



PROJECT MUSE[®]

Transforming Memory and the European Project

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REGULATION FROM “BRUSSELS,” DEPICTED alternatively as a Kafkaesque bureaucracy and as a benign source of financing, is a fact of life in the European Union. European regulation affects the quantity of milk farmers produce, the quality of the air in our cities, the color of our passports, and, for those in the Eurozone, the weight of the coins in our pocket. It also affects the intellectual agenda at European universities through the operation of various bodies within the so-called European research area and through the provision of billions of euro for the investigation of themes that have emerged, after a complex process of consultation and lobbying, as those most relevant to European society. Since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, a sequence of acronym-ridden Framework Programmes have accordingly invited proposals for research on topics ranging from particle physics to the human sciences.

In 2009, for example, a call numbered SSH-2009-5.2.2 ran as follows:

In the context of recent EU enlargements research should address how the collective representations and uses of history in Europe shaped and continue to shape the image of Europe for its citizens. Themes to be addressed include the role of different collective memories as they have been shaped by the past and its interpretation, for example by historians, writers and artists, in the perception of Europe by its citizens.¹

Although a variety of terms are used, the basic drift is unambiguous: European citizens have a problem identifying with Europe and their relationship to the past is both the cause of that problem and a resource for solving it. As the text goes on to underline, moreover, the aim of the proposed research is unashamedly instrumental: “Research must develop ideas on how the dialogue between European citizens can be strengthened in the light of the different memories and how a shared view on the past, present and future of Europe can emerge.”²

In this desire to further European integration by creating a shared view of the past, SSH-2009-5.2.2 makes common cause with the European Parliament, which voted in December 2008 to establish a “European

House of History” and commissioned a committee of experts to develop it. As the resulting policy document explains, the purpose of this museum, currently under construction in Brussels at a controversial cost of some fifty million euro, is to ensure that a “shared view on the past, present and future of Europe can emerge” by creating “a place where a memory of European history and the work of European unification is jointly cultivated.”³ (The ambivalent phrase “memory of European history” is worth noting as symptomatic of how “memory” has come to be used in public debates as a way of designating an affective, citizen-centered relationship to the past that is distinct from history as such and linked to identity.)⁴

Proposal SSH-2009-5.2.2 and the museum project illustrate the way in which “Europe” is continuously narrativized, seen as a region in transition between the past (of division) and the future (of integration). Just as importantly, the two initiatives exemplify a strong belief in design and planning: the idea that a once and future Europe can be engineered through deliberate policies extending from a single currency to a single memory (symptomatic in this regard is the repetition of the word “shaping” in SSH-2009-5.2.2). While outsiders may associate the continent with the idea of pastness and unchanging traditions, in fact being European has become intimately linked to the idea of ongoing transformation: the willingness of citizens to change their identity as nationalized subjects and, in the process, to change their memory narratives. To echo the mission statement of the museum, memory and the future are to be “jointly cultivated.” The actual telos of this project is left largely implicit, perhaps because it is so contentious, with some sort of total solidarity in a united Europe as the ultimate, if unspoken, horizon. Arguably, the great importance attached to memory as a resource for Europeanizing identities reflects the chronic difficulty of imagining a common future in anything but vaguely formulated ways.

At first sight, there is much to horrify an academic in this apparent willingness to subordinate historical understanding to its usefulness. A research agenda that forecloses discussion on its most fundamental assumption (in this case, the idea that a shared view of the past is necessary for Europeanized citizenship) seems like a nonstarter. Since humanities scholars are trained to think critically about culture and its political dimensions, and have traditionally aspired to be the thorns in the flesh of those in power and not handmaidens producing “positive” and usable knowledge, the thought of providing answers to practical problems is unsettling.

And yet, at a time of increasing financial codependence, resurgent right-wing nationalism, growing immigrant minorities, and what is widely recognized as a “democratic deficit” in the practice of European life

even as the daily influence from Brussels becomes ever greater, new articulations of citizenship are urgently needed. Surely this is an arena where humanities scholars have a responsibility to contribute. As I write these words in June 2012, it is becoming apparent that Greek mores impact the prosperity of people living in Germany and vice versa, thus bringing to a new level of visibility the challenge at the heart of the European project, namely, that “the citizens of one nation must regard the citizens of another nation as fundamentally ‘one of us,’” as Jürgen Habermas put it.⁵ Fellow Europeans are “others” as well as “one of us”; they are both domestic and foreign, in an extension of identity frames that can be seen as enriching, but as various neonationalist movements illustrate, is often experienced as a threat. The sense of interdependence with “strangers” is an integral part of globalization, of course, so at a certain level of analysis, these developments are not unique to Europe. However, the historical importance of national thought on the “old” continent means that the current state of Europe is making visible in particularly urgent ways the need for new intellectual and imaginative tools with which to articulate postnational identities.

In short, SSH-2009-5.2.2 addresses problems and poses challenges that it would be wrong-headed to ignore.⁶ At the very least, it challenges us to rethink the long-term relationship between humanities scholarship and society in ways that go beyond a kneejerk defense of the ivory tower. More immediately, it invites us to reflect critically, using the case of Europe, on postnational citizenship and on the future of collective memory as a resource for identity. Can our historical understanding of the role of collective memory in nation building help us to understand what is now happening at a European level? Is it feasible to create a shared “European memory”? Is it desirable? Or should we try to theorize the relationship between memory, identity, and citizenship in other terms?

The past decades have seen the development of the interdisciplinary field of research variously called “cultural memory studies” (emphasizing the cultural practices whereby narratives are produced and shared) or “collective memory studies” (emphasizing the actors and agencies involved).⁷ The field of memory studies has emerged in a complicated tandem with the public discourses on memory evoked above, sharing a common concern with how societies remember and how practices of remembrance shape social identities. In what follows I shall build on some recent discussions in the field in order to analyze the case of Europe as an experiment in postnational memory making. The particular combination of “aspiration” and “memory” at the heart of the European project calls for further analysis, suggesting that it may be a site for reconceiving remembrance in transformational and not merely preservationist terms.

