

WAGE: An Authenticated Encryption with a Twist

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Abstract. This paper presents WAGE, a new lightweight sponge-based authenticated cipher whose underlying permutation is based on a 37-stage Galois NLFSR over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} . At its core, the round function of the permutation consists of the well-analyzed Welch-Gong permutation (WGP), primitive feedback polynomial, a newly designed 7-bit SB sbox and partial word-wise XORs. The construction of the permutation is carried out such that the design of individual components is highly coupled with cryptanalysis and hardware efficiency. As such, we analyze the security of WAGE against differential, linear, algebraic and meet/miss-in-the-middle attacks. For 128-bit authenticated encryption security, WAGE achieves a throughput of 535 Mbps with hardware area of 2540 GE in ASIC ST Micro 90 nm standard cell library. Additionally, WAGE is designed with a twist where its underlying permutation can be efficiently turned into a pseudorandom bit generator based on the WG transformation (WG-PRBG) whose output bits have theoretically proved randomness properties.

Keywords: Authenticated encryption · Pseudorandom bit generators · Welch-Gong permutation · Lightweight cryptography

1 Introduction

Designing a lightweight cryptographic primitive requires a comprehensive holistic approach. With the promising ability of providing multiple cryptographic functionalities by the sponge-based constructions, there has been a growing interest in designing cryptographic permutations and sponge-variant modes. Permutation-based cryptographic primitives gave a new turn in the field of lightweight cryptography, which has motivated the design of lightweight permutations. In the last decade, starting from the Keccak family of permutations [BDPVA09], there have been a number of lightweight permutations developed for use in the sponge mode to construct hash and authenticated encryption (AE) algorithms, namely permutation-based hash (e.g., SPONGENT [BKL⁺11], QUARK [AHMNP13], and PHOTON [GPP11]), permutation-based AE (e.g., APE [ABB⁺15], PRIMATES [ABB⁺14], NORX [AJN14], Keyak [BDP⁺14], and Ketje [BDPA14] from the CAESAR competition [CAE]), and recently permutation-based both AE and hash functions (e.g., ASCON [DEMS16], Gimli [BKL⁺17], sLiSCP [ARH⁺17], sLiSCP-light [ARH⁺18], and FRIT [SBD⁺18]). Several constructions of lightweight sponge variant modes have also been proposed, e.g., the Beetle [CDNY18] and ISAP [DEM⁺17] modes.

The general design philosophy of constructing an iterative lightweight permutation is efficiently designing the round function to achieve the goals of low area, low power, high performance across heterogeneous platforms, and high security. However, in resource-constrained environments, designers work with limited hardware area, computation, and power where the designed algorithm is essentially an underlying enabling block for various

security protocols. This fact calls for a design that satisfies several cryptographic functionalities within the same hardware footprint. A realization of such a fact is highlighted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) call for Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) standardization submissions where a dedicated category for both authenticated encryption and hash algorithms has been laid out [MBSTM17].

In this work, we propose a new lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm, called WAGE, which is a round 2 candidate of the NIST LWC competition. The round function of the WAGE permutation is a Galois Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} to achieve a balance between hardware efficiency and security. We use the WAGE permutation in the unified sponge-duplex mode [ARH⁺17] to achieve the authenticated encryption functionality that provides 128-bit security with at most 2^{64} bits of allowed data per key. As a feature, a simple tweak in the control circuit of WAGE enables an additional pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) with proven randomness properties. Moreover, such a tweak may be leveraged to make WAGE self-sufficient in generating its own random nonces. An abstract pictorial representation of the WAGE round function is shown on the left side of Figure 1 along with the WG-PRBG feature where the output of some sboxes is disabled (right side of Figure 1).




Figure 1: An abstract diagram of WAGE round function (left), and random bit generation feature WG-PRBG (right). Tr denotes the Trace function

Performance of WAGE and NIST LWC round 2 candidates. In addition to WAGE, there are 31 NIST LWC round 2 candidates [BCC⁺19]. Each one of them adopts a design paradigm based on either a permutation, block cipher, tweakable block cipher or stream cipher. Accordingly, they have varying state sizes and performances. WAGE is implemented in ASIC ST Micro 65 nm, ST Micro 90 nm and IBM 130 nm standard cell libraries. The hardware implementation offers various degrees of parallelism for higher throughput [ASZ19]. The smallest degree 1 implementation costs 2540 GE with a throughput of 535.8 Mbit/s, and a degree 8 unrolled implementation costs 9330 GE with a throughput of 627.1 Mbit/s.

Table 1 lists the details of the ASIC implementations, throughput, and energy for WAGE and other comparable NIST LWC round 2 candidates that offer an independent authenticated encryption functionality. Bearing in mind that a fair comparison is a difficult task, we only include candidates which have provided actual ASIC implementations (not estimates) in one of the standard cell libraries in which WAGE is implemented. Moreover, we only list the smallest reported implementations as performance vary with degrees of parallelism. Furthermore, throughput is directly proportional to clock frequency, however, the circuit depth affects the clock frequency and its maximum value based on the design components. Thus, it is difficult to compare throughput at a fixed clock frequency (unless we have actual implementations). The numbers reported in Table 1 are taken from SKINNY-AEAD [BJK⁺19], ASCON [DEMS19], GIFT-COFB [BCI⁺19], Grain-128AEAD [HJM⁺19], Isap-A-128a [DEM⁺19], SPIX [AGH⁺19b], Spoc-64 [AGH⁺19a], SUNDIAE-GIFT [BBP⁺19], and TinyJAMBU-128 [WH19].

Table 1: Comparison of the different ASIC implementation results of WAGE with other NIST LWC round 2 candidates. Tput, A, F, and E denote throughput, area, maximum frequency, and energy, respectively.

Algorithm ^{‡‡}	ST Micro 65 nm				ST Micro 90 nm				IBM 130 nm			
	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]
WAGE [◊]	2900	907	517	20.0	2540	940	535	39.2	2960	153	87.21	30.4
SKINNY-AEAD	-	-	-	-	7179	422	53	-	7456	267	34	-
ASCON	-	-	-	-	2570	672	14	5,706 μ J/B	-	-	-	-
GIFT-COFB	-	-	-	-	3927	10	22.3 [†]	2.69 [†]	-	-	-	-
Grain-128AEAD	3638.5	1120	560	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Isap-A-128a	-	-	-	-	≤ 12780	≥ 169	2.9 bpc	-	-	-	-	-
SPIX [‡]	2611	100 kHz	81.8 Kbps	-	-	-	-	-	2742	100 kHz	81.8 Kbps	-
SpoC-64 [‡]	2329	100 kHz	58.3 Kbps	-	-	-	-	-	2389	100 kHz	58.3 Kbps	-
SUNDAE-GIFT	-	-	-	-	3494	10	15.9 ^{††}	4.2 [†]	-	-	-	-
TinyJAMBU-128	-	-	-	-	1352	-	24.6	-	-	-	-	-

^{‡‡} Numbers in the table are taken from the implementations provided in the references in the above paragraph.

[◊] Entire cipher including encryption, decryption and control logic

[†] For 16 B and 32 B of associated data and plaintext, respectively

[‡] Encryption circuit only. ^{††} #cycles = 242

Our contributions. We propose WAGE, a new authenticated cipher whose internal 259-bit permutation is based on a Galois NLFSR to offer an authenticated encryption with associated data functionality in a sponge mode as well as a pseudorandom bit generation feature. Our contributions are summarized as follows.

