of prosperity during that same period, the United States was economically supreme in the world as demonstrated in such Bretton Wood institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and in the global dominance of the dollar for much of the time. Finally, foreign policy for Americans must also reflect the third category of values for which they believe the United States stands. The promotion of these values in the Cold War was captured in the crusade of anti-Communism, which in turn was enhanced by its linkage to the geostrategic goal of containment. “I believe,” President Truman declared in the March 1947 doctrine named for him, “that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation . . . to work out their own destinies in their own way.”²¹

Prior to the Cold War, the strategies that served these core interests ranged from the global to the insular. The drive for physical security in terms of the former strategy was marked by the concepts of both balance of power and to a lesser extent, collective security, throughout much of U.S. history. The Founding Fathers, for instance, protected and expanded the independence of the new country by statecraft based on balance of power. And although that concept was considered at times as immoral and unstable, both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt considered it a vital enough matter to lead the United States into two World Wars, primarily oriented toward preventing a single Eurasian hegemon from emerging with a concomitant capability to wage war on the continental United States. In a similar manner, Wilson’s concept of collective security was part of a long tradition of anti-war schemes ranging from the American Peace Society in the 1820s to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Moreover, that concept in one sense was nothing more than an attempt to regulate the balance on a global basis by a community of power.²²

The other extreme concerning national physical security was isolationism, which simply meant a refusal to make commitments in advance that might detract from American freedom of action. This approach was popular throughout much U.S. history because it worked. It was a realistic strategy when there were few foreign threats and the nation was preoccupied with domestic developments. The problem was that in the

modern age domestic pressures continued to sustain the dangerous illusion that the concept was still viable. “What gave isolationism a bad name was not that it failed to provide security to the country for over a century,” Terry Deibel observes, “but that Americans failed to abandon it when the conditions required for its success disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century.”²³

The dichotomy between the global and inward looking strategies was also evident in the search for economic prosperity. The global focus was inherent in the underlying philosophical belief in free trade and economic opportunities for all states that was present throughout most of American history. In the beginning, the newly independent United States was a minor nation excluded from the mercantilist schemes of the major powers with no hope of establishing such a system. And in the 19th century, the U.S. Open Door policy in the Far East reflected a belief in free and equal access to regional markets for all nations. This concern with equality of economic opportunity also spilled over to security concerns. Thus, while balance of power remained an underlying cause of American involvement in conflicts with European powers, the wars of 1812 and 1917 also involved maintaining the U.S. right as a neutral to trade with any and all belligerents in the conflicts. On the other hand, high tariffs and protectionism represented the historical inward-looking strategies that generally provided continuity from the Civil War until discredited by the Great Depression, when free trade once again became orthodox American policy.²⁴

In a similar manner, for much of its history the United States promoted its values by example, the oldest form of “city upon a hill” projection. The change from this inward-oriented “great exemplar” strategy began with U.S. involvement in foreign wars, when it became apparent that idealism was a necessary ingredient to sustain public support. Whether it was Wilson in 1917 citing the need to make the world safe for democracy or FDR’s reformist terms in the Atlantic Charter, American presidents have long avoided using balance of power as the primary rationale for force. In more recent times as the Cold War drew to an end, the promotion of human rights and democracy reemerged separately from anticommunism. President Carter began the process with an emphasis on human rights that eventually succumbed to compromises on containment-oriented security issues ranging from South Korea to the Philippines. President Reagan subsequently changed the focus of value projection from the protection of individuals against state power to the promotion of an American style of government and economics. By 1990, as Communist regimes crumbled everywhere, Secretary of State Baker could recommend that the basis for U.S. diplomacy should be the global “promotion and consolidation of democracy.”²⁵

This connection of values and security is once again a reminder that all three core national interests form an enduring basis for analysis of the key national security issues facing the United States in the current transition period. The first issue concerning the role of America in the world, for instance, is inextricably tied to the development of

strategies for maintaining the physical security of this country. These strategies in turn will depend upon those developed to achieve the other core interests, economic prosperity and promotion of American values. This type of complex interaction will also determine the outcome of the other two principal post-Cold War security issues involving the use of national interests as a basis for the establishment of priorities and the concomitant use of military force.

The Global Role of the United States.

In the immediate wake of the Cold War, there was a refocus on ideology as a prime determinant of the role of the United States in a world without apparent overriding threats. Once again the opposite poles of isolationism and Wilsonian internationalism appeared as alternatives that split the liberal and conservative camps in American politics. Liberal internationalists concerned with human rights joined forces with so-called neo-conservatives in an “updated Wilsonianism” focused on the global advancement of democracy. At the same time, other liberals acting in the McGovernite tradition of “Come Home America” took the side of the conservative isolationists much as Norman Thomas and Robert Taft had in the 1930s.²⁶

Soon, however, the question of America’s role in the world returned to the traditional connection between the core economic and security interests. “We are a trading nation,” Secretary of Defense Cheney stated in 1992, “and our prosperity is linked to peace and stability in the world Simply stated, the worldwide market that we’re part of cannot thrive where regional violence, instability, and aggression put it at peril.”²⁷ The economic imperative fed into national concerns with possible emerging post-Cold War threats to the physical security of the United States. That same year, the Pentagon’s draft Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-1999 was leaked to the press. Among the conclusions of that document was that outside the former Soviet Union,

there are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic arms and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests²⁸

The ensuing debate over this so-called strategy of preponderance or primacy has touched upon all core interests of the United States. On the one hand there are those who see power as less fungible in an era of decreased security concerns, with the United States moving quickly to rough equilibrium among states in a multipolar world.²⁹ That state of

affairs is as unacceptable to the “unipolarists” as the displacement of the United States as the only superpower.³⁰ Somewhere between these two poles are those like Christopher Layne who see as the only answer for the United States a return to 19th century *Realpolitik*, in which core security interests must ultimately dominate those concerned with values and economics. “To avoid frightening others,” he concludes in this regard, “the United States should eschew a value-projection policy and moderate both its rhetoric and its ambitions.”³¹ And because instability will always be perceived as having dangerous implications for American prosperity in an economically interdependent world, there is a potential open-endedness to this connection in an international environment in which instability is the norm. It is a linkage in Time’s Cycle captured by Lord Roseberry at the height of British power in the 19th century.

Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars.³²

But it is in the ultimate tie to the core interest of physical security that most realist criticism of any American primacy is oriented. In a structurally realist, self-help system of international politics, the argument goes, each state is principally concerned with national survival. Even a so-called “benign” hegemon in such a world will create a perspective that will invite balancing, as did Great Britain in the Victorian and Edwardian eras. “It has sometimes seemed to me,” Lord Sanderson advised the British Foreign Office in 1907, “that to a foreigner . . . the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.”³³ In such a context, the critics of U.S. primacy point out, to expect in the future that states like Germany and Japan will remain under an American-led security and economic system is to make the unlikely assumption that rather than balance against U.S. hegemony, states will continue to bandwagon with the remaining superpower.

This is the paradoxical core of the realist critique. The harder the United States seeks to retain its primacy, the greater the incentive for other states to seek to become great powers. And the longer the United States acts as a hegemon, the more it weakens itself in relative power to the emerging great powers as the cost of sustaining preeminence begins to chip away at its economic strength and hence its economic and military capabilities. “[I]n international politics,” Kenneth Waltz concludes on this point, “winning leads to losing.”³⁴

The implications of this critique are clearcut. In an environment in which it will inevitably move from the “geopolitical interlude” of unipolarity to multipolarity, the

United States must arrest its relative decline while minimizing provocations for other states to balance against it. America's optimal approach, Christopher Layne concludes,

is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge: not too strong, which would frighten others into balancing against the United States; not too weak, which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities; but just right—strong enough to defend American interests, without provoking others.³⁵

For Layne, this in turn requires a “limited liability” strategy with a posture of “discriminating detachment”—all reminiscent of Britain's earlier maritime-oriented grand strategic role as off-shore balancer and all possible in a post-Cold War era that, Charles Krauthammer concludes, “[w]ith ideology bleached from the system, . . . will resemble the balance of power world of the late nineteenth century.”³⁶ For the United States this strategic independence is a “hedging strategy” that would involve the American military only if other states failed to balance effectively against a would be hegemon on the Eurasian land mass. Otherwise, like Great Britain earlier in Time's Cycle, an insular America with no major threat could use its sea (and air) supremacy to provide logistics, transportation and intelligence assets to allies without direct military involvement.³⁷

The problems with such an indirect approach for the United States are manifold. First of all, it ignores the forces of history that drew Great Britain to a continental strategy in the 20th century. And while there were many reasons to lament this fact, as Liddell Hart has demonstrated, the concern with defection by European allies without a full British continental commitment was certainly real enough. That type of concern still obtains with a limited liability policy that “forces the continental ally—the state most at risk—to assume the primary responsibility for opposing the potential aggressor.”³⁸ For Germany and Japan, such a policy would assuredly prevent their potential emergence, as some have argued, as the first “global civilian powers.”³⁹ At the opposite extreme, as one analyst has postulated concerning Germany and an American withdrawal from Europe, there is the specter of “a heavy handed rogue elephant” driven by “militarization, nuclearization, and chronically insecure policies.”⁴⁰

Second, a global off-shore “balancer” role for the United States is based on the classical 19th century concept of balance of power, a “model for the conduct of international relations,” Michael Howard concludes, “that . . . had simply ceased to work by the beginning of this century, not because of unskillful statecraft, but because the hermetic system in which it had been effective had ceased to exist. The more democratic societies became the less possible it was for the system to survive.”⁴¹ In addition, the off-shore American role with its alternative of imperial overstretch paints a false dichotomy between domestic renewal and global security in the post-Cold War transition period. The economic health of the United States is basically and fundamentally intertwined with international affairs. And that interdependent connection, Robert Art argues, is directly

linked to the continuity of the Cold War security effort in this transition.

It is not economic interdependence that has brought peace among the great powers. Rather, the causal arrow runs the other way: the peace wrought by nuclear deterrence has made economic interdependence possible because it has been rendered safe. If there is little likelihood of large-scale war, then states will be less concerned about the dependencies that economic interdependence creates and less worried about resisting the relative economic disadvantages that open markets produce. When war appears to be obsolete, states do not worry as much about the military advantages that could be derived from economic dependencies and inequalities. With peace assured, relative economic advantages lose their military threat.⁴²

Finally, the off-shore balancer role ignores the fundamental linkage of values to global engagement for the United States. The connection has been enhanced by the communication-information revolution that has empowered the individual and not, as George Orwell feared, the state. “The fax,” in Albert Wohlstetter’s memorable phrase, “shall make you free.”⁴³ All this, in turn, has led in the post-Cold War era not to a disengagement of values from global involvement, but rather to a refocus on the promotion of such values, particularly democracy. The key to this goal can be traced as far back as Immanuel Kant who postulated that liberal governments would seek to avoid wars. Ever since, there have been wide-spread, but failed, scholarly attempts to demonstrate that democracies are not as prone as authoritarian states to go to war. More recently, however, social scientists have recast the Kantian hypothesis to suggest that it is not that democracies don’t indulge in war, but that democracies do not go to war with each other. And although some studies have substantiated this reconceptualization of the original thesis, there is still room, as Michael Howard concludes, for skepticism.

I would like to believe those of my academic colleagues who declare that mature democracies never go to war with one another, but I would not lay any money on it. Democracy is a very elastic term. Democratic institutions are liable to decay and abuse, and electorates can show themselves to be remarkably immature in their political judgement. Even in democracies, economic failure is liable to trigger social disorder, social disorder to trigger internecine violence, and internecine violence to trigger regional if not global instability. There is nothing necessarily permanent about democracies—even for them, even for the U.S. itself, history may have some nasty tricks up its sleeve.⁴⁴

In any event, the current interest in democracy is a reminder that absent the USSR, the United States is the only major power with a set of universal political and economic values that defines its national identity. In such a context, democracy, market capitalism, and a liberal international economic order are inextricably entwined. If the United States

were to convert to particularism and become essentially like other great powers focused exclusively on its own economic and security interests, it would lose its connection to its universal founding values and principles, much the way the Soviet Union did with Marxism - Leninism. The abdication of universalist claims and superpower responsibilities could cause an inwardly focused loss of the overarching convictions that hold the United States together, bringing about instead, as it did in the USSR, a disintegration into particularist ethnic, religious and linguistic parts.⁴⁵

This type of “little England” thinking was summarized by Thomas Macaulay in his 1845 approach to British foreign policy:

I do not say that we ought to prefer the happiness of one particular society to the happiness of mankind; but I say that, by exerting ourselves to promote the happiness of the society with which we are most nearly connected, and with which we are best acquainted, we shall do more to promote the happiness of mankind than by busying ourselves about matters which we do not fully understand, and cannot efficiently control.⁴⁶

This was not an unpopular approach. But it was swept away in Britain’s rush to engage in global competition and empire building in order to retain its status as the world power. At the same time, Britain used its naval might to help suppress the international slave trade—even in violation of existing international law—long after English involvement in that trade had ended. The United States in this context has no more choice than Britain had. With power, as Irving Kristol points out, come other considerations: “A great power is as much responsible for what it does *not* do, yet is in its power to do, as for what it does.”⁴⁷

Ultimately, however, the problem for a limited liability global role for the United States has less to do with theorizing about possible anti-American bandwagoning effects and more with maintaining the positive balance or imbalance of power described in the draft FY 1994-99 Defense Planning Guidance. There is today, of course, an historically remarkable absence of great power contention. In *Time’s Arrow*, however, international politics not only abhors a vacuum, but the diffusion of power as well. And although predictions of even more such diffusion are currently fashionable, when that power is concentrated in the future, only a counter-concentration will balance against it. And in *Time’s Cycle* it will come, for situations involving either impending or actual power maldistribution always return. “There may not be a precisely predictable superpower force (state or coalition) in the United States future of today,” Colin Gray reminds us, “but all of history says that such a force will reappear.”⁴⁸

It is in this context that Paul Bracken has described three types of states that the United States will have to deal with in the future. To begin with, there are what he terms “C” competitors, “militarily ineffectual nations with complex or complicated security problems: ethnic civil war (Yugoslavia), insurgency (Peru), terrorism (Egypt), civil

disorder (Somalia), or infiltrations (narcotic flows).” Secondly, there are “B” competitors, “mid-level developing states with modernized conventional forces (much like Iraq in 1990), with the possibility of Model T nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) forces.” Finally, there is the “terra incognita” of the potential “A” nations, “peer competitors, or major regional competitors with which the United States may have to deal.” Over time, “B” countries may graduate to this level by a combination of training, doctrine, and the availability world-wide of advanced military technologies, to include weapons of mass destruction. In any event, an emergent “A” level state may not have a direct adverse effect on U.S. interests, but like Germany after 1870, might so upset a regional balance as to affect those interests.⁴⁹

It is comforting to think that with the communication-information revolution, it is improbable that an “A” level peer super threat could grow and suddenly emerge. But even Christopher Layne admits the possibility of “the appearance of a ‘careful’ challenger able to cloak its ambitions and ward off external balancing against it”⁵⁰ Moreover, as described in chaos theory, there can be a rapid growth and emergence of nonlinear threats—that is, some change in fundamental conditions that may have later consequences radically disproportionate in their adverse effect. Trend analysis, heavily dependent on Time’s Arrow, has great difficulty in dealing with such nonlinear possibilities. All in all, as Richard Betts points out in terms that apply to any future peer threat for the United States, major discontinuities in international politics are seldom predicted.

