GJALT DE GRAAF

Tractable Morality

Tractable Morality

Customer discourses
of bankers, veterinarians and charity workers

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Hanteerbare Moraliteit

Het klantendiscours
van bankiers, dierenartsen en Goede Doelen

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus

Prof. dr. S.W.J. Lamberts

en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties.

De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden
op vrijdag 12 december 2003 om 13:30 uur

door

Gjalt de Graaf
geboren te Groningen

Promotiecommissie

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Oan myn âlden

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Woord Vooraf (Acknowledgements in Dutch)

"Is het soms dankbaar om jong te zijn in een tijd waarin alle illusies als loos en naïef zijn doorgeprikt? Waarin het verlangen naar verandering heeft plaatsgemaakt voor de zucht naar effiency?", is de retorische vraag van Don in de roman "Een gelukkiger jeugd" van Job Zeeman. Het verlangen naar verandering houdt ook mij al lang bezig. Kan een wetenschap die zich bezighoudt met het invloedrijke bedrijfsleven, meer betekenen dan het oplossen van efficiëntie- en effectiviteitsvraagstukken? Ik besloot in mijn onderzoek enige mogelijkheden daartoe te verkennen, uiteraard met het besef dat mijn gedrag grote overeenkomsten zou vertonen met dat van een andere Don uit de wereldliteratuur.

De eerste jaren van mijn studie heb ik veel gelezen. Hoe meer ik echter las, hoe meer ik het gevoel kreeg steeds verder van een oplossing te geraken. Achteraf bleek dat niet erg: ik ben tot het inzicht gekomen dat het soms het beste is het raadsel te vergroten. Uiteindelijk besefte ik dat ik niet zozeer concrete oplossingen moest najagen, maar me toe moest leggen op het bereiken van een goede manier om problemen te beschrijven. Voor u, lieve lezer, ligt het eindverslag van mijn zoektocht. Ontdaan van de vele dwaalwegen en obstakels die ik onderweg tegenkwam, toont het trots de uiteindelijke ontdekkingen.

Tijdens mijn queeste heb ik veel hulp gehad. Grote dank gaat uit naar mijn beide promotoren, Theo van Willigenburg en Frans Leijnse. Hun betrokkenheid was onmisbaar bij het schrijven van dit boek. Van Theo van Willigenburg is verder het idee afkomstig om dierenartsen en een charitatieve instelling te onderzoeken. Frans Leijnse wist me na enkele jaren gezondheidsproblemen weer aan het verrichten van onderzoek en het schrijven te krijgen.

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1.   To Do Good or to Do Well: Is That the Question?

As Hans Jonas, one of the most profound analysts of our present moral predicament observed, "Never was so much power coupled with so little guidance for its use … We need wisdom when we believe in it least."[1]

1.1   Introduction

Managers, like anyone else, face many moral decisions. Yet, they find it hard to know what the right thing to do is. Moral guidance is hard to come by; solid moral rules cannot be found. Even more problematic, managers have a hard time identifying the ethical dimensions of their decisions in the first place. What moral questions should they ask themselves? When turning to students of organizational life for help, another problem arises. Scholars have a hard time characterizing the moral problems of managers, too. They are uncertain of how to research ethics within organizations, and of the terms and concepts needed to discuss the problems.

Some say (a common view, found extensively in popular debates) that it is not that hard to identify immoral behavior in organizations. Just look at conflicts with commonly held values, they say. And indeed, naming immoral acts—falsification of books, corruption, tax evasion, improper conduct, exploitation of people and so on—does not seem to pose serious difficulties. Unfortunately, things are not that clear. During the recent Enron scandal, popular opinion turned against the executive officers who misled the government and shareholders. They were wrong. But were things that clearly wrong? Their families may very well think otherwise. And so may many others. By manipulating the official figures of the company, the stock value increased and confidence in the company grew, both of which were good for the employees and their families. At least that is what they argue: higher stock value is a good cause that justifies the means. Higher stock values make the company stronger. A company with high stock value can lend money at a lower interest rate and issue new shares more easily. Should they not have done what they did? Maybe it could have all worked out. Those responsible

still believe that they were doing something great. The problems only started after a whistleblower (who became a *Times* magazine "Person of the Year") alerted the media. Maybe otherwise the economic tide would have turned for the better and no one would have ever noticed the misrepresentation of the financial situation. Everyone would have been happy. Is corruption necessarily bad?[2] Even in a case that seems so obvious at first, confusion comes easily and the moral guide becomes nebulous. Maybe, at least in some countries, it is hard to run a good business without any corruption whatsoever. Maybe it is possible to do without. Who can tell? The moral philosopher? In many other business situations, it is even harder to recognize the correct moral stances. Cheating a business partner may not be unlawful, merely immoral. Or is it? Many people would defend that being dishonest is not only justified, but also required of a manager in specific situations, like when the jobs of employees are at stake. In that case it might be justified to mislead potential business partners to close a deal that saves thousands of jobs. Carr[3] argued almost forty years ago that private morality and business morality belong to separate spheres that work by different moral rules. He argued that certain forms of deception in business are just as permissible as bluffing is within a card game. Part of the problem in the Enron case is the problem of causality. Often the causality of a situation of managers is so complex, that the outcome of a (moral) choice can not be known at the moment of making a decision, making it very hard to 'know' what is the right thing to do. And when the effects of their actions and moral decisions are often not known to managers, how do they make their morality tractable?

How would we identify immoral behavior of managers like veterinarians by just looking at conflicts with values we all hold? Veterinarians are businessmen in the sense that they make a living out of their practice, they are in charge of several employees and they compete with each other. Veterinarians also practice a profession (more on this in Chapter 5), which is different from most other businesses. But like other managers, veterinarians are often not sure whether a decision has moral dimensions or not, let alone what the right moral course of action should be. They find themselves daily asking the question: what should I do? What should veterinarians do when a farmer asks them to perform surgery for non-therapeutic reasons, say, the cutting of the chicken's beak for economic reasons? One could refuse because it is not natural. But then the chickens would pick and wound each other. Should veterinarians perform Caesarian sections on cows that cannot give birth in a natural way anymore? One could argue no, this kind of industrial animal breeding should not be aided in any way. But on the other

hand, can one refuse to help a cow that will die in great pain if the Caesarian section is not performed? Should veterinarians help farmers to perform some veterinary care themselves? Farmers deal daily with their animals and are able to bring quick relief when needed. On the other hand, as a layperson the farmer might misjudge a situation and give the wrong treatment, or misuse knowledge for economic gain, e.g., administering illegal drugs to enhance growth. There are many moral issues surrounding the intensive animal husbandry business; these are just a few cases where there are good arguments for either side. How to know whether a decision has moral dimensions? And what is the right thing to do? How to 'know' what the effects of that action will be? With these questions on their minds, veterinarians seek advice, but good advice is hard to come by.

In my discussion with veterinarians, I found that veterinarians often talk to people outside their profession about these issues, that these 'laypeople' often have outspoken opinions when they talk to them about their problems, but these opinions are usually of no relevance. Many tell veterinarians passionately that, when in doubt, they should always choose in favor of the animal. Others say they should help and support the farmer as much as possible. The reality is never that easy. Veterinarians do not see a clear distinction between the interests of farmers and animals. When they teach a farmer to perform minor veterinary care, is that good or bad for the animal? In some cases it surely is bad, in others it is not. It is not possible to develop an easy-to-use moral model that tells a veterinarian what to do in a specific situation. Such a model is always theoretical and stripped from the context in which the problems arise. Moreover, the philosophical foundation of such a model would also always be shaky. There may very well be cultures in which people really do not care about chickens and do not see an issue whatsoever in cutting their beaks. In the end, the advice veterinarians find most helpful is the advice they get from colleagues. They understand the problems, give practical advice, and are able to come up with the most interesting viewpoints; they know the context of the problem.

Not just veterinarians, all managers find it difficult to identify moral dimensions of their decisions and get moral advice. As we know from our daily papers, many things go wrong in organizations. Everyone agrees that the decisions managers make have impact on the lives of others. Yet managers are often unsure about what the right thing is and scholars have a hard time pinpointing the problems. The problem with moral advice coming from outsiders is the absence of context. An important point of this book is that we think too isolated about moral questions

in the business field. Up to now scholars have been prone to study moral questions by isolating the problems. By doing so, they do not ask all the relevant moral questions. The values of a situation are judged without regard to all the facts. I believe an important aspect in judging the actions of managers is to relate their actions, among other aspects,[4] to the perceived goal of the organization. I deal with these problems in this book. I explore a new way of describing moral dimensions within a business context. The purpose is not to formulate moral advice, but to focus on describing moral problems (within their context) and finding out how that relates to practice. Once there is more clarity as how to study moral sides of organizations, it will also be easier to advise managers on the decisions they face.

1.2　　　Two Popular Discourses

In bars, at dinner tables and in newspapers two moral stances towards companies appear to dominate. In both stances the presumption is that business people are only interested in making profits. In one stance people will justify this as the thing that business people do: "What's wrong with making a buck?!" The other stance is to stress the negative consequences of such behavior and its reprehensible character: "It's all about greed and the common man gets screwed!"

The first stance generates what I call the "do-well discourse." Here people argue that doing business has nothing to do with ethics and has nothing inherently immoral; that people pursuing their own interest will serve the common good; and that as long as no one does anything illegal, everything is fine and talking about business ethics is a waste of time. As Michael Douglas's character Gordon Gekko says in *Wall Street*: "Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies and cuts through and captures the essence of evolutionary spirit. …. Greed will save that malfunctioning corporation called the USA." This way of thinking harks back to Adam Smith and brings to mind the ideas of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hajek, even though these names do not come up in the discussions in the bars, at dinner tables and in newspapers. It is important to note, however, that to these scholars doing business is not *im*moral. It is *morally good* to just try to do well as a manager. To do well *means* doing good. The moral elements of a do-well discourse however, often stay in the *background* of the discourse.[5] So this discourse is certainly not about people who only care about money. On the contrary, the do-well discourse is often defended on moral

grounds. Managers who want to do good with the company's money—money that belongs to shareholders—are thieves. They are playing Robinhood with other people's money and that is morally wrong. It is simply not the task of managers to try to do good. If shareholders want to give their money to charities, fine. But that is not the task of business managers who do not own the company.

At the other end of the extreme, the profit motive is viewed as a bad thing. In bars, at dinner tables you hear: "What's wrong with making a buck? Well, I'll tell you! Businesses are only interested in money. They don't give [an expletive] about the results of their actions on the environment, the well-being or even the lives of ordinary people!" In such conversations we hear that managers should always do the *morally* right thing and that is usually the exact opposite of making money. In the conversation of "do-well," managers are heroes. In the conversation of "do-good," they are suspects. The latter views doing business as dirty. This way of thinking harks back to a stakeholder theorist (among business ethicists) like R. Freeman: "Freeman is out to sketch a theory that challenges 'the basic idea of managerial capitalism': namely that 'in return for controlling the firm, management vigorously pursues the interests of stockholders'. In this formulation 'vigorously' is a euphemism for 'single-mindedly' or 'ruthlessly'."[6] A business should let its actions be guided by moral principles (doing the right thing) but in reality the only thing it cares about is making money. If Shell wants to sink the Brent Spar or if a pharmaceutical company wants to lower its prices for AIDS medicine, beware: there must be something fishy. This stance I like to call the "do-good discourse." The view reminds me of Youp van 't Hek, a popular Dutch comedian who, in one of his acts, plays a president of a chemical corporation who is busy all day dumping all kinds of toxic materials into the environment yet tucks in his beautiful daughter with loving devotion every night. The question for Youp becomes, how can such a good father be such a villain in the daytime? How can he live with himself? He may be a good father, but he is also a hypocrite and cannot be trusted. This clearly buys into the discourse I just described.

The do-good discourse appeals; a variety of it pops up in the media all the time. Recent research by Gallup and NIPO shows that most people in Western countries feel businesses cannot be trusted.[7] Only one percent of the Dutch believe that big companies act in the best interest of society. In many Christmas stories values like friendship, family and sharing are prevalent but, of course, these stories need bad guys. The bad guys are usually businessmen—men with no hearts, interested only in the bottom line. A nice Christmas bonus or a day off

for their employees is a waste of money. Just think of Dickens's Scrooge. The same can be found in other literature: businessmen are often the bad guys (think of "The Grapes of Wrath"). In order to know who or what is Good, we must have an idea of who or what is Bad. The do-good story provides us with quick and easy-to-understand answers. The business position is seen as one in which the company cares only about itself, a selfish attitude. The moral position is one in which a company cares about the rest of the world, an altruistic attitude. According to the do-good discourse, a president of a multinational is only interested in looking after the interests of his company. This means he will almost never act morally right. In a certain way, we do admire presidents of oil companies; we acknowledge their prestigious societal positions. Yet we seem to assume that in being able to reach these positions, CEO's of oil companies have to have bad moral qualities. Any president of an oil company must otherwise be schizophrenic: within one man, a business discourse competes with a moral discourse. The message is: when at work, the business discourse wins and, almost automatically, immoral actions will be the result. The *goal* of most companies is the opposite of good morals. Business will be business in the do-good discourse. And what goes for oil CEO's goes for CEO's of smaller companies. In that sense, many business people are seen as bad people. Asking a company to do good is like asking the devil to devote his life to charity. It will never work. The best we can hope for is to soften the edges.[8]

Even though the do-good discourse claims that there is so much more than money, interestingly enough, in its discourse, when a company has a choice between two courses of action, the one that *costs* most is usually the best in a moral sense. Moral behavior has a price. The higher the price a company is willing to pay for a principle, the "better" (in a moral sense) the company is. After all, the one that costs least must be the best for the company because it makes the largest profit. This means that doing good within the do-good story line is often not defined in moral terms, but in monetary terms. Acting according to market principles is making as much money as possible. Acting morally must be the opposite: doing things that cost money. For example, if Shell in Burma is acting morally right as a company, it should have clean hands. If it costs Shell money to get out of Burma, than this must be the right moral thing to do. The do-good story not only defines the interesting moral questions concerning business beforehand, it also answers them. When we appeal to morals, the moral debate is already won. Not much more evidence is needed. The action that would be morally best equals the one that costs most money.

A manager is left to wonder what making decisions with sole regard to the bottom line (the do-well discourse) would mean. What would it mean, telling them that success is only to be defined in profits, in monetary terms? Life would be simple if that were possible. What is "profit"? The money made at the end of the year? Or the money made at the end of ten years? Business theorists working in the field of strategy can tell us, and do tell us, how complex the world of business is for a manager. And of course, there is no manager who would do literally everything to maximize profits. Not many managers would be willing to commit murder if that would help their profits, to give an extreme example. But apart from legal boundaries, there are norms on how to deal with other human beings, both employees and business partners, which play at least some role in the decisions managers make. To say that managers should just maximize profits is not doing justice to actual situations; actual situations are much more complicated.

When we think now of the do-good discourse, what would it mean for managers to act purely morally? If we tell managers that success should be defined in moral terms? Often managers have to decide among stakeholders who all have legitimate claims, but whose claims are mutually exclusive—the so-called "dirty hands" dilemma. Defined by Van Oosterhout: "It concerns the problem that, sometimes, political leaders, managers or other persons in positions of authority must act wrong in order to do good, that is, they must break or set aside valid norms, for the sake of some overriding social or political concern."[9] Even when trying to act as morally as possible, this may lead to conflicts and even immoral behavior. Should Antigone be loyal to her brother or her uncle? Should a manager protect jobs or the environment? Managers and their organizations operate within clouds of uncertainty. Most managers want to do good and feel good about themselves. I am convinced that most managers want to make the morally right decisions. For them, however, there is no possibility of making decisions while keeping clean hands. The dilemmas they say they face on a daily basis cannot be understood as choosing between doing well and doing good; they are often impossible to analyze in terms of ethical versus self-interest. Of course, in every situation all kinds of values play a role. Managers should not and do not make decisions looking solely to maximize profits or solely to obey abstract ethical principles. People talk about values all the time. They may not do so in abstract philosophical concepts, but whenever people make decisions, values play a role. Managers and their organizations are not isolated in society. They operate within several value contexts, and that influences their behavior. Youp was right in

pointing out that managers have a personal life in which other kinds of values are important.

Managers do feel the need to talk about the moral dimensions of their work. Within conversations people negotiate their moral positions. One hears arguments like: "Okay, so I don't like what my company does with the environment, but what should I do about it? Quit my job?" Managers have a different view of reality from the two popular discourses. Doing good is nice, but one should also do well. There might be responsibilities towards husband/wife and children. Managers are often pragmatic. Their morality must be tractable[10]—that is, amenable to the complexity of their continual pressure to decide and act.

To managers in real life, the world is not as simple as the two popular discourses assume; their world does not come in extremes. What is "best" for the company in monetary terms is often unclear to them, and what a "morally good decision" would be is at least as unclear. The do-good story tells managers that what they *should* do is try to keep "clean hands." What managers told me during interviews, however, is that that is impossible. This leaves little hope for influencing reality. When managers get advice they feel is irrelevant, or which they simply do not understand, they cannot do much good with that advice.

It is not just managers that take issue with the popular discourses, scholars do as well. After all, in both discourses, moral research does not make much sense. Either business people are bad and we need no more evidence. Or, we assume there is nothing inherent in business that makes people or organizations immoral. The market will sort everything out. And even if something were to go wrong occasionally, we have laws and a government to set things straight. I do, however, believe that studying the moral dimensions of organizations is relevant. Things go wrong when we view the world from one of the extremes and act accordingly.

Take as an example another (already classic) Shell case, the Brent Spar. The moral, "clean hands" discourse (with two meanings, now that we are dealing with an environmental issue) in the media was firm and clear from the beginning: an oil company must be suspected of wrongdoing. When Shell England announced that it would sink the Brent Spar, it was thus assumed that it was their most profitable option. After all, Shell as a company makes decisions that suit its financial interests only, regardless of the consequences. The morally right course of action must be the opposite: not sinking the Brent Spar. Greenpeace described the Brent

Spar as a "deadly chemical cocktail" and called the sinking of it a "disaster." Greenpeace also claimed that sinking the Brent Spar would cost Shell England next to nothing, whereas environmentally better options would be much more expensive. A remark along the lines of the do-good story line. This discourse was powerful even though Shell dismissed all accusations. It claimed that ninety percent of the sludge was sand and the remaining ten percent contained oil residues with negligible amounts of heavy metals. Furthermore, any other method of getting rid of the platform would pose much higher risks to the environment. Many consumers in Holland and Germany, however, decided to listen to Greenpeace and boycott Shell products. The discourse that Shell was acting out of pure self-interest and thus immorally was appealing; it fulfilled our expectations of a company. Shell gave in to the pressure and decided at the last moment not to sink the Brent Spar. Later, however, various independent tests showed that Shell was right in most of its statements and that Greenpeace had made false accusations. Greenpeace apologized for its statements and actions conceding that things were more complicated than they had presented them. In the do-good conversation, Shell is automatically a suspect. In the do-well discourse it is an admirable multinational and we have to accept it has consequences on the environment.

The Brent Spar case demonstrates how wrong acting from one of the two extremes can be. The do-good story line does not do justice to people and organizations, or to our own convictions. Chances are neither one of the extremes is satisfactory. What now if you were a manager? Neither of the two discourses seems to provide helpful advice. An easy way out would be to assume that the truth must be in between. The good, however, does not always manifest itself in compromises. The Shell case demonstrates how complicated the moral dimensions of companies are. This is a problem not only for managers who want to do the right thing, but also for those who want to study their decisions. Sometimes people are quick in their judgments but most cases are hard to judge; it is hard to even know what the moral issues are. Reality is much more resistant than either extreme would lead us to believe. This poses a problem for those who want to study the (moral) decisions of managers.[11]

Scholars from many different fields have come to the same conclusion. First of all, a philosopher like Bauman and many other post-modern philosophers tell us that the world isn't the outcome of conscious decisions. Therefore, what to consider a decision and what not is already problematic. Even assuming that we are able to

identify the decisions of managers that matter, then scholars from the field of organizational decision theory tell us that it is very difficult to study decisions of managers, let alone moral decisions. As March writes: "The study of how decisions happen provides a setting for a cluster of contested issues about human action. The first issue is whether decisions are to be viewed as choice-based or rule-based. Do the decision-makers pursue the logic of consequence, making choices among alternatives by evaluating their consequences in terms of prior preferences? Or do they pursue a logic of appropriateness, fulfilling identities or roles by recognizing situations and following rules that match appropriate behavior to the situations they encounter?"[12] If we view decisions as choice-based, which is mainstream (Simon, March & Cyert: bounded rationality; Williamson: transaction costs), then all kinds of questions about the rationality of the human decision maker and the uncertainty of their choices surface. It is hard to identify all the values involved, even though within this view facts and values can be clearly separated. And if we assume the rule-based logic, decisions are not seen as conscious anymore, which makes it even harder to identify the values involved.[13] Facts and values within this view are completely interwoven. Even assuming we can identify the (important) decisions and identify all the values involved, incommensurable values have to weighed against each other. Despite all the recent attention philosophers have given to the problem of weighing different values, they do not seem able to come with a good solution.

Managers cannot function by trying to make principled choices all the time. Thinking, "What is the right thing to do?" when facing every decision is not manageable. And, as we have seen, the problem of causality enters in. Often it is not clear what the "right thing" to do is because all consequences of different actions are not clear. Think, for example, of a veterinarian who wants—out of principle—to always choose in favor of the animal. He thus decides to teach a farmer to medicate an animal in an emergency situation. The farmer later misjudges the animal's symptoms, gives unnecessary treatment, and the end result is to hurt the animal rather than help it. Managers, working in their context, know how complex causality can be and how hard it is to predict consequences. The popular discourses give the impression of providing clear guidelines for action, but once in a specific situation—their context—the guidelines are not clear at all; the advice is intractable. In a sense, the two popular discourses do make situations very clear and very surveyable; the paradox is that they make situations look so surveyable that they no longer link to the situations managers find themselves in. Therefore, when managers confront moral issues in their daily

decisions and actions, this can only be on the basis of a—what I would call—tractable morality.

1.3   Business Ethics and Doing Well or Good

The do-good and the do-well discourses come up short in describing the moral dimensions of organizations. The two popular discourses are too quick in their judgments and reality is more complicated than they make it out to be. Another direction that can provide guidance for describing the moral dimension is the relatively new academic discipline called business ethics. If the popular discourses fail, maybe this more sophisticated discipline can help.

Business ethics leans heavily on philosophical ethics.[14] Some business ethicists base their moral advice on insights that they gain from reading classic moral philosophers. Utilitarianism is often used, for example, in cost-benefit analyses. It "is a powerful theory that certainly fits in well with our moral intuitions, particularly within the context of the business community."[15] Bob Solomon applied "virtue ethics" to business ethics.[16] Solomon came up with four basic virtues for companies: honesty, fairness, trust and toughness. He received criticism for the seemingly arbitrary basis on which these four virtues were picked.[17]

Even so, it turns out that putting advice based on moral philosophy into action is problematic. Managers do not and cannot do what these ethicists advise. Hoffmaster, on the field of applied ethics: "Within moral philosophy, factual matters are prescinded in favor of constructing rational defenses of general principles into a consistent theoretical system. The assumption is that the resulting moral system can yield determinate solutions for real moral problems."[18] This assumption fails. Peter French, a well known (business) ethicist: "I am convinced that the primary problem of business ethics is not to identify ways of applying the traditional moral theories and principles in order to evaluate the actions of corporate managers. That, unfortunately, has been the characteristic approach in the field."[19] The relationship between, say, Kant's "categorical imperative" and managers' many daily decisions is not always clear to ethicists, let alone managers. Actual moral decision-making is situational, it is not the application of a general theoretical rule to a particular situation. What is often missing in prescriptive philosophical ethics is the context, especially the business context. Being a manager is not easy. When they wonder what to do, the popular discourses turn out to be too simplistic. If they

turn to moral philosophy for help, things get too complicated; i.e., the moral advice is intractable.

Given all these complications I cannot pretend that this study will generate answers to moral questions that confront professionals and business people. For one, this is not the task of moral philosophy. At the very least we need to acknowledge that trying to find out what is going on morally in an organization is something completely different from judging the same organization. As Bradley writes: "We can no more learn to act rightly by appealing to the ethical theory of right action than we can learn to play golf well by appealing to the mathematical theory of the flight of the golf-ball."[20] In Ethics 101 discussions, students are taught no one can be proven "right" or "wrong." Ethics is not a science like mathematics. In this book, I will not try to focus on "truth" of moral questions; I leave aside whether something is good or bad. I will instead concentrate on bringing moral dimensions to the fore—complicated enough. *I will focus on how moral questions come into existence in the first place. It is more important to understand something about the fact that someone asks him or herself a moral question and how, than giving an answer to it.* Where moral philosophers frame some moral questions for managers, managers frame their moral questions (many of which seem intractable at first glance: the issues seem too complicated) on a daily basis, making them somehow tractable. Managers make them tractable in such a way that they are able to make decisions even though they are often unaware *how* they do it and how they cast all kinds of moral issues. Therefore, *I will also study how managers make their morality tractable.* I am not able to solve all the moral dilemmas which are involved in this research. Why did I write this book then? Well, for the insight.

1.4   Business Ethics and Doing Well and Good

Some within the field of business ethics state, often based on empirical research,[21] that the do-good story line is wrong because acting morally right might actually be profitable. This is what Graafland calls the win-win perspective on the relationship between profits and principles.[22] The business ethicist Solomon argues that excellent companies (as defined by Peters and Waterman[23]) are those that are most virtuous.[24] Beauchamp and Bowie state: "It is generally believed, for good reason, that the practice of morality is in the interest of business, and this is one justifiable motive for acting in accordance with morality."[25] Velasquez argues that ethical behavior is the best long term strategy for a company.[26] And KPMG

Integrity Consulting, would have you believe that not to act morally right is a bad idea in a business sense, especially in the long run. To put this differently, when a company does good, it will also do well. Within business ethics hardly a book has been written without reference to the empirical example of The Body Shop, a company with clear moral guidelines doing very well in a business sense. In Holland, by the way, a counter example is easily found. The Van der Valk concern (restaurants and hotels) has managed time and again to have front-page negative news: the concern was convicted for breaking many laws and even jeopardizing the lives of its customers and employees. Yet, people in Holland continue to eat and sleep at Van der Valk in large numbers.

My problem with "doing good means doing well" is more fundamental. First of all, it is important to clearly define what is meant by "doing good." The business ethicists cited above for example, have very different notions of what it actually means for a company to do good.[27] Second, in stating that ethics is good for the bottom line, ethics has become instrumental. It is strange to tell a manager that he or she must do good because doing good is good for profits. One can question whether with this motivation one is doing good in the first place. What would happen if the manager were to discover that by acting badly in an ethical sense the profits would be greater? Is it then okay to disregard ethics?

An even bigger problem with stating that "doing good means doing well" is that the distinction that is denied is actually reified in the process. The connection between market-oriented and moral action is accentuated.[28] In fact, now both actions are supposed to go hand in hand. In all of my contacts with managers, I found no evidence whatsoever that that connection is a real one for managers. They do not seem to perceive their decisions as a choice between doing good and doing well.

1.5   Discursive Contexts

This book is a contribution to the enterprise of business ethics. In contrast to some business ethics research, I do not believe that the moral content of an organization can be determined by looking at the goals of the organization. To make a good ethical analysis, one has to look at more than just what an organization wants to do. Others within business ethics do not look at the goals of the organization, but mainly at the moral agent. In the association model the moral side of a company is reviewed by examining the employees. The company is thus reduced to the sum

of individual actions. Employees can be screened, for example, on the way they deal with things such as their personal responsibility towards stakeholders, their own tasks and the company's assets. The question then always remains: what does this say about the organization at large? What would happen if a researcher individually screened the employees of an army (or a drug cartel) in this way? Surely this wouldn't reveal most (at least not the most important) moral questions about such an organization. There are many elements that play a role. In real life, many issues and values must be weighed against each other. To determine the moral dimensions within an organization one can look at the problems managers themselves say they face, and what courses of action they say are open to them. By listening to them, we can learn more about morals within an organization than by constructing purely moral positions or by applying philosophical ethics. In this book, I will not look at just the bottom line of an organization, or isolated values such as "integrity" or "openness" or something abstract as the moral content of an organization. I will not establish moral principles. What I will do is pay close attention to moral practices. I will not be the judge telling right from wrong, but I will try to learn how managers cope in real life. In doing so, I will take a step away from looking at individuals making decisions (believing that prescription is more complicated than focusing on one problem) and look instead at the *discursive* practices and contexts in which agents operate. I will study the managers' contexts by looking at how they talk about their reality: the discursive context. An individual veterinarian, for example, is always influenced by context. It is ethically interesting when a discourse itself identifies something as morally relevant.

The discursive context is ethically important because the way a manager talks about his daily reality tells us a lot about the way he acts. The way veterinarians talk about animals speaks volumes about the way they treat animals. When I speak with a veterinarian about his business and he goes on about inalienable fundamental animal rights, he is not likely to give in easily to pressure from animal owners to kill a healthy animal for economic gain. As soon as managers of soccer clubs start to talk, for whatever reasons, about soccer as a "product" (a relatively new development), a whole new world opens up around the same old game with new opportunities, new managerial problems and new moral issues.[29] Within discursive practices many different moral aspects play a role. Studying discursive practices is doing justice to the complicated phenomenon of ethics within business. Even though talking about discursive practices is more complicated than buying into one of the popular discourses, and even though it does not lead to

quick solutions, I hope it will lead to a better understanding what morally goes on in an organization.

1.6   Customer Relationships

In this study of discursive practices, what specific discursive contexts should I consider and how should I study them? I want to look at situations where moral questions arise, but that does not help very much. After all, every business organization has a societal function and every organization has an impact in many different ways. In that sense, I could choose almost any aspect of almost any organization to study moral sides of companies. To demarcate my study, I will study how managers view their customers and customer relationships. Because of my epistemological assumptions (described in Chapter 3), this also means studying how organizations *treat* their customers. Many values play a role in the way people are treated. The question of how organizations treat their customers is therefore a question with a clear moral dimension and thus interesting to business ethicists. It is also a question with a clearly descriptive dimension, making it interesting for business studies in general and for the stakeholders of the organizations involved in particular.

The three empirical cases of this book are about organizations that have to watch the bottom line. But it is also about organizations whose customers are more than faceless people (or animals). In such a context, managers themselves notice many moral dimensions about their daily behavior. In their relations with customers, in producing their goods and services and in acting as an organization, all kinds of moral questions automatically arise. Ruthlessly trying to maximize profits and acting strictly for economic benefit is simply out of the question for these managers. Managers who only worry about producing light bulbs will probably not identify their own work as being morally highly relevant. The manager's relationship with the light bulb customer is not very direct. But asking a veterinarian to treat an animal is another question. The relationship of a veterinarian with his customers is much more direct. Again, in treating others there is an obvious moral element.

I studied three completely different types of organizations with three completely different customer relationships. In this way I show how one can use discursive contexts (subject of Chapter 3) to study all kinds of organizations and their moral

dimensions. Heineken would have been an interesting case: how do they view and treat their customers? With respect to the popular discourses, do the managers of Heineken only care about making a profit? Or do they do whatever they can to produce good beer that brings people pleasure and at the same time try everything they can to prevent the misuse of alcohol? Or does the management of Heineken ask completely different questions? Unfortunately, at the last minute, the management of Heineken denied permission to study them for fear that the research could be used against them in a court of law. The difficulty of getting permission is also the reason why I never even tried to study the tobacco industry, even though that would have been as interesting.

The subject of Chapter 4 is the client relationships of banks, specifically from the viewpoint of Rabobank managers. Rabobank is not listed on the stock exchange, does not need to satisfy shareholders, and so should turn all its attention to helping regional businesses. Looking from the outside, we might expect other bank managers, from the ABN-Amro bank or ING bank for example, to just "do well." This means expecting they only care about making as much money as possible. In Chapter 4, however, the distinction turns out to be not very helpful; managers do not recognize themselves in either view. How do they view themselves? The research shows five different ways in which bank managers treat customers.

I have mentioned veterinarians several times because they are one of the three empirical studies of this book; their client relationships are the subject of Chapter 5. What is interesting about veterinarians is that they have two types of customers: animals and animal owners. From the outside, a pure do-good discourse expects veterinarians to do whatever they can to help animals. This discourse is very appealing. After all, veterinarians should be the solicitors of animals, who cannot speak for themselves. We could also expect veterinarians to use a more do-well discourse: to look after their own interests and just do what animal owners ask. The leading research question of Chapter 5 is: How do practicing veterinarians treat animals and their owners? An additional question is: Where do these discourses come from? The latter concerns the professionalisation and socialization processes of veterinarians.

The third empirical case is of a charity. The leading question of this chapter is: What are the special circumstances of these fundraisers when compared to fundraisers of a commercial organization? Charities are interesting to ethicists,

because as organizations they have as their expressed purpose just to do Good. To be able to "do Good," charities need money. Of course that does not mean that the end justifies all means, that a charity can treat their customers however they like. When we expect a charity to keep clean hands, we are mainly concerned with the way they make their money. A charity should collect its money without being aggressive towards donors and by being completely honest all the time. So a charity should never lie and not send a letter every week to its donors asking for more money. When we think on the other hand of selfish charities (and many people have this view of charities: according the aforementioned NIPO/Gallup research, only four percent of the Dutch feel that environmental groups and charities want what is best for society), we think of an organization which does whatever it can to raise money. Think of aggressive direct marketing tools or a television advertisement in which claims are made that are not completely true. Chapter 6 contains a case study of the Netherlands Heart Foundation.

In all of the cases presented (summarized in Table 1.1), outsiders can, and actually do, construct clear, purely do-good discourses and clear do-well discourses. As it turns out, this way of looking at the world does not make any sense to the managers involved. The actual situations and viewpoints of managers are described in the cases.

Table 1.1: Expected behavior of managers

	Do-well discourse	Do-good discourse	Reality
Bank directors	Making a good profit as a guiding principle	Local interests and the interests of clients as a guiding principle	Discourses of Chapter 4
Veterinarians	Farmers' interests as a guiding principle to make a good profit	Animal welfare as a guiding principle	Discourses of Chapter 5
Charity managers	Raising money as a guiding principle in order to do a lot of good	Honesty as a guiding principle	Discourses of Chapter 6

1.7   What Lies Ahead

Chapters 4 through 6, the main body of this book, present the three empirical studies. One question recurs: How do managers treat their customers? Three completely different settings provide the answer. Table 1.2 gives an overview of the techniques and the different data sources used in the empirical studies.

Table 1.2: An overview of the case-specific techniques

	Case-specific techniques for discourse analysis	**Data sources**
Banks	Q-methodology	Interviews (10 open and 30 structured), inquiries, academic literature, documents
Veterinarians	Q-methodology	Interviews (20 open and 115 structured), inquiries, academic literature, documents
Charities	Ethnography, participant observation	Email correspondence, documents, interviews

Chapters 2 and 3 are of a more theoretical nature; they are not necessary to understand the empirical cases presented in Chapters 4 through 6. These chapters will be of most interest to business ethicists and readers who are interested in discourse theory. They contain a justification for why I think I need discourse theory to answer the questions I raised in this chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 also show why and how discourse analysis can be helpful in the field of business ethics in general.

The main questions of Chapter 2 are: Why is business ethics an important academic field? Where does the field leave room for new research? After concluding that discourse theory is very promising, Chapter 3 looks at it in depth. What is the nature of language and what do I mean exactly by the concepts "discourse," "discourse theory" and "discourse analysis"?

The last part of this book, Chapter 7, ties all the chapters together. It draws conclusions regarding the cases and the purpose of this book.

Notes

[1] Bauman (1993), p. 17.

[2] The answer to this question depends of course on your definition of "corruption."

[3] Carr (1992).

[4] To name a few: the identity of the manager and his or her (perceived) social responsibilties. Much more on this later.

[5] But which can be made explicit. For example by debating the discourse.

[6] Sorell (1998), p. 24.

[7] *Spits*, Tuesday, 27 August 2002, ANP.

[8] Surprisingly, the do-good sentiments are not much found in business ethics. The field is much more sympathetic towards the business community. In academic literature, traces of the do-good conversation are more often found among cultural critics like Marxists. More on business ethics in the next two sections.

[9] Oosterhout (2002), p. 68.

[10] For more on the concept of "tractability," see Roe (1994).

[11] Ethics should be related to how managers view the world and what they and their organizations are trying to accomplish. If we really want managers to listen to our advice, and change something in reality, we should not approach them by telling them that ethics doesn't matter. Or talk to them with the attitude that we are asking the devil to do Good. We must try to understand their situation and help them with identifying the ethical aspects of their daily decisions.

[12] March (1997), p. 10.

[13] Decisions are shaped by the organizational roles people play. "Much of the behavior in an organization is specified by standard operating procedures, professional standards, cultural norms, and institutional structures linked to conceptions of identity." (March (1997), p. 17).

[14] Another thing that is noticeable about business ethics is that it pays most of its attention to clear big moral dilemmas. Important as this is, big moral dilemmas are relatively few compared to all the other decisions managers make.

[15] Kaptein & Wempe (2000), p. 74.

[16] Solomon (1992).

[17] See for example Kaptein & Wempe (2000), Chapter 2.

[18] Hoffmaster (1992) p. 1421.

[19] French (1984), p. xii.

[20] Quoted in Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1422.

[21] Griffin & Mahon (1997).

[22] Graafland (2002).

[23] Peters & Waterman (1982).

[24] Solomon (1992).

[25] Beauchamp & Bowie (1988), p. 5.

[26] Velasquez (1998).

[27] If you are a business ethicist like Green, who describes deontological moral rules for managers, I can see why it be would handy if doing good and doing well would go hand in hand. Why, otherwise, would managers abide by the rules disclosed to them? Those rules would only be followed if it can be shown that doing good *is* good for those who do it (see Bauman (1993), p. 27).

[28] Reification is also a problem when different perspectives are discussed on a theoretical trade-off between doing good and doing well. See for example Graafland (2002). Next to the win-win perspective on the relationship between profits and principles, Graafland develops an economic framework that distinguishes three other perspectives. Like an "acceptable profit perspective," in which, at a negative relationship between profits and principles, the firm will seek a combination of a maximum level of principles and a minimum level of profits. As we will see more clearly later on, this relationship between profits and principles, between doing good or well, is not a real one for managers facing decisions. Maybe when reading formal statements by firms, we might be able to recognize perspectives on a relationship between profits and principles, but when studying actual managerial decisions, this will turn out to be much harder.

[29] Hawkes (1998).

2.   The Context of Business Ethics

2.1   The Popularity of Ethics

Ethics—whether the context is business or society—is hot. In public debate, references are increasingly made to ethics. Politicians in the Netherlands speak of the "loss of values and norms."[1] Some say that because the government is taking a step back, it has bequeathed to business the role of providing values and norms. Others contest that the economic sector has become the ideologically dominant. Companies are openly reflecting on their morals. In that sense, a discursive space has opened up: organizations increasingly explain what they are doing and why they are doing it. Many organizations produce codes of conduct. Companies do their best to communicate a morally good public image; one related to "ethics" is, apparently, appealing. The Brent Spar case illustrates the importance of such an image.

After major scandals, moral issues surrounding business command public attention. Think of discussions after the Bhopal disaster or the sinking of the Exxon Valdez. Recently, newspapers paid attention to business ethics because company after company in the U.S. (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom) revealed accounting "problems" totaling billions of dollars. How do we even begin to make sense of this? In this chapter, I will look at the field of business ethics, i.e., the academic field in which ethics in and around business is discussed.

2.2   Values

Like any other academic field, business ethics leans heavily on concepts. And, like most academic disciplines, many are heavily contested. In business ethics, an important concept is that of "value." Mark Johnson wrote: "Every aspect of human experience is pervaded with value. This makes the concept of value itself one of the most complex and difficult notions one could possibly undertake to analyze. There is a huge literature on the subject, and there was even an area of philosophy called value theory, but no longer."[2] Values are "essentially contested

concepts": the proper use of these concepts—as well as concrete values such as honesty—is never agreed upon. What the use of the concept "honesty" means always depends on the context in which it is used.

Even though a concept like value is hard to distinguish and people will never completely agree on the notion of value, it is important to discipline the use of it. Not wanting to dwell on definition, let the following be a guide for this book: values are not only hard to define, they are also hard to locate; they are neither here nor there.[3] The best we can say is that values never come just by themselves; they never appear unaccompanied. Values are not things we can point out; they are always attached to something and express a quality. They are attached to objects ("a gun is a bad thing") and to people and their moods ("I feel good today"). Here, I will use *values* to mean "qualities that are appreciated for contributing to or constituting what is good, right, beautiful or worthy of praise and admiration."[4] Reliability, honesty and solidarity are examples.

Having defined values as qualities, it is important to avoid objectifying these qualities. A quality is clearly not an object that can be pointed out. Values are not part of a transcendental realm within or behind reality, as Platonists argue. In that sense, they cannot be objectified when using the definition I just cited. But if values are seen as *stable* qualities *existing* in reality, they are still, in a sense, objectified. That would be the case when someone argues that *the* (a priori) value of something *exists*. To me, however, values are *attributed* in a specific practice (which is always in a context); the quality is not already out there. Values are qualities-in-use. It is very well possible that different qualities are attributed to the same phenomenon. I use the expression "attributed in a specific practice" and not "attributed by someone" because values are not private. Just as a private language does not exist (as Wittgenstein has shown us), private values do not exist.

Norms are regulations prescribing what we are supposed to do or not do in certain situations, like "do keep promises" and "do not torture animals." Norms are based on values. Clearer than values, norms are more direct. People express them more easily, such as, "people should greet each other when standing in an elevator." *Morals*, then, are values and norms taken together. And *ethics* is the systematic reflection on morality.

2.3 The Birth of Business Ethics

The impact of organizations on society is enormous. With respect to personal lives, organizations determine most daily activities. Employees do more or less what employers expect them to do during working hours. The societal impact of organizations goes well beyond this influence on employees' activities; repercussion on the natural and social environment is immense. A worker cannot lift a stone bigger than himself, yet the Egyptians managed to build the pyramids. When working together and organized, people can accomplish enormous, world-influencing tasks. Organizations produce weapons of mass destruction. They produce chemicals that pollute the natural environment. The greatest difference between our society and that of the Egyptians four thousand years ago is technological knowledge. Our technological skills make the impact of organizations—potential or otherwise—even more ponderous. Enormous responsibility automatically comes with these enormous potentials. In traditional ethics, the more influence we have on other people's lives, the more responsibilities we have and the greater the need to reflect on those responsibilities. The influence of organizations on people's lives is far greater than the influence of interpersonal relationships. Yet, business ethics is a relatively small field of research compared to business studies and philosophical ethics. Can the literature of interpersonal ethics be applied to businesses? Only in a limited way, I believe. Thus, if business ethics does not have all the tools to reflect on responsibilities, we had better look for theories that are equipped to examine and guide these responsibilities.

Less than thirty years ago, an academic business ethical discourse came into existence. "One might date the birth of business ethics as November 1974 – the date of the first conference on business ethics at the University of Kansas."[5] Does that mean that businesses were all acting morally wrong before 1974? Of course not. Apparently, when talking about business and moral action, there was an unreflected element. Before 1974, Friedrich von Hajek[6] made a strong case for not considering corporations as autonomous moral entities. The market is not moral or immoral to him; it is amoral. In those days, there was little attention at universities for ethics in the field of business: the market divided. As long as everyone acted according to official rules, ethics had nothing to do with business. And, if someone did not act according to the rules (the law), the government could always step in to correct things.

Many employees of companies were not comfortable with the amoral story. In their daily activities, employees noticed that they were not just maximizing profit all day.[7] They considered other issues and goals when making a decision on the work floor, like how to deal with a customer. When dealing with another person and in face-to-face to relationships, all kinds of values play a role—be that person a customer or our mother.

Within universities, neoclassical economic models—where the responsibility of managers is mainly to maximize shareholders' interests—were also being questioned. This was partly due to the growing awareness within the field of business ethics of the (sometimes negative) impact of organizations. The new main model became stakeholder theory, where the interests of all those possibly affected by a company are taken into account. The stakeholder model has the choices managers make as its focus, just like the amoral model and the shareholder model; it looks at the responsibilities of individual managers and what the best decisions (in a moral sense) they can make are. In shareholder theory, managers are advised to do what is best for the value of the shares of the company and not let moral claims of other parties influence their decisions.[8] In stakeholder theory, the main questions are which parties a manager has to talk to and what kind of moral arguments he or she has to consider when making a decision. To resolve conflicts within stakeholder theory, many scholars turn to classic moral theories for help.

2.4 Problems with Applying Classic Moral Theories within Business Ethics

2.4.1 Business Ethics and Classic Moral Theories

According to Van Luijk and Kimman, well-known business ethicists in the Netherlands, business ethics is an institutionalized discussion about values and norms that should contribute to formulating directions for action[9] or rules[10] for managers.[11] In formulating those directions, classic moral philosophers are often studied. Some scholars within business ethics therefore lean heavily on classic moral theories, such as deontological, utilitarian and virtue "ethical theories."[12] In the first chapter, I cited the well-known business ethicist, Peter French: "I am convinced that the primary problem of business ethics is not to identify ways of applying the traditional moral theories and principles in order to evaluate the

actions of corporate managers. That, unfortunately, has been the characteristic approach in the field."[13]

Earlier I mentioned Solomon as an example of a scholar using virtue ethics.[14] Scholars who use some sort of integrity approach, such as Kaptein and Wempe,[15] usually try to find the right mix between the three classic moral theories. Scholars like Ronald Green[16] take a more deontological approach: they define clear moral guidelines and principles to which companies always have to adhere.[17] A theorist like Freeman, with a "fair contracts" approach, reflects the assumptions and methodology of the modern liberal Rawlsian theory of justice and property rights.[18] The stakeholder approach, like the one by Donaldson and Preston, has some affinities with utilitarian notions. Like the utilitarian moral theorists, stakeholder theorists struggle with the following problems: whom to identify as morally relevant? How to accommodate conflicting interests? And what to do with moral claims that are incomparable? Answers should lead to a situation that is best for all. Contract theorists, such as Donaldson and Dunfee,[19] do not so much get their inspiration from the classic moral theories, but make use of other classic philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

In the first chapter, I set out to study customer relations of different kinds of managers, including moral aspects of these relationships. Do managers want to do good, well or something else? One possible way to study customer relations is to conduct business ethics using classic ethical theories. Peter French (above) makes clear that he is not very happy with this approach. In the following section, I will discuss some difficulties with using the classic ethical theories in business ethics.

2.4.2   *The Human Agent versus Organizations: The Problem of Intentionality*
Classic ethical theories happen to have in common the assigning of a key role to the human agent. The focus is on questions how *individuals* should act in certain, morally relevant, situations. After all, the well being of persons is the primary consideration of Western ethics; most philosophical ethics is about how to treat other human beings. Concepts like "responsibility" and "blame" play central roles.

Theories like utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics can be, according to Van Willigenburg:

> …viewed as systematisations of the moral insights, intuitions and beliefs of
> all who share basic moral concerns and who, therefore, participate in a

common search for answers to questions about how to treat each other, how to organize society and how to lead our lives. Ethical theories try to construct a coherent and illuminative set of principles and rules … But clearly, not one of these theories' systematisations can provide for the whole truth, though they all start from one or another part of folk morality that we find intuitively plausible and fundamental. Each systematic reconstruction will have its blind spots: areas where its principles do not readily apply or even lead to counterintuitive results. This is certainly the case when different levels of analysis are in play. An ethical theory constructed from the perspective of the individual actor will have difficulty accounting for the corporate context.[20]

The moral rules classical ethical theories prescribe can be used to advise individuals when making decisions. But classic moral theories were not designed for the corporate context. As Van Willigenburg notes, in the corporate context, different levels of analysis are in play. An important issue for business ethicists is thus to decide how far they can go in applying philosophical moral theories— meant for individuals—to organizations. In the famous words of Velasquez, "Although we say that organizations "exist" and "act" like individuals, they obviously are not human individuals. Yet our moral categories are designed to deal with individual humans who feel, reason, and deliberate, and who act on the basis of their own feelings, reasoning and deliberations."[21] According to Velasquez, a corporation cannot be held morally responsible. It does not have autonomy. Velasquez is a so-called *moral* individualist. To him intentionality is essentially tied to consciousness. And the human kind of intentionality is necessary for moral responsibility. A related problem is how to punish organizations. Organizations cannot be put in jail and their souls cannot be damned. Many business ethicists who believe that organizations cannot be held responsible in a moral sense spend their energy on individuals within organizations, mostly the decision makers: the managers. Interesting and wide juridical and managerial literature exists on "who is to blame."

Whether or not doing something intentionally is essential to being held responsible is an important question. After all, corporations are capable of doing considerable undeserved harm. And our organizations are complex: division of labor and expertise renders every action employees undertake a minor part of the overall task. This leads to problems in business ethics because of the intentionality condition. "Sin without sinners, crime without criminals, guilt without culprits!

Responsibility for the outcome is, so to speak, floating, nowhere finding its natural haven."[22] There are some arguments that organizations can act intentionally whether or not it is seen as a human form of intentionality. These arguments, however, are not very convincing. There are many cases where the agent (the organization) has caused considerable harm (environmental pollution) that it clearly did not intend—as is required for moral responsibility on the intentionality condition. I am convinced that our ordinary (daily) discourse "casts a considerable wider net"[23] than those business ethicists who defend moral individualism. *I think that in our daily moral discourse, the fact that harm is done is more important than the intentionality condition and is therefore more appropriate* (which I will also make clear in the empirical chapters of this book).

2.4.3   The Outcome of Moral Choices

I argued that many scholars who believe strongly in using one of the classic moral theories within business ethics, focus on managers and how they should make individual choices. Those business ethicists focus on advising individuals within companies: managers. Implicitly it is assumed that the conscious decisions of managers determine what actions organizations undertake. Society and human behavior are viewed as the outcomes of conscious (moral) decisions; the functioning of organizations is seen as the outcome of (conscious) managerial decisions. Thus, if these managers get good moral advice (and abide by it), the organization will behave in a good moral sense. This gives morality a chance to determine behavior. This is why the part of business ethics that leans heavily on classic philosophical ethical theories has clear affinities with choice-based decision theories. Within choice-based theories, the process of weighing alternatives is based on values, i.e., individual preferences over alternative outcomes.[24]

In most theoretical ethical discourse, the outcome of moral choices is given. The main problem it tries to address is how to choose between different actions and/or outcomes. But, because of the aforementioned complexity of organizations, the distance between actions and outcomes is great in both space and time. Anthony Giddens therefore calls our society a risk culture. I will pay more attention to these problems in Section 2.6.2 (in the context of methodological individualism); what is important here are the consequences these problems have for applying classical moral theories in the field of business ethics. Bauman notes:

> We can do harm to them (or they may do harm to us) inadvertently, by ignorance rather than design, without anyone in particular wishing ill, acting

with malice and be otherwise morally blameworthy … It also renders impotent the few, but tested and trustworthy ethical rules we have inherited from the past and are taught to obey. After all, they all tell us how to approach people within our sights and reach, and how to decide which actions are good (and thus ought to be taken) and which are bad (and thus ought to be avoided), depending on their visible and predictable effects on such people. Even if we abide by such rules scrupulously, even if everyone around observed them well, we are far from certain that disastrous consequences will be avoided. Our ethical tools—the code of moral behavior, the assembly of the rules of thumb we follow—have not been, simply, made to measure to the present powers.[25]

2.5   Concerns for "Applied Business Ethics"

The point of this section is that context in ethics is important, especially in applied ethics. Sorrel: "I suggest there is a whole genre of applied ethics–'armchair applied ethics'–that extends in an objectionable way the method of arguing *a priori* and by abstract counter-example that is justifiable in most of the rest of philosophy. In applied ethics, there is an obvious value to leg-work—leaving one's armchair and finding out about the actual practice of business, medicine and law, including the questions that seem natural to practitioners, or urgent to them at different times."[26]

Every issue in daily management has its value implications. Managers, however, are often not aware of this—perhaps one of the reasons why applied business ethics as a field is not as evolved as applied legal or medical ethics. Managers in these fields deal daily with issues they *perceive* as morally relevant; naturally they are more prone to turn to philosophical ethics for help.[27] But when a discourse doesn't perceive an issue as morally relevant, the theoretical moral discourse runs a risk of being misunderstood and giving intractable advice. Even when business people find certain philosophical discussion interesting, they have a hard time relating it to their daily problems. The ethics are too far removed from daily practice. In other words, the discourses are too different. When talking about the same issue, ethicists and business people sometimes use different terms and concepts and talk "past each other."[28] This point is also important in relation to stakeholder theory. Social constructivists have shown that various actors are likely to hold different perceptions of what the problem "really" is.[29] Even if all the

relevant representatives of all the relevant stakes are around a table, the question is whether they perceive and are willing to talk about the same problems, let alone the same solutions. "This does not mean that facts don't enter the discussion. Ironically, participants seem exclusively preoccupied with getting the facts straight. They accuse each other of misinterpreting or simply ignoring crucial evidence. Many authors contend that these agreements about facts actually mask a conflict underlying 'belief systems.' These are sets of causal and normative assumptions about reality."[30] Both discourses have valid arguments within their own rules, but somehow they differ fundamentally.

