

# Uniting for Peace?

## DEMOCRACIES AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

JAMES H. LEBOVIC

*Department of Political Science  
The George Washington University*

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Does the level of democracy of a country incline it toward participation in post-cold war era, United Nations (UN) peace operations? The link between democracy and multilateral peace operations in liberal theory is explored, and the expanding UN global presence and its indebtedness to democracies are examined. Hypotheses drawn from liberal and realist theory are tested on a global set of countries in the period between 1993 and 2001, using cross-sectional, time-series data and a Heckman selection model. The descriptive evidence and robust model results provide strong support for the proposition that the UN peace operations of the post-cold war era relied on democratic contributions. A country's level of democracy accounts for why and how much countries contributed to these operations when competing with a host of alternative explanations derived from a realist and liberal perspective.

*Keywords:* *democracy; United Nations; peace operations; post-cold war*

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**T**he end of the cold war brought new global challenges to a United Nations (UN) security structure that had teetered on the verge of collapse on more than one occasion. With ethnic bloodletting in the Balkans, political turmoil in Central America and the Caribbean, and the African continent ravaged by famine and war, the UN was soon engaged worldwide in a variety of roles, from election monitor, truce observer, and civil police officer to active participant in aggressive peace operations. The UN and its members grappled with limited peacekeeping budgets, expressed trepidation about acquiring new responsibilities, and suffered constraints imposed by security mechanisms that had been improvised for peacekeeping. Yet member states pooled their resources and cobbled together forces under complicated command arrangements to establish multilateral presences in Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, East Timor, and elsewhere. What explains the willingness of a large number of countries to staff these operations, despite political,

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economic, and military costs that create “free-rider” problems—indeed, costs that forced a contraction in UN obligations later the same decade? Were democracies per se a vital force behind the expanded UN role?

In much of the peacekeeping literature, financial and material support for peace operations is attributed to the interests and capabilities of the participants. Most often, the self-interested participants are “middle powers” (Neack 1995), such as Canada, Austria, Chile, Sweden, and Denmark, nations that “were, as a rule, neither great powers nor very poor developing states” (Hillen 2000, 22). These countries are said to increase their international stature while advancing their neutrality by participating in peace operations. Elsewhere, the uneven support for peace operations (a free-rider problem) is credited to asymmetries in global capability that position a relatively small number of countries to provide the (perhaps impure) public good of global peace and stability (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). Contributions of forces from developing countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt, are even ascribed to their deficient capability (Shimizu and Sandler 2002, 654). The UN’s standard payment to its forces exceeds what developing countries pay their troops, and countries can participate in these missions to train and equip their forces and export “troublesome” personnel (Bobrow and Boyer 1997, 727).

Although all of these explanations have considerable merit, none is adequately attentive to the role played by democracies in crafting, staffing, and otherwise supporting multilateral peace missions, as these opened to broad participation. The UN once sought to avoid relying on forces from the permanent members of the Security Council, to balance contributions from the East and West, and to favor personnel from nonaligned countries. In recent years, the UN has been forced by the sheer number and intensity of post-cold war operations to welcome the involvement of a diverse set of states, including many democracies. True, the UN has continued to recruit from among more capable contributors—those that can supply well-armed and trained personnel, heavy weaponry, and sophisticated logistics, communications, and medical support—when it has not contracted out military functions to those same countries. These capable contributors are now found most decidedly, however, among the world’s democracies.

There is little direct support in the democracy literature for supposing that democracies per se are predisposed toward championing or assisting peace operations.<sup>1</sup> Attention in that literature has focused instead on the so-called democratic peace, the finding that democracies do not fight one another. In effect, this focus highlights the tendency for democracies to keep the peace (avoid war) among themselves without duly considering a tendency by which democracies extend the peace to other parts of the world. Such behavior is a plausible implication of liberal theory, which suggests that, under propitious conditions, democracies are inclined to support peace operations because these missions afford opportunities to spread and preserve the faith (democracy) and protect and secure the rights of individuals and because democracies define their interests around humanitarian objectives. In this study, then, I examine

1. For convenience, I refer to *democracies* and *nondemocracies* throughout this study. I actually suppose that *democracy* works as a continuous variable in much of my analysis. I also use the terms *peace operations* and *humanitarian operations* interchangeably.

whether a country's level of democracy helps explain its involvement in multilateral peace operations, even when controlling for various causes identified in liberal and realist theories.

I proceed as follows. First, I examine the link between democracy and multilateral peace operations in liberal theory. Second, I propose hypotheses drawn from liberal and realist theory for testing, using a Heckman selection model that assumes that participation in United Nations peace operations (UNPOs) is decided before contribution levels to them are determined. Third, I discuss the expanding UN global presence and its indebtedness to democracies in the years between 1992 and 2001. Fourth, I present key variables and measures and the precise cross-sectional, time-series models that I test on a global set of countries in the period from 1993 to 2001. Finally, I reveal the results of tests of these models and then my conclusions.

### **DEMOCRACY AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN LIBERAL THEORY**

According to liberal thinking, contemporary democracies have reasons to participate in operations with a democratic or humanitarian appeal. First, given their representative structure and popular responsiveness, democracies draw legitimacy, in large part, from liberal principles (Doyle 1996, 4-5). Compared to nondemocracies, then, democracies more readily accept the view that individuals possess inalienable rights that must be safeguarded and promoted. Second, democratic leaders can export liberal practices and pursue humanitarian objectives because these are not easily separated from self-interest. Liberalism suggests that the spread of democracy is essential to realize a broader harmony of interest that all people share: "individuals everywhere . . . are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being," and "freedom is required for these pursuits" (Owen 1996, 118). Liberal theory also supports the assumption that democracies share an interest in creating economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive. For example, given the Kantian view that wars provide domestic opportunities for despotic forces to undermine republican governance, democracies should prevent the spread of war and ameliorate conditions that give rise to war. Or, given the views of some liberals that political freedom stems from economic freedom (Lindblom 1977, 5), markets must be shielded from the whims and excesses of government. That liberals see peace, democracy, human dignity, and economic freedom as mutually supportive objectives is apparent in the rhetoric of democratic leaders (Layne 1996, 198) and their behavior. These goals are often sought in ambitious combinations with no appreciation of the underlying costs, compromises, and trade-offs (Packenham 1973, 20).

This is not to say that democratic intervention is coherent or ensured, even when necessary to forestall a humanitarian disaster. Because liberal principles are internally inconsistent and open to interpretation (Doyle 1996, 30-54), the relationship between democracy and humanitarian intervention could be probabilistic at best. The direction of democratic policies depends on which liberal school has the upper hand in foreign policy: "laissez-faire" liberals, who value property rights, unfettered competition, and

free trade, or “social democratic liberals,” who seek to remedy inequities within societies and prefer economic redistribution over growth. It further depends on how each school resolves tensions among its preferences: whether liberals countenance authoritarian rule by deferring to international principles of noninterference and (state) equality, whether liberals accept the suppression of civil liberties by egalitarian governments (e.g., Cuba), and whether liberals apply principles of toleration to those who do not fully embrace liberal principles (see Rawls 1993).<sup>2</sup> Certainly, a particular liberal view can prevail at a given point in time: in the 1990s, the view that diverse threats to human well-being are pressing, yet rectifiable, global problems governed thinking about postconflict reconstruction and peacekeeping within the international community (Paris 1997, 2003). But liberalism leaves open the questions of which principles leaders will emphasize and how leaders will balance benefits with costs of liberal policies that include the neglect of other objectives.

Democracies might be slow or unable to act as well because liberal principles by which power is widely distributed within a democratic system guarantee inefficiency and inertia in policy making. The U.S. political system is particularly noteworthy for its abundant veto points for blocking or forestalling government action (Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher 1983, 20), and the ability of all democracies to act decisively and forcefully can be impaired when the executive branch is weak vis-à-vis the legislature (Auerswald 2000) or when the electorate is engaged. Public support for military intervention is reputedly soft and short-lived and might wither with combat casualties (Mueller 2002). Consequently, whether democracies per se act in concert depends on an impermanent constellation of national governments that have the will to support humanitarian or democratic objectives,<sup>3</sup> the persuasiveness to sell the accompanying policies to other democratic governments and the public as articulations of democratic values and/or national interests, and the ability to commit to a course of action that makes it hard to retreat (Fearon 1997). Once engaged, democratic leaders might sustain commitments, however, with help from a democratic public that rallies to support the use of force (Jentleson and Britton 1998).