Who would not have been derided and dismissed in 1988 for predicting that within a mere three years Eastern Europe would be liberated, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union deposed, and the Union itself on the ash heap of history? Yet it is hard to believe that the probability of equally revolutionary negative developments, of economic crisis and ideological disillusionment with democracy, of scapegoating and instability leading to miscalculation, escalation, and war several years from now is lower than the probability of the current peace seemed several years ago.⁵¹

The security dilemma in such an environment is not that U.S. defense precautions will cause other nations to perceive them as hostile and thus counterbalance; but rather that absent a standing military force sufficient to deal with such surprises, democratic politics will respond with too little, too late to burgeoning security dangers.⁵² Historically in such a situation, as Britain’s interwar “Ten Year Rule” illustrates, there is a tendency to wish away the gap between perceived risks and political action even as those risks grow. “It should be assumed for framing revised estimates,” the “Rule” stipulated, “that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose”⁵³ And although there were compelling international and domestic reasons for the “Rule” when it was adopted in 1919, the automatic annual renewal through 1932 of the assumption that there would be no major war for 10 years left the British ripe for appeasement of the emerging peer threat

in Nazi Germany for the remaining years of the interwar period.⁵⁴ In this, as W. H. Auden captured in 1939, Britain was not alone.

In the nightmare of the dark
All the dogs of Europe bark,
And the living nations wait,
Each sequestered in its hate;

Intellectual disgrace
Stares from every human face,
And the seas of pity lie
Locked and frozen in each eye.

Prioritization and Credibility.

“A small knowledge of human nature will convince us,” George Washington once stated, “that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle.”⁵⁵ At the U.S. Army War College, national interests are presented in this light as the enduring end states by which nations rationally prioritize their efforts both home and abroad. The interests are organized into the core security, economic and value categories and further refined in terms of their intensity: vital, important and peripheral.⁵⁶ The post-Cold War international arena, however, is not a purely rational environment. The United States is in an Indian summer of national security in which there are no major threats to its vital interests or those of its allies. At the same time, the instability on the global “periphery” has not diminished and is now, in fact, embellished for the American public by instantaneous world-wide communications. The result in the current transition is that for a dominant global power like the United States, the dilemma concerning choices between the core and the periphery has proven no easier to solve in terms of rational gauging of national interests than it did in the Cold War when, as John Lewis Gaddis observes, the distant sound of dominoes falling could be just as loud as sabres rattling next door.⁵⁷

Domino theory in some form, of course, was the primary strategic and psychological concept underlying U.S. containment policy throughout the Cold War. President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson initially used the domino linkage of the periphery to the core superpower confrontation in order to win support for the commitments they desired in the Near East and Europe. They then had to face queries from the China lobby and Republicans as to why the logic of dominoes falling did not extend to Asia. As a consequence, Acheson’s preferred Asian defense perimeter, which excluded Korea and Taiwan, became untenable, particularly after the emergence of McCarthyism and the attack on South Korea. “If we let Korea down,” Truman briefed Congress after that attack, “the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece

of Asia after another [I]f we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse [and there is] no telling what would happen in Europe.”⁵⁸

This type of thinking can play a role in a form of rational hedging, in which national decisionmakers in an anarchical world attempt to minimize loss in uncertain situations by hedging against domino-like chain reactions. But the connectivity between interests on the periphery and those of the core can be carried too far; and as Robert Gilpin and Paul Kennedy have documented, the process is not so rational if great powers hedge against unlikely domino contingencies and overcommit to the periphery. Thus, there was 16th century Spain pulled by falling dominoes into the disastrous generation-long conflicts in the Low Countries. In a similar manner, Great Britain was active throughout Africa in the 1880s and 1890s ostensibly to keep the Suez and Cape routes out of hostile hands. This extreme connectivity caused confrontations with Germany and France and brought about a land war against the Boers that was costly in material and psychological resources.⁵⁹

Undifferentiated connectivity, in other words, means undifferentiated interests. In 1937, as an example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed the Japanese Ambassador: “There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country.”⁶⁰ During the Cold War, this tendency toward such extreme connectivity was reinforced by the East-West polarity, providing an eventual linkage of the geographical importance of any country to the security of the United States. “Using Nicaragua as a base,” President Reagan concluded in this regard, “the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there, they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sea lanes, and ultimately move against Mexico.” Even Henry Kissinger succumbed to this tendency in terms of Chile’s Allende regime, initially quipping that “Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica,” but later arguing that the country’s location did impart a special importance.⁶¹

Equally important in the context of connectivity were the psychological aspects of credibility with potential aggressors summed up in Pericles’ classic argument against giving in to demands to withdraw the Megarian decrees at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War: “If you give in, you will immediately be confronted with some greater demand, since they will think that you only gave way on this point through fear.”⁶² Allied to this argument, as George Kennan discovered at the beginning of the Cold War, were the psychological problems of open pluralistic societies in trying to differentiate between vital and other interests. In this context, defeats on the periphery could have demoralizing effects on the public and elites in areas where core or intrinsic interests were involved.⁶³ In addition, there was also the problem of cumulative effects. In 1947, for example, Kennan was concerned that Soviet victories might cause a bandwagon effect in West Europe, not because of any ideological affinity, but from purely pragmatic

motives to join early the movement of the future. And in the fall of 1961, the possibility of this phenomenon was evident in President Kennedy's justification for his increasing commitment to South Vietnam. "There are limits to the number of defeats I can defend in one twelve-month period," he explained. "I've had the Bay of Pigs and pulling out of Laos, and I can't accept a third."⁶⁴

By that time, the domino principle was fully enshrined in the indiscriminate perimeter approach to containment with its assumption of undifferentiated interests and unlimited means.⁶⁵ The expectations of domino dynamics in this approach caused interests to become a function of the threat and as a consequence credibility to become an interest in itself.⁶⁶ In such circumstances, prioritization was impossible. "I don't know where the non-essential areas are," President Kennedy acknowledged in an off-the-record press briefing.⁶⁷ Equally important, the approach left the United States in a strategically reactive mode, since the potential adversary could create a crisis at a time and place of its choosing which the United States, focused on universal credibility, could ignore only at its perceived peril. "Unlike those sociable games it takes two to play," Thomas Schelling once noted, "with chicken it takes two *not* to play. If you are publicly invited to play chicken and say you would rather not, you have just played."⁶⁸

This type of exaggerated linkage in the Cold War blurred the distinction between the intensity of national interests. Nevertheless, connectivity can be an important tool in making such a differentiation. Vital interests from this perspective are those end states in the world that would require very few dominoes to fall in order to affect directly the three categories of core interests. Important interests would require more dominoes; and peripheral interests are those which no matter how many dominoes fall, will not affect the three core categories. All this would still not mitigate the danger of connectivity becoming a function of the threat. If a government begins with a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a threat with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that intensity.⁶⁹ In a similar manner, rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest. Although U.S. administrations sensibly make just such cost-benefit calculations, Robert Blackwill points out that:

these should be analytically independent from judgements about how important to the United States a particular national security interest is. We may choose to defend a peripheral U.S. interest because it is not costly to do so; the interest nevertheless is still peripheral. Or we may choose not to defend vigorously an important—hopefully not vital—U.S. national security interest because we decide it is too expensive in a variety of ways to do so; the interest nevertheless is still important, and we may well pay dearly for our unreadiness to engage.⁷⁰

Prioritization, then, is the ultimate rationale for the use of national interests—the

sine qua non for any clarity and long-term consistency in a nation's foreign policy. To move interest after interest upward into the vital or important degrees of intensity is simply to avoid choice, an unrealistic policy given declining means and the myriad domestic problems facing the nation. This all presupposes, of course, fairly rational environments and processes. But nations, as an example, can miscalculate the relationships between near-term cost and long-term benefits. Thus, there was Neville Chamberlain's perception of the Munich crisis: "If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that."⁷¹ And there was more than a touch of the credibility argument in the rationalization for the recent deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti—all somewhat reminiscent of arguments why Britain had to suppress the Irish rebellion in World War I despite the adverse effect on the war effort: "If you tell your empire in India, Egypt and all over the world that you have not got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination, and the backing to restore order in a country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may as well begin to abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the empire at all."⁷²

In theory, the credibility factor should be drastically mitigated in the post-Cold War world. It is, after all, a world in which high indivisibility in political and economic relations among the advanced states is matched, using any rational standard, by low indivisibility in terms of security issues and conflict on the periphery. As a consequence, the United States should have the luxury of remaining highly selective in terms of involvement in these upheavals, while exerting leadership in the political and economic realms. But as Secretary of State Shultz pointed out in 1985, there are "gray-area challenges" in the world not all connected to vital interests, but where "an accumulation of successful challenges can add up to a major adverse change in the geopolitical balance."⁷³ That cumulative connection has been applied more recently to global stability, the ultimate universal connectivity rationale. If the United States, Stanley Sloan has pointed out, does not

deal with threats to international peace that do not threaten vital U.S. interests, then the international community's ability to respond to such threats could be seriously diminished, unless alternatives to U.S. leadership and resources somehow appearOver time the result could be an increasingly chaotic international system in which countries have little or no faith in the will of the United States to honor its international commitments⁷⁴

But such universal connectivity inherent in the indivisibility of global stability was only possible in the Cold War. Certainly, there is very little evidence in the current environment for the idea that a victory by an aggressive state on the periphery will lead to the belief by that state that there will be a similar lack of challenge if a powerful nation's vital interests are threatened.⁷⁵ Moreover, as cascading dominoes on the periphery have become increasingly less plausible, attention has turned to humanitarian concerns. Even

here, however, end states in a pure value-based sense have proven much harder to achieve without the geo-political tandem of the Cold War. The result in the current transition period is that intervention on the periphery is often debated in terms of varying views of connectivity between national interests and humanitarian concerns.⁷⁶ For example, institutions like Amnesty International generally perceive one connective step between abuses of human rights anywhere in the world and vital U.S. interests, because American values are at stake. While it is easy to dismiss such universal escalation as undermining the rational concept of connectivity and the ability to distinguish interest intensity, there are, as even Edmund Burke could conclude, “obligations written in the heart.”⁷⁷ Humanitarian abuses, for instance, connect more directly with the higher intensity of U.S. interests to the extent the violations become public knowledge, the more they affect large groups of humans over longer periods of time, and the more they disproportionately strike at the most helpless, particularly children.

All that notwithstanding, the road of solitary universalist promotion of values leads everywhere and thus nowhere. The basic fact remains that peace in the post-Cold War era is simply not indivisible, which means that occasional failures to preserve stability in regions of secondary geopolitical importance are tolerable. “There will be some safety in indifference,” Josef Joffe concludes in this regard, “and not every crisis needs to be approached as if it were a wholly owned subsidiary of American diplomacy.”⁷⁸ Promoting regional security because of humanitarian concerns, as UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates on a daily basis, will rarely work and only then if the ways for achieving that security are cost-effective and can be sustained economically and politically on a long-term basis.⁷⁹ That underlying acceptability, as Douglas MacDonald points out, is important.

If cost-effectiveness criteria are not observed in making moral choices, moral outrage will soon dissolve into disillusionment, creating pressure to cut and run, which might leave matters worse than if there had been no intervention. Fighting bloody, inconclusive wars for humanitarian purposes will serve only to undercut support for America’s long-range role as a leading force for world order.⁸⁰

There are choices, in other words, from the days when policymakers became accustomed to viewing even the most obscure conflicts on the periphery as possible expansionist probes carried out by surrogates of the Soviet Union. The challenge in all this is to create a strategy that allows for the promotion of values without initiating an interventionist binge that draws the United States into unnecessary conflicts world wide. That, in turn, means establishing priorities which, as Secretary of Defense Perry indicated in November 1994, means a return to the three categories of national interests that “should dictate where we get involved and the extent of our military involvement.” The first two categories are vital and important interests, the latter more difficult to deal with “because we must weigh the risks against the interests involved and because the threats

are not always clear.” The third category of national interests deals with humanitarian concerns couched specifically in terms of cost-benefits and actions proportional to the real but limited U.S. interests in this category. Bosnia, for example, requires “a level of blood and treasure that is not commensurate with our national interests.” In future humanitarian operations, the United States would use “military *forces*, as opposed to military *force*, to meet a specific need.” Generally, Perry concluded,

the military is not the right tool to meet humanitarian concerns. The U.S. government has established ongoing programs to assist international and non-governmental agencies in providing humanitarian relief. Ordinarily, the Defense Department will not be involved in humanitarian operations because of the need to focus on its war-fighting missions. We field an army, not a Salvation Army.

But under certain conditions the use of our armed forces is appropriate. First, if we face a natural or man-made catastrophe that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies to respond. Second, if the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump start the effort. Third, if the response requires resources unique to the military. And fourth, if there is minimal risk to the lives of American troops. In humanitarian operations, we only use force to protect our troops or members of humanitarian agencies helping us.⁸¹

The Use of Force.