In an interesting article, Hoffmaster presents some difficulties he has with "applied ethics."[31] By the latter, he does not mean the catchall term used to refer to activities such as ethics rounds and consultations, ethics committees, etcetera. The target is "applied ethics" in the sense of a philosophically based and motivated theory. While his article is about applied ethics in the field of medical ethics, some of his points are relevant in the field of business ethics. Let me briefly list his criticism here. What Hoffmaster calls "criticism," I see as "special areas of concern" when applying philosophical theories to applied business ethics.

Hoffmaster makes a distinction between two kinds of criticism that can be leveled against "applied" moral philosophy, namely, internal criticism and external criticism. Internal criticism purports to show that moral theory cannot succeed on its own terms. External criticism points out that moral theory cannot account for the phenomena of morality.[32]

A first internal difficulty of applied ethics is that many principles within applied ethics are too general and vague to apply determinately to concrete situations, leading to intractable advice; always a concern for any sort of applied ethics. Within applied business ethics, philosophical ethics can play a role. But the philosophical discourse within a field of applied ethics should also be close to daily (business) practices or it will suffer from what Sorell calls the alienation problem: a breach between ethicists and practitioners.[33] As Stark claims, based on his study of the business ethics literature, "Far too many business ethicists have occupied a rarefied moral high ground, removed from the real concerns of and real-world problems of the vast majority of managers. They have been too preoccupied with absolutist notions of what it means for managers to be ethical, with overly general criticisms …"[34]

All the major concepts in moral philosophy are heavily under debate. The proper use is never agreed upon.[35] Which kind of use of a concept is valid in a particular moral dilemma? In the use of the concept "values," when we study what is meant by "loss of values," we see that people can mean completely different things. Although an analysis of concepts can clarify confusion around concepts, it can never establish what a concept "really" means, let alone resolve the disputes in which concepts play a role. "In any moral controversy, the question of whether and if so, how, a principle is to be brought to bear upon that dispute is itself contentious … Disparity between the abstract semantic formulations of principles and the particular empirical circumstances they supposedly govern is a consequence of the inherently general nature of language."[36]

A second internal difficulty with applied ethics is that a multiplicity of principles is taken to be relevant to moral problems in the corporate context but when principles conflict, applied ethics does not offer a good way to resolve the conflict. This problem is often mentioned: for any one moral problem, several principles can be applied. Unfortunately, there is no accepted way of choosing one principle over another.[37]

A third internal difficulty of applied ethics is that it is not helpful in addressing some crucial moral issues because these issues challenge assumptions upon which the theoretical edifice of applied ethics is erected. The assumptions of moral theories with long traditions make many managerial ethical issues difficult to address. Addressing them would challenge the assumptions of the existing theories. Noticeable in this regard for business ethics is the debate over who belongs to our moral sphere. I started this book with some practical dilemmas of veterinarians. What, exactly, is the moral status of a cow? Or, what is the moral status of the environment, when a bank director has to decide upon giving a loan to a potentially dangerous chemical conglomerate? A cow, and certainly the environment, are not autonomous moral agents. Of course that does not necessarily mean that they are thereby excluded from moral considerations, but the moral status of non-humans complicates moral discussions to such a degree that the new field of environmental philosophy is as of yet not able to do much more than map the problems this constitutes for our longstanding moral philosophies.

Turning to Hoffmaster's external criticism, some theoretical moral theory is, in a number of respects, blind to actual moral phenomena. Therefore, applied ethics runs the danger of not appreciating the dynamic character of morality:

> Because 'applied ethics' takes morality to be an autonomous theoretical system under which the flotsam of human experience is subsumed, it cannot account for the flux in that experience. It therefore cannot answer three questions that are central to our understanding of morality: why only certain issues come to be recognized as moral problems; how moral problems get categorized or labeled; and how and why moral change occurs.[38]

Elaborating on this last issue:

> What induces and precipitates moral change? The salient moral issues of today are different from those a decade ago, let alone a century ago. 'Applied ethics' nevertheless remains impervious to moral change; it will deal with whatever moral problems are brought before it, assuming that the identification and characterization of moral problems themselves raise no difficulties and that moral problems can be dealt with independently of the contexts in which they arise. Yet, how, when and what issues become 'moral' are vitally important questions.[39]

The fact *that* an ethical question arises within a business is as interesting as *what* the question is; that many ethical questions are *not* asked is interesting as well. How animals are treated within Holland's intensive food industry is a good example. The kinds of (moral) arguments used in favor of and against intensive animal husbandry have been around for as long as these practices have existed. Yet, during the crisis of foot and mouth disease, the arguments against intensive animal husbandry gained importance. Why is that? The philosophical moral grounds concerning animals had not changed. Being able to understand why issues are raised about intensive animal husbandry requires more than just studying classical moral theory. To understand these types of questions, the context of moral questions must be examined. There must be an understanding of the discourse in which the question appears. The arguments in the Netherlands about intensive animal husbandry can only be understood against the background of the recent outbreaks of bovine diseases like the foot and mouth virus and swine fever.

How and why moral questions are asked in certain contexts at certain times is important. "Answering that question requires a broader conception of morality than

the identification of morality with philosophical moral theory, a conception that situates morality in social, cultural, and historical milieus."[40] Discourse theory is well equipped to study precisely that context and show the working of ethics in practice. By making organizational discourse analyses, it pays attention to moral practice; it puts moral problems in context.

Hoffmaster states, "a theoretically-oriented applied ethics tends to focus on 'big' decisions and portray them in binary terms. By doing so, it ignores pragmatic strategies for responding to moral problems such as abiding time, compromising or cycling through competing values."[41] When one leans too heavily on theoretical-oriented applied ethics, one's morality runs the risk of being too abstract, of being intractable. On making hard moral decisions, Frohock writes: "Pain and guilt, rather than immorality and irrationality, plague therapy decisions."[42,43] Moral decision-making is situational. When studying moral decisions, the context is of extreme importance. Due to the nature of language, abstract formulations derived from philosophical theories can easily lead to disparity with the circumstances in which a person has to make a decision.[44]

2.6   Describing the Company

Descriptive ethics is about the factual description and explanation of moral behavior. It is therefore a non-normative approach in ethics; it tries to describe without taking a moral position.[45] This contrasts with normative approaches like applied ethics (prescriptive ethics). Before elaborating on these approaches in business ethics, a warning from Beauchamp: "It would be a mistake to regard these categories as expressing mutually exclusive approaches."[46] Here, and further in this book, I hope to make it clear that the normative and non-normative approaches can never be purely distinguished. The distinction, however, is useful for a better understanding of the different areas of business ethics.

From the previous sections, it has become clear that using classic moral theories within business ethics leads to some concerns. At the very least, it leaves some moral dimensions within business ethics in the dark. Can other theories add new dimensions in the research of business ethics? I set out to study how managers deal with their customers including the moral aspects of these relationships. How to do this type of descriptive study without using classic moral theories?

Within descriptive ethics, I would like to distinguish two important questions. The first is: how can we explain how organizations act—which values do they use and how can we explain that? Related to this is, of course, what the nature of an organization is. Also related—and more important to this chapter—is the issue of methodological individualism. The second question is: when is an organization morally to blame? This descriptive question has a clear normative component and involves the issue of moral individualism in business ethics.

How to compare companies in their use of values when acting? It turns out that in the business ethics literature, not much attention has been given to the way in which organizations can be morally described and analyzed. Muel Kaptein: "In the business literature, almost no attention is paid to the way in which a description and analysis of morally relevant aspects of an organization can be made."[47] Yet, this is an important part of business ethics. After all, before giving moral advice—prescription—one must first determine what one considers morally relevant.

As I have made clear, one of the purposes of this book is to point to the many faces of ethics. I would like to stress that it is impossible to completely grasp "values": one can never determine or define exactly "the ethical content of an organization."[48] It is hard to "know" what is and is not morally relevant. When we look at one moral side of an issue, another side remains unreflected. This is not to say there are only two sides; the number of reflections of a moral coin is indefinite.

2.6.1   The Association Model
In the so-called association model, the moral side of a company is reviewed by examining the employees. Employees can be screened on how they deal with things such as personal responsibility towards stakeholders, their own tasks and the company's assets. When we have a good picture of the morals of the employees, the association model tells us, we have a good image of the morals of the organization. This way, the company is reduced to the sum of individual actions. The question of what this says about the organization at large, however, always remains. What would happen if a researcher individually screened the employees of an army (or a drug cartel) this way? Surely, it would not reveal most (at least not the most important) moral questions about such an organization.

2.6.2   Studying (Moral) Decisions in Organizations
Some descriptive ethics is centered on concepts like choice and the moment of decision making. As mentioned earlier, the decision is to some the end-point of

business ethics, since it is, as Parker writes, the moment where judgments are translated into some kind of practice.[49] That is the point where ethics can determine behavior. In Section 2.4.3, I raised doubts as to whether studying (moral) decisions would best answer my questions. It is questionable whether moral decisions determine behavior, especially for organizations. If they do not, descriptive ethics is not satisfactory when studying only the moral part of decision making.

I fear that I would miss important information by studying decisions. Values play a role in complex ways, so complex, in fact, that we are, for the most part, unaware of it. In that sense, systematic reflection on values can determine only a small part of our behavior. When managers make decisions, all kinds of (unconscious) values play a role, but so do many other things. Klamer writes: "Even the purchase of an ice-cream may involve a negotiation among many different little and big values. Because I like to follow my senses I might indulge yet because I also value being healthy I may refrain. Or I may have an agreement with my partner to reduce my weight and so have to factor the value of being trustworthy … And if I have decided to enjoy myself that very moment, will I care about whom to give my business? How much do I value the values of a socially minded and therefore high-cost company that I will pay extra for its product? Do I care about the esthetics of the place? Does it matter who the other customers are? No algorithm will do justice to the complicated process that constitutes the purchase of an ice-cream."[50] Managers will almost never base decisions only on what they perceive as explicit moral values or arguments. Many different aspects play a role in that decision. No one's actions are based on only conscious decisions solely based on explicit moral values. Yet, many values play a role in every decision, and many of them are unreflected. Describing the moral side of a company by describing the moral part of decision-making lends just a fragment of the whole picture.

At the core of most theories in business ethics that concentrate on studying moral decisions is a methodological individualism. Methodological individualism states that behavior of an organization is always reducible to the behavior of the individuals that are members of the organization. This social theory, however, has generally been discredited; it simply does not explain many social phenomena around organizations. Methodological individualism is inclined to see moral phenomena as the aggregate consequence of individual behavior. March and Olsen: "Within such a perspective, for example, the behavior of an organization is the consequence of the interlocking choices by individuals and subunits, each

acting in terms of expectations and preferences manifested at those level …
Outcomes at the system level are thought to be determined by the interactions of
individuals acting consistently in terms of individual behavior, whatever they may
be."[51] The world, in this view, is in large part the outcome of choice. And in
decision-making, processes are viewed in terms of (complex) interactions among
elementary events or actors.[52]

The impact of the consequences of our combined actions can often not be traced
back to individual decisions. This leads to some problems for business ethicists:
routine decisions, all morally acceptable from an individual standpoint, can lead to
disastrous outcomes. The world is not shaped by conscious individual decisions;
the organizational world is not simply a sum of individual decisions. Especially in
the organizational world, individual (moral) decisions are, at best, a tiny part of the
whole picture. Many good arguments about economic, natural or social forces, for
instance, can be presented to argue that institutions (not in the sense of
organizations or buildings, more in a sense of collective ways of thinking, feeling
and doing) determine, in large part, the decisions and behavior of people. There
are dynamics that transcend individuals. What managers think, feel, intend or want
is not all-important because many supra-individual causalities have to be taken
into account. *Organizations have their own dynamics.* For descriptive ethics, it is
therefore important that we do not only focus on (moral) decisions by individuals.

The internal dynamics within organizations render methodological individualism in
business ethics hard to defend. The internal dynamics of organizations transcend
individual behavior and decisions. In this book, I will focus on causalities that
transcend individuals. This means that I will not study what managers want, desire
or think. For clarity, individual subjects are included in the analysis. In the
empirical research, I did interview individual managers and let them Q-sort
statements.[53] But the individual subjects' points of view with regard to the value of
something is not my interest here.[54, 55] The unit of analysis in this book—the object
of this study—is not the individual, but the discourse.[56]

2.6.3   Codes of Conduct

Another way of describing and comparing companies in a moral sense is looking
at the company as a moral entity and studying their codes of conduct. This
method, however, also runs into some problems. How are we to compare three
banks this way? I mention this example because I will later present a study in
which I compare certain moral elements of the three largest banks in Holland:

ABN-Amro, Rabobank and ING. By looking at their respective codes of conduct, it is hard to draw moral conclusions. ABN-Amro declared four basic values in their code of conduct: respect, professionalism, integrity and teamwork. Rabobank wants to adhere to three core values: respect, expertise and integrity. There is a striking similarity. Yet, I am not sure the conclusion that both banks treat their customers the same way is a satisfactory one. Codes of conduct are the result of lengthy, top-level consultations on how management should act. Of course, when formulating them, not only the real situation, but also the image of the company plays a big role. And even when the difference between the actual situation and the ideal one—both reflected in the code of conduct—is acknowledged and something is done about it, the results are far from certain. Recent research concludes that "the use of codes of conduct alone in defining conduct, culture and performance in the private sector may be less effective than their proponents think, and of less impact on managers and employees, customers and stakeholders than they would wish."[57] This conclusion is not surprising. Morals and values must somehow lie deeper than something you can easily influence top-bottom with a few statements.[58] Thus, if codes of conduct do not tell the whole story, are there other ways to describe and compare companies in a moral sense? Well, yes: discourse theory. I suggest an additional method for describing moral issues of organizations and managers is looking at the way they talk about reality.

2.7   Conclusion

In this chapter, I described some problems with applying classic moral theories to business ethics. I believe that classic moral theories lead to interesting insights, but that business ethics should be careful with using these theories. After looking at some problems of certain approaches in business ethics in describing the corporate organization, the conclusion is that they leave open certain dimensions. An aim of this book is to add a new dimension to business ethics by studying morals of companies within their context, aided by discourse theory.

What makes discourse theory interesting is that it promises to study values within their context. Both for descriptive and prescriptive ethics, and especially in business ethics, this is important. Somewhat along the lines of philosophers like McIntyre, I would like to start my empirical research with the context I find managers in, rather than starting from a theoretical framework. When we study managers in practice, we see that they are constantly negotiating their (moral)

positions, and that facts and values are intertwined. I believe there is a strong case for business ethicists to take up discourse theory. I explain why in the next chapter, and show how in the empirical chapters.

Notes

[1] I wonder what statements like "we are losing values and norms" mean exactly. An analysis of concepts like ethics and values in popular and political debates leads to confusion. Sometimes the same concepts have completely different meanings in the same discussion. In many discussions about the loss of values and norms, values are seen as a cultural concept constituting our behavior: values determine what we do and what we do not do. But if that were true, by definition, values cannot be lost. They can change, but they cannot disappear for, in that case, people would no longer act.

[2] Johnson (1999), p. 5.

[3] Klamer (2000), p. 5.

[4] Klamer (2000), p. 5.

[5] Bowie (1992).

[6] Von Hajek (1976).

[7] This is in itself already a heavily contested concept. For example, does maximizing profit mean profit for the short term or profit for the longer term? A choice for either one option can lead to different strategies and decisions in an organization. See Ansoff (1965/1988).

[8] This reminds us of the do-well discourses.

[9] Luijk (1989), p. 20.

[10] Kimman (1991), p. 19.

[11] See Bos (1998), p. 136.

[12] I do not mean those scholars who defend the amoral model, like Von Hajek or Friedman, who believe doing business has nothing to do with ethics.

[13] French (1984), p. xii.

[14] Solomon (1992).

[15] Kaptein & Wempe (2000).

[16] Green (1994).

[17] One could also consider Badarocco, trying to formulate norms on the basis of defining moments.

[18] Sorell (1998), p. 26.

[19] Donaldson & Dunfee (2000).

[20] Willigenburg (2003).

[21] Cited in Kaptein & Wempe (2000).

[22] Bauman (1993), p. 18.

[23] Peter French used this expression when making a similar argument during the *Business Ethics Conference*, Washington D.C., August 3, 2001.

[24] *Facts and values are often clearly separated*. Values come into play after the process of information gathering. Prescriptive ethics traditionally focus on this moment. The prevailing notion is that ethics and

the non-ethical language that describes and explains situations and events belong to separate domains.

[25] Bauman (1993), p. 18.

[26] Sorell (1998), p. 19.

[27] Sorell (1998).

[28] This is a term from Sabatier (e.g., Sabatier (1988)).

[29] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 43.

[30] Eeten (1998), p. 6.

[31] Hoffmaster (1992).

[32] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1422.

[33] Sorell (1998), p. 17.

[34] Stark (1993), p. 38.

[35] See Schermer (2001) for a very interesting study on the concept of autonomy in ethical theory and hospital practice.

[36] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1442.

[37] When managers' decisions depend on the conviction that they should treat a person not solely as a means to an end (deontology), or the notion of promoting the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism), what should they do?

[38] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1424.

[39] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1424.

[40] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1424.

[41] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1426.

[42] Frohock (1986), p. 190.

[43] This raises doubts as to the rationality of moral decisions. When we study moral decisions, we can see that they do not conform to some philosophical ethical theory.

[44] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1422.

[45] As will become clear in the next chapter, I believe a purely non-normative description is never possible.

[46] Beauchamp (1991), p. 34.

[47] Kaptein (1998), p. 5.

[48] Kaptein (1998), p. 52.

[49] Parker (1998b), p. 291.

[50] Klamer (2000), p. 2.

[51] March & Olsen (1989), p. 4.

[52] March & Olsen (1989), p. 14.

[53] There will be more on Q-sorting in Chapter 4.

[54] What is of interest to me are the discourses an individual is part of (more on this in the next chapter).

[55] Again, one of the main reasons for this is that practices of valuation in everyday life come *without conscious* awareness of how and when action becomes evaluation.

[56] As I will explain in more detail in the next chapter, within a discourse the decision of a manager is viewed against the background of his or her worldview. This means that the decision is tied, amongst other things, to other decisions, to the identity of the decision maker, and to the goal of the organization as seen by the decision maker. As interesting as it may be to study the decision of a bank manager to give a loan to a start-up company, it is even more interesting to study this decision against the background of customer relations, views of customers in general and the goals of the bank. That way, the decision being studied is not isolated, but put in a context.

[57] Doig & Wilson (1998), p. 148.

[58] Warren (1993).

3. Words Are Action: Language, Discourse Theory and Business Ethics

Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society.[1]
—Michel Foucault

To be truthful means using the customary metaphors—in moral terms: the obligation to lie to a fixed convention, to lie herd-like in a style obliging to all.[2]
—Friedrich Nietzsche

3.1 Introduction

The famous motto of Rotterdam is, "Not words, but action." In this chapter, I show a perspective in which words *are* a form of action. In the preceding chapter, we saw that there are good arguments to study moral issues in their context and that discourse theory offers the possibility to do just that. Here I describe what I mean by "discourse" and "discourse analysis," presenting the ontological and, more importantly, the epistemological assumptions of my research. I will also discuss the possibilities of discourse theory for business ethics.

3.2 Language and Meaning

In past decades, discussions on the nature of truth have profoundly affected social research. Instead of assuming a given world "out there," waiting to be discovered, attention is being drawn to processes and ways through which the world is represented in language. Perhaps it is the case, as some philosophers claim, that what exists in the world is a necessity (independent of human beings or language), but things can only be differentiated through language. The world itself does not give meaning to objects; this is done through language. In other words, although things might exist outside language, they get their meanings through

language.[3] Language is a system of signs that acquire meaning by being related to other signs[4] and has its own rules, such as grammar and syntax.

The access we have to a reality outside language is highly problematic. Language does not simply report facts; it is not a simple medium for the transport of meaning. What is meant by and the effect of the words "I am Sinterklaas" depends entirely on the context in which these words are spoken or written. A search for empirical references does not reveal their meanings (if there is such a thing for Sinterklaas, it is hard to find an empirical reference).[5] Of course, language does refer to a reality other than itself. We "know" that there is a reality outside language, but we must always be aware that it is through language that we "know" so. We constantly refer to a world outside language by using linguistic signs that refer to other linguistic signs. Language can never mirror social reality;[6] the relationship between the world and language can never be one-to-one. The relationship between words and what they describe is always problematic, never perfectly clear.

Yet it is through language that we discuss the world. We use it to name certain (more or less abstract) phenomena and it influences the way we think about our world. Of the many objects in the world, human beings discuss only a small subset, but it is in those discussions that they acquire meaning. By giving something a name, we highlight certain aspects. But in that same process, all other possible qualities are placed in the background or even ignored. Language is thus neither neutral nor static in communicating meaning. The awareness that language does not neutrally describe the world is important for business ethicists. Subtle linguistic forms and associated symbolic actions shape our convictions and presuppositions.[7] "If, as Richard Rorty puts it, 'There is no way to think about … the world … except by using Language,' then the world as we find it will be a function of that language, and we won't alter the one without altering the other."[8]

Shapiro states: "With this as background, the textualist sees language not as a set of symbols whose function is exhausted by the process of representation but as a set of signs which are part of a system for generating objects."[9] Language is not a set of unambiguous tools used by individuals to reach their goals. Using this view of language, I do not adhere to studies that treat social structures as the result of the interests of individuals or organizations (as most stakeholder theorists do); I study the discourses in which interests are shaped in the first place.[10]

3.3   Discourse Theory

There have been many interpretations of discourse and discourse theory.[11] It is not my purpose to discuss all the different viewpoints but to clarify the interpretation of discourse and discourse analysis used in my research. In daily language, for example, a discourse can be defined as conversation. Within the social sciences, the concept has a wider meaning. In this book, a discourse is defined as "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities."[12] For example, psychiatric discourse brought the idea of an unconscious into existence in the nineteenth century.[13] Discourses contain groups of statements that provide a way of talking and thinking about something, thereby giving meaning to social reality. Discourses are not "out there" between reality and language; they are not just a group of signs—they refer to practices that systematically form the objects we speak of. Discourse is not just a "way of seeing"—a worldview—but is embedded in social practices that reproduce the "way of seeing" as "truth." Discourses are constitutive of reality. What is and is not true, the things we discuss—these cannot be seen outside discourse; they are internal to it. By looking at what people say and write, we can learn how their world is constructed.[14] This does not mean that discourse theory necessarily denies the existence of anything outside discourse; it does say that everything gets meaning through discourse.[15]

A discourse is reproduced through a sequence of language practices. Discursive practices systemically form the objects we speak of with rules that are immanent in the linguistic practice. Foucault:

> The discursive relations are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, classify them, explain them, etc. These relations characterize not the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice.[16]

Since discourses institutionalize the way of talking about something, they produce knowledge and thereby shape social practices. Social interactions cannot be understood without the discourses that give them meaning. Discourses function as a structure to behavior; they both enable and constrain it.[17]

Discourse is not something used by individuals to manipulate the world; discourses are part of reality and constitute the identity of the discoursing subject.[18,19] Foucault:

> There are not on the one hand inert discourses … and on the other hand an all-powerful subject which manipulates them, overturns them, renews them; but that discoursing subject forms a part of the discursive field—they have their place within it … and their function … Discourse is not a place into which the subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions.[20]

Identity is constituted discursively: the discursive practices help construct and maintain personal and collective identities.[21] The construction of individual and organizational identities is thus alike. This view of identity means that I do not see discourse as a medium through which individuals can easily manipulate the world. Philips and Hardy:

> We do not believe that individuals always have the luxury of choosing their identity, their truth and their reality. We think our experience is largely written for us by the multitude of conflicting discourses of which we are a part. This is not to say that we do not strategically draw upon these discourses. We obviously do. But our ability to act strategically is limited by the discourses that accompany our intervention and the complex processes of social construction that precede it.[22]

Discourse theory, as described above, implies that the business context is also to be analyzed as a discursive construction. The meaning of anything always exists in particular discursive contexts; meaning is always contextual, contingent and historical. For business studies, language is not just seen as reflective of what goes on in an organization. Discourses and organizations are one in the same. "That is, organizing becomes communicating through the intersection of discourse and text."[23] Our so-called "organizational actions" are embedded in discursive fields and are only recognizable as practices through discourse. Organizational discursive practices exist only in the organizational surroundings and practices they are part of. The concept of discourse is used to overcome oppositions like "action and structure" or "individual and structure."

3.4   Discourse Analysis

How does research with discourse theory work? A researcher conducts discourse analyses, the basis of which are texts (although discourses exist beyond the texts that compose them). Texts, the material manifestation of discourses, are the object of study in this book. All verbal and written language can be considered. A discourse analysis shows which discursive objects and subjects emerge in social practices, and which conceptualizations are used. Consequently, what is left out in social practices also emerges. It is not the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what the authors exactly meant or felt when writing or speaking, or what interests they had. Discourse analysis is not a search for meaning, empirical or otherwise, of texts.[24] "Discourse analysis investigates the boundaries between … the moral and the efficient, or how a particular framing of the discussion makes certain elements appear fixed or appropriate while other elements appear problematic."[25]

A discourse analysis inquires into forms of problematization and offers a narrative about the production of problems. Why is something considered a problem (or not)? It does not concentrate on answering the problem at hand. In other words, when doing a discourse analysis, one can establish the limits of what can and cannot be said in a particular context, what Foucault called "the conditions of possibility" of a discourse. Turning the concept of "problem" into the more critical concept of "problematization" is strategic to Foucault's so-called genealogical analyses (see Appendix C). A discourse analysis can identify the rules and resources that set the boundaries of what can be said, thought and done in a particular (organizational) context or situation. "Thus, if we are to comprehend how decisions are made … it is by examining the conditions of possibility in relation to which these statements are formulated, that is, the often implicit institutionalized speech practices that guide what is and what is not likely to be said (Bourdieu)."[26]

3.5   Discourse Theory and Values

Over the last ten years, business studies have given much attention to discourse and organization.[27] One can think of scholars like Hajer, Hardy, Dryzek, Parker, O'Connor, Alvesson, Putnam and Fairhurst. Metaphors have been studied extensively,[28] as have concepts such as trope,[29] symbolism[30] and narrative.[31] As O'Connor writes, "Organization studies have increasingly taken up ideas from

literary theory."[32] Many (but certainly not all) of these scholars would acknowledge Michel Foucault as their inspiration. Putnam and Fairhurst give a good overview of the developments in the area of discourse theory in business studies.[33] The field of business ethics, however, does not pay much attention to discourse theory (shown by the lack of attention to discourse analysis at the annual meeting of the Society of Business Ethics). Some scholars in the field of discourse and organization—Shapiro[34] and Parker,[35] for instance—do pay attention to ethics.

Morality—as became clear in the previous chapter—is a complicated phenomenon. Every practice has some effect on others; even the things we omit are important to others. The same goes for the words we speak (and those we do not speak), even when speaking to ourselves;[36] everything we say and do has moral significance. The mainstreams of thought in philosophical ethics have different opinions about when human action is morally relevant.[37]

Like meaning, values are immanent features of discourse.[38],[39] Even though I clearly do not endorse a Durkheimian view (with my emphasis on discourses instead of institutions), there is a parallel. To Durkheim social institutions, collective ways of thinking, feeling and doing are not empty but full of values (values give meaning to relationships). In similar fashion, discursive practices are not empty; they are filled with values.[40] Discourses emphasize certain meanings over others; in discursive practices, certain meanings are reproduced instead of others. There is a considerable "power" working through discourses because they influence so strongly a way of viewing reality (power defined relationally, not as a feature of an institution or person). People do not recognize all the implicit uses of a discourse's concepts, ideas and categorizations. Building on the work of Foucault, some researchers within business studies have shown how discourses, with their inherent worldview, give some an advantage over others.[41] (For more on this concept of power, see Appendix C.) Discourses automatically contain (value) judgments. Seemingly technical positions in discourses conceal normative commitments. "From this perspective, value gets created when discursive structures are stabilized sufficiently to serve as the basis for enabling people to value some identities and interests over others."[42] Since it is clear that language is not a neutral means of communication, the use of language contains normative commitments.[43] When we give meaning to something, we are also valuing it.

The way one looks at the world and the way one perceives facts necessarily determines the way one values. The "is" and "ought" influence each other in

countless ways. Without the subjects of a discourse being aware of it, values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions affect each other. In our daily lives, we jump so often between normative and factual statements that we do not realize how much our views of facts determine whether we see problems in the first place. But when we study our discussions more carefully, we can see that the "is" and "ought" are intertwined. The problem definition and the possible solutions are inseparable. Discourses make more than claims of reality—they accomplish what Schon and Rein have called the "normative leap" or the connection between a representation of reality and its consequences for action.[44] Discourses necessarily contain both facts and values. Or, as Randels recently put it, "Worldview narratives not only describe particular understandings of business, but have important normative considerations. They are not merely stories, but construe how we do, can, or should view the world, and how business people and corporations act, can act and should act."[45] Parker: "As Adam Smith, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim and many anthropologists, institutional economists, sociologists and organizational ethnographers have suggested, questions about modern organizations, markets and the division of labour are matters which cannot be separated from notions of what is good and what is bad within a particular social context."[46] Within discourse theory, the strict dichotomy between facts and values ceases to make sense. Facts and values here are not treated as ontologically different; discourse theory treats them as different sides of the same coin.

Discourses contain the conditions of possibility of what can and cannot be said. In a specific discourse, different moral questions are raised than in others. Recall from Chapter 1 that as soon as managers of soccer clubs start to talk about soccer as a "product" (a relatively new development), a new world opens up around the same old game with new opportunities, managerial problems and new moral issues.[47] Managers of company A—who talk among themselves about customers as people from which their company makes its profit—will ask themselves different (moral) questions than managers from company B, who view their customers as colleagues with shared interests. Managers of company B might consider it unfair to sell their clients a product knowing that a different, cheaper product would do just as well, whereas managers of company A would not. Whether either view is better in a business or moral sense is not the issue; that a different discourse leads to different moral questions is. Discourses do not only help us understand that a certain moral question is asked, they also give us the spectrum of possible solutions to moral problems being raised, i.e., what is or is not seen as a viable solution to a specific moral problem. Some bankers use a discourse where helping

to start a business is seen as a moral question; others do not. The latter will not ask themselves moral questions about start-up company loans but will look primarily at the financial risk, and ask themselves primarily financial questions.

To study how corporate managers treat their customers, I want to look at the context. I want to study why and how a certain (moral) question concerning customers is relevant within a sphere of certain concepts (discourse).[48] What is most interesting in a business moral sense is that specific moral questions are asked in the first place. How far one could go in arguing that humans are free agents or intentional subjects when actually facing a choice is an interesting issue. It might also be interesting to use philosophical moral theories to help judge what in a particular case would be a good and a bad decision. But it is even more interesting *that* people see themselves facing choices and the effects that has.

Although Aristotelians and pragmatics like Dewey intensely consider deliberation and conversation, there are clear differences with the discourse theory described above. Aristotelian ethicists are usually looking for virtues to be named, virtues that are Good. Most discourse theorists, though, want to stay away from anything associated with essentialism. Instead of looking for virtues for individuals, discourse theorists want to problematize the central role of individuals (at least the central role of individuals in research). Individuals are part of organizations; they operate in discursive contexts that determine (at least in great part) their behavior. I thus focus more on context than on individuals and their virtues.[49]

3.6   Discourse Analysis and Descriptive Business Ethics

Until now, I have discussed what I mean by discourse theory and how it relates to ethics. An additional method to the more traditional ones mentioned in Section 2.6 of describing moral issues of companies, is looking at the way managers talk about and view reality. Instead of looking at the moral agents or the organization as a moral entity, one can study an organization's internal discourse. In this book, individuals are neither central to nor the objects of study (methodological individualism); the object of study is discourses. By doing a discourse analysis of an organization, moral aspects come to the fore (shown in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Putnam and Fairhurst recently concluded, "Language analysis has moved into a prominent place in organizational studies."[50] I mentioned that this move has missed its impact on business ethics, which is striking considering the potential of discourse theory. In the next two sections, I highlight certain aspects of discourse analysis (metaphors, storylines and identity) and discuss their implications on business ethics. Following that, I discuss the impact of discourse theory on prescriptive business ethics and its status. To be clear: I will not make use in the empirical chapters of all the possibilities of discourse analysis within business ethics that I will discuss in the rest of this chapter.[51] Appendix C considers the use of so-called genealogical studies (with their explicit attention for power) in business ethics.

3.7   Metaphors and Storylines in Business Ethics

Discursive practices are morally shaped in many ways and discourse theory offers several possibilities to study how. One is studying storylines and metaphors in discursive practices. When one has a certain worldview and uses a certain discourse, one takes a position within discussions in terms of the particular concepts, metaphors and stories of that discourse.[52] For business ethics, it is important that a discourse analysis can show how forces in language influence moral positions by looking at the role metaphors and storylines play within a discourse. Discourse analysis can also gain perspectives into the structure, dynamics and directions of conflicting discourses, like narrative strategies.

According to Hajer, storylines are "a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical and social phenomena."[53] Within stories, the "is" and "ought" are closely connected. Even if they seem to give simple factual descriptions, an enormous implicit normative power lies within narratives. Hayden White: "What else could narrative closure exist of than the passage of one moral order to another? … Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too."[54,55] A narrative analysis can therefore shed light on how different moral positions relate to each other. It shows how narrative structures (partly) determine moral positions and identities, and how they thereby influence the actions of individuals and organizations.[56] In the Chapter 6 study of the Netherlands Heart Foundation, stories—in both a theoretical and empirical sense—are given in-depth consideration.

Scholars have pointed to the moral significance of metaphors in business studies and in many empirical organizational discourse analyses, the role of metaphors has been brought to the fore.[57] Weick, for example, pointed to the operational consequences of metaphor.[58] Just like stories, metaphors are important to business ethicists because of the (often implicit) moral baggage they carry.[59] Analyzing metaphors in discursive practices can bring clarity to how metaphors, in part, morally shape discursive practices, i.e., how morality is embedded in discursive practices.

3.8 Identity and Business Ethics

In his last work, Foucault detailed the relationship between moral codes (which state what to do, which acts are forbidden and which are permitted) and the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself (what he called "ethics"); the way we are related to (moral) codes. This brings us back to the concept of identity, this time in relationship to business ethics.

As stated in Section 3.3, since everything is contingent in discourse theory, so is the discursive identity. We are embedded in the discourses whose conceptualizations and habits shape not only our actions but also who we are.[60] Identity operates and is constituted by a context of discursive practice; the identity of the discoursing subject is formed in the discourse.[61] Identity, and with it the moral subject and its ability to judge and act in freedom, could be described as formed, for a large part, in specific social and cultural situations.[62] Goffman, for example, showed in his studies how people who deal daily with institutions develop identities that seamlessly fit with the goals of the organization, even when these goals conflict with their own.[63,64] A discourse analysis can pay attention to the functioning of (organizational) identity, which now has clear moral significance.

With this idea of identity in view, a subject is not capable of making completely independent choices in wide-ranging moral decisions. The view leads to moral theories different from the more traditional business studies. But, even when identities are completely formed in discursive contexts, that does not mean that subjects cannot exert influence—they can, by using discursive strategies. Hajer: "Discursive challenges may consist of withstanding understandings in terms of routinized categories, or even more powerful, in establishing new combinations

within seemingly traditional discursive structures (e.g., by introducing new historical examples). This would be an example of how the discoursing subject can actively exploit the tactical polyvalence of discourse."[65]

3.9   Discourse Analysis and Prescriptive Ethics

Within discourse theory, one does not come up with morals or rules that will lead to the "good life." Discourse theory has more affinity with ethical theories like postmodern ethics or care ethics. If an ethicist wants to change things in reality, it might be more effective to study existing discourses—with their clear normative sides—than to confront managers with philosophical ethics. Using literary theory, Roe[66] and Van Eeten[67] have interesting ideas on how to confront incommensurable discourses. The prescription within discourse theory focuses on the process instead of the content. It does not say what is "good" or "bad" based on philosophical moral theories. To use another metaphor, prescription within discourse theory would be more like a "therapist." By confronting discourses, it can make people look differently at their own points of view. And by offering different points of view, one can come to new "insights" and some movement in the old discourse could be accomplished.[68,69]

3.10   The Status of Business Ethics

This last section takes up the influence and effects of the academic discourse of business ethics. When values are an integral part of any discourse, they are an integral part of the business ethics discourse. The thesis that meaning is constructed by and through discourse has implications for the notion of ethics itself. It is, as Hackley notes, "inseparable from ways of talking about and doing ethics and ethical things."[70] The descriptive ethics of the researcher comprises a moral component; descriptive ethics contains values itself and does not just mirror reality.[71] Business ethicists' studies play a role in what Foucault called "the regime of truth." Of course, this also goes for my own studies which, including descriptions of discourses, inevitably contain normative aspects.

It was often concluded in business studies literature that "independence" and "accountability" of employees were good for a company in a business sense. At the same time, business ethicists concluded they were good in a moral sense.

Within companies, it is important who speaks of morals, what their viewpoints are and whose interests are represented. In a nutshell, how is ethics turned into a discourse?[72] How do the forms of problematization of managers fit with forms of problematization of business ethics? The Foulcauldian question becomes, to what extent is business ethics used as a power tool to discipline workers?[73] This is what Bauman argues too. He accuses organizations (bureaucracies) in our society of "instrumentalising" ethics to achieve the goals of the organization rather than ethics being the systematic reflection of the goals of the organization.[74] When opinion within a management discourse is that employees steal too much from the company, they can hire "integrity consultants." These consultants do not evaluate the goals or the products of the organization, nor do they look at whether employees are treated kindly. Instead, they are used to discipline employees with the use of an ethical discourse. Are business ethicists busy with making companies moral, or are they helping management to control morality within companies?[75]

Notes

[1] Foucault (1984b), p. 247.

[2] Nietzsche, cited in Shapiro (1984), p. 227.

[3] Words get their meanings in a linguistic context.

[4] See the work of De Saussure (1983).

[5] "The meaning that any object has at any given time is a contingent, historical achievement … theorists of discourse argue that the meaning of objects is different from their mere existences, and that people never confront objects as mere existences, in a primal manner; rather these objects are always articulated within particular discursive contexts." (Du Gay (1996), p. 47).

[6] Alvesson & Karreman (2000).

[7] Twist (1994), p. 79.

[8] Du Gay (1996), p. 42.

[9] Shapiro (1984), pp. 222-223.

[10] In the stakeholder model (as in many political models) the prominence of a discourse is explained by concepts like values and interests. Discourse analysis has a different starting point. To a discourse analyst, conflicts within a company or between stakeholders are not completely reducible to conflicting values or interests; the dynamics of discourse are more complicated. With a constitutive view of language, discourses constitute what the interests are in the first place. Discourse theory starts with the assumption that many (moral) aspects of society cannot be explained by fundamental moral choices. Discourse theory does not consider concepts like "motivation," "intention" or "decisions" as the main causal conditions to explain behavior. What I describe here is also called "the decentering of the subject." Also, the subject is formed in discursive practices. "Foucault's theory of discourse shows that the reference to institutional backgrounds or vested interests is an unsatisfactory circular explanation because institutions are only powerful in so far as they are constituted as authorities *vis-a-vis* other actors through discourse. Similarly, interests cannot be taken as a priori, but are constituted through discourse." (Hajer (1995/1997), p. 51).

[11] For a good overview, see Putnam & Fairhurst (2001). Outside business studies, there is also much disagreement about discourse theory and discourse analysis. See, for example, Titscher et al. (2000) and Dijk (1985).

[12] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 44.

[13] Phillips & Hardy (2002), p. 3; Foucault (1961/1975).

[14] Hajer writes that this constitutive view of language is widely endorsed (Hajer (1995/1997), p. 51).

[15] Discourse theory is not "idealistic"; it does not exclude non-linguistic things. "Rather it serves to undermine divisions between language and material practices by indicating the ways in which meaning and use are intimately connected." (Du Gay (1996), p. 46) Language and "other" practices are inseparable. By looking at how meaning is given in society, discourse theory undermines the distinction

between linguistic and non-linguistic practices. Since all social practices are meaningful practices, they are discursive.

[16.]Foucault (1971a/1972), p. 46.

[17] Foucault (1976/1992), p. 101.

[18] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 51.

[19] "According to Foucault there is no a priori thinking subject trying to express or transcribe his or her preconceived ideas in language. The subject operates in the context of a whole group of regulated practices to which his or her own ideas are formed." (Hajer (1995/1997), p. 49).

[20] Foucault, cited in Hajer (1995/1997), p. 48.

[21] Schram (1993).

[22] Phillips & Hardy (2002), p. 2.

[23] Putnam (2000), p. 225.

[24] The analysis focuses on the *effects* of the texts on other texts. They are analyzed by studying the language practices among similar language practices.

[25] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 54.

[26] Mauws (2000), p. 235.

[27] Over the last decade, King's College in London organizes the biannual *Conference on Discourse and Organization*.

[28] For example, Alvesson (1993), Palmer & Dunford (1996), Yanow (1992).

[29] For example, Skoldberg (1994).

[30] For example, Morgan (1986).

[31] For example, Dicke (2001), Deetz (1986), O'Connor (1995).

[32] O'Connor (2000), p. 174. Examples: Boje (1991), Wilkins (1983).

[33] Putnam & Fairhurst (2001).

[34] Shapiro (1992).

[35] Parker (1998b).

[36] To say that everything is ethically relevant is of course not saying very much. Let me reassure the reader that this is not a book about everything. I find the fact *that* certain moral problems are presented interesting, what is *perceived* by a person or discourse as being moral. It is interesting to see what happens within a discourse as soon as something is labeled as "moral." Then wholly different aspects of a problem surface and other solutions are brought to the fore.

[37] As I will make clear later, to raise a moral question is just as important as to answer it.

[38] See Nietzsche (1887/1903), § 260, or Foucault (1984b), p. 85. "In a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this 'nonplace,' the endlessly repeated play of dominations. The domination of certain men over others lead to the differentiation of values; class domination generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to

them account for the origin of logic ... The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion: guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, was saturated in blood."

[39] Values within discursive practices cannot be easily captured in simple concepts. Values and value concepts get their meaning—just as everything else—only in context, in discourse. I believe there are no universal norms or values, only local norms and values that are crystallized in discursive practices.

[40] Because meaning and value are inherent to whatever discourse we are referring to and because they are complexly interwoven, traditional ethical thinking as an independent form of reasoning is not the path I chose to follow in this book. See Shapiro (1992). A valuational discourse can never be wholly autonomous; such a discourse would always be outside reality.

[41] For example, Clegg (1989).

[42] Schram (1993), p. 251.

[43] As Shapiro puts it: "since language is not a neutral means of communication but a process that forms the objects and subjects of which we speak, conversations always take place in a preconstituted meaning and value system." (Shapiro (1992), p. 10).

[44] Cited in Eeten (1999), p. 6.

[45] Randels (1998), p. 1299.

[46] Parker (1998b), p. 285.

[47] Hawkes (1998).

[48] When using discourse, a researcher studies ethics within a context, within an actual discourse.

[49] The extent to which individuals are influenced by their contexts gives rise to extensive discussions about their autonomy and freedom. I leave these discussions (interesting as they are) aside. What is important is that the behavior of individuals is, at least to a high degree, influenced by the organizational entities in which they work.

[50] Putnam & Fairhurst (2001), p. 78.

[51] Discourse theory can aid business ethics in more ways than I am able to empirically show in this book.

[52] The interests of a person, therefore, are not a priori to the discourse; the interests are produced in the discourse.

[53] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 56.

[54] White (1980), p. 26.

[55] Hayden White: "The events that are actually recorded in the narrative appear 'real' precisely insofar as they belong to an order of moral existence, just as they derive their meaning from their placement in this

order. It is because the events described conduce to the establishment of social order or fail to do so that they find a place in the narrative attesting to their reality." Cited in Ettema & Glasser (1988), p. 10.

[56] And how internal dynamics of a discourse can influence the moral position that is taken.

[57] As a good example, see those done by O'Connor (O'Connor (1995, 1997, 2000)).

[58] Weick (1979), p. 50.

[59] O'Connor notes, "The image carries with it some metaphorical 'baggage,' as it were, of mostly moral significance." (1995), p. 788.

[60] Embedded are our expectations of how to handle the information that comes to us through discourse. This, in turn, influences the decisions made. A subject in discourse theory, as used here, has no a priori thinking to express.

[61] Discourses are both enabling and constraining; the identity is intimately linked to the production of truth and power in discourse.

[62] Because role pressure within organizations is especially strong, *moral* autonomy in a business context seems far from given.

[63] Kaulingfreks (1996), p. 50.

[64] Foucault: "…that, consequently, the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization are not adequate to describe, at the very center of the carceral city, the formation of the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties, small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, 'sciences' that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual. In this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration,' objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle." (1975/1989), p. 429.

[65] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 57.

[66] Roe (1994).

[67] Eeten (1999).

[68] In the remaining chapters, prescriptive and applied ethics will not be major topics.

[69] Discourse theory also aids prescriptive business ethics by simply bringing different moral sides of organizations to light: if discourse theory is capable of revealing moral issues and brings moral issues different from other current research to the fore, then this automatically leads to more issues prescriptive ethics can be applied to. One has to identify moral issues before formulating an opinion on it. Applying classical moral theories can be helpful at the moment a moral question is raised. But when every discourse contains many values, the fact *that* a moral question arises in business is as interesting as *what* question is asked, as is the fact that many moral questions are *not* asked. Every (non-)decision of any manager in any company is a social activity and affects people's lives (Hackley & Kitchen (1999a) p. 23). Therefore, applying ethics to only obvious moral questions within a company

deals at best with only a small portion (albeit sometimes an important one) of the moral questions involved.

[70] Hackley (1999b), p. 38.

[71] Willmott (1998), p. 80.

[72] See Foucault (1976/1992), p. 17.

[73] Studying the moral implications of studies within business ethics and ethical consulting within companies can lead to interesting insights into morals in and around business.

[74] Morality, according to Bauman, has in our society become a matter of "being in conformity with," of doing what the "moral experts" say is the right thing to do. Responsibility is floating or, rather, resting with the role of the employee, not the person who performs that role. "If I wouldn't do it, somebody will do it anyway," we say. (See Bauman (1993), p. 19.) Bureaucracy changes morality in our society, according to Bauman (1989/1998). Within bureaucratic organizations, it is not self respect, integrity, empathy or individual responsibility, but more self-sacrifice, obedience, discipline and obligation. (See Bos (1998), p. 138.) The question for a bureaucrat is not so much whether an action is morally right, but whether it conforms to the rules laid down by the authorities of the organization. According to Bauman, this can contribute to excesses like the Holocaust. (See also the work of Arendt (Arendt (1965)).

[75] Bauman would argue the second position. He notes that business ethics has become a slave to the big morality based on contractarian obligations. Bauman thereupon discusses three strategies used in companies to neutralize the moral impulse of employees (Bauman (1993)).

4.   Bankers' Conceptualizations of Customers

4.1   Bankers Who Do Well and Bankers Who Do Good

How should bank managers treat their customers? Should they do well or should they do good? More than forty local bank managers told me the question was impossible to answer. In their daily practice, questions and decisions did not come in these terms.

In Holland, with its relatively small Dutch financial markets, three players dominate commercial banking: ABN-Amro, ING and Rabobank. All are international companies with large interests outside Holland. This is somewhat an inheritance of the Dutch colonial past, whereby the Dutch were pioneers in international trade. A banker in an economy comprising intensive foreign trading easily attains an international attitude.

It is perhaps not surprising that the managers of the three banks came up with the same "answer" when forced to choose between doing well and doing good. After all, the market for bankers is competitive. There are clear similarities among the banks just as they are all evolving into ambitious international presences. While it might be expected that competitive pressure lessens their dissimilarities, their mission statements support it. As discussed in the last chapters, the core values of ABN-Amro (respect, professionalism, integrity and teamwork[1]) resonate those of Rabobank (respect, expertise and integrity). ING aligns comparably with integrity, entrepreneurship, professionalism, responsiveness and teamwork.[2]

The mission statements lead to a conclusion that the three banks are similar. Do Dutch bankers, then, treat their customers similarly? There is reason to look a little further, to survey, for example, the historical backgrounds of the banks. Rabobank, founded as a cooperation by farmers, has historically served a large farming population. As Rabobank writes on its web page:

> The first cooperative banks sprang out of agricultural communities in the Netherlands a century ago. Their main objective was to provide credit to members—who were usually farmers—at reasonable interest rates. These

credits helped to sustain their financial security, particularly in times of hardship and uncertainty, and they also paved the way for growth. Given the importance of agriculture to the economy at that time, the rapid development of the cooperative movement also stimulated local prosperity. The cooperative banks were deeply rooted in their communities. They took a special interest in their members and in the local environment—an interest that extended well beyond short-term financial goals. The Rabobank of today is a global operation that has remained true to its cooperative origins.[3]

These days, Rabobank has all sorts of businesses as customers. Yet traces of its past remain. To this day, most farmers in Holland do their money business at Rabobank. Because Rabobank is a cooperative rather than public company, it does not have to satisfy public shareholders. Rabobank is still owned by its members. According to Rabobank, this means more than just a different legal way of doing business. Rabobank claims that (partly) because they do not have to make a profit to satisfy shareholders, they treat their clients differently. Rabobank claims that it puts its customers first in a different way than the other banks.

When we think in general of a banker who wants to do good, we think along the lines of Rabobank's public persona: bankers who are not profit driven, but interested in the local environment; bankers who will try to do whatever they can to keep the environment clean and safe. Above all, we expect such bankers to support the local economy as much as possible. A local start-up company, representing a substantial risk to a bank, should be helped with a loan to launch its business. We can also think of donating large sums to local charities, and sponsoring local initiatives and (sporting) clubs—beyond the point of sponsoring just to increase name recognition. A banker in this discourse would define his success in moral terms, like the economic development of the region, honesty and the like.

ABN-Amro is the result of several mergers with the Dutch Trade Company as one of its origins. ABN-Amro has always been strong in retail banking. The colonial past of Holland is shown by the firm footings ABN-Amro has in other countries. In the words of ABN-Amro on its web page:

> On 29 March 1824, King Willem I issued a royal decree creating the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij with the aim of reviving trade between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies. In 1964 NHM merged with De Twentsche Bank to form Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN) while Amsterdamsche Bank and Rotterdamsche Bank joined to become

Amsterdam-Rotterdam (Amro) Bank. In 1991 these two banks merged as ABN AMRO Bank. Today ABN AMRO is a powerful presence in world markets, building on a tradition of stimulating international trade.[4]

Clearly, the bank works hard to be a top player in international commercial banking:

ABN AMRO is a prominent international bank … ABN AMRO ranks 10th in Europe and 22nd in the world based on tier 1 capital, with over 3,400 branches in more than 60 countries, a staff of 110,000 employees and total assets of EUR 607.5 billion (as per end of June 2002).[5]

Like ABN-Amro, ING is the result of several mergers. Its past, however, is more modest. One of its original functions was in state banking. It has also served historically as a Dutch bank for small businesses. ING's website:

In 1990, the legal restrictions on mergers between insurers and banks were lifted. This prompted insurance company Nationale-Nederlanden and banking company NMB Postbank Groep to enter into merger negotiations. The merger took place in 1991. Nationale-Nederlanden was formed on 3 April 1963 by merging the Nationale Levensverzekering-Bank (1863) with De Nederlanden van 1845.[6] In the years to follow, the company experienced strong growth, autonomously as well as through acquisitions. Nationale-Nederlanden developed into the largest insurer in the Netherlands by far. Substantial acquisitions in the United States, Australia and Canada increased the international revenue contribution to more than 50%. Postbank was created in 1986 out of a merger between the Rijkspostspaarbank (state postal savings bank, 1881) and the Postcheque- en Girodienst (postal cheque and giro service, 1918). NMB Bank (1927) was originally established as a credit institution for small and medium enterprises. The Dutch government stake in NMB Postbank Groep of 49% has been gradually reduced to less than 1% in ING Group now. Since 1991, ING Group has expanded very rapidly. The company expanded mainly through autonomous growth, but it also made several large international acquisitions.[7]

On the basis of their histories and reputations, one would expect the three banks to stand differently on the do-good-do-well spectrum, with ABN-Amro most businesslike, ING closer to the public sector and Rabobank nearest to a do-good discourse. The ambitious goals of ABN-Amro and ING suggest a do-well discourse.[8] Bankers not only want to make as much money as possible, their very

trade is money; i.e., their only interest is money. When we think of bankers in a do-well-discourse, we expect their actions to be based on marketing principles and we expect them to try to make as much money as possible. Such bankers focus primarily on rates and risks. They do not bother too much with fostering regional economic development. They would not spend much money on donations and sponsoring—just a bit for name recognition as follows good marketing principles. They would define their success in monetary terms.