In what follows, I shall argue against those who would merely replicate the nineteenth-century model of nation building at a supranational level in the form of a monumental museum, and I propose instead that we look at memory practices in productive, performative, and dynamic terms as a cultural activity that has the potential to forge new connections between people and to cross borders. It is an ongoing conversation about the past in changing circumstances through the generation of stories that can refigure, and not just express, the identities of the actors who encounter and appropriate them.⁸ Reconceptualizing memory in these terms as an imaginative resource that can be shared, rather than as a fixed legacy that is inherited or owned by particular groups in an exclusive way, provides a better model for Europe and for new forms of postnational citizenship based on the principle of affiliation rather than descent. Before making this point, however, more needs to be said about the role that memory has played hitherto in articulations of the European project.

A European Master Narrative?

The word “Europe” is notoriously polyvalent, referring to multiple, if overlapping, realities: a geographical area (circumscribed more broadly, narrowly, or imprecisely depending on whether one is talking about the EU, the Eurozone, or Google maps); a conglomerate of Euro-institutions involving consortia of variable geographical reach (the EU, the Schengen area, the European football association, the European Broadcasting Union, and so on); an imagined community based on shared values and traditions against a background of linguistic and ethnic diversity; a “fortress” that keeps out non-Europeans from less prosperous parts of the world; the home of former colonial powers with an extraterritorial history on other continents; an increasingly small province within a world stage whose center of power is shifting eastwards; a trajectory; an idea whose time has yet to come.⁹ Lots could be said about these overlapping European realities and the multiple images they have spawned. Suffice it here to argue that there is a structural difference (indeed *différance* in the Derridean sense) between these “Europes,” in particular between the EU as a legal entity with defined boundaries, Europe as a cultural space with much more fuzzy edges, and Europe as an “imagined community.” Reflecting the legacy of nationalism (predicated as it was on an ideal congruence between territory, polity, and culture), this *différance* continuously feeds a desire to bring Europe’s political borders more into line with its cultural ones and vice versa; for example, by creating or promoting a shared memory.

Given the future orientation of the very idea of a European project, it may seem surprising that collective memory should figure at all as a key element of supranational identity formation. But in contrast to other confederative projects like that of the United States, the past has always played a key role in imagining the futures of Europe.¹⁰ The sheer length of the documented prehistory of modern Europe, whose entanglements have created many deep-rooted path dependencies, goes a long way to explain this. But the importance of the past to the European project is above all linked to the legacy of the immensely bloody conflicts within Europe in the twentieth century.¹¹ The fact that the EU selected *Ode an die Freude* as its official anthem (searching for common symbols in the manner of nineteenth-century nation building) is an ironic mirror of this deep history of hostility. Overcoming the legacy of the past, in the first instance by creating the conditions in which France and Germany could no longer go to war with each other, has been a key element in discourses about European integration since the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Thus Winston Churchill, in his famous Zurich speech in 1946, promoted the idea of a United States of Europe specifically as a way of transcending the negativity of the past: “We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We must look to the future. We cannot afford to drag forward across the years that are to come the hatreds and revenges which have sprung from the injuries of the past. If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past.”¹²

At first sight, this combination of future building with memory politics seems to replicate Ernest Renan’s analysis of the dynamics of nation building in his classic essay “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1882).¹³ Outlining a radically performative model of identity, Renan argued that nations were ongoing referenda (“everyday plebiscites”) in which members confirmed their willingness to work together towards a common future while sharing the sense of a shared past. As Renan recognized, in ways that resonate with recent theoretical discussions of controlled amnesia, shared pasts are the product both of selective remembering (of the things that connect people) and of selective forgetting (of the things that divide them).¹⁴ In the case of France, for example, people needed to forget the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572 in order to envisage living together in the future. Although people might come to believe that their nation was eternal, Renan claimed, national unity depended on the occlusion of differences and on the desire of different groups at particular moments in history to overcome their divisions (most nations were hybrid products of at least two races, he argued). Following the same logic,

Renan predicted that the current division of Europe into nations would be replaced in time by a new confederation in which presumably the same process of overcoming divisions through future-oriented remembering would be repeated at a higher level of integration.

There have certainly been many attempts in the course of the last half century to formulate a master narrative that would help generate the sense of a common past as an underpinning of the European project. But how to create a common narrative while also doing justice to the unprecedented scale of intra-European slaughter in the twentieth century? How could past horrors be “critically recollected,” to use Paul Ricoeur’s term, so that their reality was acknowledged at the same time as their affect was transformed, rather than repeated as trauma or *ressentiment*?¹⁵ From the outset, the project of a specifically European memory, like that of European integration, was linked to a desire for reconciliation and to the possibility of generating new alliances and identities based on what Graham Dawson has called “reparative remembering.”¹⁶ Indeed, creating a European memory has arguably been as much about *transmuting* memory narratives, about learning to remember differently in new social configurations, as about preserving indivisible legacies.

A key element in this process involved integrating existing narratives into one that would take Europe itself, rather than any of its constituent nations, as its subject. As various historical studies of memory discourses have shown, the first Europeanized narrative to develop in the immediate postwar period was that of a transnational resistance to fascism, whose defense of democratic principles was enshrined, as guarantor of a different future, in the European Convention on Human Rights drafted in 1950 by the recently formed Council of Europe.¹⁷ But as awareness grew in the 1960s both of the enormity of the Holocaust and of the prevalence of collaboration under Nazi occupation, the foundational narrative of successful resistance to tyranny gave way to a new concern with genocide and with culpability in its many forms.¹⁸ As a result, the need for transnational cooperation became refigured as a way of moving beyond the Holocaust—taken to be the “Other” of European values and a symptom of where pathological nationalism and unbridled racism can lead. The central importance of the Holocaust, as a figure of memory for the “Dark Continent” that Europe became in the twentieth century, is reflected in the fact that the European Parliament has officially marked Holocaust Remembrance Day since 2005.¹⁹