- **PERMUTATION DESIGN:** We construct a hardware-friendly permutation of size 259 bits based on a 37-stage Galois NLFSR over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} with a simple state update function consisting of a primitive polynomial and two distinct sboxes (WGP (Welch-Gong permutation) and a newly designed SB). In the state update function, the six 7-bit sboxes provide the nonlinearity, and the primitive feedback polynomial and a partial mixing among state words along with the shift operation provide the diffusion. We show how to use the permutation to construct the AE functionality.
- **SECURITY ANALYSIS:** We analyze the diffusion, algebraic, differential, and linear properties of the WAGE permutation. Our analysis suggests that WAGE with full 111 rounds offers strong resistance against attacks exploiting such properties. We also show that when the WAGE permutation is used in a mode, the positions for the feedback taps and sboxes along with the rate positions provide tighter bounds on the probabilities for differential and linear trails.
- **PERFORMANCE:** We provide a comparison of WAGE authenticated cipher with other NIST LWC round 2 candidates (Table 1). WAGE has the second¹ lowest area and achieves the highest throughput and clock frequency in ST Micro 90 nm. The performances on three different microcontrollers are also reported.
- **PRBG:** We show the construction of WG-PRBG with guaranteed randomness properties from WAGE. We analyze its security by considering distinguishing and state recovery attacks on stream ciphers. Since both primitives are independent, the security of WG-PRBG does not affect the security of WAGE.

Outline of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the specifications of the WAGE permutation and the authenticated cipher WAGE-AE-128. Sections 3 and 4 present their detailed security analysis and rationale of our design choices, respectively. In Section 5, we show the construction of PRBG based on the WG transformation from the WAGE permutation. A short description on the performance of WAGE in hardware and microcontrollers is given in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.

¹After TinyJAMBU-128 which only offers 112-bit confidentiality and 64-bit authentication security

Notation. The following notations will be used throughout the paper.

- \mathbb{F}_2 denotes the finite field consisting of $\{0, 1\}$. For a positive integer n , \mathbb{F}_{2^n} denotes an extension field defined using an irreducible polynomial over \mathbb{F}_2 of degree n . For $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, $x \otimes y$ represents the finite field multiplication. Further, $\text{Tr} : \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$ denotes the trace function defined by $\text{Tr}(x) = x + x^2 + \dots + x^{2^{n-1}}$.
- $\{0, 1\}^n$ and $\{0, 1\}^*$ denote the set of all length n , variable length and empty bitstrings, respectively. For any string $X \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $|X|$ denotes the length of X in bits and by $(X_0, \dots, X_{l-1}) \stackrel{n}{\leftarrow} X$ we refer to the n -bit block parsing of X where $|X_i| = n$ for $0 \leq i \leq l-2$ and $1 \leq |X_{l-1}| \leq n$. For strings X and Y , the operations $X \odot Y, X \oplus Y, X \| Y$ denote the bitwise AND, bitwise XOR and concatenation of X and Y , respectively.
- We denote by $S^i = (S_{36}^i, \dots, S_0^i)$ the internal state of the WAGE permutation at the i -th iteration. The symbols K, N, AD, M, C and T denote the secret key, public nonce, associated data, message, ciphertext and tag respectively.

2 Specification

In this section, we first give a brief overview of the design of WAGE. Next, we present the specifications of the WAGE permutation and the authenticated cipher WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128.

2.1 Overview of WAGE

At the core of the authenticated cipher WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 is a hardware-friendly and lightweight WAGE permutation. The design of the WAGE permutation adopts the structure of the (nonlinear) initialization phase of the WG stream cipher family [NG05, NG08]. More specifically, the initialization phase is built on an NLFSR based state update function where the nonlinear feedback is composed of a primitive feedback polynomial and a WG permutation over a finite field \mathbb{F}_{2^m} . In the feedback function, the WG permutation provides confusion and the linear feedback polynomial along with shift operations provides the diffusion. Note that the state update function of the NLFSR is a one-to-one mapping. We tweak the design of the WG cipher's structure to construct the authenticated encryption functionality as follows.

- **Shift register length:** Our goal is to design a permutation with a state size that can provide 128-bit AE security in the sponge duplex mode. Considering the best known security bound of the sponge duplex mode in [JLM14], the state size of the permutation should be at least 256 when restricting the data limit of 2^{64} bits per key. Thus, we choose the length of the shift register to be 37 over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} which results in an internal state of size 259 bits.
- **Strengthening confusion and diffusion:** To achieve faster confusion and diffusion, we add one more WG permutation and four lighter sboxes (SB) in the state update function and update five words in total (namely $S_5, S_{11}, S_{19}, S_{24}$, and S_{30}) in the state. Each word is updated by taking its current content and XORing it with the sbox output of a different word so that the state update function is a permutation.
- **Round constants:** We XOR a pair of distinct round constants (rc_1, rc_0) at two cells (S_{36}, S_{18}) to avoid using the identical state update function in each iteration. The round constants are generated using a 7-stage parallel LFSR so that a pair of 7-bit round constants at each iteration can be produced simultaneously, with a minimal hardware cost.
- **Hardware consideration:** We opted for a design that can provide a tradeoff between the security and hardware efficiency. We chose the register length, feedback

taps, sboxes and the round constant generation technique based on the aforementioned criteria.

Figure 2 presents a high-level overview of the round function² of the WAGE permutation. The round function can be viewed as a Galois NLFSR, consisting of a Fibonacci NLFSR and a partial mixing among state words, with a round constant as an input.




Figure 2: A block diagram of the WAGE_STATEUPDATE function

2.2 The WAGE Permutation

WAGE is an iterative permutation with a state size of 259 bits over the extension field \mathbb{F}_{2^7} . The core components of the permutation include two different sboxes (WGP and SB) defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} , a nonlinear feedback, five word-wise XORs, and a pair of 7-bit round constant (rc_1^i, rc_0^i) (see Figure 2). Below we provide the mathematical details of each individual component.

2.2.1 Nonlinear components

WAGE employs two distinct 7-bit sboxes, namely WGP and SB as its nonlinear components. The former preserves the structure of the WG cipher while the latter is added to achieve faster confusion and diffusion in the state. A detailed justification of our choice of sboxes is given in Section 4.1.

Welch-Gong permutation (WGP). For a positive integer m with $m \bmod 3 \neq 0$, the Welch-Gong permutation, denoted by WGPerm over \mathbb{F}_{2^m} is defined as $\text{WGPerm}(x) = t(x+1) + 1$ where $t(x) = x + x^{q_1} + x^{q_2} + x^{q_3} + x^{q_4}$. The exponents are given by $q_1 = 2^k + 1$, $q_2 = 2^{2k} + 2^k + 1$, $q_3 = 2^{2k} - 2^k + 1$ and $q_4 = 2^{2k} + 2^k - 1$ where $3k \equiv 1 \pmod m$ [GY02, MGFA14]. Since the finite field is \mathbb{F}_{2^7} , we have $m = 7$ and $k = 5$. The WGPerm over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} denoted by WGP7 is given by

$$\text{WGP7}(x) = x + (x+1)^{33} + (x+1)^{39} + (x+1)^{41} + (x+1)^{104}, \quad x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^7}.$$

To achieve low differential uniformity and high nonlinearity, we use a decimated WGP7 with decimation $d = 13$. Accordingly, we define the utilized WGP sbox of WAGE as $\text{WGP}(x) = \text{WGP7}(x^{13})$.

SB sbox. We construct the lightweight 7-bit sbox SB in an iterative way using the nonlinear transformation Q and the bit permutation layer P which are given by

$$Q(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) = (x_0 \oplus (x_2 \odot x_3), x_1, x_2, \bar{x}_3 \oplus (x_5 \odot x_6), x_4, \bar{x}_5 \oplus (x_2 \odot x_4), x_6)$$

$$P(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) = (x_6, x_3, x_0, x_4, x_2, x_5, x_1).$$

²We use round function and state update function interchangeably throughout the paper.