We would expect bankers in the do-well discourse not to have moral concerns about whom they lend money to, such as brothels or environment-polluting industries. As mentioned in the first chapter, this does not mean that this discourse lacks morals; morals are everywhere, so also in a do-well banker's discourse. Within all discourses, facts and values are intertwined. These moral issues are simply not as much in the foreground of a do-well discourse—at least not as much as in the do-good discourse, which rests more on obvious moral arguments and storylines. It is important to note that many defenders of the do-well discourse, like Milton Friedman, feel that acting according to this discourse is the right thing to do. In this case, it is the task of the bank manager to make as much money as possible for the bank. There are other values at stake. One relies more on the market and believes that the government is responsible for the rules. Doing nice things with the bank's money, say, donating a chunk of it to charity, is nothing less than fraud. Within the do-well discourse, the do-good discourse is morally wrong. Trying to maintain a good image of the bank is fine—even if it costs money—but only to make more money in the end. To people looking at the world from the do-good discourse, bankers trying to do well "treat people purely as instruments and that is wrong." To the do-well discourse, looking solely at money is not treating people as instruments; rather, it is giving people dignity and granting them autonomy. "Maintaining something else is confusing business with something else, namely social behavior." From the different discourses follow different value judgments, different morals. Again, in the do-good discourse moral arguments are more in the foreground and have a clearer presence.

Does the do-good discourse accurately describe how Rabobank treats its customers? Does the do-well-discourse give an accurate description of how ABN-Amro and ING treat their customers? Are the differences between these banks that great? There is doubt. Even though Rabobank harbors the illusions of its cooperative past, within the bank are serious discussions on whether it can hold on to its cooperative statements within the current competitive environment of

international banking. What does that say about the differences between Rabobank and its main competitors?

The challenge now is to see whether it is possible to detect differences in the way the banks treat their customers.[9] It has become clear that they are not that explicit.

4.2 Discourses

There are various ways to investigate the customer relationships of bank managers. One would be to ask the bank directors directly how they treat their customers but I would be skeptical of the answers. They might be socially desirable ones, that is to say, promotional statements. Rabobank claims that because of their cooperative nature, they can create more "customer value." It says that all its operations are, by definition, customer-driven.[10] What to do with such a claim? Other banks could come up with claims that they "always put the customer first." ABN-Amro says on its web page: "The goal of ABN Amro is to create value for its clients."[11] ING claims: "In all its activities ING is aware of its social responsibilities."[12] I do not believe interviewing top bank managers would answer the question of whether these banks treat their customers differently. I do not believe it is very useful to study isolated values claims.

What I will do instead is study how bankers talk about their customers. I will study their internal discourses, their conversations. Do bank managers talk about their customers as instruments to make money (with the understanding of treating customers well, otherwise they will soon cease to be customers), or as means to improve the world? Are the banks only interested in making as much money as possible, or do they see environmental concerns as a task for themselves?

Looking at the way bankers talk about their customers is something other than just looking at purely moral aspects of banking or purely commercial aspects of customer relationships. Although a small amount of literature about commercial banker relationships with customers exists, it does not include moral aspects.[13] Most of the studies create theoretical constructs of different ways customers can be treated by banks. It has been concluded that "customer relationships have been insufficiently studied … new concepts are needed in addition to those used in static service quality models."[14] Most of this type of research establishes conceptual frameworks wherein theoretical characteristics of the relationships play

an important role. In other words, pre-developed categories of how customers are treated are established, then these frameworks are related to customer perceptions of service quality. This is clearly not my intention. I am not looking for descriptions of customer relationships that lead to the greatest customer satisfaction. I am more interested how the three largest banks in Holland actually treat their customers.

There are also studies about purely moral aspects of banking, like whether racism in banker-customer relationships exists. I would like to go further than that. These studies run the risk of what Alasdair McIntyre would call "armchair philosophy." To look for general value statements is not that helpful. I want to take all aspects of treating customers together and look at the way all aspects of the relationships are weighed by a banker: their "everyday morality."

I have stated that it is not that useful to look at official value statements by companies. The same would hold for less official value statements by individual bankers; these statements are too isolated to say very much. Value statements can best be studied within their context. While I could ask directly whether a banker thinks the bank's regional environment is important, I expect that nearly all bankers would say "yes." In other words, when looking for bankers' value statements we have to watch out for socially desirable answers, else run the risk of having to consider isolated statements by bankers like, "Honesty is the most important value for me." By itself, outside its context, such a statement does not tell me much.

How customers are described in the discourses of the three banks is morally relevant because how the banks internally make sense of "customers" provides insight into their moral choices. After all, according to the discourse theory of Chapters 2 and 3, if bank managers speak differently about their customers, they treat them differently. What moral questions arise in their discourses and what possible answers are given to the moral dilemmas they see themselves facing? As was made clear in the first chapters, the moral element of being a manager is expressed in anything a banker does and says. Different moral questions are raised in one discourse compared to others on the same subject. Recall the example of a banker's discourse in which helping a start-up business is seen as a moral question and another in which it is not. The latter types of bankers will not ask themselves moral questions about giving loans to starting businesses. For every loan request, they look primarily at potential financial risk. They ask

themselves financial, not moral, questions. Discourses contain the conditions of possibility of what can and cannot be said within a certain discourse. They do not only help us understand *that* a certain moral question is asked, they also give us the width of possible solutions to actual moral problems being raised. In other words, they give us what is seen as a viable solution to a specific moral problem and what is not. Therefore I studied the whole of the discourses of bank managers concerning their customers. And by doing so, I studied whether there are *different* discourses, whether it makes a difference when a banker operates from, say, a Rabobank discourse or an ABN-Amro discourse, and whether these discourses contain different morals.

4.3   Q-Methodology

How can a researcher look at the way the word "customer" functions within the internal discursive practices of the Rabobank, ING and ABN-Amro? How can the internal discourses of the banks be described?

Dryzek names Q-methodology as a method to deconstruct discourse.[15] Examples of successful discourse analyses using Q-methodology include Van Eeten,[16] Dryzek and Berejikian,[17] and Thomas et al.[18] "Q study will generally prove a genuine representation of that discourse as it exists within a larger population of persons…To put it another way, our units of analysis, when it comes to generalizations are not individuals, but discourses."[19] The discourses are examined without pre-developed categories of the researcher. Quite the opposite: Q-methodology gives researchers the opportunity to reconstruct the discourses in their own words using only the words spoken by individuals in the discourse.

The instrumental basis of Q-methodology is the Q-sort technique. Usually the statements are taken from interviews.[20] As Steven Brown writes about Q-methodology:

> Most typically, a person is presented with a set of statements about some topic, and is asked to rank-order them (usually from 'agree' to 'disagree'), an operation referred to as 'Q sorting.' The statements are matters of opinion only (not fact), and the fact that the Q sorter is ranking the statements from his or her own point of view is what brings subjectivity into the picture. There is obviously no right or wrong way to provide "my point of view" about anything—health care, the Clarence Thomas nomination, the reasons people commit suicide, why Cleveland can't field a decent

baseball team, or anything else. Yet the rankings are subject to factor analysis, and the resulting factors, inasmuch as they have arisen from individual subjectivities, indicate segments of subjectivity which exist. And since the interest of Q-methodology is in the nature of the segments and the extent to which they are similar or dissimilar, the issue of large numbers, so fundamental to most social research, is rendered relatively unimportant.

I will not go into every detail of Q-research but present the main steps and relevant information for this study.[21]

For Q-research, a so-called *concourse* has to be constructed. The concourse is a technical concept (not to be confused with the concept of discourse) much used in Q-methodology for the collection of all the possible statements managers can make about customers. The concourse is thus supposed to contain all the relevant aspects of all the discourses. It is up to the researcher to draw a representative sample from the concourse at hand. In this case, it contains statements used internally by the bankers about the different aspects of customers. To deconstruct the ways bankers talk about their customers, I used "customer" as an organizing principle; all statements that used the word were considered.

An important first decision is where *exactly* to look for the discourses. Because almost all contact between companies and banks is at a local level, I decided to look at the local branches of the three different banks for the statements of my concourse.[22] I chose the local director of each bank as a representative. This person in charge should know how their branch's customers are dealt with and, as another advantage, has considerable personal experience in dealing with customers.

Ten open interviews were conducted in which the directors were invited to talk about as many aspects of customers and dealing with customers as their time would allow.[23] These interviews were taped. All literal statements about customers were later transcribed. To these statements, I added statements about customers found in written documents produced by the banks, as well as a few statements from the academic literature on customer views of companies. After looking at these sources, the concourse contained about 150 statements. Largely overlapping statements were thrown out. Finally, this list was shown to the three participating bank directors and a few colleagues familiar with the banking

business. The question was then asked whether the remaining statements contained all relevant issues. After suggestions from a bank manager and a colleague, a few statements were added. At this stage my concourse was formed: fifty-two statements had been gathered (in Q-methodology this is called the Q-set).[24] I stress that nearly all were literal statements from bank directors. Some statements can be ambiguous to some people, but that is the nature of language. Therefore, most statements were not edited. Ambiguity is resolved by each of the Q-sorters, who gave their own interpretation to the statements; i.e., every bank director interpreted the statements within his (there were no females, as it happened) own worldview.

The next step was to decide who would be asked to give opinions on the Q-set, or, in other words, who would be asked to Q-sort the statements (the exact process is explained in the following section). In Q-methodology one has to construct a P-set, the person samples. The P-set is the set of persons relevant to the problem.[25] Following the same logic of the Q-set, I decided to have the local bank directors Q-sort the fifty-two statements.[26] Ten from each bank were randomly selected. I structured the P-set according to the size of the municipality the banks were located in, ranging from big cities to small rural villages.[27]

The thirty bank directors interviewed were given a deck of fifty-two cards containing the fifty-two statements (the Q-set). They were then asked to arrange the cards according to the degree they agreed with the statements, with scores ranging from –3 to +3. The score an isolated statement received was not the most important aspect; much more important was the placement of one particular statement among the fifty-two, which is why the respondents were asked to order the statements according to a fixed distribution.[28] (Figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1: Fixed Distribution of the Q-set

Least Agree					Most Agree	
		(Statement Scores)				
-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
(2)	(5)	(11)	(16)	(11)	(5)	(2)

The two statements they most agreed with were put on the right; the two they disagreed with most on the left. The statements they felt indifferent about (or did not understand) were put in the middle. The final distribution is the Q-sort.[29] After the Q-sorting, some open questions were asked to see whether the bank directors missed important issues, and to gain more insight into the discourses by asking about the reasons behind the choices they made. This helped with the final analysis of the different discourses.

The thirty Q-sorts were analyzed using statistical methods. The idea is to look for patterns among the Q-sorts. Are there similar ways in which the thirty directors have prioritized the fifty-two statements? In this case I used factor-analysis, which is standard in Q-methodology. First a centroid factor analysis produced different factors, which were then rotated according to the varimax rotation. This analysis led to five different factors (extracting more than five factors would have led to statistically insignificant factors). In Figure 4.2 (at the end of this chapter), the loadings of the thirty Q-sorts are given on the five different factors.

4.4 The Five Discourses

The five factors deliver the most important information to reconstruct the five discourses: five different ways to conceptualize customers. For each factor, an idealized Q-sort is computed (see Appendix A). This represents how a hypothetical bank director with a 100% loading on a factor would have ordered the fifty-two statements. Here, I present the five discourses in the form of a label and a narrative.[30] When reconstructing the discourse, special attention was paid to the most salient statements and the discriminating items. The discourses are thus constructed not by simply cutting and pasting statements; also taken into account is how the statements are comparatively placed in the different discourses.[31] Furthermore, the interviews after the Q-sorting were used to gain extra insight into why the directors ordered the cards the way they did. Some relevant statements for a discourse are presented, together with the idealized score of the five discourses.

4.4.1 Similarities among the Bankers
I found similarities as well as differences among all the discourses; some are highly correlated. Several statements were ordered virtually the same by the bank directors. Here are some noticeable examples:

	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
36. Financial rates are an important part of doing business. But at least as important for customers are good service and image. As a bank you should most of all communicate that you have the knowledge.	+3	+3	+2	+3	+3
12. Financial rates are more important to our customers than a sense of involvement from our bank.	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2
43. The *average* customer is someone who puts himself in the center, and in general doesn't like banks very much. He or she is mainly focused on making profits. As a bank you feel more like an opponent than as a partner.	-2	-3	-2	-3	-2
19. Ethics plays a role in our business. This means not facilitating customers with activities that cross our boundaries. These boundaries go clearly further than just legal boundaries. We even ethically reprimand customers sometimes.	0	0	0	0	+1

Furthermore, I did not find any bipolar factors. This suggests the presence of consensus on several issues among the discourses. To anyone familiar with the banking business, it should come as no surprise that all the directors stressed in one way or another that banking is a "people business." Within every discourse, money and financial rates certainly were not the all-dominating themes. Statement number 36, for example, has notable agreement within all discourses.

To all banks, good service and knowledge about the business are very important. Earlier I mentioned that every Q-sorter was asked whether any important issue was missing in the statements. Even though most said no, it was mentioned that professionalism and especially knowledge did not get enough attention, given their importance.

Trust was seen as very important by all the bankers. Almost by definition money is about trust. When people lend or borrow money, they only periodically see printed figures on a cheap piece of paper. Therefore, they must trust that their money is in good hands. Also, in Western society money is a private business. A bank must be trusted to respect a customer's privacy.

As far as the moral rules within the three largest banks in Holland are concerned, hardly any banker goes so far as to morally reprimand customers. Furthermore,

environmental sustainability is not a big issue. The environmental laws are taken seriously, but no active policy going further than the legal restrictions of the Netherlands seems to exist.

4.4.2 The First Discourse: Together for Ourselves

Discourse A_b

	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
2. Financial service is a matter of live and let live (between customers and banks).	**+2**	0	+1	+2	+1
28. Rates differ with us from client to client.	**+3**	0	0	0	+1
35. Desperate cases require desperate remedies. You should let weak companies know as soon as possible that we want to end the relationship. In the end, that's also the best for the customer.	**+2**	0	0	0	+1
30. For start-up companies, the threshold to our bank is not the lowest.	**+2**	-2	0	0	0
24. Often we give starting businesses a chance, customers that otherwise wouldn't get a chance with other banks.	**-3**	+1	-2	-1	-1
32. We ask ourselves constantly: what can we do for the region, which means more than just our customers and prospects. It means that we initiate things, that we contact people ourselves to see how we can contribute to all kinds of societal developments.	**-2**	+3	+1	0	-1
37. We don't do too much sponsoring. We just have a certain amount of money for relationship-marketing in general. That means doing everything to bond with our clients and prospects.	**+1**	-3	-3	-1	0

For the bankers in discourse A_b, relationships with customers must be mutually beneficial and are seen as gainful to both. The customers are seen as partners. Once a relationship is established, the bankers of factor A_b want more out of their customers than just making a profit. There is a strong bonding with the customer. This does not mean that the customer is always right. Nothing is done for free. Financial service is a matter of live and let live. It is seen as inefficient to work hard for a customer who does not, in turn, make the bank better. The bankers of discourse A_b are focused on making *both* better. They are constantly looking for win-win situations while working with the customer against the rest of the world. Consequently, when

the relationship is no longer mutually beneficial, these bankers are not the most loyal and consider it best to end the relationship. This is thought to be the most "honest" thing to do.

Since the relationship with the customer is very important, bankers of discourse A_b expect something from their customers. Not everyone is accepted. Start-ups, for example, have the most trouble getting a loan from bankers of factor A_b. After all, a new business is riskier and the question is whether the bank will ever see a profit from it. Accepting start-ups because it is good for the region as a whole is not an issue; the region is of no concern to the banks in discourse A_b. This also means that sponsoring serves no other goal than promotion of the name. Customers are judged on their own merits, not their role in society. They call this being "positively critical."

Once accepted, however, customers get individualized treatment. Bankers of discourse A_b do not look for automatic solutions. And since every customer is different, the treatment of each customer is different. Financial rates offered to customers vary widely.

4.4.3 The Second Discourse: Using the Bank to Improve the Region

Discourse B_b

	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
50. A customer is someone with whom you have partly common and partly opposing interests. He or she is a colleague and a competitor in one.	-1	**-2**	+3	0	0
6. When a customer is in financial difficulty, we are more focused on helping the customer than on reducing the financial risk of the bank, even if the risk of losing money increases.	-1	**+1**	+1	-2	-3
22. At our bank, every customer pays the same rate for the same service.	-3	**-1**	-3	-3	-3
32. We ask ourselves constantly: what can we do for the region, which means more than just our customers and prospects. It means that we initiate things, that we contact people ourselves to see how we can contribute to all kinds of societal developments.	-2	**+3**	+1	0	-1

37. We don't do too much sponsoring. We just have a certain amount of money for relationship-marketing in general. That means doing everything to bond with our clients and prospects.	+1	**-3**	-3	-1	0
30. For start-ups, the threshold to our bank is not the lowest.	+2	**-2**	0	0	0
4. We have strong ethical boundaries, which means we do not want to do business with just any customer. I am talking about things such as abiding by the law and absolutely never accepting large gifts.	+1	**+2**	0	+1	+1

Among all the factors, the correlation between factors A_b and B_b is the lowest. The only agreement is that the customer is not seen as a competitor. For the rest, the concept of "customer" is completely different. For discourse B_b, the main purpose of the relationship is not just to have a win-win situation. Profit is not their main goal. There are other important issues in the world besides each other. Money is not so much the goal as it is a means to other things.

The broader interest of the customer—not just the direct interest—is important. Within discourse A_b, the interest of the customer is the interest of the bank. In discourse B_b, however, the customer is seen in a broader societal context. Yet the direct interests of the customer are also in the foreground. This inevitably leads to conflicts. Sometimes the broader context contradicts the direct financial interest of a customer (for example, how far does a banker go with morally reprimanding a customer who crosses social but not legal boundaries in polluting the environment). This conflict was often mentioned and seems to be one of the defining daily struggles of bankers in discourse B_b.

When a customer is in trouble, bankers of discourse B_b are the most preoccupied with helping the client rather than reducing their own financial risk. This is not to say that the differences in this respect are very great—banks will be banks and all banks have to keep a constant eye on their own financial situation. They will not go so far as to not make a profit; they do not see themselves as charity institutions. There is even less understanding, compared to the other discourses, for a customer who also has a relationship with other banks.

The financial rates are not the same for everyone, but vary less than those of the other banks. Of all the factors, negotiating with bankers of factor B_b is the least useful. No two customers are the same, but if two customers are the same in

principle, they should pay the same rate for the same service. Just like relationships in life, it is important for these bankers to have "a good feeling" about their customers. They also want customers to "feel at home" in their bank. The client is more like a partner. The bank cannot have the feeling that a customer is its competitor. Compared to the other discourses, loans are given somewhat more on intuition than on a purely mathematical basis.

Being an active party in society—especially in one's own region—is important for bankers in factor B_b. They do not feel this way because it is good for business; a genuine idealism is at work. Both the bank and the customers are seen as regional entities. Again, this is very much in contrast with discourse A_b. Bankers of discourse B_b spend money on sponsoring because it helps organizations in the region, not so much the bank itself. Sponsoring is not just for their own clients and prospects. Start-ups are seen as important to the region, thus they give these businesses many opportunities.

The interests of the customers play a role, but when bankers of factor B_b have to make choices, they are not based on improving the world irrespective of all else. It is not the case that they have stringent environmental rules for their customers. When they say that ethics are important, they mean respecting the law, not accepting bribes—not issues in a wider moral sense. They are not moralists with a clear idea of how to improve the world. They do not reprimand their customers on what they consider purely moral grounds, such as, "Don't pollute the environment that much."

4.4.4 The Third Discourse: A Customer Is a Colleague and Competitor in One

Discourse C_b

	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
50. A customer is someone with whom you have partly common and partly opposing interests. He or she is a colleague and a competitor in one.	-1	-2	**+3**	0	0
7. We (almost) never have big problems with customers who feel they are treated wrongly. When there are problems, we usually solve them to everyone's satisfaction. We feel very responsible for (almost) all problems.	0	0	**+2**	0	0
13. Values are very important, but they have to be sincere. If you play a game with them, and just give some money for some good causes, a (potential) customer will see right through that.	0	+1	**+3**	+1	+2

20. When judging a business-plan of a (potential) customer, the concept of sustainability plays a role. We go clearly further than just finding out whether the company has the necessary licenses.	+2	+1	**-1**	0	+1

Discourse C_b is by far the least populated among the five (with only three defining variates, one of which has an even higher loading on another factor). But since it has both clear statistical significance and a clear view of customers, a description follows.

Discourse C_b is an open business approach. In discourse C_b we see for the first time that a customer is not only conceptualized as a partner, but also as a competitor. This is mainly because (like the two factors that follow) making a profit is considered more important than in the previous discourses. Naturally there are common interests between bank and customer, but there are also clear opposing interests. And the bankers of discourse C_b are aware of that. They consider it "honest" to admit that. This also means that they think it unfair for a banker to claim he has only common interests with a customer—that is simply not the reality and one should not try to conceal that. That would be "insincere." Typical is that one of the bankers of this discourse noted that he missed a few cards about the power games in the banking business. They consider it a fact that in the banking business one is constantly in a negotiating position. They do not, however, "play games" with the customer.

Money is simply what their business is all about. Bankers of discourse C_b want to make a buck and do not hide that; their main interest in the customer is a commercial interest. They also easily accept that attitude from their customers. They are by far the least prone to call their customers materialistic. In that sense, they do not feel let down by the customer very easily. The relationship with their customers is less personal than in discourse A_b and B_b. They are, of all the discourses, also the least upset when a customer goes bankrupt: that is simply part of the money game.

Morally speaking, they do not have an impulse to improve society. Environmental sustainability plays no role. Values are important, of course, but they do not take the idea too far. Bankers in discourse C_b are sincere in that sense; they do not try to look better than they are.

4.4.5 The Fourth Discourse: Marketing and the Customer as a Buyer of Profitable Products

Discourse D_b

	A_b	B_b	C_b	**D_b**	E_b
45. In our bank, customers are put at the center of attention, because it's they who have to generate the profits.	+1	+1	+1	**+3**	+3
6. When a customer is in financial difficulty, we are more focused on helping the customer than on reducing the financial risk of the bank, even if the risk of losing money increases.	-1	+1	+1	**-2**	-3
10. The worst experience with customers for me is when a company goes bankrupt.	-1	0	-2	**+1**	0

Discourse D_b is most marketing-oriented. When negotiating, bankers of C_b have a pure and open business approach. Bankers of discourse D_b are more apt to play games. They look carefully at their opponents, like poker players, and try to figure out what the best strategy would be in the negotiations. The customer who does not negotiate will pay a price, something that generally characterizes discourse D_b. As in discourse E_b (to follow), bankers of discourse D_b are most concerned with making a profit; profits are the bottom line. The way to do that differs; in this case, it is by listening to what (potential) customers want. Service is considered highly important. As in discourse A_b, they listen carefully to their customers, but in discourse D_b it is less personal; it is simply the best way to make money. If you keep your customers happy, you keep yourself happy. It is the customer who ultimately pays the banker's salary (many commented spontaneously that the client *is* their bread and butter). The client is put on a pedestal because that is the best way to make money. For example, when a customer is in trouble, the main goal is to minimize the bank's losses. This is nonetheless a very distressing situation, the worst that can happen in this kind of business. The worst-case scenario is when a banker does everything to keep a customer happy and the customer fails.

The notion that the relationship is less personal manifests in the sense that bankers of discourse D_b tend to talk about their clients in terms of categories rather than in personal terms. They are marketing-oriented; they look for products to fit their customers instead of the other way around. They do not simply try to sell existing products because customers want service made to measure. That is not always easy. There are many different clients out there.

Since bankers of discourse D_b are the most interested in what customers think about them, they are most likely to be disappointed by customers. Many complain that customers are too critical. When you knock your socks off for a customer, it is not nice to find out that he or she is mainly interested in your financial rates. They view many clients as primarily interested in money, and are therefore the most likely (especially when compared with the profit-oriented factors C_b and E_b) to complain about customers being materialistic.

Bankers of discourse D_b would not miss an opportunity to present themselves in the most favorable ways, including in a moral sense, even if they themselves know the created image is not completely accurate.

4.4.6 The Fifth Discourse: The Customer as a Commercial Relationship

Discourse E_b

	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
45. In our bank, customers are put at the center of attention, because it's they who have to generate the profits.	+1	+1	+1	+3	**+3**
6. When a customer is in financial difficulty, we are more focused on helping the customer than on reducing the financial risk of the bank. Even if the risk of losing money increases.	-1	+1	+1	-2	**-3**
3. A customer is someone you cooperate with; after all, we only have common interests. He is like a colleague.	0	+1	0	+1	**-1**
49. Values are more and more important to us. Because our name has to appear only once in the papers with "that bank did something wrong" and there goes our good name. And that will cost us customers.	+1	+1	+1	0	**+2**
13. Values are very important, but they have to be sincere. If you play a game with them, and just give some money for some good causes, a (potential) customer will see right through that.	0	+1	+3	+1	**+2**
23. The worst experience with customers occurs when one of the many forms of fraud comes to light.	0	0	0	0	**+2**
38. I wish customers in general wouldn't be so materialistic. Financial rates are often the only thing that counts when doing business.	-1	0	-1	0	**-2**

For both discourse D_b and E_b, profits are the bottom line. What separates them is that bankers in discourse E_b are less outgoing, more focused on themselves. They are self-assured and appear so with customers. Some might call this arrogant. They believe that quality is the name of the game. If a bank delivers the best products, the customers will come automatically, and the bank will make the most money. Customers do not decide which bank to go to based on "feeling at home"; they decide primarily on business calculations. Therefore a bank must be the best in a business sense. This does not mean simply having the best financial rates. Quality, good service and professionalism are of utmost importance.

As in discourse C_b, customers and banks do not always have common interests. A customer is not just a colleague. Both have their own obligations and tasks. Bankers of discourse E_b do recognize themselves in the customers. They think about their customers in the following terms: "They are like us. Therefore, they will understand if we just try to be the best in everything and make a good profit, then the customer will recognize themselves in us, because they too are very concerned with the quality of their own products, and thus feel at home as our customer."

Since the bank is business oriented, most decisions are made on a business basis. When a client is in trouble, it is simply the duty of the bank to look after its own risks first. Of course, bankers of discourse E_b want to help, but there are clear boundaries. Never throw good money after bad. The bank's own financial risk is number one on its list of priorities.

Whereas trustworthiness is a great marketing tool, fraud is the most egregious sort of advertisement. In a moral sense, the worst thing that can happen is fraud. Bankers of discourse C_b are more likely to blame themselves for not noticing something was amiss, but not the bankers of discourse E_b. Fraud touches the heart and soul of their business. Bankruptcy is part of the business banks are in; fraud is not. It can be ruinous for the reputation of the bank and cost a good deal of money. Customers seek quality and a sense of security; bad press might drive them away. Trust is seen as a crucial part of providing good service.

The role of the bank in the region is banking, i.e., to provide businesses good service. A start-up is taken on if the business plans and approaches are promising; if it happens to improve the region, so be it. If a start-up company has potential value for the region but is financially dubious, the bank chooses not to take the risk.

Values are important insomuch as they support good reputation. A manager of discourse E_b believes that when morally judging their customers, they should not go further than legal boundaries. Improving the world is not the task of a banker: again, the task of a banker is to excel in the business of borrowing and lending money. One also should not present oneself as better than one is in reality. There is nothing wrong with being a good banker. On the contrary, it is an honorable profession. Similarly, bankers of discourse E_b expect their customers to be good business people and nothing more. Customers are later rather than sooner seen as materialistic. If most customers are profit-oriented, that is a good thing.

4.5 Different Banks and Different Municipality Sizes

From the numbers collected I cannot say exactly what percentage of large city banks fall into any one specific discourse. But since the bankers were selected in random fashion, some conclusions can be drawn.[32]

The differences in the discourses of banks of big cities and banks of small villages do not seem to be very great; the particular bank, however, does seem to be important. As can be seen from the subjects' factor loadings (Figure 4.2), seven of the ABN-Amro bankers fall into discourse E_b (The Customer as a Commercial Relationship), where only three defining variates are found in this factor from the other two banks combined. Discourse E_b therefore seems to be predominantly an ABN-Amro factor. Discourse A_b (Together for Ourselves) looks like an ING discourse and discourse B_b (Using the Bank to Improve the Region) a Rabobank discourse.

These impressions can be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny[33] by treating the loadings on each of the factors as separate dependent measures[34] and analyzing differences among these scores in terms of the 3 x 3 (region x bank) ANOVA design implicit in the P-set. The analysis of variance amplifies the initial impressions. The size of the municipality hardly predicts a factor the banker will fall in to. Small villages, however, have significantly lower loadings on factor E_b ($F = 6.23$, $p = .008$).

The impressions of bank-specific factors were also confirmed. Perhaps the most surprising result of the analysis of variance is that the strongest relationship ($F = 14.36$, $p < .001$) was found with respect to factor A_b. At first this did not seem to be the most bank-specific factor, but a second look revealed the extremely low score of

the Rabobank bankers on this factor, resulting in the high F score. Factor E_b also shows significance: Rabobank is very low and ABN-Amro very high (F = 7.26, p = .004).

One of the questions discussed earlier was whether Rabobank was right when it claimed that it is different from other banks in treating its customers. The answer, the research reveals, is both yes and no. Discourse B_b (Using the Bank to Improve the Region) clearly seems to be a Rabobank discourse. Only one other defining variate can be found in this discourse. Furthermore, the loadings among the other bank directors on factor B_b are very low. The conclusion it begs is yes; the discourse within Rabobank backs its claim. Yet only five of the ten Rabobank directors are defined by factor B_b. And those who are defined by other factors have extreme low loadings on factor B_b, indicating they do not identify themselves with it. Thus, even though a Rabobank-specific customer treatment exists, not all Rabobank managers employ it. Furthermore, in the larger cities, no defining variates were found. A random customer going to a random Rabobank would not, it seems, be able to count on a Rabobank-specific treatment. This conclusion is not surprising, since Rabobank is decentralized and every branch is independent. In contrast to the other banks, the hiring of personnel is completely decentralized. Even if Rabobank desired it, it would be difficult to create a shared culture among all the local banks throughout the Netherlands.

4.6   Conclusion

I asked the question at the beginning of this chapter whether there are *different* discourses among bankers, whether it makes a difference when a banker operates from, say, a Rabobank discourse or an ABN-Amro discourse. If so, do these discourses contain different morals? The answer to all is yes. It turns out that it is useful to distinguish different discourses. Even though at the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the differences between the different banks might not be great, it turns out that important differences in the way bankers treat their customers exist. The differences cannot be ignored and have consequences.

The differences are not a matter of some bankers being racist while others are not, or that some embrace "corporate social responsibility" and others ignore it. The differences are more subtle, and represent five different discourses in which bank directors talk about their customers, five different ways for banks to conceptualize

their customers. Furthermore, this chapter presents empirical evidence that the factual images banks have of their customers are connected to different moral questions and possible solutions to these questions. With respect to values, bank managers from discourse E_b (The Customer as a Commercial Relationship) talk immediately about fraud and how to prevent it. Other moral issues seen by the bankers—how to treat start-ups, how to deal with environmental issues, how to use the bank to improve the region, how to deal with sponsoring, how to treat a customer in financial difficulty, whether to treat clients differently, when to be completely honest to customers, how to negotiate with customers—are indissolubly tied to factual images a banker has of his customers. The moral questions and the factual images are part of the same discourse. That is what I meant by avoiding McIntyre's "armchair philosophy." From the different discourses follow different value judgments. The moral side of the discourse is firmly footed in practice. This shows how hard it is to look at moral issues of companies without taking account of factual views and contexts.

One way to look at the moral aspects of the discursive practices of the three banks is to study their internal discourses. That leaves the possibility, as has been done in this study, to compare similar discourses; the moral aspects show in contrast. There is no discourse that focuses only on doing well or only on doing good. Bank managers do not make decisions along those lines. Their world is more complicated. The way choices are made in the one discourse that pays more attention to the region (discourse B_b, Using the Bank to Improve the Region) is not as clear cut as the description in the first section of this chapter. Bankers of discourse B_b also look at the bottom line; they also try to do well throughout the day, every day.

I have not made judgments on whether one discourse was better in a moral or economic sense. Some bank directors feel more comfortable in discourse A_b, others in discourse B_b, just as customers have personal preferences for bank directors. It does matter what kind of bank director a customer is dealing with: a customer is treated differently. This last conclusion touches on the corporate culture literature where the type of bank makes a difference for the customer.

Figure 4.2: Subjects' Factor Loadings

			A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
Rabobank	large	1	.02	.10	.34	(.44)	.30
		2	.15	.04	.10	(.49)	.37
		3	.26	.25	.33	.25	(.46)
	medium	4	-.02	(.67)	.19	.24	.12
		5	.08	.09	(.65)	.25	.10
		6	-.03	(.57)	.02	-.02	.16
		7	.10	(.45)	-.16	.38	.27
	small	8	.12	(.67)	.15	.24	.05
		9	-.01	.08	.09	.34	.01
		10	.04	(.65)	(.50)	-.07	-.24
ABN-Amro	large	11	.30	.40	-.11	.33	(.43)
		12	.24	.16	.23	.39	(.53)
		13	.26	.23	.15	.12	(.59)
	medium	14	.41	.06	.26	(.47)	(.48)
		15	.15	.22	.20	.20	(.71)
		16	.23	.26	.30	.02	(.59)
		17	-.01	(.65)	.06	(.52)	.18
	small	18	(.68)	.33	.11	.35	.11
		19	(.49)	-.01	-.18	.36	(.48)
		20	.41	.06	.14	(.47)	.17
ING	large	21	(.61)	-.21	.07	.03	.22
		22	.34	.37	-.06	(.49)	.17
		23	(.44)	.02	-.01	.31	(.56)
	medium	24	.35	.09	-.05	.21	(.47)
		25	(.56)	-.03	.24	-.01	.35
		26	.18	.20	(.55)	.16	.29
		27	.41	.00	.21	.33	.28
	small	28	.13	.24	.17	(.50)	.23
		29	(.44)	.29	.02	-.03	.19
		30	.37	.39	.11	.11	.36

Notes: 1. In parenthesis are the *defining variates* (loadings that exceed .43, $p < .001$).

2. Subjects 1 through 10 are from Rabobank; 11 through 20 ABN-Amro; 21 through 30 ING.

3. The first three subjects of each bank are located in large cities (CBS stedelijkheid score 1 or 2); the next four subjects are located in medium size communities (score 3); the last three subjects of each bank group are located in small villages (score 4 or 5).

Notes

[1] http://www.abnamro.com/com/about/profile.asp#corpvalue, 23-1-03.

[2] http://www.ing.nl/ing/contentm.nsf/content, 23-1-03.

[3] http://www.rabobank.com, 23-1-03.

[4] http://www.abnamro.com/com/about/history.asp, 23-1-03.

[5] http://www.abnamro.com/com/about/about.asp, 23-1-03.

[6] http://www.ing.nl/ing/contentm.nsf/c8974df1bc36c15ec12569d90047e5ea/fa4b88f973205c44c1256a7 700499312?OpenDocument&lan=en, 23-1-03.

[7] http://www.ing.nl/ing/contentm.nsf/c8974df1bc36c15ec12569d90047e5ea/fa4b88f973205c44c1256a7 700499312?OpenDocument&lan=en, 23-1-03.

[8] Bankers in literature are often depicted as greedy people.

[9] I also look into whether there are differences among the banks or differences related to the municipality size the banks are in.

[10] http://www.rabobank.com, 23-1-03.

[11] http://www.abnamro.com/com/about/profile.asp, 23-1-03.

[12] http://www.ing.nl/ing/contentm.nsf/content/2DA337E37B12EDE2C1256C4500352BD2!OpenDocume nt&sc=society&lan=en, 23-1-03.

[13] Including Liljander & Strandvik (1995) and Schneider et al. (1980).

[14] Liljander & Strandvik (1995), p. 141.

[15] Dryzek (1990), p. 187.

[16] Eeten (1999).

[17] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993).

[18] Thomas et al. (1993).

[19] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[20] http://www.rz.unibw-muenchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod/srbqhc.htm, 23-1-03.

[21] The main source for Q-methodology in general is Stephenson (1953). Within the social sciences, Brown (1980) is a classic.

[22] For ING and ABN-Amro I investigate at the level of "rayon-kantoren." Rayons are the main areas in which they have divided Holland. Rabobank does not have such an intermediate level.

[23] Banks usually divide their customers in two categories: business clients and private clients. I instructed the directors to talk about their business customers. Because of automation processes, most private clients hardly ever personally interact with their banks. This category was therefore less interesting than the business clients, who always have a personal contact with the bank. Today, a discourse about private customers hardly exists within banks; most exchanges are computerized.

[24] During the many interviews that followed, every interviewee was asked whether the fifty-two statements contained all the relevant aspects of customers and dealing with customers. In almost every case, this was confirmed.

[25] Brown (1980), p. 192.

[26] For ABN-Amro and ING only "rayon-directeuren" were considered. There are about 200 of them within Holland. Rabobank does not have rayon-directeuren, only local bank directors (about 470).

[27] For this I used the 'mate van stedelijkheid' (measure of urbanization) of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. This measure applies to every municipality from 1 (totally urbanized) to 5 (not urbanized). For each bank, I investigated 3 branches that were in category 1 or 2, 4 in category 3 and 3 that were in the highest two categories.

[28] In this case standard Q-sort procedure was followed, and a quasi-normal distribution was chosen.

[29] Even though a forced distribution was used, some deviations were tolerated. If the Q-sorter found the forced distribution too much unlike his position, he was allowed to slightly vary the number of statements in a category.

[30] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[31] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[32] There is a small amount of literature on the translation of Q-technique results into questionnaire items for administration to larger audiences. Steven R. Brown gave a list of literature on this subject on the "Q-method Discussion List" (Kent State University, March 5th 1999). On Q-methodology in general, see Thomas & Baas (1992).

[33] Thomas et al. (1993), p. 707.

[34] After an email suggestion by Steven R. Brown, the loadings were first transformed into Fisher's Z.

5. Veterinarians' Conceptualizations of Animals and Animal Owners

The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.
—Mahatma Gandhi

5.1 Professional Veterinarians and Their Customers

I wrote this chapter in the midst of the Dutch foot and mouth disease crisis. Even though the technology exists to fight the disease, the EU decided not to use the available vaccination because it would have meant the loss of export markets, including the United States and Japan. One of the results was that about 300,000 healthy cows, pigs and sheep were killed in the hopes of eliminating the virus. Unlike the late 1990's outbreak of swine fever in Holland (when about three million healthy pigs were destroyed) this crisis led to a national debate about the best way to fight disease. It has even led to a renewed public debate about the way animals are held for food production in Holland and a discussion about the quality of animals' lives in modern stables. All participants, including Mr. Doornbos, chairman of the LTO (Holland's National Farmers' Association), publicly agree that policy has to change and animal welfare should be improved.

In the improvement of animal welfare, veterinarians obviously play a role. How do they treat their clients? Furthermore, who *are* their clients? With bankers, this was not an issue. For veterinarians, however, things are less clear. Are the customers of veterinarians the animals they treat or the owners who pay the bills? And where do their loyalties reside? I suspect most veterinarians feel a love for animals—an interest in animals is implicit in the decision to study veterinary medicine. After all, they will be dealing with animals for the rest of their working lives, which suggests that the prospect of helping animals is appealing. Dating back to the first veterinarian surgeons, many expressed they were the counsels of animals.

Yet the profession is service-oriented; the feelings and interests of animal owners have considerable effect. It is the owner who calls for a veterinarian in the first place. It is the owner who pays the bills and thus provides the veterinarian's income. Some sort of business-oriented rationality in veterinary practice must therefore exist. The owner is also the animal's caretaker; in wanting the best for the animal, the person who gives it daily nourishment cannot be dismissed. This brings up interesting questions for the veterinarian. Since veterinary practice is a service-oriented profession, who is responsible for the animal? The owner, the veterinarian, or both? And how far do their respective responsibilities go? Do the interests and feelings of animal owners conflict with the responsibilities veterinarians feel they have towards the animals? If so, how do they deal with those conflicts? Can client-oriented practitioners be distinguished from animal-oriented practitioners?

Veterinarians are businesspeople: they make a living out of their practice, they are in charge of several employees and they compete with each other. But I have used the term "profession" several times. Veterinary medicine being a profession sets it apart from a traditional business like banking. In 1915, Flexner set forth six criteria for distinguishing a profession from other kinds of work: intellectualism, learnedness, practical knowledge, technique, organization and altruism.[1] Flexner also noted, "The term profession strictly used, as possessed to business of handicraft, is a title of peculiar distinction, coveted by many activities. Thus far it has been pretty indiscriminately used."[2] Many definitions of "profession" have been given since then; scholars do not seem to be able to agree on one. In a classic study,[3] Howard Becker finds a way out not so much by giving a definition but by giving characteristics of an honorific symbol of a profession in use in our society.[4] The characteristics are that professions, as commonly conceived, possess a monopoly of some esoteric and difficult body of knowledge; it is felt that entrance into professional practice must be strictly controlled ("The client therefore, is supposed to be able to count on the professional whose services he retains to have his best interest at heart. He rests comfortable in the knowledge that this is one relationship in which the rule of the marketplace does not apply[5])"; members of the professions are usually thought of as (and often in fact are) people of sizeable income and high community prestige. These features of the symbol "profession" represent a consensus of what a profession ought to be, not necessarily a reality. For our purposes, the "right" definition or criteria of a profession is no great matter; under any definition, veterinary practice is seen as a

profession. That introduces some peculiarities for managers in veterinary practice and makes veterinarians different from bankers.

Professionals identify strongly with each other. Reputation is important with colleagues as well as customers. Therefore, professionals keep a close eye on each other.[6] An interesting aspect in Holland is that The Faculty of Veterinary Medicine in Utrecht is the only veterinary medical school in the country, so nearly all Dutch veterinarians have studied there. Perhaps because of the close eye they keep on each other and their homogeneous educational backgrounds, Dutch veterinary managers are more alike than bank managers.

5.2   Veterinarians Who Do Good and Veterinarians Who Do Well

The characteristics of the symbol "profession" given by Becker leads to the expectation that veterinarians mainly want to do good: clients must "rest comfortable in the knowledge that" the professional has their best interests at heart. But once again, who are the customers of veterinarians? Too, Becker noted that reality may differ from the symbolic characteristics. Perhaps veterinarians are dissimilar after all. Are there different factions among them? Let's find out.

When we think of what it would mean for a veterinarian to do good, "animal welfare" comes to mind. When we think of veterinarians interested solely in animal welfare, we expect them to always act in favor of the animal. Such veterinarians would define success in moral terms, how much they are able to help animals. If, on the other hand, we think of veterinarians who do well, we expect them to please as much as possible the person paying the bill, the animal owner. Such veterinarians would define success in monetary terms, how much money they (and maybe the farmers) are making.

Scarce literature exists on tensions for veterinarians that arise from conflict between animal and animal owner. This is surprising; in the field of human medicine, much has been written on the doctor-patient relationship. As mentioned in Chapter 3, applied ethics too is lively in the medical field. In that vast body of literature, however, it is clear who the customer is. Perhaps if the patient's autonomy is compromised, interesting questions about whom the doctor should consult for patient decision-making arise.[7] In most circumstances, however, the

patient is the doctor's "customer." If animals are veterinarians' patients, are they therefore their "customers"? What about the animal owner?

In the literature on the veterinarian-animal relationship, the tensions between dealing with two types of customers are not the focus of the research.[8] It rather concentrates on the human-animal relationship.[9] Swabe has written an interesting book on the relationships humans have with animals, especially against the background of human and animal diseases. It spans some ten thousand years and raises questions about the increasing intensification of animal use for both animal and human health with attention to the veterinary regime as enforced by the state within an international arena. Swabe also pays attention to the veterinary surgeon in the field of farm animals:[10]

> Throughout this century, the veterinarian's role has changed quite dramatically from treating individual animals to the management of herd-health.[11]

This mainly historical account of the developments within veterinarian practice has some interesting conclusions:

> The face of everyday veterinary practice has continued to change as antibiotics, vaccines, anesthetics and analgesics have been introduced to aid the treatment and cure of animal patients … Furthermore, the call for veterinary education has greatly increased throughout the twentieth century[12] … The practising veterinary surgeon is, therefore, one of the most important cogs in the wheels of the complex machinery that is responsible for the transformation of living flesh into the animal produce fit for human consumption.[13]

About the veterinarian's daily work, Swabe comments:

> In reality, veterinarians are endlessly preoccupied with performing highly routine procedures pertaining to management, control and prevention of disease and parasitic infection.[14]

This leaves open the question of how a veterinarian deals with daily dilemmas, the focus of this book. It leaves aside how veterinarians look at and deal with customers and conflicts of interests, and whether they should do well or good. In Rutger's Dutch dissertation on the tension between dealing with animals and animal owners (written in 1993), he makes a distinction between animal-oriented and service-oriented veterinarians. He discusses similarities to the distinction between doing good and doing well: the do-good veterinarian chooses in favor of

animals, the do-well veterinarian chooses in favor of animal owners. The question is whether it makes sense to divide veterinarians along these lines.

5.3   Two Research Questions

The first question is: *How do practicing veterinarians treat animals and their owners*? It is clear by now that connected to this question are questions like, how do they see their professional role, what are their responsibilities and how do they position themselves? In other words, what discourses are there among veterinarians concerning animals and their owners? These discourses should include a view about, for example, their professional responsibility towards both animals and their owners. As explained earlier, these discourses have to be very broad. All the opinions of a person somehow relate to each other. That means that when talking about farm animals, a view about intensive animal husbandry is part of the discourse on animal and animal owners; otherwise, the moral issues are treated without context. A veterinarian working on farms that practice intensive animal husbandry treats diseases that are partly related to the practice of it. Therefore, when studying the discourse of a veterinarian's professional responsibility, this context plays a role. It influences the way he or she feels about responsibilities towards the animal and animal owner.

The socialization aspect of a profession makes one suspect that among same-school veterinarians (as opposed to bank managers whose backgrounds, university degrees, levels of formal education and career paths within the bank may all differ), there would be more unanimity in their discourses. Maybe the stronger socializing effects of a profession create a discourse on clients that is shared by most veterinarians. Becker already noted:

> A third discovery … was that the people the institution was trying to socialize did not respond to its efforts as individuals, but might … respond as an organized group. Thus, my colleagues and I, when we studied the socializing effects of a medical school, found it necessary to speak of *student culture*. By this term we referred to the meanings and understandings generated in interaction among students, the perspectives they developed and acted on in confronting the problems set for them by the school, its authorities and its curriculum.[15]

On the other hand, Becker writes:

> The world beyond the socializing institution played an important part in the socializing process.[16]

So which is it? Is there only one discourse of veterinarians about their clients or are there more? And if there are more, how different are they and in what aspect do they differ? In keeping with the research in this book, I leave open the possibility that veterinarians can be divided into those who do good and those who do well. As with the bankers, however, the discourse might be far too complicated to allow such a simple divide.

Veterinarians can be roughly divided into those who treat companion animals and those who treat farm animals (animals for food consumption). In the last two years of study, students can choose to specialize in one of these fields. It turns out that, in general, the relationship with animals and their owners is group-specific. Different problems and conflicts surface. For example, veterinarians working with companion animals sometimes find the humanizing of companion animals troublesome. That is not a problem farm animal veterinarians have to deal with. Also, veterinarians who work with large animals (farm animals) deal more with herd-health and less with the treatment of individual patients. Swabe:

> For example, it is now standard for poultry to be treated as a flock, rather than be examined individually. Large-animal practitioners are required to spend an inordinate amount of time engaged in taking blood samples for analysis by governmental agencies and inoculating livestock herds en masse against a wide variety of infectious diseases which may otherwise impede production and the livestock and meat trade.[17]

To lessen complications introduced by these differences, I limit this study to discourses of farm animal veterinarians. An interesting aspect of this field is the economic interests of the animal owners: farmers earn their livelihood from their animals which, of course, influences the relationship they have with their animals (more on this later).

The second major research question is: *Where do these discourses come from*? This is a question concerning the professionalisation and socialization processes of veterinarians.[18] The professionalisation literature shows that socialization processes are an integral part of professionalisation. How does one become a professional? How one acquires the typical body of knowledge that distinguishes a profession from other kinds of work is for a great part formed in Utrecht, but how does one acquire the identity of a veterinarian? Is that also formed in Utrecht? We suspect that the self—the identity of one working within a profession—is more shaped by the profession than those doing other kinds of work. As Becker asks,

"What kinds of mechanisms operate to produce the changes we observe in adults?"[19] Colander and Klamer write on the socialization of economists:

> Our conclusion from these two incomplete tests is that while some adjusting to the school view does occur in graduate school, unless the changes occur in the first-year, the predominant factor in determining the beliefs of a graduate school student is self-selection. Graduate schools modify these beliefs somewhat but often reinforce previously existing views.[20]

Does the same go for veterinarians? The more we can find out on this issue, the more we can say about the possibility of influencing the existing discourses.

With respect to the question of where these discourses come from, I decided to compare the discourses of veterinarians with those of veterinary students. What are the differences? Included in the study are the discourses of first-year students (who had been studying at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine for just three months) and fourth-year students (of a six-year curriculum). I also considered variables like graduation date, gender and geographical place of practice. Students who graduated before 1990 did not have courses on ethics in their curriculum; they had only had technical courses. Now, all students have a mandatory course in the fourth year called "Veterinary Medicine and Society" and in the first year, some attention is given to the normative aspects of veterinary medicine.

For many years, there were few female students at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine in Utrecht and thus most veterinarians in Holland are male. Interestingly enough, approximately eighty percent of current students are female. One of the reasons for this is that women have, on average, higher secondary school grades, which increase chances of admission. An interesting sub-question is whether the change of gender has had, or will have, an influence on the way veterinarians deal with animals and their owners.

Could the discourses of veterinarians working in different geographical locations be significantly different? The mentality of farmers might differ from one location to another (for example, more or less money-oriented) and this could influence a veterinarian. Nor are animals uniformly distributed. In the province of Brabant, for example, the sandy, rather infertile soil means there are relatively more pigs and fewer dairy cattle. The type of animal a veterinarian treats might also influence his or her discourse.

5.4   Discourse Analysis and Q-Methodology

As in Chapter 5, Q-methodology is used to deconstruct the discourses.[21] As a reminder:

> Q study will generally prove a genuine representation of that discourse as it exists within a larger population of persons…To put it another way, our units of analysis, when it comes to generalizations, are not individuals, but discourses.[22]

The discourses are examined without pre-developed categories by the researcher. On the contrary, Q-methodology gives researchers the opportunity to reconstruct the discourses in their own words using only those spoken by individuals involved in the discourse. Only the main steps and relevant information of Q-research for this study are presented here.[23]

First, for Q-research, the so-called *concourse* has to be constructed. The concourse is a technical concept (not to be confused with the concept of discourse as I use in this book) used in Q-methodology for the collection of all the possible statements veterinarians can make about customers. The concourse is thus supposed to contain all relevant aspects of all discourses. It is up to the researcher to draw a representative sample from the concourse at hand. In this case, it contains statements used by veterinarians and students about the different aspects of animals and their owners.

An important first decision is where exactly to look for the discourses. Twenty open interviews were conducted with veterinarians, first-year students and fourth-year students. In these taped interviews, the (future) veterinarians were invited to talk about as many aspects of their relationship with animals and their owners and the possible conflicts with them as their time would allow. All literal statements about animals and their owners were later transcribed. To these statements, I added a few statements about the veterinary profession from the academic literature on relationships of veterinarians with animals and their owners.

The statements of the three groups were kept apart, forming three separate lists and, in effect, three Q-studies. This was done because it became clear after the interviews that the discourses of the three groups had distinct differences. For example, fourth-year students and practicing veterinarians used the term "utility

surgery" for performing surgery for non-therapeutic reasons. First-year students needed an explanation of the term before they could give their opinion on it. Although there were many overlapping concerns, there were also many differences. Sometimes it was only a difference in wording of the same issue; sometimes there were issues for one group that could not be found in another. Another difference was the tendency of first-year students to give few general remarks about an issue. They talked more about personal relationships with animals ("*I want to work with reptiles later*"). A more practical point is that talk with students about practicing had to be in the future tense, whereas with veterinarians it was in the present tense; the same statements could not be used literally for both groups as in certain situations they would not make sense. Another example of a difference between the groups was that the fourth-year students could talk about the way their studies altered their opinions. For first-year students this was not yet possible.

The concourse of the veterinarians contained about 150 statements, the fourth-year students 100 statements, and the first-year 80. (Since first-year students talked less in general terms, many of their remarks were unusable.) All (largely) overlapping statements were thrown out. Finally, the three lists were shown to several academics at Utrecht with different specialties to see whether, in their opinion, the remaining statements contained all relevant issues. After some suggestions, a few statements were added to the lists. At this stage, my concourse was formed: fifty-two statements were gathered for the veterinarians and forty-two for each student group (in Q-methodology these are called the Q-sets).[24] There was some overlapping of literal statements among the three Q-sets. When it appeared that a certain issue was missing, I chose to take a literal statement from one of the other Q-sets rather than composing one. Almost all statements are literal statements from veterinarians or veterinary students.