In a parallel movement, the Holocaust as a negative benchmark has also generated a neo-Enlightenment narrative identifying Europe as a global defender of democratic values whose present investment in universal human rights is all the greater precisely because of the extent to which

it has violated them in the past. Thus Jürgen Habermas argued in 2003, in an essay cosigned by Jacques Derrida at the time of the American-led invasion of Iraq, that “old” Europe (primarily, the French-German axis) should develop its own foreign policy so as to bring a distinctive voice to the international table that was committed to “defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law.”²⁰ Crucially, according to Habermas, it was the Europeans’ historical experience of dealing with dictatorships that made them now well equipped to defend a cosmopolitan rule of law: their own mistakes had taught them a painful lesson about “how differences can be communicated, contradictions institutionalized, and tensions stabilized.”²¹ Writing a year later, Derrida too linked Europe specifically to the “memory of the Enlightenment” and outlined its future role in terms of a heightened responsibility to promote human rights because of its earlier violations of them, not just in Europe itself, but also in the colonies.²² Using such formulations, the two philosophers were drawing on and helping to articulate a memory narrative in which Europe’s past crimes could feed into its present aspirations and responsibilities both at home and on the global stage.²³

In the first instance, the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and the major expansion of the EU that followed in 2004 undermined the emerging consensus about the centrality of the Holocaust to any master narrative of Europe. Revivified nationalism in countries only recently emancipated from foreign dominance, together with the “defrosting” of unprocessed memories of World War II, brought other narratives into play. At a time of “disappearing customs barriers and single currencies,” Tony Judt wrote in 2000, “the frontiers of memory stay solidly in place.”²⁴ After all, where 1945 meant liberation for “old” Europe, it had marked the beginning of a new dictatorship for the countries in the East. Where there had been an intensive production in Western Europe of all sorts of narratives reinterpreting the events of 1914–1945, state censorship, the inaccessibility of archives, and other priorities in the former East meant that the process of critical recollection in the public sphere was delayed. In the decade after 1989, and especially during the Yugoslav war, there was accordingly a tendency among commentators in the former West to view the “new” members of Europe as belonging to an earlier stage of development in an implicitly stadial narrative in which “overcoming” ethnic and political conflict was taken to be an inevitable stage in modernization and European integration.²⁵ Critically, the difficulty of integrating the former Communist countries into the larger European master narrative was compounded by the fact that the legacy of Stalinist dictatorship introduced a new focus of memory that offered serious competition to the Holocaust as the dominant site of atrocity and victimhood.²⁶

With the passing of time, however, new conceptual frameworks have allowed stories from the “new” Europe to be integrated into the dominant narrative. Thus Aleida Assmann recently redefined European identity in terms of an ability to reach a point of reconciliation where enemies turn into neighbours, a broad framework that also accommodates the narratives brought into play in Eastern Europe after 1989 and the war in the former Yugoslavia. The European “dream,” she argued, is based on a proven capacity to bury the hatchet so that past enemies can become new neighbors (with the historical awareness that it’s all too easy for the process to be reversed): “The European dream . . . consists of the conviction that former deadly enemies can become peacefully co-existing neighbours. In the last decades we have seen how the opposite can happen and how formerly peaceful neighbours can turn into deadly enemies and mass murderers, which means that the European dream has become a cultural legacy of the highest significance and undiminished relevance.”²⁷ This particular combination of “cultural legacy” and “dream” suggests that the European master narrative has also morphed into a metanarrative of memory itself: out of multiple bitter experiences Europeans have been forced to learn the art of reconciliation and how to transcend the past while also remembering it. This master narrative echoed very strongly in the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU in October 2012 for its contribution to the “advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.”²⁸

Other sources support this idea, showing that the willingness to admit responsibility for past actions and to assume the burden of guilt inherited from an earlier generation has itself become a marker of a distinctively European set of values. Even where Europeans don’t share a common narrative, they increasingly share a common memory culture.²⁹ In this regard, Chancellor Willy Brandt’s public performance of apology in kneeling at the Warsaw ghetto in 1970 played an important role in inspiring what Jeffrey Olick has usefully called a “politics of regret,” in which demonstrations of repentance became signs of moral strength.³⁰ An increasingly dominant narrative has thus linked European identity and integration precisely to this ability to deal with divisive and troublesome pasts for the sake of a better future, by allowing stories to be told from different perspectives, but above all through performances of remorse that help transform the affective charge of grievous events and hence help the parties involved to transcend their enmity.

It is not without irony that this particular repentance-based identity has also been seen as expressing German hegemony within European memory culture, a mark of that country’s success in providing a template for dealing with World War II (and, as at least one critic complained, a

way of Europeanizing a culpability that is primarily that of Germany).³¹ One way or another, “the politics of regret” has become widespread as a cultural template across Europe for dealing with bilateral conflicts and, albeit very hesitantly and unevenly, with the legacy of colonialism and slavery.³² Indeed, participation in what has by now become a global culture of apology has already become a quasi-official passport for entry into the European community at least as far as certain human rights violations are concerned: hence the pressure on Serbia to apologize for the massacre of Srebrenica as a prelude to accessions talks, hence also the fact that the debate concerning the qualifications of Turkey to become a member of the EU has crystallized around that country’s readiness to admit to the Armenian genocide.