Despite the plausible link between democracy and liberal intervention, the international politics literature is generally unconcerned with whether, when, and how democracies engage in such action, but it does provide important insights into the international conditions under which any state might choose to pursue liberal objectives. First, participation in humanitarian operations depends on the capabilities of international institutions. Whereas realists discount the importance of international institutions (Mearsheimer 1994–1995), liberal institutionalists recognize that certain objectives can be pursued multilaterally within international organizations when the

2. Liberal principles allow countries the leeway to act on their own imperatives (on U.S. “exceptionalism,” see Luck 2002).

3. Enthusiasm for peace operations grew and subsided with changes in national leadership (e.g., McDougall 2002) and the responsiveness of democratic leaders to appeals and arguments from abroad. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, for one, aggressively pushed an agenda that “defined democracy in decidedly Western-liberal terms” and “identified democracy as the prerequisite for achieving a long list of other social goals, including development, human rights and peace” (Paris 2003, 446).

payoff is insufficient for any one state to act unilaterally. Multilateral operations spread risks and costs among participants, promise scale and efficiency advantages (that might offset problems of force integration), provide political cover by legitimizing operations, dilute the opposition when opponents must spread their fire among an array of political targets, and permit states to monitor and control the behavior of other intervening countries (Keohane and Martin 1995; Martin 1992). They also allow states to realize shared interests (Zacher and Matthew 1995, 109-10): liberal institutionalists stress the longer term gains to be had when states resist temptations to compete over short-term benefits. Second, participation in humanitarian operations owes to a permissive security environment. Contemporary (neo)realists claim that in an anarchic world, security is the overarching objective for states and, consequently, that democracies and nondemocracies alike must preserve and extend their capabilities to deflect challenges and offset the capability improvements of rivals (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1979). But liberal theorists concede that the logic of "relative gains" permits some flexibility in response or can soften through circumstance to permit the pursuit of "less essential" objectives. Not surprisingly, then, U.S. enthusiasm for peace operations grew after the cold war and waned again after the attacks on September 11, 2001, when the United States marshaled its resources for a global campaign against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

## HYPOTHESES

Factors, such as international institutions, that facilitate liberal intervention can independently explain a country's decision to intervene abroad. I thus read the international politics literature as supporting a model in which (a) institutional participation bolsters the effects of some variables (e.g., democracy) and (b) realist security variables vie with liberal variables—democracy and institutional involvement—in explaining a country's UNPO contributions. When estimated, the model can disclose whether the democratic character of a country explains its UNPO contributions when considering other reasons that the country had to act.

First and foremost, the model recognizes that the democratic character of a country influences its decision to contribute personnel to UN peace operations. Whether taking the lead or responding to appeals, democracies are predicted to have carried a significant share of the UNPO burden in the post-cold war period when controlling for other variables. This argument is expressed in the first hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 1:* More democratic countries contribute larger numbers of personnel to UNPOs than less democratic countries do.

This hypothesis speaks to the overall contribution of democracies to peace operations, but the prior discussion also provides reason to suspect that the relative democratic contribution depends on whether a country currently participates in a facilitative international institution. A focus on current participants is required, given liberal

institutionalist assumptions that participants experience different pressures and hold different expectations than nonparticipants do.<sup>4</sup> Because UNPO participants work together through the offices of the UN Secretary General (Hillen 2000, 15) to determine how much each state will contribute to the UN force, given the likely contributions of other states, the model is based on a distinction between (democratic and non-democratic) “insiders,” which coordinate their policies and collaborate to achieve common objectives, and “outsiders,” which are not parties to negotiations that establish a division of labor among the participants. Indeed, states—including democracies—might exempt themselves or be exempted from UNPO participation for self-interested reasons. States facing immediate threats elsewhere are loath to supply forces for “superfluous” UN operations; in addition, global politics precludes some states (e.g., Israel) from participating whatever their wishes. If this is the operative logic, hypothesis tests must acknowledge that democracy might explain a country’s contribution levels to UNPOs but not participation in them. For these reasons, I test a two-stage (Heckman) “selection model.” The selection model assumes that factors that affect whether a country participates in an institution might not be those that affect how much participants give to those institutions—and that the latter is for the participants alone to decide.

Yet the liberal argument also justifies treating institutions as independent causal influences and to expect, therefore, that the prior institutional involvement of a country explains its current UNPO contributions. Liberal institutionalists argue that institutional involvement is self-perpetuating, that an act of participation commits a state (democracies and nondemocracies) to further action by creating and reinforcing roles, rules, and expectations. Thus, states cannot extricate themselves from existing arrangements—doing less than in the past—without inviting the transaction costs of establishing alternative arrangements and/or the reputation costs of appearing unwilling to stand by commitments (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).<sup>5</sup> This argument underlies a second general hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 2:* The greater a country’s prior involvement in international institutions (including but not limited to UNPOs), the greater its current UNPO contribution.

For realists, the democratic character of a country has no bearing on its defined interests and thus on whether and how much it participates in UN peace operations. Typically, realists note that states—democracies included—have chosen to avoid or at least quickly curtail humanitarian interventions (in Rwanda and Somalia, respectively), sought to maintain state control over multilateral missions, or participated in them only to the extent that they had an immediate security rationale. States join UNPOs, then, to the extent that doing so offers direct benefits or, as some realists

4. That gross human rights violators might be excluded involuntarily from UN operations is another reason for validating the democracy thesis at the second stage of the analysis, where contribution levels are decided.

5. I do not maintain that democracies per se favor multilateralism (as might occur if democracies favor action with other democracies and policies that have been vetted through exchange or if a shared identity permits democracies to overcome collective-action problems).

argue, exacts only a small price.<sup>6</sup> Together, realist arguments suggest a third general hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 3:* The immediate security interests of a country determine its UNPO contributions.

The impact of these interests can be understood by examining the effects of variables that are mainstays of realist theory. These include a state's power, rivalry with others, involvement in conflict, and stake in these operations. First, the size and military strength of a country could boost its UNPO contributions because greater capabilities make it easier for countries to spare resources for less vital security operations and because powerful countries are more likely than weak countries to pursue regional or global security interests that require UN support. The wealth of a country could similarly induce it to make large personnel contributions, although this effect could be offset if developing countries readily contribute personnel to UN operations for the financial and training benefits that participation affords. Second, states involved directly in international or domestic conflict might withhold personnel contributions to UN operations (assuming that parties to a conflict are precluded from participating in missions that concern the conflict). Conflicting states cannot afford to waste their capabilities on superfluous missions that present even a small risk of becoming serious entanglements. Third, UNPO contributions might play to global rivalries when UN operations are backed (or viewed unenthusiastically) by a preeminent global power. If so, states might align with or against that power (the United States) by offering or withholding support for UN operations. Fourth, a country could contribute to UN operations that are intended to control the spread of proximate conflicts and instability that directly compromise the country's security. For instance, European states intervened in the Balkans with fears that instability there could spark a regional conflagration, and the United States intervened in Haiti in part to stem the flow of refugees to the United States.

### **DEMOCRACIES AND POST-COLD WAR UN PEACE OPERATIONS**

That the end of the cold war dramatically heightened and transformed UN involvement around the world is apparent from the rich mandates of UN missions, their number, and the demanding conditions under which UN forces operated. As impressive as the challenging and diverse nature of these numerous operations has been their reliance on democratic support.

The UN remained involved in labor-intensive monitoring operations (of moderate to low risk) in Lebanon and Cyprus and in low-manpower observation missions in the

6. Unlike their contemporary counterparts, traditional realists are more open to the idea that states pursue humanitarian goals. For instance, Morgenthau suggests that foreign policy is guided by "human rights" when he regards them as a subordinate (U.S.) "interest" that can be pursued by states if costs permit (Morgenthau 1985, 276). The traditional view converges, then, with the liberal view that under the rights conditions, states pursue humanitarian goals. The realist and liberal views differ, however, in emphasis: realists stress that immediate security interests are an overarching governmental priority.

Golan Heights and along the Pakistan-India border. At the same time, it undertook a large number of “second-generation” operations (Boutros-Ghali 1992)—multidimensional peace-building efforts in such places as Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia—that involved the UN in refugee resettlement, election monitoring, disarmament and demobilization, and (in Cambodia) rebuilding the economic, political, and administrative structure of a “failed state.” Whereas cold war-era, UN peace operations had only occasionally strayed into the domestic affairs of affected countries (e.g., the Congo), the new operations amounted to nothing less than attempts to “remake war-shattered states as liberal democracies” (Paris 2003, 449-50). The UN departed further from its prior practices in “third-generation” peace enforcement—strenuous, high-risk, multidimensional operations in the Balkans and Africa. The new missions marked a change from large-scale operations of the past (in Korea and the Congo) in both the number of overlapping functions in which UN personnel were engaged and the frequent belligerence of their operating environment.