Some statements can be ambiguous to some people but that is the nature of language; the statements were therefore not edited. Ambiguity is resolved by the Q-sorters, who gave their own interpretation to the statements (students or veterinarians interpreted the statements within their own worldview).

The next step was to decide who should be asked their opinion about the Q-set or, in other words, Q-sort the statements. In Q-methodology one has to construct a P-set, the person samples, i.e., the set of persons relevant to the problem.[25] I selected the students and veterinarians in a random way (I will explain why later). I

took large samples to make sure there were enough male and female students, and veterinarians of differing age and from different parts of the country. Furthermore, I ensured there were a sufficient number of students who wanted to work in the field of farm animals as well as in the field of companion animals. The P-set thus had implicit designs.

At the close of a mandatory class that included all first-year veterinary students, I asked for volunteers to help with the study. About seventy students offered their assistance, out of which forty were randomly chosen. Each was given a deck of forty-two cards containing the forty-two statements (the Q-set). They were then asked to arrange the cards according to the degree they agreed with the statements, with scores ranging from –3 to +3.[26]

The particular score an isolated statement received was not the most important aspect. More important was the placement of a statement among the other forty-two, which is why the respondents were asked to order the statements according to a fixed distribution. The two statements they agreed with most were put on the right; the two they disagreed with most on the left. The statements they felt indifferent about (or did not understand) were put in the middle (the 0 category). The final distribution was the Q-sort.[27] After the Q-sorting, a few questions were asked to see whether important issues concerning the students' (future) relationship with animals and their owners were missing, and to gain more insight into the discourses by asking about the reasons behind the choices they made. This helped with the final analysis of the different discourses. The students were also asked questions about gender, age, and the field they intended to practice in (farm animals, companion animals, or something else).

The same process was followed with the fourth-year students. Since fourth-year students do not have any communal mandatory classes, I visited three clinical demonstrations with attendance between ten to about sixty each. The first time I had twenty volunteers; the second, ten and the third, five. I decided that a total of thirty-five to Q-sort was sufficient.

Forty veterinarians Q-sorted their statements. Again, I used a rather random method to select them, but made sure there were enough respondents to sufficiently structure the P-set geographically (Overijssel, Utrecht/Gelderland, and Brabant/Limburg were represented); by gender, by age and by size of practice (small and large). The first contacts were made with help from the Faculty of

Veterinarian Medicine in Utrecht. From those initial Q-sorters, I asked for names of colleagues who might have different opinions. (Making sure all the relevant points of view are taken into account is most important to a Q-study. This differs from random sampling theory.)

The forty Q-sorts were analyzed using statistical methods. The idea was to look for patterns among the Q-sorts. Are there similar ways in which the forty veterinarians have prioritized the fifty-two statements? As with the previous case, I used factor-analysis, which is standard in Q-methodology. First a centroid factor analysis produced different factors, which were then rotated according to the varimax rotation. This analysis led to four different factors for the three groups. (Extraction of more than four would have led to statistically insignificant factors.)

5.5 The Discourses

The four factors in every group deliver the most important information to reconstruct four discourses: four different ways to conceptualize customers, four different ways to talk about the relationships veterinarians and students have with animals and their owners. For each factor, an idealized Q-sort is computed. This represents how a hypothetical (student) veterinarian with a 100% loading on a factor would have ordered the fifty-two (or forty-two) statements. Appendix B lists all statements with their idealized score for every discourse. This gives an impression of what a discourse is all about. At the end of this chapter, Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 give the factor loadings of all the subjects of this study, including their gender, workplace (preference) and, if applicable, year of graduation.

I present the four (times three) discourses in the form of a label and a narrative.[28] At the beginning of each, some relevant statements for a discourse are presented in smaller print, together with the idealized score of the four discourses.

As with the bankers, when reconstructing the discourse special attention was paid to the most salient statements and discriminating items. The discourses are thus not constructed by simply cutting and pasting statements. Also taken into account is how the statements are comparatively placed in the different discourses.[29] Furthermore, the questions asked after the Q-sorting were used to gain insight into the reasons the (student) veterinarians ordered the cards the way they did. Literal

remarks given when answering these questions are included in the narrative of the discourses. These remarks are presented in italics.

5.6   Veterinarians

	A$_v$	B$_v$	C$_v$	D$_v$
32. To be honest, I find it annoying to think about ethical issues of our profession. I do not like it when I am confronted with it.	-2	-3	-2	-3
7. If I have to name something, then the contact with animal owners is the most annoying aspect of my profession.	-3	-2	-3	-3
10. There are a few vets who do not stick to the rules. Vets who do things that are not allowed. That is unfair competition for the rest of us.	+2	+1	+3	+3

Naturally, veterinarians agree on many things. They do not mind being confronted with ethical issues; in fact, they think they are important: "*Actually, it's essential to think about ethical aspects*." They all feel a love for animals. Dealing with animals, an important aspect of their profession of course, is considered enjoyable. None thinks dealing with owners is the worst aspect of their job. On the contrary, dealing with people is one of the nicest parts of their profession (though there are some differences). Overall, veterinarians agree that some do not stick to the rules. This is seen as unfair competition and, "*It's frustrating. It happens every day*." "*Veterinarians who conduct illegal practices blemish the entire profession and thwart fair competition*."

Discourse A$_v$: Supporters of the Responsible Farmer

	A$_v$	B$_v$	C$_v$	D$_v$
4. I don't have a problem with the fact that animals have become a means of production. It is out of the animal that the farmer makes a living.	**+3**	+2	+1	+1
2. There are not many conflicts with the owner. I act as an intermediary. If the owner has a different opinion than me, we can always work that out.	**+3**	+1	+1	+1
12. The keeping of farm animals is very much focused on production. There is no attention for the individual animal. The individual animal doesn't count.	**-2**	0	0	-1
38. It shouldn't happen that you kill a healthy animal, but sometimes you are taken by surprise by a situation or an owner. Then you can get angry, but sometimes you just have to go along.	**+1**	-1	0	-2

37. In general, things are going very well in the Dutch intensive animal husbandry.	**+1**	-2	0	0
33. Pigs are, in general, very well housed, fed and taken care of in Holland.	**+2**	-1	0	+1

Veterinarians ranked in discourse A$_v$ feel strongly connected to the animal's owner (in this case, the farmer). Being a veterinarian is a service-providing job and it is the veterinarian's duty to help a farmer run his business. Should the farmer's economic interest be opposed to the animal's interests, they side with the farmer. There are few conflicts with the farmer. They are nearly always on the same level. Naturally, veterinarians cannot kill a healthy animal (apart from slaughter for consumption) without emotion, but sometimes they find themselves in a situation where they have no choice. "*Dealing with the owners is very important and actually very enjoyable. If you don't like it, you had better find a different job.*"

Animals in animal husbandry are economic factors, and veterinarians in discourse A$_v$ are comfortable with this. The animal is a means of production and the farmer simply has to make a living. As a rule, a farmer can never see his cattle "*too much*" as a means of production: "*I don't object to using an animal on behalf of people, provided that the animal's health and well-being are not put to harm too much.*" The responsibility for the animal's health and well being is clearly the owner's: "*The animal's owner is and will be responsible.*" For every veterinary intervention, the owner has final responsibility: "*We cannot force farmers to perform acts that are economically disadvantageous.*" "*The animal isn't mine.*" "*In the end, it's the owner who decides.*"

Veterinarians from discourse A$_v$ trust the farmer. Cattle-breeders, for example, should be prompted to participate in the decision-making as much as possible. The more cattle-breeders do in terms of veterinary intervention, the more they will be concerned about the well being of their animals. It also reinforces their sense of responsibility.

They believe that intensive animal husbandry could be improved, but is generally good in the Netherlands. Just take a look abroad, animal well-being is often considerably worse there. Intensive animal husbandry is simply the only way to stay alive economically. This is a fact. Of course, as a society we should try to smooth some rough edges and we are doing so. Where the current situation is not ideal, things are happening to improve it. The farmers are prepared to cooperate

but are having a hard time. Veterinarians in this discourse claim that stating that the pigs' fate in the Netherlands is bad is nonsense. Pigs are generally well taken care of and well housed in the Netherlands. "*Pigs are well off, are well nourished and well taken care of.*" "*Abroad, the situation is much worse.*" Veterinarians in this discourse often claim to be annoyed by the negative image that, in their eyes, remains with intensive animal husbandry ("factory farming" is too negative a term). "*It's much better than people think.*" "*Pig farmers are conscious of their often negative image.*" It is typical in the discourse that the issue of an undeserved bad reputation of intensive animal husbandry was often considered lacking in the fifty-two statements: "*What is missing is a statement about the entrepreneur's commercial possibilities to be able to comply with all values and rules.*" Another aspect considered lacking was public health: "*The spearhead should be public health, where the animal's well-being, among other things, isn't forgotten.*"

Veterinarians from discourse A_v are not too troubled by competitiveness among veterinarians.

Discourse B_v: Animals' Advocates

	A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v
40. I find satisfying customers more important than the stimulation and maintaining of the health and well being of animals.	-1	**-3**	-1	-2
3. My loyalty is the most with the animal. In extreme circumstances, I make decisions against the interests of the owner. My point of departure is always the animal.	0	**+2**	-1	+1
39. Intensive animal husbandry troubles me, especially the housing of animals. We have grown into the current situation, but if you look at it neutrally, it is a very unhealthy situation.	-1	**+2**	-1	-1
46. It is a good development that farmers do more and more veterinarian care themselves. Because of this, farmers are more aware of certain issues, they have more knowledge and accept more responsibility.	+1	**-2**	0	0
44. Business considerations play a bigger role in the decision of a farmer to call a vet than compassion and a sense of responsibility.	-1	**+3**	+1	0
5. Sometimes you can be forced by the situation to do things that you do not want to do. But if you don't do them, the animal owner will go to a colleague.	0	**-2**	+2	-1

Discourse B$_v$ is typified by difficulties in dealing with intensive animal husbandry: "*Intensive animal husbandry causes serious problems as far as animal well being is concerned*." They consider it unnecessary and think it should not continue in its current form. The housing of animals is a major cause of concern. They see a country that has grown accustomed to the current system, but it is an unhealthy one. So, it is not so much the fact *that* animals are kept for human consumption, it is the *way* in which this happens. "*I don't have any problems with meat production, but I do with the way in which it happens*." "*Animal well being can be improved*." "*Animal well being is attracting far too little attention, by veterinarians as well as by the government and farmers' organizations*." Improving animal well being "*is a clear cut task for veterinarians*." Veterinarians from discourse B$_v$ are still prepared to do their work in pig farming, but their hearts are less in the work compared to veterinarians from any other discourse. The fact that pigs are castrated without anesthesia is strongly opposed by veterinarians from discourse B$_v$. The economic motives behind such a practice do not, in these veterinarians' minds, justify it.

The correlation between discourses A$_v$ and B$_v$ is lowest among all veterinarians' discourses. The image of the cattle-breeder is much different from the one in discourse A$_v$. Business economics are a large factor for a farmer when initiating a veterinarian visit. Veterinarians of this discourse view cattle breeders as owners whose interests in animals are economic rather than compassionate, "*Farmers just keep animals to earn a living,*" where B$_v$ veterinarians' starting points have little, if anything, to do with economics and everything to do with the animal's welfare. They are clearly more loyal to the animal. In extreme cases, decisions are made against the owner's interest. After all, satisfying customers is far less important than improving and maintaining the animals' health and well being. The latter is, after all, the primary veterinary responsibility. Even though the owners' decisions can be acted upon for a large part (this is an important task for the veterinarian), the veterinarian has to make the final decisions and should bear an important part of the responsibility. The veterinarian acts as the animal's advocate.

When cattle-breeders request veterinarians from discourse B$_v$ to perform an unacceptable act, it reinforces the rather negative image veterinarians have of them. "*Unreasonable requests are made on a regular basis*." They do not have much confidence in the farmer. Therefore, it is not a good development that farmers take on more veterinary responsibility. They often see injudicious use of medicines by farmers. "*Veterinary tasks carried out by cattle-breeders often lead to loss of quality in animal health and are therefore no good*." The more farmers do

themselves, the more problems will emerge in animal well-being. It is striking that, in the aspects considered lacking, one person mentioned "*the veterinarian's educational duty*."

Veterinarians from discourse B_v are more often in conflict with cattle-breeders than those from discourse A_v. It is not necessarily a major conflict. But "*to a customer, I always point out those situations which are not good for his/her animals' health or well being and that things can be improved*." And it goes without saying that this leads to differences in opinion. Yet, in this discourse too, dealing with the owners is generally considered enjoyable. "*I consider dealing with animal owners one of the nicest aspects of the job, even if it can be difficult*."

Veterinarians from discourse B_v are not too troubled by competitiveness among veterinarians.

Discourse C_v: The Situational and Intuitive Veterinarians

	A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v
26. The owner sees the animal too much as a means of production.	-1	0	**+2**	-1
42. In principle, the animal owner is responsible for every veterinary surgery. It is the task of the vet to communicate the pros and cons.	+2	+2	**-1**	+3
11. I would perform caesarian sections on a routine basis. I have to make a living too.	+1	-1	**+2**	0
27. I do not kill healthy animals, out of principle.	0	+1	**-2**	0
19. There is too much competition among veterinarians.	-1	-1	**+3**	+2
5. Sometimes you can be forced by the situation to do things that you do not want to do. But if you don't do them, the animal owner will go to a colleague.	0	-2	**+2**	-1

Veterinarians from discourse C_v are mostly led by their feelings. This is stated many times, often literally. In explanation of their opinions, one said: "*The statements go too much against your feelings or are very much in line with them*." Another voiced "*a feeling of very true*." While veterinarians from discourse B_v give a lot of thought to what is best for animals in general, those from discourse C_v judge what is best for animals by providing a judgment, a "feeling" about a situation. They are not so much led by general principles, as by their own gut-feeling. In doing so, it is "*hard to keep ratio and instinct apart*." They often think from and are led by specific situations and examples. The individual, sick animal most often takes center stage, seldom the farmer. The animal ought to get the best treatment available. These veterinarians ask themselves: What is best for this

specific animal? Veterinarians from discourse C_v are the only ones who think they deal with couple treatment too frequently and individual treatments too infrequently. This goes against their instincts.

While providing service is important (as in discourse A_v), it is interpreted in a different way. Veterinarians think less along the lines of the farming business and more towards performing veterinary acts with great care. The veterinarian's time and attention should go to the sick animal, meaning, among other things, that veterinarians from discourse C_v are the only ones who dismiss the notion of killing of healthy animals (apart from slaughter for consumption). While they want the best treatment for every sick animal, this is not always economically feasible. Instinctively they have problems with this. When needed, routine Caesarian sections are carried out without much hesitation since it is the best course for the cow.

These veterinarians are rather critical towards the farmer. It is not so much the system of intensive farming that they consider a problem, but the farmers. "*I think intensive farming is a very reasonable branch of industry*." It is typical that the following statements were made by the same veterinarian: "*In general, pigs are well fed and housed, better than many a human being*" and "*Especially in intensive farming, animals are almost exclusively seen as a means of production*." Veterinarians from discourse C_v alone believe that owners see the animal too much as a means of production.

A critical attitude toward colleagues and the thought that there is too much competition among veterinarians are typical of discourse C_v. Veterinarians from discourse B_v act on principle; they refuse to do things they do not want to do (or think that what cannot be good for a specific animal cannot serve a higher principle). Veterinarians from discourse A_v are not often confronted with this situation (they trust and support the farmer). Veterinarians from discourse C_v realize that if they do not act, the farmer will invariably turn to another veterinarian who will. Thus competition is seen negatively and they are sometimes forced to do things they do not want to do. Moreover, the development that farmers take on more veterinary work is, as in discourse B_v, seen negatively. "*Medicines can be obtained somewhere else far too easily*." "*I think that farmers do far too much themselves*."

Discourse D$_v$: The Professional Veterinarians

	A$_v$	B$_v$	C$_v$	**D$_v$**
28. I find the stimulation and maintaining of the health and well being of animals more important than satisfying customers.	+1	+1	0	**+2**
42. In principle, the animal owner is responsible for every veterinary surgery. It is the task of the vet to communicate the pros and cons.	+2	+2	-1	**+3**
48. The castration of pigs should be prohibited. But that is impossible: that is the consumption problem.	0	-1	+1	**+2**
38. It shouldn't happen that you kill a healthy animal, but sometimes you are taken by surprise by a situation or an owner. Then you can get angry, but sometimes you just have to go along.	+1	-1	0	**-2**
21. It turns out to be hard not to conform to certain habits. Non conformance leads to a difficult relationship with the farmer and to a lack of understanding by colleagues.	0	+1	+1	**+2**

Veterinarians from discourse D$_v$ act on principle more often than those from discourse C$_v$. They do not often feel compelled by a situation to do things, like the veterinarians from discourse B$_v$. They do not allow a situation or farmer to force them to do something. "*As a professional, I think, you must be above that. It is unthinkable that a situation determines the animal's fate.*" Of all discourses, they are most strongly led by the profession. Legislation and agreements with other veterinarians are seen as important. It is not so much personal ethics that play the leading role (as is often the case in discourse B$_v$); rather, they are guided by shared professional ethics.

It is typical of veterinarians from discourse D$_v$ that they often ponder what their job implies, including ethical problems. They are aware of both the possibilities and restrictions of their profession. The veterinarian's task is never simply providing a service to a customer or an animal. Enhancing and maintaining animals' health and well being is seen as most important. Unlike discourse B$_v$, a large share of responsibility remains with the animal's owner. There is no such a thing as a negative image of the owner: it is the veterinarian's job to help the owner do what is best for the animal. The veterinarian's task is best described by statement 42: "*The owner is responsible for all operations on the animal. It is the veterinarian's job to communicate the pros and cons*." This clearly contrasts with discourse C$_v$.

As opposed to discourse B$_v$, they have no major problems with intensive animal husbandry, although room for improvement exists. They fundamentally object to

the castration of pigs without anesthesia: "*Logical thinking would be better!*" Competition among veterinarians is seen as a major problem of the profession. "*A veterinarian is a doctor in the first place. Competition in itself isn't bad, but too much competition in prices is bad for the animal, the owner and the veterinarian.*" Being professionals, veterinarians from discourse D_v think about the dynamics of working together: "*Working in a group practice means adapting and adjusting; that's the power of the group.*"

5.7 Fourth-Year Veterinary Students

Most veterinary medicine students feel a love for animals, else they would not have chosen veterinary medicine. Killing healthy animals (apart from slaughter for consumption) because otherwise somebody else will (even if it means making money) does not make sense to them. Even though their views of animal owners differ, none thinks a veterinarian should have an entirely service-providing role to the owner and that their loyalties should always reside with the owner: this would be unjust to the animals. That their loyalties should always be with the animal, some agree and others do not.

Discourse A_4: Principled Animal Lovers Confronted with Harsh Reality

	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
31. The animal has become a product. The fact that it also lives, is something that tends to be forgotten.	**+3**	-1	+2	-1
39. Intensive animal husbandry troubles me, especially the housing of animals. We have grown into the current situation, but if you look at it neutrally, it is a very unhealthy situation.	**+2**	-1	+3	0
8. If the disadvantages for animals are small, and the advantages for humans are very big, I do not object to the use of drugs to enhance growth, production or performance.	**-2**	0	-1	0
24. I think many students will forget their ethical concerns at the moment they are practicing themselves. They will get used to things through routines.	**+2**	+1	0	0
42. The image I had of animals has not changed much during my studies.	**-3**	0	-1	+2
12. If you look at animals in nature, you see much misery. Do not idealize nature. That is a much tougher world for animals than the world of farm animals.	**-3**	0	-1	+2

Although not many fourth-year students can be ranked in discourse A_4, it is striking that the four who are have no desire to be agricultural animal or pet practitioners. They are not sure what they want to do exactly; some hope to find a job in research or education.

Students from discourse A_4 have problems with both intensive animal husbandry and animal housing. They feel that the animal in intensive animal husbandry has become a product, and that people forget it is alive. The individual animal in intensive poultry farming, for instance, does not have any value. This bothers the student. Incidentally, they believe it is not only in intensive animal husbandry that animals are not treated well: "*Also in the field of pets many ethical questions need to be asked.*"

Students from discourse A_4 are principled ("*Killing healthy animals because otherwise owners will go to another veterinarian: nothing will change in this way; you should stick to your own principles*") and have given a lot of thought during their studies to the animals' well being and human responsibility. They expect they will be able to act according to their own convictions in future. "*Your integrity shouldn't yield to anything, including a threatening owner.*" "*Following the crowd is never an option.*" They do not approve of the way society treats animals and believe they have strayed too far from nature. "*The animal's intrinsic value should be recognized.*" They alone strongly disapprove of the thesis that nature should not be idealized. "*It's hypocritical to compare your own mistakes with natural processes. In animal husbandry human beings influence life.*"

Interestingly, students from discourse A_4 (and only those students) feel that their academic tenure has strongly changed their opinions: "*Because of my studies, my view (especially of farmers' animals) has definitely changed. Owing to better background knowledge, well-founded reasoning has become possible.*" They encountered new problems throughout their studies: "*Veterinary medicine is much more limited in its possibilities than I expected.*" These students worry about the socializing process of fellow students. They feel that the study of veterinary medicine teaches what is good and what is not, and they fear that students will forget ethical objections when later confronted with them.

Students from discourse A_4 disagree most that being a veterinarian is a service-providing profession. "*I chose veterinary medicine in the first place to help*

animals, not to please the owners." "*What it's about is helping an animal and protecting an animal*." A veterinarian's loyalty should be with the animal and every veterinarian must protect its well being. "*This statement sums up my entire story*." The final decision on what should happen to an animal is not just the owner's. "*Sounds very simple: when you want to earn money you need to accept responsibility, so you have to take good care; this responsibility is first of all the consumer's and the government's*." Veterinarians exist to do more than come up with solutions.

These students claim that the animal is not here for humanity. Even when there is little harm to an animal and major benefits for people, they are strongly opposed to administering substances without medical indication.

Discourse B_4: Future Supporters of the Responsible Farmer

	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
17. The way farm animals are treated in Holland depends usually on the farmer.	0	**+2**	0	0
18. I am against the castration of pigs without anesthesia. I would never do that.	+1	**-2**	+1	+2
2. You cannot change the world on your own. I do not see it as a solution when you withdraw yourself from certain practices. When utility surgery has to be performed, you had better do it yourself, then at least it is done well.	-2	**+1**	-1	-2
40. The well being of the animal is for me the most important thing. Also more important than the interests of the owner.	+1	**-2**	0	-1
30. I really cannot say whether my 'loyalty' will be with the animal or the animal owner. That will purely depend on my judgment of concrete situations.	-1	**+3**	0	-1
13. As a veterinarian I will get requests that will offend me. It cannot be helped that other people think differently than I do. We will have to deal with that together. Therefore, I will have to make concessions too.	0	**+3**	+1	+1
4. My loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. Every veterinarian has in the first place the duty to protect the well being of the animal.	+3	**0**	+2	+3
10. Dairy cattle are top producers; you can compare them with athletes. I will never cooperate in letting them produce even more.	-1	**-3**	+1	-2

Students from discourse B$_4$ view cattle-breeders positively. They are, as opposed to students from discourses A$_4$ and C$_4$, convinced that farmers love their animals, "*but this isn't noticed by the outside world.*" "*If they didn't, they wouldn't have become farmers.*" It is nonsense to claim that farmers see their animals only as products. They say it affects them that farmers are often portrayed negatively in the news. "*Farmers do want to change things.*" "*Why judge a farmer who sticks to the rules and at the same time trim your dog because it looks nicer?*" Laypeople form their opinions by "*one-sided images. Until now the consumer was stupid as far as that is concerned.*" The consumer is often mentioned as causing problems: "*Consumers can run on terribly* [humanizing companion animals].*" The government contributes, too: "*The fact that problems have arisen in the last couple of years is largely caused by the government's stimulation of farm production.*"

Students from discourse B$_4$ do not have many problems with present-day intensive animal husbandry. There are few objections to castrating pigs without anesthesia. "*Castrating pigs is not an ethical question anymore now; it happens everywhere and that is what you should consider.*" They believe there is always room for improvement, but the field is obviously heading the right way. "*A lot of thought is given to well being and well being is realized within the given possibilities.*" There is not much wrong with the system itself. "*Dairy cattle must take care of the farmer's income and may produce a bit more.*" Incidentally, there is just as much wrong with companion animals. They are the only ones convinced that the treatment of cattle largely depends on the farmer. Concerning improvements in the field, the thought is that the world cannot be changed by one individual, therefore withdrawing from action is no solution. It is better for the veterinarian to act on, say, a utility surgery that he or she does not fully support, because at least the veterinarian then has control of the situation.

Students from discourse B$_4$ are most involved with animal owners and feel a strong loyalty to them. They are thus the only ones who cannot say that their loyalty is in the first place with the animal and that the paramount obligation of a veterinarian is to protect the well being of an animal. All other discourses are clear about the animal-loyalty role. This does not mean, however, that discourse B$_4$ students' loyalties will always be with the farmer. Every situation must be judged individually. "*Owner and animal must live together; I have to make decisions which are good for both, so it depends on the situation.*" "*You can never judge the animal and its owner independently, so your loyalty depends on the given situation.*" They will find themselves, at times, in situations where they are asked to do something

they have problems with, at which point they will have to work out a solution with the farmer. "*As a veterinarian you want to do what is best for the animal, but as time goes by you find out that this is not always possible* [financially/economically]." In such cases, the veterinarian will also have to make concessions. Moreover, "*the farmer often knows what's best for his animals*." This means that students from discourse B_4 are the only ones who cannot say that they will never kill healthy animals. Everything must be solved in consultation with the owner. They are also alone in stating they do not object to performing utility surgery.

Discourse C_4: Counsels of Animals against the System of Intensive Animal Husbandry

	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
31. The animal has become a product. The fact that it also lives, is something that tends to be forgotten.	+3	-1	**+2**	-1
41. I don't have a problem with the fact that animals have become a means of production. It is out of the animal that the farmer makes a living.	+1	0	**-3**	+1
1. The animal is of minor importance than making money in intensive animal husbandry. I do not agree with that.	+1	-1	**+3**	-1
39. Intensive animal husbandry troubles me, especially the housing of animals. We have grown into the current situation, but if you look at it neutrally, it is a very unhealthy situation.	+2	-1	**+3**	0
35. I find the economic side of veterinary practice quite interesting.	0	0	**-3**	+1
10. Dairy cattle are top producers; you can compare them with athletes. I will never cooperate in letting them produce even more.	-1	-3	**+1**	-2
16. When I will be practicing, I expect I will have problems with animal owners.	0	+1	**+2**	+1

Among the four discourses, B_4 and C_4 have the least correlation. What is more, the correlation is the only negative one of all the discourses in the research project.

Students from discourse C_4 have major problems with the way animals are dealt with in intensive farming. The animal has become a product and it is often forgotten that it is a living thing. The individual animal in the poultry sector does not have any value, for instance. The cause can be found in money. In intensive farming the animal has become subsidiary to making money, and that is a very bad situation. "*I am very much against the fact that animals are just kept for*

money and are therefore simply kept as cheaply as possible. Money, money, money! It's all about money." They do not think things are getting better: "*It's not going the right way—just take a look at pigs and chickens*." Students from discourse C_4 are strongly inclined not to cooperate in intensive animal husbandry. They believe that animals in intensive farming have become merely a means of production. "*I've got problems with that! Money plays far too important a role. The well being of animals is most important to me*." On housing: "*I think it's very bad that people house animals in this way*." "*I strongly disapprove how animals are kept in intensive animal husbandry*." The economic aspect of the profession and of intensive farming does not interest them in any way. "*I am not interested in the economic aspect of farming*." "*It's important to keep up with the economic aspect, but it does not interest me much*."

Students from discourse C_4 do not readily agree that farmers feel a love for their animals, but this does not mean that they view farmers negatively. What is wrong with farmers is the fault of the system. They believe it is not true that farmers only have an eye on the economic value of their animals. "*This is stigmatizing. If farmers just wanted to make money, they all would turn to a job in Information Technology. Whether they listen* [to veterinarians] *depends on your own persuasiveness*."

These students took up veterinary medicine especially because of their love for animals. They do not support the statement that the owner has final responsibility and must make decisions about the animal. "*I see myself as independent, not as a service-provider to somebody but as a representative of the animal*." Many problems in dealing with owners are expected. "*I think it will be very hard to deal with different types of owners. You will need a lot of practice for this, I guess*." "*I often think about this and sometimes discuss it with people around me*." "*Before my studies I did not give much thought to owners with their own opinions…This could surely lead to problems*."

The loyalty of students from discourse C_4 will strongly be with the animals. Every veterinarian is first obliged to protect the well being of the animal. "*That's exactly my idea!*" "*My loyalty will always be first with the animal*." All this does not mean that the owner is absent from the picture; on the contrary: "*As a veterinarian you are there* also *to help the owner*."

Their studies have changed their judgment of situations a bit: "*I was unaware of the existence of some things or my perception was wrong*." They sometimes feel they have begun to accept things they used to oppose. They do not believe, however, that the university sets out to do this.

Discourse D_4: Future Critical and Principled Farm Animal Practitioners

	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
18. I am against the castration of pigs without anesthesia. I would never do that.	+1	-2	+1	**+2**
42. The image I had of animals has not changed much during my studies.	-3	0	-1	**+2**
4. My loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. Every veterinarian has in the first place the duty to protect the well being of the animal.	+3	0	+2	**+3**
3. You cannot say: I would never kill healthy animals. Together with animal owners, you always come to an agreement.	-1	+1	0	**-2**
6. As long as the animal has a good life, I will never start killing a healthy animal.	-2	-1	+1	**+3**
12. If you look at animals in nature, you see much misery. Do not idealize nature. That is a much tougher world for animals than the world of farm animals.	-3	0	-1	**+2**
10. Dairy cattle are top producers; you can compare them with athletes. I will never cooperate in letting them produce even more.	-1	-3	+1	**-2**

While discourse D_4 is sparsely populated (considering the number of students in the group; it is much smaller than B_4 and C_4), it has a clear-cut outlook. The four students belonging to this discourse would prefer to work as farm animal practitioners. There are some striking similarities with students from discourse B_4, especially with respect to the system of intensive animal husbandry, to which students from discourse D_4 have no major objections. They would like to work in the agricultural sector and do not like it when it is portrayed negatively in the news while there is just as much wrong with companion animals. "*Farmers are often scapegoats because citizens are falsely informed by the media*." And do not idealize nature, they say; it is a much tougher world than the one farm animals share. They sympathize with farmers who, they believe, love their animals. Some farmers do want to change production, but it is simply not possible. They believe it is not so bad that an animal in intensive farming is a means of production; farmers have to make a living.

Still, there are some striking and major differences with discourse B_4. Students from discourse D_4 have a clear and principled attitude. "*When you have principles, you should stick to them (i.e., not make concessions).*" "*You must be firmly in favor of well being; you must be ethical*." "*When you start performing operations you don't support, you aren't doing the right thing. Then you are denying your principles*." As veterinarians, their loyalties will strongly be with the animal. They seem to have had this attitude for a long time. The image they have of animals has changed little, if at all, during their studies. As long as the animal has a good life, they will not kill a healthy one. "*This is my principle*." "*I feel you do not kill healthy animals*." On the castration of pigs without anesthesia, students from discourse B_4 may not have many objections, but those from discourse D_4 do. They would not want to participate in this. A consequence of this principled stand is that, as in discourse C_4, problems can be expected when dealing with animal owners. In the end, the owner always decides. "*In spite of what I said above, you must make concessions, for you are a service-provider working for the owner*."

5.8 First-Year Veterinary Students

Of the three groups in this research project, the correlation among the different factors is highest in the group of first-year students. While this indicates a high degree of similarity in the group, it also indicates more insecurity about their own views.

Discourse A_1: Instinctive Future Supporters of Cattle-Breeders

	A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1
14. Most farmers really feel for their animals.	**+3**	+1	+2	+2
17. I think the intensive animal husbandry is more than terrible.	**-2**	-1	0	-2
23. Farmers want to produce in a different way, but that is simply impossible.	**+3**	0	+1	0
28. The well being of the animal is for me the most important thing. Also more important than the interests of the owner.	**-2**	+1	-1	0
36. To kill a healthy animal is always idiotic.	**-3**	-1	-1	0
12. On request, I would probably kill healthy animals. Otherwise, the owners will go to a different vet. Now at least I collect the 35 guilders.	**-1**	-3	-3	-3
5. It must be economical to treat an animal. Vets are there to suggest solutions. In the end, the animal owner decides.	**+2**	-1	+2	+1

Students of discourse A₁ do not object to intensive animal husbandry. "*People who do often haven't experienced intensive animal husbandry up close.*" "*People who say this don't get it at all; they're ignorant and stupid!*" In the Netherlands, they consider that the industry is going well although there is always room for improvement. That intensive farming is often portrayed negatively in the news is unfair and caused by ignorance. "*People are prone to glorifying nature and blaming farmers for mistreating animals while they don't have a clue as to what they are talking about.*"

"*Many people complain about farmers, who are really trying to do their best.*" Students from discourse A₁ feel a deep sympathy for the cattle-breeder and think the farmer is doing the best he can for his animals. "*Farmers have chosen this profession because of the animals, for it's not lucrative, it's nostalgic and traditional; it takes heart.*" "*Although they need to earn their money, they really care about their animals.*" They believe there is little cattle-breeders can do to improve the situation, even though they are prepared to. "*As long as consumer behavior doesn't change, farmers simply can't change their production methods.*" "*A farmer can't always do what he wants, because his economic interest plays a role.*" "*Farmers usually want improvement for animals, but this isn't feasible economically.*" The system "*needs to work and be lucrative.*" Students from discourse A₁ do not like the fact that people often say that things are not the way they should be with farmers' animals while there is just as much wrong with pets.

They believe it is nonsense to claim that killing healthy animals is wrong, for in the meat industry this happens all the time and there is nothing wrong with it. We are allowed to keep animals and kill them for meat production. In animal husbandry it is simply the case that the animals provide the farmer's income. What is essential is that the animals have decent lives, and this depends largely on the cattle-breeder. Fortunately, the animals' well being in the farming sector is generally quite good, owing to the hard work of Dutch farmers (even though there are exceptions: "*for not every person is as easy*"). Farmers do not treat their cattle as just a product. They are clearly connected to them and do not forget that their animals are alive. "*A cattle-breeder doesn't see his cattle as lumps of meat. He realizes what he's doing.*"

The animal's owner eventually decides about the treatment of the animals. Of course he needs to weigh different issues, including economic ones, but this he

generally does responsibly. You can hardly expect a farmer not to consider economic interests; after all, he is an entrepreneur. The veterinarian's duty is to help the owner make decisions by providing solutions. "*You need to work it out together.*" The veterinarian's loyalty must therefore be with both the animal and its owner; they cannot say that the animal's interest is superior to the owner's. "*I think owners are important; for them you do your job.*" "*You come into the farmer's home, not vice versa. Animals are number one, but you're* not *the manager.*" "*It's their animal; in a way, they can decide about it.*" Thus it may happen that they will receive requests which at first they do not like. These have to be worked out with the owner. The veterinarian will have to give in partly as well. Of course, veterinarians can always try to convince the farmer of their views. Their role is an "*advisory one.*"

Discourse B₁: Instinctive Animal Lovers

	A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1
27. It fascinates me to see how you can maximize meat production.	-1	**-3**	-2	0
34.The way animals are kept as consumer goods is not always reasonable. I want to change that.	0	**+3**	+2	+2
33. My loyalty as a vet will in the first place be with the animal. How I will deal with that exactly, will depend on the sector I will work in. As far as, for example, a cow is concerned, I won't just look at the individual animal, but also at the farm as a whole.	+1	**+3**	+1	+1
28. The well being of the animal is for me the most important thing. Also more important than the interests of the owner.	-2	**+1**	-1	0
40. As a vet, my loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. The animal should have a good life. The interests of the owner are less important to me.	-1	**+2**	0	0
35. It bothers me that people always say that there is so much wrong in the farm animal sector, because in the companion animal sector, it is just as bad.	+2	**+2**	-1	0
10. If the disadvantages for animals are small, and the advantages for humans are very big, I do not object to the use of drugs to enhance growth, production or performance.	+1	**-2**	-1	0
5. It must be economical to treat an animal. Vets are there to suggest solutions. In the end, the animal owner decides.	+2	**-1**	+2	+1

The correlation between discourses A_1 and B_1 is by far the lowest among the four. They deal with most issues in a completely different way. The paramount reason

students from discourse B₁ want to be veterinarians is a love for animals. They instinctively object to the way in which our society often deals with animals. "*My view on the use of animals for people is instinctive.*" Their instincts apply to companion animals as well. In both areas, many things go wrong.

They feel meat should be produced in a different way. The way animals are kept for consumption is considered unreasonable. "*I, for one, think the current housing of pigs in feeding boxes is unacceptable. I think animal welfare suffers and it shows a great lack of respect for the animal.*" They are also prepared to help realize an alternative production method. When they compare animals in intensive farming to nature, nature is closer to ideal. They feel that having animals solely for the use of people is problematic. Thus, even when there is little harm to the animal and great benefit for people, students from discourse B₁ have objections to drug enhancement without medical indication. What keeps them from working in the agricultural sector is that the economic interests they would have to take into account: "*I think farm animals are interesting, but I don't like the economic aspect. That is uninteresting to me; I would have gone into economics if it were.*"

It is not the owner who should decide what happens to the animal, but the veterinarian, though the veterinarian has to deal with the owner: "*Animals take center stage, but you cannot see the owner apart from them.*" "*It's my goal to work for animals, not owners. Unfortunately, things often revolve around the owner.*" Nonetheless, "*Both the owner and the animal are important to you, and the animal is of value to the owner.*" Veterinarians are not only there to provide solutions. Financial matters should play only a marginal role when deciding about animal well being. Students from discourse B₁ almost invariably choose in favor of the animal's well being, which is more important than the interests of the owner. "*I think that in my future job the animal comes first.*" This is often an instinctive choice. Not all of them have given a lot of thought to the existence and interests of the owner. While their loyalties as veterinarians will first be with the animal, it is a bit more complicated. The veterinary sector makes a difference. A veterinarian does not merely visualize the individual cow, for instance, but the entire farm.

Discourse C_1: "Thinking" and Principled Animal Lovers

	A_1	B_1	**C_1**	D_1
4. I have great doubts about the modern reproduction technology for animals.	0	0	**+1**	-1
6. The animal has become a product. The fact that it also lives, is something that tends to be forgotten.	-1	+1	**+3**	-1
21. I have not thought much about the ethical side of veterinary practice.	-1	-1	**-3**	-2
7. I have thought much about the ethical side of veterinary practice.	+1	0	**+3**	+2

The correlation between the factors of students from discourses B_1 and C_1 is high though clear differences exist. Students from discourse C_1 are slightly more pessimistic and less convinced that things are going the right direction in intensive animal husbandry.

Students from discourse C_1 seriously object to intensive animal husbandry in the Netherlands, especially the maximization of meat production. They do not idealize nature—that can be a tough world too—but they object to the economic aspect of the farm animal sector. While sharing this with students from discourse B_1, they (and only they) have fewer problems with the companion animal sector. The problem in the farm animal sector is that the animal has become a product. "*It's against the intrinsic value of the animal, for instance, the method of slaughtering of chickens in the poultry industry*" "*I think that that people are missing the link between product and animal.*" It is often forgotten that the animal is alive. "*It's always about cheap methods of production; the animal is forgotten.*" The problem, they say, is in a system that has become rooted in society. Not so much the farmer but "*the consumer is guilty.*"

Students from discourse C_1 are more principled than students from discourse B_1. That a treatment is necessary "*because it is happening everywhere*" they deem complete nonsense; they hold their own opinions, which seem more solid, less intuitive. It is typical of students from discourse C_1 to give thought to the ethical aspect of the profession and all related matters. "*I feel it's very important to think about the ethical sides of any profession.*" They have a clear view on, say, modern methods of reproduction (which are not immediately harmful to the individual animal's well being). Arguments against them are often fundamental. They alone have serious doubts about modern reproduction techniques.

They hesitate to take a view on killing healthy animals: it largely depends on the situation. Like students from discourse B_1, they believe that administering drugs without medical indication is not good, even when there is little harm to the animal and great benefits for people. Moreover, students from discourse C_1 are the only ones who feel that veterinary medicine is doing its best to shape students' opinions. "*Factory farming veterinarians need to graduate as well, don't they? Of course you are pushed in that direction*." (Students from discourse B_1 disagree: "*Study is aimed at individual opinions. They have students think about ethical issues.*") Of the four factors, only students from discourse C_1 think their views on animals have changed somewhat during the short time they have studied veterinary medicine.

The principled attitude of students in discourse C_1 does not lead to considering their roles as significant. Nor does it lead to acting according to a few fixed rules; they cannot be accused of being rigid. "*When you tie yourself to a fixed position, you lose your own judgment.*" "*After all, every situation is different.*" A major difference with discourse B_1 is the view on the roles and tasks of animal owners. Students from discourse C_1 believe the animal owner is primarily responsible for the animal. Veterinarians provide solutions for their problems, but in the end the owner decides. Owners' interests are significant in their judgments and, unlike students from discourse B_1, they are not prepared to place the animal's well being above everything else. A difference too from discourse B_1 is that these students had realized the interests of the owner even before their studies. "*I have chosen this profession because you get to deal with animals and people.*" Along with their attention to the farmer's interests, they are somewhat more positive about them than students in discourse B_1. This does not mean, however, that their loyalties are with the animal's owner. These are clearly with the animal itself, whatever the practice. "*As a veterinarian you are there for the animals. The interests of the owner or farmer is not superior to the interest of the animal. But as a veterinarian, you will have to cooperate with customers. Not only my opinion will count, but theirs as well.*"

Discourse D_1: Advocates of Animal Rights and Well Being in Intensive Farming

	A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1
30. My loyalty will be as much with the animal as with the owner. You cannot look at the animal as separate from its owner.	+2	0	+1	**+3**
3. As long as the animal has a good life, I will never start killing a healthy animal.	0	0	0	**+3**
9. Before I was a student, I never realized that dealing with animal owners is an important part of veterinary practice.	-2	0	-2	**-3**
25. You cannot say: I would never kill healthy animals. Together with animal owners, you always come to an agreement.	+1	+1	0	**-1**
7. I have thought much about the ethical side of veterinary practice.	+1	0	+3	**+2**

The correlation between discourses A_1 and D_1 is the highest of all discourses of the research project. Just like discourse C_1 is a somewhat principled counterpart of discourse B_1, discourse D_1 is a counterpart to A_1, although the difference is slighter. Students from discourse D_1 regularly ponder the ethical sides of the veterinary profession. "*Ethical aspects play a large role in this profession. Animals cannot talk and veterinarians are educated to know what is best for them and must make this clear. Animals cannot do this themselves.*" An outcome of this attitude is that they have no disagreement with modern techniques of reproduction; it does not cause animals to suffer and may even improve animal well being.

Like students from discourse A_1, students from discourse D_1 do not have fundamental objections to modern intensive animal husbandry, but they are more worried about animal well being. As long as animal well being is guaranteed, people may keep animals for consumption. Overall, they believe animal well being is quite good in the Netherlands, but abuses exist, and they constantly keep an eye out for these. They claim they will never be involved in abuse.

More than all other first-year students, those from discourse D_1 have major problems with killing healthy animals (apart from slaughter for consumption), and this they claim they will never do. For it is useless. It affects animal well being in the most fundamental way. "*I'm simply against the killing of healthy animals. As a veterinarian it's your duty to improve animals' lives … As long as the animal's well being is still good, I think you may not/mustn't kill it.*" "*One of the biggest problems in the keeping of animals is boredom, which is something they do not know in nature.*" They claim there are also many problems in the well being of companion

animals. "*Many rabbits are not kept in an ideal way; dogs have to walk around in jackets and so on. The animal's integrity is damaged in a major way.*"

Their view on owners, including farmers, is positive. "*99% of farmers or more look at the animals' health first and only then at the economic interest.*" Their loyalty is just as much with the owner as it is with the animal. Like students from discourse A_1, it is hard for students from discourse D_1 to separate the two. They cannot view the animal apart from the owner and vice versa. They knew this before they started their studies. "*I already knew that veterinary medicine largely had to do with animal bosses.*" This opinion has not changed and is not very likely to change either.

5.9 Conclusions About Socialization

Because of the status discourse theory attributes to discursive practices, the question how veterinarians treat animals and their owners—the first research question—is answered by the four discourse descriptions. It has become clear that there are different ways for veterinarians to conceptualize animals and owners. Earlier it was proposed that, since veterinary medicine is a profession, veterinarians might have the same discourse about their customers—could the socializing effects of a profession be that strong? But after deconstructing the discourses, it does not seem that the veterinarians are any more homogeneous than bank directors. Even though a comparison of such different types of managers is difficult, the differences in conceptualizations of customers seem to be stronger in veterinarians' discourses than in those of bank directors.

Where do the discourses come from? This second research question can now be partly answered by first making qualitative comparisons of the discourses of the three groups. While the groups use different concepts and see different relationships, some similarities also exist. Both can be further explored by making qualitative comparisons of the discourses between the different groups.

Most notably, the discourses of the veterinarians take the relationship with animal owners much more into account. In the student discourses, "the system" and the animal play a more important role. The relationship with animal owners in the student discourses are described in more abstract terms. This indicates, rather

obviously, that frequent contact with farmers and daily practice change the views of veterinarians.

Although each group has four discourses, the discourse narratives make it clear that that they do not have parallel matches. Similarities are highest among discourses A_1 (Instinctive Future Supporters of Cattle-breeders), A_v (The Supporter of the Responsible Farmer) and B_4 (The Future Supporter of the Responsible Farmer). What unites them is how strongly veterinarians relate to the farmer/owner. They do not have problems with intensive animal husbandry; it is, simply, a way for farmers to make a fair living. They believe the industry in Holland is better than in other countries. They accept that farm animals are part of an economic industry. All show concern for the current image of farmers, which they see as negative and unjust. Many who fall into this set of discourses are likely to have had these views most of their lives. During their educational and working lives, they find it easier to defend them. It is likely that most come from rural backgrounds. Students of discourse A_1 noticeably use arguments that are more emotional; they find it harder than their older counterparts to explain the position they take.

Similarities can also be found in discourses D_v (The Professional Veterinarian), D_4 (Critical and Principled Future Farm Animal Practitioners) and D_1 (Advocates of Animal Rights and Animal Well Being in Intensive Farming). They have (or are expected to have) roughly the same relationship with animals. They do not have great difficulties with intensive animal husbandry. They understand the pressures on farmers; they nonetheless feel strong obligations towards animals and have clear principles and boundaries.

Discourse B_1 (Instinctive Animal Lovers) corresponds with discourse C_4 (Counsels of Animals Against the System of Intensive Animal Husbandry). Something of both can be found in discourse B_v of the veterinarians (Animals' Advocates), although the students' obligations toward animals and their dislike of intensive animal husbandry are felt more strongly. In discourse C_4, there is a clear explanation for this. Most students of the group will (want to) work with companion animals (more on this follows) because of their opposition to intensive animal husbandry. This preference for companion animals is less obvious in the corresponding discourse B_1 because first-year students are less sure of their future working field, although they may indicate what they are unlikely to specialize in. Some first-year students want to work in a zoo, even though in Holland jobs for veterinarians in zoos are

scarce. For many students their field of choice is found during the course of their studies and is determined by the way they conceptualize animals and their owners. The older they are, the more they will tie their conceptualizations to their working preference.

The remaining student discourses, A_4 (Animal Lovers with Principles Confronted with Harsh Reality) and C_1 (The 'Thinking' and Principled Animal Lovers), represent the conscientious animal lovers. They are the "thinkers" among the students. A corresponding discourse cannot be found among veterinarians. One explanation is that most will end up not working with farm animals; three of the four students of A_4, for example, want to work in research and education (see Figure 5.2, at the end of this chapter). Similarly, C_v (The Situational and Intuitive Veterinarians) has no student counterpart, since they base many of their judgments on gut feelings.

It seems that the values of professionals are not completely formed during their education. This research suggests that the school reinforces discourses that existed upon entering the university. Some adjustment occurs, but university schooling primarily strengthens these discourses in the sense that the knowledge learned is used to better defend and define the pre-existing position; it becomes more coherent. From a survey of graduate students in economics, Colander and Klamer come to the same conclusion about the profession of economists: "These data suggest that schools tend to reinforce previously held positions."[30] This means that it will be hard to alter these discourses: the discourses are firmly footed.

This is important information for the University of Utrecht. As mentioned, in the fifth year of study, students can go off in one of two directions: companion animals or farm animals, however, the capacity of the faculty is such that it is best if fifty percent specializes in companion animals and fifty percent in farm animals. This split is geared to the job market for veterinarians; changes would result in over- or underemployment in one sector. The problem is that in recent years, more than fifty percent have wanted to specialize in companion animals. The students cannot be forced to choose farm animals, leading to long waiting lists for certain courses. This study suggests that the problem will not be solved by giving a nice presentation to fourth-year students about how great it is to work on farms—their discourses are too firmly rooted. Students will interpret such suggestions within their existing discourse and their preferences will not change.

Recently, the Utrecht faculty received permission by the Dutch Minister of Education to select 25% of their first-year students. Potential students spent two days at the university for tests and interviews. What the faculty selected on was not so much perceived excellence as a student or future veterinarian, but a coherent preference for farm animals. Given the research on educational reinforcement of existing discourses, this strategy may eventually correct the imbalance of students opting to specialize in farm versus companion animals.

5.10   Age, Gender and Date of Graduation: Quantitative Relationship

The defining variates of first-year students (Figure 5.1) led to no particular conclusions regarding student gender and a particular discourse. These impressions can be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny[31] by treating the loadings on each of the four factors as separate dependent measures.[32] The differences among these scores were analyzed on a 3 x 2 (preference x gender) analysis of variance (ANOVA) design for students and a 3 x 2 x 2 (workplace x gender x age class) ANOVA design for veterinarians implicit in the P-set (see Figure 5.3, at the end of this chapter). The three-way design was divided into a 3 x 2 (workplace x gender) two-way design for the younger veterinarians and a 3 x 2 (workplace x age class) two-way design for male veterinarians because there were no female veterinary graduates before 1990 in the sample (reflecting the general population). The analyses of variance were done by making use of saturated models. In case of an overall significant difference between the three levels for preference or workplace, they were compared pair-wise by separate (i.e., non-simultaneous) contrast tests. Especially for the student discourses, an analysis of variance can be quite telling, since the random samples of these groups (40 out of 225) were rather large. Since veterinarians were not selected in a purely random manner, conclusions from an analysis of variance for this group will have to be drawn with caution.

The analysis of variance amplified the initial impressions of first-year students. No difference between males and females could be demonstrated with respect to a particular factor. There was, however, a relationship between discourse and preference of work field. Six of the nine defining variates listing "farm animal practitioner" fell into discourse A_1 (Instinctive Future Supporter of Cattle-Breeders).

This impression was confirmed in the variance of analysis: those choosing "farm animal practitioner" have significantly higher loadings ($p \leq 0.02$) on factor A_1.

Not much can be said about the differences between the preferences for the first-year students with respect to the three remaining factors.

Fourth-year students are similar to first-year students with respect to gender; it did little to explain the variation in factor scores. There is, however, a strong relationship between their workplace preference and discourse. All defining variates of discourse A_4 (Animal Lovers with Principles Confronted with Harsh Reality) chose something other than working with either companion or farm animals. When asked to specify, three said research. The analysis of variance clearly confirmed this with $p < 0.01$.

Discourses B_4 (The Future Supporter of the Responsible Farmer) and D_4 (Critical and Principled Future Farm Animal Practitioners) clearly align with the farm animal workplace preference. All thirteen defining variates with this preference fall in one of those two discourses. The analysis of variance confirmed this for discourse B_4 ($p \leq 0.01$) and discourse D_4 (compared to preference for companion animals, $p = 0.001$; "something else" gave nearly significantly higher scores compared to companion animals with $p = 0.07$).

Discourse C_4 (Counsels of Animals Against the System of Intensive Animal Husbandry) is clearly related to those students who want to work with companion animals. Ten of the twelve students giving this field as their preference fall in discourse C_4. I found significantly higher scores for preferences for companion animals compared to farm animals ($p = 0.02$), and nearly significantly higher scores for "something else" compared to farm animals ($p = 0.06$).

The age of a veterinarian seems to make a difference, although not a great one. Veterinarians graduating after 1990 have nearly significantly higher loadings on discourse B_v (Animals' Advocates) with $p = 0.08$, and those graduating before 1990 have higher loadings on discourse D_v (The Professional Veterinarian) with $p = 0.06$. Since discourse B_v would be sensitive to the issues discussed in a course like "Veterinary Medicine and Society," this could be an indication that having these subjects in the curriculum makes a difference, although a more detailed study is needed to draw strong conclusions on this. Growing up in different times and being from different generations might also explain the difference. Whatever

the explanation, it seems that more veterinarians will identify with discourse B_v in the future. (This particular analysis did not consider gender, so the fact that more veterinarians will be women is irrelevant here).