One-round R (see Figure 3) of SB is computed by composing Q and P , i.e., $R = P \circ Q$. The final output of SB is obtained by iterating R five times (denoted by R^5), followed by applying Q once, and then complementing the 0th and 2nd components. Mathematically,

$$\begin{aligned} (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) &\leftarrow R^5(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) \\ (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) &\leftarrow Q(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) \\ x_0 &\leftarrow x_0 \oplus 1 \\ x_2 &\leftarrow x_2 \oplus 1. \end{aligned}$$




Figure 3: A block diagram of R

Note that our approach of SB's construction is similar to Skinny's sboxes [BJK⁺16], however we have aimed for cryptographic properties close to that of WGP sbox with a lower hardware cost. Table 2 summarizes the cryptographic properties of both sboxes while the hexadecimal values are provided in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix A.

Table 2: Cryptographic properties of WGP and SB

Sbox	Differential uniformity	Nonlinearity	Minimum algebraic degree	Maximum algebraic degree	Fixed point
WGP	6	42	6	6	Yes
SB	8	44	3	6	No

2.2.2 Round constants

An LFSR of length 7 with feedback polynomial $x^7 + x + 1$ is used to generate the round constants. To construct these constants, the same LFSR is run in a 2-way parallel configuration as shown in Figure 4. Let $\mathbf{a} = \{a_i\}$ denote the sequence generated with the initial state (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_6) of the LFSR without parallelization. The parallel version of this LFSR outputs two sequences, both of them using decimation 2. The eight consecutive sequence elements $(a_i, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_{i+7})$ are used to generate the tuple (rc_1^i, rc_0^i) as follows.

$$\overbrace{a_{i+7}, a_{i+6}, a_{i+5}, a_{i+4}, a_{i+3}, a_{i+2}, a_{i+1}, a_i}^{rc_1^i}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{rc_0^i}$$

In terms of sequence, rc_0^i corresponds to the sequence \mathbf{a} with decimation 2 and rc_1^i corresponds to the sequence \mathbf{a} shifted by 1, then decimated by 2. The round constants are listed in Table 12 in Appendix A.




Figure 4: The LFSR generating WAGE round constants

2.2.3 State update function of WAGE

The state consists of 37 7-bit words and is denoted by $S^i = (S_{36}^i, \dots, S_0^i)$ at the beginning of i -th round. The state update function of WAGE, denoted by `WAGE_STATEUPDATE` (see Figure 2), takes as inputs the current state S^i and the round constant tuple (rc_1^i, rc_0^i) , and updates the state in a Galois NLFSR fashion with the following three steps:

Step 1: Computing nonlinear feedback. The nonlinear feedback function consists of the following primitive polynomial of degree 37 over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} and WGP

$$\ell(y) = y^{37} + y^{31} + y^{30} + y^{26} + y^{24} + y^{19} + y^{13} + y^{12} + y^8 + y^6 + \omega$$

where ω is a root $x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$, which is a primitive polynomial defining \mathbb{F}_{2^7} . The feedback computation is given by

$$fb = \text{WGP}(S_{36}^i) \oplus S_{31}^i \oplus S_{30}^i \oplus S_{26}^i \oplus S_{24}^i \oplus S_{19}^i \oplus S_{13}^i \oplus S_{12}^i \oplus S_8^i \oplus S_6^i \oplus (\omega \otimes S_0^i).$$

Step 2: Updating intermediate words and adding round constants.

$$\begin{aligned} S_5^i &\leftarrow S_5^i \oplus \text{SB}(S_8^i) \\ S_{11}^i &\leftarrow S_{11}^i \oplus \text{SB}(S_{15}^i) \\ S_{19}^i &\leftarrow S_{19}^i \oplus \text{WGP}(S_{18}^i) \oplus rc_0^i \\ S_{24}^i &\leftarrow S_{24}^i \oplus \text{SB}(S_{27}^i) \\ S_{30}^i &\leftarrow S_{30}^i \oplus \text{SB}(S_{34}^i) \\ fb &\leftarrow fb \oplus rc_1^i. \end{aligned}$$

Step 3: Shifting the register contents and update the last word.

$$\begin{aligned} S_j^{i+1} &\leftarrow S_{j+1}^i, 0 \leq j \leq 35 \\ S_{36}^{i+1} &\leftarrow fb. \end{aligned}$$

On an input state S^0 , the output of the WAGE permutation, S^{111} , is obtained by applying `WAGE_STATEUPDATE`, 111 times. The justifications behind the choice of the state update function and the number of rounds are provided in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.

2.3 The Authenticated Cipher WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

WAGE operates in the unified sponge duplex mode [ARH⁺17] to offer an authenticated encryption with associated data functionality. The authenticated cipher WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 supports key, nonce and tag sizes of 128 bits, and processes 64 bits per call of the WAGE permutation. In what follows, we describe the state representation (rate, capacity, domain separator positions), padding rule and the individual phases of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 in detail.

2.3.1 Internal state

The 259-bit internal state is represented as (X, Y) string where X and Y denote the 64-bit rate and 195-bit capacity part of the state, respectively. A 2-bit domain separator $0x01$ and $0x02$ is XORed with Y to distinguish between associated data and message processing phases, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the one-to-one correspondence between 7-bit words of WAGE and X, Y .




Figure 5: Visualization of internal state of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

2.3.2 Padding

The padding rule consists of appending “1” followed by adding as many 0’s as required to reach the next 64-bit block boundary. In the case where no associated data is present, no processing is necessary. The padding procedure for message M and associated data AD is explained below.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{pad}_{64}(M) &\leftarrow M \parallel 1 \parallel 0^{63 - (|M| \bmod 64)} \\ \text{pad}_{64}(AD) &\leftarrow \begin{cases} AD \parallel 1 \parallel 0^{63 - (|AD| \bmod 64)} & \text{if } |AD| > 0 \\ \phi & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$


The padded message and associated data are then divided into chunks of 64-bit blocks, i.e., $(M_0, M_1, \dots, M_{m-1}) \stackrel{64}{\leftarrow} \text{pad}_{64}(M)$ and $(AD_0, AD_1, \dots, AD_{a-1}) \stackrel{64}{\leftarrow} \text{pad}_{64}(AD)$.

2.3.3 Phases of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

The WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 algorithm consists of 4 phases, namely 1) Initialization, 2) Processing associated data, 3) Encryption or decryption, and 4) Tag generation. Figure 6 shows a high-level overview of the WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 encryption algorithm. We now describe each phase in detail.

Initialization. The state is first loaded with a 128-bit nonce $N = (n_0, \dots, n_{127})$ and a 128-bit key $K = (k_0, \dots, k_{127})$. This procedure is denoted by $\text{load}(N, K)$ and explicitly specified in Appendix B. Afterwards the two key blocks $K_0 = k_0, \dots, k_{63}$ and $K_1 = k_{64}, \dots, k_{127}$ are absorbed into the state, with the WAGE permutation applied each time. The steps of the initialization are described as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} (X, Y) &\leftarrow \text{WAGE}(\text{load}(N, K)) \\ (X, Y) &\leftarrow \text{WAGE}(X \oplus K_i, Y), \quad i = 0, 1, \end{aligned}$$

Figure 6: The WAGE-AE-128 encryption algorithm where $P = \text{WAGE}$ permutation

where $\text{WAGE}(\cdot)$ denotes the WAGE permutation.

Processing associated data. For $i = 0$ to $a - 1$, the associated data blocks $AD_0, AD_1, \dots, AD_{a-1}$ are processed as follows.

$$(X, Y) \leftarrow \text{WAGE}(X \oplus AD_i, Y \oplus 0x01).$$

Encryption/Decryption. For $i = 0$ to $m - 1$, each message block M_i is XORed with X which gives the corresponding ciphertext C_i . The ciphertext is then used for the state update. More precisely,

$$\begin{aligned} C_i &\leftarrow M_i \oplus X \\ (X, Y) &\leftarrow \text{WAGE}(C_i, Y \oplus 0x02). \end{aligned}$$

The last ciphertext block is truncated so that its length is equal to that of the last unpadded message block. The decryption procedure is symmetrical to the encryption algorithm and hence the details are omitted.