In traditional peacekeeping, UN personnel functioned as a neutral, lightly armed force within a clear and accepted buffer zone. Their success hinged on consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, nonuse of force except as a last resort, the multinational (thereby neutral) composition of UN forces, a willingness of member states to contribute forces, and noninterference in the internal affairs of the host country (Diehl 1994; Heje 1998). In the second- and third-generation efforts of the 1990s, however, these basic principles frequently seemed moot. UN forces were made to intervene when the identity of parties to the conflict was ambiguous (due to problems distinguishing civilians from combatants, separating combatants along geographical lines, etc.); when these forces were seen (often correctly) as hostile to one or more of the parties (e.g., the Serbs in the Balkans, the forces of General Aideed in Somalia, and the Vietnam-imposed Hun Sen government in Cambodia); when these forces had to impose their will or engage in active defense to realize their mandate (in Somalia and Bosnia); when many UN personnel were ill-trained, ill-prepared, and ill-equipped to assist these operations; and when central governments had lost control (Somalia) or were themselves the problem (Yugoslavia in Kosovo).

The new UN activism brought a staggering increase in the financial cost of global peace operations. Spending on UN peace operations, which stood at \$190 million in 1980, reached \$3.5 billion by 1994 (Shimizu and Sandler 2002, 651). Of the 55 peace operations established by the UN since its founding in 1945, 41 started after 1988. Whereas 10,000 personnel (from 26 countries) joined peace operations in 1988 (Hillen 2000, 155), by 1994, the number was eight times higher and the number of contributing countries almost three times higher. Overall, in the period from 1992 to 2001, 120 UN members contributed troops, observers, and police personnel to support UN operations, and an average of 76 countries participated each year.

The larger UN presence is apparent in the data on personnel contributions for the period from 1992 to 2001 (see Table 1).<sup>7</sup> With sizable UN operations in Somalia and

7. Monthly data from the peace and security section of the Affairs Division of the Department of Information at the UN are incomplete for earlier years. Thus, the “midyear” data are for June in most years, for August in 1992, and July in 1994. Recent data are from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.html>.



TABLE 1  
Personnel Contributed to United Nations (UN) Peace Operations by Location, 1992-2001

	Year										
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Midyear levels by location											
Africa	534	24,772	26,089	8,792	7,087	4,312	2,592	1,478	12,740	18,977	
Central America and Caribbean	595	357	205	6,907	2,075	1,523	284	291	63	14	
Cyprus	2,197	1,113	1,220	1,173	1,182	1,215	1,267	1,263	1,250	1,314	
East Asia	17,531	19,630	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,390	9,500	
Middle East and North Africa	8,054	7,265	7,885	7,727	7,200	7,042	7,211	7,057	7,493	8,051	
South Asia	38	38	38	40	44	43	44	46	45	43	
Soviet Union (former)	0	0	45	171	172	137	164	132	103	103	
Yugoslavia (former)	14,896	24,126	37,733	41,836	8,331	8,143	3,009	1,874	5,528	6,229	
Overall totals	43,845	77,301	73,215	66,646	26,091	22,415	14,571	12,141	36,612	44,231	
Midyear											
Monthly											
Maximum	—	78,744	78,111	68,844	29,140	24,952	14,347	18,460	38,501	47,777	
Average	—	68,237	72,658	59,837	26,032	20,968	14,362	13,665	33,759	44,343	
Minimum	—	52,127	69,356	31,031	24,919	14,879	13,329	12,084	18,643	38,922	

NOTE: Africa: Angola (1992-1994, 1998-2000), Central African Republic (1998-2000), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2000-2001), Ethiopia/Eritrea (2001), Liberia (1994-1997), Mozambique (1993-1994), Rwanda/Uganda (1993-1994), Rwanda (1994-1995), Sierra Leone (1999-2001), and Somalia (1992-1994). Central America and Caribbean: El Salvador (1992-1994), Guatemala (2000-2001), and Haiti (1995-2000). East Asia: Cambodia (1992-1993) and East Timor (2000-2001). Middle East and North Africa: Golan Heights (1992-2001), Iraq/Kuwait (1992-2001), Lebanon (1992-2001), and Western Sahara (1992-2001). South Asia: India/Pakistan (1992-2001), Soviet Union (former); Georgia (1994-2001) and Tajikistan (1995-2000). Years (above) are those in which UN personnel were engaged in that location at the midyear mark.

TABLE 2  
Average Annual Personnel Contribution of Democracies and  
Nondemocracies to UN Peace Operations, 1992-2001

Type	Year											Mean
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
Troops	430*	822*	735*	661*	205*	176*	96 <sup>†</sup>	81	203	205	352*	
	138	201	223	205	92	68	44	41	157	228	142	
Observers	25*	21*	20*	20*	13*	11*	9*	8*	12 <sup>†</sup>	14*	15*	
	7	7	11	10	6	5	4	3	7	8	7	
Police	28	36	16	13	24*	29*	33*	25*	66*	70*	34*	
	19	23	9	10	11	10	9	6	27	30	15	
Total	483*	879*	771*	693*	241*	217*	138*	113*	280	289	401*	
	164	232	243	226	109	84	56	50	192	266	164	
<i>n</i>	56	62	65	65	65	68	67	66	67	71	65	
	102	98	95	95	95	92	93	94	93	89	95	

NOTE: Contributions are midyear levels. Democracy:  $\geq 7$  on Polity scale (in prior year).

\* $p \leq .05$ , two-tailed. <sup>†</sup>  $p \leq .05$ , one-tailed.

the Balkans, the number of personnel engaged in UN peace missions worldwide increased from just below 44,000 in mid-1992 to more than 77,000 by mid-1993. Indeed, by mid-1993, UN force levels reached their highest level (78,744) in the 10-year period. Although these numbers declined precipitously in subsequent years (by 1999, the number of personnel committed to peace missions reached a decade low of around 12,000), UN activity soon increased again with the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone and the monitoring operation in East Timor. General trends and conclusions from these data appear largely insensitive to the exact month on which the analysis focuses.<sup>8</sup>

Given that UN missions in recent years have been frequent and taxing, how actively did democracies support them? Using Polity data (discussed below),<sup>9</sup> Table 2 demonstrates that in the years between 1992 and 2001, democracies carried the burdens of supplying troops, observers, and police to UN operations.<sup>10</sup> Per country and overall, the relative contribution of democracies was considerable. In an average year, each of the world's democracies contributed 401 personnel to peace operations, compared to the 164 contributed by each nondemocracy. The democratic contribution was most impressive when the number of UN personnel peaked between 1993 and 1995. For instance, in 1993, the 62 democracies contributed an average of 879 personnel to peace operations compared to 232 personnel contributed by the 98 nondemocracies; in 1995, the 65 democracies contributed an average of 693 personnel to peace operations compared to 226 personnel contributed by the 95 nondemocracies. Only in 2000 and 2001 were the combined per-country nondemocratic and democratic contributions statistically equal. The imbalance between the democratic and nondemocratic contributions held, in general, across personnel categories (the difference between democratic and nondemocratic contributions is statistically insignificant, however, for police in the 1992 to 1995 period and for troops in the 1999 to 2001 period).

It is important to recognize that *democracy* here is not synonymous with *NATO* (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or *Western Europe*. As Table 3 indicates, the democracies at issue are not an exclusive club, geographically or economically. Although the countries of Western and Eastern Europe were heavily represented among the largest contributors, the democracies of India, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, Thailand, Brazil, the Philippines, Botswana, New Zealand, Japan, Chile, and Colombia also fell roughly within the top half of personnel contributors in the 1992 to 2001 period. The democratic contribution is even more impressive when the democracy standard is relaxed ( $\text{Polity} \leq 4$ ). Of the top 25 contributors in that period, 20 met the weaker standard (compared to 15 that met the higher standard). (Appendix A shows noncontributors to be, on the whole, a less democratic group.)

8. Some month-to-month variation (expressed in differences between yearly minimum and maximum figures) occurs when the UN gears up for operations in some parts of the world (e.g., in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia in 1993) and closes down operations in others (e.g., in the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1995). Consequently, aggregate data can also hide underlying trends (e.g., as Bangladesh dramatically reduced its force levels in Cambodia, it greatly increased its force commitment to Somalia).