Geographical areas were not greatly consequential except that among those graduating after 1990, Brabant and Limburg provinces can be identified with discourse C_v (The Situational and Intuitive Veterinarians) by claiming five of the eight defining variates. The analysis of variance confirmed this by giving significant higher scores ($p <= 0.02$).

Gender seems to be of consequence with respect to those graduating after 1990. Women have significantly or nearly significantly higher loadings on discourses A_v ($p = 0.02$) and D_v ($p = 0.08$). Men have higher loadings on discourses B_v ($p = 0.06$) and C_v ($p = 0.003$). Thus more young female veterinarians identify with "The Supporter of the Responsible Farmer" and "The Professional Veterinarian"; young male veterinarians identify more with "Animals' Advocates" and "The Situational and Intuitive Veterinarians."

5.11 Choosing between Animals and Their Owners

The discourses in this chapter present further empirical evidence that the factual images veterinarians have of animals and their owners are connected to different normative questions and possible solutions to these questions. They both are part of a worldview. The question of what responsibilities exist towards animals and their owners is connected to morals such as how they feel about intensive animal husbandry. Normative issues—how to treat animals, non-therapeutic surgery, lay veterinary care, farm animal reproduction, the use of growth enhancing drugs, production or performance, reproduction technology, etcetera—are indissolubly tied to veterinarians' factual images of animals and their owners. The normative questions and the factual images are part of the same discourse. This shows how hard it is to look at normative issues of veterinarians without taking factual views into account. It shows how important the context is.

Trying to group veterinarians into animal-oriented versus client-oriented practitioners or into those who do good versus those who do well turns out to be an oversimplification that does not do justice to their positions. Most veterinarians found it impossible to qualify themselves as either animal-oriented or client-

oriented because the question is much too simple. They feel a responsibility to both animal and owner. The answer would depend on the situation. It is no choice, really. In their daily practice, the veterinarian cannot view the interests of animals apart from the interests of its owner and vice-versa. The conclusion must be that *both* animals and owners are seen by veterinarians as customers. This does not mean that all veterinarians treat animals and their owners the same way. There are clearly tensions between the interests of animals and the interests of their owners. And there are four different ways in which veterinarians conceptualize these problems and deal with them.

The way veterinarians treat animals and their owners and possible conflicts between them can best be explained by studying their conceptualizations of animals, owners and all the complicated relationships they have with both, as has been done in this chapter. Let us look, for example, at the issue of Caesarian sections for "heavy calves." These calves are specially bred to produce a high quantity of quality meat, which results in heavy ends that prevent them from calving in a natural way. How should veterinarians deal with this? They *might* feel that performing the Caesarian section prolongs a practice that is unnatural and therefore wrong. At the same time, they might feel duty-bound to help a pregnant cow that would otherwise die. Here, many aspects play a role in the veterinarians' opinions and actions. The relationship veterinarians have with animals and their owners, and the way they treat them, can only be described in context. This context, when talking about practitioners who work in the farm sector, includes, among many other aspects, a view on intensive animal husbandry. We can only understand the relationship a veterinarian has with a farmer when the view of the veterinarian on the way animals are treated in Holland is taken into account. But then, issues around technologies like drugs to enhance growth, or utility surgery, or modern reproduction also have to be considered.

In discourses, facts and values are intertwined. It is impossible to make a simple scale of loyalty (or responsibility) towards either animal or owner and divide veterinarians up accordingly. This point is important if we want to influence the way veterinarians use their knowledge and technologies to treat animals and owners. For example, if a group wanted to change the role of veterinarians in crises like foot and mouth disease, it could not merely present a conclusion from environmental philosophy and expect veterinarians to be persuaded. The morality must be made tractable for the veterinarian. The philosophical argument must be "translated" into their view of reality. It must make sense to them else it runs the

risk of being incommensurable with their discourses. To state this differently: what is and what is not a moral question for a veterinarian is determined by his discourse, not by philosophical ethical theory.

Subjects' Factor Loadings
- For all figures, the *defining variates* (loadings that exceed .48, p < .001) are in parentheses.
- Workplace preference key:
    - L = Farm animal practitioner (Landbouwhuisdieren)
    - G = Companion animal practitioner (Gezelschapsdieren)
    - A = Something else (Anders)

Figure 5.1: First-Year Students

A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1	Gender	Workplace Preference
-.19	.44	.31	.43	F	G
(.49)	.22	.15	.01	F	A
-.02	.21	(.53)	-.14	F	L
.42	.16	.34	(.55)	F	G
.28	.44	.06	.42	F	G
-.01	.39	.46	.45	F	A
.47	.26	(.55)	.29	F	A
.03	.27	.28	(.53)	M	G
-.03	.47	(.60)	.16	F	G
(.54)	.18	.13	.30	M	G
.13	.15	-.05	(.66)	F	A
.37	.31	.10	.43	F	G
.41	(.68)	.10	-.19	F	G
(.49)	.26	(.50)	.15	F	G
(.64)	.10	-.15	.01	F	L
(.82)	.06	.11	.03	F	L
.09	.02	(.62)	.16	M	G
.33	.19	.13	.12	M	G
(.72)	.00	.17	.21	M	G
.17	(.54)	.05	.10	F	G
.32	.21	.46	.22	F	G
(.72)	-.01	.12	.21	F	L
.24	(.54)	.15	.46	F	A
-.05	(.65)	.08	.33	F	A
.08	(.62)	.11	.27	M	G
.04	.37	.23	.26	M	A
.37	.14	-.05	(.51)	F	A
.31	(.49)	.37	.24	F	A

A₁	B₁	C₁	D₁	Gender	Workplace Preference
.41	.12	.18	(.51)	F	A
(.81)	-.23	-.18	.08	M	L
(.48)	.30	.16	.18	F	A
(.64)	.20	.12	(.57)	M	G
.29	.13	.26	.39	M	A
.16	.28	.27	.02	F	A
(.55)	.29	.46	.27	F	L
(.53)	-.04	.43	.21	F	G
(.64)	.23	.41	.27	F	L
-.13	(.60)	.16	.24	F	G
.35	.06	.34	.41	F	G
.24	(.63)	.29	.01	M	L

Figure 5.2: Fourth-Year Students

A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4	Gender	Workplace Preference
.46	.25	.38	.28	F	L
.11	(.74)	.30	-.19	F	G
.07	(.52)	.19	.02	F	L
-.13	-.02	**(-.62)**	-.17	M	G
(.62)	.17	.8	.02	F	A
.14	-.14	(.75)	.05	F	G
.42	.26	.16	.22	F	G
.28	.06	.23	(.54)	F	L
.42	.20	.22	.26	F	A
(.49)	.14	.25	.04	F	A
-.01	(.68)	-.12	-.02	F	L
.32	-.27	(.66)	-.24	M	G
.34	(.49)	.15	.20	F	G
-.05	(.76)	-.16	.25	M	L
.46	-.27	(.58)	.05	F	G
.21	(.52)	-.25	.37	F	L
-.04	(.60)	-.05	.18	F	L
-.08	.33	(.49)	.12	F	G
.07	(.63)	-.13	.08	F	L
.01	(.61)	-.01	.12	F	L
.14	.10	(.64)	.30	F	G
.29	-.02	(.58)	-.07	F	G
.09	.29	.06	.44	F	L
.43	.05	(.59)	.12	F	G
.37	-.23	(.55)	-.05	F	G
.25	.35	.07	.21	F	L
.14	(.60)	.05	.04	M	L
.16	.20	(.65)	-.12	F	G
(.56)	-.10	.40	.26	M	A
.08	.10	-.11	(.63)	M	L
.08	.06	.16	(.68)	F	L
.14	.36	.02	(.57)	F	L
.01	-.02	.16	.02	F	L
(.53)	-.16	.27	.29	F	A
.01	(.58)	-.20	.25	M	L

Figure 5.3: Veterinarians
Workplace key:

      B = Brabant/Limburg
      U = Utrecht/Gelderland
      O = Overijssel

A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v	Gender	Year of Graduation	Practice Area
.05	.34	.19	(.52)	M	82	B
.31	.33	(.43)	(.45)	M	78	B
.00	(.57)	.03	.02	M	67	B
.39	(.45)	.04	.21	M	72	B
(.66)	.01	.18	.41	F	93	B
.37	(.46)	**(-.50)**	.38	M	85	B
.22	(.49)	.03	.15	F	99	B
(.67)	.09	.09	.11	F	93	B
.21	.01	(.45)	(.52)	M	87	B
(.63)	.19	.31	.10	M	84	B
.25	.00	(.54)	.13	M	95	B
.02	.26	(.50)	.32	M	90	B
-.04	.22	(.49)	-.01	M	89	O
-.02	(.72)	.26	-.18	M	95	O
.31	-.04	(.53)	.12	M	71	O
-.23	(.63)	.01	.30	M	83	O
(.47)	.29	.38	.27	M	78	O
(.51)	.03	-.07	.39	F	98	O
(.58)	.24	-.03	.25	M	83	O
.36	(.47)	-.01	.22	M	98	O
.42	.26	.15	(.54)	M	88	O
.33	.40	.20	.34	M	83	O
(.55)	.10	.06	(.43)	M	78	O
(.58)	.19	.27	.10	M	92	U
.09	-.01	.13	.34	M	84	U
.42	.05	.39	-.09	M	91	U
.23	(.56)	.32	.00	M	96	U
(.64)	.07	-.02	.39	F	99	U
.42	.20	-.06	(.58)	M	73	U
(.52)	.18	.11	.12	M	97	U

A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v	Gender	Year of Graduation	Practice Area
.13	.26	(.48)	.22	M	70	U
.17	.00	.05	.37	M	91	U
(.53)	(.46)	.10	.11	M	99	U
(.65)	.09	.16	.18	M	79	U
(.81)	-.11	.13	.19	F	96	B
(.75)	.19	.24	.11	M	88	B
(.56)	**(-.48)**	-.01	.26	M	86	B
(.64)	.07	.02	.17	M	84	B
(.65)	-.05	.20	.07	M	81	B
(.56)	-.17	(.45)	.30	M	81	B

Notes

[1] Flexner (1915).

[2] Flexner (1915), p. 577.

[3] Becker (1977).

[4] Becker (1977), pp. 93-98.

[5] Becker (1977), p. 95.

[6] Regarding the problems of veterinarians getting moral advice from outside their profession (see Chapter 1), part of this may come from the fact that since outsiders do not possess the difficult knowledge of the veterinary profession, their advice is mistrusted. How can outsiders really know what is going on in a veterinarian's daily practice?

[7] See Schermer (2001).

[8] See, for example, Swabe (1999) and Arluke & Sanders (1996).

[9] Arluke & Sanders (1996).

[10] Swabe (1999), pp. 151-155. In these pages, Swabe gives a good overview of the tasks modern veterinarians perform.

[11] Swabe (1999), p. 151.

[12] Swabe (1999), p. 152.

[13] Swabe (1999), p. 154.

[14] Swabe (1999), p. 153.

[15] Becker (1977), p. 295.

[16] Becker (1977), p. 295.

[17] Swabe (1999), p. 154.

[18] "Socialization" is often applied to children. The concept of "adult socialization" is being considered here. (Becker (1977), p. 293.)

[19] Becker (1977), p. 294.

[20] Klamer & Colander (1987), pp. 108-109.

[21] This is named as a possible method to deconstruct discourse in Dryzek (1990), p. 187. Examples of successful discourse analyses include Eeten (1999), Dryzek & Berejikian (1993) and Thomas et al. (1993).

[22] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[23] The main source for Q-methodology is Stephenson (1953). Within the social sciences, Brown (1980) is a classic.

[24] Every interviewee was also asked whether the 52 (or 42) statements contained all the relevant aspects of their relationship with animals and their owners. In almost every instance, this was confirmed.

[25] Brown (1980), p. 192.

[26] The same quasi-normal distribution for the 52 statements was chosen as for the banker managers. See Chapter 4 (Figure 4.1). For the 42 statements of the first-year and fourth-year students the following quasi-normal distribution was chosen: two in the –3 category, four in the –2 category, nine in the –1 category, twelve in the 0 category, nine in the +1 category, four in the +2 category and two in the +3 category.

[27] Even though a forced distribution was used, some deviations were tolerated. If the Q-sorters found the forced distribution too much unlike their positions, they were allowed to slightly vary the number of statements they were "supposed to" have in a category.

[28] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[29] Dryzek & Berejikian (1993), p. 52.

[30] Klamer & Colander (1987), p. 106.

[31] Thomas et al. (1993), p. 707.

[32] After an email suggestion by Steven R. Brown, the loadings were first transformed into Fisher's Z in order to meet as much as possible the assumption of Gaussian distributions.

6.   A Charity's Conceptualization of Customers

Charity is a great marketing tool. In the last decennium, a new sector came into being in the Netherlands, the philanthropic sector. In 1999 it was good for 10 billion guilders or 1.2 percent of gross national product. The influence of these charities can be big, take for example the influence of the big medical funds on scientific research.[1]

—Theo Schuyt

6.1   Introduction

In discussing the commercial relationships bankers have with their customers and describing the professional relationship veterinarians have with their customers, we found that both these groups deal with customers in particular ways. How about non-profit organizations? Are they any different? One would expect, as with veterinarians, that doing good prevails over doing well. But we saw that things were not that simple with veterinarians. There is confusion within which they maintain, in different ways, some sort of loyalty towards both animals and animal owners. Would such a thing be the case with charities that, almost by definition, do good? Even so, they have a need for money, meaning they have to do well too. Does this raise tensions within charities? How do charities deal with their customers? Rather than using Q-methodology, I study these questions by means of ethnographic study within a Dutch charity.

The story of Máxima's bike is a striking illustration of charities.[2] It tells us that directors of fundraising charities have to be cautious with the images they project and more sensitive than people involved with commercial organizations. Within universities, much attention is given to the concept of "gift" (within economics, especially, consideration is given to why people give, the role of the gift in society, why it is different from markets and so on) but not much attention is given to the philanthropic sector, the philanthropic *organization*,[3] and how charities deal with their customers. In this book it is important to know what the consequences are for internal discourses when an organization depends on gifts and donations. *How do*

you deal with customers if that is the case? This chapter makes special use of the concept of "story" and includes several like "Máxima's Bike."

Why most attention is given to the concept of gift and not the organization might be because it is unclear what discipline such a study belongs to: economics, social psychology, public management? Recently, the Netherlands has experienced a growth in literature on philanthropy. The Free University of Amsterdam even established a professorial chair for philanthropy in 2001. Although most of the research done in the philanthropic sector is about the people who donate money (and to the concept of gift), the fields of economics, sociology and psychology pay some attention to benefactors. Why do people give money and how can they be influenced? Komter and Schuyt[4] studied the giving habits of the Dutch using cultural anthropological literature. They concluded that giving is often based on reciprocity; pure altruism is the exception. After a study of the business literature, Pronk and Tack[5] concluded that research about philanthropic actions by *companies* is a blind spot. In the studies done in the philanthropic sector, the focus has been on why people and public organizations[6] donate money. There has not been much attention paid to the philanthropic *organizations* and the way customers of charities are and should be treated even though, as will become clear, charities deal with these questions on a daily basis. In this chapter I will focus on the philanthropic organization itself: what problems and moral issues are important when trying to do good? The purpose of a charity—its reason for existence—is to do good. How does such an organization treat its customers? How far should it go in reaching its goal? Let's find out.

Box 1: The Story of Máxima's Bike

> This is a story about an organization, a prince, a princess and the decision of the Netherlands Heart Foundation (NHF) to give a present to its patron, Willem Alexander, the crown prince of the Netherlands.
>
> The fact that Willem Alexander is the patron of the NHF is a source of great pride within the organization. Several employees have pictures of themselves with Willem Alexander. During a farewell reception on September 11, 2001 for the NHF director of twenty years, Jan van Deth, the fact that the prince had become the patron of the NHF under his reign was mentioned as one of his main accomplishments.
>
> On Friday, March 30, 2001, Willem Alexander announced his engagement to Miss Máxima Zorreguieta of Argentina. On the same day a little experiment was going on within the NHF. The director of fundraising and a mailroom employee had decided to switch jobs for a day to gain more understanding of each other's work. Their experiences were reported in "Collegiaal," a magazine for NHF employees.
>
> When the engagement of Willem Alexander and Máxima was announced, NHF management debated on how to congratulate their patron. Naturally, a gift should be given, but what? Flowers and a cake with little hearts were mentioned as options but no one at the management meeting was happy with them. For security reasons, the cake would probably not be eaten and flowers, well, the happy couple was undoubtedly swamped with them already.

The person from the mailroom, Willem, who just happened to be in the management meeting March 30 because of the one-day-job-switching experiment, wondered if it would be a good idea to give a present to the patron's fiancée. Everyone immediately agreed, but then the problem became what to give her. Well, Willem said, why not a bike? The idea was received enthusiastically. The Netherlands is known for its bikes, and what could be a more appropriate present to welcome someone to the country? Much more importantly, a bike and the NHF are clearly connected because exercise is good for prevention of heart disease. The media attention would not only bring the NHF under a positive light but also communicate to the Dutch public the importance of exercise—with zero costs! Zero costs because once Batavus—one of the two biggest bike producers in Holland—heard of the plan, it gladly donated a bike. The company undoubtedly recognized a great opportunity to get (almost) free publicity. The plan to give a bike to Máxima seemed like a win-win situation for everyone. For months the NHF looked forward to the opportunity to present its gift. The opportunity arrived six days after the terrorist attacks in the U.S.

On September 17, 2001, four representatives of the NHF handed the bike to Máxima. In the aftermath of September 11, the attention of the press was not overwhelming. Still, a picture appeared in several national newspapers and a few TV news programs paid some attention. That evening everyone agreed that the presentation went well; the management of the NHF was pleased.

The same management was negatively surprised the next day. About 100 people had called the NHF with complaints about the gift to the future Dutch queen. In the following days, many angry letters arrived. A negative letter was published in a well-read national newspaper; numerous angry emails and complaints were registered on the (just renewed) NHF Internet site. A few examples:

"*It cannot be that the NHF gives money of collecting boxes to members of the royal family. Next time, pass my front door; I will not give anymore.*"

"*Since you apparently have enough money to give a bike to the daughter of an Argentinean with a very questionable past, you cannot count on my donations anymore.*"

"*I think it is ridiculous. I thought that people gave money to the NHF for good causes (e.g., research). Máxima is rich enough and she can buy a bike herself. I will not give money to the NHF anymore. I am very disappointed in the way they handle money.*"

"*Can my wife also get a bike? What Alexander gets in a year, I do not get in my life time!*"

"*Give the bike to someone who really needs it. I do not believe that the bike was sponsored. And even if the bike was sponsored, why was this bike given to someone from the royal family? They can easily buy thousands of bikes from taxpayers' money. It should have been the other way around; this royal couple should have done a royal contribution to the NHF.*"

"*Outrageous! Máxima may be a nice girl but this went too far. I always thought that the painstakingly collected money—people walk through rain and wind—would be better spent. This really went too far. I have no faith anymore in your collections. You probably have too much money.*"

On the morning of the 19th, the NHF released a press statement:

Several of our donators contacted us with remarks about our engagement gift to our patron, Prince Willem Alexander and Miss Máxima Zorreguieta. They were disturbed that their donations were used for this. The NHF wants to stress that the bike was a donation of the firm Batavus. Money from our donators was not used. By presenting the bike, the NHF wanted to convey the message that exercise, including biking, contributes to the prevention of heart and blood vessel diseases. Unfortunately, some people were not able to conclude this from the picture in the paper; we apologize for that.

The NHF had told the press on the 17th that the bike was paid for by Batavus. Intentionally, however, they had not pressed the point. If it had gotten too much attention, the prince could have been in an awkward position. He cannot accept overly expensive presents from industry because it might look like he could be bought to promote or advertise certain products.

The press statement of the NHF did not put an end to phone calls and emails but did have an effect: some people now thought that the present was a good idea, but others were still

(very) angry. The following remarks were posted on the Internet site (after releasing the press statement on the same site):

"*On your website was a good thing too, the message that a bike firm had given the bike away. It would have been helpful if that piece of information had been conveyed more clearly to the public. Your explanation, unfortunately after the event, was a big relief.*"

"*Despite the fact whether this bike was paid for by the NHF or not, we thought it was a splendid idea to use such an event to stress that biking is very good for a person. Furthermore, this gesture was not just very nice, it also had more p.r. value than ten advertisements or leaflets. We would like to congratulate you with that. We will double our contribution when we see the next collecting box.*"

"*The press statement is such a lame excuse. In the newspaper, Spits, it says that it is a gift from the NHF to Máxima. You should know better than to organize this.*"

"*Many volunteers go through rain and weather to collect money; it is not appropriate to give a bike to a rich woman, even if it is paid for by other means, it is not a good idea.*"

"*If you really have to give away a bike, give it to a poor heart patient who can keep fit with it, then at least it is well spent. And you do not believe Máxima will really ride that bike, do you?*"

Despite the background information on the website of the NHF, many more complaints came in for weeks, in which the idea to give money from collections to a rich woman was attacked. Many of these people somehow never read the "explanation" by the NHF. For example, this message was posted on September 21:

"*It is not only an outrageous scandal that this rich woman got a bike from our collections, but that she keeps it is too ridiculous for words. What a mentality. The collection can skip our door this year.*"

And on the 28th:

"*After years of collecting money for the NHF, I definitely stop! For this I do not go through rain and weather! Shame, shame, shame, we really feel used and abused. I will keep being active, but for a different organization. This cannot be!!*"

A manager of the NHF said a few weeks later that if they had to do it all over again, they certainly would not do it in the same way. His comment:

"*More than half of the people we explain our position to accepts our explanation and is satisfied. But there are also those who say: you should have given the bike to a deserving heart patient.*"

What seemed like a great idea with no downside backfired. No one in the organization, despite his or her experience dealing with donators, saw this coming. The manager again:

"*Even with hindsight, I find it impossible to understand. We have the rule that for every person calling, there are ten not calling with the same complaint. So now there are 1000 people angry with us. And they are the ones who give us our mandate. Our collection is a yearly popularity vote about the position of the NHF. The money given to us is entrusted to us. It is borrowed money. But it is weird that people do not seem to understand what happened.*"

6.2   Charities That Do Good and Charities That Do Well

Just as with commercial organizations like banks and a profession like veterinary medicine, to outsiders two ideal discourses present themselves in this chapter: one about a do-good charity and the other about a do-well charity.

In philanthropy, an extra degree of separation exists between those who pay and those who benefit. When I donate money to the Netherlands Heart Foundation, how do I know "my" money is well spent? Giving money to the Netherlands Heart Foundation is different from buying something in a shop (in which case I immediately get a product) or giving money to a homeless person (in which case I am in contact with the person who benefits). Trust is therefore an important issue for charities. I asked people about the fears and dislikes they have with respect to charities and found that some regard them as "too aggressive." They complain about the many letters asking for donations. And even when money is donated— or perhaps *especially* when money is donated—new letters with the same type of questions follow. People find this not only wasteful but an invasion of their privacy. Other worries have to do with wasting money. Of course they understand that the organization of a charity has costs, but think they should be as low as possible. Another worry has to do with trust and control of the charity they give money to. In the Netherlands, a scandal concerning the Foster Parents Plan recently brought this to the fore, leading to a huge decline in donations. Apparently, people want to be certain that a charity does what it says.

Combining the above, an archetypal image of a do-good charity presents itself. Just like the previous do-good discourse, many moral aspects are in the foreground. Success is defined in moral terms. A charity that wants to do good is, in this discourse, one that is first and foremost *completely honest*. It does what it says and promises and is not misleading. Marketing is a suspect tool for such an organization: it can too easily mislead people. Ideally, do-gooders would also like it to be possible that every penny of the donation go to the intended purpose. Those who give money can then be certain that the unknown people who stand to benefit are helped in the best possible way. A do-good charity spends just a small amount of its budget on its own organization. Furthermore, a charity trying to do good has respect for privacy. It must raise money of course, but never does that in an aggressive way.

The discourse that views the do-well charity is the opposite. Monetary, not moral, issues are in the foreground. Again, this is not saying that such a discourse is less moral, just that success is defined more in monetary terms. To do good, a charity needs money. If it is treating customers well, a do-well discourse would say, "That's nice, but if the result is that the charity has next to no income, what good does that do in the end?" In a do-well discourse, the do-good discourse is wrong in a moral sense. And vice-versa. But moral issues are not in the foreground. Such a

discourse sees charities as organizations that should try to collect as much money as possible. Money is the name of the game. The ultimate purpose of the organization is a good one, and therefore it should try to achieve its goal in such a way that it is not continually halted by minor, immediate moral concerns. Within this (archetypal) discourse, the distance between donators and those who benefit is so great that it could be interpreted as if the philanthropist is less concerned with those who benefit (the raison d'être of the organization) than with the organization itself. This discourse expects the charity to be market-oriented. Economic rationalities should influence decisions because charities are economic, profit-maximizing organizations trying to do well. They do not need to be completely honest to their donators all the time. In advertising, they should be willing to play with images to raise money. For example, giving the impression that all the money goes to deserving little children (when in fact just a small portion of it does) is good business. A charity should try to maximize its organization; the bigger it is, the better.

6.3   The Netherlands Heart Foundation

Charities need money to support their cause and most have a dedicated staff of fundraisers. What are the special circumstances of these fundraisers compared to those within a commercial organization? What is their dominant language? Those are the main questions I will answer in this chapter. I will describe the special circumstances of charities in dealing with customers. As with veterinarians, this involves describing who is seen as a customer in the first place.

This chapter is based on ethnographic research. To collect the data and describe the discourse of a charity, I worked for two months at the Netherlands Heart Foundation (NHF). Most of the descriptions are of the (for lack of better phrasing) "fundraisers' discourse." Attention is also given to other discourses, but those descriptions will be less extensive. *This does not mean I think that the fundraisers' discourse is better in a moral or any other sense. I chose beforehand to study fundraisers in a charity and therefore I collected most material about them.* (For an introduction to the specific circumstances and problems of a charity dealing with its customers, refer to Box 1, "The Story of Máxima's Bike.")

I chose to study the NHF for its size and reputation, among other reasons. As one of the largest charities in the Netherlands, it has one of the largest fundraising

staffs. Additionally, it has the image of being a stable organization which, I assumed, would help my chances of getting in. I considered three other charities on my shortlist after these criteria. I decided to first approach the NHF. After my request to the NHF to do my research, I met all the cooperation I could wish for.

In the rest of this section I will give some basic information about the NHF. For the most part, it comes directly from the NHF.

The Netherlands Heart Foundation, founded in 1964, is active throughout the country. Its goal is to fight cardiovascular disease and to see that it is no longer the major cause of premature death and disability. The NHF is active in scientific research, prevention and patient care. According to its website, its principle aims with respect to cardiovascular disease are:[7]

- To stimulate and support basic, strategic, and applied scientific research.
- To inform the public and motivate their interest in cardiovascular risk factors.
- To prevent disease through modification of lifestyle and maintenance of a healthy lifestyle.
- To advise the government and thereby catalyze public policy changes that promote cardiovascular health.
- To improve the quality of health care available to patients with cardiovascular disease.

The NHF has approximately 1,100,000 donators and 1,600 "Friends Committees" comprising about 5,500 volunteers. The NHF budget is around 70 million guilders annually. The lifeblood of the foundation's endeavors is fund-raising, which accounts for ten percent of the organization's expenditures. For its revenues, the foundation depends exclusively on donations from the public. More than half comes from direct mail campaigns and door-to-door collections, a fifth comes from bequests and legacies, the remainder from lotteries, accrued interests and miscellaneous sources. A major direct mail and collection campaign during National Heart Week each April enjoys strong media support and raises over one-third of the foundation's donations. Direct mail activities provide solid additional income. Door-to-door collections are carried out by an army of volunteers known as "Friends of the Heart Foundation."

Recently the NHF decided to formulate "*what* [the NHF] is *exactly*" by coming up with three "official" values. "*There have been many different sessions in the NHF*

with the question, 'Who are we?'" The key values are saving lives, empathy and approachability.

6.4   Research Methodology: Ethnography

The ethnographic approach used here differs in various ways from the Q-method and serves different ends. The goal of the ethnographic research is to identify the hegemonic discourse(s) *within a single case study*. In the previous chapters, I was looking for discourses among bankers and veterinarians in general; in this chapter, I will look at the discourse(s) within one organization. For a single case study, ethnographic research is most well suited because of the possibility of participant observation.[8] Its concepts and phrases were of great help to this study.

The advantage of ethnographic research is that it allows a researcher to make a distinction between texts based on the context. After all, the texts are collected and studied within their context. "Ethnographic methods are particularly appropriate for studies dealing with the context of organizational action."[9] "They provide background data to illuminate what particular speech acts, including stories, mean to organizational insiders and what these individuals are trying to accomplish by so speaking and so doing."[10] Van Maanen[11] writes: "Fieldwork asks the researcher, as far as possible, to share firsthand the environment, problems, background, language, rituals, and social relations of a more-or-less bounded and specified group of people. The belief is that by means of such sharing, a rich, concrete, complex and hence truthful account of the social world being studied is possible." In other words, the context helps the researcher to sample the texts he considers for analysis.

One of the methodological problems for discourse analysis in general is selecting which of the texts found within an organization are important and which are not. In the previous two chapters I used Q-methodology. Its great advantage is that it deals in an interesting way with what Putnam and Fairhurst[12] call the major question of sampling, i.e., which texts to select for discourse analysis, because Q-methodology does not simply take a sample of all the texts that are available. Q makes certain that those aspects most important in a discourse come to the fore (see the previous two chapters).

As Putnam and Fairhurst indicate, the problem of which texts to select is the largest methodological dilemma of any discourse analysis. As stated above, Q-methodology makes an important contribution to discourse analysis precisely because of its methodological clarity. The advantage ethnographic research has over Q is the ongoing access to, and direct witnessing of, naturally occurring organizational discourse. The researcher has limited influence on the discourse he registers, ideally as little as a thermometer on the temperature of a hot summer day. But the question of sampling remains. In the last ten years, many scholars within business studies have asked for more ethnography.[13] I believe the reason there still are not many ethnographic studies in business research is the methodological problem of sampling, i.e., which texts to use for discourse analysis. Another reason, and probably a more important one, is that it is a time-consuming research technique.

Ethnography puts emphasis on data collection. In most ethnographic research, impressive amounts of texts are collected. Researchers play an important role in this process. First they have to decide which data to collect and which not, since they clearly cannot write down every sentence heard at an organization; in my case, two months' worth. After the process of data collection, the important question becomes which data to select out of it, which words are worth mentioning in the story. The influence of the researcher in these processes is not necessarily a bad thing; researchers "must use their knowledge of the world as resource for interpreting discourse and textual materials."[14] The problem of representativity, however, cannot be solved in ethnographic research. On the other hand, the problem of representativity exists in all qualitative research. No solution can or should be compared to random sampling methods.

Like most scholars who conduct discourse analysis using ethnography, I will try to make the process as clear as possible. Along the lines of Hammersley,[15] I will concentrate on the validity as a trust in the results of my study rather than looking for absolute certainty. I will pay much attention to both the process of my data collection and of my story telling. More specifically, in order to find the hegemonic discourses, I chose to follow the logic of grounded theory: I went into the field with little knowledge of the organization I was researching. After spending some time, certain themes emerged. I will go through this process now in more detail.

In the field, I listened especially for forms of problematization: what is seen as a problem and why? Controversies are very important. At moments of controversy

many texts are produced; arguments are exchanged. I gave some attention to *forms of problematization* in Chapter 3. By presenting the problems and controversies that a discourse itself identifies, the discourses are described without too much hindsight. Therefore, while working at the NHF, I paid special attention to the questions the NHF asked itself. Presenting the problems of a discourse clarifies the rationality of the discourse: why is something seen as a problem? It makes clear what the most important concepts and aspects of a discourse are. It also shapes the conditions of the possible answers to the questions presented.

After looking at the first sets of data, certain themes emerged. A theme is a recurrent issue that is continually repeated and recognized by the researcher as important to a discourse. Around a theme, a first impression of the hegemonic discourse(s) is formed. With the newly gained problematizations, knowledge, insights and concepts, always accompanied by new questions, I went back into the field to see whether my new insights and concepts could be expanded or rejected. Once I felt comfortable with the results, I decided to stop and write my discourse analysis. This method, in a sense, details the sources and not the methods,[16] like the studies of Linder,[17] Chock[18] and Pal.[19] It should be clear that the strict divide between data collection and data analysis of positivistic research is not present in the method I chose. They are conducted neither separately in time nor separately in analysis.

Once again, it is important that data collection (by lack of a better word, with data I mean observation of words, acts and artifacts plus the meanings they have for the participants) and interpretation be in the field. I collected the data within their contexts—very important for discourses. In that sense, the data was not so much collected as it was "accessed."[20] The basic research process was: "Observing what people do and how they do it. Listening to how they talk about the issue, reading what they read, and talking with them about their views will lead the analyst to a degree of familiarity with the issue and views on it from the perspective of those affected by it in any way. Out of this growing familiarity, the researcher-analyst will be able to identify the overlappings and commonalities that will begin to define borders between communities of different interpretive positions."[21]

By conducting an ethnographic study in the field of business ethics, I take seriously what I wrote earlier in this book about the contextuality of ethics. What

many ethnographers have revealed[22] is that moral decision-making is situational. Understanding it means understanding the particular circumstances (possibilities, etc.) of a certain situation. "The most important contribution of ethnographic studies is that they give content to the vague notion of 'putting moral problems into context.'"[23]

6.5 Stories

As mentioned earlier, within this chapter I make liberal use of stories. Stories play an important role in people's lives; in large part, they give meaning to them.[24] If you want to get to know someone, you ask for a life story. Stories are about what is important and what is not. Philosophers like Johnson[25] or McIntyre[26] would go so far as to argue that stories are central to creating human understanding: "I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question, 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?'"[27] Fisher claims that "all forms of human communication need to be seen fundamentally as stories."[28] It is therefore not surprising that stories are also important to studies of the organization. Herbert Simon argued that stories allow decision-making to take place. Now many scholars agree that stories contain much information about an organization and are efficient at conveying information.[29] "People engage in a dynamic process of incremental refinement of their stories of new events as well as ongoing reinterpretations of culturally sacred story lines."[30] "In sum people do not just tell stories, they tell stories to enact an account of themselves and their community."[31]

Every scholar (in various disciplines, including psychology and literature) writing about stories agrees that they are narratives with a chronological order: they have a beginning, a middle and an end (which means that stories are not the only form of narrative). Here the agreement ends. Some insist that, apart from the temporal element, stories necessarily contain meaningful connections in a causal way.[32] This is what I will assume in this chapter. Furthermore, stories have characters, ranging from heroes to villains (for example, people usually reserve the position of 'good guy' for themselves, in stories they play a role in). Stories generally have plots, narrators and settings. Last, stories within a context must have a certain degree of plausibility. One can try to establish whether a fact is true, but that is not possible with a combination of events. "In this regard, narrative theory posits a number of criteria, including coherence and causality, morality, closure and utility."[33]

The assumption in this book that meaning is produced in linguistic form fits well with exploring stories. Stories are simply one type of linguistic form. Stories are elements of a discourse with certain characteristics. Stories are especially important for ethicists: they contain values (ideas about good and bad, right and wrong); they are about good and evil. White: "What else could narrative closure exist of than the passage of one moral order to another? … Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too."[34] "It is the 'moralizing impulse' that endows facts with relevance, and stories with closure and coherence—the very features we use to judge the value and the truth of the stories we hear."[35] "[W]e can see how the moralizing impulse organizes the narrative economy of cause, blame and measures."[36]

In organizational research that uses discourse analysis, stories and narratives have been studied extensively.[37] The precise ontological status given to stories differs among these analyses, leading to confusion. Dicke rightly claims: "Discourse, story and narrative are sometimes used in organization and policy sciences as if they were completely interchangeable. Indeed, these concepts for organizational analysis are 'poorly defined'."[38] Earlier I defined discourse as "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities."[39] Through discourse, meaning is given to physical and social realities.

Some scholars work on the assumption that all discourse consists of stories. A discourse can be reduced to one main story, usually comprising many sub-stories. To scholars in the organization field, this means that organizations *are* stories, albeit a multiplicity of stories, each struggling for dominance. Others see stories as parts of a wider discourse: "In organizations, storytelling is the preferred sense-making currency of human relationships among internal and external stakeholders."[40] In this book I will treat stories much like Boje describes them. I will not treat a discourse as a whole as a story, but I do acknowledge that stories are a main *part* of every discourse, a specific form of discourse with the specific characteristics described above. "A narrative text is also an instance of discourse, of linguistic action."[41] Or as Hajer puts it when discussing Davies and Harre: "A story-line, as I interpret it, is a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical and

social phenomena ... The underlying assumption is that people do not draw on comprehensive discursive systems for their cognition, rather these are evoked through story-lines. As such story-lines play a key role in the positioning of subjects and structures."[42] Obviously, the bankers' and veterinarians' discourses also contained many stories; in those chapters, however, I did not make them explicit.

As soon as, ontologically speaking, there is more in the world than just stories, their context is important. A story can only be understood within a context. It can be studied as an object in the sense that a text can be analyzed as if it were an object. But to understand the meaning of a narrative, one must always take its particular context of space and time into consideration. A story is dependent on a social context for its existence. This is often forgotten in narrative analyses. As O'Connor argues: "With a few exceptions, research on narrativity continues this separation of text from context."[43] O'Connor also suggests that ethnographic research provides a good method to put the stories within their context. "Linguists have emphasized that narratives, because they demand an unusual amount of the listener's time, must have a point."[44] And understanding the point requires an understanding of the context in which the narrative is told: "Relevance is … ultimately, the perception of a relationship between story discourses and story situation."[45] I stated earlier that precisely one of the strong points of ethnographic research is the ability to study the context of words. Ethnographic studies are the best way to study stories not just as objects, as mere texts (as most narrative analyses do[46]), meaning that, unlike most narrative analyses, within ethnography there is no separation between text and context. It is therefore fitting to pay attention to stories while doing a discourse analysis using the ethnographic research method.

In this research I will include stories on two levels. First I will describe "The Main Story of the NHF." Within every organization such a dominant story exists, sometimes more than one. This one is about the founding of the organization, the reasons for its founding, the direction the organization should be going and the meaning this has for present members of the organization. These original stories are significant, described by Eliade[47] and others as "sacred."[48] I will use original stories, like the one of Máxima's bike, to explain, illustrate and elaborate the discourses I will describe. They are the stories that give meaning to the world of the employees of the NHF. The stories are in numbered boxes and, as before, direct NHF dialogue is italicized.

6.6 Practical Research Background

Consistent with ethnographic organizational research,[49] I spent considerable time (thirty hours a week for two months) at a site (the NHF). Cooperation was entirely forthcoming. I alternated among three desks in three rooms, always sharing a room with employees of the Department of Fundraising. Being able to hear their everyday, continual conversations proved to be a crucial source of information. I was allowed to go to every meeting, including those with consultancies. I was allowed access to all archives whose texts I photocopied and used extensively for my analysis. I was put on the mailing list. At the end of each day I kept a detailed diary.

The NHF cooperated in any way I asked and did not limit my study in any way. I agreed with the NHF to an intern assignment at which I spent about twenty hours a week. The rest of the day I spent on my own research and observing the NHF. In the evenings I worked on my daily notes.

6.7 The Main Story of the NHF: Unity as a Theme

In the process of getting permission to do research, I had several meetings with the NHF management and fundraisers to explain my plans. When I walked toward the building for the first time, I saw a big flag of the NHF, white with a red heart, the corporate logo. I recognized the logo immediately and realized how well the NHF is known in Dutch society. I also realized that the NHF had succeeded, probably through media attention and their regular TV infomercials, in having me recognize their logo without having to think about it.

During the first meeting, I was offered a cup of coffee. I was struck by the nice cup, white, with the red corporate logo. It was a nice view around the table, too: all the same white cups with the logo of the NHF. Those who were using sugar and milk had tiny white papers lying next to their cups, white papers with the red corporate logo. During the meeting I was surprised by the unity of the NHF. Both management and the fundraisers were united in the opinion that it was a fine idea for me to study them and offered their total support. They all spoke enthusiastically

about their organization and made it clear they had nothing to hide. It was obvious that they were all proud to work at the NHF.

The first day of my ethnographic research reminded me of my initial meetings. I was struck by the unity the organization radiated. The corporate logo did not only appear on coffee cups, the red hearts were everywhere. I presumed that the unity, symbolically shown by the ubiquitous red logo, was the reflection of a deeply felt, shared purpose by the members of the NHF. As described earlier, every organization has a main story, one or more stories about the reason for its existence, and stories about the causes of success or failure in the present and what it will take to be successful in the future. At the NHF, everyone is convinced that the image of the NHF has made the NHF as big as it is. The NHF is a reliable, decent, solid, independent organization, maybe even conservative. That is the main (and uniting) story of the foundation, its purpose and success, which is repeatedly told in different forms by the employees of the NHF. This story is their image and one they want to keep, one that should be guarded in any way possible. NHF autonomy is seen as important. As will become clear later, this has enormous consequences for the fundraisers' discourse. It means, for example, that a fundraiser's decorum in direct contact with people is important and important in a moral sense:

"*At the NHF, we are very fair with guidelines regarding mailing people, more than we strictly have to be. We are very ethical; that is what made us who we are.*"

In Section 6.16, more attention to the link with this and (perceived) morals is given.

An organization called the Central Bureau of Fundraisers (CBF), of which most charities in the Netherlands are members, has introduced a sort of hallmark which charities earn by adhering to particular rules. One is that the charity cannot spend more than one-quarter of its budget on fundraising. The CBF hallmark is clearly part of the image of the NHF, where they were "*of course*" among the first charities to earn it. Everyone within the NHF agrees that if it were to lose that hallmark— which is at the same time inconceivable to everyone—the organization would be lost. The hallmark is proudly displayed on many public communications as evidence of its solidity and trustworthiness.

Everyone sees bad publicity as disastrous. At the NHF, it would affect its good name, so essential for its existence. The unity of the NHF is evidenced by the

many forms of problematization and attention assigned to it. Recall, for example, the story of Máxima's bike.

6.8 A Bomb Is Dropped; Different Themes Emerge: Reliability and Soundness

After a few days at the NHF, when I found myself thinking about what I just described, I was surprised by how quickly the main story had presented itself. Furthermore, I was amazed by the unity of the NHF, which seemed unlike any other organization I had ever known. During this thought process, the director of fundraising (responsible for contacts with companies) came into our office, saying he had big news. My two officemates dropped their work and asked what it was. The director told us, with obvious emotion, that he had just come from a management meeting where it was decided that:

"*There can be no fundraising activities anymore with the food industry. Food industry won't be allowed to put our logo on their products anymore.*" My officemate, who was a company-dealing fundraiser, sighed in disbelief: "*It's a good thing I'm leaving, otherwise I would have resigned by now.*"

During the long discussion we had that afternoon, she would repeat this statement, albeit in different words, many times.

During the rest of the afternoon I talked with the fundraisers about the meaning of this "big announcement," how they felt about it and many other aspects of their work. These conversations gave a completely different view of "unity" within the NHF. I became aware that there were two discourses when it comes to fundraising. In the first week, I had taken the logo of the NHF as a symbol of unity. Now I realized that it was also a symbol of divide between two discourses. Logos, typically marketing inventions, are seen as means to make money through familiarity and recognition. Outside marketing discourses, logos sometimes have different meanings. Logos might be seen as useful because they express a feeling of common purpose within the organization. The main function of a logo is then to remind insiders and outsiders of the purpose of the NHF. Suddenly, the logo had two meanings and became a divide between the discourse of the fundraisers and the discourse of management. When studying the words of the fundraisers about the logo, I noticed that they emphasized it as a marketing tool. The management discourse talked about the logo as a means to express a feeling of common purpose.

At first, every employee of the NHF seemed to subscribe to the main story of the NHF. After the episode described above, I began to realize that what I thought was one story was actually a story with two versions. To be more precise, the story had two endings. During long and emotional talks the afternoon the announcement was made, it appeared that the main story split when it came to talking about the future. Instead of unity, new themes came to the fore. During the rest of my tenure, it was not the theme *unity* that was all-dominating, but the themes *reliability* and *soundness*. Even though the story of the history of the NHF—the reasons for founding it, the reasons it was so successful and *that* it had been successful—was shared by everyone, there were two versions of the story when it came to how the NHF should deal with its current image and how it should move forward. NHF fundraisers were constantly looking for ways to retain the solid image, but at the same time to modernize it:

"*Consultants always say that we're too much like bookkeepers. That means that we do our jobs well, but that we're not lively or appealing.*"

"*We aren't fresh. We have to be much fresher.*"

"*Management thinks our image is great. They don't want to think about it. They don't want to innovate, they just want to consolidate. They're too conservative.*"

"*We're a sort of people's fund; we're just there. People don't feel a close bond with us. Their ties with us aren't strong. They just give their money. This goes for both individuals and businesses. For organizations like NOVIB and Milieudefensie* [international aid organization and environmental organization, respectively] *this is different. People really* choose *these funds.*"

"*We're a solid organization, but not very hip.*"

"*That's right, to people we're just one of the medical charities, but we don't manage to do something with actual events.*"

"*Yet, we are in the top three of the image and donation preference lists of people. So we're a good club.*"

"*We are just the second most known deadly disease. That's by definition. We're among the biggest public diseases. People just see people dropping dead around them. So that's something people talk about. But if a club came along that had a trendier image, we'd definitely run a major risk.*"

"*Of course the question is whether there can be an upbeat image with heart and vessel diseases.*"

"*We have to land more often than other charities on people's doorsteps, so we have to be more appealing. When you land for the fifth time on a person's*

doorstep, then it gets tough. After the first mailing they might send us ten guilders, but after that it becomes tough."

"*We have to create more of a bond with the customer. We have to 'trigger' something.*"

"*If we want more young people, we have to appeal to them too.*"

Management and the medical departments (also called "*those from above,*" explained in more detail later) are very much concerned with "*being careful not to throw away our independence.*" The stories in Boxes 2 and 3 below serve as an introduction to the clashes this leads to.

Box 2: The Story of Disco Fruit Juices

> "*There was an enthusiastic young guy here who wanted to reach young people with the message of the NHF. He wanted to approach young people at discos. There they're receptive to information. Plus, they're in groups, so you don't have to approach them and speak to them individually. This enthusiastic guy wanted to sell fruit juices in discos so that a little money could go to the NHF. But the following two points were more important: A) to show that you really don't have to drink alcohol or get drunk and B) especially to make young people aware of their lifestyle and their health. It was a very good project. But management didn't approve, because we didn't want to associate ourselves with discos. They said we wouldn't do that. 'We don't want to have anything to do with discos; they're bad.' By the way, dancing is very good exercise and therefore very good for your heart. So dancing in itself is recommended by the NHF.*"

Box 3: The Story of St. Valentine's Cakes

> "*Once, on Valentine's Day, catering came up with a nice gesture. They thought it would be fun to give every employee of the NHF a little cake shaped in the form of a heart. So they did, just for fun. But afterwards, they received criticism from those from above, because too much fat is bad for your heart. They were against this gesture and asked them not to do it again. Ridiculous how they think sometimes. Too sick for words.*"

The fundraisers seem to have their own discourse within the NHF and it has a different rationality. As in the above, differences can be found in issues such as what the image of the NHF should be and how the organization can survive in the future. When I studied this theme more carefully, however, I realized that there are also differences in issues like how to treat the customers of the NHF, how wealthy, exactly, the organization is, what should be done to raise money, who the customers of the NHF are, on what criteria these customers should be judged, how to coordinate actions with commercial organizations, morals, and so on. In the next section I will describe the fundraisers' discourse and its rationality in more

detail. I will make extensive use of quotes and stories, staying as close as possible to their own words.

6.9 The Fundraisers' Discourse and Its Rationality: A Marketing Discourse - Forms of Problematization in Daily Activities

The story of Máxima's bike made it clear that there is something special about fundraising, marketing and customer interaction within a philanthropic organization. To describe these differences, I will describe the fundraisers' discourse and its rationality within the context of the NHF in some detail. In doing so I will answer the question: What rationalities do fundraisers within charities use?

6.9.1 Customers

It has become clear that when it comes to customers, two discourses clash in the NHF: the fundraisers' discourse and management discourse, the latter strongly influenced by the NHF medical departments. Before describing the fundraisers' discourse in detail, let me characterize this clash. For management, there are different types of NHF customers. The people who donate money comprise one large group, but there are also those who come to the NHF for help: patients, medical researchers, people seeking information and so on. The whole society is the customer of the NHF. To be more precise: customers are any people important to the mission of the NHF. If a person or organization fits the mission of the NHF—whether costing money or bringing in money—he, she or it is welcome and invited. If a person or organization does not fit with the mission of the NHF but is capable of bringing in a million Euros, that's nice but he, she or it is not welcome or necessary. Customers, in all their various forms, are judged solely against the mission of the NHF. The mission is a grave one:

"If we do not do our job very well, people might die as a result. I see myself as a prophet. What is important is our message. Our message is our goal."

According to the fundraisers, this is all nice and noble, but money is required; principles alone cannot fulfill the mission of the NHF. For fundraisers, customers are more strictly defined: those who can bring in money. Of course, there are limits. A donator cannot be totally opposed to the mission of the NHF. Nor, for example, can the tobacco industry be a sponsor. But the monies of those not completely opposed to the mission, say, those neutral towards it, are welcome. In

other words, the fundraisers use money, not the mission of the NHF, as their leading principle.

Within the fundraisers' discourse, those who donate money are sometimes called "customers." Not all the time and not by everyone, but it always occurs within the fundraisers' discourse. Customer is a concept used for all those who give money to the NHF. It is also used for those who order (free) information from the NHF. Thus, in the fundraisers' discourse, every citizen or company in contact with the NHF can be called a customer. Those who give money are divided roughly into three categories: posthumous bequests (this is a special discipline and is not given great attention here), private donators, and companies. Private donations are subdivided into two general categories: those who give money to the yearly collections and "the relations" or people whose addresses are known and who donate money to the NHF periodically (also called "the donators"). Among the "better ones"[50] (those who give 100 guilders or more on a regular basis) are "members," who are entitled to the quarterly magazine *Heartbeat*.[51]

The word customer is not used very much, even in the fundraisers' discourse. It can be used, "*I see companies as my customers. I try to serve them as well as possible.*" Everyone in this discourse knows what is meant by customers, but "relations" and "donators" are more frequently used concepts. The marketing discourses of the consultants with whom the fundraisers are in contact use the concept of customers much more than the management's discourse. It is interesting to note that when talking with consultants, the fundraisers also talk of their "customers," while amongst themselves this concept is much less used. A fundraiser:

"*I find it personally annoying when a big company calls me a customer. Then I don't feel at ease. We purposely don't directly call people our 'customers.' Most people are amazed when they hear that so many professionals work here. We have the image that many volunteers work for the NHF. And we should be aware of that image. So we must not behave like a commercial company. Just like the ANWB* [Netherlands automobile club], *they're very professional, but they prefer to present themselves as a volunteer organization. In conversation with the customer you cannot use the word 'customer.' It's too commercial. A donator probably wouldn't like it.*"

6.9.2   Marketing

The fundraisers' discourse is influenced by marketing discourses of business studies. Marketing discourses may be normal and influential in commercial organizations, but within a charity they lead to conflict and even frustration. The fundraisers often feel misunderstood. Most workers in the fundraising department have some sort of background or training in marketing:

"*Even though we raise money in different areas, one for companies, the other with mailings, we are both from the same school: the post-academic course of the University of Utrecht. They have special training for marketing for charities. We were taught a clear distinction between gifts* [giving something for nothing] *and sponsoring* [giving something for something]. *The rest of this organization doesn't see these distinctions as clearly.*"

Those from the fundraising discourse feel that consultants understand them, that they speak the same language (discussed in more detail in Section 6.13). It is predictable therefore that consultants with a background in marketing are less understood by the rest of the organization.