For the United States in the post-Cold War era, multilateralism and unilateralism are not zero sum concepts in the approach to the use of military force. Unilateralism, of course, provides more flexibility of action; but it can also undermine alliance systems and prove costly in blood and treasure. Thus the United States after the Vietnam conflict, like the British after the Boer War, reassessed its outlook on general interventions with the prohibitive list of conditions for such actions in the so-called Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, which at the very least cancelled out, if not overcompensated for the lessons of Munich. In this context, in those rare cases where American vital interests are threatened by regional conflict, unilateral action may prove both necessary and desirable. In fact, if the United States is unwilling to bear the costs of such unilateral intervention, the interest at stake is most probably less than vital.⁸²

The considerations for the multilateral use of force have proven more complex. Desert Storm provided an effective model for coalition building and use of international institutions in major regional conflicts in order to ensure both legitimacy and the sharing of political risks. But the results of that conflict only fed the post-Cold War euphoria concerning the management of power and led to impossibly high expectations in the realm of lesser multilateral operations on the periphery ranging from peacekeeping to

peace enforcement. The result early in the Clinton Administration was a policy that came to be called “assertive multilateralism,” the major rationale of which was to maintain U.S. global involvement at a much reduced cost. The major vehicle was to be a reinvigorated United Nations that would not only provide legitimacy to interventions on the periphery, but would mount such operations with its own resources. All this, it was expected, would constrain unwanted unilateralism by other nations while easing the burden for the United States.⁸³

The reality was somewhat different. To begin with, there was the realization that traditional UN peacekeepers had never been able to create the conditions for their own success and that to establish institutional capabilities in the UN for such endeavors would be an enormous undertaking. At the same time, U.S. forces were increasingly involved in Somalia where humanitarianism was evolving into peace enforcement and nation building, the latter an extreme form of Wilsonianism. The loss of American soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993 renewed an intense debate by the public and Congress. The outcome in May 1994 was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, a set of 17 preconditions for U.S. participation in Security Council votes on peace operations as well as for the actual involvement in such operations—all distinctly reminiscent, with its “stringent conditionality,” of the Weinberger Doctrine. Most of the considerations in the PDD, Stanley Sloan observes, “taken individually, appear reasonable . . . under most circumstances. Taken collectively, however, against the backdrop of the experiences with the use of force in the post-Cold War world and the current priorities of the Administration and Congress, these factors appear so constraining as to be prohibitive of action.”⁸⁴

The restrictive nature of the document, however, is a necessary anodyne for public misunderstanding and disillusionment with a situation in which U.S. leadership can no longer bridge the gap that it did in the Cold War between the national interest and the general interest. That misunderstanding extends to the United Nations where the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations recently stated that with the Clinton plan for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, “the impression has been created that the easiest way to disrupt a peacekeeping operation is to kill Americans.”⁸⁵ The fact is that conflict on the periphery just as it is at the core is controlled by its political objective, and that as Clausewitz long ago observed, “the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*.”⁸⁶ And as was demonstrated in Mogadishu, in the absence of a convincing value for military intervention on the periphery, the cost in terms of casualties will always appear to be prohibitive.⁸⁷

Equally important, PDD 25 demonstrates that unlike the artificial environment of the Cold War, selectivity today does not mean a choice between sometimes and always, but between sometimes and never. This type of selectivity is necessary for the United States if the UN is not to remain the focal point of frustrations and recriminations caused

by assignments beyond its capacity. Already in Congress, restrictive legislation is in train that reflects House Speaker Gingrich's description of the UN as "a totally incompetent instrument any place that matters."⁸⁸ The counter to this impression lies in renewed U.S. leadership selectively implemented under PDD 25, multilaterally when possible, unilaterally when necessary, but always aimed at building consensus around American policy preferences. In this way, multilateralism becomes not so much an alternative to American leadership, as the consequences of that leadership. The fact remains that the international community still looks to the United States for this leadership, a reflection not only of habits formed during the Cold War, but of America's continued position as the only remaining global superpower. As such, the United States has a greater self-interest than any other nation in improving and supporting an institution that does not depend on American intervention alone for the maintenance of global stability.⁸⁹

The theme of selectivity and supranational institutional support is particularly important for a U.S. military stuck squarely on the horns of a dilemma between peace operations and other nontraditional missions on the one side and preparation for larger and longer term threats to vital national interests on the other. It is a dilemma similar to that faced by the British Army and the government in the early 1920s. For the tank advocates at the time, the question was whether Britain would continue to play the traditional role as balancer at the core of British vital interests on the Continent. The alternate, supported by the Colonel Blimps, the British public and the belt tightening government that represented them, was the periphery: the Colonial Service's requirement to place sufficient troops throughout the British Empire, which in turn siphoned off funds from equipment modernization, training and military schooling. The upshot was that Britain did not capitalize on its earlier successes in creating a modern armored force. "External pressure and internal stress," Thomas Donnelly concludes, "eventually converted the Royal Tank Corps from a college of inspired prophets to an inflexible doctrinaire organization."⁹⁰

For critics, such an either/or proposition does not exist for the U.S. military. Many of what are now called non- or less traditional missions, Carl Builder points out, are actually more traditional than those "traditional" ones normally associated with military forces and likely to become even more common in the future. Army engineers, for example, worked on roads throughout much of America's history and built the Panama Canal. And the military has remained the ultimate safety net whether it involved efforts at the 1871 Chicago fire or those concerned with earthquake, flood and other humanitarian relief in the 1990s; or whether it involved the suppression of riots and revolt ranging from Shay's 1786 Rebellion to the 1992 Los Angeles riots. For Builder, however, the case for nontraditional roles ultimately returns to an apocalyptic, Kaplanesque view of the future in which the relative vulnerability of societies measured by their infrastructure dependence plays an increasingly larger role in relative power. The "revolution" of Desert Storm has been supplanted by political, social, cultural and technological sources of change that are reshaping the character of modern warfare.

The pattern of future conflicts may be more evident in the cities of Beirut, Belfast, and Bethlehem than it has been envisaged on the borders of nations divided by the Cold War or, more recently, over the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. While some wars may still be fought with regular forces and traditional means, more and more conflicts have the character of civil wars, insurrections, and riots, and they are exportable through acts of terrorism anywhere in the world.⁹¹

In this environment, the critics contend, the U.S. military has hunkered down, protecting hierarchical structures, and like German officers a half-century before, attempting to reestablish a basis for military professionalism incorporated in the view that war remains the special province of the warrior who can thus rightly claim a distinctive status in society. The revolution in military affairs in such a milieu is nothing more than a reactionary attempt to ignore nuclear and unconventional warfare as well as other factors that shape warfare, while conveying a “techno-chic” image, in A. J. Bacevich’s description, of military institutions “in the midst of continuous transformation, redesigning, restructuring and reorganizing in a hell-bent rush to embrace the future.”⁹² In this light, Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) scenarios are simply attempts to revive an unlikely model of limited war more suited to 18th century politics than an era of changing warfare. “If forces designed and equipped in compliance with the dictates of the future,” Bacevich concludes, “are ill-suited for dealing with civil wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and terror, then they are of limited utility in the world as it exists.”⁹³

All this, particularly that concerned with the low intensity aspects of conflict, is reminiscent of those arguments during the Cold War that caused Robert Komer to define the “likelihood fallacy” as posturing to deal primarily with the most likely contingencies on the conflict spectrum to the detriment of the less likely but most critical ones.⁹⁴ The ultimate result is that by ignoring the most critical contingencies, they become in fact the most likely. Such considerations have direct implications for trade-offs concerning forces configured to protect vital national interests in major regional contingencies. For example, the U.S. Army, primarily configured for these contingencies, has a shortage of mobile light divisions that could be used in urban, jungle or mountain operations. The temptation in such circumstances is to ignore Ambassador Komer’s warning. “Given the increased importance of peacemaking, peacekeeping operations and the *likelihood* of other contingencies to which airborne and air assault forces would be best suited. . .,” one analyst concludes, “it seems that the priority being given to heavy units—the very forces for which Air Forces can most nearly substitute on the margin—may be overdone.”⁹⁵

The tensions between traditional warfighting missions and what the U.S. Army has almost defensively and certainly unfortunately termed Operations Other Than War (OOTW) were summed up by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. “If a soldier reacts like a policeman in a military situation, he’s dead; if he reacts like a soldier in a police

situation, he creates an international incident.”⁹⁶ The key to alleviating some of these tensions is selectivity and some frank acknowledgment of what this means on both sides of the political spectrum. Liberals will have to drop the pretense that the UN as it is presently structured can effectively resolve international disputes. And conservatives will have to recognize that funding of the UN is better than watching, as Karen House points out, “the U.S. military evolve into the Dutch Army.”⁹⁷

Ultimately, selectivity is important because the indiscriminate use of the U.S. military for social welfare is self-defeating. Such use normally places troops in situations where there are no demonstrable vital, much less important national interests. In these circumstances, as we have seen, the American public is unlikely to suffer U.S. casualties for long. The consequent withdrawal of the forces in turn undercuts American credibility abroad, encouraging would-be aggressors. All this will eventually undermine public support even in those situations where vital national interests are at stake, the post-Cold War version of the Komer “likelihood fallacy.”

The result in this transition period is a standoff. “Much as the military may wish it,” Richard Swain concludes, “they will not have the liberty of selecting either an *Armee de Metier*, or forces organized for Operations Other than War. Their world is not going to be that simple and somehow the armed forces must prepare to deal with both categories of the problem.”⁹⁸ Certainly, selective nontraditional missions for the military will be necessary occasionally to counter the cumulative credibility loss that can occur if the United States declines to respond to the “grey area challenges” described by Secretary Shultz. That credibility also plays a role in the preservation of national values. Without it, the most likely alternative is an American public suffused with flickering pictures of suffering populations, increasingly reacting to international horrors with the apathy it currently reserves for the daily news reports of the panoply of murder and mayhem on the streets of U.S. cities. In addition, the skills learned and practiced on nontraditional missions, as a host of field commanders visiting the U.S. Army War College have attested, by no means constitute a wash in terms of warfighting leadership and training. Finally, selective nontraditional missions at home and abroad can provide a relevancy to the American public for the U.S. military that may be lacking, as it often is in Time’s Cycle, before the ultimate emergency of a clear and present A-level danger.

Meanwhile, in the case of potential imbalance of power problems in Eurasia, the United States needs to maintain its high value to others as an ally. At the same time, there is a need to preserve the American ability to conduct timely and decisive responses to selected local and regional problems around the world. And, as we have seen, there is also the need for the deft use of force in precise and limited ways that are short of war. In the current transition period, it is impossible for the United States to purchase insurance against every possible threat. But as Colin Gray indicates, it is possible for the country to invest in forces and technologies that will yield the highest payoff and hedge against the major unpleasant surprises, unlikely by their nature, that will invariably occur.

If the United States maintains a strategic-force posture second to none, a navy able to enforce the right to maritime passage virtually everywhere, the ability to project power from the air on a massive scale and globally, and can project land power on a modest scale but with great agility and precision, little lasting damage can be done to the vital interests of the Republic.⁹⁹

CHAPTER 3

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DOCUMENT

The national security strategy document of the United States is a requirement. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the President to submit an annual national security strategy that discusses as a minimum: vital global U.S. interests and objectives; proposed short and long term use of all elements of national power to achieve U.S. objectives; and the commitments and defense capabilities required to deter aggression and implement the strategy while achieving a balance among all elements of power.¹⁰⁰ Over the years, this strategy has not in general received a good press. One analyst who participated in the creation of the first four documents, considered them to be “pedestrian or worse in conception, preparation and final product.”¹⁰¹ More recently, the Clinton administration’s July 1994 strategy was characterized by a former Army Chief of Staff as something that “the wind came in and blew. . . away. There was nothing to it.”¹⁰² That particular strategy was also dubbed the “En-En Document” for its two principal themes of engagement and enlargement—terms, William Safire concluded, that conjured up “a vision of involved tumescence.”¹⁰³

A major problem for the document is that it does not serve the needs of the White House. It is due in January and thus guaranteed to be overshadowed in effort and effect by the President’s State of the Union Address. That problem illustrates a larger one: the strategy document cannot even begin to approach other means such as speeches and testimonies in terms of influencing Congress and the public. “What President in a fast-paced, media oriented world,” Don Snider points out, “would want to articulate once a year, in a static, written report a detailed statement of his forward-looking strategic vision?”¹⁰⁴ This reluctance is compounded if there is any lack of consensus on grand strategy within an administration, particularly if that administration is not doing well in public opinion polls. “To publish a detailed report of national security strategy now,” one Clinton White House staffer commented, “would just provide chum for the sharks.”¹⁰⁵ The result, by one official’s estimate, was that there were 21 drafts of the Clinton administration’s first national security strategy between early 1993 and the July publication of that document “in the dead of the night.”¹⁰⁶

All that notwithstanding, the national security strategy serves some useful functions for the President. To begin with, it provides a beginning for his dialogue with Congress concerning the administration’s rationale for resources. It also charts a strategic vision useful not only to other nations, but to selected domestic supporters as well. Equally important, the annual process of creating the document serves the internal constituency in the Executive Branch by creating consensus on foreign and defense policies. Nevertheless as Snider concludes, a Presidential strategy report:

can never be more than it really is, a statement of preference from the

executive branch as to current, and perhaps future, grand strategy. Given our government of shared powers, it remains for a constructively adversarial process with the Congress to refine that preferential strategy into one that has any chance of being effective—one around which there can be created domestic political consensus, and thus an allocation of resources effective in creating instruments of national power.¹⁰⁷

Over the years, that consensus has focused on an increasingly more sophisticated report. The 1987 strategy was similar to many of the basic security documents of the Cold War years with its strong emphasis on the military instrument of power.¹⁰⁸ The 1988 report, however, addressed all the elements of national power and tied them into regional strategies while focusing on five core national interests. The 1990 and 1991 documents represented attempts to deal with change: the former with events in the USSR and East Europe; the latter delayed because of the Iraqi crisis, and thus able to introduce the concept of regional conflicts as the organizing focus for the military. The January 1993 report for the Bush administration was a lame duck document that continued the 1991 focus on the deliberate transition from containment to “collective engagement,” while emphasizing the “need to be selective and discriminate in our global undertakings.” At the same time, the document heavily stressed the goal of “democratic peace” and the absolute need for U.S. leadership if that were to be attained.¹⁰⁹

There is thus more than a little continuity between the Bush national security documents and the two reports rendered by the Clinton administration in July 1994 and February 1995. The major difference is the logical distillation in the Clinton documents of core U.S. national interests into three categories: physical security, value projection and economic prosperity—all placed under the overarching strategic concepts of engagement and enlargement. In terms of security, there is no consideration given to historically inward looking pre-Cold War strategies in articulating a substitution for global containment. “While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments.”¹¹⁰ At the same time, in returning to the pre-Cold War global strategy of balance of power, there is also an acknowledgement in the current security document that the residue of U.S. global dominance from that twilight war still casts a *primus inter pares* light on the emerging multipolar variables in the international system. “Our economic and military might, as well as the power of our ideals,” President Clinton notes in the document’s preface, “make America’s diplomats the first among equals.”¹¹¹

In a similar manner, there is a recognition in terms of the core interest of economic prosperity that the protectionism that played a role in some of American history prior to the Cold War is no longer a viable strategy. That recognition also extends to the demise of the economic hegemony the United States enjoyed throughout much of the Cold War. The result in the current security document is the continued emphasis on the earlier global strategic orientation on free trade that dominated much of U.S. history.

