

## UNDECIDABILITY OF THE COMPLETENESS PROBLEM OF MODAL LOGIC\*

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A normal modal logic is said to be *complete* if for each non-thesis  $a$  of the logic there is a Kripke frame for the logic on which  $a$  is not valid. This paper addresses the question whether there is an effective procedure for determining whether or not a given finitely axiomatized normal modal logic is complete.

We shall consider logics with several necessity operators: if  $S \subseteq N = \{1, 2, \dots\}$  let  $K_S$  be the logic whose language has  $\neg$ ,  $\vee$ , and distinct unary operators  $\Box_i$  for  $i \in S$ , and which has the axioms and rules of  $K$  for each  $\Box_i$ . That is, the axioms of  $K_S$  are the classical tautologies and  $\Box_i(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box_i p \rightarrow \Box_i q)$  ( $i \in S$ ), and the rules of inference are Substitution, Detachment, and Necessitation (from  $a$ , infer  $\Box_i a$  ( $i \in S$ )).

Let  $\text{Fla}_S$  be the set of all formulas of  $K_S$ . If  $\beta \in \text{Fla}_S$ , let  $K_S(\beta)$  be the logic obtained from  $K_S$  by adding  $\beta$  as a new axiom;  $K_S(\beta) \vdash \gamma$  means that  $\gamma$  is a thesis of  $K_S(\beta)$ .

A *Kripke frame*  $W$  for  $K_S$  consists of a non-empty set  $W$  together with binary relations  $<_i$  ( $i \in S$ ) on  $W$ . The relation  $W \models \beta$  ( $\beta$  is *valid on*  $W$ ) is defined as follows: a *valuation*  $\theta$  assigns to each  $a \in \text{Fla}_S$  a subset  $\theta(a)$  of  $W$  subject to the conditions

$$\theta(\neg a) = W - \theta(a),$$

$$\theta(a \vee \beta) = \theta(a) \cup \theta(\beta),$$

$$\theta(\Box_i a) = \{w \mid (\forall v)(w <_i v \Rightarrow v \in \theta(a))\},$$

and  $W \models \beta$  if  $\theta(\beta) = W$  for every valuation  $\theta$ .

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A *general frame*  $(W, P)$  for  $K_S$  consists of a Kripke frame  $W$  together with a non-empty family  $P \subseteq P(W)$  such that

$$\begin{aligned} X \in P &\Rightarrow W - X \in P, \\ X, Y \in P &\Rightarrow X \cup Y \in P, \end{aligned}$$

$$X \in P \Rightarrow \{w \mid (\forall v)(w \prec_i v \Rightarrow v \in X)\} \in P \quad (i \in S).$$

A valuation for  $(W, P)$  is a valuation  $\theta$  for  $W$  such that  $\theta(\alpha) \in P$  for each  $\alpha \in \text{Fla}_S$ , and  $(W, P) \models \beta$  if  $\theta(\beta) = W$  for every such  $\theta$ .

It is easily seen (cf. [4]) that  $\alpha$  is a thesis of  $K_S(\beta)$  if and only if  $\alpha$  is valid on every general frame on which  $\beta$  is valid;  $K_S(\beta)$  is *complete* if this remains true (for all  $\alpha$ ) when "general frame" is replaced by "Kripke frame".

A general frame  $(W, P)$  is *connected* if the smallest equivalence relation containing all the  $\prec_i$ 's is  $W \times W$ , and *refined* if  $P$  is the basis of a Hausdorff topology on  $W$  such that each  $\prec_i$  is closed in  $W \times W$  (cf. [4] for a more explicit definition). It is not difficult to show (cf. [7]) that for each general frame  $(W, P)$  and formula  $\alpha$  not valid on  $(W, P)$  there is a connected, refined, general frame  $(W', P')$  such that every formula valid on  $(W, P)$  is valid on  $(W', P')$  but  $\alpha$  is not valid on  $(W', P')$ . Hence  $K_S(\beta) \vdash \alpha$  if and only if  $\alpha$  is valid on every connected, refined, general frame on which  $\beta$  is valid.