Since the fundraisers' main purpose is to try to maximize the income of the NHF, the subject characterizes their discourse. Interestingly, this drive to collect as much money as possible does not necessarily stem from a desire "to do good." (Examples of this are given in Section 6.15*.*) The motivation comes more out of the marketing discourse itself: it is the job of fundraisers to raise money. They do trust good things are done with the money, but to do good does not seem to be their driving force. I had expected the opposite: that employees of the NHF would be motivated by the clearly "good" goal of the organization. A fundraiser:

"*You should try to understand what the customer wants. You have to be serious about your marketing. Everything we mail out has been tested. I once considered quitting working here (which I didn't do by the way) because someone said, 'Let's send a Heartbeat or a puzzle with all our mailings.' It's not the point whether I like our magazine or not. The point is that you don't just do something because someone here has a good feeling about it. It's never been tested. It's not based on anything.*"

The fundraisers' discourse is one that marketers in commercial organizations would recognize. They talk about the same problems and use the same concepts. A sub-discipline of marketing, direct marketing (DM), is followed according to official books within the NHF. This is not to say that the fundraisers' discourse is

the most profound marketing discourse available, at least not according to them. There is much talk about room for improvement. The general feeling is that the NHF could do more with their donator information:

> "*Our database management should look closer at the profile of the customer and then study what we can do with that. Now we look only at 'the donators' in general, how they react to mailings. But there are different sorts of donators. The big group of donators should be subdivided into segments. Every group behaves in different ways. In other words, what does the customer look like? We will analyze extensively what information we have, that will be analyzed in different groups, different behavior. That will be a big and long project. It will take time before that brings us results. We're not getting the most out of our database at all; we could collect much more money.*"

Thus there is uncertainty within the fundraisers' discourse about their own professionalism in direct marketing. A consultant had the following advice for fundraisers:

> "*What is your ambition level? There are five phases of DM. The initial fundraisers' system is purely financial: eighty percent is focused on processing payments. That does not give you knowledge of the customers. In phase one, several people have access to the addresses. In phase two, you have a certain product and look for matching customers. An existing situation or product is the starting point. In phase three, you start to see the customer as the starting point. In phase four, you match the customer with a best way to reach him. There are, after all, several channels. In phase five, you also look at the best moment; then you are practicing 'predictive DM,' like sending a card to a customer on their birthday and asking them to take a moment to remember the NHF. The NHF is now in phase two.* [Everyone at the NHF agreed.] *Of course you have to ask yourself whether you want to go to another phase.*"

6.9.3   Forms of Problematization

Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that to describe a discourse and show its rationality, I would pay attention to forms of problematization: what problems do people see themselves facing? What are the controversies? The eight forms of problematization that follow are all in the daily operations of the NHF. In the next section I will discuss the forms of problematization within the NHF that are about the differences of their own organization. The description of these problems and questions gives a good overview of the rationality of the fundraisers' discourse.

Most examples in this section come from fundraisers' meetings where, naturally, they discuss their problems (underlines are my emphasis):

"*One of the bureaus we work with made some very serious mistakes. They didn't cash the automatic monthly collections. That means many people will be charged twice next month. People really dislike that.*"

"*Maybe we can send them an apology letter and let the bureau that made the mistake pay for it.*"

"*Well, we could do that; make the bureau pay. The <u>problem</u> is another one: we did something like that before. We sent an apology letter to all our relations. Afterwards many people cancelled their monthly payments and we got many reactions like, 'I didn't know I had these monthly payments going.' So that cost us a lot of money. We won't make that mistake again. It's better to wait for negative reactions, then apologize and explain that it wasn't our fault.*"

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"*We give out free brochures with information to individuals. That's one of the goals of our organization: to distribute information. We also work with intermediate organizations that give out information. When these organizations order brochures from us, they have to pay for them. That's weird, because individuals can order the same brochures from us for free. There's a clash between individuals and intermediaries.*"

"*The real <u>problem</u> here is a clash between different goals of this organization: 1. to give out information, 2. there has to be money in order to give out information. Therefore we need a commercial policy. Right now the different goals of our organization cannot be weighed against each other.*"

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"*I just came from a meeting in which we decided which addresses to send our next mailing to. It was a very technical meeting, with many complicated <u>problems</u>. Also with a lot of math. I'm exhausted. We came up with all kinds of criteria to decide which addresses were suited for the next mailing. Criteria like age, how many mailings they get a year, how much they gave in response to previous mailings. Many factors are taken into account. We always have these meetings before every mailing.*"

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"*We have local volunteers; they are the local representatives of our organizations who also approach companies for donations. We need to make good arrangements for who does what. The activities of the local person and the national organization overlap; <u>that cannot be</u>. We have to work together and come up with answers to the following questions: 1. How much money is collected from*

companies in each municipality? 2. In what ways is this money collected? 3. What are the good and bad points of the way we do things now?"

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"*One of our biggest <u>problems</u> and biggest frustrations is trying to bring in a big corporate sponsor. 'The big fish,' as we call it. We really put a lot of energy into that, but we never succeeded. We wanted one company who would bring in at least one million guilders a year. Such a company could use our name everywhere and tell everyone they sponsor us, a sort of partner. The reason we never managed to bring in the big fish is that health organizations sound so heavy. Plus, companies sponsor to communicate something to their customers. Natuurmonumenten* [an environmental charity in Holland that owns large areas of nature lands] *can take their corporate sponsor and its clients into the woods. We don't have something equivalent. We have nothing like that.*"

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"*The organization will have to decide whether my function stays the same after I'm gone. My job was to bring in companies that wanted to give us money or sponsor us. The <u>problem</u> is that we are doing well with medium and small businesses. Sponsoring and giving money is the same to them. Sponsoring doesn't mean much to them. They just give us some money, because they believe that's a good thing to do. Now we've built up quite a database of these businesses. Bringing in a new relation costs time; you have to guide them, but in the future it will be more a matter of maintenance, of simple direct marketing and sending these businesses mailings and thank you notes every once in a while. That's a different job.*"

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"*We have a 'brand strategy': that is, how you want to present yourself. A marketing bureau advises us to work more with faces and personal human aspects in our mailings. It's very hard to compare those mailings, by the way, to see which brings in more donations. Some mailings work better among our regular donators; others work better among prospects. It's a <u>problem</u> to identify the causes of that. It might have something to do with the text of the mailing, but also with the layout of the letter, the theme, the colors or the pictures.*"

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[During a brain-storming session with fundraisers and consultants]

"*Donators appreciate it more and more if we inform them about what we do.*"

"*Maybe reactively, but not proactively. They do want to be informed, but don't go after the information themselves. People are becoming more and more*

democratic and emancipated. The critical group is small, but becomes bigger and bigger."

"The critical consumer is more and more present."

"But the donator is still mostly reactive. If I don't inform him, that's okay with him. They don't adapt their giving behavior to the information we give them about what we do."

"The same with businesses: they give because of our name, not because of how we spend our money."

"That's true. But indirectly things like informing people what we do have effects."

"What happens with a person who gives us money for three years but all of a sudden stops? Do we know why? That's very important information for us."

"Something like, 'the complaint is the best marketing instrument.' The well known story."

"In that sense, we don't know our customers very well. We only know them from the mail and the action."

"Well, we did start a project to analyze the data—an inquiry into the gift motivation of our donators. But that takes time. We did take the first steps though. After that we could answer many other questions. We have to know what the motives are."

"We actually know very little of our donators right now, that's a <u>problem</u>."

"We do know something about groups in general, but nothing of the segments."

"No gender, no ages?"

"Well, we do know something indirectly. We could determine the age of people, but that costs money. We do, however, already have a general profile of our donators."

"We should be able to determine what percentage is male by just one push of a button."

The eight forms of problematization described above are important to the fundraisers discourse in their daily operations. Together, the eight questions give valuable insight to the fundraisers' discourse.

6.10 Internal Organizational Forms of Problematization, Part I: Conflicting Discourses within the NHF

In the previous two sections, I introduced the discourse of the fundraisers and surveyed its conflicts with another NHF discourse. In this and the next two sections I explore the conflicts more extensively by answering the question: What are the most important forms of problematizations that arise in the fundraising discourse about their own organization?

What are important issues for fundraisers at a charity organization like the NHF? They lie in the difference between the discourses of the fundraisers and management, where many of the problems in the discourses of the fundraisers arise. Many of the texts I collected are discussions about how an organization should do its fundraising and how the fundraising department gets too much opposition from the medical departments. This is because of fundamental differences in the way they look at their own future organization. Here I will also answer the questions: What is special about a marketing discourse within a charity? How do they differ from commercial organizations?

In the fundraisers' discourse, there are many complaints about the rest of the organization. Most of them reduce to the statement: fundraising is not appreciated. "*The Heart Foundation is too rich*" is an often-heard complaint. The rest of the organization is referred to as "*those from above.*" The NHF has two floors in their office building. Most money spenders work on the floor above the fundraisers. They are also called "*the (medical) substance-concerning departments*" and often work with people with medical backgrounds (thus "substance-concerning"). The latter have three main departments: Research, Patient Care, and Prevention and Information. Those from above, according to the fundraisers, count too easily on the money coming in and have little interest in the way it is done. They think much too casually about it. Yet, marketing is a profession and should be treated as such. A fundraiser:

> "*When you read the strategic plan of the NHF, you can find—with a lot of trouble and only when you try really hard—exactly one line about fundraising. There was exactly one sentence: 'We should have five percent more income every year.' That's not a policy. 1. We will never make it. 2. There is no policy specifying how the five percent should be reached. 3. Why not zero percent, or ten percent? We are reduced to a number. Every quarter, they just look at a number.*"

I once asked a senior fundraiser what the substance-concerning departments, those from above, do:

> "*Well, I'm not exactly sure; I guess they write notes all day.*"

Of course management and those from above would like the NHF to raise as much money as possible; they would never consider themselves "too rich." More money affords more research. If the NHF could double its budget, great! But the different rationalities of the two discourses give the fundraisers the feeling that more money is not a significant need. The managers view things differently even though they do, of course, want as much money as possible. They weigh issues other than money and have different priorities. The fundraisers perceive this as not being interested in more money and it leads to misunderstandings between the two discourses.

As it turns out, a typical problem for charities is that, unlike profit organizations, there is no clear force to make as much money as possible. Where in commercial organizations the goal of the organization is to make a profit, charities are more complicated. The fundraisers' discourse acknowledges this and focuses on it regularly. It influences their discourse deeply and differentiates it from a commercial organization's marketing discourse (where things are clearer by looking at the bottom line). A dialogue between a manager and fundraiser:

M: "*In our hierarchy, the substance-concerning departments come first. That's what we're all about. They concern our goal as an organization. It's what we're focused on. Fundraising is a conditional policy towards achieving our goal. That's also in our strategic plan.*"

F: "*I think that's wrong. We have an important role to play. Without money, there are no substance-concerning departments.*"

A fundraiser complains:

> "*I'm not motivated by the organization to raise more money. We once went from 27 million to 24 million. That was considered a problem. But they don't research it to get to the bottom of the issue. If there's more money at the end of the year, the discussion is: how to put those millions to use. Projects are made up. They never say, 'Because of your money, I was able to do this or that.' I wish they gave me a clear project and told me, 'We need money for that good cause.' That motivates.*"

> "*The problem of the NHF is that it is such a rich organization. If we had to fight for every dime, things might be different. But we're too rich. That makes it hard for people to be motivated.*"
> "*The problem here is that there's enough money.*"

This complaint is typical of the fundraisers discourse. There is a genuine feeling that fundraising is not appreciated within the NHF as a whole, that too many things are taken for granted by "*those from above*"; that they do not value the fundraisers as they should, nor do they sufficiently take fundraising into account in their activities. I would specify this as one of the main problems of marketers within a charity, and as the most significant difference between their circumstances and those of commercial marketers. Consider the remarks of this fundraiser:

> "*What I hear from above is that there's enough money at the NHF. And the money has to be spent. The NHF can't save money.*[52] *People wouldn't have it. And they think: money comes in anyway. Plus we get more and more from inheritance. So at the end of the year it's, 'Okay guys, we have to come up with new projects.' The thought of consulting with us on what it is we raise money for isn't there. It's a pity, but it's a fact.*
> "*The substance-concerning departments know that their money will be there. There's no need for them to say 'Come on, guys, we need money.' That's been the culture here for ages. There's no necessity. That also raises ethical questions towards the donators: we say, for example, that if they don't donate money research will stop. Even though we know that this isn't true; it* will continue.*"

During my tenure at NHF, this issue negatively affected the motivation of those working in the fundraising department. This case study suggests that, if not a special problem for charities, it is at least a special issue. In the epilogue we see that whether it is perceived as a problem depends on the particular organization and the state of the economy.

Those from above, according to the fundraisers, expect them to bring in money such that they will have slightly more to spend every year, preferably raising the funds at the lowest cost possible. This last aspect is important: within charities the ratio of money earned to the cost of collecting it is important and constitutes a special problem for charity fundraisers. Recall that to be recognized by the CBF, a charity cannot spend more than twenty-five percent of its income on fundraising. This is because people want to know that at least 75 cents of their guilder goes to

the cause they donate to.[53] What, then, if a charity can spend 1 million to collect 2 million? Then 1 million goes toward a good cause! In a commercial organization, this would be a lucrative deal. But this cannot be done in a charity; furthermore, there are no clear internal guidelines on how to deal with the issue. By simply trying to keep costs as low as possible, the NHF spends approximately half its maximum allotment on fundraising, according to the CBF. The pressure of the twenty-five percent bar combined with the absence of internal norms make the fundraisers nervous:

"*It's scandalous that there are no norms for individual projects. They never say, 'This is the return needed for a new activity. You make a budget.' They look at how much we collect on the organizational level. Then they look at whether we stay under the twenty-five percent. The inheritance department, by the way, brings in a lot against low costs. But we're directed solely to achieve gross growth, which is income without the costs. And not net growth. That discussion should be much clearer. It's in the yearly planning, but the discussion doesn't have much energy. They've told me several times: 'You have to collect more money.' Then I calculated what it would cost: the same amount. Then they said, 'We'll do it anyway.' We're directed by gross growth numbers; that's a scandal. Someone here did introduce a ten percent norm for companies. It's a pity there are no norms for mailings. The Valentine mailing collected more than it cost, so everyone was pleased. Especially for a first mailing, it was a good score. But the next year I heard that it wasn't a good mailing because the costs were too high compared to the income. That's because of the lack of norms. And that is what I think is a scandal.*"

The management does not really agree with this story. They would say that there is a twenty-five percent norm across the board. "*If we could make two million at the cost of one million, we wouldn't do it.*" It remains unclear, though, just what the norms are. I found no evidence of clear guidelines.

6.11 Internal Organizational Forms of Problematization, Part II: The Solid Image of the NHF and the Particular Problems It Raises for the Fundraisers

Many clashes between the fundraisers' discourse and those from above are about the image of the NHF. Both agree that the NHF has a solid, independent and reliable image. Both agree that this image is a good one that should be protected:

"*Members and donators of charities are usually very critical about their organizations. Very important requirements are independence and neutrality. Cooperation with a business can lead to damage of the independent and neutral image of the NHF. Charities therefore have to be very critical with their attitude towards potential sponsors.*"

But it turns out that there are many judgment calls made as to how far they should go to protect their image. And at what cost? Many stories are told among the fundraisers that, to them, symbolize the rigidity of those from above and the unreasonable constraints they put on their job, which is raising money for a good cause. The following stories illustrate this point.

Box 4: The Story of Kassa

> A story I heard many times was about 'Kassa,' a consumer program on Dutch TV which interviewed the NHF medical director about its being sponsored by the food industry. Everyone begins this story by saying that the medical director did really, really well. He explained the policy clearly and, even though he was asked some very nasty questions, he calmly explained what he had to explain. The questions concerned the neutrality of the NHF and whether it could remain so if sponsored by the food industry:
>
> "*Meurders* [the interviewer] *came up with the question: 'Why do you sell your logo? I thought you were neutral?'*" Again, everyone agreed that the medical director handled these questions well, but—a "but" always followed. Everyone was afraid program viewers might conclude that there must be something fishy going on at the NHF, otherwise Meurders wouldn't be asking these questions.
>
> The lesson taken home by many in the NHF was: to avoid misunderstandings, forgo being sponsored by food industry. Even if the accusations are completely unfounded, people might come to the wrong conclusions. For the fundraisers' discourse, this was straying too far from responsibility and rationality. Of course the NHF should guard its independence and image, but to say "no" to the food industry because it was the food industry was wrong, didn't make sense, was avoiding responsibilities and was chickening out:
>
> "*I say there are big commercial interests at stake here, so if we decide to put our logo on something why not ask money for it? They make money out of our logo! The only reason not to do it is fear. In England they put logos on everything, as long as they make money from it. That's the other end of the extreme.*"

Box 5: The Story of the Kwetters Eggs

> "*At the Kwetters firm, they feed chicken special food, like omega 3 fish fat acids in order to infuse specific acids into the eggs which, supposedly, have a good effect on blood cholesterol levels. And that would be good for your heart. It's even good for the chicken. So the director of Kwetters came to us with the question of whether he could put our logo on the box of his eggs. He would pay us money for it; he wanted to sponsor the NHF.*
>
> "*The problem is, however, that eating eggs is not very healthy, especially if you eat more than a few a week. So we said, 'If even Becel [a cholesterol-reduced butter substitute] is a problem, we really cannot do this; too many eggs are bad for you. The NHF gives the following food advice: two or three eggs a week.' Then Kwetters said: 'You can put whatever you want*

> *on the eggs package, even that a person shouldn't eat more than three eggs a week.' We could put exactly that on the box, or add leaflets to the box—whatever we wanted. Well, if we did do that, then we would even get free communication. It would have given us a free opportunity to communicate to, say, one million egg eaters about the consequences of eating eggs and inform them about the activities of the NHF. A beautiful way to inform people, while even making money for the NHF! But the Department of Prevention and Information [one of the substance-concerning departments] said: 'As soon as we put our logo on such a box, despite all the stories you print with it, it will have an encouraging effect on egg eating. People will think, "The NHF says it's okay, so we can eat 10 eggs a week." The question is of course how seriously to take such a risk. But the consensus in management was that egg sponsoring was going too far. Eating eggs and heart and blood vessel diseases are too closely associated with each other. It leads to narrowing of heart and blood vessels.*
>
> *"The medical director saw nothing positive about the plan, saying: 'We thought the image of the egg was much stronger than the message of the NHF, therefore the plan would lead to confusion among consumers as well as our own people. People might think that the NHF can be bought, so we decided not to do it. The Kwetters egg is just a tiny little bit less bad for people than other eggs. That's not good diet advice."*

Box 6: The Story of California Wines

> *"Moderate use of alcohol is not bad. Once someone had an idea for a project, an auction of very good Californian wines. It was a pure fundraising activity. The proceeds of the auction were to go to good causes. So they contacted us about whether they could donate the proceeds of the first 100 bottles they sold to us and whether they could communicate that. That was approved on a lower level in our organization. After the auction, there were many questions from the Department of Prevention and Information. It also led to a reactionary anti-alcohol campaign. The Department was outraged at first. They wanted to talk to us, whether we were promoting alcohol now. When we explained our reasons, they understood our actions much better."*

The discourse of management is clear in its criteria of judging potential sponsors:

"*The NHF can lose its reputation only once. That's a reason for great precaution. Everything should be judged against our independence and our reliability. Those are the cornerstones of our reputation.*"

"*As soon as it even appears that we can be influenced or can be bought, we are in a very distressing position. Then we have to fight biased ideas of people. Just think of what happened with Máxima's bike; problems will be much greater with products that are not so directly related to our mission.*"
The fundraisers have a different rationality, which will be become clear from my description of the so-called product related cooperation.

"Product-related cooperation" is a form of cooperation in which the NHF couples its logo to a product or service. The fundraisers have a different rationality about it. This has gotten much attention within the NHF over the last few years. Before that, it was not really an issue. Now it is the source of many discussions and a classic

area where the fundraisers' discourse clashes with the discourse from those above:

"*In the beginning, the skepticism of management was enormous. Food producers, on the other hand, were really eager to cooperate with us. Many, very many, conversations with Becel, management and someone from the substance-concerning department were held in order to get our logo on a butter package. Deliberation, deliberation, and more deliberation. What kind of risk were we running if the NHF were to put its logo on a box of margarine …?!*"

Since the fundraisers subscribe to the main story of the NHF, they do want to be very careful in product-related cooperation. But not doing it just because it is food industry is going too far for them, even considered plain stupid:

"*With Becel, the cooperation is going very well. They are also very satisfied.*"

As long as there are guidelines, why not? The NHF can really use money, right? Just before I arrived the NHF was considering adopting the following guidelines as part of its strategy:

<u>*The conditions of product-related cooperation are:*</u>
- *The product and the producer must have a reliable image.*
- *The product must meet all the content-related requirements (specified for food products)*
- *It must be a product whose consumption the NHF thinks should be promoted.*
- *The logo of the NHF is not allowed on the package/product. It must be presented fundraising context. For example, "Tefal supports the work of the NHF" or "Of every steamer, 1 guilder goes to the NHF" or words with similar effect.*
- *The logo and the accompanying fundraising sentence must be in a separate frame.*

<u>*The responsibilities:*</u>
The cooperation can only come about when the following persons give their written permission on the project proposal:
- *Manager business relations*
- *Head marketing*
- *Content expert*
- *Heads of the concerning departments*
- *Management*

These guidelines, which nearly became standard policy, show how carefully the NHF is in dealing with the food industry. But apparently management still

considered the risks too great. While I was working at the NHF, this policy statement was issued instead:

"*Management has decided to not raise funds by cooperating with the food industry. The choice of whether or not to cooperate with a food product is purely a matter of the Departments of Prevention and Information. All requests should be handled by them. Fundraising will not longer play a role in this.*

"*We do not want to lose our neutrality towards products.*"

The current contacts remained, but no payment would be accepted by the industry. In the end, management did not think the advantages (the money) outweighed the disadvantages (the perceived risks). A fundraiser explains:

"*They have decided not to raise funds anymore with food industry. The food producers can still put the label of the NHF on their products, if the NHF approves. But they will not have to pay for it. The Department of Prevention and Information will have to judge whether requests in that area should be approved.*"

The fundraisers were dumbfounded by the news of changing the policy towards fundraising in the food industry:

"*It's too sad for words. The whole sponsor policy is back to the waste bin.*"

"*Management sees product-related sponsoring as selling your identity. At least, they're afraid that the media would see it that way. Management says that we may make money out of products, but that we would have to be 100 percent behind a product and that is, by definition, impossible.*"

"*If I understand their reasoning, this can't be restricted to the food industry; every product now will have to show that it's better than all the others.*"

"*They really don't understand our job! The whole principle of sponsoring is gone now! You give something for something. Something exclusive that other companies don't have. That whole idea is gone now. What we are stuck with now are specific gifts, special actions and plain mailings. We have the 'luxury' of being completely objective. That's luxury. Pure luxury.*"

This typical aspect of the fundraisers' discourse was discussed earlier. They believe they are restricted in bringing in the most money possible and that confuses them:

"*In the past year or so, the Department of Information has become very strict. They don't want association with butter or wine or anything. Everything is stiffer and stricter. There's no room anymore for fresh, new things. Those from above nowadays think very quickly that something is too 'commercial.' New things*

are almost always disapproved. Everything is too commercial to them. But you have to remain new and fresh somehow.

"*I spent a lot of time on articles of food. Logo in exchange for money. But management just decided: we can't commit to one product. They don't want to give one producer exclusivity. I look differently at that. All producers can advertise in our magazine. There is always one activity at a time. Everyone can approach us. When they're too late, they usually say, 'Well then, we'll do it after your current activity.' And that's fine with me.*"

"*I just came back from the International Network of Heart Associations. I asked them what they thought about sponsoring and eggs. The common opinion was that as long as you put a warning on the box or label, most would certainly consider doing it. The Americans and the Canadians are sponsored by egg producers. In England they just signed Nestle for 800,000 guilders and a tea producer for 250,000 pounds a year. That sort of thing is not possible for us anymore …*"

A discussion among five fundraisers at a meeting:

"*I still really cannot understand why we can't be sponsored by the food industry anymore. Can someone please explain it to me one more time?*"

"*Their main argument is that the NHF can't be bought. If you let yourself be sponsored by Becel, why not Benecol? The NHF can't be bought.*"

"*We've had so many discussions about this. We never promised Becel exclusivity. It's the lack of a clear policy here. Even though I'm the person most involved, officially I still haven't heard anything—very typical.*"

"*Maybe it's because they themselves can't understand this new policy. Maybe they still want the possibility to change it once again.*"

"*That's weak, that they maybe want to change the policy once again just because we're running amok. That's very weak.*"

"*We're hindered in the execution of fundraising. There's too much attention for substance-concerning matters* [too much attention for the discourse of the medical people and not enough for the fundraisers]."

"*And that'll be worse in the future. We'll have a medical director at the top of the NHF pretty soon. In England they had that for a while and it was a disaster. They told me, 'Make sure not to have a medical director at the top of your organization. He'll look too much to substance-concerning matters.'*"

"*It's all because of the luxury position of the NHF.*"

"*Yes. On the other hand, they do want more money from us all the time ...*"

"*Those from above say, 'Well now at least there's a clear policy and you've always indicated that that's what you wanted most: clarity on the issue.' Now food industry can approach the NHF, but we won't ask for money. Prevention and Information will judge whether the product is 100 percent according to our standards and whether they can put our logo on their product. I still disagree though. The food industry can make a lot of money, and now they are sponsoring for nothing! We lose a lot of money that way.*"[54]

The conclusion of this section is that the image of a charity is an important issue that poses specific problems for charity fundraisers. Fundraisers in commercial organizations do not have to deal with these problems, at least not to the extent of a charity. The clash between the rationality of making money and the rationality of protecting a solid image produces problems. During my time at the NHF, I spoke with several of its 'competitors,' big charities dealing with health issues. From those conversations I can conclude that the problems of the NHF fundraisers are typical of charities in general. Most of the other charities are even "*more conservative*" or so they say. A fundraiser from another big health charity:

"*Our management is very conservative. Everything is driven by the medical substance, not by fundraising. We hear a lot that we're there to inform people. That's our mission, and that's seen as a contradiction within fundraising. Fundraising is seen as something dirty.*"

6.12 Internal Organizational Forms of Problematization, Part III: The Solid Image of the NHF and the Particular Problems It Raises For DM

In this and the previous two sections, I am looking at forms of problematization that came to the fore within and about the organization. In the previous section I described forms of problematization that arose for company-dealing fundraisers concerned with sponsorship. In this section, I will look at the fundraisers who do the mailings and deal with the donators. It turns out that the forms of problematization about the image of the NHF are similar.

According to the management discourse, not surprisingly, the NHF is doing well in getting gifts because of its image. The most important thing one can do, then, in direct marketing and in the activities of the NHF in general, is to guard that image. The maxim is to not do anything foolish:

"We don't know exactly where our good reputation comes from. It's probably impossible to know. But we do know that we have a stable, good reputation built up with careful and conservative policies. We take great precautions to handle with care the guilder entrusted to us. That may be dull, even a 'petit bourgeois' mentality. And I sometimes hear complaints about that but apparently the Dutch people don't blame us for it! The challenge for fundraisers is to think of something new, something fun, but to not bring damage to our image."

Box 7: The Story of Seed Mailings

> The legacy of the head of DM (direct marketing), who had recently left the organization, is seed mailing. Everyone knows it and employees bring it up when they talk about him. People even start to giggle because it is seen as a typical and classic story within the NHF. In the former head of DM's words:
>
> *"Once I went to the Foundation Council, the highest bureau of the NHF, with the head of fundraising. We discussed with them our new plans. We made an interesting presentation which had already been approved by management. In it, we said we wanted to test new things because we wanted to know more about what our customers wanted. So I said (how incredibly stupid of me; I should have kept my mouth shut), 'As an example, we want to test sending out free flower seeds'. Within one second, the chairman reacted with 'We will not do that.' A day later we were sitting at a meeting with management: what to do? All preparations had to be stopped. Why did the chairman of the Foundation Council think it was a bad idea? Because of potential damage to the image of the NHF. If you give away something, even if it costs the NHF almost nothing, it can piss people off. Yet, we really thought it was a good idea and thought we could earn money with it. In the end a manager came up with a compromise: as long as it was consistent with the activities of the NHF, sponsoring was a possibility. Then we decided to include cress seeds. You can grow cress with them, a plant which is healthy food, good for your heart. So when there was some sort of relationship with the NHF, it was approved; that was the compromise. It became a big success, and now of course we are allowed to do it!"*
>
> On the day the DM head left the NHF, the yearly seed mailings landed on the doormats of NHF donators. As a little joke, everyone at his good-bye reception got a free sample of the seeds.

The discourse of the fundraisers is different from management in this respect. They feel the image gets too much attention and that the money that does come in is, in large part, because of their hard work. The rest of the organization unfortunately (according to the fundraisers) does not see it that way. The problem as stated by fundraisers:

"I think we should keep looking for new target groups. We have to remain fresh."

"We're not the communication department. We're judged by the money we bring in, not by what information we communicate to the outside world."

"That's right. We're from the department of fundraising and we're focused on fundraising, on financial responses, on gifts."

"*One of my problems is that in all the years I've worked here, the substance-concerning departments never managed to come up with information that I could focus on in a mailing. I never managed to get them to say, 'Let's raise money to do this or that,' a specific mailing to accomplish something in particular. They always tell me, about every one of our suggestions, that there are so many players involved and that there are so many medical issues involved that I can't use it for directed fundraising. I can't even use the findings of research. Because what is it that the NHF can claim? 'We're just one of the players,' I hear all the time from those from above. We can't claim all the techniques that are invented with the research we support. The marketing plan should be made with the substance-concerning departments.*"

The story of the seed mailings is typical of DM's particular problems. The conclusion of this section is that the "solid image" problem is valid not only for the fundraisers who deal with companies, but also for those responsible for the mailings.

6.13   The Influence of Consultants on the Fundraisers' Discourse

The role of consultants is an interesting one and they have significant influence on the fundraisers' discourse. While with the NHF, I witnessed the presentations of four agencies for the fundraisers. The interesting aspect, mentioned earlier, is that consultants use a typical marketing discourse. They present plans on how to cooperate with companies and thereby make more money. The fundraisers are enthusiastic about their advice. They "understand" the language of marketing consultants and usually share their conclusions. Consultants continually speak with the fundraisers about their "customers," even "consumers." In one presentation they first referred to the "*the donator/consumer*" then shortened it to "*consumer.*" Consultants, because they speak the same language, can be expected to put forth agreeable things to fundraisers. Of course, the question then is, what will the rest of the organization think of the advice? The following snippet of management discourse gives us a clue:

"*We are constantly wrestling with not letting commercial tendencies conflict with the heart of the message of the NHF. External advisors don't fully realize how vulnerable the NHF is to reputation damage. Problems can arise in unexpected corners. You can think of the Brent Spar. That hurt the credibility of*

Greenpeace. And it even had effects on the income of the NHF. That's how strangely things can work out."

The fundraisers often use consultancy reports to prove a point. As a fundraiser told me:

"*The NHF has three times been evaluated by big consultancy firms.*[55] *Their reports are holy until a new report comes out. One bureau told us that we could get ten million more from businesses. People in general here like to hear that, but they only look at the big picture. They don't realize what that would mean for the organization. They don't realize what it would mean to really evaluate what we're doing. And as soon as you make things concrete and you use the word 'reorganization,' everyone is against it.*"

The following texts from a presentation of a consultancy (**C**) for a group of fundraisers (**F**) show the enthusiasm of the fundraisers' discourse for consultants and how that can sharpen the difference with the management discourse:

C: "*We conclude that there is no strategy in this organization. Well, what we mean is that fundraising is not taken seriously. We have a strong opinion on that. If you had a private clinic, the strategic plan would be fantastic. But in relation to fundraising, it's worthless. We will put this conclusion in our documentation. We asked about fundraising in our first question to the medical director. Fundraising is very dear to him, but only in an instrumental way. He keeps his distance; he has no empathy for fundraising. Both parties will have to work on that. The money comes in relatively easily. It would be good for those types if that were to change. They have no affection for the discipline, the profession of fundraisers.*"

F: "*But our current medical director will be our managing director. England advised very strongly against that.*"

C: "*We also have a proposal for that. But you're right, that's not good for the profession of fundraising; we will be very clear in our presentation about that!*"

F: "*This is all great! I came up with all that too! It's great to hear that outsiders agree with that!*"

C: "*For the fundraisers, there's not much focus in this organization on society. There's no feeling for the surroundings. The leaflets of the NHF: all about lifestyle and most are full of medical substance. Not anything fundraisers can work with.*"

C: "*The way it is now, fundraisers can't break down the strategic plan for targets. There are no norms. The strategy, vision and direction are missing. This is a major obstacle for planned work.*"

In the final report of these consultants was the following text:

"*There is too little cooperation between the department of fundraising and other departments. Because of this, available knowledge is not always used to its full capacity. The departments are not well enough aware of each other's activities, even when these activities influence the activities of the other departments. Tasks, competencies and responsibilities with regard to the making and execution of fundraising policy are not clearly written down. Because of this, the necessary guiding and coaching of the employees of the fundraising department are missing; the discipline and also policy instrument of fundraising are not visible enough within the NHF … This means that, according to us, the strategic plan should come about by a healthy confrontation of the opinions and visions from both the department of fundraising and the substance-concerning departments.*"

Although management was not present for the initial conversation between the consultants and the fundraisers, it is striking that they understood the same advice oppositely:

"*I interpreted the advice as: the fundraisers must better realize the heart of our mission by staying closer to the message of the NHF.*"

The NHF has asked several consultancies to help them with matters of sponsoring and finding a major corporate partner. What is interesting is that in these plans, the consultancies use traditional marketing discourse and marketing rationalities. Even when they specialize in charity consulting, their plans are to get as much income as possible from the market. The fundraisers' discourse, as noted, is similar to that of marketers, but remains within the realm of the specific problems of implementing a pure marketing discourse in a charity like the NHF. In the following interaction, it becomes clear that the marketing discourse of the consultants and the marketing discourse of the NHF fundraisers are not completely cohesive. A dialogue among consultants (**C**), NHF management (**M**) and NHF fundraisers (**F**):

C: "*Most charities have the dilemma of being associated with diseases. And that doesn't sell. You have to stay away from illness; you have to emphasize the prevention of illness. That means positive associations.*

"*So, for example, never say, "Don't smoke"—that's so patronizing. You should focus on telling people to smoke less. That sounds nicer and creates a better image. Companies will find it easier to cooperate with the NHF if it says that.*"

M: "*But we're against any smoking whatsoever. We would never tell people to smoke less. The point is NOT to smoke. We're very strict on that. Anything else would not be acceptable to our organization.*"

C: "*Well, we pointed out the consequences of that because we think there are lucrative possibilities in cooperating with companies on special projects like a healthy lifestyle. But if you set up those kinds of absolutely no-smoking campaigns by yourself there's no chance of letting certain businesses in.*

"*You should try to do things together with companies.*"

M: "*Not smoking is a part of us; it's not negotiable.*"

M: "*Right. And if we do things with them, we lose control over the contents. Plus, exclusive relationships present great problems for us. Their competitors' stuff is maybe just as good. There are many sensitivities there.*"

C: "*Take the example of olive oil. Unilever will even have special stores selling it. And that's good for the heart isn't it? So there must be possibilities!*"

F: "*But then we have internal troubles about, for example, the price. I know that people will have trouble with us giving up our neutrality, as they call it. Sunflower oil is much cheaper, so we immediately get into trouble with the substance-concerning departments. People will say, 'Why do I have to buy expensive olive oil? The ALDI is cheaper and just as good.'*"

M: "*That's right. We prefer to first make the campaign ourselves and then tell potential sponsors; this is what we want to communicate.*"

C: "*But the entrepreneur will first look at his customers.*"

M: "*I see the problem. You say, 'First do business, then work together on a campaign.' That would be the change we would have to make. But then the sponsor directs the campaign with us. That's a major step for the NHF. We would lose our reliability and our independence.*

"*On the other hand, the plus would not just be the money. Even one and a half million is not that immense to us. After all, we have 70 million a year. So we won't say we'll do everything for one and a half million. The plus also has to be in communicating to people. But if that means influence is permitted in our organization, that would be tough.*"

C: "*Well, the sponsor doesn't need to be on the board of the NHF. But sponsoring does introduce another influence.*"

F: "*A campaign should correspond with the target group. We have to keep having a feeling with the market. Then search for a theme, and then look for a partner. Take Heartfailure, our campaign. The medical problem is central. From the NHF, we saw a development within society. Then we made a campaign from the contents of the message we wanted to get out. Only after that, we looked*

whether there were possibilities for sponsors or mailings. But then the campaign is already planned, made by the substance-concerning departments. We jump then on a riding train. If we, as the NHF, think sponsoring is important, it should get more attention throughout the NHF, in every planning stage."

M: *"Well, we do have substance-concerning priorities. Like not smoking. That's the message we want to get out. And they say we shouldn't do that. We are driven by our mission, and I think there will be many problems in the organization if sponsoring gets a say in the earlier stage."*

F: *"Think of the Kassa debacle. Even though our medical director did a good job, everyone here had a bad feeling about it afterwards. It's all about the support we get in this organization. Information has to go along with us, if we want to do something with sponsoring."*

M: *"I think you're right. It's a matter of timing. Is the Information Department ready for this?"*

C: *"That's just a matter of presentation. They have to see success to start believing in the process. You have to present it well."*

One of the remarkable things about the discussion is that the fundraisers' discourse agrees with the consultants but realizes—and want to deal with—the opposition within their own organization. In the last remarks of the consultants, they present the discourse differences as a matter of good presentation and making people enthusiastic. This is where the consultants differ from the fundraisers. The fundraisers know from their own experiences that the differences of opinion are not just a matter of presenting their ideas well. Later the fundraisers were therefore skeptical about adopting new policies along the lines the consultants suggested. Even if the suggestions were good, they realized that the whole organization had to see them that way, and saw no plans for getting those from above to agree with them. The "real" internal problems were not addressed in the eyes of the fundraisers, namely: how to get the rest of the organization to go along with these plans.[56]

Throughout this chapter I have given several examples of the discourse of consultants. Clearly, fundraising consultants are even more "classical" marketers than the fundraisers of the NHF, meaning they follow more strictly the marketing rationality taught by marketing handbooks: get as much money out of the market as possible. Yet, the fundraisers' discourse is evidently influenced by the marketing discourse of consultants. One of the noticeable examples of this is that consultants keep pushing the NHF to learn more about their customers. Good

marketing is only possible with good knowledge of customers. As an example a conversation between two different consultancy firms and a fundraiser:

C1: "*The NHF should ask itself why people give money to the NHF; that's what you should research.*"

C2: "*I agree. Do a written inquiry about the interests of the donators of the NHF.*"

C1: "*You should listen to your donators. Now you only look at their gifts.*"

F: "*We started a project in which we will learn much more about our donators.*"

C1, 2: "*That's very good!*"

C2: "*The knowledge of DM should be on a higher level. There should be much more knowledge about the customers of the NHF.*"

To conclude, this case study presents evidence that fundraisers within charities use a marketing rationality, but one that has adapted to the special circumstances of a charity. Still, they are happy with the support they get from outside discourses precisely because they underscore the marketing rationale.

Consultants are hired by organizations to deal with conflicts and make organizations function more effectively and efficiently. It is their task to bring conflicting parties together. This case study, however, suggests that hiring consultants in a charity for strategic problems might have the opposite effect. Consultants run a risk of *worsening* internal conflicts by strengthening the fundraisers discourse, thereby lowering efficiency (plus they cost the charity a lot of money).

Fundraisers, in their discourse, perceive a policy (which they see as no policy) that always tells them "no." They have the feeling that they continually come up with new ideas that are continually rejected by management. This becomes frustrating. Hired consultants strengthen their ideas and thus the conflict. The discourses would lead to fewer clashes if a policy were adopted that formulated what *can* be done (according to reasonable management guidelines, of course). The fundraisers would be less frustrated and the policy would lead to better cooperation.

6.14   Competition

One of the motivations for studying a charity was the suspicion[57] that competition among charities in the Netherlands was becoming increasingly intense. I was curious about how charities, with their mission to "do good," were dealing with it. Did they start behaving more like commercial companies? How far would charities go in competing with each other? The charity sector is rapidly growing in the Netherlands,[58] but the amount of money the Dutch are willing to donate is limited. In that sense, all charities fish in the same pond. An additional Euro for the NHF means a Euro forgone to another organization. And what about their TV advertisements? What would happen if they all became shocking and pitiful, appealing to sympathy? The Dutch public might become fed up and decide to not give anything at all. Do charities compete in this respect is the question addressed in this section.

At the NHF, other charities are sometimes seen as competitors. Not by management:

> "*We do not have competitors. In the fight against heart and blood vessel diseases, we are alone.*"

Again, we see that, in the management discourse, most things are judged against the mission of the organization. Because the fundraisers are concerned with money, they recognize competitors—at least, they occasionally refer to them as such. This is especially true for the other large medical charities:

> "*People do have to make choices: who do I give my money to? In that process choices are made. That's the context we raise money in. In that sense, by the way, we're not exclusive enough.*"

But as will become clear, even though these other charities are called competitors, the term has special meaning in the fundraisers' discourse, a meaning that is different from commercial organizations' discourses. The one medical charity in the Netherlands larger than the NHF is called a "*competitor*" as well as "*our big brother.*" Thus even in competing, they are seen as colleagues. Their interests notwithstanding, they have a common goal: doing good in society; more specifically, they both fight disease and help the sick.

The pressures of competition are indeed growing within the charity sector, raising questions about coordination of activities and competition within the philanthropic sector. These pressures and questions, however, are much less serious than I thought they would be. The problems are acknowledged, but not taken too

seriously. "*Even if we felt pressure by competitors, we wouldn't know what to do about it!*" The sense of competition turns out to be insignificant, the pressure of competition much less important than within commercial organizations. Questions about competition are hardly ever raised. I once asked fundraisers about the competition of the Dutch Kidney Association. At the word "competitor," everyone started to laugh:

"*That's not how it works in this sector, especially not in the NHF.*"

An NHF fundraiser once met with fundraisers from two major health charities in the Netherlands. The outsiders came with the purpose (as they explained in detail) of learning from the NHF. They asked various strategic questions; the NHF fundraiser answered as well as possible. There seemed to be no secrets, no information held back. Both organizations genuinely wished each other as much success as possible. I found another example of non-competitiveness when calling other charities about their mailing policies and strategies. After identifying myself as an NHF intern, any and all questions were cordially answered.

Thus competition is not an important theme within the discourses of the NHF. The fact that I can publish this report uncensored is an indication that there is nothing to hide. The NHF is active in branch organizations, supporting them with money and personnel. It sees them as important in devising agreements about direct mailings, moral codes and the like. There are few complaints about the misuse of the agreements or free riders' problems:

"*In England, 'better' donators get a letter every six weeks. Many people feel obliged to give money when they get a letter so, for those people, the more letters the better. But if we send out too many mailings, people start to see it as a waste. They think the costs of that must be too high. In general, the pressure of direct mail in Holland has increased. People fifty years and older who are good donators get several mailings a week from charities. That leads to more pressure in our field; there is more competition. There are two important agreements with the other charities: 1. There is a collection schedule. The roster arranges which week which charity goes out with their collectors from door to door within the Netherlands. The problem is only twenty charities are involved in that. The rest are not tied by this agreement. It's just a gentleman's agreement not to have a collection in that week. 2. Within the DSMA* [a branch organization of direct mailers involving not only charities]*, we try to coordinate a little bit, things like when to send out our mailings in order to spread that out a little. That's a sort of*

self-regulation. It's a scheme for when to mail. But these aren't very hard agreements. Organizations don't have to stick to them.

"There are no agreements about the themes and substance of our TV ads. Each decides for themselves how to present themselves. The trend, by the way, is to present something positive, not too shocking. The trend is also to do something that has a big impact, more emotional, but they all do that in different ways. So the trend is that not everyone is doing something pitiful, for example.

"We can't spend more than twenty-five percent of our budget on fundraising, because then we would lose the recognition of the CBF, our branch organization. So if we're certain to raise three million guilders by spending two million, we can't do it. People would hate it if we were to spend eighty percent of our budget on fundraising, even if it would mean we could spend more money on good causes. It stops somewhere. There's a limit, and justifiably so. Besides, otherwise another organization would come into existence and say, 'We spend ninety percent of our money on the good cause.'"

The NHF's direct competitor is the "Fund for the Heart." At first they called themselves "The National Heart Fund" but the name was too confusing for many people. More to the point, the NHF sued them. After a final court ruling they were forced to change their name. They were never recognized by the CBF.

"In their first two, three years, they were very aggressive in their fundraising. They took two million guilders out of the market."

"The National Heart Fund blamed us that we don't support alternative forms of treatment. That's not true. We have scientific criteria for the research we support. The research they supported most of the time couldn't be defended scientifically. We hear less and less of them. It's also becoming less and less clear in which respect they differ from us."

6.15   Identity and the Reason and Motivation to Work for a Charity

6.15.1   Introduction and Questions

Earlier in this book I discussed the concept of "identity" with respect to discourses. What can be said about the identity of employees who work for an organization that wants to "do good"? Are these employees uniquely motivated? If so, what can commercial organizations learn from this? What are the reasons people want to work for philanthropic organizations? These questions are addressed in this section.

6.15.2   A Soft Culture

Compared to commercial organizations, the culture of charity fundraisers is informal. I conclude this by observation of NHF fundraisers as well as other charities. They do not wear expensive suits or dresses to work. They do not come across as fast, commercial, career-oriented. When asked, most of them would describe their culture as "*pretty soft.*" The image is often associated with that of volunteers. This fits the image the outside world has of charities, according to the fundraisers' discourse:

"*I used to work for commercial organizations. When they heard I was going to the NHF, they said, 'Are you crazy, that soft sector? Are you going to walk around with a collecting box?'*

"*By the way, I wouldn't rule out going back to a commercial organization. But commercial organizations are suspicious of hiring employees who used to work for charities because of the soft image of our sector.*"

6.15.3   Reasons to Work for a Charity

Most NHF employees who speak about the reasons why they work for the NHF, say that the fact the NHF is a charity was a plus at best. Most fundraisers seem to identify more with their function or job than with the fact that they work for an organization that does good. All the employees who left the organization during my tenure went to similar jobs at commercial organizations. Reasons for accepting new jobs are "*to face new challenges,*" "*to make more money*" or "*to establish a career.*" The fact that the NHF is a charity was not the decisive factor in leaving.

Nor did anyone state that working for a charity was a disadvantage, except that the outside world sees it as a "*soft sector*" which might harm their careers. After all, that means that they might have a hard time getting a job in a commercial organization. The outside job market is seen as a little bit mistrusting of people who work for charities.

6.15.4   Motivation

The special purpose of the NHF is also not used very much to motivate the employees of the fundraising department. The fact that the NHF exists "to do good" is mostly used by the employees to raise money. "Doing good" is their product; that is what they sell. Fundamentally, there is no difference with, for example, selling insurance or commercial organizational advice. Fundraisers are

more motivated by their function, their profession, than by the goal of their organization.

Several quotes illustrate this:

"*I think the content of my job is what is most important to me. What I actually do all day. For what organization I do it for is less important.*"

"*When I came here four years ago, the special cause of the NHF played a big role for me. I really felt something like: I'm doing good now. Family and friends also commented on that, which I liked. But that's completely different now. First I wasn't working as a fundraiser, but since I am a fundraiser, I don't have the feeling that it's different to work here compared to a profit organization.*"

"*I do prefer working for noncommercial organizations, because the atmosphere is different; it suits me better. I worked for both commercial and noncommercial organizations and I prefer the latter. So because of the atmosphere I prefer noncommercial organizations, my personality fits better there, not because I do something 'good' or something like that.*"

This case study suggests that the special purpose of the NHF is not a big motivator for its fundraisers. There are, however, differences with commercial organizations and these differences play a role in people wanting to work for a charity.

6.16   Morality

6.16.1   Introduction and Questions

In this section, I discuss some moral aspects of the discourse of the NHF. I study the dominant moral issues of charity fundraisers within a fundraisers' discourse. Which moral aspects come to the fore in the discourses? A primary reason for analyzing a charity's discourse was to understand the influence of "doing good" on the organization. Are there differences in the way the goal of the organization is formulated? What are the morals of an organization that has such a sympathetic purpose? The *moral problematizations* are studied.

As in the last two chapters, the discourse analysis of the NHF fundraisers made clear that moral elements and factual statements are inextricably joined within a discourse. The way customers are viewed and the image the NHF has of them determines the way the NHF treats them. Many moral concerns have therefore

already been discussed. I now look at what the discourse itself perceives as moral. When are they talking about "ethics" or "norms"? What moral questions are asked and what moral problems are raised by the fundraisers?

6.16.2   Subject and Content of Mailings

Many questions asked by the fundraisers which their discourse would qualify as moral questions are about the topics and the texts of the mailings and television spots. Half the money the NHF spends goes to scientific research, but the subject bores most people. Most people with heart problems are older, so older people benefit more from the scientific research than children. To be market savvy in mailings, however, it is better to talk about heart problems of young people; it leads to more and higher donations. The mailings are not meant to inform the relations of the NHF; their purpose is to raise money. What should the topic of such mailings be? Should the topic be whatever brings in most money? Related to this issue are questions about the exact formulations of the text. How far can the NHF go in claiming the successes of its activities? Even when research sponsored by the NHF makes a scientific breakthrough, the NHF cannot claim much more than that it contributed to that research. The research itself was done by scientists, usually within universities, who also like to claim the successes of their products. The NHF can claim little by way of concrete successes and it is hard for fundraisers to find "meaty" projects they can use as examples to raise money. Sometimes they describe the NHF as a sort of bank where, after getting money from society, it then invests it in the best possible way. But it offers nothing of much interest; nothing substantial happens with that scenario. That makes the question of what to ask money for more serious; moral questions get involved: how far can they go in presenting the activities of the NHF?

A foremost moral rule that everyone endorses is that the NHF can never lie. It is, however, often not exactly clear what lying is. For example, in the so-called "vacation mailing" people are asked to donate money so that young children with heart problems can go on vacation. This turned out to be quite successful. "*We came up with the vacation mailing. But the children's vacations were already financed. So our financing request was indirect. If the revenues of a mailing are disappointing, not much changes. Maybe the program makes some small changes, but that's it. So the relationship between the money and the actual vacations is not direct. Of course, then you can ask yourself whether that's ethically all right.*"

Much of the perceived morality has to do with mailing rules and codes beyond the CBF's, which are practical and adhered to by other fundraising organizations. They are seen as a "*protection of the consumer*" and the NHF strictly abides by them:

"*Those* [CBF] *rules are very logical and very broad, and we were already adhering to them before they were adopted by other organizations. We'd have to do really stupid things to lose the CBF hallmark. To be honest, the actual rules don't play a role in our everyday work because we follow them anyway. The NHF is very fair in that respect. We at the NHF are very ethical; that is how we became who we are.*"

"*We absolutely do not sell our mailing addresses. That would be against the law. There has been much talk about swapping addresses with other organizations. But we decided not to do that. What is allowed by law is that another fund writes to its relations and tells them about our existence, in exchange for which we would do the same. But we don't do that either. The common opinion among fundraisers is that the selling of addresses is vulgar. No one wants to get his or her fingers burned. And you really want to prevent getting a bad reputation. We also have some codes with the fundraising organizations, but they are very broad. Those are norms at a general level; we stick by them anyway. There are no codes, for example, about which kind of pictures you can use in a mailing or about the frequency of mailing.*" [A rule seen as a moral rule is that they cannot send more than five mailings to one person in a year. Otherwise the NHF would be too aggressive towards its donators.]

"*We really need something new and fresh to raise money. The vacation mailing, for example, that was fun. I even got five requests from schools that they want to do their own action regarding this. It was exciting, new. But the problem is that we got a hundred times more money than the actual budget for the vacations of the children with heart problems. So we cannot raise money on this issue anymore. We could organize vacations for the next hundred years. Morally speaking, we can't use that item anymore; I mean, raise more money and spend it on something else.*"

"*What is ethically very important for us is that we do not deceive people. We must do what we say we do. And say what we do. We do stress those of our activities of which we know that they do well when fundraising. For example, attention to children, even though we do most things for older people. We give children proportionally more attention in our presentation than is justified by the spending of our money. But we do do the things we say we do for children. We*

support research in genetic deviations and the like. And then I do not see a problem with using pictures of cute kids instead of gray people."

6.16.3 The Autonomy of the NHF and Other Moral Issues

Another important explicit moral issue is the autonomy of the NHF. Letting others influence the opinion of the NHF on something is seen as immoral:

> *"There is an element of ethics involved in sponsoring the way those consultants proposed. It doesn't matter how sweetly they talk about it, we always would lose some of our autonomy. Now we have perfect autonomy. We will lose that if they have their way. In the end, what they propose is some sort of partnership."*

The NHF would never cooperate with tobacco industry. That is described as "*unethical.*" As an example, a question by fundraisers of a 'competitor' (**CF**) of the NHF:

CF: *"You did something with gasoline. Gasoline is not healthy. Do you have codes for that, or ethics?"* To which the fundraiser of the NHF (**NHF**) replied:

"*We want nothing to do with 1. companies in the sphere of tobacco or smoking and unhealthy foods. So I don't see a problem. We try to promote exercise, but we don't say that people should do away their cars. We don't have to be more Catholic than the Pope.*"

CF: *"We feel the same way. It has to be scientifically proven, or we don't want to cooperate. That means: smoking and unhealthy foods. Their bad influences are scientifically proven. We even did something with Heineken once. They themselves tell people not to drink too much."*

NHF: *"Well, we at the NHF did something with California wines once, but will never do that again. Something must be healthy, no matter how much you consume. The use of it must promote your health.*

> *"What is also ethically very important is that when people call us to ask their money back, they get it immediately. We are very good at that. That is a part of us; we want to be meticulous and approachable. So if someone says, I donated 2500 guilders, but that was supposed to be 25 guilders and 00 cents, and I have a low income, I never transfer that much money, we refund the money. If it turns out that that person did donate 2500 guilders every month, we could ask some questions. But even then, we usually give the money back. We correct mistakes, whoever made them, also if it was not our fault.*

> *"What is ethically also very important is how we deal with competitors. As far as competition goes: we are very clean. The weeks for collections are very well*

divided. *We do not raise funds in the weeks others do. A mailing is allowed, but no publicity.*[59] *These rules are more and more violated by others. But we would never do that. We also make a big contribution to the administration and coordination of these things. That goes very well.*"

6.16.4   The Consultants' Discourse on Morals

It is interesting to see what consultants think about when they talk about the morals of the NHF. They perceive different issues than those working within the NHF. They speak of the integrity of the employees and their consciousness of working for a good cause:

"*As far as the ethics of the NHF are concerned, everyone here lives with the idea: 'We are fundraisers; we do this for a special purpose.' Also everyone is very budget minded. That's huge here. Everyone tries to keep costs as low as possible everywhere.*"

Neither of these two moral aspects that the consultants considered most important were mentioned as ethical aspects by the fundraisers in all the time I worked for the NHF.