Tag generation. After the extraction of the last ciphertext block, the domain separator is reset to zero. First, the two 64-bit key blocks K_0 and K_1 are absorbed into the state, with the WAGE permutation applied each time. Then, the tag is extracted from the positions of state which are used for loading the nonce with $\text{load}(N, K)$ procedure. The tag generation steps are mentioned below.

$$\begin{aligned} (X, Y) &\leftarrow \text{WAGE}((X \oplus K_i), Y), \quad i = 0, 1 \\ T &\leftarrow \text{tagextract}(X, Y). \end{aligned}$$

The tagextract function is explicitly given in Appendix B.

3 Security Analysis

In this section, we first present the security properties of the WAGE permutation such as diffusion, expected upper bounds on the probabilities of differential and linear trails³, growth on the algebraic degree and non-symmetric behavior. Next, we give the concrete security bounds of the authenticated encryption algorithm WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128.

3.1 Security of WAGE Permutation

3.1.1 Diffusion behavior

We model the diffusion behavior of WAGE to show its resistance against meet/miss-in-the-middle distinguishers. Let $S_{j,k}^i$ denote the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the k -th bit of word j after the i -th round. We say WAGE achieves full bit diffusion at i -th round if $S_{j,k}^i$ is a function of $S_{j,k}^0$, for all $j \in \{0, 1, \dots, 36\}$ and for all $k \in \{0, 1, \dots, 6\}$. Note that both WGP and SB sboxes have the full bit diffusion property but the multiplication by ω mixes only two bits at a time, which can be seen from the explicit representation of $x \otimes \omega$ given by

$$(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) \otimes \omega \rightarrow (x_6, x_0 \oplus x_6, x_1 \oplus x_6, x_2 \oplus x_6, x_3, x_4, x_5).$$

Since WAGE adopts an NLFSR based design, the word at position 0 is mixed at a slower rate than others. Thus, it is sufficient to find i for which $S_{0,k}^i$ achieves full bit diffusion for all $k \in \{0, 1, \dots, 6\}$. Table 3 depicts such behavior for word 0 while for other words the details are provided in Table 14 in Appendix D.

Table 3: Diffusion behavior of 0-th word

Round	1	4	7	11	15	19	23	27	28
# dependent bits	1	1	8	22	36	84	168	252	259

From Table 3, we observe that WAGE achieves full bit diffusion in 28 rounds. Thus, WAGE (with 111 rounds) provides a huge security margin against meet/miss-in-the-middle distinguishers as 56 (= 28+28) rounds guarantee full bit diffusion in both the forward and backward directions.

3.1.2 Differential and linear cryptanalysis

We now analyze the strength of the WAGE permutation against differential and linear attacks. In WAGE, we use two distinct 7-bit sboxes, namely WGP and SB as the nonlinear components. The differential probabilities of the sboxes are $2^{-4.42}$ and 2^{-4} , while the corresponding linear squared correlation are $2^{-5.08}$ and $2^{-5.35}$, respectively. To provide upper bounds on the maximum expected differential characteristic probability (MEDCP) and maximum expected linear characteristic squared correlation (MELCSC), we bound the minimum number of differential/linear active sboxes using a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model⁴. In Table 4, we list these values for two cases which are described below:

- **Case I:** No constraints on the positions of input and output differences. This case considers the differential and linear distinguishers of the permutation only.
- **Case II:** Input and output differences are restricted to only rate positions, i.e., differences are allowed at words 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 27, 28, 34, 35 and 36 (Figure 5). This case analyzes the resistance of WAGE against differential and linear attacks in a sponge mode.

Table 4: Lower bounds on the minimum number of differentially/linearly active sboxes for up to 74 rounds of WAGE. “★” means no solution

Round i	Case I	Case II	Round i	Case I	Case II
1	0	0	42	27	41
7	0	★	49	37	48
14	2	★	56	42	55
21	8	★	63	48	63
28	15	34	74	59	72
35	21	32	-	-	-

The upper bounds of MEDCP and MELCSC values of WAGE for both cases are given in Table 5. Note that the MILP solver [Gur] is unable to finish for $i > 74$. Thus, we expect that for 111 rounds the minimum number of active sboxes for Case I is at least 65. This is because for each 7 rounds, the number of active sboxes increases by at least 6, which implies $\text{MEDCP} \leq 2^{-260} < 2^{-259}$.

Table 5: Upper bounds of MEDCP and MELCSC values of WAGE in $\log_2(\cdot)$ scale

	Rounds	Minimum # active sboxes	MEDCP	MELCSC $\log_2(\cdot)$
Case I	74	59	$-59 \times 4 = -236$	$-59 \times 5.08 \approx -299.7$
Case II	74	72	$-72 \times 4 = -288$	$-72 \times 5.08 \approx -365.7$

3.1.3 Algebraic degree growth

Knowing the algebraic degree of WAGE is crucial for its resistance against integral and cube attacks. The WGP and SB sboxes have an algebraic degree of 6. Note that if we only have WGP sbox at position 36 along with the feedback polynomial and exclude all other sboxes and intermediate XORs, then we get the original WG stream cipher. Such a stream cipher is resistant to attacks exploiting the algebraic degree if the nonlinear feedback used in the initialization phase is also used in the key generation phase [Røn17, RAG17]. Given that WAGE has 6 sboxes with continuous nonlinear feedback and it achieves full bit diffusion (see Section 3.1.1) in 28 rounds, the algebraic degree in WAGE grows at a larger rate. Thus, the full-round WAGE provides a large security margin against the integral and cube attacks.

3.1.4 Self-symmetry based distinguishers

WAGE utilizes two 7-bit round constants, rc_0 and rc_1 , which are XORed to S_{18} and S_{36} , respectively. The round constant tuple is distinct for each round, i.e., $(rc_0^i, rc_1^i) \neq (rc_0^j, rc_1^j)$ for $0 \leq i, j \leq 110$ and $i \neq j$. This property ensures that all the rounds of WAGE are distinct and thwart attacks such as slide attacks [BW99] and invariant subspace attacks [LAAZ11] which exploit the symmetric properties of the round function.

3.2 Security of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

The security proofs of sponge-duplex modes rely on the indistinguishability of the underlying permutation from a random one [BDPVA07, BDPVA12, BDPVA11, JLM14]. In the previous subsection, we have shown that WAGE is indistinguishable from a random permutation (based on our security analysis). Accordingly, WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 adopts its

³We use trail and characteristic interchangeably throughout the paper.

⁴The exact model is available at <https://uwaterloo.ca/communications-security-lab/lwc/wage>

security claims from the security bounds of well-analyzed sponge-duplex modes. We now present the concrete security claims of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128.

3.2.1 On the data limit and security goals

WAGE relies on the uniqueness of nonce for its security, meaning the nonce is never repeated for an encryption query. While for decryption, if the verification procedure fails, i.e., the tag does not match, then the decrypted ciphertext is not released. To achieve κ -bit security with allowed data of 2^d bits, the capacity should satisfy $c \geq \kappa + d + 1$ and $d \ll c/2$ [BDPVA11]. Note that the actual effective capacity is $c - 2$ as 2 bits are used for domain separation. For WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128, the parameters are $c = 195 - 2 = 193$, $r = 64$, and $\kappa = 128$, which implies $d \leq 64$. Our choice of parameters also satisfy the bound of Jovanic et al. [JLM14] for sponge-duplex modes given by $\mathcal{O}(\frac{DT}{2^c})$. In our case, we have $D = 2^{64}$ bits, $T = 2^{128}$ and $c = 193$.

The security claims of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 are summarized in Table 6 where the security for integrity includes the integrity of nonce, plaintext and associated data. Moreover, our claims are for the full round WAGE permutation, and as such we do not claim any security for WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 with reduced-round versions of WAGE.