This orientation is linked in turn to a more activist projection of U.S. values based on the historical free trade goal of a community of market democracies, rather than a return to the more passive “great exemplar” or “city upon a hill” strategies. “The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”¹¹²

This type of linkage is the essence of the tie between engagement and enlargement in the current national security strategy document. It is a much more difficult relationship to maintain than that of the Cold War when containment and anti-communism flowed together into a protracted Manichaean geopolitical and ideological struggle that provided Americans the rationale liturgized in NSC 68 for global engagement. And yet historically on both sides of the Atlantic, the ideological has proved to be a necessary concomitant to power politics. In the United Kingdom on the eve of World War I, for instance, liberal internationalism was dominant in British public opinion. At the same time, Edward Gray, the liberal foreign minister, was attempting to preserve the balance of power through his alliances with France and Russia. But it was necessary for his efforts to be almost as covert as those of FDR in 1940 since the parliamentary majority he represented abjured as much as Wilson anything associated with the balance of power concept. In the end, the majority support of Britain’s entry into World War I was due not so much to a belief in the preservation of that concept as to the need to vindicate the rule of international law violated by the German invasion of neutral Belgium.¹¹³

In a similar manner, Americans have never taken kindly to the concept of power politics, even when most blatantly engaged in them. Thus, the rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy has been traditionally to deny the requirement for anything so crude, while denouncing the very idea as a European perversion. As a consequence, Michael Howard observes, the policies of American statesmen, “however much they may be guided by a perception of the national interest, must always be made acceptable to an ideologically motivated electorate.”¹¹⁴

This task was taken on in the Clinton administration by Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In September 1993, he emphasized in a major speech that global engagement in the 20th century had never been a sufficient rationale in itself for Americans. “As we fought aggressors and contained communism, our engagement abroad was animated both by calculations of power and by this belief: to the extent democracy and market economies hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential . . .”¹¹⁵ It was this rationale, Lake stressed, that needed to be communicated. Without it, “public support for our engagement likely would wane; and America could be harmed by a rise in protectionism, unwise cuts to our military force structure or readiness. . . and thus the erosion of U.S. influence abroad.”¹¹⁶ By February 1995, Lake’s rationale formed an important basis in the current strategy document for the reconciliation of enlargement with engagement:

The core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most.¹¹⁷

The combination of engagement and enlargement brings together all the elements of national power, a grouping for the current national security strategy that effectively forecloses any choices concerning the role of the United States in world affairs. “First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership,” the introduction to that document emphasizes. “We are not the world’s policeman, but as the world’s premier economic and military power, and with the strengths of our democratic values, the United States is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade.”¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, after two years in office, there is a hard-edged, realistic emphasis on military power underlying the administration’s assertion “that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs—political, military and economic—that affect our well-being so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly.”¹¹⁹ To that end, the security document calls for “robust and flexible military forces” that can operate across the conflict spectrum from operations in MRCs to those focused on peacekeeping. All that notwithstanding, the document makes clear that “the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened.”¹²⁰ In this context, there is no doubt as to the primacy of the MRC capabilities, not only concerning the immediate regional requirements, but in terms of the future emergence of a major A-level peer threat as well.

With programmed enhancements, the forces the Administration is fielding will be sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities on this scale. Obviously, we seek to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere. *More basically, maintaining a ‘two war’ force helps ensure that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than we foresee today.*¹²¹

At the same time, beginning with President Clinton’s preface, there is a pervasive acknowledgment throughout the national security strategy document of resource constraints. “We can and must make the difference through our engagement,” he points out; “but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests”¹²² And those interests now reflect Secretary Perry’s three degrees of intensity as a guide for

prioritization: vital, important and humanitarian. This delineation thus serves as the basis for selective engagement, “being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community.” In all cases, the strategy document concludes, “the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own long-term national interests.”¹²³

Nowhere is that response more clearly and restrictively outlined in the current national security strategy than in the guidelines for the use of military force. All the provisions of the Weinberger Doctrine, for instance, are evident throughout the document with such familiar requirements as “clearly defined, achievable missions” and “reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives” supplemented by the Christopher Doctrine’s emphasis on the need for exit strategies. “These requirements,” President Clinton observes, “are as pertinent for humanitarian and other nontraditional interventions today as they were for previous generations during prolonged world wars.” Nevertheless, in a world of instant communication and even while constantly reassessing the costs and benefits of any operations, he warns that “reflexive calls for withdrawal of our forces when casualties are incurred would simply encourage rogue actors to try to force our departure from areas where there are U.S. interests by attacking American troops.”¹²⁴ To avoid such situations in multilateral requirements in particular, the security document specifically cites the restrictions in PDD 25 while stressing that the United States must make highly disciplined choices concerning when to support or participate in UN peace operations. Improving the way that both decide upon and conduct peace operations, the document observes,

will not make the decision to engage any easier. The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself.¹²⁵

Such lessons are a result of the experiences with long-term continuities coupled with on-the-job training in dealing with the manifold changes of the new era. Those changes offer dangers and opportunities that can only be addressed in the continuity from the Cold War of U.S. active leadership and engagement in global affairs. “We are the world’s greatest power,” President Clinton concludes in this regard, “and we have global interests as well as responsibilities.”¹²⁶ In the current transition, however, the United States also has the flexibility and relative strategic distance to make choices on when and how to get involved, if at all, that it never had, or believed it had, in the Cold War. As a consequence, the current national security strategy of selective engagement in a pluralistic

world provides the United States the most leverage and the best chance to achieve its broad national goals. Those goals are firmly anchored in the continuity of America's three enduring core national interests and can thus have the same synergistic effect they had in much of U.S. history before the anomaly of a bipolar world. It is a synergism captured by the President in his preface to the 1995 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*:

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.¹²⁷

CHAPTER 4

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The *National Military Strategy of the United States* is not a required document. National military strategy is addressed in a classified form by the JCS in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and by the Secretary of Defense in his mandatory, unclassified *Annual Report to The President and Congress*. Nevertheless, in 1989 as the Cold War faded, forces were set in train that generated a perceived need for such a document. To begin with, there was the general public expectation of a peace dividend as the long war in peace came to a close—an expectation clearly understood by the new Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell:

The bottom line is that we can't act in the 1990s as if we had the same consensus of the early 1980s, or as if the geopolitical situation is the same . . . I believe we are going to have to make some hard choices . . . (The American public will) support us, but not at any cost. They don't see that as reasonable under the changed circumstances in the world . . . Remember, the future ain't what it used to be.¹²⁸

In this environment, Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney were only too conscious of the adverse aspects of Time's Cycle in U.S. post-war demobilization patterns and considered, in the Chairman's words, that "the greatest challenge facing us was the controlled build-down of U.S. capabilities . . ." ¹²⁹ That concern had already emerged in the national security review conducted by the Bush administration in the first six months of 1989. A fundamental premise that evolved from the review was that at the regional level, "the distance between a superpower and an aspiring regional hegemon had been greatly foreshortened."¹³⁰ The result was the establishment of a JCS planning group by the Chairman in the fall of 1989. "What will it take," Powell charged the group, "for the United States to remain a superpower after the Cold War is over in terms of U.S. military capabilities, forces and alliance relationships . . . And remember, we must be able to explain our needs to the American people—needs that must be well below today's levels."¹³¹

By December 1989, Powell and Cheney were able to brief the President on the new strategic concepts that had emerged from the planning group and outline the potential "base force" required for implementation. In the new year, the process accelerated under the impetus of disparate but related events. Between March 22 and April 20, 1990, Senator Sam Nunn made four speeches linking the changing global environment to a new military strategy. With this influential entrance into the debate, there was the danger that the administration could lose control of the projected build-down without a persuasive combination of military strategy and force structure. At the same time, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 established high but declining defense

spending levels for three consecutive fiscal years (91-93)—a unique allotment of time in which the President and his civilian and military advisors could plan for the future with a stable environment, sure of the defense appropriations they would receive. By May 1990, Cheney had pulled together the JCS effort with one that had been underway by his staff and was prepared to “influence the coming reallocation of resources by defining the terms of the debate.”¹³² The vehicle was a speech announcing the anticipated 25 per cent reductions in defense expenditures, to be given that summer by President Bush at the Aspen Institute.

The Aspen speech was made as the Gulf War began. Nevertheless, the defense budget continued to decline more or less on schedule even as Desert Shield and Desert Storm unfolded. This gradual slope was due to the concept of the base force coupled with the “Rose Garden” budget agreement, all of which prevented the type of budget and procurement free-fall prevalent in the post-Vietnam build-down. Equally important, the Gulf War quickly validated the basic concepts of the new military strategy as well as the enhanced warfighting capabilities of the CINCs to the public and within the military. After the war, in the new August 1991 national security strategy, the Bush White House officially promulgated an outline of the new defense strategy. The following January, General Powell published the first unclassified national military strategy just in time for FY93 congressional testimony by the Bush administration. The reason for the intentional declassification was “more effective public communications,” and was the last step in effectively ending the era of individual service strategies.¹³³

The January 1992 national military strategy was a slick, well-packaged product that outlined both the ways and means to achieve the controlled build-down of defense capabilities. In his preface, the Chairman tied the document directly to the National Command Authorities as an implementation not only of the defense agenda in the President’s national security strategy, but of the Secretary of Defense’s policies spelled out in the Defense Planning Guidance and in his annual report. At the outset, the military strategy clearly distanced itself from the former focus on the containment of the Soviet threat predicated on a credible nuclear deterrent and a large standing conventional military force, much of which was stationed overseas as part of a “forward defense.” The new focus was regional rather than global, with strategic nuclear deterrence and defense the only holdover from the Cold War strategy. Forward defense was replaced by forward presence, the active and visible engagement of U.S. forces with more limited overseas stationing offset by deployments and exercises—all still designed to reassure Allies and deter potential adversaries. Almost lost in the discussion was the possibility that forward presence forces might be called upon to exercise less traditional operations ranging from combating drugs to humanitarian assistance.¹³⁴

The concept of reconstitution was also introduced as a hedge against uncertainty, designed to “forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily” by providing “a global warfighting capability” based on the fielding of new fighting units and the

activation of the industrial base “on a large scale.”¹³⁵ But the central pillar of the 1992 military strategy was crisis response, the basic rationale for a power projection strategy against the background of unthreatened air and sea lines of communication, but with the possibility of forced entry. To meet the requirements for this and the other concepts, the strategy outlined the composition of the base force, specifically delineating the active and reserve components of all services programmed for forward presence and regional crises. This linkage of the base force and crisis response was already couched in terms that would form the basis for future controversy with the recognition:

that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation. Thus, we cannot reduce forces to a level which would leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.¹³⁶

At the same time, however, the strategy also carefully linked the smaller numbers of the base force with the “urgent domestic needs” of the country. “This military strategy, which places a premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness,” the document concluded, “is designed to be implemented with a significantly reduced defense budget.”¹³⁷

The 1995 National Military Strategy Document.

The newest *National Military Strategy of the United States*, much like the current national security strategy, appeared with very little fanfare and almost no media coverage.¹³⁸ This is unfortunate because the JCS has brought together much of the post-Cold War change and continuity in a sophisticated public relations package designed to inform the public and the media of the continued rationale for the controlled draw-down of U.S. military forces. The answer to the low key introduction of the new national military strategy may lie in the Chairman’s preface, which directly links the document to the defense framework outlined in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) as well as the national security strategy. The BUR, which was released in fall 1993 along with the Clinton 5-year defense program, generated a great deal of controversy at the time with its reassessment of the base force and its limited, controlled reduction of that base as the blueprint for sizing and shaping U.S. general purpose forces. Some critics saw the BUR as the previous administration’s strategy simply stuffed into the Clinton budget constraints; or as former Reagan defense planner Lawrence Korb dubbed it, “Bush-lite.”¹³⁹ And General Powell conceded at the time that “the strategy underpinning [it] is quite similar . . . because the world looks quite similar to us whether you’re wearing base force eyes or Bottom Up Review eyes.”¹⁴⁰

The controversy has somewhat subsided in the ensuing period and is unlikely to reemerge fully in the wake of the subdued introduction of the current national military strategy. One reporter, for instance, ignored the BUR and noted that unlike the 1992

document, the new version does not specify “a precise force structure” and “makes no mention of sizing and shaping the U.S. military according to some notion of a ‘base force,’ which was the Bush Administration’s approach.”¹⁴¹ This misperception also points to another possible reason for the relatively quiet reaction to the strategy: the low-key approach in the document itself to the question of future force structure. Buried back on the seventeenth page of the 20-page strategy, the JCS specifically points out that in the eighth year of a controlled drawdown, the military will continue to be reduced and reshaped in accordance with the BUR. And although the active unit BUR target numbers are mentioned for each service in the narrative, the entire layout is much different from the base force composition table in the 1992 strategy with its stark comparisons to the FY91 force and its direct link to what were termed the Strategic, Pacific, Atlantic and Contingency forces.¹⁴²

Nevertheless, the importance of the continuity in the controlled reduction of forces is pervasive throughout the strategy, reflecting Secretary Perry’s contention the previous fall that without the proper management of the drawdown, there will be no way to determine how to use force or the threat of force in the new environment. “This national military strategy,” the document concludes, “builds on its predecessors and continues the *evolution* from the strategies developed during the Cold War.”¹⁴³ The continuity is clearly evident in one of the two key objectives of the strategy, couched in the old English verb used over four decades earlier in NSC 68: to “thwart” aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities. The key to those capabilities, as first outlined in the BUR and reflected in the President’s national security strategy and the Defense Secretary’s annual report, is “to have forces of sufficient size and capabilities, in concert with regional allies, to defeat potential enemies in major conflicts that may occur nearly simultaneously in two different regions.”¹⁴⁴

Equally important, with reconstitution a dead issue, there is also the marker from the national security strategy, repeated in the current military strategy, of the military need to “hedge against the unknown,” to provide “a hedge against the emergence of a hostile coalition or a more powerful or resurgent adversary.”¹⁴⁵ For critics of such a strategy, there is the time-honored military rationale that “the intentions of other nations can change, sometimes very rapidly, and thus our national military strategy must account for the military capabilities of other nations as well as their current intentions.”¹⁴⁶ More important for these critics, the national military strategy also returns in Time’s Cycle to a wider focus on continuity. “There is ample historical precedent in this century that regional instability in military, economic, and political terms can escalate into global conflict.”¹⁴⁷

Other elements of the “fight and win” component of thwarting aggression are less controversial. The “win the peace” and “win the information war” categories reflect renewed emphasis on post-conflict operations and the leverage of information systems that are emerging from the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). And “clear

objectives—decisive force” reflect the pervasive influence of the Weinberger Doctrine throughout the section dealing with the overarching component of “fight to win.” That component is in marked contrast to the Cold War emphasis in Europe of holding or restoring the East-West border as part of a conventional defense sufficient to supplement the nuclear deterrent. Now with the focus on winning, the strategy’s underlying concept of power projection takes on more importance, since deficiencies in that concept hold out the possibility of *fait accomplis* by regional aggressors, which in turn could require potentially antithetical missions of conducting decisive counter-offensive operations while minimizing casualties. Finally, the “counter weapons of mass destruction” element is curiously flat, emphasizing the strengthening of defensive capabilities, the preparations to operate efficiently in an NBC environment, and the U.S. capability to “dominate any escalation of conflict should weapons of mass destruction be employed against us.”¹⁴⁸ Missing is the active vocabulary used in the national security strategy concerning this subject as well as the heavily implied threat of preemption.