If  $S \subseteq T$ , then  $K_T(\beta)$  is a *conservative extension* of  $K_S(\gamma)$  if the theses of  $K_S(\gamma)$  are exactly the formulas of  $K_S$  which are theses of  $K_T(\beta)$ .

**PROPOSITION.** *If  $S \subseteq T$  and  $\beta \in \text{Fla}_S$ , then  $K_T(\beta)$  is a conservative extension of  $K_S(\beta)$ . If  $S \cap T = \emptyset$ ,  $\beta \in \text{Fla}_S$ ,  $\gamma \in \text{Fla}_T$ , and  $K_S(\beta)$  is consistent, then  $K_{S \cup T}(\beta \wedge \gamma)$  is a conservative extension of  $K_T(\gamma)$ .*

To prove the first statement, it suffices to note that if  $(W, P)$  is a general frame for  $K_S$ ,  $(W, P) \models \beta$ , and  $\neg(W, P) \models \gamma$ , then we can find a general frame  $(W', P)$  for  $K_T$  such that  $(W', P) \models \beta$  and  $\neg(W', P) \models \gamma$ ; namely,  $W'$  is  $W$  together with  $\prec_i = W \times W$  for  $i \in T - S$ . The second statement is proved in [8].

An intuitive understanding of certain recursion-theoretic notions will be necessary (and sufficient). A set  $C \subseteq N$  is *recursively enumerable* if there is an effective procedure for generating the members of  $C$  (not necessarily in any particular order) and *recursive* if there is an effective procedure for determining of an arbitrary number whether or not it is a member of  $C$ . A set  $C$  is *reducible* (or *many-one reducible*, in the usual terminology) to another set  $D$  if there is a recursive (that is, effectively calculable) function  $f$  such that  $(\forall n)(n \in C \Leftrightarrow f(n) \in D)$ , and  $D$  is *universal* (respectively, *co-universal*) if every recursively enumerable set is reducible to  $D$  (respectively, to the complement of  $D$ ). There exist recursively

enumerable, non-recursive sets; such a set is not reducible to any recursive set, so no universal or co-universal set is recursive. Reducibility is transitive, and one set is reducible to another if and only if its complement is reducible to the complement of the other, so any set to which a universal or co-universal set is reducible is itself universal or co-universal respectively. We identify formulas with natural numbers via a suitable Gödel numbering of  $\text{Fla}_N$ .

If  $S = \{1, \dots, m\}$  we write  $\text{Fla}_m$  and  $K_m$  for  $\text{Fla}_S$  and  $K_S$  respectively. Let  $A_m = \{\beta \in \text{Fla}_m \mid K_m(\beta) \text{ is consistent}\}$  and  $B_m = \{\beta \in \text{Fla}_m \mid K_m(\beta) \text{ is complete}\}$ . Our main result is the following.

**THEOREM.** (a)  $A_1$  is recursive, but  $A_m$  is co-universal for all  $m \geq 2$ .  
(b)  $B_m$  is universal for all  $m \geq 3$ .

It is easy to see that  $A_1$  is recursive, since  $K_1(\beta)$  is consistent if and only if  $\beta$  is valid on some one-element Kripke frame [2]. Since  $K_m$  is a conservative extension of  $K_n$  when  $n \leq m$ ,  $A_n$  is reducible to  $A_m$  ( $\beta \in A_n \Leftrightarrow f(\beta) \in A_m$ , where  $f(\beta)$  is  $\beta \wedge p \wedge \neg p$  according as  $\beta \in \text{Fla}_n$  or not). So to complete the proof of (a) it suffices to show that  $A_2$  is co-universal.