Table 6: Security claims of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 (in bits)

Confidentiality	Integrity	Authenticity	Data limit
128	128	128	2^{64} bits

3.2.2 On the forgery attacks against improper domain separation

The choice of domain separators is crucial to resist forgery attacks against improper domain separation techniques [STMÇ⁺19]. WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 uses 2-bit domain separators 0x01 and 0x02 while processing associated data and message blocks, respectively. In Table 7, we show that 2-bits are enough to distinguish all cases including empty, partial and complete AD and/or M blocks.

Table 7: Domain separators for different processed blocks (current last block) where $r = 64$

AD	M	Domain separators sequence	Processed blocks
Empty	Empty	0x02	10^{r-1}
	Partial	0x02	Partial M with padding
	Complete	0x02, 0x02	complete M block and 10^{r-1}
Partial	Empty	0x01, 0x02	Partial AD block with padding and 10^{r-1}
	Partial	0x01, 0x02	Partial AD and M blocks with padding
	Complete	0x01, 0x02, 0x02	Partial AD block with padding, complete M block and 10^{r-1}
Complete	Empty	0x01, 0x01, 0x02	complete AD block, 10^{r-1} and 10^{r-1}
	Partial	0x01, 0x01, 0x02	complete AD block, 10^{r-1} and partial M block with padding
	Complete	0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02	complete AD block, 10^{r-1} , complete M block and 10^{r-1}

4 Design Rationale

Our design philosophy for the WAGE permutation is to reuse and adopt the initialization phase of the well-studied WG stream cipher. We choose to design a hardware-friendly and

lightweight cryptographic permutation based on a word-oriented shift register and sboxes that can have a simple security analysis and offer good security bounds. Below we provide the rationale of our design choices.

4.1 Choice of Underlying Components

Finite field. For an efficient hardware implementation of WGP and the shift register, a natural choice of the finite field is \mathbb{F}_{2^t} where $t \in \{4, 5, 7, 8\}$. We choose \mathbb{F}_{2^7} and discard other choices based on the following two reasons.

- For decimation $d = 1$, the choice for $t = 4$ is discarded due to the fact that the WGP over \mathbb{F}_{2^4} is a linear function. Moreover, for other decimations, the WG-PRBG utilizing WGP generates sequences with weak cryptographic properties.
- For \mathbb{F}_{2^5} , the state will consist of many 5-bit words. Thus, it is not feasible to provide the bounds for the differential and linear distinguishers as the MILP model does not converge (especially for word-based shift-register designs).
- The ASIC 65 nm synthesis results showed that the cost of WGPPerm module over \mathbb{F}_{2^8} is at least twice the cost of the WGPPerm module over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} .

Once the field \mathbb{F}_{2^7} is set, different field defining polynomials were explored for a minimum area of WGP. Note that the cryptographic properties of WGP under different polynomial bases are invariant. However, there is a connection between the hardware areas for WGP, the constant multiplier ω and the field defining polynomial. We chose the field defining polynomial $x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ for which the total area of WGP is minimum.

State size. Our goal was to select the state size (multiple of 7) which can offer a security level of 128 bits for the authenticated encryption. We emphasize that we targeted the overall 128-bit security, i.e., the time complexity of attacks equals that of an exhaustive key search, when restricting at most 2^{64} bits of processed data per key. We followed the bounds in [BDPVA11, JLM14], and accordingly chose the state size of WAGE as $37 \times 7 = 259$ bits (see Section 3.2.1 for further details).

Two distinct (WGP and SB) sboxes. We use WGP to maintain compatibility with the WG cipher which enables leveraging its extensive analysis, but mainly we benefit from the properties of the generated sequences in an efficient PRBG mode (see Section 5.3 for further details). However, such properties come with an expensive hardware cost, i.e., one WGP module costs around 250 GE in ASIC 65 nm, so in order to provide fast confusion in the WAGE permutation round function, we search for a 7-bit lightweight sbox whose cryptographic properties are close to that of WGP and have a pre-PAR implementation area in the range of 55–65 GE. While exploring the 7-bit sboxes, we chose the nonlinear transformations Q that have efficient hardware implementation and varied all 5040 (= 7!) bit permutations (P). The 7-bit sbox SB we found is given in Section 2.2.1.

Our search shows that WGP is better in terms of differential uniformity (6 in WGP vs 8 for SB), minimum algebraic degree (6 for WGP vs 3 for SB), and nonlinearity of each component. It only falls back slightly in the nonlinearity which is defined by the linear combinations of the components of a permutation (42 in WGP vs 44 for SB).

Number of sboxes. The single WGP nonlinear feedback state update results in a slower confusion and diffusion and it is not good from the point of view of efficiency. Further, guaranteeing security bounds using automated tools for a large number of rounds is not an easy task. Accordingly, we opt for multiple sboxes (2 WGP and 4 SB) to achieve a reasonable hardware footprint.

Round constants. The round constants are added to avoid the identical state update function in each iteration (Section 3.1.4). We use a single 7-stage LFSR to generate a pair of constants at each round. The utilized LFSR with a primitive polynomial ensures that each pair of such constants does not repeat, due to the periodicity of the 8-tuple sequence constructed from the decimated m -sequence of period 127.

4.2 Choice of State Update Function

The state update function of WAGE is composed of 1) \mathcal{L}_1 : a primitive polynomial of degree 37 over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} and 2) \mathcal{L}_2 : the input and output tap positions of WGP and SB sboxes. There exist many choices for \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 , which result in a tradeoff between (especially) security and implementations. Note that we cannot have only \mathcal{L}_1 or \mathcal{L}_2 , because

- having only \mathcal{L}_1 results in a slower diffusion.
- having only \mathcal{L}_2 means there are many words which are not mixed among themselves. Thus, the entire state can be divided into multiple independent sub-states leading to meet-in-the-middle attacks.

The required criteria for \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 are listed as follows.

1. To have a lightweight \mathcal{L}_1 we searched for a primitive polynomial of the form

$$\ell(y) = y^{37} + \sum_{j=1}^{36} c_j y^j + \omega, \quad c_j \in \mathbb{F}_2$$

where ω is the root of the chosen field defining polynomial, which is also a primitive element of \mathbb{F}_{2^7} . Including ω , we choose symmetric feedback polynomials with few non-zero tap positions ($c_j = 1$).

2. A combination of \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 for which computing the minimum number of active sboxes is feasible and enables us to provide the bounds for differential and linear distinguishers.
3. An even number of WGP and SB sboxes to keep the overall structure symmetric and have efficient implementations with different degrees of parallelism for higher throughput [AAG⁺19].

We followed the aforementioned criteria and analyzed the polynomials with 10 non-zero taps and 6 sboxes: 2 WGP and 4 SB. For a combination of 8 sboxes, the hardware cost increases. Thus, we restrict ourselves to 6 sboxes and search for a combination of \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 which offers good security bounds against differential/linear distinguishers. More precisely, we found

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_1 &: y^{37} + y^{31} + y^{30} + y^{26} + y^{24} + y^{19} + y^{13} + y^{12} + y^8 + y^6 + \omega, \\ \mathcal{L}_2 &: \{(36, 36), (34, 30), (27, 24), (18, 19), (15, 11), (8, 5)\} \end{aligned}$$

where $(a, b) \in \mathcal{L}_2$ denotes the (input, output) position of an sbox (see Figure 2).

4.3 Number of Rounds

Our rationale for choosing the number of rounds (say n_r) is based on the property that the WAGE permutation is indistinguishable from a random permutation. We justify our choice for $n_r = 111$ as follows.

Diffusion behavior. WAGE adopts an NLFSR structure with 37 7-bit words and hence $n_r \geq 37$, otherwise there is no proper mixing among the words, which may lead to meet/miss-in-the-middle distinguishers. Our choice of the state update function ensures that WAGE achieves full bit diffusion in 28 rounds (Section 3.1.1), and hence resists such attacks.