It is against the background of such discursive articulations of a European narrative and values that the mission statement of the “House of European History,” mentioned at the beginning of this article, can best be understood. Although it relegates nationalism along with war and dictatorship to the past, the terms it uses to depict the “supranational union” of Europe ironically echo Renan’s definition of nationalism as a voluntary association based on the sense of a shared history. As the policy document explains, the aim is to convey, both cognitively and through an appeal to the emotions, a master narrative of European integration that is based on the overcoming of past divisions. The museum aims to engage people affectively in a participatory way, but the primary emphasis is nevertheless on the top-down transmission of a “key message”: “The continent’s recent history has been dominated by the notion of freely associating in supranational institutions at European level and by the willingness to do so. The overcoming, to a large extent, of nationalisms, dictatorship and war, coupled with, since the 1950s, a willingness to live together in Europe in peace and liberty, a supranational and civil union—these should be the key messages conveyed by the House of European History. The exhibitions should make it clear that, in a world of progress, a united Europe can live together in peace and liberty on the basis of common values.”³³

In the current crisis-ridden climate of 2012, this confidence “in a world of progress” seems to hail from another age. As Dominique Moïsi has suggested in his *Geopolitics of Emotions* (2009), European society is increasingly dominated by fear for an uncertain future and is less likely than ever to be inspired by a narrative of reconciliation and hope.³⁴ (In this light, the 2012 Nobel Peace prize was both a recognition of achievement and a gesture of encouragement in difficult times.) As we reel from one Euro-crisis to another and governments struggle to control the financial markets, the contours of a new narrative about the rise and erosion of

the social democratic welfare state in postwar Europe may already be emerging, along with an anti-immigration narrative, purportedly going back to the Middle Ages, centered on a European crusade against the Islamic world.³⁵ In view of such shifting perspectives, stabilizing European memory in a single master-narrative conveyed through the bricks and mortar of a monumental museum may not be the best way forward. Even as it aspires to be different, the “House of European History” risks perpetuating a nineteenth-century habitus in which the identity of citizens was articulated through a collective memory narrative that served, by an appeal to origins and continuities, to differentiate those who belonged from those who did not and that, by an appeal to an exclusive past, created an obstacle to the integration of newcomers.³⁶ (It is worth noting as a further reflection of this habitus that resistance to Europeanization in some countries has also taken the form of initiatives to construct neonational history museums as bulwarks against both “Brussels” and immigrants.)³⁷

To challenge the top-down promotion of a European master narrative is not to deny the real achievements of the integration project in turning the awful “blood lands” of Europe into a largely peaceful, prosperous, and lawful region. Nor is it to deny the importance of educational programs fostering knowledge of that common history: an awareness of the alterity of the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen* (“as it actually happened”) remains necessary as an antidote to complacency and temporal foreshortening.³⁸ But it is to propose that the experimental character of the European project also provides grounds for generating a more dynamic way of looking at the relationship between memory, citizenship, and culture, one that would be less monolithic, more forward-looking, and, to echo arguments advanced by Étienne Balibar, more in tune with the shifting alliances and material realities of lived experience and more open to newcomers.³⁹

Postnational Memory

When Maurice Halbwachs first launched the term “collective memory” in the 1920s, his primary concern was with the sharing of experiences across the time span of some three generations. As the title of his *Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925) indicated, Halbwachs was committed to the idea that personal memories are always shaped by “social frameworks,” since people adapt what they remember to the social contexts in which they conduct and imagine their lives. Although Halbwachs did acknowledge the role of media in passing, the most important social frameworks

for his analysis were the face-to-face communities of embodied experience: the family, the parish, and the professional group to which an individual belonged. Anything at a higher level of aggregation belonged to the impersonal realm of national history rather than to that mode of shared experience for which he reserved the term “collective memory.”⁴⁰

Later elaborations of the idea of collective memory extended Halbwachs’s idea of framework from small-scale embodied communities to the “nation” as being the primary frame for memory and identification in the modern period.⁴¹ But the scale on which “nations” were conceived (that is to say, their primary character as “imagined communities”) meant that nationalized memory has always been an artificial composite dependent on mediation and on the power of media to reach across larger territories.⁴² We now know that it is a form of what has variously been called “imagined” or “prosthetic” memory: a shared sense of history that is not the result of common experience, but rather the outcome of the mediated production and circulation of narratives supported by a whole gamut of memory institutions in the form of archives, educational materials, official commemorations, and museums.⁴³ In line with such insights, Pierre Nora demonstrated in his highly influential *Lieux de mémoire* (1984–92) how the imagined communities constitutive of modern nationalized societies were shaped by top-down and bottom-up processes around the shared knowledge of a limited number of highly invested and highly mediated memory sites that served as common points of reference across the national territory.⁴⁴

Not surprisingly, given its historical importance, the national frame figured very prominently in cultural memory studies from the outset, with the nation being taken as the ideal-typical collective in the modern period. Increasingly, however, globalization, transnational migration, and European integration have been making the national frame less self-evident, both for practitioners in the field and for scholarship. Hence the growing number of attempts to go beyond methodological nationalism in the study and theorization of cultural memory.⁴⁵ Is it possible for memory to become collective and yet be nonnational? What are the imagined communities that will succeed the nation-state? Are there specific forms of diasporic memory? Questions like these have been generating new debates around the dynamics of what has variously been called “transcultural” and “transnational” memory, along with new concepts for analyzing the dynamics of memory production outside national frames.

In a recent article called “Travelling Memory” (2011), Astrid Erll has convincingly argued for the importance of studying the movement of memory narratives across social and territorial borders. Recognizing

that memory “travels,” she argues, would do greater justice to actual communication flows in the contemporary world and to the potential of memory narratives to operate outside their place of origin thanks to the mobility of media and of people.⁴⁶ The recognition that memory narratives no longer operate solely within national frames has been linked by other analysts specifically to new possibilities for shaping post-national citizenship and for creating new lines of solidarity within the global arena. In *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (2006), for example, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider sketched the contours of an emerging “cosmopolitan memory” in which the Holocaust functions as a universal site of memory and moral benchmark: a “touchstone for a disoriented, deterritorialized humanity searching for moral clarity amid constant uncertainty,” as they put it.⁴⁷ According to Levy and Sznaider’s normative account, the bonds of ethnic nationalism and particularism have been giving way (or should give way) to a cosmopolitan commitment to universal human rights that is reinforced by the recognition of their total violation in the Holocaust. Locating the Holocaust within a global arena of political atrocity is also the main concern of Michael Rothberg’s *Multidirectional Memory* (2009). In this path-breaking work of cultural criticism, Rothberg goes beyond the view of the Holocaust as universal benchmark, however, by showing how memory narratives relating to crimes against humanity across the globe work together in a comparative, “multidirectional” way so as to contribute to an evolving understanding of singular atrocities and the connections between them. With the help of many examples, he shows accordingly how the “memory of the Nazi genocide and struggles for decolonization have persistently broken the frame of the nation-state” and, in the process, broken through the customary frames demarcating zones of solidarity.⁴⁸