9. A country is a democracy on the Polity scale with a score  $\geq 7$  (Marshall and Jaggers 2000, 32).

10. Some observation missions only include observers, whereas others employ troops. Conversely, peace enforcement missions can include observers.

TABLE 3  
 Percentage of Personnel Contributed to  
 United Nations (UN) Peace Operations, 1992-2001

1	France <sup>b</sup>	7.362	42	Germany <sup>b</sup>	0.575	82	Kuwait	0.026
2	Pakistan <sup>a</sup>	6.520	43	Romania <sup>a</sup>	0.572	83	Bolivia <sup>b</sup>	0.024
3	Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	5.602	44	Bulgaria <sup>b</sup>	0.544	84	Jamaica <sup>b</sup>	0.024
4	India <sup>b</sup>	5.061	45	Philippines <sup>b</sup>	0.531	85	Slovenia <sup>b</sup>	0.023
5	Jordan	4.135	46	Morocco	0.526	86	Estonia <sup>a</sup>	0.022
6	United Kingdom <sup>b</sup>	3.956	47	Botswana <sup>b</sup>	0.518	87	Sri Lanka <sup>a</sup>	0.018
7	Poland <sup>b</sup>	3.430	48	New Zealand <sup>b</sup>	0.485	88	Luxembourg <sup>b</sup>	0.018
8	Canada <sup>b</sup>	3.393	49	Guinea	0.388	89	Lithuania <sup>b</sup>	0.017
9	Ghana	3.369	50	Senegal	0.358	90	Guyana <sup>a</sup>	0.016
10	Nepal <sup>a</sup>	2.971	51	China	0.338	91	Niger	0.015
11	United States <sup>b</sup>	2.785	52	Korea, South <sup>a</sup>	0.328	92	Trinidad <sup>b</sup>	0.013
12	Nigeria	2.459	53	Hungary <sup>b</sup>	0.293	93	Congo, Republic	0.012
13	Finland <sup>b</sup>	2.189	54	Japan <sup>b</sup>	0.241	94	Tanzania	0.012
14	Argentina <sup>b</sup>	2.133	55	Ethiopia	0.200	95	Djibouti	0.011
15	Russia <sup>a</sup>	2.023	56	United Arab Emirates	0.183	96	(Suriname)	0.011
16	Norway <sup>b</sup>	1.975	57	Saudi Arabia	0.163	97	(Vanuatu)	0.010
17	Austria <sup>b</sup>	1.957	58	Namibia <sup>a</sup>	0.146	98	Peru	0.010
18	Kenya	1.887	59	Mali <sup>a</sup>	0.126	99	Ecuador <sup>b</sup>	0.010
19	The Netherlands <sup>b</sup>	1.866	60	Ivory Coast	0.113	100	(Cape Verde)	0.009
20	Ireland <sup>b</sup>	1.845	61	Chile <sup>b</sup>	0.107	101	(Bahamas)	0.009
21	Malaysia	1.828	62	Singapore	0.098	102	(Barbados)	0.008
22	Fiji <sup>a</sup>	1.674	63	Colombia <sup>b</sup>	0.095	103	Bosnia	0.008
23	Uruguay <sup>b</sup>	1.492	64	Switzerland <sup>b</sup>	0.091	104	Mozambique	0.008
24	Belgium <sup>b</sup>	1.466	65	Algeria	0.090	105	Croatia	0.006
25	Denmark <sup>b</sup>	1.465	66	Togo	0.079	106	(Samoa)	0.006
26	Ukraine <sup>a</sup>	1.370	67	Greece <sup>b</sup>	0.066	107	El Salvador <sup>b</sup>	0.004
27	Sweden <sup>b</sup>	1.356	68	Gabon	0.065	108	Dominican Republic <sup>a</sup>	0.004
28	Zambia	1.309	69	Burkina Faso	0.063	109	Iceland <sup>b</sup>	0.004
29	Egypt	1.291	70	Chad	0.062	110	(Antigua)	0.004
30	Spain <sup>b</sup>	1.225	71	Mexico	0.062	111	(Brunei)	0.004
31	Australia <sup>b</sup>	1.217	72	Malawi	0.058	112	Kyrgyzstan	0.003
32	Indonesia	1.212	73	Honduras <sup>a</sup>	0.057	113	Cuba	0.003
33	Italy <sup>b</sup>	1.207	74	Guinea Bissau	0.053	114	Paraguay <sup>a</sup>	0.003
34	Portugal <sup>b</sup>	0.985	75	Cameroon	0.043	115	Yugoslavia	0.003
35	Zimbabwe	0.938	76	Venezuela <sup>b</sup>	0.033	116	Albania <sup>a</sup>	0.002
36	Turkey <sup>b</sup>	0.918	77	Benin <sup>a</sup>	0.032	117	(St. Lucia)	0.002
37	Slovak Republic <sup>b</sup>	0.861	78	Guatemala <sup>a</sup>	0.032	118	(St. Kitts)	0.002
38	Tunisia	0.779	79	(Maldives)	0.030	119	Libya	0.001
39	Thailand <sup>b</sup>	0.777	80	Gambia	0.029	120	(Belize)	0.001
40	Czech Republic <sup>b</sup>	0.762	81	South Africa <sup>b</sup>	0.028			
41	Brazil <sup>b</sup>	0.664						

NOTE: Mean Polity score (lagged 1 year): <sup>a</sup>  $\geq 4$ , <sup>b</sup>  $\geq 7$ . Countries in parentheses mean that the Polity score is missing. Contributions are based on midyear levels.

TABLE 4  
 Percentage of Personnel Contributed by Top 10 Contributors  
 to Select Sets of United Nations (UN) Peace Operations

Africa (without Somalia)		Somalia, 1992-1994		Haiti, 1995-2000	
India <sup>b</sup>	12	Pakistan <sup>b</sup>	32	United States <sup>b</sup>	22
Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	12	India <sup>b</sup>	14	United Kingdom <sup>b</sup>	21
Nigeria	10	United States <sup>b</sup>	7	Pakistan <sup>a</sup>	18
Zambia	8	Italy <sup>b</sup>	7	Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	15
Uruguay <sup>b</sup>	6	Zimbabwe	5	Nepal <sup>a</sup>	4
Jordan	5	Egypt	5	Argentina <sup>b</sup>	4
Ghana	5	Morocco	4	France <sup>b</sup>	3
Kenya	4	Nigeria	4	The Netherlands <sup>b</sup>	1
Brazil <sup>b</sup>	3	Malaysia <sup>a</sup>	3	Jordan	1
Zimbabwe	3	France <sup>b</sup>	3	Mali <sup>a</sup>	1
Others	32	Others	16	Others	10
Cyprus		Cambodia, 1992-1993		East Timor, 2000-2001	
United Kingdom <sup>b</sup>	32	Indonesia	11	Australia <sup>b</sup>	17
Argentina <sup>b</sup>	24	India <sup>b</sup>	9	Portugal <sup>b</sup>	11
Austria <sup>b</sup>	22	France <sup>b</sup>	8	Jordan	10
Canada <sup>b</sup>	5	Pakistan <sup>b</sup>	7	Thailand <sup>b</sup>	9
Hungary <sup>b</sup>	4	Malaysia <sup>a</sup>	6	Pakistan	9
Denmark <sup>b</sup>	3	Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	6	Philippines <sup>b</sup>	8
Ireland <sup>b</sup>	2	Ghana	6	New Zealand <sup>b</sup>	7
The Netherlands <sup>b</sup>	2	Uruguay <sup>b</sup>	5	Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	6
Slovakia <sup>b</sup>	2	Tunisia	5	South Korea <sup>b</sup>	5
Australia <sup>b</sup>	2	Bulgaria <sup>b</sup>	5	Kenya	3
Others	2	Others	32	Others	15
Lebanon/Golan Heights		India-Pakistan		Former Yugoslavia	
Poland <sup>b</sup>	14	Sweden <sup>b</sup>	20	France <sup>b</sup>	15
Ghana	12	Italy <sup>b</sup>	16	Jordan	8
Nepal <sup>a</sup>	11	Denmark <sup>b</sup>	14	United Kingdom <sup>b</sup>	7
Ireland <sup>b</sup>	11	South Korea <sup>a</sup>	14	Pakistan <sup>a</sup>	5
Fiji <sup>a</sup>	10	Finland <sup>b</sup>	13	Canada <sup>b</sup>	5
Finland <sup>b</sup>	10	Chile <sup>b</sup>	8	Russia <sup>a</sup>	5
Norway <sup>b</sup>	9	Uruguay <sup>b</sup>	6	United States <sup>b</sup>	4
Austria <sup>b</sup>	7	Norway <sup>b</sup>	5	The Netherlands <sup>b</sup>	4
France <sup>b</sup>	5	Belgium <sup>b</sup>	5	Denmark <sup>b</sup>	3
India <sup>b</sup>	3	Hungary <sup>b</sup>	.2	Belgium <sup>b</sup>	3
Others	8	Others	0	Others	41

NOTE: Percentages are prorated yearly averages calculated from full-period contributions. Period = 1992-2001 unless otherwise noted. Mean Polity score (lagged 1 year): <sup>a</sup> ≥ 4, <sup>b</sup> ≥ 7.