We shall make use of some constructions appearing in [7]. Let  $C$  be any recursively enumerable set. By [7], Section 4, there is a number  $m$ , a formula  $\beta$  of  $K_m$ , and a recursive sequence  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$  of formulas of  $K_m$ , such that

$$(*) \quad (\forall n)(n \in C \Leftrightarrow K_m(\beta) \vdash \alpha_n).$$

Moreover, examination of this construction reveals that if  $(W, P)$  is any connected, refined, general frame for  $K_m$  and  $(W, P) \models \beta$  then, for each  $n$ ,

$$(**) \quad (W, P) \models \alpha_n \quad \text{or} \quad (W, P) \models \neg \alpha_n.$$

By the reduction procedure of [7], Section 2, one obtains a formula  $\beta'$  of  $K_1$ , and a recursive sequence  $\alpha'_1, \alpha'_2, \dots$  of formulas of  $K_1$  such that  $(*)$  is true of  $\beta', \alpha'_1, \alpha'_2, \dots$ . But examination of this construction shows that  $(**)$  no longer holds. All that can be said is that  $\theta(\alpha'_n)$  is independent of  $\theta$ , that is, if  $(W, P)$  is a connected, refined, general frame for  $K_1$ ,  $(W, P) \models \beta'$ , and  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  are valuations for  $(W, P)$  then, for each  $n$ ,  $\theta_1(\alpha'_n) = \theta_2(\alpha'_n)$ . In order to restore  $(**)$  we must retreat to  $K_2$ .

**LEMMA.** *If  $C$  is a recursively enumerable set, then there is a formula  $\beta$  of  $K_2$  and a recursive sequence  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$  of formulas of  $K_2$  such that  $(*)$  and  $(**)$  hold.*

To prove the lemma, let  $\beta', \alpha'_1, \alpha'_2, \dots$  be formulas of  $K_1$  as in the preceding paragraph. Let  $\beta$  be the conjunction of  $\beta', \square_2 p \rightarrow \square_2 p$ , and the S5 axioms for  $\square_2$ , and for each  $n$  let  $\alpha_n$  be  $\square_2 \alpha'_n$ . If  $(W, P)$  is a general frame for  $K_1$  and  $(W, P) \models \beta'$ , then  $(W', P) \models \beta$ , where  $W'$  is  $W$  together with  $\prec_2 = W \times W$ ; moreover,  $(W, P) \models \gamma \Leftrightarrow (W', P) \models \gamma$  for all  $\gamma \in \text{Fla}_1$ . Thus

$K_2(\beta)$  is a conservative extension of  $K_1(\beta')$ , so  $n \in C \Leftrightarrow K_1(\beta') \vdash \alpha'_n \Leftrightarrow K_2(\beta) \vdash \alpha'_n \Leftrightarrow K_2(\beta) \vdash \alpha_n$ , and (\*) holds. Moreover, if  $(W, P) = (W, <_1, <_2, P)$  is connected and refined and  $(W, P) \models \beta$ , then  $<_2 = W \times W$  so  $\theta(\alpha_n) \in \{\emptyset, W\}$  for any valuation  $\theta$  for  $(W, P)$ ; but  $\theta(\alpha_n)$  is independent of  $\theta$  (any valuation for  $(W, P)$  is a valuation for  $(W, <_1, P)$ , and  $\theta(\alpha'_n)$  is independent of  $\theta$ ), so  $(W, P) \models \alpha_n$  or  $(W, P) \models \neg \alpha_n$ ; that is, (\*\*) holds as well. This completes the proof of the lemma.

Let  $C$  be any recursively enumerable set and let  $\beta, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$  be as in the lemma. If  $n \in C$ , then  $K_2(\beta) \vdash \alpha_n$  so  $K_2(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n)$  is inconsistent and  $\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \notin A_2$ . Conversely, if  $n \notin C$ , then  $\neg K_2(\beta) \vdash \alpha_n$ , so there is a connected, refined, general frame  $(W, P)$  such that  $(W, P) \models \beta$  but  $\neg (W, P) \models \alpha_n$ . Because of (\*\*),  $(W, P) \models \beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n$ , so  $K_2(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n)$  is consistent and  $\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \in A_2$ . Thus  $(\forall n)(n \in C \Leftrightarrow \beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \notin A_2)$ . Since  $C$  was arbitrary,  $A_2$  is co-universal.