Upper bounds of differential trails. For $n_r = 74$, the MEDCP value equals $2^{-4 \times 59} = 2^{-236} > 2^{-259}$. To push this value lower than 2^{-259} , the number of rounds n_r should be greater than 74. However, it is infeasible to compute the value when $n_r > 74$. Thus, we expect that for $n_r = 111$, the MEDCP $\ll 2^{-259}$ (Case I in Table 5). However, when the WAGE permutation is used in the mode, an adversary can only inject and cancel the differences at the rate positions. For our choice of rate positions, MEDCP $\ll 2^{-259}$ for 74 rounds (Case II in Table 5).

5 Pseudorandom Bit Generators using WAGE

One natural choice to construct a pseudorandom bit/number generator (PRBG/PRNG) from a permutation is based on the sponge construction, which was introduced by Bertoni et al. [BDPVA10], we call it **Sponge-PRBG**. In such a construction, to generate a pseudorandom sequence of longer length, reseeding is required, meaning after outputting a certain number of bits the generator needs to reseed to further produce output bits using the current internal state, for which an external source for reseeding is required. However, it is hard to guarantee the randomness properties of the produced bits or sequences mathematically. In this section, we provide two alternatives on how to configure WAGE and generate pseudorandom bits with minimal overheads. In addition to **Sponge-PRBG**, our second alternative is the construction of a PRBG based on the WG transformation, called **WG-PRBG**, by reusing certain circuitry of WAGE where we can mathematically ensure certain randomness properties. We start by describing the **WG-PRBG**.

5.1 Constructing WG-PRBG: Guaranteed Properties, but Limited Bits

We construct a pseudorandom bit generator by tweaking the round function of the WAGE permutation to obtain the original state update function of the WG cipher. Note that the sponge mode is not used while generating pseudorandom bits in this case. The `WAGE_STATEUPDATE` function is modified as follows.

- **Nullifying five sboxes:** The outputs of sboxes at positions 8, 15, 18, 27 and 34 connected to the XORs with $S_5, S_{11}, S_{19}, S_{24}$ and S_{30} (resp.) are not used. In particular, we remove Step 2 of WAGE state update function (see Section 2.2.3).
- **Adding a trace function:** In the pseudorandom bit generation phase, we add the trace function over WGP which becomes the WG transformation.

The **WG-PRBG** has two phases, namely an initialization phase and a running phase where the output is produced only in the running phase. Below we describe both phases in detail.

Initialization phase. Let $S = (S_{36}, S_{35}, \dots, S_1, S_0)$ denote the initial state. A random seed is loaded into the internal state and then the following state update function is applied 74 times.

$$S_{37+i} = \text{WGP}(S_{36+i}) \oplus S_{31+i} \oplus S_{30+i} \oplus S_{26+i} \oplus S_{24+i} \oplus S_{19+i} \\ \oplus S_{13+i} \oplus S_{12+i} \oplus S_{8+i} \oplus S_{6+i} \oplus (\omega \otimes S_i).$$

Running phase. In this phase, the internal state is updated according to the following LFSR feedback function:

$$S_{37+i} = S_{31+i} \oplus S_{30+i} \oplus S_{26+i} \oplus S_{24+i} \oplus S_{19+i} \\ \oplus S_{13+i} \oplus S_{12+i} \oplus S_{8+i} \oplus S_{6+i} \oplus (\omega \otimes S_i).$$

In each clock cycle, a pseudorandom bit is output by applying the WG transformation on the last word of the register (i.e., S_{36}). In other words, the pseudorandom bits are obtained by applying WGP, followed by the trace function $\text{Tr}(x) = x_0 + x_5$, becoming the WG transformation, on $\{S_i\}$. A pseudorandom bit sequence $\mathbf{b} = \{b_i\}$ is produced by WG-PRBG as

$$b_i = \text{WGT}(S_{i+110}), \quad i \geq 0$$

where $\text{WGT}(x) = \text{Tr}(\text{WGP}(x))$.

Randomness properties of sequence. The sequence \mathbf{b} generated by WG-PRBG has the following randomness properties [NG08]:

- The sequence has a period of $2^{259} - 1$.
- The output sequence is balanced, i.e., the number of 0's is one less than the number of 1's in one period of the sequence.
- The sequence has an ideal 2-level autocorrelation property.
- The sequence has an ideal ℓ -tuple ($1 \leq \ell \leq 37$) distribution.
- The linear span of the sequence is $2^{34.11}$.

5.2 Sponge-based PRBG from WAGE

Sponge-based PRNG (Sponge-PRBG) constructions offer a great flexibility due to their simplicity, security relying on indistinguishability of the underlying permutation, and efficient hardware/software implementations, which can be flexibly configured to a PRBG. After the sponge-based construction by Bertoni et al. [BDPVA10], several variants of sponge-based PRBG have been proposed, with improved security and robustness under different security models, e.g., [GT16, ST17, Hut17, CDKT19]. The construction of the seeded PRBG proposed by Gazi and Tessaro [GT16] provides robustness and forward secrecy guarantees, however, this construction incurs an extra hardware cost of r XOR gates, needs an additional source of weak randomness and an extra call to the underlying permutation. For the lightweight applications, obtaining an additional source of weak randomness may be critical. In a follow-up work, an improved construction by Hutchinson [Hut17] can provide forward secrecy and robustness guarantees, which reduces addition calls to the permutation. This construction incurs an overhead of $(r + c)$ XOR gates in hardware over the construction of [BDPVA10], but reduces one permutation call over the construction of [GT16]. Depending upon the security requirement of PRBGs from the lightweight applications, WAGE can be flexibly configured as a PRBG using the same circuitry with some extra hardware costs of XORs and control logic.

5.3 WG-PRBG vs Sponge-based PRBG

One may argue that up to computational complexity, similar random properties of WG-PRBG are expected from Sponge-PRBG, and then wonder if the overhead in hardware cost associated with WGP when compared to SB is justified. Although the hardware footprint of WGP is larger than SB, by using it to construct WG-PRBG, we can generate provably random bits very efficiently when compared to Sponge-PRBG. This is certainly advantageous for chips with limited energy or power (e.g., NFC, EPC and battery-powered devices). For example, generating 64 128-bit random nonces (using a single seed) require 2

x 64 calls (128 x 111 cycles) for WAGE permutation with sponge-based approach. On the other hand, WG-PRBG requires $74 + 64 \times 128$ cycles where only one WGP is evaluated at each cycle. The main applications for such a scenario are protected implementations on low end devices which require random bits for masking [Sug19, Pap18]. For generating a limited amount of random bits, the energy consumption for WG-PRBG is lower than Sponge-PRBG because WG-PRBG needs one execution of WGP, instead of six sboxes. The 2-level autocorrelation and ideal l -tuple distribution properties are additional measures of randomness that are ensured by WG-PRBG. On the other hand, Sponge-PRBG does not provide such randomness guarantees.

5.4 Security of WG-PRBG

We analyze the security of WG-PRBG against stream cipher based attacks, namely algebraic attack [Cou03], correlation attack [Sie85, MS89, CJS01], discrete fourier transform (DFT) attack [GRHH11], distinguishing attack [RSOP19], time-memory-data tradeoff attack [BS00], and an attack by Rønjon [Røn17]. We present a summary on the time complexity and data complexity of building distinguishers or seed recovery techniques based on these attacks in Table 8. We provide the detailed analysis and reasoning behind the time and data complexities of these attacks in Appendix E. Note that the WG-PRBG instance completely differs in functionality and security from the WAGE authenticated cipher.