The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, *we will need the capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it.*¹⁴⁹

“Deterrence and conflict prevention” is the second component of the military strategy feeding into the objective of thwarting aggression. The treatment of nuclear deterrence reflects the traditional need, even as the United States pursues reductions under START I and II, to maintain a survivable triad of strategic delivery systems, to include a mix of forward deployed and deployable nonstrategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, the diminishment of the nuclear threat against the continental United States is also acknowledged while “remaining mindful” of the “thousands of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems in the world.”¹⁵⁰ But with the tangential exceptions of “peace enforcement” and “crisis response,” the strategy lacks any focus on conventional deterrence. And yet this form of deterrence is a key rationale for maintaining the current control of military drawdown. For despite the concept of overseas presence, deterrent forces will be based primarily in the United States. As a consequence, in order to deter regional threats on a global basis, the U.S. military will continue to require conventional forces that have a strategic rather than theater capability.

All this is reinforced in the current transition period by the separation of the concepts of nuclear and conventional retaliation. This separation makes extended conventional deterrence more credible, since there is no danger of conventional attacks on the American homeland. It also makes possible the conventional equivalent of massive retaliation, because one purpose of the current military strategy is rapid conflict

termination, the antithesis of the Cold War graduated response, in which quantum escalation was avoided due to the nuclear link. As a consequence, conventional deterrence requires the intense and overwhelming application of offensive force that has both punishment and denial capabilities tied into a global reach made possible by weapons and technology modernization.¹⁵¹

Selectivity would still be a key element in such an approach. But as Robert Haffa has pointed out, “the use of conventional force (presumed in the past to be a ‘failure’ of conventional deterrence) can in the future be a major contributor to the deterrence of conventional conflict.”¹⁵² Inevitable breakdowns of conventional deterrence could thus be opportunities to rejuvenate the credibility of that deterrence by applying force, perhaps in the form of the JCS Flexible Deterrent Options, to demonstrate the price of failure even on relatively small issues. It is a point made by Pericles at the start of the Peloponnesian War. “[I]f we do go to war, let there be no kind of suspicion in your hearts that the war was over a small matter,” he warned. “For you this trifle is both the assurance and the proof of your determination.”¹⁵³

Deterrence and conflict prevention are also linked in the national military strategy to the other principal objective: to promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction. Thus, as the document points out, elements of the deterrence component such as regional alliances and crisis response can serve to promote stability as well as to thwart aggression. But the major component of stability promotion is something called peacetime engagement, “a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces,” that represents the largest change from the 1992 version of the military strategy.¹⁵⁴ These activities, which range from nation and security assistance to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, reflect an acknowledgement that “global interdependence and transparency, coupled with our worldwide security interests, make it difficult to ignore troubling developments almost anywhere on earth.”¹⁵⁵ The activities also reflect the link from the national security strategy of actively shaping the international environment, with the regional stability presented as both the cause for and the result of military forces in peacetime fostering “the peaceful enlargement of the community of free market nations.”¹⁵⁶

Most significantly, the activities associated with peacetime engagement reflect the acknowledgment of the open-ended nature of promotion of stability and the concomitant emphasis on selectivity and prioritization contained in the President’s national security strategy. Phrases such as “carefully selected cases, where our interest so dictate,” and “on a case-by-case basis [w]hen warranted by circumstances and national interests” are strung throughout the military strategy as are references to the restrictions of PDD 25.¹⁵⁷ This, of course, does not preclude the use of peacetime engagement as a source of relevancy and justification for forces, particularly with “tens of thousands” U.S. troops involved daily in such noncombat activities as providing humanitarian aid, assisting foreign militaries and tracking drugs. “This level of activity . . . suggests a continuing need for flexible and

robust military capabilities.”¹⁵⁸

The national military strategy, then, takes its cue from the national security strategy in leaving unresolved the tension between the activities associated with peacetime engagement and those with warfighting, “the ultimate guarantor of our vital interests.”¹⁵⁹ “I think that tension can be overstated,” a senior military official commented on condition of anonymity when briefing reporters on the new military strategy document. Peace operations can reinforce some combat skills, he added, and there was always refresher training for troops returning from peacekeeping missions. “How that’s all put together—that’s a responsibility of the commander at the respective levels out there,” he concluded.¹⁶⁰ There is also, however, a higher responsibility, as the emphasis on selectivity and prioritization indicates in the strategies of both the President and the Chairman. “Being ready to fight and win remains our foremost responsibility,” the military strategy reminds us. “It is for this reason, fundamentally, that our nation has raised and sustained its Armed Forces.”¹⁶¹

Two MRCs Or Not Two MRCs.

“Uncertainty is not a mere nuisance requiring a bit of sensitivity analysis,” Paul Davis points out; “it is a dominant characteristic of serious planning.”¹⁶² The U.S. military is well aware of this fact, but has had difficulty during the current transition in selling it to Congress and the public. A major problem is the lack of the all-consuming threat that allowed a deductive approach to the problem of containing the USSR for over four decades. With that problem firmly in sight and with nuclear deterrence as the primary instrument for avoiding general war with the Soviets, the solutions through eight different American Administrations (Figure 1) oscillated between the high defense cost, low risk approach (Quadrant 2) characteristic of NSC 68, and the low cost, high risk strategy (Quadrant 3) captured in the nuclear forces of the Eisenhower years.¹⁶³

Despite these shifts, general war remained the overarching rationale for MRCs in the Cold War. The specific threat scenarios in the 1960s (2-1/2 wars), 1970s (1-1/2 wars), and 1980s (at times—3 wars), were all based on worst case MRCs (USSR, PRC/North Korea, Iran) and a Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) such as Southeast Asia or Cuba. Defense Secretaries during those years charged the various CINCs to prepare not only for the primary and most demanding scenarios that were used to justify overall force structure, but also for a range of smaller crises as well. The wide range of capabilities required to meet such requirements were possible because of the large and diverse American military posture generated by U.S. planning based on the global Soviet threat. The framework of that threat was further emphasized by the later requirements for CINCs to come up with a planning scenario for each of a number of different theaters.¹⁶⁴

In 1979, however, there was a momentary shift from the focus on threat-based requirements. An OSD study group that year examined a variety of possible Middle East/

		RISK	
		High	Low
COST OF DEFENSE	High	1	2
	Low	3	4

Figure 1.

Persian Gulf contingencies ranging from the Iraqi threat to Kuwait and an Iran-Iraq war to a possible Soviet invasion of Iran. The group concluded that no one could foresee who the enemy might be for the United States in a decade. Planning under such uncertainty, the final study report avoided “requirements” and focused instead on increasing capabilities without going into much detail concerning precise employment of those capabilities.¹⁶⁵

There was increased U.S. concern with the region after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a consequence, the Brown and Weinberger defense regimes initiated and expanded a program to build capabilities for general deterrence and defense in the Persian Gulf region. Part of that effort structurally evolved into the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and then later into U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Overall, the program, which was to pay dividends in Desert Storm, was the largest effort in the Cold War to build capabilities for contingencies other than all out war with the Soviet Union in Europe.

But the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) soon became controversial within and outside the military, best demonstrated by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s observation in the manner of Voltaire’s description of the Holy Roman Empire, that the RDF was neither rapid, deployable, nor a force. Moreover, such planning for uncertainty could not surmount the renewed emphasis in the Reagan years on potential global war with the USSR, primarily brought about because the Soviets

appeared to have increased their capability for aggression in several theaters. The United States responded with the concept of “horizontal escalation,” which faced Soviet aggression in one region with the possibility of American counter-offensives in regions of Soviet weakness. In such an environment, the picture of a global war that might escalate to the strategic nuclear level kept a very tight hold on the strategic framework; and the detailed military planning by the Joint Chiefs, the services and the RDJTF soon returned almost exclusively to the Soviet threat in terms of Iran.¹⁶⁶

This deductive framework has evaporated in the post-Cold War era, leaving the problems inherent in inductive reasoning of postulating solutions in the form of capabilities for problems that do not fully exist in the form of threats. Those capabilities are focused on the four key requirements outlined in the BUR. To begin with, U.S. forces must be able to deter and prevent the effective use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. territory, troops and allies. They must also maintain a strong peacetime overseas presence. Finally, there are the controversial dual requirements that U.S. forces be able, with regional allies, to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs, while maintaining the capability of conducting a variety of operations short of MRC scale that will still require significant combat forces.¹⁶⁷

With no dominating short-term threat and an uncertain long-term one, the general perception of many critics in terms of Figure 1 is that the United States is in Quadrant 2 of high cost and low risk and should move toward the low cost, low risk Quadrant 4 by abandoning the two MRCs requirement. In this context, some see the BUR force as the last gasp of an outmoded garrison state that can’t shake the Cold War mentality. That force, they point out, will level out in 1998 at \$234 billion a year, leaving the next biggest spender, Russia, at an estimated \$40 billion per year, and North Korea and Iraq at annual rates of less than \$6 and \$3 billion respectively. Even then, they argue, the cost of the two MRC forces may cause major items replacement to be deferred until such time in the future when the United States will face “a massive junking of obsolescent gear.”¹⁶⁸ It is such problems that make the Revolution in Military Affairs so seductive in a capabilities-based, inductive environment. In one argument, for example, the money saved by going to a one MRC planning basis could be used as seed corn for new research and development efforts. The increased technological capabilities resulting from these efforts in the long-term would lower the risk even if the threat increased in the same period. By lowering the cost in the short run, the argument goes, the risk in the long-term is also lowered, thus enabling the United States to move into the low cost, low risk Quadrant 4 of Figure 1 and remain there for the foreseeable future.¹⁶⁹

There are also other problems with what Richard Kugler calls “canonical MRCs” dealing with Iraq and North Korea. To begin with, the BUR force may not even be enough to take on one MRC successfully all at once. The Gulf War, after all, required well over 50 per cent of U.S. airlift and aerial refueling aircraft committed to the deployment and sustainment of the force. This is not to say that in some play of scenarios,

for instance in an environment favorable to air forces, the United States could not be successful with even smaller forces. But the lesson potential adversaries took away from Desert Storm is not to fight in a manner of American convenience. This may result in the future in better equipped and trained enemy forces. Certainly there will be different dynamics that could include the use of WMD to scare off Western allies; the deliberate playing on U.S. sensitivity to casualties; more ambiguous forms of aggression; or even a different approach to conflict reminiscent of what the nonstandard Blitzkrieg did to the French Army that had prepared for a generation to fight a canonical scenario replicating World War I. Finally, the process of coalition building will vary with the MRCs, making neutrality or even opposition a possibility as opposed to the two MRCs assumption of multi-governmental support.¹⁷⁰

All this notwithstanding, the two MRCs standard demonstrates that uncertainty, in Eliot Cohen's words, "need not be the same thing as bewilderment."¹⁷¹ Inductive, capabilities-based planning is simply better in the new environment for encouraging diversity and adaptability than the old threat and requirements based planning, in which the focus was on deductively fulfilling estimated needs for a few precisely defined threat scenarios. In this regard, the two canonical MRCs are the right basis for planning the national military strategy. Together, they encourage diversity with the Persian Gulf MRC requiring heavy armor and mechanized units and the Korean contingency dealing with lighter infantry, artillery and air mobile units. And in both theaters, there is the need for joint and combined, offensive and defensive operations, all incorporating the latest in doctrine and technology. Most importantly, the two MRCs establish a prudent floor under defense spending that prevents any budgetary free fall and provides some element of predictability.¹⁷²

That predictability is important if the United States is to hedge against the emergence of A-level threats. Dramatic force improvements normally require time; but with outside assistance and new technologies, there will be increased possibilities for surprise build-ups in the future. In this regard, Germany in the 1930s is a useful reminder how a nation can go from almost complete disarmament to being the world's strongest military power in 6 years. That experience also indicates how difficult it is to discern intentions and ultimate ambition, with that ambition in itself influenced by victories along the way. It is in this context that establishing capabilities dealing with potential B-level threats in the MRCs takes on more importance. In the first place, those capabilities will serve as important blocks upon which to build should it become necessary to fight an A-level adversary. Equally important, the capabilities may even deter the formation of a peer threat, one that could occur, however, if aggression in one region went ultimately unanswered because of U.S. preoccupation with a major contingency in another. This is not a problem if, as the *New York Times* recently maintained by quoting Secretary Perry, the prospect of fighting two wars is "entirely implausible." Perry's riposte was in the best tradition of Ambassador Komer's "likelihood fallacy":

The two words that you surgically lifted from my testimony to Congress distorted my point: fighting two wars is implausible precisely because we have the capability to respond to two challenges at once. If we only had the capability for one major conflict, our weakness could invite a second conflict, thereby making plausible what would otherwise be an implausible scenario.¹⁷³

In any event, the two MRCs concept remains the central focus of the dynamic process envisioned in the BUR when it identified areas requiring further assessment as well as those that would have to be constantly refined within the overall analytic framework. The philosophy behind much of this analysis is summed up in the current national military strategy:

While smaller, we must become pound for pound more capable through enhancements and selected modernizations. Our ability to execute this strategy of flexible and selective engagement will be put at risk without these required upgrades.¹⁷⁴

As a result, the Pentagon is currently at work on critical force enhancements that include improvements in strategic mobility, advanced precision-guided munitions, readiness of selected reserve component forces, and surveillance and command, control and communications capabilities. These enhancements, initially identified in the BUR and later validated in the evolving framework of that review, will enable the programmed BUR force to support the national military strategy well into the next century. As part of the continuing analysis of this inductive process, the Chairman is sponsoring a series of wargames to assess the capability of the 1997 force and the enhanced BUR force of the future to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.¹⁷⁵

In making that assessment, there is a need to avoid too narrow a focus on the canonical Persian Gulf and Korean MRCs. Fortunately, capabilities-based planning encourages the type of adaptability and flexibility that should mitigate any such tendency. This is inherent in such BUR innovations as the force building block concepts for major and lesser regional contingencies. In addition, the strategic component of peacetime engagement with its focus on the shaping of the international environment will encourage a wider, more flexible perspective in terms of MRCs. In any case, no matter the contingency, force capability should assume that WMD, “the Great Equalizers of the late twentieth century,” will be major factors in future regional conflicts.¹⁷⁶ Standard MRC scenarios should reflect the potential use of these weapons, which in turn highlights the need to think through the United States and Allied ability to use punishment, not only as part of enhanced conventional deterrence, but in preemptive strikes against rogue nations and organizations either developing or possessing WMD.