The democratic contribution is impressive, even when calculated per mission. The top three democratic contributors provided the majority of personnel to between one-quarter and one-half of the operations conducted each year, whereas the top five democratic contributors provided most of the personnel to about one-half of all missions. In contrast, the top five nondemocratic contributors accounted for half the personnel for only two or three missions in the same period. In general, democracies contributed an overwhelming annual share of personnel to most missions—missions that spanned the globe (see Appendix B). As Table 4 reveals, a relatively small number of (different) democratic countries accounted for a substantial proportion of the personnel sent to each of various locations (multiple operations sometimes operated in the same geographical area). This was less true in Africa (excluding the Somali operation), but democracies carried a large burden on the front lines of the Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan conflict and in Haiti, Cyprus, Cambodia, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia (and former Soviet Union; not reported here).

It should be noted, however, that personnel contribution patterns might not mirror patterns using other indicators, such as financial contributions. The 29 countries that accounted for more than 95% of the financial contributions to UN missions in the period from 1994 to 2000 period (Shimizu and Sandler 2002, 658) contributed roughly half the personnel employed in UN peace operations between 1992 and 1999; by 2000 and 2001, their contribution dropped to just over one-quarter of the amount contributed by all UN members.<sup>11</sup> For a number of reasons, however, personnel contributions are especially meaningful indicators of state objectives. First, countries are reluctant to volunteer forces that will be placed at risk. None of the many countries that made their forces nominally available to the UN for peace operations was willing to commit forces to stop the carnage in Rwanda in 1994. Second, force contributions can be controversial. Countries contributing forces invite embarrassment when their soldiers engage in criminal conduct<sup>12</sup> or when national forces fail to accomplish their military objectives (e.g., the precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia), aid besieged units from other countries (e.g., as Italian forces in Somalia stood accused), or stop the slaughter of innocents under the protection of these forces (e.g., the 1995 massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica). Indeed, because of the political sensitivity of personnel contributions, the UN did not disseminate country-specific data on contributions to specific missions until the 1990s, and the UN has not made these data available for earlier periods. Third, formally at least, contributors have more control over the size and use of their national peace force contingents than their financial contributions (which, admittedly, states have withheld to express disapproval with some UN activities). Whereas a country's financial contribution to peace operations (for all but the "Permanent Five"—the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China) is a strict function of a sliding payment scale based on UN membership

11. The financial data, from Shimizu and Sandler (2002), are from <http://tsandler.cjb.net>. For these 29 countries, the correlation between personnel and financial contributions is typically near zero between 1994 and 2000 (not surprisingly given the extent to which the financial burden is carried by a relatively small number of countries). Assuming zero financial contributions from the remaining countries only slightly strengthens these correlations.

12. Charges of sexual solicitation, rape, torture, racketeering, and smuggling have followed these forces throughout the world.

dues (which reflect a member's ability to pay), members can choose whether to deploy their forces in particular parts of the world. Finally, personnel contributions to UN-led missions parallel contributions to multilateral missions that are not under nominal UN control but are hard to distinguish from UN-created missions in command structure, participation, and mandate. For instance, in 1999, Australia took the lead in forging and supporting the UN-sanctioned force in East Timor, which laid the military foundation for a UN-led mission to which Australia was also the largest personnel contributor.

### MODEL SPECIFICATION

Heckman models are commonly used to determine whether policy making conforms to a two-stage process in which subjects are selected to receive a good—say, arms or aid (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998)—before the amount of the good to be received by the selected countries is determined. The logic behind these models is that the (arms or aid) qualification decision stands apart from the allocation decision: the same criteria might not influence both decisions, and second-stage decisions pertain only to subjects (countries) selected in the first stage (i.e., estimates at the second stage are obtained only for the selected cases). In statistical terms, the selection process requires the simultaneous estimation of the two equations because the correlation between the error terms will otherwise produce inconsistent estimates (Winship and Mare 1992).<sup>13</sup> With similar reasoning, I examine the characteristics of countries that determine their participation in UNPOs (equation 1, or the “selection” equation), whether criteria that affect UNPO participation (a binary variable) also affect contribution levels (equation 2, or the “outcome” equation), and whether the decisions to participate in UNPOs and provide them a certain level of support are distinct but interdependent choices. I derive the coefficients for these equations through full-information maximum likelihood estimation. Most of the same independent variables appear in both equations.

The model includes variables that liberals consider important. First, the centerpiece of the model is a posited relationship between a country's *level of democracy* and UNPO contribution. Democracy is measured here in continuous form using Polity democracy ratings. These are constructed by subtracting a country's combined (Polity) autocracy score from its combined democracy score.<sup>14</sup> The net (democracy-autocracy) index varies between -10 (the least democratic score) and +10 (the most democratic score).<sup>15</sup>

13. Biased coefficients can result from single-equation (ordinary least squares [OLS] or probit) estimation.

14. These data are based on a variety of weighted indicators. The manual (Marshall and Jaggers 2000) and data are from [www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity](http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity).

15. Countries for which Polity data are missing are excluded from the model analysis (these are mostly small island countries). For the few countries (e.g., Eritrea, Slovakia) created after 1992, Polity, UN vote agreement, and foreign military sales values for the country of which the former had been a part were used for independent variables in the precreation year. UNPO contributions were ascribed to the country (e.g., the Czech Republic) in which the capital was located. Estimates were derived for other missing data.

Second, the model includes two sets of lagged variables that measure a country's multilateral security (institutional) commitment *in the prior year*. The first set of indicators measures the level of a country's prior commitment to UNPOs. These indicators are the *number of personnel* and the *ratio of noncombat to total personnel* that a country contributes to UN operations. Including the latter measure in the model promises insights into a paradox: on one hand, costly signals (such as sending troops) increase a country's commitment to a course of action; by the same token, these actions weaken commitment by inviting the economic costs that a signaling policy is meant to overcome. Because countries that contribute personnel to UNPOs might thus choose a sustainable over a high-profile course of action, it could well be that the noncombat personnel ratio and UNPO participation are positively related.<sup>16</sup> Conversely, because combat missions are labor intensive and require and induce commitment from participating countries (relative to observer and police operations), the noncombat ratio may be negatively related to the amount of UNPO personnel contributed.

The second set of indicators is intended to measure the scope of a country's commitment to security multilateralism. Because a country that has performed a variety of functions in a large number of operations is more likely to participate actively in current UNPOs than is a country that can end its commitment when its specific contribution (e.g., combat troops in Somalia) is no longer required, scope of involvement is measured by the *variety of tasks* a country performed in UNPOs in the prior year. (The contribution of troops, observers, or police to a given UNPO each counts as a single task: thus, one operation can result in a country performing as many as three different tasks.) This measure is based on the Hirschman measure of concentration.<sup>17</sup> It achieves its lowest value of 0 when a country performs no more than a single task; it approximates a value of 1 as a country's UNPO personnel contributions are distributed more evenly over a larger number of tasks. Scope of involvement in multilateral security cooperation is more generally measured by *security treaty ratification*. To create this variable, I focus on the important set of treaties pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. These include the Biological Weapons Treaty (1972), the Seabed Treaty (1971), the Chemical Weapons Treaty (1993), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996). I count the number of these treaties (when open to ratification) that a country has ratified in the prior year (in 1993, the highest value this variable could obtain is 2; by 2000, the highest value this variable could obtain is 4).<sup>18</sup> I exclude the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) Treaty from this group because, by the 1990s, it had been ratified by almost all states and because ratifying that treaty had different implications for different countries: it enhanced the power of nuclear "haves" while curtailing the prerogatives of nuclear "have-nots."

Similarly, the model incorporates a measure of *post-cold war participation* in UNPOs into the selection equation to control for the possibility that nonparticipation

16. This relationship is likely reinforced by the many years that some countries have been involved in observer missions that have carried over from the cold war period.