Travelling, cosmopolitan, multidirectional memory: these are timely and valuable attempts to conceptualize memory outside national frames that I will come back to. Of more immediate concern, however, is their striking lack of attention to Europe. In attempts to go beyond methodological nationalism, the global frame or open horizon seems to have become the natural successor to the national one. This is understandable given that cosmopolitanism and the rule of universal human rights have become cherished ideals in the contemporary world. A wariness about focusing on the “old continent” is also understandable in view of the history of Eurocentrism and imperialism and the fear of reinstating a border in a world that, seen from the perspective of cosmopolitan values, should aspire ultimately to have no boundary except that of humanity itself.⁴⁹

Yet this is what makes the case of “Europe” theoretically so fascinating. It represents neither the national nor the global, but a social forma-

tion—an actual as well as imagined frame—that occupies an intermediary position between the regional and the world, between past and future. As a mesostructure, it challenges us to think about forms of solidarity and community building at lower levels of aggregation than that of humanity, but at higher levels than the nation. And it also challenges us to take into account the very real borders that in practice regulate the apparently free flow of stories in a globalized world and thereby create differentiated zones of solidarity.

For Europe is defined, for better or worse, by the existence of borders. Whereas the “global” or “universal” knows no horizon, since everybody is in principle included on the basis of their common humanity, the very term “Europe” designates by definition some sort of bounded space.⁵⁰ It is circumscribed by the legal borders that constitute its often fortresslike interface with the outside world as well as the fuzzier cultural borders demarcating its horizon as an imagined community. Within that bounded space, moreover, Europe is far from homogenous, being made up of a spaghettilike entanglement of boundaries, interfaces, and contact zones running along administrative, linguistic, cultural, and mnemonic lines. It is best seen in terms of multiple “translation zones,” to use Emily Apter’s term, as an accumulation of thresholds that both divide and link groups that perceive themselves as different.⁵¹ Historical research has shown just how frequently those internal and external borders have shifted across time, and they continue to do so.⁵² Among the most recent boundaries to emerge are those surrounding the zones of otherness occupied by immigrant communities and serving as a material reminder of Europe’s extraterritorial colonial past and of a future at home that will be colored differently.

In short, “Europe” can be seen as a multidimensional framework that is continuously “under construction” in a dialectical relation with existing imaginaries: images of a monolithically white-skinned continent united by virtue of having overcome the past exist in tension with more ethnically diverse realities on the ground and the concomitant realization that there are parts of Europe’s colonial history that have yet to be remembered. In light of this, it seems best to think of “Europe” not as a monolithic container, but as a horizon that can be continuously displaced, as I shall argue, by the performance itself of memory and its capacity to renegotiate borders and create new lines of affiliation.

Crossing Borders: The Performativity of Narration

Implicit in what has been said so far is the idea that cultural memory is a collective activity, and not a thing: it involves the ongoing produc-

tion, reproduction, and dissemination of narratives with a capacity to reconfigure social relations and to constitute publics.⁵³ In light of this, it is useful to recall Hayden White's argument that the desire to narrate history arises from the possibility that someone else might tell the "same" story differently and that historical narration, therefore, is inherently dialogic.⁵⁴ The evidence presented in Claus Leggewie and Anne Lang's *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung* (*The Struggle for European Memory*, 2011) bears out White's basic point, showing how controversy, rather than consensus, drives the ongoing production of memory narratives and their multimedial expression in the public sphere: it is the energy generated by friction and differences that gives remembrance its power to reconfigure identities and to forge new connections between people.⁵⁵

Placing the useful concept of *geteilte Erinnerung* (memory that is both shared and divided) at the center of their analysis, Leggewie and Lang offer a polycentric account of memory discourses in contemporary Europe, analyzing multiple flashpoints and contact zones where controversies about the meaning of the past are played out.⁵⁶ Examples include disputes in Tallinn about a monument to the Russian army, debates among Turkish immigrants in Germany relating to the Armenian genocide, discussions about how to renovate the colonial museum near Brussels, and claims by Ukrainians that the Holodomor they suffered under Stalinism was on par with the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust. As Leggewie and Lang show, the controversies themselves are helping to articulate and, in the process, to gradually transform the relations between the opposing parties by forging new connections between them. They argue that the conflict between viewpoints can generate newly integrated stories or, if this proves impossible, at least mutual respect for grievances through the multidirectional interaction of opposing narratives.⁵⁷ Bilateral exchanges across the dividing lines between former enemies (between Ireland and England, Poland and Germany, Croatia and Serbia, for example) have been painful and slow, but the gradual transformation of old enemies into new neighbors, to recall Assmann's words, is being informed by the pan-European culture of "regret," mentioned earlier, and the rituals associated with it.

The importance of dialogic memory to the working through of intra-European conflicts has thus been amply demonstrated. But the real challenge for the future may actually lie elsewhere: in creating solidarity and a sense of neighborliness among people who have *not* been former enemies, who have been indifferent to each other rather than at loggerheads. Or more generally, how can one generate a sense of connectedness between groups who have not traditionally figured prominently in each other's identity narratives or have been excluded from them, but

who now belong together for better or for worse as “intimate others” and fellow citizens within the EU? What memory narratives could connect the debt-ridden Portuguese and their prosperous German fellow citizens of Europe? More critically, what stories connect so-called “new” Dutch citizens from Morocco with their indigenous counterparts? Or with French citizens? Producing affiliation along new lines calls for new stories and not just the reframing of old ones, new stories based on more recent experiences as well as on the creative reactivation of the archive.