A recent RAND study concludes that the BUR force with capabilities of taking on

one to two MRCs is adequate in terms of the perceived value of those capabilities and acceptable in terms of low to moderate risk. The study also points out, however, that “the BUR program is at the edge of prudence—i.e., that further cuts would have serious negative consequences.”¹⁷⁷ Certainly among these consequences would be a diminishment of overseas presence in critical regions that would be taken as a sign of strategic withdrawal. This in turn would leave power vacuums that could create regional instabilities in the form of, for example in Asia, Japanese, Chinese and Korean military competition. Moreover, despite the advances of the communication- information revolution, distance is still key in military affairs; and the loss of facilities outside U.S. territory would make it much more difficult for the United States to bring overwhelming force to bear in every region of the world. Finally, with a cut in the military below the BUR level, the fraction of the remaining forces that would have to be committed to any regional contingency will grow, creating the distinct possibility of a concomitant diminution in the willingness of the nation’s political and military leaders to risk the engagement of those forces no matter how critical the issue.¹⁷⁸

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the wake of victory in the Cold War, Time's Cycle is a reminder that the fruits of such victory can soon turn bitter. The Athenians, for instance, defeated Persia in the 5th century BC and then with the arrogance of hubris defeated themselves. In a similar manner, the Turks spent centuries attempting to conquer Constantinople for Islam only to see world power passing to secular European states even in the triumphant year of 1453. Such examples are why G. K. Chesterton saw a kind of heroism in dealing with what had gone on before: "Man is like Persius, he cannot look at the Gorgon of the future except in the mirror of the past."¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, as Homer's *Odyssey*, reminds us, there is strength to be drawn from the past. In that epic, when Telemachus goes with his grandfather and father, Ulysses, to fight the army of his mother's suitors, Athena speeds his first spear with such impact that it breaks the spirit of the suitors and ends the battle. Telemachus is victorious against the mob, "for he is a crowd in himself."

He is all the good things loved that have been passed down to him in the mystery of human tradition, the community that lives on even in the single self. His spear flies shining into the future because his whole race threw it—the human race, the past, the Fathers.¹⁸⁰

This is ultimately why Time's Arrow with its assertion that every moment of time is unique is unsatisfactory. Man craves something that provides help for the future, some underlying generality, some principles that impart order by transcending the distinction of moments. In no field is this urge more evident than in strategy and international relations. And yet Time's Arrow is a constant reminder that strategy is far from being a science, that international politics like evolution can go down very different paths based on particular events. Natural selection, for instance, does not preclude a large role for chance and accident in making life evolve very differently. For this there are no general principles or scientific laws. In a similar manner, as an example, the role of contingency in international politics is illustrated by the Korean War. For absent that conflict, the Cold War might have taken on an entirely different form—one without high defense budgets, increased Sino-American hostility, a militarized NATO, and U.S. global commitments.¹⁸¹

But it did not. And from the peculiar form of that decades-long war in peace have emerged strands of change and continuity that pose challenges and opportunities for American elites in the iterative civil-military security dialogue that is itself a product of the Cold War. Two of the most visible products of that process are the current U.S. national security strategy and the derivative national military strategy. Both documents deal with the interrelated issues that face the United States in a transitional period of great uncertainty: the nature of America's global role and the prioritization and military efforts that should accompany that role. And in both cases, the three core American national

interests of security, economic prosperity and promotion of values serve as the basis for these efforts. The result is a combination of change and continuity embodied in the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement, which with its synergistic use of those core values, effectively demonstrates the false dichotomy between domestic well-being and an activist global role for the United States.

Both documents can play a major role in helping the White House create a consensus on strategic choices that will determine the course of U.S. national security policy well into the next century. This was also the situation that faced Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. The primary difference, however, is that today the President is dealing with an American public, more informed, more internationalist and certainly more open to leadership and persuasion from the very top. There is some concern, in this regard, that self-imposed restrictions on the use of American military may have led to a self-deterrence phenomenon. But the fact remains that the public is insistent on a case-by-case examination concerning the use of force and very much in favor of the type of prioritization inherent in the strategy of selective engagement. “Of course, Americans do not like sending their sons and daughters abroad for combat,” Leslie Gelb points out.

But they never did. What country does? It is remarkable how readily, despite internal opposition, Americans will fight for others if the cause is just and rightly explained—even in the absence of an overriding threat Americans are not turning inward. They are waiting for their President and others to chart a compelling international course. If Americans are to sacrifice when nothing seems to threaten their survival directly, they want to know why and how. Public opinion polls demonstrate not the return of isolationism, but good old American pragmatism.¹⁸²

That pragmatism is evident in a number of ways in the national military strategy’s extensive treatment of peacetime engagement. To begin with there is the acknowledgment that the varied missions inherent in this strategic component are here to stay. There is also the use of those missions to help provide a relevancy for credible peacetime strength in an era of uncertainty. Finally, there is the strict prioritization concerning missions on the periphery in keeping with the realization that unrestricted humanitarian operations is not only counterproductive in terms of public support, but also “induces an insidious kind of muscle fatigue, consuming sinew in what appears to be a beneficial exercise.”¹⁸³ But that pragmatic prioritization has worn a bit thin in the wake of the antiseptic success of the U.S. relief operations for Rwandan refugees—all reminiscent against the background of widespread genocide of Herman Kahn’s assertion that “it is the hallmark of the expert professional that he doesn’t care where he is going as long as he proceeds competently.”¹⁸⁴ At least part of the answer to this problem is to begin the very long process of helping to shape a more effective and responsible United Nations. This must include the development of military capabilities that move beyond

traditional peacekeeping operations to the more complex military missions associated with peace enforcement that, in Jessica Mathew's description, "are still being patched together colonel by borrowed colonel."¹⁸⁵

In the meantime, the U.S. military will continue to plan for uncertainty in the best tradition of Admiral Horatio Nelson. "But in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood," the admiral instructed off Cadiz in October 1805, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy."¹⁸⁶ The problem today is that even the enemy ships are not yet clearly visible, leaving U.S. planners to face the adverse confluence of both Time's Cycle and Arrow. Time's Cycle begins with Edward Gibbon's reminder that history "is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind."¹⁸⁷ Historical experience also suggests that by the time a distant threat emerges as a clear and present danger to the United States, it will be too late, as it was in 1941 when the Imperial Japanese Navy had to announce that danger from the air. At the same time, the ongoing unprecedented technological revolution in Time's Arrow is creating an increasingly more instantaneously dangerous world. In such an environment, capabilities planning will form the basis for threat-based requirements planning and implementation when it is needed in the future. On the other hand, a return in the present to threat-based requirements planning can lead to a new version of the Ten Year Rule, in which even the existence of Nelson's enemy ships is assumed away.¹⁸⁸

It is in this context that the *National Military Strategy of the United States* ultimately plays its most important role. The JCS document clearly underscores the need for a selective and flexible strategy in the calculation of the relationship between the means, the BUR force, and the ends, the thwarting of aggression and the promotion of stability. That emphasis is demonstrated throughout the national military strategy in the focus on the use of all elements of national power to achieve the overarching twin objectives and on the great care that the United States must exercise in using military forces as instruments of national policy. The strategy also reflects the iterative interaction of the JCS with the NCA, a relationship reflected in the President's national security strategy and the Defense Secretary's annual report. Equally important, the document provides the Chairman a single, unclassified outlet to make his case for the controlled build-down of U.S. military forces in protecting and opportunistically extending the current transition. In making that case, the national military strategy also demonstrates that capabilities-based planning is not synonymous with a military effort to collectively feather its organizational nest. National security for the strategic hedgehog is the ultimate duty of the nation-state; and even in the vast complexities of the modern world, the primary responsibility for achieving that mission still belongs to the military. In the end, that reminder may be the most important rationale for continuing to publish the unclassified national military strategy document.

ENDNOTES

1. Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1992, p. 81. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "Coping With Victory," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1990, p. 49.
2. Gaddis, p. 50.
3. Stephen Jay Gould, *Time's Arrow. Time's Cycle. Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time*, Cambridge: Howard University Press, 1987, pp. 10-11.
4. Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. X, No. 4, Winter 1993/94, p. 30. See also Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18; the short responses to Fukuyama's article, *Ibid.*, pp. 19-35; and Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," *Ibid.*, pp. 3-11.
5. Gould, p. 11.
6. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. & ed. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1976, p. 80.
7. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization On Trial*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 7-8. See also Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," *The National Interest*, No. 29, Fall 1992, p. 12.
8. Howard, p. 33.
9. Charles Krauthammer, "After the Battle, Unrest," *The Washington Post*, November 18, 1994, p. A-27. See Also John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter 1991/92, pp. 46-47; and Colin S. Gray, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar Period," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 13, October-December 1994, p. 358.
10. For example, Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage*, New York: Putnam, 1910, and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed., New York: Harper Collins, 1989.
11. Original emphasis. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273, No. 2, February 1994, p. 58.

12. John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 240. For Mueller, war is initially rejected because it is ineffective or unprofitable and then later becomes “unthinkable” because of changes in mental habits caused by a socio-cultural revolution. The development of nuclear weapons did not affect the process. See also John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Fall 1988, pp. 55-59. See also Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay,” *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Spring 1990, p. 43, who believes Mueller is right for the wrong reason. “It is because wars of the kind under consideration have become unprofitable, both economically and politically, that they have become unthinkable.”

13. For example, Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991, and John A. Keegan, *History of Warfare*, New York: Knopf, 1993.

14. Jeremy D. Rosner, “Is Chaos America’s Real Enemy?” *The Washington Post*, August 14, 1994, p. C-1. See also U.S. Institute of Peace, “Managing Chaos,” *PeaceWatch*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1995.

15. Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History*, New York: Mentor Books, 1957, p. 7.

16. Rosner, p. C-1. See also Gray, “Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs,” pp. 354, 357, and 363.

17. Gray, “Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs,” pp. 354 and 357.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 357.

19. Gary Wills, *Confessions of a Conservative*, New York: Penguin Books, Ltd.: 1979, pp. 216-217.

20. Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, London: Constable, 1970, p. 334. The U.S. Army War College uses the four broad categories outlined in Donald Neuchterlein, *America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, which adds world order to the three addressed here. Terry Deibel points out, however, that national interests at the highest strategic level determine ends not means and that favorable world order is a means not an end. Deibel, p. 82.

21. Harry Truman, March 12, 1947, message to Congress, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-49*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 1256. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold*

War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 23, who describes how the United States in the aftermath of World War II defined American national security well beyond the normal geo-strategic terms: "Defending the nation's core values, its organizing ideology, and its free political and economic institutions was vital to national security."

22. Deibel, pp. 84-85 and 87.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

24. The exception to the continuity was Wilson's 1913 Underwood tariff. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-101.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 97 and pp. 94-98.

26. Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion," *America's Purpose. New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Owen Harries, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991, p. 7.

27. Dick Cheney, "The Military We Need In The Future," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 59, No. 1, October 15, 1992, p. 13.

28. "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival'," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. 14.

29. For example, Robert Jervis, "International Primacy. Is the Game Worth the Candle?" *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 52-67.

30. For example, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990-91, pp. 23-33, and Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 68-83. A unipolar system is "one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, p. 5.

31. Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 46. See also Christopher Layne, "American Grand Strategy After the Cold War: Primacy or Blue Water," *American Defense Annual*, ed. Charles F. Hermann, New York: Lexington Books, 1994, p. 36. For a Whiggish outlook, see Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter 1991-92, pp. 39-73.

32. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British Domestic Policy, 1865-1980*, London: George Allen, and Unwin, 1981, p. 105. "A

strategy that equates security with geopolitical tranquility virtually everywhere is an imperial strategy.” Layne, “American Grand Strategy,” p. 30.

33. “Memorandum by Lord Sanderson,” *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Vol. III, eds., G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, London: HMSO, 1928, p. 430. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Welsey, 1979, pp. 107 and 127, and Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” pp. 14 and 34.

34. Jack Snyder, “Introduction,” *Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rhineland*, eds., Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 14. For an historical analysis of the great power evolutionary response by England, Austria and Russia to French unipolarity from 1660-1714 and that of Germany to British unipolarity from 1860-1910, see Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” pp. 16-25. See also Layne, “American Grand Strategy,” p. 35.

35. Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” pp. 45 and 47.

36. Krauthammer, “Universal Dominion,” p. 6. See also Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” p. 47, and “American Grand Strategy,” pp. 38-39.

37. On the concept of strategic independence, see Christopher Layne, “Realism Redux: Strategic Independence in a Multipolar World,” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer-Fall 1989, pp. 19-44; Ted Galen Carpenter, “An Independent Course,” *America’s Purpose*, pp. 81-88; and Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After the Cold War*, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992.