17. Where  $t_i$  = the number of personnel contributed to a given task and  $t$  = total number of personnel contributed to all tasks, concentration =  $1 - (\sum [t_i/t]^2)$ . The measure is subtracted from 1 so that a wider variety of tasks yield higher numbers. It is set to 0 when a country performs no tasks.

18. These data are obtained from <http://untreaty.un.org>.



comes easiest to perennial outsiders. That North Korea does not contribute forces to UNPOs is to be expected, perhaps, from its security alignments and conflict involvement, but North Korea, Iraq, or Vietnam might be unlikely participants because they have developed (indeed, fostered) reputations as “nonparticipants.” Otherwise 0, this variable is set to 1 if a country contributed personnel to any UN mission in any prior post-cold war (1991–2000) year.

The realist theory-inspired independent variables in the model pertain to a contributor’s security interests. First, a country’s capability to provide personnel is measured with three country indicators. The first of these is *population* ( $\log_{10}$ ), given that bigger countries (e.g., India) are more able to supply personnel to UN operations than are smaller countries (e.g., Nepal).<sup>19</sup> The second is *growth in military spending* because countries that are gaining military resources are more able to supply personnel than are countries that are cutting military spending.<sup>20</sup> The third of these is a country’s *wealth*, as measured by its UN “human development index” (HDI) score. Because this score takes into consideration a country’s life expectancy, education level (i.e., literacy and school enrollment), and standard of living (i.e., gross domestic product [GDP] per capita), it permits a more valid test for whether nonmodernized countries contribute to UNPOs to obtain financial benefits, troop training, and equipment than GDP per capita alone would.<sup>21</sup> Another indicator, *troops*, the size of a country’s armed forces ( $\log_{10}$ ),<sup>22</sup> is used only in model robustness tests because it is highly correlated (.72) with, yet less reliable than, population. Population is also the better measure if countries increase their force levels when mobilized for conflict and disinclined to join UN operations, draw UN personnel (e.g., civilian police) from outside the military, or join UN operations only because donated troops can be replaced from the country’s large labor pool.

Second, the model incorporates a measure of *conflict involvement* based on data employed in Hegre et al. (2001).<sup>23</sup> Otherwise 0, this variable is set to 1 when a country is involved in civil or international conflicts, which might make a country reluctant to spare forces for UNPOs.

Third, the model includes three variables to assess the effects of U.S. hegemony—the extent to which UNPOs are undertaken to realize or counter U.S. policy preferences. These variables are *U.S. security ties* based on U.S. foreign military sales to a

19. Population figures are Penn World Table data supplied by the Center for International Comparisons, University of Pennsylvania. They are available at <http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu>.

20. Data were calculated from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2002).

21. It also avoids multicollinearity due to including gross domestic product (GDP)/cap with population in the model. Data and information on the human development index (HDI) were obtained from <http://hdr.undp.org>. Because HDI data are available at only 5-year intervals, missing values were replaced by assuming a constant rate of increase between the years 1990 and 1995 and the years 1995 and 2000. When 1990 or 1995 data are unavailable, the rate of increase was based on the mean of a country’s UN assessment group, which, for all but the Permanent Five, are based on financial criteria. The few severely affected countries (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia) for which data are unavailable for all years were assigned the lowest HDI value in their respective assessment groups within the period from 1992 to 2000.

22. Data were obtained from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1997) and the SIPRI database at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org). Missing data were replaced using the STATA ipolate procedure or the most recent figure.

23. These data are available at <http://www.prio.no/cwp/datasets.asp>.

country (U.S. Department of Defense 2000), *U.S. political agreement* (judged from that country's and the United States's UN votes),<sup>24</sup> and *NATO membership* (a dummy variable that is set to 1 for NATO countries and 0 for non-NATO countries). Given that NATO membership is restricted to democracies, including this variable imposes a tough test of the democracy thesis, as does including a term for the interaction between the NATO dummy and population. Because this multiplicative term obtains the value of the population variable only for NATO countries (otherwise, its value is 0), it presumes that larger NATO countries (e.g., the United States) carry a higher security burden than smaller NATO countries do (e.g., Iceland).

Fourth, the model includes regional dummy variables because the part of the world in which a country is located can affect its interest in, and capability to contribute to, a given operation. Based on classifications from the Correlates of War (COW) project,<sup>25</sup> these regions include Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia (as the reference category, its coefficient is represented by the model's intercept term). Augmenting these variables, a dummy variable is included in the model to determine whether states in *proximity* to a country hosting a UN mission are especially inclined to contribute forces. This variable is used only in robustness tests,<sup>26</sup> however, because what makes these countries interested parties also compromises their neutrality and renders them poor prospects for mission participation.<sup>27</sup>

Fifth, as an additional control variable, a dummy variable is included (otherwise 0, it assumes a value of 1) in the outcome equation for each permanent member of the UN Security Council—the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China. The inclusion of this variable reflects the ability of these countries to influence their relative personnel contribution through a veto threat.

Model tests require some sensitivity to potential statistical problems. Given possible simultaneity problems that confound estimation, all independent variables in the model are lagged 1 year. Outlier problems and potential heteroscedasticity are addressed by expressing UNPO personnel contributions (at  $t$  and  $t - 1$ ) and population in  $\log_{10}$  form. The resulting nonlinear form of the model also permits estimates of the joint (nonlinear) effect of key variables—specifically, democracy and institutional participation—when the dependent variable is expressed in its original units. (These estimates allow insights into whether, compared to nondemocracies, democracies are better positioned to stick to their goals once engaged.) To address possible

24. For this, I employ a measure of similarity of foreign policy positions (Signorino and Ritter 1999) applied to all General Assembly votes cast in the prior year. Data for the years from 1992 to 1996 were provided by Erik Gartzke at <http://www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets.htm>; data for 1997 and 1998 were provided by Erik Voeten, and data for 1999 and 2000 were collected by the author.

25. The data are from <http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html>.

26. Based on Correlates of War (COW) data, this dummy obtains a value of 1 for states that share a border with or are separated by no more than 400 miles of water from a country hosting a UN mission. This variable is set to 0 for other states; for UN missions located in the Middle East, Cyprus, and South Asia; and for Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe for the 2000-2001 mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (all were parties to the cease-fire agreement that preceded the UN mission). Conversely, any country bordering on the former Yugoslavia (but not part of it) is considered a neighbor to all missions there.

27. In any case, the region and proximity variables might have little impact when personnel contributed to operations worldwide are combined in aggregate analysis.

autocorrelation in the selection equation, a dummy variable representing each year (except 1993, the reference category) is included in the model. Because these dummies offer the further advantage of controlling for year-to-year variation in the global demand for UNPO personnel, they are incorporated into equations with both binary and continuous dependent variables.<sup>28</sup> In response to problems specific to cross-sectional analysis (e.g., contemporaneous correlation among the cross sections), I generate robust standard errors by using the so-called sandwich estimator of variance with the assumption that observations are not independent within the cross sections (White 1980).<sup>29</sup>

## RESULTS

The aggregate cross-sectional, time-series (CSTS) analyses of the Heckman models for the period from 1993 to 2001 yield a number of important findings. Most important, they reveal that a country's level of democracy explains both its UNPO participation and contribution levels. They further establish that participation in UNPOs is effectively a two-stage process in which participation in UNPOs is decided before the actual contributions to them are determined. This is revealed by the chi-square test of independence of the two equations that generates a significant ( $p \leq .001$ ) statistic.

The determinants of participation in UNPOs are found in Table 5.<sup>30</sup> (To simplify the results, the yearly dummy coefficients are not reported in the tables.) The statistically significant results indicate that the probability that a country participates in UNPOs reflects the influence of variables linked to liberal assumptions. A country's level of democracy predicts participation in UNPOs (the relevant coefficients are positive), as does a country's prior commitment to UNPOs. Positive coefficients indicate that countries that made larger UNPO personnel contributions and widely participated in UNPOs (by assuming a variety of tasks) in the prior year are more inclined to participate in UNPOs than other countries are. The same is true of countries that participated in only one peace operation in the prior post-cold war period. These findings, combined with the positive effects of a higher ratio of noncombat to total personnel, support the speculation that policy commitments have paradoxical effects: that large, visible contributions reflect and perhaps increase a country's engagement but that less-demanding non-combat commitments are easier to maintain. Furthermore, supporting realist arguments, the findings indicate that U.S. ties are significant determinants of UNPO participation. The positive coefficients for U.S. security assistance and the

28. Following Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), I use time dummies to control for autocorrelation in the binary dependent variable equation; following Beck and Katz (1995), I use an endogenous lag term (here, personnel contributed in the prior year) to correct for autocorrelation in the continuous dependent variable equation.