This brings me specifically to the particular agency of the arts. In her history of human rights, Lynn Hunt has argued that novels played a key role in preparing the ground for a belief in a general humanity by generating empathy with other people’s existence through immersion in fictional stories. (Her account thus presents a variation on Anderson’s earlier argument about novels being resources for creating imagined communities, and Rothberg’s more recent discussion of how narration helps redefine the border between the domestic and the foreign.⁵⁸) As memory studies has long accepted, but not always explicated, shared stories at local and national level are effective by capturing people’s attention and imagination through the immersive depiction of singular individuals and their experiences across time.⁵⁹ As I have argued elsewhere, imaginative writing and the arts more generally have historically played a distinctive role in this regard as mediators or “connectors” between different mnemonic communities, be these defined nationally, ethnically, or in other terms.⁶⁰ Thanks to the surplus aesthetic pleasure offered by art along with the possibility of becoming immersed in singular stories about imaginable individuals, novels have helped, as Franco Moretti among others has shown, to build up a sense of a larger geopolitical world, both European and beyond.⁶¹ Moreover, creative writing and filmmaking arguably travel more easily than historiography does, to pick up on Erll’s argument, because they invite voluntary participation in a story and, in the process, have the potential to generate empathy for hitherto unfamiliar characters in particular material circumstances. Top-down memory narratives offered by institutions (even those that, like the House of European History, recognize the importance of involving the subjectivities and emotions of their visitors) arguably lack the lure, mobility, and transformative power of the arts. Because of their unscripted and imaginative character, finally, the arts have the potential to generate new narratives that break away from inherited models, by providing a conduit for bringing into play new perspectives and unfamiliar voices that fall outside dominant discourses.

In multilingual Europe, envisaged here as the site of a dense network of exchanges across various borders, literature and the audiovisual arts

play a key role in involving people in “the lives of others” (to invoke the translated title of the 2006 film which played ambassador for East German history both across Germany and abroad).⁶² To name just a few illustrative examples: Ivo Andrić’s *Bridge on the Drina* (1961), which opened up the world of Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina to other parts of Europe through its many translations; Javier Cercas’s *Soldiers of Salamis* (2001), which did the same for the Spanish Civil War; *La graine et le mulet* (directed by Abdellatif Kechiche, 2007) and *Indigènes* (directed by Rachid Bouchareb, 2006) that have given imaginative access to the lives of Algerian immigrants to publics in France and elsewhere and Andrzej Wajda’s *Katyn* (2007), which played a role in recalibrating Russian-Polish relations at a local level, while also conveying the story of the massacre of Polish officers in 1940 across Europe. Many other examples of the migration of what I call “subtitled memories”—memories that cross borders—could be offered. But the point is hopefully clear: that the translation of narratives from one European zone to another creates a new memory at the point of destination that is prosthetic, but that nevertheless has power to convert a “distant” reading of other European countries or migrant groups into a closer reading by staging a virtual contact with the singular experiences of individuals in another zone. In this way, creative narratives help to “thicken” imaginative relations with other groups with whom one is already economically and politically connected, along lines that transcend those of traditional memory narratives while helping to create alternative shared points of reference for the future.⁶³ Given the nature of artistic production, this “thickening” of the relations between individuals across great distances is a largely unplanned and noninstitutionalized process, though it may be facilitized by cultural policies.

There are closely knit patterns in the exchange of narratives within European cultural space, just as there is a particularly dense network of flight paths across our skies. If we follow Erll’s point that memory narratives and cultural templates “travel” outside of their original social formations, however, there is no reason to think that the multilateral trafficking mentioned above should stop at the borders of the EU, any more than weather systems or flight paths do. Transactions also occur between European cultural space and the rest of the world, although arguably at a lower level of intensity and reciprocity than those within Europe.⁶⁴ Reference could be made here, for example, to the Turkish movie *Once Upon a Time in Anatolia* (directed by Nuri Bilge Ceylan, 2011), which provided a haunting sense of life in Eastern Turkey to cinemagoers in Europe last year, or to Amitav Ghosh’s *River of Smoke* (2011), originally written in a combination of English and pidgin and

like Ghosh's earlier works set for translation into many European languages, which vividly depicts the world of nineteenth-century Canton at the height of the British Empire and the Opium Wars. The circulation of such works helps extend the borders of imaginative communities in different directions and create forms of virtual solidarity that exceed the boundaries of Europe as a political and economic configuration—in the case of Ghosh by recalling Britain's extraterritorial colonial history from an indigenous perspective. Picking up on White's point about the link between dissensus and narration, I argue that new narratives emerge precisely from the systemic and continuously contested gap between social formations, imagined communities, and hard-wired, legal borders.

This productive discrepancy can be illustrated in a very concrete way with reference to the self-presentation of European arthouse cinemas belonging to the International Network of Cinemas for the Circulation of European Films, an organization supported financially by the EU and aiming to promote the showing of European movies (defined very broadly) outside their country of origin.⁶⁵ Each showing at a member cinema accordingly begins with a rhythmical, fast-paced visual presentation of the names of the cities participating in the network: Dublin, Amsterdam, Paris . . . but also Ramallah, Tunis, Istanbul, and Baku. Every time these opening credits are played in any of the member cinemas, an imagined network of cities is projected that overlaps with, but also extends beyond, the legal and geographical borders of Europe as these are currently defined. In this way, the cinemas work to circulate subtitled memories across translation zones, while also producing continuous reflection on where the outer reaches of Europe are located, and on what lies beyond.