6.16.5   Conclusion

The evidence of this case study suggests that that the perceived moral issues for fundraisers in charities are about their autonomy. Furthermore, they are about the rules and codes in their mailings and advertising: to strike a balance between making money and not deceiving people. "*Being very ethical*" means to the fundraisers being careful in direct mailing; not sending too many a year. More generally it means not being aggressive. It was indicated that how they are "*very ethical*" in this sense has to do with two overriding themes in the discourse: reliability and soundness.

Here we see that it is neither a pure do-good discourse nor a pure do-well discourse that the fundraisers within a charity use. It is not the case that the ultimate good purpose of the organization justifies any means to raise money. Nor is it the case that the fundraisers try to be "*more Catholic than the Pope.*" The vacation mailing is a good example of this.

6.17   Concluding Interpretations

In this chapter I described the discourses about customer relationships and all relating subjects of a charity using ethnographic research methods. I entered the field with little knowledge and was looking for overriding themes to describe the discourse(s). At first the theme "unity" (Section 6.7) seemed to describe what was going on in the charity. Later, however, two different themes emerged: "reliability" and "soundness" (Section 6.8). Along the line of these themes two discourse were identified: the management discourse (and "those from above") and the fundraisers' discourse. The fundraisers' discourse was described by looking at forms of problematization: What are the most important questions the discourse asks itself? What problems do they see themselves facing? In Section 6.9, the forms of problematization of their daily activities was described. In Sections 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12, the discourse of the fundraisers were described by describing the forms of problematization and the conflicts and disagreements between the discourses of fundraisers and management. This entailed, respectively, describing the conflicts about the wealth of the organization, sponsoring and mailings. In so doing, many issues and problems of charities not shared by commercial organizations came to the fore.

The evidence of this case study suggests that within charities there are constant dilemmas over the boundaries of what is permissible, boundaries that are deeper and fuzzier than those dictated legally. Furthermore, image reliability and soundness are important issues that are more debated and protected in charities than in commercial organizations. This poses problems for charity fundraisers: on the one hand they employ the rationality of a marketing discourse (which says they should make as much money as possible), on the other hand, their hands are tied because of the constraints of being a philanthropic organization.

In Section 6.13, I concluded that consultants advising fundraisers in charities risk deepening the conflicts between fundraisers and the rest of the organization. Consultants tend to strengthen the marketing arguments of the fundraisers, which are not easily understood in the other discourses of a charity. Consultants should be aware of differences between fundraisers in philanthropic organizations and fundraisers in commercial organizations. In Section 6.14, I concluded that philanthropic organizations do not see each other as competitors but rather more as colleagues. In Section 6.15 the main conclusion was that the special goal of a charity is not the main motivator for fundraisers working at a charity. There are

differences in the identity, however, between fundraisers in philanthropic organizations and fundraisers in commercial organizations. In Section 6.16 I concluded that the evidence of this case study suggests that that the perceived moral issues for fundraisers in charities are about their autonomy. Furthermore, they are about the rules and codes in their mailings and advertisements, and about how to strike a balance between making money and not deceiving people.

The management of the NHF is, as described, protective of their image. No one in the organization is allowed to take risks with it. The case of the Dutch Foster Parents plan is a scary story about images, a worst-case scenario for the NHF management. The story of Máxima's bike is another example. Since studies indicate that the image is a major source of income for the NHF, they should take care of it. Yet, no one has studied what would happen if the image of the NHF were damaged in some way. Even though the image is all-important, there is no such thing as image management. There is no concept of what image management is or a clear policy on how to deal with it. While working at the NHF, I got the feeling it was best not to talk about it. When it had to be discussed and a choice had to be made, it was whatever was safest. That aspect of fundraising frustrates NHF fundraisers the most. To them it is as though they cannot even discuss aspects of fundraising that *could* have an effect on the image. Even if the independence of the NHF in medical matters was not jeopardized, fundraising options that might conceivably hurt the image of the NHF were not given opportunity for discussion. If the result is more money and more work done toward a good cause, it is then legitimate to question if image management should be taken up in a different way.

The discourses of this chapter suggest that the concept of money within charities is problematic. In a commercial business, where money is the bottom line, measures for success manifest in monetary terms. Within the NHF, money, too, plays a big role; everyone at one time or another measures the success of the NHF in monetary terms. They often compare themselves to other health charities by comparing budgets. In discussing the past, everyone agrees that the growing budget is an important indicator. Yet in a study of official goals, money is not mentioned. Let us refer back to the official goals of the NHF:
- To stimulate and support basic, strategic, and applied scientific research.
- To inform the public and motivate their interest in cardiovascular risk factors.
- To prevent disease through modification of lifestyle and maintenance of a healthy lifestyle.

- To advise the government and thereby catalyze public policy changes that promote cardiovascular health.
- To improve the quality of health care available to patients with cardiovascular disease.

Within the discourse of the fundraisers, money is used as the main indicator of success. The discourse of the management, however, uses a mix of criteria. Money is one of them, but medical goals are others. The problem is that these goals are vague at best. They are couched in medical terms and hard to measure, which inevitably leads to confusion within the organization.

One of the sub-questions was: Do fundraisers use the language and rationality of business studies (marketing)? Or do they use the language of "doing good"? I can conclude that even though fundraisers are influenced by marketing discourses, they do not use a pure marketing discourse. This became especially clear when their discourse was contrasted with the discourses of consultants. The fundraisers realize that working for a charity means raising money within special circumstances. It is not a choice between "doing good" and "doing well," nor can things be described in those terms. Even though success is defined for fundraisers in monetary terms, they accept constraints in the ways money can be earned— constraints unheard of in commercial organizations—which clearly indicate that they do not simply try to do well at all costs. Their questions and forms of problematization are much more complicated. An example is of the fundraisers who are not allowed to spend 1 million guilders, to make two million guilders. They do not seem to be completely aware of how *unique* that circumstance is; they consider it a normal constraint of their work. Here they clearly differ with fundraisers in commercial organizations. What the fundraisers do ask for (and, in my opinion, they have a good point) is a clear policy on how to deal with these matters. For example, the twenty-five percent norm could be used per project or spread over a year's worth of projects. Constructive internal discussion and a clear policy would help charities deal with a working condition outsiders consider strange.

Because of the different goals of the two described discourses, different groups of people are regarded as customers of the NHF. Also, moral questions asked within the managers' discourse are different from those asked within the fundraisers' discourse. This leads to tension between the two discourses.

As with the previous two chapters, here a discourse analysis turned out to be helpful in analyzing moral aspects of an organization. When looking at the hegemonic discourses identified within the NHF, factual and moral aspects turned out to be inextricably tied, as in the previous chapters. Even though this chapter is divided into several sections—each of which highlights aspects of a charity's discourse and thereby answers different questions about it—it became clear that these aspects are closely connected. Any division of a discourse is arbitrary. Each part connects with all other parts.

Epilogue

A year after my study at the NHF, I returned to present my report (i.e., the above sections) to the director. I noticed that almost all of the fundraisers I knew had left the organization or were about to leave. Seven of the eight persons working at Fundraising when I first came at the NHF, were gone. The only person staying with the department was a part time secretary.

Other things seemed to have changed as well. After a talk with the director of the NHF, I decided to do five more interviews (about an hour each) with two fundraisers I had known from the year before (who were about to leave to organization), the new director of fundraising, the director of the NHF and the new director of communication. Among other things, I wanted an opinion of this report.

Things change. New people in the organization and a different economic climate had had a profound influence on the discourses within the NHF. Evidence suggests that because of economic circumstances the discourse of the fundraisers gained more importance in the organization and now has much more influence. Examples:

Fundraiser:

"*What you describe about us being rich is not the case anymore. The economic developments, September 11th, etcetera have changed things. Fundraising is much more important now in this organization. There is also less money from wills.*"

Director:

"*Now it is possible to spend a million if it makes two million. Now we do work with the food industry, like T.V., Becel commercials. The twenty-five percent norm is used much less strictly. In all of our organizations there are cutbacks, except in the department of fundraising. Plus, now, we do call donators with the question of automatically donating an amount to us every month. We do monitor that very closely. We are very nervous about it.*"

New director of communication:

"*Because the outlook right now is none too bright, we've become more pragmatic.*"

What has changed in the discourses is that money, instead of medical and image principles, is in the foreground of all discourses.

Director (about the changes of the last year):

"*The most important change is that the necessity of fundraising is now apparent to the* whole *organization. Other departments now see that there is less money. And it is necessary for our goal to generate money. We remain in a pickle: on the one hand independent and authoritative but also needing sponsors. Now we cooperate more with companies.*

"*Changes have also come about because of the new people we hired. I don't know how the old people will deal with this. When we hired new people we looked for enterprising people, people who are not afraid of traveling new roads. But the medical director still has to approve everything. We do look out for our image. At the edge of the abyss grow the most beautiful flowers. Of course there are still clashes of interests. That is why management still takes all the responsibility. Pharmaceuticals can now sponsor us, but only if there are at least three of them at the same time. Once there were only two and we didn't do it. If there are at least three, we send out the message that we are not dependent on them. Pharmaceuticals cannot influence our policies. It is the task of the new director of fundraising to test the boundaries; it is my task to give boundaries. Our image is guarded by the new director of communication. There is a natural tension between the director of communication and the director of fundraising. The director of communication has to guard the long term. This tension makes matters more explicit in our organization. By the way, I wanted these changes anyway, regardless of the bad economic times.*"

New director of fundraising:

"*When I read* [your report], *I read about the organization as a minister. If there was a discussion about something negative, apparently the NHF didn't do it. That's easy when you have enough money; now there's less income. Now we're the merchants. Money* has *to come in.*

"*There's a great difference between a year ago and today. Two reasons: there are different people here now and there are different economic circumstances. When people have more money, they give more money away.*

"*That means that the department of fundraising is now much more commercial. Not necessarily the organization as a whole, but our department has to bring in the money. If you want to do a lot as a organization, and the financial means are not sufficient, you must come up with new ways to make money.*"

How fundraisers deal with direct marketing shows how the discourse about their customers has changed. When I interned there, five mailings a year per person was the limit (see Section 6.16). Right now, the NHF is testing what the reactions are to seven or even eight mailings a year. The self-imposed rules about mailing (Section 6.14) do not exist anymore. This does not mean that this is no longer seen as a moral issue.

New director of fundraising:

"*We do discuss these things extensively; we still want to remain independent and we have to behave properly. But we also have to behave more commercially. We would never want to become the ING bank, but we have to make money. There is a big grey area between being a minister and a merchant.*"

The issue is still a moral one, but the discourses present different answers to the same moral question. The choices made on perceived moral issues are clearly different. The rationale is much more a pure marketing discourse: success is measured in terms of money made. The own moral rules do not go much further anymore than legal boundaries.

New director of fundraising:

"*The Telegraaf* [the biggest newspaper in the Netherlands] *asked 250 people what they think of charities. The people said: 'Charities send too much mail, they give away too many presents and they call too much.' But I think those are socially desirable answers. Right now we call 80,000 people and we know that we get angry reactions from that. People should always be approached in a proper way. We are sensitive to complaints. But if we don't get too many reactions, we consider the few persons who call in angry as people who got out of the wrong side of the bed this morning. Of course we do have to be careful: our image should not be harmed. But we are not at the edge of jeopardizing that yet. Greenpeace is much further along in this than us. I think they are much more professional.*"

This quote makes it clear that customers are now differently conceptualized within the NHF. The fundraisers talk differently about their customers; the rationale of making money is more important when customers are discussed. Customers are no longer discussed in terms of colleagues supporting the same cause as the NHF. As I argued several times in this book, when organizations talk differently

about customers, they treat them differently. And here we have evidence: donators get more mailings; people are called at their private addresses (which was out of the question a year earlier); donators get presents. A year ago, all donators were talked about in the same way; everyone contributed to the cause of the NHF. Donators were equally important. But the tenor has changed:

New director of fundraising:

"*Twenty percent of our customers bring in eighty percent of our money. So those twenty percent are the most important. That used to be different around here. That's the biggest change from a year ago. The biggest complainers usually give the least money. It's a waste to spend too much time on them.*"

The story of Seed Mailings (Box 7) was a classic direct mail story. Recall that the problem was people should not get the idea that the NHF gives away presents with their money. This can lead to negative reactions; some see it as a sign that a charity has too much money. The Story of Máxima's Bike (Box 1) emphasized this. The seed mailing, however, came to a compromise: yes, the seeds are a gift, but one that is good for your heart. Because the seed mailing was a success, now more mailings are sent with presents:

New director of fundraising:

"*Now we give away picture postcards. Twice as many people reacted to that mailing. There hasn't been any discussion about it. I did tell management that I was about to do it. Pretty soon we'll give away aprons. I just know that even more people will react to that. If we can make money out of it, I am not the one to say 'We cannot do that.' We're not American about it—they even give away backpacks. But we're five years behind, so who knows …*"

The new director of communication is "*responsible for the image of the NHF. The image is what we make our money with. It's a big problem if that goes wrong.*" I described earlier how important image is for an philanthropic organization that is dependent on gifts from society. While the new director of communication is responsible for the image, she does not think the NHF should be overprotective:

"*You can never lie to people. But that's it. There's no problem with highlighting small aspects of our work. If that brings in the money, it's fine with me. It's just that you can never lie. For the rest: that's the art of fundraising, the art of writing good mailing letters.*

"*We should present ourselves more as an intermediary in society. We should not tell people: 'Get that cigarette out of your mouth!' If you use that tone…you simply don't realize where the money comes from … We should not point fingers.*"

This is another good example of how the discourse of the fundraisers has changed. The rationale is based more on pure marketing. Before, the mission of the NHF was to get people to quit smoking. This medical rationale—the purpose of the organization—made the NHF tell people: "Quit smoking!" Now the fundraisers are concerned that saying that might result in people giving less money. The concern is of such importance that it changed the communication policy of the NHF. "*Nobody gives money to an organization that then tells them what they do wrong. For research people do give money.*" Right now Becel airs a commercial with the NHF to stimulate healthy life styles (by lowering cholesterol). The commercial is completely paid for by Becel, something not possible a year ago.[60] "*We even gave a press statement about the nice cooperation we have with Becel/Unilever.*" Because of the commercials, Becel thinks it sells more of its products.

The change within the fundraisers' discourse over the course of a year is remarkable. Of the two reasons for the change—economic circumstances making the fundraisers' discourse more powerful and the turnover in personnel—the two fundraisers from the "old days" underscore the latter. They seem to hang on to their old discourse. Interestingly, while the discourse of a year ago was that the fundraisers *should* use more of a marketing rationale and that the fundraisers *should* have more influence, now they believe the new fundraisers discourse is *overly* market-oriented. Now the fundraisers have a "they" in their discourse when talking about management and the NHF; a year earlier, they said "we":

"*In the old days, we were slowed down by management; it was chaos sometimes. Now all of a sudden everything is possible: we cannot support that anymore. They are going from right to left. It was not good how things went, but now it is no questions.*

"*They never use the word image anymore. These days they're outsourcing a lot, which gives other agencies influence on our policies. Now they don't bother much with complaints. As long as it makes money, they do it. They're not much concerned with the image anymore. They just come with marketing plans and as long as it makes money, they do it. They don't look at people who stop donating because of the new plans. As long as the plans make money. They should be careful not to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs.*

"*In the past we were too careful. Now I often think: that's not good for the name of the NHF.*

"*If because of the current culture something were to go wrong, like certain people running amuck, what happened with Foster Parents Plan could happen here.*"

Notes

[1] Prof. T. Schuyt, *Trouw*, 25 May 2001, p. 15.

[2] See Box 1. Literal quotes are in italics.

[3] Schuyt & Hoff (1997), pp. 12-13.

[4] Komter & Schuyt (1993).

[5] Pronk & Tack (1997).

[6] Bruijn (1997).

[7] www.hartstichting.nl, 20-7-02.

[8] Yin (1989).

[9] Boje (1991).

[10] O'Connor (1999), p. 4.

[11] Van Maanen (1988), p. 3.

[12] Putnam & Fairhurst (2001).

[13] Watson (1994), p. 8.

[14] Cicourel (1980), p. 127.

[15] Hammersley (1992), p. 50.

[16] Yanow (2000), p.30.

[17] Linder (1995).

[18] Chock (1995).

[19] Pal (1995).

[20] Yanow (2000), p. 27.

[21] Yanow (2000), p. 37.

[22] E.g., Lippman-Hand & Fraser (1979).

[23] Hoffmaster (1992), p. 1427.

[24] Watson (1994).

[25] Johnson (1993).

[26] McIntyre (1993).

[27] O'Connor (1997), p. 304.

[28] Fisher (1987), p. xiii.

[29] Roe (1994), p. 9.

[30] Boje (1991), p. 106.

[31] Boje (1995), p. 1001.

[32] Dicke (2001), p. 5.

[33] O'Connor (1997), p. 308.

[34] White (1980), p. 26.

[35] Ettema & Glasser (1988), p. 11.

[36] Eeten (1999), p. 52.

[37] E.g., Dicke (2001); Eeten (1999); Roe (1994); O'Connor (1995, 1997, 2000); Deetz (1986); Boje (1991).

[38] Dicke (2001), p. 6, partly quoting Grant et al. (1998).

[39] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 44.

[40] Boje (1991), p. 106.

[41] Onega and Landa, quoted in Dicke (2001), p. 7.

[42] Hajer (1995/1997), p. 56.

[43] O'Connor(2000), p. 2.

[44] Labov (1972).

[45] Chambers (1984), p. 20, cited in O'Connor (2000), p. 175.

[46] Boje (1991), p. 107.

[47] Eliade (1975).

[48] O'Connor (2000), p. 175.

[49] See O'Connor (1999); Hammersley & Atkinson (1983); Watson (1994); Van Maanen (1988).

[50] A comment of a fundraiser on this report: "*"Better" in the sense that they give a regular amount. In general, members are not automatically better. Some cost a lot and give only limited amounts. Active members are "better" in the sense that they volunteer for us.*"

[51] There is a so called "customer pyramid" by Jay Curry.

[52] It is now possible to keep reserves, i.e., be less vulnerable. See the epilogue to this chapter.

[53] At the time, the ratio was 13 percent, so they were not in danger of coming close to the limit.

[54] A comment of a fundraiser on this report: "*We are sponsoring them!!*"

[55] These were conducted before my research at the NHF began.

[56] About the remark of fundraising getting more attention in earlier stages: that is direct marketing's complaint of the fundraisers. I already pointed out how frustrated they get by not getting good ideas or cooperation for writing mailings in which they ask people for money.

[57] Given to me by my advisor prof. T. van Willigenburg.

[58] At least it was until September 11th 2001.

[59] Not a recruiting mailing to gain new donators at least, the NHF does send mailings to existing donators.

[60] The tone of the commercial is also different from the paste. It tells people that it is good to "eat a delicious fat fish every once in a while." Such food advice, in such a way, would probably have been considered too risky a year ago. See the story of the Kwetters eggs (Box 5).

7.   The Importance of Context

7.1   Tractable Morality in Managerial Customer Relations

7.1.1   Comparisons between the Discourses on Customers

The previous discourse descriptions are an important part of the answers to the questions asked at the outset of this book, making them, in a sense, the most important results. There are, however, other questions to be answered and conclusions to be drawn, like what can I conclude about the tractability of the morality of managers in their client relations? Prerequisite to answering this question is comparing how managers treat their customers.

Despite the differences in the three cases, it is possible to compare the conceptualization of customers on certain dimensions.[1] For example, do managers see their clients as colleagues or competitors? How do they view the role and (moral) responsibility of the client?[2] How do they view their own role and responsibilities? The issue of responsibility is especially important because it is part of the identity of managers.[3] When people feel responsible for something, their discourses evidence it and have clear moral aspects.

The following three tables help eliminate the various nuances that make the discourses difficult to compare. They focus on 1) the task of the managers (their role and responsibility); 2) the relationship they have with their customers; 3) their image of their customers (their role and responsibility); and 4) the moral issue that is most important according to the discourse. These tables should not be seen as precise summaries. For the sake of comparison, the contents of the discourses were reduced to terms or phrases taken directly from the discourses.[4,5]

Table 7.1: The Bank Managers' Discourses

	A_b (Together for Ourselves)	B_b (Using the Bank to Improve the Region)	C_b (A Customer Is a Colleague and Competitor in One)	D_b (Marketing, the Customer as a Buyer of Profitable Products)	E_b (The Customer as a Commercial Relationship)
Role/ Responsibility	Making money plus helping customers.	Making money plus improving the region.	Making money. No societal role.	Making money. No societal role.	Making money. It is the sole task of a banker to excel in the business of borrowing and lending money.
Relationship With Customers	Customers are partners. Relationships with customers are personal.	Customers are partners. There are conflicts with customers. For example, how far does a manager go with morally reprimanding customers who cross moral boundaries (e.g., polluting the environment), when they do not cross legal boundaries.	Customers are partners and competitors. There are clear, opposing interests with banks. Want a commercial relationship with customers. Not easily let down easily.	Customers are competitors. Relationship is not personal. Are easily disappointed by customers, but not in a moral sense; disappointed because customers complain too much about the bank.	Commercial relationships with their customers.

Image of Customers (Their Role/Responsibility)	Customers have the main responsibility. They are judged on their own merits, not their role in society.	Broader interests of the customers are important. Customers are seen within a broader societal context; they have a societal responsibility. A sense of betrayal when customers have a relationship with other banks.	Customers are mainly interested in making a profit, which is a good thing.	Customers are materialistic, only interested in money.	Customers are mainly interested in making a profit, which is a good thing: it is the task/ responsibility of a business to make a good profit. "Customers are like us." Not easily disappointed in customers. Not morally judging customers.
Most Important Morals (As Seen By Discourse)	Being honest.	Improving the region.	No role in improving the region. Being open and honest in this; do not like to present themselves differently.	Like to create a moral image, even when they know the image is not accurate.	Fraud is most morally egregious.

Table 7.2: The Veterinarians' Discourses[1]

	A$_v$ (The Support of the Responsible Farmer)	B$_v$ (Animals' Advocates)	C$_v$ (The Situational and Intuitive Veterinarians)	D$_v$ (The Professional Veterinarian)
Role/ Responsibility	Being a veterinarian is a service-providing job and it is the veterinarian's duty to help a customer run his business. Should the customer's economic interest be opposed to the animal's, they side with the customer.	Improving animal well-being *is a clear-cut task for veterinarians*. Satisfying customers is far less important than improving and maintaining the animals' health and well-being. Veterinarians bear a great responsibility for the animal. They have to make the final decisions and so must bear an important part of the responsibility.	Providing service is considered very important. Veterinarians do not so much think along the lines of the customers' business. Instead, providing good service consists of performing veterinary duties in a careful way.	The veterinarian's task is never simply providing a service to a customer. Enhancing and maintaining animals' health and well-being is seen as most important. This is more important than satisfying customers.

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[1] I chose the farmers as customers in this table. They are the human clients who pay the bills, and in that sense can be compared more easily with the customers of charities and bankers than animals.

Relationship With Customers (Farmers)	Strong relationship. Very few conflicts. Much trust in customers.	More loyal to the animal than their customers. In extreme cases, decisions are made against the customer's interest. Not always much trust in the customers, sometimes disappointed. There are differences of opinion/conflicts with the farmers.	Rather critical towards the customer. Customers cannot be completely trusted with the animal's health.	Professional relationship. Veterinarians should teach customers. It is the veterinarian's job to communicate the pros and cons. Not many conflicts.
Image of Customers (Their Role/ Responsibility)	Farmers have a hard time running their businesses; need a good business attitude to survive. The responsibility for the animal's health and well-being is the customer's, not the veterinarian's.	Not a positive image of some customers: many customers care too much about money and not enough about animals.	Consider it unfavorable that customers see the animal too much as a means of production.	The responsibility for animals remains largely with the farmers. Not a negative image of customers. Not many conflicts. The customer is responsible for all operations on the animal.
Most Important Morals (As Seen By Discourse)	It is a shame that customers are in such a bad economic position.	The health of animals.	Health of animals. Competition among vets is bad.	Professional ethics are important.

Table 7.3: The Charity's Discourses

	A_c (Fundraisers)	B_c (Management)
Own Role/ Responsibility	To raise as much money as possible so that others within the organization can do good with that. The product of the organization is doing good.	To help heart patients, promote healthy life styles and support medical research in the field of heart disease. The organization has to be an independent in society. The mission is taken very seriously: *"If we do not do our job very well, people might die as a result. I see myself as a prophet. What is important is our message. Our message is our goal."*
Relationship With Customer	Customers are mainly those that can bring in money. Customers are welcome as long as they are not *opposed* to the goals of the organization. Customers are often approached with a marketing rationality. Not easily disappointed by customers.	There are many types of customers of the NHF. The people who donate money, patients, medical researchers and people seeking information. If a person or organization fits the mission of the NHF, whether he or she costs money or brings in money, he or she is welcome and invited and considered a customer. Customers should be approached on a personal basis.
Image of Customers (Role/ Responsibility)	It is the responsibility of customers to give or not give money. Not easily disappointed when they do not. Money comes in because of the good work of the fundraisers.	Customers (in all their different forms) are judged solely against the mission of the organization. It is their responsibility to understand the importance of the organization. Money comes in because customers want to join the fight against heart diseases. Disappointed when customers do not fully support the organization in fighting its noble cause (with money for example).
Most Important Morals (As Seen By Discourse)	One can play with the truth to present a good image, but never lie. There are rules and codes in their mailings and advertisements: to strike a balance between making money and deceiving people. Autonomy and independence are also important.	Being *completely* honest and independent all the time. Remain completely autonomous.

7.1.2   Symmetry Principle

When we study the way managers deal with their customers, a striking resemblance is that *whatever role (responsibility) managers see for themselves they expect from their customers too, especially in a moral sense*. Apparently, this symmetry principle makes the complicated moral issues around how to deal with their customers more tractable for managers. Bank managers who see their main task as making a profit expect customers to want the same thing; bank managers who see improving the region as a task expect customers to appreciate this. Similarly, veterinarians who think their primary task is to promote the health of animals believe this should be their customer's main concern too (even though they might doubt this is actually the case). Those veterinarians who see their jobs as service-providing expect and accept a business approach from their customers. The discourse within the charity case that takes the mission of the charity most seriously (the management discourse) shows an expectation that their customers take the mission seriously too; the fundraisers have lesser expectations on this issue.

7.1.3   Higher Moral Expectations of Customers Lead to More Conflict

Related to the symmetry principle is: *the more a manager's discourse has characteristics of an ideal type do-good discourse, the bigger the chances of conflict between manager and customer.* Such a manager has moral expectations of customers which are more in the foreground, the expectations are obvious in the discourse. Apparently, for those managers, conflict is part of their tractable morality. By definition, managers in those discourses closest to the ideal type do-good discourse see responsibilities as more than making money. And it turns out that these managers construct the responsibilities of their customers also as more than making the most money possible. These higher moral expectations lead to conflicts. For example, the discourses B_b (Rabobank), B_v (Animals' Advocates) of veterinarians and A_c of charity management frame the customer in terms of common goals. These managers see customers as collaborates or allies rather than competitors or dissenters. For managers who use a discourse that has more characteristics of a do-well discourse, the opposite conclusion can be drawn: to them trying to avoid conflict with their customers helps make their morality tractable.

7.1.4 High Moral Expectations of a Customer Lead to Detraction of Moral Autonomy of a Customer

Managers closest to a do-good discourse, are also more easily *disappointed* by their customers because they expect more from them, will more quickly hold them morally responsible and share responsibility for what they do. In the Rabobank discourse (B$_b$), customers are more likely to be seen as having responsibilities towards the community, like Rabobank itself. For ABN-Amro (E$_b$), the customer should try to do well, like ABN-Amro does. Within the discourses closest to the do-good ideal, customers are more quickly and severely judged and managers are more prone to hold strong moral opinions; they will sooner claim to "know" what is morally right. This is their way of making moral issues surveyable. This is interesting: *even though those closest to the do-good ideal exhibit an expectation of a more extensive social responsibility from their customers, they also claim to know what is right and feel responsible for their customers' responsibilities, thereby detracting from the moral autonomy of their customers.* An example is veterinarian B$_v$ (Animals' Advocates), who believes a certain animal owner does not give enough attention to his animals' well-being. Such a vet sees customer responsibility as more than just looking after the business: animal well-being is an important responsibility as well. On the other hand, such veterinarians also feel responsible for clients' responsibilities, and by doing so take moral autonomy away from animal owners. In a discourse that has characteristics of a do-good discourse, the manager defines what is good and bad for their customers. This can lead to a feeling of moral superiority, of "knowing better."

Within discourses closest to the ideal type do-well discourse, managers tend to see different responsibilities for their customers than for themselves. They do not like to be moralists. Customers are preferably seen as partners, as "someone like me." See, for example, discourses E$_b$ (The Customer as a Commercial Relationship), A$_v$ (The Support of the Responsible Farmer) and B$_c$ (Fundraisers): the animal owner is more responsible for the well-being of the animal and customers are responsible for their own social actions. In these discourses, customers can still be assigned a social responsibility, but the belief is that the manager is not to be the judge of it; the customers themselves determine what is morally right. *In order to make their morality tractable, those managers that are closest to a do-well discourse believe that their customers are the ones who should raise moral issues.* In that sense, they give customers the greatest autonomy of all the discourses. This may also lead, however, to an expectation of

customers always and only taking care of themselves, which means no expectations of social responsibility at all.

7.1.5   A Focus on Making Money Leads to High Loyalty to the Organization

Managers most interested in making money (closest to a do-well discourse) are most likely to claim that loyalty towards their organization and immediate colleagues plays an important part in their (moral) decision-making. In other words, managers closest to an ideal do-well discourse justify their moral decisions on what they see as loyalty towards their organization and its employees. Not so much the function/role of the organization is considered most important, but the organization itself; these managers feel a great loyalty towards their organization. The fundraisers within the NHF see an increase of budget as an important goal. They consider the prohibition of management to receive money from the food industry as an act disloyal to the organization. Decisions from veterinarians of discourse A_v (The Support of the Responsible Farmer) can be best understood against the background of the financial well-being of the practice they work in. They are likely to justify decisions on the grounds that it is best for their practice. In a similar way, managers from the ABN-Amro base many of their (moral) decisions on the well-being of their bank. Shareholders' value of the ABN-Amro stock and the profits the bank makes are important goals.

On the other hand, *managers who use a discourse closer to a do-good discourse are less likely to base their moral decisions on loyalty towards their organization and more likely to justify their moral decisions based on the function of their organization in society*. Managers closest to a do-good discourse are more likely to use the function/role of their organization or profession in society as a moral rule. Managers of the NHF make decisions based on the main goals of their organization. These managers see the prohibition of making money from the food industry (one of their own decisions) as a sound moral rule because it safeguards the all-important autonomy of the organization in society. Similarly, veterinarians in discourse B_v (Animals' Advocates) make decisions with the well-being of animals in mind, thereby giving priority to what they see as their role as veterinarians in society. Managers of the Rabobank (as opposed to managers from ABN-Amro) are more likely to give a loan to a start-up company based on the argument that they stimulate the local economy.

7.1.6   *Professionals Are More Likely to Morally Judge Competitors*

From the discourse descriptions, we notice that veterinarians spend most time on thinking about how managers in their profession should or should not act. Veterinarians set clear rules for this. They have committees who think about their professional ethics. As noted in Chapter 5, veterinary medicine has the characteristics of a profession. The evidence of the three cases suggests that managers whose jobs can be characterized as a profession are most likely to have professional moral rules to help make their morality tractable. This is not because in professions the discourses are more homogeneous: I concluded in Chapter 5 that the differences in conceptualizations of customers seem to be stronger in veterinarians' discourses than in those of bank directors. Professionals use professional moral rules to make and justify decisions. Indeed, one discourse (D_v: The Professional Veterinarian) evidences that professional ethics is most important to decision-making. Managers in this discourse spend much time thinking how a "good veterinarian" should act and try to formulate tractable rules. They justify many of their daily decisions on the grounds that it is part of their professional ethics to act in such a way. In the other veterinarian discourses, professional ethics are also mentioned, albeit to a lesser extent than discourse D_v (The Professional Veterinarian). Basing their moral decisions on their professional ethics, they expect their colleagues to do the same. Therefore, they keep a close eye on what colleagues are doing. *Managers in a profession therefore seem more likely than other managers to have strong opinions on the moral acts of their competitors and to judge them*. During my interviews with veterinarians, many veterinarians gave examples of colleagues who were acting morally wrong, condemning them. Bankers did not make such remarks.

Bankers hardly ever morally judge their competitors. In the banker's discourses, nothing implies that bankers base their decisions on professional rules of how a "good banker" should act. I found no evidence of professional ethics being used as part of a morality. The fewer the characteristics of a profession in a manager's job, the less likely he or she is to use professional moral rules to help make morality tractable.

Nor do managers of a charity practice a profession (as defined in Chapter 5). Yet, as we saw in Chapter 6, fundraisers and management of the NHF refer to charities as a profession several times, even though it is not a profession in the narrow sense of the word. When we think of the six criteria Flexner set forth for distinguishing a profession from other kinds of work (intellectualism, learnedness,

practical knowledge, technique, organization and altruism), we can apply several to charities. The NHF does think about questions like how a "good charity" (a form of professional ethics) should act. The NHF spends time and energy on meetings with other charities to discuss "the proper rules of the business." For example, how many letters can they send to (prospective) donators? When do they cross a boundary, and when does a friendly request become an invasion of privacy? They also judge other charities (albeit not to the extent veterinarians do) and cite examples of competitors behaving morally badly, e.g., being too aggressive in their mail campaigns, something a "good charity" should condemn. Thus, managers within the NHF use some professional rules in framing their morality.

7.2   Do Good and Do Well Discourses Contain an Intractable Morality

What did all the discourse descriptions of this book produce? I started this book with the following:

> Managers, like anyone else, face moral decisions. Yet they find it hard to know what the right thing to do is. Moral guidance is hard to come by; solid ethical rules cannot be found. Moreover—and this is even more problematic—managers have a hard time identifying the moral dimensions of their decisions in the first place. What moral questions should they ask themselves?

Possible answers to this question are given by the popular discourses characterized by doing-good and doing-well (described in Chapter 1). Are corporate managers primarily trying to do good or are they more interested in doing well? The banking business is competitive and one would expect, therefore, that banking discourses would be focused on doing well. Further, since banking is all about money, one might suspect managers to concentrate on making as much of it as possible. Veterinarians, on the other hand, practice a profession involving health, death and sickness (albeit non-human). It evokes the expectation that their work is more than just about making money. In other words, veterinarians would be expected (to try) to do good. The same would go for managers within charities. After all, the *purpose* of a charity is to do good.

But my empirical research leads to the conclusion that managers do not think that way. *The morality of the popular discourses is intractable for managers.* Managers hardly ever see themselves facing choices in the binary terms of doing well or doing good; corporate managers want to do both. The most we can say is that

within certain discourses, within certain fields, an element here and there is typical of a do-well or a do-good discourse. The general distinctions made in the popular discourses do not hold up. Managers think in terms of the practical problems and dilemmas surrounding them. And in those cases it is not always a search for doing the "right" thing, as the popular discourses would have it; it is more a matter of being in a discourse.

That certain issues are seen as (morally) relevant is discourse-dependent. The understanding of them is through practical problems and practical solutions that, in the managers' minds, relate to them. Within discourses (with their inherent worldview and morality), the relevant moral questions are rarely the weighty ones that can be asked of anyone. Gross moral questions found in popular discourses (How should we treat animals in our society?") play a minor role in practical discourses. Asking these kinds of questions regularly would not allow a manager to function properly. If these weighty questions do play a role, they must somehow be made tractable within a manager's discourse. Practical dilemmas that often need a quick response ("Should I, now that the farmer has requested, kill this healthy chicken?") take principal part.

The discourses described made clear which questions with moral sides managers do ask themselves and which answers they consider. As it turns out, it is not just important to see *that* managers ask themselves moral questions, but also *which* moral questions managers ask themselves. It has to be noted that I did not pay much attention to the way these questions came into being. I did not trace back the moral questions as Foucault did in much of his research (see Appendix C) with the exception of the chapter on veterinarians. By studying first year students and fourth year students' discourses, I did (partly) trace back the (moral) questions veterinarians ask themselves.

The daily reality of managers is much more complicated than the popular discourses make them out to be; their reality is confusing. But it is not so confusing that there is nothing left to say. In this book I have shown how morals can be studied in organizations without focusing only on specific moral decisions. *Most moral decisions, after all, do not clearly present themselves as such. Most moral decisions are implicit; they are part of the way managers talk about their reality. Therefore, I did not study the weightiest moral decisions; for that matter, I did not study* any *particular decision. Neither did I look at value concepts like*

'integrity' or isolated statements of managers on their moral principles. Instead, I looked at discourses with their implicit morals.

7.3 Information Strategies

The advantage of the popular discourses is that they provide easy answers to complicated moral questions—answers outside the actual situation, outside the context. One could say that they have moral answers in absence of much information. Managers, however, have to deal with all the information that comes spinning at them; this is the context of their daily work and the context within which they solve problems. Which information they need and what is relevant to them differs from discourse to discourse.

In a do-good discourse among people outside veterinary practice, the "right" decisions are (perhaps) obvious. For example, animal rights activists might argue that a veterinarian should always choose in favor of the animal. For veterinarians, situations are never that simple. When they ask themselves a (moral) question in their daily practice, they need information; they do not know how to "always choose in favor of the animal." Some veterinarians place most responsibility with the animal owners in which case they need, among other things, information about the animal owner. Decisions made in context cannot be made without information.[6] The information needed differs from discourse to discourse. Managers thus use some sort of information strategy: which information is important and how to interpret it? All the discourses described evidence that information strategies are employed when making decisions. The information strategy must be tractable. The information strategy is such that the answers to the questions asked are obtainable, and lead to clear conclusions about which actions to take. *So the information strategy is part of a tractable morality of a manager.* In Chapter 1, I discussed the problem of causality in relation to morality: often causality is so complex (and infinite), that the outcome of many (principled) choices are unknown, introducing the danger of making action impossible. Yet, managers have to act and constantly make decisions. The information strategy of managers in a context is such that when managers obtain the information they want, they immediately know what consequences that information will have for their actions. *Because discourses contain an inherent morality (some of which is explicit but some of which is implicit, even for the discourse participants), it is the*

discourse that determines what information is relevant. The information strategy, for moral and non-moral questions, is part of a discourse.

What if an animal owner, a layperson, asks permission to carry out some veterinary care? For example, asks the veterinarian to give him a drug—which by law only a licensed veterinarian may administer—so that a sick animal can get quick treatment in case of need. We could, as outsiders, make moral arguments in favor of it and against it. In context, however, a veterinarian needs certain specific pieces of information. And the questions he asks himself depend on his or her discourse with its inherent worldview, morality and, coupled with that, an information strategy. Contextual questions emerge (Can I trust this owner? Can he do something else with the drug? Will he put it to wrong use?) These are important. Different answers may cause him to make different decisions in seemingly similar circumstances. The veterinarian is not solving a big, moral question, but a small, practical dilemma.

7.4   Values and Norms in Discourses

Where exactly can we find values?[7] A quick answer is that morality is in the discourses; discourses contain values and norms. For the most part, I considered moral elements to be those that were qualified as moral by a discourse itself; i.e., when people in a discourse say that something is moral or use "moral arguments" to convince themselves or others. (By "moral arguments," I mean those that do not claim to be about factual situations, but make claims about, or are justified on, values or norms.) Not only whether an issue is seen as morally relevant, but also the judgment on them is a moral issue. I did not so much study values, but discourses with their inherent values. Every discourse contains its own (tractable) morality. A particular discourse determines whether something is considered good or bad. Someone in a prototypical do-well discourse would view a manager giving company money to a charity as morally suspect; other discourses would frame different opinions.

In the discourses presented, factual and valuational statements are intertwined. Different ways of looking at the factual world lead to different valuations of it and vice-versa. The moral problems managers have are always embedded in a context. Morals are always situational. In talking about values, bank managers from discourse E_b (where the relationship with the customer is a commercial one)

immediately start to talk about fraud and how to prevent it. Moral issues seen by bankers—the treatment of start-ups, environmental issues, using the bank to improve the region, dealing with sponsor money, having a customer in financial difficulty, whether to treat clients differently, when to be completely honest to customers, how to negotiate with customers, etcetera—are indissolubly tied to factual images a banker has of his customers. The moral questions and the factual images are part of the same discourse.

It is important to note that a discourse containing many moral arguments is not necessarily morally better than one using fewer moral claims. An ideal type do-good discourse makes values more explicit; moral arguments are always in the foreground. In such a discourse what is seen as good is stressed more than in a do-well discourse. Ultimately, however, everyone wants to do good. To the do-well discourses, doing well *means*, in a sense, doing good.[8] In do-well discourses, moral arguments are more in the background.[9]

I have pointed out several elements that discourses themselves reveal as moral. What I found morally interesting about a specific discourse was not that relevant. As a researcher, what I tried to do was depict the discourse descriptions as wholly and as neutrally as possible.[10]

While concluding that bankers have different moral positions, in the discourse descriptions (Chapters 4 through 6) I was careful about *naming* those differences. By giving the best discourse description possible, the differences in moral stances became apparent by contrasting them. I could have gone a step further and named the different values. For example, Rabobank managers use more "community" values and ABN-Amro managers have more affinity with values connected to "loyalty" towards ABN-Amro. But, with respect to the questions asked in this book, I did not find a need to name all the values I found.[11] What is important is that from the discourse descriptions it becomes clear that certain values play a role in that discourse. Whether these discourses and their morality are appealing is something people should decide for themselves. If I had named the values in the discourses more clearly, I would have taken a large step towards giving moral judgment. The naming of values in terms such as "loyalty" or "community" can never be done neutrally; it depends on the researcher's own discourses (or worldview, if you like). A bank manager using discourse A_b would describe the values of discourse B_b differently than the manager of discourse B_b would describe them herself. One could describe certain values as "loyalty to the

bank" where another might describe them as "greed." A manager doing morally well in an ABN-Amro discourse might very well be doing morally "bad" in a Rabobank discourse. When in one discourse, there is the tendency to look unfavorably at the moral aspects of other discourses about the same subject.

7.5   Discourse Analysis and Business Ethics

I have treated both language and the subject as contingents instead of looking for essential, deep criteria or fundamentals. I started from the assumption that the "world out there" is constructed by discursive conceptions and that they are collectively sustained and continually renegotiated in the process of making sense.[12] The role of language in constituting reality was seen as central. It is through discourses that we view and value things. Therefore, the specific discourse a manager is in has many consequences. For one, it determines to a (high) degree how the person within a discourse treats customers. There are clear differences between the discourses that cannot be ignored. In the same profession, managers treat clients differently. This is interesting for clients, managers and, not least, business ethicists.

Discourse theory was helpful when studying various routine decisions. Some business ethicists focus on responsibilities of decision makers, especially in grievous cases like Chernobyl or Enron. The decisions I mentioned were more routine, not always having major consequences—after all, more than major moral issues like environmental impact or racism figure in managerial decisions. Furthermore, the discourse theory used in this book is excellent in showing how moral problems and choices are embedded in other considerations. I took a step away from finding out what is right and wrong in certain situations, as business ethicists are wont to do. Most situations are complex. I took the approach of describing actual discourses of different kinds of corporate managers dealing with customers. Of course, it does require some sophistication to deconstruct the discourses (here, Q-methodology and ethnography). Even though the researcher always has an influence on his research, the research descriptions are presented as neutrally as possible (meaning influenced by the researcher as little as possible). A good test is whether the managers see themselves in a discourse. In all three empirical cases, the managers of the respective fields said they easily recognized themselves.

By using discourse theory to study morality, I did not look at the traditional smallest units of ethical research: the person and the moment. The person and the moment were coupled to a multiplicity of places and functions. In what Foucault would call traditional humanistic ethics,[13] the person and the moment are all-important. Here, the subject is de-centered and the attention is drawn to discursive practices. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that many existing moral theories focus on individuals making decisions, clearly a different unit of analysis than studying discourses. One can question whether studying fundamental moral choices is the best way to describe what morally goes on in organizations. The way I studied morals was not by asking managers what they would do in certain situations (like, "Would you tell a lie in order to get an important contract?"). By doing that, I would have torn the moral question from its context.

Discourses give different *forms of problematization* that are important, different solutions coupled to the problems, different conditions in which possible responses to the problems can be given. For example, in discourse E_b (ABN-Amro), the social responsibility of customers is nothing more or less than making a profit. Once that is the case, bank managers using discourse E_b will not further address social responsibility issues of their customers. And that makes a difference for the way the customer is treated.

7.6   Changing Morals

To change something in a discourse, you have to know how to participate in that discourse. As has been made clear, judgments on certain issues depend on the discursive context the participant is in. Judgments vary from different standpoints. People—and managers are people—deliberate within their own discourses, which allows them a certain limited discursive space. This makes discourse-clashing unavoidable. Modes of argument differ from discourse to discourse. Sometimes discourses do not "understand" each other, in which case it is very well possible that the differences are stated in moral arguments.[14]

The research in this book focuses mainly on description, not prescription. Yet, the descriptions have consequences. By describing the different (moral) dimensions of their discourses, managers can become more aware of the problems they and their colleagues see. In a sense, the discourse descriptions can be therapeutic. What if veterinarians decide to invite animal rights activists—who are opposed to

vets working in intensive animal husbandry—to talk with them? In such a case, the discourse descriptions can make both parties more aware of the standpoints, factual and valuational. This might change how they talk and weigh their options. By becoming aware of different discourses, self-discourse is also looked at differently. I believe this kind of plurality is important[15] (as long as the other discourses make sense, which might not be the case when the other discourses are theoretically constructed).

The perceived differences between one's own discourse and other discourses evoke moral feelings: another discourse is always (morally) judged from the standpoint of self-discourse. An ethicist using discourse analysis has the opportunity to let people reflect on their moral choices. A researcher can also use discourse analysis to be critical, taking issues from the discourses or issues that differ between similar discourses and letting managers reflect on them. For example, a researcher can talk about the issue of responsibility with veterinarians. I found that veterinarians have different ideas among themselves about what their responsibilities towards animals and animal owners are.

7.7   Now What?

Are the results and conclusions of this book bad news for people within management? After all, it is not a how-to book: how to deal with moral questions and problems. Nor is it easy to change discourses. Change is not a matter of picking a few nice values to put on a company banner. This book is not about the issue of change partly because change is, for a large part, a contingent matter: it is hard to predict what in the end will change discourses and morals within discourses.

I am, however, convinced that organizations and managers can gain important insights in their discourses and morals from reading the discourse descriptions. They can become aware of conflicts or more aware of their own discursive space.[16] Contrasting moral differences may evoke new discourses with moral aspects and arguments. It is possible managers will do better when they understand this, that they will develop new skills for deliberation. The same applies to customers: the discourse descriptions can teach them much about the managers they deal with, which, in turn, may influence their attitudes towards them or the choices they make about which type of manager they prefer to face.

My greatest hope is that the results of this study will have an influence on business ethicists, that this book will have consequences for the way ethics is studied within organizations.

Notes

[1] The three types of corporate managers studied differ in many respects, as do their customers. The customers of bank managers are business managers; the customers of veterinarians are animals and animal owners; the customers of charities are beneficiaries, donators and sponsors. Despite the obvious differences between the managers' discourses, it is interesting to see what conclusions can be drawn when comparing the *content*. After all, there is one commonality among them: they are about customers. And, except for the charity donators, all the customers have face-to-face meetings with the managers.

[2] Perceived morality of others—in this case, customers—plays a role in addressing moral claims to other persons. The way a manager sees the responsibility of his or her customers within his or her discourse, determines many moral claims towards these customers.

[3] For more on identity, see Chapter 3.

[4] Thus they are *not* moral qualifications of mine.

[5] Since they concentrate on the few chosen dimensions, they clearly do not do justice to the exact positions, which are described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

[6] Some general moral principles based on classical moral theories claim to know what is good and what is bad in certain situations. They do not need much information, just certain conditions of a situation. I claim that, in order to study moral judgments and make moral judgments, the context is highly important. Moral choices are always made in the context of many other choices.

[7] As a definition of values, I gave the following definition in Chapter 3: "Qualities that are appreciated for contributing to or constituting what is good, right, beautiful or worthy of praise and admiration." I described norms as regulations prescribing what we are supposed to do or not do in certain situations. Morals are values and norms taken together. And ethics is the systematic reflection on morality.

[8] Milton Friedman: "There is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits, so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free communication, without deception or fraud." (Friedman (1962)).

[9] Discourses are more than all that is written and said (see Chapter 3). Explicit moral elements can be part of the sets of rules and procedures. Even though certain moral aspects do not so much come to the fore, they can be brought to the fore by, for example, confronting a do-well discourse with a do-good discourse. When a discourse has to defend itself, the moral arguments can play a more obvious role.

[10] I described in Chapter 3 that a researcher can never be completely neutral. Also my discourse analyses contain many moral elements. But I should not leave it at that; this awareness has consequences. For example, as a researcher, I cannot qualify elements of a discourse as "moral" from a neutral position; that would always be done from another specific discourse. The discourses I operate

in determine my moral feelings. In that sense, one could point out infinite moral aspects in any discourse.

[11] Even in Section 7.1.5, I did not name the values of the bankers but described some tractable moral rules that are used in discourses by managers. To be clear, I did not say that "ABN-Amro managers are more loyal to their employer than managers of Rabobank" but that ABN-Amro managers use the term "loyalty" more than Rabobank managers to justify the decisions they make. I did not come up with the term "loyalty"; it came from the discourse descriptions.

[12] Parker (1992), p. 3.

[13] Foucault (1961/1995), p. 19.

[14] After all, to convince other people, we sometimes use factual statements and sometimes use moral statements.

[15] Bauman noted this too when discussing the Millgram studies. The subjects were inclined to do what a "scientist" in a white coat asked of them, even if that would be against their moral feelings. But as soon as there were two "scientists" in white coats with *opposing* views and instructions, the subjects of the Millgram studies were no longer prepared to follow instructions to physically hurt other people (Bauman (1989/1998)). The first thing a totalitarian regime usually tries to do is silence opposing points of view: to not allow people moral choices or opposing moral points of view (discourses).

[16] Other people think differently than you do! Not necessarily better or worse, but differently.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Hanteerbare Moraliteit

Net als iedereen, nemen managers dagelijks beslissingen. Vaak vinden ze het echter moeilijk te weten wat het goede is om te doen. Elke beslissing heeft ethische consequenties, maar ethisch advies is moeilijk te verkrijgen, en duidelijke morele regels ontbreken. Vaak kunnen managers de ethische kanten van hun beslissingen niet identificeren. Welke morele vragen moeten ze zichzelf stellen? Zelfs wetenschappers hebben de grootste moeite morele problemen van managers te karakteriseren en te verwoorden.

In de publieke opinie domineren twee morele posities ten aanzien van organisaties. De gedachte dat managers in het bedrijfsleven alleen geïnteresseerd zijn in het maken van winst, overheerst beide standpunten. Het ene standpunt benadrukt de positieve kanten: "Wat is er mis met geld verdienen?" Het andere de negatieve gevolgen: "Het is een en al hebzucht en de gewone man is altijd de klos."

Het eerste standpunt noem ik het "koopman-discours". Mensen die volgens dit discours redeneren, vinden vaak dat het bedrijfsleven zich moet richten op geld verdienen. Mensen en organisaties die met name aan zichzelf denken, ondersteunen automatisch het gemeenschappelijk welzijn. Zolang niemand iets illegaals doet, is bedrijfsethiek beoefenen zelfs zonde van de tijd. Deze manier van redeneren doet denken aan wetenschappers als Adam Smith, Milton Friedman en Friedrich von Hajek. Het is belangrijk op te merken dat voor deze wetenschappers handel drijven niets *im*moreels heeft. Degenen die voortdurend moraliteit benadrukken in bedrijven, zijn juist moreel verdacht: het is moreel gesproken goed, ja het is zelfs de morele plicht van een manager om zich als koopman op te stellen en de winst van de eigen organisatie in de gaten te houden. In dit discours blijven de morele elementen echter vaak op de achtergrond.