29. These operations were performed using the Heckman procedure in STATA 6.0 and generating robust standard errors (clustering on country).

30. Because permanent members did not vary their participation very much from year to year, inducing multicollinearity, the dummies for these countries are excluded from the participation equation. The results otherwise are uninfluenced by multicollinearity.

TABLE 5  
 Heckman Model of the Propensity for a Country to  
 Contribute Personnel to United Nations (UN) Peace Operations, 1993-2001

	<i>Selection Equation</i>		<i>Outcome Equation</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>z</i>
Constant	-3.720*	3.78	0.738*	2.02
Democracy level (Polity)	0.024*	2.18	0.014*	2.43
Multilateral security commitment				
Number of personnel <sub><i>t</i> - 1</sub>	0.702*	8.30	0.529*	13.13
Noncombat contribution	1.353*	6.38	-0.386*	4.67
Variety of tasks	1.705*	3.01	0.529*	5.35
Weapons of mass destruction treaty ratification	-0.026	0.43	0.043	1.56
Post-cold war participation	0.516*	2.80		
Power, security, and interests				
Population	0.314*	2.67	0.080*	1.99
Military spending growth	0.149	0.57	-0.102	0.93
Wealth	0.650	1.22	0.132	0.50
Conflict involvement	-0.816*	5.95	-0.012	0.17
U.S. security ties	0.036 <sup>†</sup>	1.89	-0.023*	2.46
U.S. political agreement	0.098	0.34	-0.238	1.31
NATO Member × Population	-4.235	1.66	-1.161*	2.20
	0.751*	2.02	0.169*	2.27
Region				
Africa	0.171	0.81	0.088	0.84
Europe	0.072	0.29	-0.080	1.02
Latin America	-0.360	1.68	-0.240*	3.09
Middle East	-0.254	1.19	.131	1.20
Permanent members (Security Council)				
China		-0.349*	3.13	
France			0.142 <sup>†</sup>	1.94
Russia		-0.002	0.02	
United Kingdom			0.160*	2.19
United States			0.263	1.15

NOTE: Chi-square test of independent equations = 16.89\*. Wald chi-square = 4836.96\*. For the selection equation,  $n = 1,417$ ; for the outcome equation,  $n = 679$ .

\* $p \leq .05$ , two-tailed. <sup>†</sup> $p \leq .05$ , one-tailed.

NATO × Population interaction term indicate that countries with U.S. security linkages and larger NATO countries are especially inclined toward participating in UNPOs. Indeed, all other things being equal, even non-NATO populous countries are inclined toward participation in these operations (the population coefficient is positive), but high conflict involvement has the opposite effect (the given coefficient is negative).

Table 5 also displays the estimates for the outcome equation. Again, these reveal the significant impact of the liberal variables. Democracy is positively linked to UNPO contributions, as is prior commitment: the larger and more varied a country's past UNPO contribution, the larger is its present UNPO contribution. These effects are

reinforced by the negative effect of a higher noncombat personnel ratio, which indicates a persisting commitment of manpower by participating countries that contribute troops to UN operations. Accompanying these effects are the impact of the realist variables. First, countries with large populations provide large personnel contributions (the relevant coefficient is positive). (When substituted for population in the model, troops have a significant, positive effect on UNPO participation and contribution levels; although the interaction term is rendered insignificant, the variable switch does not affect the sign and significance of the democracy coefficient.) Second, U.S. security ties have a negative effect on UNPO personnel contributions in the analysis. Although countries tied to the United States are inclined to participate in UNPOs, that tendency does not appear to boost those countries' UNPO contributions. The reason, it seems, is that UN operations are still crafted with some deference to the neutrality of the participants. Furthermore, whereas larger NATO countries are again shown to carry a relatively high burden, that effect is skewed heavily toward large NATO countries (judging from the negative NATO and positive NATO  $\times$  Population coefficients). (The precise effect for a given NATO country is determined by summing the NATO term, the model intercept, and the product of a country's population and the interaction term.) Given the relative size of the NATO coefficient and interaction term, the implication is that the NATO contribution to UNPOs comes from countries with populations above a floor level of approximately 7 million people (a logged value of 6.87). In fact, only four NATO countries (Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Norway) have population sizes that weigh against a positive UNPO personnel contribution, and the largest NATO countries (e.g., the United States) have made enormous contributions. Finally, a country's standing as a major power and regional location affect contribution levels: negative coefficients for China and countries of Latin America indicate that these countries offer more meager contributions than would otherwise be supposed, whereas positive coefficients indicate that two members of the Permanent Five—the United Kingdom and France—are especially inclined toward contributing personnel to UNPOs.

But how does the impact of democracy compare with that of the other liberal and realist-inspired variables? To obtain the answer, I compute the marginal effects of these variables.

To assess the relative influence of the variables in the selection equation, I allow each significant variable in the model to vary—between 1 standard deviation (*SD*) above and 1 *SD* below its mean—when setting all other continuous variables in the model to their means and all dummy variables to their modes. The calculations reveal that the democratic effect is small compared with the effects of other variables. An increase in value of the democracy variable over the 2 *SD* range increases by 8% the probability that a country will participate in UNPOs, a somewhat milder effect than that of the realist security variables: the 2 *SD* change in the US security ties, the NATO interaction term, and population variables increase the probability of participation by 9%, 21%, and 16%, respectively, whereas conflict involvement reduces the probability of participation by 24%. Moreover, compared to these variables, prior commitment has strong probabilistic effects on UNPO participation. The 2 *SD* change in the number of personnel contributed, variety of tasks performed, and noncombat ratio

increases the participation probability by 60%, 81%, and 40%, respectively. (Post-cold war participation increases this probability by only 13%.)

Marginal effects are computed more easily for variables in the outcome equation, given its linear form. For that equation, the relative impact of right-hand side variables can be measured by multiplying the coefficient for each variable by 2 *SD* units. In these calculations, only one realist variable—the NATO × Population term—is shown to have a larger effect on UNPO personnel contributions than democracy does: with a 2 *SD* increase in the population, the interaction term boosts the amount of personnel contributed by .22 (logged personnel units) compared to a .19 impact with a 2 *SD* change in democracy.<sup>31</sup> In at least relative terms, then, democracy has a somewhat stronger effect on levels of support for UNPOs than on participation in them (albeit the predicted effects on participation vary with the specified values of the other model variables). Still, a 2 *SD* increase in number of personnel contributed and variety of tasks performed increases the level of support for UNPOs by 1.28 and .26, respectively, whereas the same increase in noncombat contribution decreases the level of support by .30.

To further assess the sensitivity of UNPO contributions to the democracy coefficient, marginal effects are computed in original (unlogged) units for hypothetical Polity scores of 10, 5, 0, -5, and -10, with prior personnel contributions set to its actual values and all other variables in the model set to their means and modes. The results (Appendix C) establish that, for countries contributing thousands of personnel to UN operations, a high democracy score has a strong supportive effect on the tendency for a country to hold to its commitments. For example, a country with a Polity score of 10 that contributed 5,000 personnel in the prior year is predicted to commit roughly 3,000 personnel, almost twice the level predicted for a country with a Polity score of -10. Although these estimates are for the year 1993 (the reference category in the model), a busy period for UN operations, the democracy effect remains substantial, in relative terms, in slower years (e.g., 1999). Only somewhat less impressive results (amounting to hundreds of personnel) are obtained when the actual values of the percentage of tasks performed are substituted for prior UNPO contributions in the analysis.<sup>32</sup> It is fair to say, then, that democracies with large prior commitments carry a substantial share of the UNPO burden in the years that follow. Apart from its immediate effects, democracy appears to strengthen the inclination of a country to hold to its military commitments.

The analysis has centered on aggregate personnel contributions because personnel are often transferred among UNPOs in time of need or initially drawn from existing operations. In addition, problems of coordinating and integrating contributions from a large number of countries have meant that a small number of countries have taken the lead and provided the bulk of forces to specific UN operations. To test the robustness of the results, however, the model is applied to various geographically defined sets of

31. The 2-standardized unit change in population and U.S. security ties increases and decreases the level of support by .11 and .15, respectively.