Conclusion

Is this view of European identity merely a presentist celebration of all things fluid and dynamic whose future-orientation fails to account for the path dependency offered by history? Patrick Geary's *Myth of Nations* (2002), a study of identity politics and formations in the early medieval period, shows persuasively that many of the modern "nationalities" of Europe were carved out and defined as if they were historically immutable in order to fit in with the politics of the day. This leads him to conclude, with reference to late antiquity and the Middle Ages, that Europeans have continuously been reinventing themselves: "The peoples of Europe are a work in progress and always must be," and "the history of European peoples . . . is a history of constant change, of radical discontinuities, and

of political and cultural zigzags, masked by the repeated re-appropriation of old words to define new realities."⁶⁶ The salutary lesson offered by Geary's historical study is that interpretations of the distant and more recent past continue to provide an imaginative and cognitive resource for understanding contemporary realities—his own carefully researched history presenting a countervoice to essentialist notions of what it is to be European, as well as a template for understanding the ways in which identities evolve over time. So the conclusion from the case of Europe must be that memory should not be abandoned as a resource for shaping citizenship. We should, however, conceive of it in much more dynamic terms, not as a singular or monumental destiny, but rather as an ongoing conversation about multiple pasts and just as many futures.

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NOTES

I am grateful to the Lichtenberg Kolleg at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen for a three-month fellowship which allowed me to work on the present article, as well as to the many colleagues with whom I have developed projects relating to memory cultures in Europe over the last years, especially Gert Buelens, Chiara de Cesari, Stef Craps, Astrid Erll, and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa.

1 European Commission, Work programme 2009, *Cooperation—Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities*, Rev., SSH-2009-5.2.2, European Commission C (2009)10074 of 17 December 2009, ftp://cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/cooperation/ssh/h_wp_200902_en.pdf; visited 13 June 2012.

2 European Commission, *Cooperation—Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities*, Rev., 18.

3 Committee of Experts, *Conceptual Basis for a House of European History* (Brussels, October 2008), 5, http://europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/745/745721/745721_en.pdf.

4 For a succinct account of the relationship between memory and identity, see Duncan Bell, ed., *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (London: Palgrave, 2006), 5-11.

5 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning at the Core of Europe," *Constellations* 10, no. 3 (2003): 293.

6 In the end some six small-scale projects were actually funded under the call, ranging from a statistical survey of patterns of identification among European citizens to a comparative study of conservation policies with regard to war ruins; see <http://cordis.europa.eu>.

7 See respectively Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), and Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds., *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011).

8 A refocusing on the relational and processual aspects of cultural memory production has been advocated in Jeffrey K. Olick, *Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 89-118; see also Ann Rigney, "Plenitude,

Scarcity and the Circulation of Cultural Memory,” *Journal of European Studies* 35, no. 1 (2005): 9–26. Rigney, “Divided Pasts: A Premature Memorial and the Dynamics of Collective Remembrance,” *Memory Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008): 89–97; Erll and Rigney, eds. *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009).

9 For a wide-ranging exploration of the many overlapping images of Europe, see Joep Leerssen, *Spiegelpaleis Europa: Europese cultuur als mythe en beeldvorming* (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2011). For shifting visualizations of Europe as territory, see Michael Wintle, *The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography throughout the Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009). On Europe as an aspirational community of values, see especially Habermas, *Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011). The idea of Europe as province was first formulated in Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000).

10 Aleida Assmann, “Europe: A Community of Memory?” *German Historical Institute Bulletin* 40 (2007): 11.

11 Étienne François, “Europäische lieux de mémoire,” in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2006), 293.

12 Winston Churchill (Zurich University, Zurich, September 19, 1946), <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html>.

13 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1882), in *Oeuvres complètes d’Ernest Renan*, ed. Henriëtte Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–61), 886–907.

14 Among the growing body of literature on historical acts of oblivion and postconflict forgetting, see in particular: Harald Weinrich, *Lethe: Kunst und Kritik des Vergessens* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997); Paul Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* (Paris: Seuil, 2000); Luisa Passerini, “Memories Between Silence and Oblivion,” in *Memory, History, Nation: Contested Pasts*, ed. Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (London: Routledge, 2003), 238–54; Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” *Memory Studies* 1, no.1 (2008): 59–71; and the recent special issue “Reconciliation and Memory: Critical Perspectives,” ed. Nicole Immler, Rigney, and Damien Short, *Memory Studies* 5, no. 3 (2012).

15 Ricoeur, “Memory—History—Forgetting,” in *Collective Memory Reader*, 475–80.

16 Graham Dawson, *Making Peace with the Past? Memory, Trauma and the Irish Troubles* (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2007), 77–81.

17 Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Europe 1945–65* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 262–63.

18 This summary is based on Thomas Banchoff, “German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory,” *German Politics* 6, no. 1 (1997): 60–76; Jan-Werner Müller, ed., *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002); Jeffrey K. Olick, ed., *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2003); Wulf Kansteiner, Claudio Fogu, and Ned Lebow, eds., *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2006); Christian Meier, *Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerens: Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit* (Bonn: BPP, 2010); Claus Leggewie with Anne Lang, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2011), especially 15–21.

19 The concept of “memory figure” is borrowed from Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (1992; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997); the phrase “dark continent” is from Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998).

20 Habermas and Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together,” 291–97.

21 Habermas and Derrida, “February 15,” 294. It is striking how Great Britain, and commentators from Britain, are largely absent from discussions of European memory.