Table 8: Summary of the data and time complexities of different attacks

Distinguisher type	Time complexity	Data complexity
Algebraic	$\mathcal{O}(2^{57.02})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{21.45})$
Correlation	$\mathcal{O}(2^{144.71})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{52.10})$
TMD	$\mathcal{O}(2^{129.5})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{129.5})$
DFT	$\mathcal{O}(2^{34.1})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{34.1})$
Rønjon’s attack [†]	$\mathcal{O}(2^{47.88})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{26})$
Distinguishing attack	$\mathcal{O}(2^{40.81})$	$\mathcal{O}(2^{40.81})$

[†] Combining the DFT attack and algebraic attack, the data complexity of Rønjon’s attack can be reduced up to that of the original algebraic attack at a cost of an increased time complexity.

Limit on output bits. Similar to the key usage data limit for an authenticated encryption scheme, we also impose a limit on generating pseudorandom bits using WG-PRBG given the attack complexities in Table 8. Thus, we restrict the number of consecutive output bits up to 2^{18} (which is $< 2^{21.45}$) per seed.

6 Performance of WAGE

In this section, we give a brief description of performance of the WAGE in hardware and microcontrollers. We highlight the implementation results from [ASZ19, YG19, AAG⁺19] and discuss the comparisons with other round two candidates.

Hardware efficiency. WAGE has been synthesized using four different ASIC libraries, namely STM 65 nm, TSMC 65 nm, STM 90 nm and IBM 130 nm as well as on three different FPGA libraries. The hardware implementation cost of WAGE on these four ASIC libraries are 2900, 3290, 2540 and 2960 GE, respectively, without any parallelization. In Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA, WAGE consumes 144 slices, 232 flip flops and 367 look up tables. For the details about the parallel architectures, energy consumption and other FPGA results of WAGE, the reader is referred to [ASZ19, AAG⁺19].

Table 1 provides a comparison of the smallest hardware implementation costs and throughput with other LWC candidates in round 2 that offer independent authenticated encryption and have ASIC implementation using one of the standard cell libraries which

WAGE is implemented in. Our comparison results show that the smallest area of WAGE, i.e., 2540 GE is smaller than the implementations of all other comparable ciphers, except TinyJAMBU-128. However, TinyJAMBU-128 offers 112 (resp. 64) bit security for confidentiality (resp. authenticity) which are lower than WAGE. The area of WAGE is comparable to the low-area implementation of ASCON, and its throughput is about $38\times$ higher than that of ASCON.

Efficiency in microcontrollers. The WAGE permutation and WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 are implemented on the following three microcontrollers: 1) the low-power 8-bit microcontroller ATmega128 [Cor19], with 128 Kbytes of programmable flash memory, 4.448 Kbytes of RAM, and 32 general purpose registers of 8 bits, 2) the 16-bit microcontroller MSP430F2370 from Texas Instruments [Ins19b] with 2.3 Kbytes of programmable flash memory, 128 Bytes of RAM, and 12 general purpose registers of 16 bits, and 3) the 32-bit microcontroller ARM Cortex M3 LM3S9D96 [Ins19a], with 524.3 Kbytes of programmable flash memory, 131 Kbytes of RAM, and 13 general purpose registers of size 32 bits. We focus on four key performance measures, namely speed (Cycles/Byte), flash/code size (Bytes), energy (nJ), and RAM (Bytes) consumption. Only the encryption module is implemented as the decryption module is the same as encryption except updating the state with ciphertext. The codes were written in the assembly language to achieve an optimal performance. Table 9 presents the performance of the WAGE permutation and WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 for two different combinations of AD and M blocks.

Table 9: Performance of WAGE on microcontrollers at clock frequency 16 MHz

Cryptographic primitive	Platform		Memory usage [Bytes]		Setup [Cycles]	Cycles/Byte	Energy/bit [nJ]
	Device	Bit	SRAM	Flash			
WAGE permutation	ATmega128	8	802	4,132	19,011	587.21	568
WAGE permutation	MSP430F2370	16	4	5,031	23,524	726.61	135
WAGE permutation	LM3S9D96	32	3076	5,902	14,450	446.33	1,162
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 0, m = 16$)	ATmega128	8	808	4,416	362,888	2,835.06	2,741
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 0, m = 16$)	MSP430F2370	16	46	5,289	433,105	3,383.63	628
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 0, m = 16$)	LM3S9D96	32	3084	6,230	278,848	2,178.50	5,673
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 2, m = 16$)	ATmega128	8	808	4,502	397,260	2,758.75	3,001
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 2, m = 16$)	MSP430F2370	16	46	5,339	47,4067	3,292.13	687
WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128 ($a = 2, m = 16$)	LM3S9D96	32	3084	6,354	305,284	2,120.02	6,210

A note on the masking cost of WGP. For WAGE, the masking costs for side channel protections highly depends on the WGP sbox. Although its boolean representation has high algebraic degree and nonlinearity, one could utilize its compact representation (sum of power maps, Section 2.2.1) to investigate the masking costs using the techniques mentioned in [DMRB18]. Note that we do not provide any estimates for such costs in the current work as the estimated and actual costs vary with the implementation platform. In future work, we plan to investigate side channel protected implementation of WAGE.

7 Concluding Remarks

In this work, we have proposed WAGE, a sponge-based authenticated encryption algorithm, tailored for resource-constrained environments. The construction of the WAGE permutation is based on a simple Galois NLFSR consisting of two sboxes WGP and SB, a primitive feedback polynomial, and partial word-wise XORs to balance the tension between the hardware efficiency and a good security guarantee. Our security analysis shows that WAGE is resistant to diffusion, algebraic, differential, linear, and meet-in-the-middle distinguishers. Moreover, WAGE is designed so that its state update function can be easily tweaked, with a minimal overhead, to generate pseudorandom bit streams with proven randomness properties for generating nonces or for the protocols that require randomness guarantees. Compared to other NIST LWC candidates, WAGE is a competitive candidate in terms of security, throughput and hardware efficiency.

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B Key and Nonce loading positions and tag extraction for WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

In Table 13, we show the exact positions of the internal state where the 128-bit key $K = k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{127}$ and 128-bit nonce $N = n_0, n_1, \dots, n_{127}$ are loaded.

Table 13: The $\text{load}(N, K)$ procedure of WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128

Word	Loaded bits	Word	Loaded bits	Word	Loaded bits
0	k_0, \dots, k_6	13	n_{64}, \dots, n_{70}	25	k_{92}, \dots, k_{98}
1	k_{14}, \dots, k_{20}	14	n_{78}, \dots, n_{84}	26	k_{106}, \dots, k_{112}
2	k_{28}, \dots, k_{34}	15	n_{92}, \dots, n_{98}	27	k_{120}, \dots, k_{126}
3	k_{42}, \dots, k_{48}	16	n_{120}, \dots, n_{126}	28	n_0, \dots, n_6
4	k_{56}, \dots, k_{62}	17	n_{106}, \dots, n_{112}	29	n_{14}, \dots, n_{20}
5	k_{71}, \dots, k_{77}	18	$k_{63}, k_{127}, n_{63}, n_{127}, 0, 0, 0$	30	n_{28}, \dots, n_{34}
6	k_{85}, \dots, k_{91}	19	k_7, \dots, k_{13}	31	n_{42}, \dots, n_{48}
7	k_{99}, \dots, k_{105}	20	k_{21}, \dots, k_{27}	32	n_{56}, \dots, n_{62}
8	k_{113}, \dots, k_{119}	21	k_{35}, \dots, k_{41}	33	n_{71}, \dots, n_{77}
9	n_7, \dots, n_{13}	22	k_{49}, \dots, k_{55}	34	n_{85}, \dots, n_{91}
10	n_{21}, \dots, n_{27}	23	k_{64}, \dots, k_{70}	35	n_{99}, \dots, n_{105}
11	n_{35}, \dots, n_{41}	24	k_{78}, \dots, k_{84}	36	n_{113}, \dots, n_{119}
12	n_{49}, \dots, n_{55}	-	-	-	-

The tagextract function extracts the 128 bit tag from the positions where the nonce was loaded.