38. Layne, “American Grand Strategy,” p. 41.

39. Hanns Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5, Winter 1990/91, pp. 91-106. See also Yorchi Funabashi, “Japan and America: Global Partners,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 86, Spring 1992, p. 37.

40. Richard L. Kugler, *The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era*, R-4194 - EUCOM/NA, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992, pp. 11 and 16. See also Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” pp. 34 and 46.

41. Michael Howard, “The World According to Henry. From Metternich to Me,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 139.

42. Robert J. Art, “A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance Without Dominance,” *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 7-8. See also Stephen Van Evera, “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1990, pp. 10-11.

For a counter-argument, see Footnote #172, Layne, “Unipolar Illusion,” p. 50. Samuel Huntington, on the other hand, argues that all this bolsters the case for primacy, the main purpose of which is not victory in war, but the ability to promote its interests and shape the international arena—in other words, to achieve the state’s national objectives without recourse to war. Huntington, “Why Primacy Matters,” p. 70. See also Paul K. Davis, “Protecting the Great Transition,” *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*, ed., Paul K. Davis, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994, pp. 146-155.

43. Robert L. Bartley, “A Win-Win Game,” *America’s Purpose*, p. 77. For a version of strategic independence that includes the promotion of values, see Carpenter, “An Independent Course,” *Ibid.*, p. 87. For the positive and negative sides of the communication revolution, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 193-216.

44. Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 164. Richard Kugler also points out that interstate war has other casual factors that can overcome interstate ideology. And while democracy helps ensure that decisions for war include not only governmental elites, but parliaments and the general public as well, the people and the legislatures have a history of being as warlike as kings and presidents, in many cases more so. “Democracy is no impenetrable barrier to warfare among nations that hate each other for reasons that go beyond similarities or differences in governmental structures.” Richard L. Kugler, “Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning,” *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 169. See also, in particular, Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. For a survey of the research focused on why democracies don’t fight each other, see Charles F. Hermann, “Democracies and War: One of Many Security Issues,” *American Defense Annual*, pp. 3-4 and Endnote #3, *Ibid.*, p. 297. The other hypothesis continues to be used by governmental leaders. On April 1, 1993, for example, President Clinton stated that “[d]emocracies are far less likely to wage war on other nations than dictatorships are.” Endnote #5, *Ibid.*, p. 298.

45. For arguments for the aggressive exportation of democracy, see Gregory A. Fossedal, *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution*, New York: Basic Books, 1989 and Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny*, Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1991. See also Nathan Tarcov, “If This Long War Is Over . . .,” *America’s Purpose*, p. 21 and Huntington, “Why Primacy Matters,” p. 82.

46. Irving Kristol, “Defining Our National Interest,” *America’s Purpose*, p. 65.

47. Original emphasis. *Ibid.*, “While other states had interests, the United States had responsibilities.” Geir Lundestad, *The American Empire*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 11.

48. Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," p. 19. See also Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." For a counter-view in terms of "eclectic Realism," see Jervis, "The Future of World Politics."

49. Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 164-165 and 167. See also Alvin H. Bernstein, Director, *Project 2025*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 6, 1991, pp. 62, 68, and 77.

50. Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 48.

51. Richard Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, p. 14. See also Steven R. Mann, "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought," *Parameters*, Vol. XXII, No. 3, Autumn 1992, pp. 54-68 and Gray, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs," p. 359.

52. Discussion with Colonel William Flavin, USAWC. See also Gray, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs," p. 364. "A democratic polity like the United States whose politicians tend to be legally trained and whose dominant ideas on the practice of statecraft are driven by platoons of liberal-minded, reasonable scholars, may be functionally disabled in its ability to deal effectively in a timely fashion with true thuggery." *Ibid.*, p. 361. For the classic treatments on this subject, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960, and John W. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *How American Foreign Policy Is Made*, New York: Praeger, 1974.

53. Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 24.

54. In their annual review for 1926 and repeated in 1927, the British Chiefs of Staff reported: "We wish to place on record our view that forces available for Imperial Defence are now reduced to a minimum and are hardly capable of dealing with the problems that are liable to arise either singly or simultaneously." Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1972, p. 277. In their annual review for 1932, which caused the government to end the Ten Year Rule, the Chiefs stated that the Rule had caused a "terrible deficiency in essential requirements for all three Defence Services and a consequential inability to fulfil our major commitments." *Ibid.*, p. 343. The Ten Year Rule and the recommendations of the Geddes Report or Geddes Axe as it was known were entirely in keeping with the strong public faith in the League Covenant's substitution of collective security for national "swords." Bond, p. 27. See also Richard M. Swain, "The Future of War," Letter to Editor, *The*

National Interest, No. 38, Winter 1994/95, p. 108, who points out that the adoption of the Ten Year Rule in 1919 was “a valid policy choice.”

55. Greg Russell, “Hans J. Morgenthau and the National Interest,” *Society*, Vol. 31, No. 2, January/February 1994, p. 81.

56. World order is also used as a category. See Endnote #20. For the intensity of interests, see Robert D. Blackwill, “A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond,” *Europe in Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe*, eds., Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning, Guetersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1993.

57. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 91-92.

58. Floyd Gardner, “Truman Era Foreign Policy: Recent Historical Trends,” *The Truman Period as a Research Field, A Reappraisal, 1972*, ed., Richard Kirkendall, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974, p. 63. See also Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, pp. 20-21 and Snyder, “Introduction,” *Ibid.*, p. 13.

59. In 1635, an adviser to Spain reported:

The first and greatest dangers are those that threaten Lombardy, the Netherlands and Germany. A defeat in any of these three is fatal for this Monarchy, so much so that if the defeat in those parts is a great one, the rest of the monarchy will collapse; for Germany will be followed by Italy and the Netherlands, and the Netherlands will be followed by America; and Lombardy will be followed by Naples and Sicily, without the possibility of being able to defend either.

Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York: Random House, 1988, p. 51. See also Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. The Fashoda crisis on the Upper Nile came about because Lord Salisbury believed that France might some day build a dam at the headwaters of the Nile. This would cut off Egypt’s water supply which would then lead to a revolutionary upheaval in Cairo that would not only threaten British control of the Suez Canal, but also sever sea lanes of communications to India, precipitating there either a revolt or outside interference—all of which would destroy Britain’s imperial economy. The French move to Fashoda was caused by a similar perception of cascading dominoes. See also Snyder, “Introduction,” pp. 3, 8-9 and 16; Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” p. 20; and Snyder, “Conclusion,” *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, p. 282.

60. Jonathan Uitley, *Going to War With Japan, 1937-1941*, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985, p. 5.

61. For both quotes, see Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," pp. 31-32.

62. Thucydides, p. 92.

63. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 85-88 and Glen Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 31.

64. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, p. 761.

65. John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest*, No. 10, Winter 1987/1988, pp. 27-38, and *Strategies of Containment*, particularly pp. 352-353.

66. For example, Secretary of Defense Weinberger once pointed out: "In every corner of the globe, America's vital interests are threatened by an ever-growing Soviet military threat." Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 11. See also Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," p. 24. See also Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 127-159, in which the arguments are couched almost entirely in terms of the threat, particularly those concerned with Persian Gulf instability and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

67. Herbert Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, New York: Dial Press, 1983, p. 328. See also Douglas J. MacDonald, "The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle," *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, p. 133 and Jervis, *Ibid.*, p. 24.

68. Original emphasis. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 118. To the extent that a state expects a domino effect, it cedes power to local allies. Any threat by the major power to abandon these allies will lack credibility if the client states believe that the patron perceives a local defeat as a blow to its credibility and thus to its vital interest. Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," p. 25.

69. Irving Kristol illustrates how hard this is to avoid in the post-Cold War era.

It is very difficult for a great power—a world power—to articulate a foreign

policy in the absence of an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one's enemies that help define one's 'national interest,' in whatever form that definition might take. Without such enemies, one flounders amidst a plenitude of other trivial, or at least marginal options.

Kristol, p. 53. See also Blackwill, pp. 104-105.

70. Blackwill, p. 118.

71. Telford Taylor, *Munich*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979, p. 885.

72. Quote is from "The Imperialist," E. H. Carson, in Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 18.

73. George Shultz, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 31, 1985. "The Future of American Foreign Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," *Department of State Bulletin*, p. 19. See also MacDonald, p. 132.

74. Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report 94-5815, July 20, 1994, p. 31. For a similar view, see Michael O. Desch, "Bases for the Future: U.S. Military Interests in the Post-Cold War Third World," *Security Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1992, pp. 201-224. For a critique of the American preoccupation with global stability, see Benjamin C. Schwarz, "Rights and Foreign Policy: Morality is No Mantra," *The New York Times*, November 20, 1992, p. A19.

75. See Ted Hopf, "Soviet Inferences from Their Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Culminating Gains," *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, p. 147, who concludes from his studies of the Soviet perceptions of their victories in Vietnam, Angola and Ethiopia that "there is little or no historical evidence that, in fact, statesmen infer an opponent's general irresoluteness and weakness from encounters in the periphery." Moreover, credibility in terms of resolve was not, with the exception of Hitler, a key factor historically prior to the Cold War. Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 187. In any event, psychological studies indicate that national leaders rarely learn lessons vicariously from other countries. Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 103-107.

76. For earlier perceptions of the periphery couched primarily in terms of U.S. national security, see Stephen Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," Steven David, "Why the Third World Matters," and Michael Desch, "The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery;"—all in *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Summer 1989.

77. Kristol, p. 69. See also Blackwill, pp. 107-108.

78. Josef Joffe, "Entangled Forever," *America's Purpose*, p. 154.

79. Attempts at geopolitical rationalization for U.S. involvement in the Balkans has stretched the connectivity link until that involvement is no longer acceptable. "Those who presently counsel the West to go to war with Serbia over Bosnia frequently send the dominoes toppling from Bosnia, to Kosovo, to Macedonia, to Albania and Bulgaria, to conflict between Greece and Turkey, to a copy cat effect by dozens of other petty tyrants around the world." Blackwill, p. 105.

80. MacDonald, p. 137. See also Jack Donnely, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, July 1982, pp. 574-595 and Samuel P. Huntington, "Human Rights and American Power," *Commentary*, September 1981, pp. 37-43. See also Russell, p. 83, who concludes that:

the more we indulge in an uncritical reverence for the supposed wisdom of our American way of life, the more odious we make it in the eyes of the world, and the more we destroy our moral authority, without which our economic and military power will become impotent. There is something unhealthy in a craving for ideological intoxication and in the ability to act and to see merit in action except under the stimulant of grandiose ideas and far-fetched schemes. Have our intellectuals become like Hamlet, too much beset by doubt to act and, unlike Hamlet, compelled to still their doubts by renouncing their sense of what is real? The challenge today is to define the national interest as a guide for both understanding and action.

81. Original emphasis. William J. Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," *Speech at the Fortune 500 Forum*, Philadelphia, PA, November 3, 1994, p. 6. *Ibid.*, Carpenter, "An Independent Course," pp. 83 and 87.

82. Macdonald, p. 134; Richard N. Haas, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 50; Snyder, p. 15; and Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945*, London: Fontana, 1983, Chapter 8.

83. Madeleine Albright, "The Myths About UN Peacekeeping," June 24, 1993, Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, September/October 93, pp. 35-38; Sloan, p. 16; and Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington: Congressional Research Service Report 94-2605, May 10, 1994, p. 14. One of the other pernicious effects of Desert Storm, as one analyst has pointed out, was that it "taught the American people, wrongly, that vital

interests could be defended with a handful of casualties in a video-game war." David Compert, "How to Defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, p. 42.

84. Sloan, p. 17. For the evolution from PDD 13 in May 1993 to PDD 25 a year later, see Lowenthal. See also Harry Summers, "Weinberger Doctrine is revisited by Clinton," *Army Times*, August 15, 1994, p. 55. See also *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Washington, DC: GPO, May 1994.

85. Paul Lewis, "UN Official Reproves U.S. Over Plan to Pull Out of Somalia," *New York Times*, January 30, 1994, Section 1, p. 10.

86. Original emphasis. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 92.

87. For a lament of this state of affairs, see Edward N. Luttwak, "Twilight of the Great Powers: Why We No Longer Will Die for a Cause," *Washington Post*, June 26, 1994, pp. C1-C2. See also Gerald F. O. Linderman, "Why We Fight: What Wars Can Do For Us," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1991, p. C1, who believes that American society lacks a sense of war's realities. Near Leningrad, he points out as an example, there is a single cemetery that has over 600,000 World War II dead, twice the number of Americans lost in the entire war. For an effective counter to the lament, see Harry Summers, "Great Power Envy: Nothing to be jealous of," *Army Times*, July 11, 1994, p. 44.

88. Julia Preston, "Blue Hat Blues, Where Cutting UN Forces Could Hurt The Peace," *Washington Post*, February 29, 1995, p. C1. The House national security bill includes new restrictions on allowing U.S. troops to operate under UN military command and requires the President to consult with Congress before sending U.S. forces on UN peace operations. Both provisions, however, allow waiver of the restrictions by the President if he certifies the actions are in the interest of national security.

89. Haas, pp. 57-58; Sloan, p. 5; William J. Durch, "America's UN Stake," *Washington Post*, February 23, 1995, p. A21; Brian Urquhart, 1995, "Peacekeeping Saves Lives," *Ibid.*, February 16, 1995, p. A23; "National Strategy Makeover," *Ibid.*, February 16, 1995, p. A22.

90. Thomas Donnelly, "No End of a Lesson," *The National Interest*, No. 37, Fall 1994, p. 111. See also Harold R. Winton, *To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938*, Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1988.

91. Carl Builder, "Non-traditional Military Missions," *1994 American Defense Annual*, p. 236.

92. A. J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse," *The National Interest*, No. 37, Fall 1994, p. 45.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 49. See also A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force In Our Time," *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 61, and Robert L. Borosage, "Inventing the Threat: Clinton's Defense Budget," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, Winter 1993, p. 12.

94. Robert W. Komer, "Future of U.S. Conventional Forces: A Coalition Approach," *Rethinking Defenses and Conventional Forces*, John Glen, Barry E. Carter, Robert W. Komer, Washington, DC: Center for National Policy, 1983, p. 45. Lord Palmerston described one aspect of the fallacy when he noted that:

any nation which were to act upon the principle of yielding to every demand made upon it, if each separate demand could be shown not to involve directly and immediately a vital interest, would at no distant period find itself progressively stripped of the means of defending its vital interests, when those interests came at last to be attacked.

Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale*, London: Athlone Press, 1974, p. 56.

95. Paul K. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 41.

96. Karen Elliott House, "The Wrong Mission," *Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1994, p. A18. "To assign names to these kinds of missions is to categorize them, and thereby to lend or deny them stature within the military services that perform them." Builder, p. 225. The term, "operations other than war," is used only once in the current national military strategy and then only in lower case letters. John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, hereafter referred to as *NMS 95*, Washington, DC: GPO, February 1995, p. 15.

97. House, p. A18. Resistance to nontraditional roles for the military is not confined to the military. "Military force is seen as something used as an instrument to bring nations together, not to protect them," Henry Kissinger has complained, and James Schlesinger has noted:

Military force is designed to respond to threats. Police forces have to use patience. To the extent to which our military is transformed into a political force, that much less effective will it be as a military one. We are using our military force for purposes not originally intended.

Both quotes from Georgie Anne Geyer, "Kissinger's sage advice," *Harrisburg Patriot*, October 21, 1994, p. 47.

98. Swain, p. 109.

99. Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," p. 18.

100. Section 108 [50 USC 404a] (a) (1), *National Security Act of 1947* as amended by Public Law 99-433, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 1 October 1986, particularly Section 104(b) (3 & 4). See also Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed., Carlisle Barracks: Department of National Security and Strategy, July 1994, p. 2 and Glen A. Kent and William E. Simmons, "Objective-Based Planning," *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 60.

101. Blackwill, p. 102.

102. General (Ret) E. C. Meyer. Tom Philpott, "America's Military: Ready or Not?" *The Retired Officer Magazine*, Vol. 51, No. 2, February 1995, p. 32.

103. William Safire, "The En-En Document," *New York Times*, August 25, 1994, p. A21. See also Art Pine, "Clinton Issues Muted National Security Report," *Los Angeles Times*, July 22, 1994, p. A17. The February 1995 NSS apparently received no more fanfare.

104. Snider, p. 4.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

106. William Safire's description. Safire, p. A21. Snider, p. 9.

107. Snider, p. 13. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

108. For the earlier trend, see Aaron Friedberg, Appendix C, "History of U.S. Strategic Planning Efforts," *Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy: Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment*, Washington, DC: GPO, 1988.

109. Snider, pp. 6-8 and George Bush, *National Security Strategy* Washington, DC: GPO, January 1993, p. 3. A. J. Bacevich, "Out of Touch: The U.S. Foreign Policy Elite in Crisis," *America*, Vol. 171, No. 18, December 10, 1994, p. 9, sees the term, "engagement," as "freighted with encoded meaning" used by governmental elites to warn that without it will follow "the diplomatic equivalent of mortal sin— isolationism."

110. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and*

Enlargement (hereafter referred to as *NSS 95*), Washington, DC: GPO, February 1995, p. 33. The interests jettisoned: a stable and secure world; healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.

111. *NSS 95*, p. ii.

112. *NSS 95*, p. 2.

113. Michael Vlahos, "To Speak To Ourselves," *America's Purpose*, p. 44. Howard, "The World According to Henry," p. 139.

114. Howard, "The World According to Henry," p. 133.

115. Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. Current Foreign Policy Debates in Perspective," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. LX, No. 1, October 15, 1993, PP. 15 and 19.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

117. *NSS 95*, p. 23. Critics, perhaps taking the cue from the title of Lake's speech, chose to ignore the pragmatic link of values and power. See, for example, Haas, p. 44 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Lessons of the Cold War," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 3, September 1994, p. 305, who labeled the speech "Wilsonianism revisited."

118. *NSS 95*, p. 7.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 17. See also *Ibid.*, p. 8.

121. Emphasis added. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

122. *Ibid.*, p. i. It would seem to make more sense to add humanitarian interests as a category, not a degree of interest intensity. But as originally described by Secretary Perry and used in *NSS 95*, it becomes in effect an intensity of interest.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 7. See also Lake, p. 19.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. ii and iii. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

126. *Ibid.*, p. ii.

127. *Ibid.*, p. i. See also Veahos, pp. 51-52.

128. Don M. Snider, *Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post Cold War, 1989-91*, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. 8, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993, p. 8. Goldwater-Nichols requires that the Secretary of Defense's annual report justify the major U.S. military missions during the next fiscal year in terms of the national security strategy and provide an explanation of how the military force structure is related to those missions. Goldwater-Nichols, Section 603. See also Kent and Simons, p. 61.

129. Snider, *Strategy, Forces and Budgets*, p. 9. See, for instance, Cheney's quote in his annual report from James Forrestal's initial report to Congress in 1948: "Our quick and complete demobilization was a testimonial to our good will rather than to our good sense." Richard Cheney, *Annual Report to The President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: GPO, January 1991, p. x. Contrary to popular belief, although all the services after World War I declined drastically from the wartime numbers, they still remained larger than their pre-war numbers. The Navy in 1933, for instance, was over two-thirds larger than in 1914. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945," *The Making of Strategy. Rulers, States, and War*, eds., Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 429.

130. Snider, *Strategy, Forces and Budgets*, p. 19.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 13. The OSD planning group was headed by Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The only link between the two groups was by Powell and Wolfowitz. Nevertheless, their products, in Cheney's words, demonstrated "a remarkable similarity" in terms of strategic concepts and the forces required for a new regional strategy. *Ibid.*, pp. 22 and 20.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 42. See also James Blackwell, "U.S. Military Responses to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," *The Persian Gulf Crisis. Power in the Post-Cold War World*, eds., Robert F. Helms II and Robert H. Dorff, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, pp. 121-136.

134. Colin L. Powell, *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, hereafter referred to as *NMS 92*, Washington, DC: GPO, January 1992, pp. 14-15.

135. *NMS 92*, pp. 7-8.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

138. The one exception buried on the back pages of the *Washington Post*: Bradley Graham, “Responsibilities of U.S. Military Expanded. New Pentagon Strategy Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to Combat Tasks,” *Washington Post*, March 9, 1995, p. A36.

139. Borosage, p. 7.

140. John Isaacs, “Bottoms Up,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 49, No. 9, November 1993, p. 12.

141. Graham, p. A36.

142. *NMS 92*, p. 19 and *NMS 95*, p. 17.

143. Emphasis added. *NMS 95*, p. 20. See also Perry, p. 2 and William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: GPO, February 1995, p. 7.

144. *NMS 95*, p. 5. See also *Ibid.*, p. 17.

145. *Ibid.*, pp. 19 and 5.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 4. “Since the threat of a global hegemon has passed into history and is unlikely to reappear, worldwide war, as encountered in World War II and prepared for during the Cold War, should no longer animate U.S. defense policy.” Kugler, “Non-standard Contingencies for Defense Planners,” p. 167. “The scenario of a global conventional war in the future is as fanciful as it was during the Cold War.” Art, “A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990s,” p. 19.

148. *NMS 95*, p. 15. See also Davis, “Planning Under Uncertainty,” p. 32.

149. Emphasis added. *NSS 95*, p. 14. For the muted military strategy approach, see *NMS 95*, p. 15. See also Perry, *Annual Report*, p. 25, who unlike *NMS 95*, cites the need for capabilities to destroy WMD arsenals and their delivery means “prior to their use.”

150. *NMS 95*, p. 3.

151. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., “The Future of Deterrence in a New World Order,” *The*

Search for Strategy. Politics and Strategic Vision, ed., Gary L. Guertner, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993, pp. 156-157. The Secretary of Defense certainly sees conventional capabilities as an important part of deterrence. William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 66-82. On the use of punishment as a deterrent, see Eliot A. Cohen, "What To Do About National Defense," *Commentary*, Vol. 98, No. 5, November 1994, p. 26, and Paul K. Davis, "Improving Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era: Some Theory and Implications for Defense Planning," *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 220.

152. Haffa, p. 155.

153. Thucydides, p. 92. Flexible deterrent options can also be counter-productive if an option is seen by aggressors or allies as proof of timidity. In late 1990, for example, the exercises by U.S. naval forces and selected aircraft in the Persian Gulf was meant to signal to Iraq U.S. support for the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. In addition to the ambiguity of the exercises' signal, the UAE and other Arab states perceived it as a provocative move. General Powell later noted that the exercise scared only U.S. allies, not Saddam. Davis, "Improving Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 219-220.

154. *NMS 95*, p. 8.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

157. For example, *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 9.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

159. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

160. Graham, p. A36.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

162. Paul K. Davis, "Institutionalizing Planning for Adaptiveness," *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 81.

163. Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," pp. 27-38. For the military in the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was rarely pinpointed as the specific threat, particularly during exercises, as the detailed order of battle for the "aggressor" adherents of the Circle Trigon Party indicated. Later, of course, there was the NTC focus on the Soviet Union and its allies, a focus made explicit in the annual *Soviet Military*

Threat of the Reagan Years. On the selling of uncertainty, see William Kaufmann, *Assessing the Base Force. How Much is Too Much?* Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 27.

164. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty," pp. 17-18 and 28 and Kent Lewis, "The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning," *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, p. 103. The various numbered war strategies were declaratory policies. There was, for example, never any expectation that the United States could win 2-1/2 wars simultaneously. Like World War II, the conflicts would have been sequential. This is not to contend that such declaratory policy is not important. For example, the 1-1/2 war standard apparently played a role in convincing the PRC that President Nixon was serious in his desire to improve relations with China. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 221-222.

165. The director of the study was the ubiquitous Paul Wolfowitz. Paul Davis was study leader and summary author. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) *Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf* (Declassified), Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 1979. See also Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty," p. 26. The interwar years, of course, were a time when the military conducted capability planning under uncertainty. Even with small budgets during that period, the services developed weapon systems in prototype form and prepared a mobilization base for wartime expansion of forces. The problems inherent in such an approach, however, were illustrated by the Army, which targeted a generic enemy for much of the interwar years. And since its preference was for forces developed to fight in the Western Hemisphere, it created infantry divisions too light for Europe. Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence?" pp. 441-442 and 445.

166. For an example of the criticism, see Jeffrey Record, "The RDF: Is the Pentagon Kidding?" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol 4, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 41-51. For horizontal escalation, see Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the President and Congress, FY 1982*, Washington, DC: GPO, 1981. See also Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty," pp. 26-27.

167. On the inductive-deductive contrast, the point was made by LTC(P) Robert Reardon, USAWC 1995 as well as Colonels Leonard J. Fullenkamp, USAWC, and James M. Dubik, Commander 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Washington, DC: GPO, October 1993, p. 13 and Perry, *Annual Report*, p. 11.

168. Eliot A. Cohen, "Down the Hatch," *The New Republic*, Vol. 210, No. 10, March 7, 1994, p. 15. See also, "The Two-War Fantasy," *New York Times*, February 5, 1995, p. E-16; Borosage, pp. 9-10; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Beyond 'Bottom-Up,'" *National Review*, Vol. XLV, No. 22, November 15, 1993, p. 40.

169. Point made by Colonel Joseph Cerami, USAWC. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Assessing the Bottom-Up Review," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 3, Winter 1993-94, pp. 23-24.

170. Cohen, "Beyond Bottom-Up," p. 40 and Kugler, "Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning," pp. 180-181. The BUR did not include the use of allies in its initial two MRCs statement. Aspin, p. 7. The current military strategy document is replete with references to allies in terms of not only MRCs to thwart aggression, but peacetime engagement to promote stability. *NMS 95*, pp. 4-6, 9-11, and 13.

171. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Future of Force and American Strategy," *The National Interest*, Fall 1990, p. 11.

172. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13 and Kugler, "Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning."

173. William J. Perry, "What Readiness to Fight Two Wars Means," *New York Times*, February 16, 1995, p. A-26. See also "The Two-War Fantasy," *Ibid.*, February 5, 1995, p. E-16.

174. *NMS 95*, p. 17.

175. Perry, *Annual Report*, p. 12.

176. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of American Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 8. On the building blocks, see Aspin, pp. 10 and 12.

177. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty," p. 46. The study points out that the earlier base force would provide a little more insurance. But beyond that force, there would be more capabilities than are required. The line levels off thereafter without appreciably diminishing risk any further. *Ibid.*

178. *Ibid.*, pp. 31 and 35 and Friedberg, "Future of American Power," pp. 6-7.

179. Wills, p. 217. See also Gaddis, "Coping With Victory," p. 50.

180. Wills, p. 219.

181. Gould, *Time's Arrow. Time's Cycle*, p. 196, Jervis, "Future of World Politics," pp. 42-43, and Stephen Jay Gould, *Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the*

Nature of History, New York: Norton, 1989. See also Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," p. 16: "Defense planning, alas, is an art and not a science."

182. Leslie H. Gelb, "Quelling The Teacup Wars. The New World's Constant Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 6, November/December 1994, p. 5. See also Catherine M. Kelleher, "Soldiering On: U.S. Public Opinion on the Use of Force," *Brookings Review*, Spring 1994, p. 28, who points out that there "is indeed an increasing trend supporting an interventionist, engaged America," and concludes (p. 29) that:

success at home and leadership abroad are not mutually exclusive, and building a new post-Cold War consensus may be easier than it is often portrayed. An increasingly well-informed public values preserving U.S. interests overseas, whether they be centered on economic stability or human rights, whether they involve the assumption of international obligations or national sacrifice.

On the eight factors ranging from Cold War leadership fatigue to cautious U.S. military leadership that lead to the "Self-Deterrence Phenomenon," see Sloan, pp. 20-28.

183. Cohen, "What To Do About National Defense," p. 28. "The main strategic challenge for the United States is . . . to stem civil wars without drowning in them." Gelb, p. 6.

184. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 7.

185. Jessica Mathews, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," *Washington Post*, December 5, 1994, p. A23. "Multilateralism, for good or ill, almost always requiring American leadership, has descended on the world. It is a fact not to be debated, but absorbed into American strategy." Gelb, p. 6. But see Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 275, who points out that it remains to be seen whether in the wake of the Gulf War, "those who momentarily agitated for collective security will work as assiduously as did the 'wise men' of the Cold War to put the Wilsonian genie back into the bottle, once it served their transitory purpose."

186. Appendix D., Julian S. Corbett, *The Campaign of Trafalgar*, London: Longmans and Green, 1910, pp. 447-449.

187. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. I., ed. J. B. Bury, London: Methuen, 1909, pp. 85-86.

188. Uncertainty, Colin Gray points out, angers the "clear and present danger"

crowd. Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," p. 17. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16 and Gray, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs," pp. 354 and 364.

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