- 22 Derrida, "A Europe of Hope," *Epoché* 10, no. 2 (2006): 407–12.
- 23 The phrase "bad conscience" is used in Derrida, "Europe of Hope," 410.
- 24 The image of "defrosting" memory is from Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," in *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath*, ed. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), 173.
- 25 Leggewie, *Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung*, 134.
- 26 Leggewie, *Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung*, 127–43.
- 27 Aleida Assmann, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gedächtniskultur* (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 2012), 19 (author's translation); also Aleida Assmann, "Response to Peter Novick," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 40 (2007): 33–38.
- 28 "The Nobel Peace Prize 2012," Nobelprize.org. 16 Nov 2012, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/
- 29 Levy, Michael Heinlein and Lars Breuer, "Reflexive Particularism and Cosmopolitanization: The Reconfiguration of the National," *Global Networks* 11, no. 2 (2011): 141.
- 30 Olick, *Politics of Regret*.
- 31 Peter Novick, "Comments on Aleida Assmann's Lecture," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 40 (2007): 27–32.
- 32 On the international culture of apologies, including many European cases, see for example Melissa Nobles, *The Politics of Official Apologies* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds. *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006). Its particular resonance in Europe is discussed in Olick, *Politics of Regret*. Apologies for colonialism are emerging as sites of new controversy but also of new forms of political opportunism; see for example Chiara de Cesari, "The Paradoxes of Colonial Reparation: Foreclosing Memory and the 2008 Italy–Libya Friendship Treaty," *Memory Studies* 5, no. 3 (2012): 316–26.
- 33 *Conceptual Basis for a House of European History*, 5. There have also been several nongovernmental initiatives to establish a European museum of memory, with a mixed record of success; see for example Krzysztof Pomian, "Pour un musée de l'Europe: Visite commentée d'une exposition en projet," *Le Débat* 129 (2004): 89–100. Various attempts have also been made to define a canon of European sites of memory (on the model of Nora's nationally framed *Lieux de mémoire*, see below): Pim den Boer, Heinz Duchhardt, Georg Kreis, and Wolfgang Schmale, eds., *Europäische Erinnerungsorte*, 3 vols. (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012); also François, "Europäische lieux de mémoire."
- 34 Dominique Moïsi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World* (New York: Doubleday, 2009).
- 35 The master narrative of Christian-Islamic conflict was promoted by Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik, in his "Knights Templar 2083: A European Declaration of Independence" (available online at various sites). For the larger trend, see also *The Gates of Vienna*, <http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.nl/>.
- 36 Joep Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2006).
- 37 In 2006 the Dutch government controversially commissioned the development of a new "national historical museum" but the project was cancelled by a subsequent government in 2011: <http://www.geschiedenis24.nl/dossiers/Nationaal-Historisch-Museum.htm>; in 2011, French president Sarkozy initiated a similarly controversial project, the *Maison de l'histoire de France*: <http://www.maison-histoire.fr/museum>. See also Stefan Krankenhagen, "Exhibiting Europe: The Development of European Narratives in Museums, Collections, and Exhibitions," *Culture Unbound* 3 (2011): 269–78.
- 38 On the necessity of actively teaching history as part of a system of checks and balances, and as a counterforce to cultural memory, see Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since*

1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 830–31. The impressive collaborative project Cliehres (2005–2010), funded by the EU, has been developing new educational materials aimed to go beyond nationalism in the teaching of history in the various member states by showing international crosscurrents and entanglements; <http://www.cliehres.net/>.

39 This point draws on Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, trans. James Swenson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004).

40 Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925; Paris: Albin Michel, 1994); Halbwachs, *La Mémoire collective* (1950; Paris: Albin Michel, 1997). The concept of “communicative memory” is introduced in Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*, 48–66.

41 Joep Leerssen, “Nationalism and the Cultivation of Culture,” *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 4 (2006): 559–78; also Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*; and further his Study Platform in Interlocking Nationalisms: www.spinnet.eu.

42 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983; London: Verso, 1991); Jonathan Culler, “Anderson and the Novel,” *Diacritics* 29, no. 4 (1999): 20–39.

43 Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia,” *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 27; Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2004).

44 Nora’s work in defining a canon of French memory sites, as arguably similar projects elsewhere across Europe, should also be seen as a nationalizing reaction to “Europeanization,” on the one hand, and to increasing numbers of immigrants from former colonies, on the other; on Nora’s failure to include colonial history, see especially, Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in France,” *Public Culture* 23, no. 1 (2011): 121–56.

45 For a more general critique, see Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” *Global Networks* 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–34.

46 Erll, “Travelling Memory,” *Parallax* 71, no. 4 (2011): 4–18.

47 Levy and Natan Sznajder, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 2006), 24; also “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 no. 1 (2002): 87–106. See also Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, eds., *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories* (London: Palgrave, 2010), especially 8–9.

48 Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009).

49 These dilemmas are articulated in Levy and Sznajder, “Memories of Europe: Cosmopolitanism and Its Others,” in *Cosmopolitanism and Europe*, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2007), 158–77.

50 This reflection on the boundedness of Europe draws on Balibar, “Europe, an ‘Unimagined’ Frontier of Democracy,” trans. Frank Collins, *Diacritics* 33, nos. 3–4 (2003): 36–44.

51 Emily Apter, *The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).

52 On the mutability of Europe’s borders, see most recently, Norman Davies, *Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-Forgotten Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

53 On the formation of publics, see Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 49–90

54 Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (1981; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987), 19. Agonism does not just relate to competing groups but is also played out between, for example, professional historians and creative writers; see further Rigney, “All This Happened, More or Less: What a Novelist Made of the Bombing of Dresden,” *History and Theory* 48, no. 2 (2009): 5–24.

- 55 This discussion of the performativity of “friction” draws on Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004).
- 56 Leggewie, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung*, 7.
- 57 This point echoes Aleida Assmann’s “dialogic” approach to memory; *Auf dem Weg*, 50–61.
- 58 Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: Norton, 2007), 35–69; see also Joseph R. Slaughter, *Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law* (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2007).
- 59 The argument here follows Derek Attridge, *The Singularity of Literature* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- 60 Rigney, “Fiction as a Mediator in National Remembrance,” in *Narrating the Nation: The Representation of National Narratives in Different Genres*, ed. Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas, and Andrew Mycock (Oxford: Berghahn, 2009), 79–96.
- 61 Franco Moretti, *Atlas of the European Novel 1800–1900* (London: Verso, 1998).
- 62 *Das Leben der Anderen* [The Lives of Others], dir. Florian Henkel von Donnersmarck (2006).
- 63 The idea of “thick relations” is drawn here from Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002).
- 64 On cultural borders as a series of thresholds marking reduced ease of communication, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* (Paris: Plon, 1974), 352–53.
- 65 Example inspired by Leerssen, *Spiegelpaleis*, 105.
- 66 Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 157.