32. The size of the confidence intervals for these predictions establishes that for large differences on the Polity scale (e.g., between -5 and 10), the resulting predictions are statistically different (for large and small prior contributors alike).

missions—those in the former Yugoslavia, those outside the former Yugoslavia, and those in Africa (excluding North Africa).<sup>33</sup> Interestingly, the utility of a Heckman model is revealed in two sets of tests but not for operations in Africa. There, the peculiar concerns of the participants appear to have folded into one choice—whether to participate in UNPOs and how much support to give them. These tests establish also that democracy affected one or both decisions, regardless of where the operations was located.<sup>34</sup> They also show that outside the former Yugoslavia, countries that had ratified major arms control treaties were more inclined to provide troops to UNPOs than were countries that had ratified fewer treaties (a finding that was not supported using the more inclusive data set). The model is further tested to determine whether results varied with the kinds of personnel contributed, that is, whether democracies are inclined to contribute UNPO observers as much as combat forces (which constitute the majority of personnel contributed to UNPOs). In different analyses, observer personnel are defined as observers participating in any mission, in missions in which most personnel were not combat personnel (troops), and in missions without combat personnel. Although chi-square tests again validate the Heckman approach (in all but the last analysis), only the analysis of total observers contributed reveals a democracy effect (and then only for participation). That finding provides some evidence that democracies husband their resources to participate in higher risk missions.

It should be noted that the significance and direction of most coefficients are unaffected when the equations are estimated independently through ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit techniques (Appendix D) and, most important, that the direction and significance of the democracy (and most of the commitment) variable coefficients are unaffected by the estimating method.<sup>35</sup> (Democracy remains significant in the OLS estimates of the “outcome” equation, whether or not nonparticipants are retained in the sample or selected out of the sample by setting zero personnel contributions to “missing.”) Including geographical proximity in the basic model does not affect the sign and significance of the democracy coefficient (indeed, the proximity variable is statistically insignificant). Moreover, omitting the institutional variables (with the exception of the lagged endogenous variable that adjusts for autocorrelation in the outcome equation) also fails to change the sign and significance of the democracy coefficient (or impugn the appropriateness of the selection model). On the other hand, when the model is estimated with a dichotomous democracy indicator, democracy is signed as predicted but statistically insignificant in tests of the Heckman, OLS, and probit models (using aggregate data). That result is not surprising, given that the model controls for a European location, NATO participation, and U.S. security and political affiliations, but it provides grounds for additional robustness tests. For that reason, the aggregate analysis is repeated, using a continuous democracy measure constructed by combining the Freedom House civil liberties (1-7) and political rights (1-7) scales and, then, a dichotomous democracy indicator created from those combined scales

33. In these analyses, number of personnel now refers to the number of personnel involved in the defined geographical area (so that it remains an endogenous lag term).

34. Democracy is positive and significant in probit estimates of equation 1 and OLS estimates of equation 2 for operations in Africa.

35. The findings for equation 1 hold up a bit better than do the findings for equation 2.

(democracies were defined as countries with combined scores  $\leq 5$ ).<sup>36</sup> In these model estimates, both indicators are significant in the two equations.

## CONCLUSIONS

In all, the model results provide some support for realist theory. Contributions to UN peace operations from a country are explained by its capabilities, alliances, and conflict involvement—factors that are critical to the realist argument that states direct their behavior toward countering and deflecting challenges from other states. At the same time, the descriptive and robust model results strongly indicate that the multilateral peace operations of the post-cold war era relied on democratic participation: a country's level of democracy accounts for whether and how much countries contributed personnel to these operations when competing with a host of variables linked to liberal and realist theory. Drawing from liberalism, it seems that democracies support these multilateral operations because democracies place significant value on individual rights and welfare and do not easily distinguish altruism from interest.

Further validating liberal theory, states (democracies and nondemocracies) appear to act on—or at least stand by—their multilateral (institutional) commitments: a strong predictor of participation in UN peace operations is the extent and scope of prior involvement in these missions. The cooperation-inducing effects of a more general multilateral security commitment are also visible: outside of the former Yugoslavia, UNPO participation appears to come easier to states that have multilateralized their security by accepting the prohibitions and risks of existing global security treaties. That multilateralism affects behavior across issues with little formal institutional connection is evidence that multilateral participation is a learning experience in which lessons and roles acquired in one area are extended to others.

Test results suggest further that democracy affects personnel contributions to UN peace operations through a two-stage process in which the eligibility and availability of countries for participating in these missions are decided before the amounts of personnel contributed are negotiated. In fact, there is some evidence that democracy shapes decisions less strongly at the first than the second stage (where democracy effects are more meaningful in theoretical terms). One reason might be that democracies have difficulty reconciling conflicting liberal principles that counsel both intervention and restraint, especially given realist admonitions about depleting scarce resources for limited gains. After all, even peacekeeping places soldiers and civilians in harm's way, imposes economic costs, and diverts resources from social-welfare to military programs. Once engaged, however, democracies appear to commit more fully to these operations.

Contrary to a pessimistic realist view, then, the future of multilateral intervention does not hinge solely on the narrow, self-interested calculations of potential participants. States—specifically, democratic ones—are shown to act together because they are democratic and thereby embrace liberal values and perspectives. It is hard to

36. The values were obtained from [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).



explain the extensive and ultimately costly global involvement in far-flung places such as Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia in other terms. As important, despite broad participation, a number of democratic countries have been shown willing to carry the significant burden of leading multinational operations in distant lands over relatively long time periods. Notwithstanding their supposed accountability to a public that demands progress and tires quickly from international obligations, democracies appear to find payoffs in the pursuit of goals that promise only long-term, indirect benefits.

Yet, some qualifications to these conclusions are in order. First, it is not apparent that multilateral missions will soon replace unilateral ones. Indeed, U.S. unilateralism in Iraq has placed further demands on the finite energies, treasuries, and manpower of countries inclined to participate in multilateral peace operations (if it has not placed the future of multilateralism in doubt). Many question how the world's preeminent power could so quickly abandon multilateralism in the face of resistance from an overwhelming majority of states. Second, it is not clear that multilateral missions can yet motivate enduring sacrifice from their participants. The number of personnel involved in UN peace operations has declined sharply from its high point in the early 1990s, and countries have been slow to contribute forces to the UN, even with impending humanitarian crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and the Sudan. Third, the track record of recent multipurpose missions is unlikely to convince hardened skeptics that multilateral operations, democratic participation in them, or liberal policies will contribute greatly toward solving global problems. Political turmoil exists throughout Africa, deep divisions and inequities remain in Haiti and throughout Central America, Cambodia lurks in an uneasy intermediate state between war and peace, and social and ethnic cleavages endure in the former Yugoslavia, where a nonliberal separation of peoples, not integration, provides some measure of political stability. That intervention by democracies has had some positive effects is apparent (Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999). Also apparent is that the UN and various governmental and nongovernmental organizations have pursued a peace-building strategy of promoting market economies and democratic elections that has often been ineffective or counterproductive (Ottaway 2003; Paris 1997). Lessons from Cambodia, Bosnia, and other war-ravaged countries are that a precipitous push for economic and political liberalization can reinforce existing social disparities, exacerbate conflicts among former combatants, strengthen the position of nationalists and political extremists, and provide opportunities for the old guard to thrive in the black market economy.

To say that democracy or multilateralism matters, or that each abets the other, is not to deny any of this. It is to concede, instead, that the relationship between democracy and multilateral peace operations is probabilistic, at best, and that a reality of these nascent efforts is that they are easily overwhelmed and prone to obstruction and setbacks. In the end, liberal values must compete at a disadvantage with security objectives and influence policy only after considerable domestic and international consensus building. Taken together, then, the evidence supports a realist argument that states avoid humanitarian intervention that could bring costly entanglements and compromise important security goals. But realists do not give much attention to why states would consider such intervention in the first place, let alone why intervention would be, in large part, a democratic burden. Consequently, realists cannot account for a

striking post-cold war reality: despite the attending casualties and financial burden, democracies per se united repeatedly to serve reputedly worthy causes around the globe.

The potential thus remains for states to tap liberal values to gain support and resources for multilateral humanitarian operations, notwithstanding the recent turn toward unilateralism in U.S. policy. The logic of *realpolitik* used by the George W. Bush administration to justify regime change in Iraq was paired nonetheless with liberal assumptions about the ease with which Iraq would take to democratic and free market principles. Moreover, opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq occurred in part because U.S. policies contravened an emerging tradition of multilateralism, one that had been reinforced, ironically, by the first Bush administration in Somalia and Kuwait and by current U.S. critics through their support for U.S.-led, postwar stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Whether or not a tradition of multilateralism and the strengthening of multilateral operational capabilities make it easier for states to define their interests around multilateral operations and humanitarian goals, they most certainly make it harder for states to justify unilateralism or to stand aside and let a catastrophe unfold in some part of the world.

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