Hier recht tegenover staat een discours dat het winstoogmerk van organisaties en managers als iets negatiefs beschouwt. Ik noem dit het "dominee-discours".

Volgens dit discours moeten managers zich richten op het nemen van moreel juiste beslissingen. En dat is meestal het tegenovergestelde van geld verdienen. Een manager zou zijn acties moeten laten leiden door duidelijke morele regels. Waar managers in het koopman-discours de helden zijn, zijn ze in het dominee-discours verdacht. Vaak komt het er in het dominee-discours op neer dat een bedrijf één keuze heeft: het maken van winst of het doen van het moreel juiste. Datgene wat het best is in morele zin, kost vaak het meeste geld. Moreel gedrag heeft zijn prijs.

Volgens managers stellen de populaire discoursen de wereld te zwart-wit voor. Wat betekent het als succes alleen in termen van winst wordt gedefinieerd? Wat is winst eigenlijk? Natuurlijk is er geen manager te vinden die letterlijk ten koste van alles financieel gewin nastreeft; in de praktijk doen managers meer dan alleen op geld letten. De beslissingen die zij moeten nemen, komen zelden neer op een keuze tussen winst en verlies, tussen doen van goed of slecht. Bovendien, zeggen ze, zouden ze niet kunnen functioneren als ze voortdurend principiële keuzes moeten maken. Verder zijn de gevolgen van te nemen beslissingen in veel gevallen onduidelijk. De twee populaire discoursen lijken hanteerbare morele regels voor situaties voor te schrijven, maar ze beschrijven situaties dusdanig duidelijk en overzichtelijk dat die niet meer aansluiten op de feitelijke situaties waarin managers zich bevinden. Uiteindelijk verschaffen ze dus geen hanteerbare morele regels voor managers.

Het grootste probleem ligt blijkbaar bij de identificatie van morele problemen. De beide populaire discoursen weten niet goed de vinger op de zere plek te leggen. Ze beschrijven niet goed wat er speelt in een organisatie. Wellicht dat de relatief nieuwe discipline van de bedrijfsethiek hieraan een bijdrage kan leveren. Er blijken echter bezwaren te kleven aan de meeste bestaande manieren in de bedrijfsethiek om organisaties moreel te onderzoeken. Bepaalde morele dimensies worden niet onderkend.

Bovendien geven vele bedrijfsethici advies op basis van ideeën van klassieke morele filosofen en het blijkt dat de klassieke morele theorieën niet probleemloos op bedrijven kunnen worden toegepast. Sommige morele regels die ze voorschrijven blijken onhanteerbaar voor managers. De klassieke morele theorieën zijn ontworpen voor beslissingen van individuen en niet voor die van organisaties. Dit roept vragen op: Zijn de morele regels die zijn opgesteld voor individuen, ook van toepassing op organisaties? Organisaties hebben hun eigen

dynamiek. Bewuste beslissingen van individuele managers bepalen maar voor een klein gedeelte hoe de wereld (van een organisatie) eruit ziet. Als een onderzoeker wil kijken naar de morele aspecten van een organisatie, zijn de beslissingen, gedachtes, meningen, redeneringen en gevoelens van managers niet al wat meespeelt. Anderen binnen de bedrijfsethiek beweren dat als een bedrijf moreel zo goed mogelijk probeert te presteren, dat automatisch leidt tot goede bedrijfsresultaten. Maar ook deze visie roept vragen en bezwaren op: Wat houdt dat precies in, "moreel zo goed mogelijk presteren"? Bovendien is ethiek nu een instrument geworden. Zoals in het dominee-discours, wordt de tegenstelling tussen moreel goed doen en geld verdienen gereïficeerd.

Om moraliteit in organisaties bloot te leggen, worden in dit boek causaliteiten onderzocht die boven individuen uitstijgen, namelijk discursieve praktijken. Daarbij is de context van groot belang. Het empirische onderzoek van dit boek start niet met een theoretisch raamwerk dat getoetst moet worden, maar met de context waarin managers functioneren. Meer specifiek is bestudeerd hoe managers over klanten en klantrelaties spreken. Gezien het theoretisch kader van de discours theorie, betekent dit dat ik bestudeerd heb hoe managers met hun klanten omgaan. In hun contacten met klanten komen allerlei morele vragen automatisch naar voren. In de behandeling van anderen is een duidelijk moreel element aanwezig.

In hoofdstuk 1 wordt een inleiding in de thematiek van dit boek gegeven. In de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 worden de theoretische achtergronden van deze studie uitgebreid beschreven. Hoofdstuk 2 spitst zich toe op de bedrijfsethiek. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de discours theorie verder uitgelegd en het belang van discours theorie voor de bedrijfsethiek. "Geen woorden, maar daden" is het bekende motto van Rotterdam. In discours theorie *zijn* woorden daden. We hebben toegang tot de werkelijkheid via de taal, maar de relatie tussen woorden en datgene wat ze beschrijven, is altijd problematisch. Taal is geen neutraal communicatiemiddel, het is geen statisch systeem. De textualist ziet taal niet als een set symbolen wier enige functie het proces van representatie is. Hij ziet taal als een systeem dat objecten en subjecten hun betekenis verleent. Sociale studies zouden sociale structuren niet als resultaat moeten zien van de belangen van individuen of organisaties, zoals de meeste stakeholder theoretici doen, maar de discoursen moeten bestuderen die die belangen vormen. Een discours theoreticus ziet discours als een specifiek ensemble van ideeën, concepten en categorisaties, die

geproduceerd, gereproduceerd en getransformeerd worden in een specifieke set van praktijken. Het discours geeft betekenis aan fysieke en sociale realiteiten.

Op basis van discours theorie kan een onderzoeker discoursanalyses uitvoeren. Het onderwerp van zo'n analyse is tekst, de materiële manifestatie van discoursen. Een discursieve analyse toont aan welke objecten and subjecten een rol spelen in sociale praktijken, welke conceptualiseringen er worden gebruikt. Een discoursanalyse is geen zoektocht naar de betekenis, empirisch of anderszins, van teksten. Het onderzoekt eerder de problematiseringvormen en komt met een narratief over de productie van problemen: waarom wordt iets als probleem gezien (of juist niet)? Met andere woorden, middels een discoursanalyse kan worden vastgesteld wat de grenzen zijn van wat wel en wat niet kan worden gezegd in een bepaalde context. Foucault noemde dit de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van een discours.

Binnen organisatie studies is er de laatste tien jaar veel aandacht voor discours en organisaties. De bedrijfsethiek daarentegen heeft tot nu toe nauwelijks oog gehad voor discours theorie. Toch kan de discours theorie veel voor de bedrijfsethiek betekenen. Het kan erg interessant zijn om te proberen een specifiek probleem met behulp van filosofische morele theorieën op te lossen, maar het is net zo interessant *dat* mensen zich voor bepaalde problemen en keuzes geplaatst zien. Discursieve praktijken bevatten vele waarden. De manier waarop men de werkelijkheid bekijkt, bepaalt ook hoe die gewaardeerd wordt; onze kijk op de werkelijkheid bepaalt of we überhaupt ergens een probleem zien of niet. Probleemdefinities en mogelijke oplossingen zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden. In discoursen lopen feitelijke en waarderende statements door elkaar. Binnen een bepaald discours krijgt een bepaalde kijk op de werkelijkheid de voorkeur boven een andere. Discoursen hebben daardoor allerlei machtsinvloeden.

In de hoofdstukken 4, 5, en 6 gaat het om de drie empirische studies die de basis vormen van dit onderzoek. Hier worden morele problemen beschreven van drie verschillende typen organisaties: Nederlandse banken, een professie en een charitatieve instelling. Hoe gaan Nederlandse banken met hun klanten om? Zijn er verschillen tussen de ABN-Amro, ING en de Rabobank, en zo ja, welke? En zijn (eventuele) verschillen te verklaren door te kijken naar de regiogrootte waarin een kantoor gevestigd is of door de bank waar een kantoor toe behoort? Om deze vragen draait het in hoofdstuk 4. ABN-Amro en ING zijn beursgenoteerd en

hebben aandeelhouders. Rabobank is een coöperatieve onderneming, en is niet beursgenoteerd. Volgens Rabobank kunnen ze mede daardoor anders omgaan met hun klanten dan hun grootste concurrenten. Rabobank hoeft immers geen aandeelhouders tevreden te stellen.

Om te achterhalen hoe binnen een bankkantoor (van Rabobank, ING en ABN-Amro) over klanten wordt gedacht, is gekeken in welke termen over een klant (in het algemeen) wordt gesproken. Om de discoursen te deconstrueren, heb ik de Q-methodologie gebruikt. Er zijn vijf verschillende discoursen gevonden, vijf verschillende wijzen om tegen klanten aan te kijken. De vijf discoursen kort getypeerd:

Discours A: "Samen (klant en bank) voor onszelf". Voor alle bankiers in discours A geldt dat de relatie met de klanten van wederzijds voordeel moet zijn. De relatie met de klant wordt gezien als één waar beiden van moeten profiteren. De klant wordt gezien als partner;

Discours B: "De klant als onderdeel van de regio". Voor discours B is niet het belangrijkste doel binnen een relatie om slechts een win-win situatie te creëren. Er zijn andere belangrijke zaken in de wereld naast banken en hun klanten. Geld is niet zo zeer een doel, het is meer een middel;

Discours C: "Een klant is een collega en concurrent in één". Discours C is een 'open business approach'. In discours C zien we voor het eerst dat een klant niet alleen als een partner gezien wordt, wat ook het geval is, maar ook als een concurrent;

Discours D: "Marketing, de klant als afnemer van winstgevende producten". Discours D is erg marketing gericht. Waar bankiers van discours C bij onderhandelingen een open business benadering hebben, zijn bankiers van discours D meer geneigd spelletjes te spelen;

Discours E: "De klant als een commerciële relatie". Bankiers van discours E zijn niet naar buiten gericht, maar sterk op zichzelf gefocust. Ze zijn erg zelfverzekerd, ook richting hun klanten. Ze geloven dat het in de bankwereld om kwaliteit draait.

Het verschil tussen grote steden en niet-verstedelijkte gebieden blijkt niet al te groot. Het enige dat opvalt, is dat in dorpen discours E niet voorkomt. In dorpen lijkt men zich dus niet met dat discours te kunnen vereenzelvigen. De bank waar een bankdirecteur toe behoort, blijkt wel een rol te spelen. Discours E blijkt met name een ABN-Amro discours te zijn. Discours A blijkt een ING discours te zijn en discours B overwegend een Rabobank discours. Hoewel er dus zoiets bestaat als

een Rabobank specifieke manier van omgaan met klanten, geldt dit zeker niet voor elk lokaal Rabobank-kantoor. Zo is discours B niet in steden aangetroffen. Een willekeurige klant die naar een willekeurige Rabobank gaat, lijkt er niet van op aan te kunnen op een specifieke wijze behandeld te worden.

Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over de klantrelaties van een professie, namelijk de klantrelaties van dierenartsen. Het onderzoek beperkt zich tot dierenartsen die werken in de veehouderij. Dierenartsen voelen een duidelijke verantwoordelijkheid naar hun dieren toe. Dieren zijn in die zin de klanten van dierenartsen. Dierenartsen hebben echter evenzeer te maken met de eigenaren van dieren. Die zijn hun opdrachtgever en betalen de rekeningen. In hoofdstuk 5 staan de volgende vragen centraal: Wie zijn nu de klanten van de dierenartsen, de dieren of de diereigenaren? Hoe gaan dierenartsen met hun klanten om? Hoe gaan ze om met de afwijkende belangen van dieren en hun eigenaren? Wat kunnen we concluderen over socialisatie en professionaliseringsprocessen van dierenartsen? En hoe verhouden de discoursen van dierenartsen zich tot die van studenten diergeneeskunde? Ook is gekeken naar de (eventuele) relatie tussen de discoursen van dierenartsen en variabelen als het jaar van afstuderen, geslacht, en de geografische plaats van beroepsuitoefening. Ook hier is als methode van onderzoek de Q-methodologie gebruikt.

Er blijken vier verschillende discoursen te bestaan van dierenartsen over hun klanten, vier verschillende wijzen van omgaan met dieren en hun eigenaren. De vier discoursen kort getypeerd:

Discours A: "Steun van de verantwoordelijke veehouder". Dierenartsen die zich in discours A bewegen, voelen een sterke band met de eigenaar van het dier, de veehouder. Dierenarts is een dienstverlenend beroep en het is de taak van de dierenarts om de boer te helpen bij zijn bedrijfsvoering;

Discours B: "De advocaten der dieren". Discours B kenmerkt zich in eerste instantie door de moeite die de artsen uit dit discours hebben met de intensieve veehouderij. De loyaliteitswijzer slaat duidelijk door naar het dier. Het tevreden stellen van klanten is veel minder belangrijk dan het bevorderen en handhaven van de gezondheid en het welzijn van dieren. De dierenarts draagt een grote verantwoordelijkheid richting het dier;

Discours C: "Gevoelsmatige dierenartsen". Dierenartsen uit discours C laten zich het meeste door hun gevoel leiden. En dit gevoel is afhankelijk van de situatie. Het individuele zieke dier staat meestal op de voorgrond, soms de individuele veehouder. Men is vrij kritisch ten opzichte van de veehouder.

Typerend voor discours C is verder de kritische houding ten opzichte van collegae;

Discours D: "De professionele dierenarts". Dierenartsen van discours D zijn erg principieel. Ze voelen zich niet zo snel door een situatie gedwongen dingen te doen. Wat dierenartsen uit discours D typeert, is hun preoccupatie met de vraag wat het beroep dierenarts inhoudt, met alle ethische vraagstukken van dien.

Onder studenten diergeneeskunde zijn twee onderzoeken uitgevoerd, één onder de eerstejaars en één onder de vierdejaars. Bij alle studenten diergeneeskunde blijkt een duidelijke liefde voor dieren. Het doden van gezonde dieren, puur omdat anders een ander het zou doen, is niet geaccepteerd. Hoewel het beeld dat studenten van de diereigenaren hebben onderling verschilt, heeft niemand het idee dat een dierenarts puur dienstverlenend moet zijn aan de eigenaar en dat de loyaliteit altijd bij de eigenaar van het dier moet liggen. Dat zou het dier te kort doen. Het omgekeerde, dat de loyaliteit in eerste instantie bij het dier moet liggen, geldt voor sommigen, voor anderen niet.

Bij de eerstejaars studenten zijn vier discoursen gevonden:

Discours A: "Gevoelsmatige toekomstige steun van veehouders". De eerstejaars studenten uit discours A zien niet al te grote bezwaren in de intensieve veeteelt. Ze voelen een sterke sympathie voor de veehouder. De veehouder heeft het beste met zijn dieren voor. Bij het behandelen van dieren beslist uiteindelijk altijd de eigenaar;

Discours B: "Gevoelsmatige dierliefhebbers". Eerstejaars studenten uit discours B hebben grote gevoelsmatige bezwaren tegen de wijze waarop in onze samenleving vaak met dieren wordt omgegaan. De eigenaar behoort niet over het dier te beslissen, maar de dierenarts;

Discours C: "De denkende en principiële dierliefhebbers". Studenten uit discours C idealiseren de natuur absoluut niet, het kan een harde wereld zijn. Het is met name het economische aspect van de landbouwhuisdierensector dat ze tegen de borst stuit. Ondanks hun principiële houding schatten de studenten uit discours C de eigen rol niet als zeer groot in. Dierenartsen zijn er om oplossingen aan te dragen, uiteindelijk beslist de eigenaar;

Discours D: "Voorvechters voor dierenrechten en dierenwelzijn binnen een intensieve veehouderij". Studenten uit discours D denken geregeld na over de ethische kanten van het beroep. Ze maken zich zorgen over het welzijn van dieren. Het beeld van de eigenaar is positief.

Bij de vierdejaars studenten werden eveneens vier discoursen aangetroffen:

Discours A: "De met de harde realiteit geconfronteerde principiële dierliefhebbers". Studenten uit discours A hebben veel moeite met de intensieve veehouderij. Ze hebben het idee dat het dier in de intensieve veehouderij een product is geworden, en dit wordt als een negatieve ontwikkeling gezien. Studenten uit discours A zijn er het meest mee oneens van alle studenten dat dierenarts een dienstverlenend beroep is;

Discours B: "De toekomstige steun van de verantwoordelijke veehouder". Studenten uit discours B hebben een positief beeld van veehouders. Ze zijn er, in tegenstelling tot studenten uit de discoursen A en C, sterk van overtuigd dat boeren hart voor hun dieren hebben. De studenten van discours B zijn verreweg het meest begaan met de diereigenaren en voor hen voelen ze dan ook een sterke loyaliteit;

Discours C: "Advocaten der dieren tegen het systeem van de intensieve veehouderij". De wijze waarop met dieren wordt omgegaan in de intensieve veehouderij, stuit vierdejaars studenten in discours C tegen de borst. Het dier is in de intensieve veeteelt ondergeschikt geworden aan geld, en dat is een slechte zaak. De oorzaak ligt echter niet bij de individuele boer, het ligt meer aan het systeem. Maar de loyaliteit van studenten uit discours C zal later wel bij de dieren liggen;

Discours D: "Kritische en principiële toekomstige landbouwhuisdierenpractici". Het raakt studenten uit discours D als de landbouwsector negatief in het nieuws staat. Ze idealiseren de natuur niet. Ze hebben een duidelijke sympathie voor de veehouders, dat zijn mensen die hart hebben voor hun dieren. Studenten uit discours D hebben een hele duidelijke en principiële eigen instelling. De loyaliteit zal later als dierenarts heel sterk bij het dier liggen.

Het onderverdelen van dierenartsen in dier-georiënteerde artsen en service-georiënteerde (of eigenaar-georiënteerde) artsen blijkt veel te simpel. Zowel het dier als de veehouder zijn klanten. Geen dierenarts kan principieel kiezen tussen dier en diereigenaar. Toch nemen ze dagelijks vele beslissingen over het welzijn van dieren en hun eigenaren. Dat doen ze vanuit de achtergrond van de vier discoursen. De houding van artsen en hun wijze van omgang met dieren en hun eigenaren worden niet gevormd tijdens de studie diergeneeskunde. Hoogstens wordt een bestaande houding daar versterkt. Het geslacht van de dierenarts of de leeftijd blijkt evenmin een grote invloed te hebben op hun omgang met dieren en

diereigenaren. Wel lijkt de plaats van beroepsuitoefening van enige invloed te zijn. In de nabije toekomst zullen er meer studenten afstuderen die grote bezwaren hebben tegen de intensieve veeteelt. Dit zal of leiden tot een tekort aan dierenartsen in de veehouderij, of tot veranderingen in de intensieve veehouderij.

Hoofdstuk 6 gaat over een derde type organisatie met een eigen problematiek: een charitatieve instelling. Hoe gaan filantropische instellingen met hun klanten om? Wat is hun dominante taal? Goede doelen hebben geld nodig om goed te kunnen doen, maar hoever gaan zij bij het innen van dat geld? Wat zijn de morele grenzen bij het fondsenwerven? En wat zijn de verschillen op dit punt met commerciële organisaties? Wat zijn de speciale omstandigheden van charitatieve instellingen? Antwoorden op deze vragen zijn verkregen door middel van een etnografische studie bij de afdeling Fondsenwerving van de Nederlandse Hartstichting (NHS).

Binnen charitatieve organisaties blijken er zeer speciale omstandigheden te bestaan voor fondsenwervers, zeer specifieke vormen van problematisering. De fondsenwervers moeten met allerlei beperkingen rekening houden, die men bij commerciële organisaties niet tegen komt. Zo mag voor elke binnengekomen euro, niet meer dan 25 eurocent zijn uitgegeven aan fondsenwerving. Men mag dus niet 1 miljoen euro uitgeven om 2 miljoen euro voor het goede doel te verdienen.

Bij de fondsenwervers blijkt een ander discours te bestaan dan bij de directie en medisch inhoudelijke afdelingen van de NHS. In het discours van de directie staat de missie van de NHS centraal: het ondersteunen van onderzoek, het bevorderen van een gezonde levensstijl en (medische) hulp voor hartpatiënten. Heel erg belangrijk is dat de NHS onafhankelijk is en blijft. De NHS moet altijd autonoom blijven en altijd *volledig* eerlijk blijven.

De fondsenwervers daarentegen zien het als hun voornaamste verantwoordelijkheid om zoveel mogelijk geld te verdienen, zodat de NHS daar veel goeds mee kan doen. Het product van de organisatie is "goed doen". Als er geen geld binnen komt, kan de organisatie zijn product niet leveren en dat vergeet de rest van de organisatie nog wel eens (volgens de fondsenwervers). Er leven andere morele vragen dan bij de directie. Dit leidt tot spanningen. Bij het fondsenwerven en adverteren moet een balans gevonden worden tussen creatief met de waarheid omgaan en geld verdienen. Het speciale doel van de organisatie

motiveert de fondsenwervers niet speciaal. Het zijn professionals die het als hun taak zien geld voor de organisatie binnen te halen.

In het discours van de directie zijn er verschillende typen klanten van de NHS. Klanten zijn de mensen die geld doneren, maar ook degenen die naar de NHS komen voor hulp: patiënten, medisch onderzoekers, mensen die informatie willen, etc. Zolang mensen passen in de missie van de NHS, of ze nu geld kosten of genereren, ze zijn welkom en worden als klant beschouwd. Voor de fondsenwervers daarentegen zijn diegenen klanten, die geld inbrengen. Klanten worden met een marketing rationaliteit tegemoet getreden.

Binnen goede doelen zijn de dilemma's over de grenzen van wat is toegestaan bij het fondsenwerven, dominant. Verder zijn betrouwbaarheid en onafhankelijkheid dominante concepten, belangrijker dan in commerciële organisaties.

In hoofdstuk 7 wordt teruggekeerd naar de hoofdvragen van dit boek. Als alle discoursen naast elkaar worden gelegd, kunnen uiteenlopende conclusies worden getrokken met betrekking tot de klantrelaties van managers en met betrekking tot hun hanteerbare moraliteit. Om tamelijk onhanteerbare vraagstukken hanteerbaar te maken, blijken managers hun eigen rol te projecteren op die van hun klanten: de rol (verantwoordelijkheid) die een manager zichzelf toedicht, verwacht hij of zij ook van zijn of haar klanten, met name in morele zin. Verder is het zo dat hoe meer karakteristieken het discours van een manager heeft van een dominee-discours, hoe groter de kans op conflicten met de eigen klanten. Ten derde is opvallend dat een manager die bewust met maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen bezig is, beter denkt te 'weten' wat moreel goed en slecht is voor klanten. Hij of zij voelt zich verantwoordelijk voor hen en doet meer af aan hun morele autonomie. Omgekeerd is het zo dat hoe meer karakteristieken een discours heeft van een koopman-discours, hoe meer de manager verschillende verantwoordelijkheden voor zichzelf en zijn of haar klanten ziet. Klanten worden dan meer als gelijkwaardige partners beschouwd. De verantwoordelijkheid van de klant ligt bij de klant: de klant moet zelf bepalen wat moreel goed en fout is. In die zin laten managers uit een ideaaltypisch koopman-discours hun klanten de meeste morele autonomie. Ten vierde blijken managers die zich sterk focussen op geld verdienen, hun moraliteit hanteerbaar te maken door beslissingen te nemen en te rechtvaardigen op grond van hun loyaliteit aan de eigen organisatie. Ten slotte valt op dat professionals meer handelen vanuit regels van een

beroepsethiek om hun moraliteit hanteerbaar te maken en meer bezig zijn hun concurrenten moreel te beoordelen.

Voor het oplossen van problemen is informatie nodig en voor het verkrijgen van de juiste informatie, moeten specifieke vragen worden gesteld. Alle discoursen hebben daartoe een informatie strategie. Deze informatie strategie is een onderdeel van de hanteerbare moraliteit van een discours. Managers moeten voortdurend beslissingen nemen. De informatie strategie van een discours helpt ze met te bepalen welke informatie van belang is, en helpt ze de verkregen informatie in actie te vertalen. Aangezien de discoursen een inherente moraliteit bevatten (waarvan een gedeelte expliciet, maar ook een gedeelte impliciet), verschilt het van discours tot discours welke informatie van belang wordt geacht en welke praktische vragen daartoe gesteld worden.

Het is niet alleen belangrijk *dat* managers zich voor morele problemen geplaatst zien, maar ook *welke* problemen ze formuleren. Welke problemen worden wel onderkend en welke niet? De meeste morele beslissingen manifesteren zichzelf niet duidelijk als dusdanig. Ze zijn impliciet. Ze zijn verbonden met de wijze waarop managers over hun realiteit praten. De discoursen van managers blijken niet te verdelen in een koopman-discours en een dominee-discours. We kunnen slechts zeggen dat sommige discoursen meer of minder elementen van de populaire discoursen bevatten. Managers zien zichzelf niet voor binaire keuzes geplaatst die uitsluitend betrekking hebben op goed doen en geld verdienen. De populaire discoursen bieden managers geen hanteerbare moraliteit. Managers willen goed doen *en* geld verdienen. Ze denken in termen van concrete en praktische dilemma's. Welke problemen ze zien en welke oplossingen daarvoor geschikt zijn, hangt af van het discours (de context) van de manager.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores of the Bankers

	DISCOURSE				
	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
1. There are no specific sectors of business, which we prefer strongly. It doesn't matter which sector a (potential) client is from.	0	-1	+2	-1	-1
2. Financial service is a matter of live and let live (between customers and banks).	+2	0	+1	+2	+1
3. A customer is someone you cooperate with; after all, we only have common interests. He is like a colleague.	0	+1	0	+1	-1
4. We have strong ethical boundaries, which means we do not want to do business with just any customer. I am talking about things such as abiding by the law and absolutely never accepting large gifts.	+1	+2	0	+1	+1
5. In the relations with customers you can notice that banks are more and more marketing-organizations, instead of product-organizations.	0	0	+1	+1	+1
6. When a customer is in financial difficulty, we are more focused on helping the customer, than on reducing the financial risk of the bank, even if the risk of losing money increases.	-1	+1	+1	-2	-3
7. We (almost) never have big problems with customers who feel they are treated wrongly. When there are problems, we usually solve them to everyone's satisfaction. We feel very responsible for (almost) all problems.	0	0	+2	0	0
8. Some customers are very interesting to us, because they contribute to the image of the bank. Just an example: we do not have to make a profit out of a customer like a hospital even in its totality (including insurances etc.), and then it's still a challenge to facilitate such a customer as good as possible.	-1	0	+1	-1	0
9. The average customer is someone who is very focused on money. Growth, profit and independence are very important to him. If we do not give him the highest quality of service and very good rates, he's gone.	-1	-1	0	-1	0
10. The worst experience with customers for me is when a company goes bankrupt.	-1	0	-2	+1	0

		DISCOURSE			
	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
11. It is not *necessary* to be involved in the region, but it is commercially absolutely desirable. The goodwill you gain with customers (or prospects) by being an active partner in society is at least as big as by local advertisements.	+1	+2	+1	+2	+1
12. Financial rates are more important to our customers than a sense of involvement from our bank.	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2
13. Values are very important, but they have to be sincere. If you play a game with them, and just give some money for some good causes, a (potential) customer will see right through that.	0	+1	+3	+1	+2
14. It never happens that we sell a product to a customer about we think: "he could easily miss that".	-2	-1	0	-1	-1
15. It is certainly conceivable that we first invest in the relationship with a new customer, and view the earning-capacity as a manifestation of the deepening relationship.	0	+2	+2	+1	+1
16. Of course we are involved in our region, but one certainly mustn't exaggerate that. The involvement is mainly through our customers.	0	-2	-1	-2	-1
17. Of course it happens that we sell a product to a customer about we think: "he could easily miss that".	0	-2	-1	-2	0
18. I wish that our customers would care a little more for society. You see a lot of superficiality. Customers are very self-occupied. The common interest hardly gets any attention.	0	0	0	0	-1
19. Ethics play a role in our business. This means not facilitating customers with activities that cross our boundaries. These boundaries go clearly further than just legal boundaries. We even ethically reprimand customers sometimes.	0	0	0	0	+1
20. When judging a business-plan of a (potential) customer, the concept of sustainability plays a role. We go clearly further than just finding out whether the company has the necessary licenses.	+2	+1	-1	0	+1
21. The *average* customer is someone who doesn't see money as a goal in itself, but more as a means to express a certain achievement. We, as a bank, are sort of a partner with whom he maintains a personal relationship. As soon as he feels he is treated unfairly, you run the risk he will go to a competitor.	0	+1	0	0	+1
22. At our bank, every customer pays the same rate for the same service.	-3	-1	-3	-3	-3

	DISCOURSE				
	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
23. The worst experience with customers occurs when one of the many forms of fraud comes to light.	0	0	0	0	+2
24. Often we give starting businesses a chance, customers that otherwise wouldn't get a chance with other banks.	-3	+1	-2	-1	-1
25. The most important reason for a customer to choose us is 'the impression we have of each other', that customers feel comfortable with us, that they feel at home.	+1	+2	+2	+1	0
26. We are now certainly more customer-oriented and less product-oriented than we used to be. We used to have products, which we tried to sell to a customer. Nowadays we investigate more in the market what customers want and adapt our products accordingly.	+2	+2	0	+2	+1
27. When we notice at a certain point that a customer is not remunerative, it matters to us whether he is a starter just beginning or has been remunerative for years, or that the whole sector is going through a rough period, or that there are signals that point downwards for a longer period.	+1	+1	0	+1	0
28. Rates differ with us from client to client.	+3	0	0	0	+1
29. When a customer is in financial difficulty, we are strongly focused on helping the customer. But most of our attention is of course on reducing the financial risk of the bank. The risk of losing money may not increase.	0	0	+1	+2	+2
30. For start-up companies, the threshold to our bank is not the lowest.	+2	-2	0	0	0
31. Most of our customers chose us because of our friendliness and because we are easily attainable.	-1	-1	-1	0	-1
32. We ask ourselves constantly: what can we do for the region, which means more than just our customers and prospects. It means that we initiate things, that we contact people ourselves to see how we can contribute to all kinds of societal developments.	-2	+3	+1	0	-1
33. When judging a business-plan of a (potential) customer, the concept of sustainability plays a role, but certainly not a big one. We cannot go further of course than checking whether the company has the necessary licenses.	-2	-1	-1	-1	-2
34. The worst experiences in our job are customers who are materialistic. Those who are being difficult about every penny.	0	-1	-2	+1	-1

	DISCOURSE				
	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
35. Desperate cases require desperate remedies. You should let weak companies know as soon as possible that we want to end the relationship. In the end, that's also the best for the customer.	+2	0	0	0	+1
36. Financial rates are an important part of doing business. But at least as important for customers are good service and image. As a bank you should most of all communicate that you have the knowledge.	+3	+3	+2	+3	+3
37. We don't do too much sponsoring. We just have a certain amount of money for relationship-marketing in general. That means doing everything to bond with our clients and prospects.	+1	-3	-3	-1	0
38. I wish customers in general wouldn't be so materialistic. Financial rates are often the only thing that counts when doing business.	-1	0	-1	0	-2
39. You could wish of course that every customer makes us a profit with every product he buys, but you can also look differently at that: for example at the length of the total relationship or at the profitability of the sector he belongs to.	+1	0	+1	+1	0
40. We sometimes have big problems with customers who feel they are treated wrongly. But some customers are very unreasonable. Some of them hold the bank responsible for everything, they consider themselves faultless.	+1	-1	-1	0	0
41. Customers, who don't negotiate, still get the best financial rates with our bank.	-1	0	0	-2	-1
42. I certainly cannot say that customers are very materialistic. Of course, we talk a lot about money, but that's my job.	0	0	+1	-1	0
43. The *average* customer is someone who puts himself in the center, and in general doesn't like banks very much. He or she is mainly focused on making profits. As a bank you feel more like an opponent than as a partner.	-2	-3	-2	-3	-2
44. With start-up companies, we run more of a risk on purpose, because they are very important to the region.	0	+1	0	+1	-1
45. In our bank, customers are put at the center of attention, because it's they who have to generate the profits.	+1	+1	+1	+3	+3
46. I think it is very wise of customers if they don't want to be dependent on just one bank for their financial services.	-1	-2	-1	-1	0

	DISCOURSE				
	A_b	B_b	C_b	D_b	E_b
47. It is very unwise of a customer not to negotiate with us about our financial rates. That would certainly cost them money.	-1	-1	-2	-1	0
48. Some customers are very interesting to us. The interest we have in a customer is the *total revenue*. We don't have to make a profit out of a loan to a hospital, if we can also do the insurance, pensions, etc..	+1	+1	0	+2	+2
49. Values are more and more important to us. Because our name has to appear only once in the papers with "that bank did something wrong", and there goes our good name. And that will cost us customers.	+1	+1	+1	0	+2
50. A customer is someone with whom you have partly common and partly opposing interests. He or she is a colleague and a competitor in one.	-1	-2	+3	0	0
51. We don't want to have anything to do with illegal business, very clearly, but we aren't moralists either. If someone in society finds something indecent, it's not a reason for us not to do business with a customer. Then the fences are down.	+1	0	-1	0	0
52. With a starting business we only look at the business-plan. Then we are very critical, because it's no use throwing good money after bad. That's for neither a good situation.	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2

Appendix B: Statements and Factor Scores of Students and Veterinarians

First-Year Students, 42 Statements, Idealized Factor Scores

	DISCOURSE			
	A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1
31. I do not want to be responsible for intensive animal husbandry, but I possibly would want to work in that sector.	0	0	0	0
27. It fascinates me to see how you can maximize meat production.	-1	-3	-2	0
38. Meat should be produced in a different way in Holland. But it is going better. People are more aware of the well being of animals.	0	+2	+1	+1
34. The way animals are kept as consumer goods, is not always reasonable. I want to change that.	0	+3	+2	+2
17. I think the intensive animal husbandry is more than terrible.	-2	-1	0	-2
14. Most farmers really feel for their animals.	+3	+1	+2	+2
41. The way farm animals are treated in Holland, depends usually on the farmer.	+1	-1	0	+1
1. I do not have objections to intensive animal husbandry. As long as it is clean.	0	-1	0	0
39. The castration of pigs is apparently necessary, because it happens.	0	0	-1	-1
18. I am against castration of pigs without anesthesia. I would never do that myself.	-2	-1	0	0
2. I think that as a vet, you should have the integrity not to perform surgery that you are against. Period. Even when the owner threatens to kill the animal. Otherwise you let yourself be blackmailed.	+1	0	-1	+1
37. As a vet I will get requests that will offend me. It cannot be helped that other people think differently than I do. We will have to deal with that together. Therefore, I will have to make concessions too.	+2	+2	0	+1
19. I do not like the economic aspect of the farm animals sector.	-1	+1	+1	0
33. My loyalty as a vet will in the first place be with the animal. How I will deal with that exactly, will depend on the sector I will work in. As far as, for example, a cow is concerned, I won't just look at the individual animal, but also at the farm as a whole.	+1	+3	+1	+1
23. Farmers want to produce in a different way, but that is simply impossible.	+3	0	+1	0
32. As a farm animal practitioner, your loyalty should always be with the farmer.	-1	0	-2	-1

	DISCOURSE			
	A₁	B₁	C₁	D₁
28. The well being of the animal is for me the most important thing. Also more important than the interests of the owner.	-2	+1	-1	0
40. As a vet, my loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. The animal should have a good life. The interests of the owner are less important to me.	-1	+2	0	0
30. My loyalty will be as much with the animal as with the owner. You cannot look at the animal separate from its owner.	+2	0	+1	+3
13. Veterinary practice is a service-oriented practice. My loyalty will therefore in the first place be with the owner of the animal.	-1	-2	-2	-2
4. I have great doubts about the modern reproduction technology for animals.	0	0	+1	-1
26. As long it doesn't harm the animal, I do not have any problem with the modern reproduction technology.	+1	+1	0	+2
20. To say to farmers that something should be done differently, is no use. They are only interested in their own economic interests.	-3	-2	-1	-2
35. It bothers me that people always say that there is so much wrong in the farm animal sector, because in the companion animal sector, it is just as bad.	+2	+2	-1	0
36. To kill a healthy animal, is always idiotic.	-3	-1	-1	0
42. Your opinion is formed in this study. They want to create certain types of veterinary practitioners. You are taught what is right.	0	-2	+1	-1
22. I am not sure how I will react if I am asked to kill healthy animals, I will have to think about it.	0	+1	+1	0
3. As long as the animal has a good life, I will never start killing a healthy animal.	0	0	0	+3
9. Before I was a student, I never realized that dealing with animal owners is an important part of veterinary practice.	-2	0	-2	-3
6. The animal has become a product. The fact that it also lives, is something that tends to be forgotten.	-1	+1	+3	-1
12. On request, I would probably kill healthy animals. Otherwise, the owners will go to a different vet. Now at least I collect the 35 guilders.	-1	-3	-3	-3
25. You cannot say: I would never kill healthy animals. Together with animal owners, you always come to an agreement.	+1	+1	0	-1
11. If you look at animals in nature, you see much misery. Do not idealize nature. That is a much tougher world for animals than the world of farm animals.	+1	-1	+1	-1

	DISCOURSE			
	A_1	B_1	C_1	D_1
10. If the disadvantages for animals are small, and the advantages for humans are very big, I do not object to the use of drugs to enhance growth, production or performance.	+1	-2	-1	0
8. The image I have of animals has not changed in the short time I am studying now.	0	0	-1	+1
24. The image I have of animals has changed in the short time I am studying now.	0	0	0	-1
5. It must be economical to treat an animal. Vets are there to suggest solutions. In the end, the animal owner decides.	+2	-1	+2	+1
16. When I will be practicing, I expect I will have problems with animal owners.	+1	+1	+2	+1
29. When I will be practicing, I expect I will not have problems with animal owners.	0	-1	-1	0
15. The keeping of farm animals is very much focused on production. There is no attention for the individual animal. The individual animal doesn't count.	-1	+1	0	-1
21. I have not thought much about the ethical side of veterinary practice.	-1	-1	-3	-2
7. I have thought much about the ethical side of veterinary practice.	+1	0	+3	+2

Appendices

Fourth-Year Students, 42 statements, Idealized Factor Scores

	DISCOURSE			
	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
31. The animal has become a product. The fact that it also lives, is something that tends to be forgotten.	+3	-1	+2	-1
27. Farmers want to produce in a different way, but that is simply impossible.	0	+1	0	+1
38. Things could be improved in intensive animal husbandry, but it is going in the right direction.	-1	+2	-1	0
34. Most farmers really feel for their animals.	+1	+2	0	+2
17. The way farm animals are treated in Holland, depends usually on the farmer.	0	+2	0	0
14. The individual animal has no value in the poultry sector. That offends me.	+2	-1	+2	-1
41. I don't have a problem with the fact that animals have become a means of production. It is out of the animal that the farmer makes a living.	+1	0	-3	+1
1. The animal is of minor importance than making money in intensive animal husbandry. I do not agree with that.	+1	-1	+3	-1
39. Intensive animal husbandry troubles me, especially the housing of animals. We have grown into the current situation, but if you look at it neutrally, it is a very unhealthy situation.	+2	-1	+3	0
18. I am against the castration of pigs without anesthesia. I would never do that.	+1	-2	+1	+2
2. You cannot change the world on your own. I do not see it as a solution when you withdraw yourself from certain practices. When utility surgery has to be performed, you had better do it yourself, then at least it is done well.	-2	+1	-1	-2
37. Utility surgery should be minimized as much as possible. Only when the interests for humans are very large and the detriment to the well being of the animal is very small, one is allowed to perform such surgery. Otherwise I will not cooperate	0	0	+1	-1
19. It is hard to say whether I will perform utility surgery. But I dare saying that I will probably not do it.	+1	-2	+1	+1
33. I think that as a vet, you should have the integrity not to perform surgery that you are against. Period. Even when the owner threatens to kill the animal. Otherwise you let yourself be blackmailed.	+1	+1	0	0

	DISCOURSE			
	A₄	B₄	C₄	D₄
23. I notice that I am finding certain issues more and more normal during my studies, of which I used to think: "that is wrong". I am accustomed to those issues now.	-1	0	+1	-1
32. To say to farmers that something should be done differently, is no use. They are only interested in their own economic interests.	-1	-3	-2	-3
28. It bothers me that people always say that there is so much wrong in the farm animal sector, because in the companion animal sector, it is just as bad.	+1	+2	0	+2
40. The well being of the animal is for me the most important thing. Also more important than the interests of the owner.	+1	-2	0	-1
30. I really can not say whether my 'loyalty' will be with the animal or the animal owner. That will purely depend on my judgment of concrete situations.	-1	+3	0	-1
13. As a veterinarian I will get requests that will offend me. It cannot be helped that other people think differently than I do. We will have to deal with that together. Therefore, I will have to make concessions too.	0	+3	+1	+1
4. My loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. Every veterinarian has in the first place the duty to protect the well being of the animal.	+3	0	+2	+3
26. Veterinary practice is a service-oriented practice. My loyalty will therefore in the first place be with the owner of the animal.	-2	-2	-2	-1
20. As a vet, my loyalty will in the first place be with the animal. The animal should have a good life. The interests of the owner are less important for me.	0	+1	0	0
35. I find the economic side of veterinary practice quite interesting.	0	0	-3	+1
36. My romantic view of animals has been disturbed during my studies. Reality is simply different, but I do not mind that that is the case.	-1	0	-1	0
42. The image I had of animals has not changed much during my studies.	-3	0	-1	+2
22. On request, I would probably kill healthy animals. Otherwise, the owners will go to a different vet. Now at least I make some money out of it.	-3	-1	-2	-3
3. You cannot say: I would never kill healthy animals. Together with animal owners, you always come to an agreement.	-1	+1	0	-2
9. You may only kill healthy animals, if you are not sure whether they are healthy. So, only when they *could* have a dangerous disease, like swine fever.	0	-1	-1	0

	DISCOURSE			
	A_4	B_4	C_4	D_4
6. As long as the animal has a good life, I will never start killing a healthy animal.	-2	-1	+1	+3
12. If you look at animals in nature, you see much misery. Do not idealize nature. That is a much tougher world for animals than the world of farm animals.	-3	0	-1	+2
25. I have more knowledge now about the way animals live. I have thought things through. I think my opinion has grown stronger during my studies.	0	0	+1	+1
11. I have seen problems of veterinarian medicine during my studies, that I was unaware of as a freshman.	+2	0	+1	0
10. Dairy cattle are top producers; you can compare them with athletes. I will never cooperate in letting them produce even more.	-1	-3	+1	-2
8. If the disadvantages for animals are small, and the advantages for humans are very big, I do not object to the use of drugs to enhance growth, production or performance.	-2	0	-1	0
24. I think many students will forget their ethical concerns at the moment they are practicing themselves. They will get used to things through routines.	+2	+1	0	0
5. Your opinion is formed in this study. They want to create certain types of veterinary practitioners. You are taught what is right.	0	0	-1	0
16. When I will be practicing, I expect I will have problems with animal owners.	0	+1	+2	+1
29. When I will be practicing, I expect I will not have problems with animal owners.	0	-1	-2	-2
15. It must be economical to treat an animal. Vets are there to suggest solutions. In the end, the animal owner decides.	-1	+1	-1	+1
21. I have great doubts about the modern reproduction technology for animals.	0	-1	0	-1
7. As long it doesn't harm the animal, I do not have any problem with the modern reproduction technology.	+1	+1	0	0

Appendices

Veterinarians, 52 Statements, Idealized Factor Scores

	DISCOURSE			
	A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v
28. I find the stimulation and maintaining of the health and well being of animals more important than satisfying customers.	+1	+1	0	+2
40. I find satisfying customers more important than the stimulation and maintaining of the health and well being of animals.	-1	-3	-1	-2
30. If the interests of the owner conflict with those of the animal, I chose just after my studies always for the animal. But later on you get more attention for the interests of owners: now I choose more often for the owner.	0	-1	-1	-1
13. It must be economical to treat an animal. Vets are there to suggest solutions. In the end, the animal owner decides.	+2	+2	+2	+1
45. Economic interests can conflict with the interests if the animal. Now I choose, more than I used to, for the animal.	0	+1	0	+1
4. I don't have a problem with the fact that animals have become a means of production. It is out of the animal that the farmer makes a living.	+3	+2	+1	+1
26. The owner sees the animal too much as a means of production.	-1	0	+2	-1
20. In general, the owner doesn't see the animal too much as a means of production.	+2	0	-1	0
35. I am very involved with the farmer. What is more, I am economically dependent on him. So I cannot have him be upset with me.	0	0	+1	-1
2. There are not many conflicts with the owner. I act as an intermediary. If the owner has a different opinion than me, we can always work that out.	+3	+1	+1	+1
42. In principle, the animal owner is responsible for every veterinary surgery. It is the task of the vet to communicate the pros and cons.	+2	+2	-1	+3
22. The contact with animal owners is troublesome sometimes.	-1	0	0	-1
3. My loyalty is the most with the animal. In extreme circumstances, I make decisions against the interests of the owner. My point of departure is always the animal.	0	+2	-1	+1
52. The different interests of animals and their owners can sometimes lead to conflicts. In that respect, I notice that my values have changed during the years.	0	+1	-1	0
9. Utility surgery is either to protect the animal or with an eye on the consumer. In both cases, humans are allowed to do that.	+1	0	0	0

	DISCOURSE			
	A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v
6. Caesarian sections should be much more expensive: than there would be much less of them.	-1	0	0	0
50. Actually, I am against utility surgery which is only useful for the owner of the animal and not the animal itself. But I do perform that surgery anyway.	-1	0	0	+1
12. The keeping of farm animals is very much focused on production. There is no attention for the individual animal. The individual animal doesn't count.	-2	0	0	-1
51. With caesarian sections of the specially bred "heavy calves", you preserve something that is not natural. As long as you do them, that practice won't end. We have to stop with that immediately.	-2	0	-2	-1
11. I would perform caesarian sections on a routine basis. I have to make a living too.	+1	-1	+2	0
31. The fact that pigs are castrated is not a problem for me, but that can never be done without anesthesia. The only reason to do it without anesthesia is money. And that is not a good reason.	-1	+1	-1	-1
48. The castration of pigs should be prohibited. But that is impossible: that is the consumption problem.	0	-1	+1	+2
27. I do not kill healthy animals, out of principle.	0	+1	-2	0
38. It shouldn't happen that you kill a healthy animal, but sometimes you are taken by surprise by a situation or an owner. Then you can get angry, but sometimes you just have to go along.	+1	-1	0	-2
47. I cannot say much about the killing of healthy animals. You have to weigh the pros and cons in each particular situation.	+1	0	0	0
39. Intensive animal husbandry troubles me, especially the housing of animals. We have grown into the current situation, but if you look at it neutrally, it is a very unhealthy situation.	-1	+2	-1	-1
41. Many right-minded persons are troubled by the housing of some animals. Me too, but I still try to keep every farmer as my customer.	-1	0	+1	-1
34. You can try very hard to solve certain problems in the intensive animal husbandry, but somewhere else, in other countries, the problem is just as big.	+1	0	+1	0
17. Producers deliver what consumers want. You can not agree with that, but that doesn't change anything. The producer must offer the product against a price that the consumer demands.	0	-1	-1	-2
14. Intensive animal husbandry is not necessary. It should be abolished.	-2	0	-2	-2

	DISCOURSE			
	A$_v$	B$_v$	C$_v$	D$_v$
49. The fate of pigs in Holland is terrible. I do not want to cooperate with that.	-3	-1	-3	-2
36. Many housing systems are far from optimal. But it is not realistic not to cooperate with that.	0	+1	0	+1
18. I have too many mass (and flock) treatments of animals and much too few individual treatments.	-2	-2	+1	0
37. In general, things are going very well in the Dutch intensive animal husbandry.	+1	-2	0	0
33. Pigs are, in general, very well housed, fed and taken care of in Holland.	+2	-1	0	+1
19. There is too much competition among veterinarians.	-1	-1	+3	+2
1. At the beginning of my study, I sometimes thought: "Certain things I just won't do". But I notice that I, often forced by the situation, I do those things anyway later on. My boundaries have shifted.	+1	0	0	+1
43. Things only change in the way we treat animals in general in Holland, if you change the law.	-1	0	0	-1
23. I see service to the customer as the most important goal of my profession. It is out of the customers that I make my living.	0	+1	+1	0
32. To be honest, I find it annoying to think about ethical issues of our profession. I do not like it when I am confronted with it.	-2	-3	-2	-3
25. I sometimes notice improper veterinary care by farmers. That is the danger of do-it-yourself-veterinarian-care.	+1	+3	+2	+2
46. It is a good development that farmers do more and more veterinarian care themselves. Because of this, farmers are more aware of certain issues, they have more knowledge and accept more responsibility.	+1	-2	0	0
10. There are a few vets who do not stick to the rules. Vets who do things that are not allowed. That is unfair competition for the rest of us.	+2	+1	+3	+3
8. During your study, you learn that you do not only experience the pleasant side of animal life in our profession. You learn that there are also nasty aspects in our profession.	0	+1	0	0
5. Sometimes you can be forced by the situation to do things that you do not want to do. But if you don't do them, the animal owner will go to a colleague.	0	-2	+2	-1
16. I am a woman/man of principle. If I do not want to do something, I absolutely refuse to do it.	0	0	-1	+1

| | **DISCOURSE** | | | |
	A_v	B_v	C_v	D_v
24. As long as it is not forbidden, I sometimes treat animals without veterinarian medical indication, otherwise the owners will do it themselves.	+1	-1	-1	+1
15. An owner has (almost) never asked me to do something that was totally unacceptable for me.	0	-1	+1	0
21. It turns out to be hard not to conform to certain habits. Non conformance leads to a difficult relationship with the farmer and to a lack of understanding by colleagues.	0	+1	+1	+2
7. If I have to name something, then the contact with animal owners is the most annoying aspect of my profession.	-3	-2	-3	-3
29. Compassion and a sense of responsibility play a bigger role in the decision by a farmer to call a vet, than business considerations.	0	-1	-2	0
44. Business considerations play a bigger role in the decision of a farmer to call a vet, than compassion and a sense of responsibility.	-1	+3	+1	0

Appendix C: Archeological and Genealogical Discourse Analyses

Two forms of discourse analysis not taken up in this book are Foulcauldian archeological and genealogy studies. Within his so-called archeology, Foucault looked for specific forms of problematization, how the subject and knowledge were connected. Within archeology, by using a grammar in its descriptions that replaces the subject with consciousness by a subject as the receiver of social meaning, static concepts are made fluid in a historical process. Within genealogy, he looked for the way forms of problematizations are shaped by other practices:

> Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. Committed to inquiry, it seeks endlessly to dissolve the coherence of systems of intelligibility that give individual and collective identities to persons/peoples and to the orders that house them by recreating the process of descent within which subjectivities and objectivities are produced.[1]

The role of power is now central. There is considerable power in structured ways of viewing reality. Recall from Section 3.5 that:

> "[P]ower" is not defined as a feature of an institution or person but relationally. Building on the work of Foucault, some researchers within business studies have shown how discourses, with their inherent worldview, give some an advantage over others.[2]

As soon as the power concept comes in, it should get the immediate attention of business ethicists. As explained earlier, within all human identities are immanent values. To reveal the forces or power of a discourse, genealogy has to go back to the moment in which an interpretation or identity became dominant within a discourse. Habermas tried to improve conversation. Genealogists, on the other hand, are suspicious of all conversation because they recognize that systems of intelligibility exist at the expense of alternatives.

A genealogical discourse analysis can analyze how power and knowledge function in discourse, how the rules and resources that delineate the limits of what can be said are working. Foucault has shown how power works through "subjectification." Every discourse claims to talk about reality. In doing so, it classifies what is true and what is not, what is permitted and what is not, what is desirable and what is not, and so on. Truth and power are closely related. As Foucault said, "Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which induces and which extend

it. A 'regime of truth.'"[3] Power is not just repressive; it is always productive. A genealogical discourse analysis can reveal some of the ways power functions and can thus add to the understanding of the meaning of decisions in organizations. It can follow back in history the traces of a discourse and reveal the contingencies of a current discourse.

Notes

[1] Shapiro (1992), p. 29.

[2] See, for example, Clegg (1989).

[3] Foucault (1984b), p. 74.

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Ethical problems continually confront managers in the workplace, but how do they know what the "right" thing to do is? A manager's world is more complicated than choosing between "doing well" and "doing good." It is difficult enough to identify the ethical dimensions of their decisions in the first place, let alone consider the consequences of the various actions that might follow. Nor are scholars certain of how to research ethics within organizations. What terms and concepts are most useful? This thesis studies discourse theory to help both managers and academicians. Within discourse theory, language is seen as constitutive of reality. This has consequences for business ethics because, after all, how we look at the world and perceive facts determines how we value. The book's three empirical studies of customer discourses of bankers, veterinarians and charity workers pose some intriguing questions while framing the discourse analyses. Does the Rabobank treat its customers the same way as its competitors? Do fundraisers and managers of charities define "customer" differently? How do veterinarians deal with conflicts of interest between animals and animal owners? The answers lie within.

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