We turn now to the proof of (b). If  $m \geq 3$ , let  $\gamma \in \text{Fla}_{\{m\}}$  be such that  $K_{\{m\}}(\gamma)$  is incomplete ([1], [5]). If  $C$  is any recursively enumerable set, let  $\beta, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$  be as in the lemma, so  $n \in C \Leftrightarrow K_2(\beta) \vdash \alpha_n \Leftrightarrow (\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n) \notin A_2$ . If  $n \in C$ , then  $K_2(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n)$  is inconsistent, so  $K_m(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma)$  is inconsistent and thus complete, and  $(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma) \in B_m$ . Conversely, if  $n \notin C$ , then  $K_2(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n)$  is consistent. By the proposition  $K_{m-1}(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n)$  is consistent and  $K_m(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma)$  is a conservative extension of  $K_{\{m\}}(\gamma)$ . Then since  $K_{\{m\}}(\gamma)$  is incomplete, so is  $K_m(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma)$  and  $(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma) \notin B_m$ . Thus we have  $n \in C \Leftrightarrow (\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma) \in B_m$ , and  $C$  is reducible to  $B_m$ . This completes the proof of the theorem.

It is clear that each  $A_m$  has recursively enumerable complement. Thus part (a) of the theorem specifies each  $A_m$  up to recursive isomorphism type ([3], Chapter 7) and so determines exactly the complexity of each  $A_m$ . Part (b) is much less definitive. In the first place, the condition  $m \geq 3$  should not, it seems to me, be required. The reduction procedure of ([7], Sections 2, 3) provides, when  $m \geq n \geq 1$ , a formula  $\delta$  of  $\text{Fla}_m$  and a recursive function  $\varphi: \text{Fla}_m \rightarrow \text{Fla}_n$  such that if  $K_m(\beta)$  is incomplete, then so is  $K_n(\delta \wedge \wedge \varphi(\beta))$ , but (contrary to what I said in April) it is not clear whether the converse holds as well. If so, then  $B_n$  is reducible to  $B_m$  when  $n \geq m \geq 1$  and so  $B_m$  is universal for all  $m \geq 1$ . In the second place, part (b) leaves open the possibility that there may be an (infinite) recursive set  $I$  of formulas of  $K_m$  such that, for every  $\beta \in \text{Fla}_m$ ,  $K_m(\beta)$  is complete if and only if  $\beta$  is equivalent to some formula in  $I$ . I do not believe that this is the case.

An interesting problem, related to the ones discussed here, was mentioned by a member of the audience at the Banach Center. (I hope he has had more success with it than I have.) Is  $\{\beta \in \text{Fla}_1 \mid K_1(\beta) \text{ is decidable}\}$  decidable?

Addendum (added August 25, 1978). Robert E. Woodrow showed me a way to prove that  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  are universal, by modifying the reduction

procedure of [7]. Another way, which does not require such a modification, is as follows.

Let a formula  $\beta \in K_m$  be called *r-persistent* if whenever  $(W, P)$  is refined and  $(W, P) \models \beta$ , then  $W \models \beta$ . It is clear that if  $K_m(\beta)$  is inconsistent, then  $\beta$  is *r-persistent*, and if  $\beta$  is *r-persistent*, then  $K_m(\beta)$  is complete. It is not difficult to show that the reduction procedure of [7] preserves *r-persistence*, that is, if  $\beta$  is *r-persistent*, then so is  $\delta \wedge \varphi(\beta)$ . So we may apply the reduction procedure to the formulas  $\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma$  of  $K_3$  to obtain formulas  $\eta_n = \delta \wedge \varphi(\beta \wedge \neg \alpha_n \wedge \gamma)$  of  $K_2$  (or of  $K_1$ ) such that  $n \in C \Leftrightarrow \eta_n \in B_2$  (or  $B_1$ ).

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