C Test Vectors

Below we provide a test vector for the WAGE permutation and WAGE- \mathcal{AE} -128.

WAGE PERMUTATION

Input : 000

Output : 0FA82908FEA670F1B8609F00420FC3376A52DCA922061FED7C568F785C22B4A4C

WAGE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION

Key : 00111122335588DD 00111122335588DD

Nonce : 111122335588DD00 111122335588DD00

Associated data : 1122335588DD0011 1122335588DD00

Plaintext : 335588DD00111122 335588DD001111

Ciphertext : 4B7CD23D07D75575 5EA2ADEC4FEFF3

Tag : D03CF7894D6D3697 C2B1758D41E78344

D Diffusion behavior of WAGE

Table 14 depicts the diffusion behavior of WAGE whose values can be interpreted as follows. Consider the word 36 after one round, then $S_{36,0}^1, S_{36,1}^1, S_{36,2}^1, S_{36,3}^1, S_{36,4}^1, S_{36,5}^1$, and $S_{36,6}^1$ depends on 17, 18, 18, 18, 17, 17, and 17 input bits, respectively. Accordingly, we list the minimum value 17 for S_{36}^1 .

Table 14: Diffusion behavior of WAGE

Word j	Round i								
	1	2	3	4	...	25	26	27	28
0	1	1	1	1		217	238	252	259
1	1	1	1	8		238	252	259	259
2	1	1	8	8		252	259	259	259
3	1	8	8	8		259	259	259	259
4	8	8	8	15		259	259	259	259
5	1	1	1	1		252	259	259	259
6	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
7	1	1	1	8		259	259	259	259
8	1	1	8	8		259	259	259	259
9	1	8	8	8	...	259	259	259	259
10	8	8	8	8		259	259	259	259
11	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
12	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
13	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
14	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
15	1	1	1	8		259	259	259	259
16	1	1	8	15		259	259	259	259
17	1	8	15	22		259	259	259	259
18	8	15	22	29	...	259	259	259	259
19	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
20	1	1	1	8		259	259	259	259
21	1	1	8	8		259	259	259	259
22	1	8	8	8		259	259	259	259
23	8	8	8	15		259	259	259	259
24	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
25	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
26	1	1	1	8		259	259	259	259
27	1	1	8	8	...	259	259	259	259
28	1	8	8	8		259	259	259	259
29	8	8	8	78		259	259	259	259
30	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
31	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
32	1	1	1	1		259	259	259	259
33	1	1	1	17		259	259	259	259
34	1	1	17	85		259	259	259	259
35	1	17	85	139		259	259	259	259
36	17	85	139	181		259	259	259	259

E Detailed Security Analysis of WG-PRBG

In this section, we provide the security analysis of WG-PRBG against known attacks on stream ciphers.

Algebraic attack. The goal of an attacker in an algebraic attack [Cou03, CM03] is to form a system of lower degree multivariate equations by multiplying the filtering function by a low-degree multivariate polynomial. This constitutes a overdefined system of nonlinear equations for sufficiently many keystreams, which can be solved to recover the internal state of the WG-PRBG. The algebraic immunity of the WG transformation $WGT(x)$ is equal to 3. According to the algebraic attack, the time complexity and the data complexity for recovering the internal state of the WG-PRBG are about $\frac{7}{64} \cdot \binom{259}{3}^{\log_2 7} = 2^{57.02}$ and $\binom{259}{3} = 2^{21.45}$, respectively. Moreover, an attacker needs to obtain more pseudorandom bits to execute a fast algebraic attack. As there is a restriction on generating the amount of pseudorandom bits per seed, an attacker is be unable to obtain about $2^{21.45}$ pseudorandom bits to execute an algebraic attack.

Correlation attack. As a fast correlation attack is a powerful one among different correlation attacks [Sie85, MS89, CJS01], we consider this attack where the pseudorandom bits of WG-PRBG is viewed as a distorted version of the LFSR output of WG-PRBG. In the fast correlation attack, the linear approximation of the WG transformation $WGT(x)$ can be used to derive a generator matrix of a linear code that can be decoded by a maximum

likelihood decoding (MLD) algorithm. As the nonlinearity of $\text{WGT}(x)$ is 42, the probability of approximating it by a linear function $f(x)$ in 7 variables is $\Pr(\text{WGT}(x) = f(x)) = \frac{(2^7 - 42)}{2^7} = 0.671875$. Using the results of [CJS01], the amount of pseudorandom bits required for a successful attack is given by $N \approx (k \cdot 12 \cdot \ln 2)^{\frac{1}{3}} \cdot \epsilon^{-2} \cdot 2^{\frac{259-k}{3}}$ and the decoding complexity is given by $C_{dec} = 2^k \cdot k \cdot \frac{2 \ln 2}{(2\epsilon)^6}$, where $\epsilon = \Pr(\text{WGT}(x) = f(x)) = 0.671875$ and k is the number of WG-PRBG's LFSR internal state bits recovered. If an attacker wishes to recover $k = 128$ bits from the internal state, the data complexity to launch the attack is about $2^{52.10}$ and its decoding complexity is approximately $2^{144.71}$, which is not better than an exhaustive search attack.

Time-memory-data (TMD) tradeoff attack. The TMD tradeoff attack [BS00] is a generic cryptanalytic attack whose complexity is directly related to the length of the internal state, which is $O(2^{\frac{n}{2}})$ where n is the length of the internal state. For WG-PRBG, the complexity for a TMD attack is at least $2^{129.5}$ as the length of WG-PRBG's state is 259.

Differential attack. A differential attack on the initialization phase of the original WG cipher was proposed in [WP06] and that weakness has been fixed in the later variant by placing the WG permutation module at the last position of the LFSR [NG08]. The differential distribution of $\text{WGP}(x)$ is 6-uniform, which provides a maximum probability of $2^{-4.415}$ for differential characteristics. As $\text{WGP}(x)$ is applied for 74 times in the initialization phase of WG-PRBG, it is hard for an attacker to distinguish the output bits of WG-PRBG from a truly random one.

Distinguishing attack. A distinguishing attack was proposed against the WG-7 stream cipher in [OPS12], which was successful due to a small number of tap positions in the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR of WG-7. Applying a similar distinguishing attack of [RSOP19, OPS12], a distinguisher of WG-PRBG can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} F(S_i, S_{i+6}, \dots, S_{i+31}) = & \text{WGT}(S_{31+i} \oplus S_{30+i} \oplus S_{26+i} \oplus S_{24+i} \oplus S_{19+i} \oplus S_{13+i} \oplus S_{12+i} \\ & \oplus S_{8+i} \oplus S_{6+i} \oplus (\omega \otimes S_i)) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{31+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{30+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{26+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{24+i}) \\ & \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{19+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{13+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{12+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{8+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_{6+i}) \oplus \text{WGT}(S_i). \end{aligned}$$

which is a Boolean function in 70 variables. For the distinguisher F , the probability of $F(x) = 0$ can be written as $\Pr(F(x) = 0) = \frac{1}{2} \pm \epsilon$ for some ϵ . Using the counting algorithm in [RSOP19], the value of ϵ is $2^{-20.405}$. Therefore, the time and data complexities of the distinguishing attack is $O(2^{40.81})$ for distinguishing the outputs of WG-PRBG from a truly random one.

Discrete fourier transform (DFT) attack. The goal of an attacker in a DFT attack is to recover the internal state of a filtering generator. The DFT attack was first proposed by Rønjom and Hellesteth in [RH07] and extended to attacking filtering generators over \mathbb{F}_{2^n} by Gong *et al.* in [GRHH11]. Recently, Rønjon [Røn17] developed an attack on word-oriented filtering generators combining the algebraic attack and DFT attack. To launch Rønjon's attack against the WG-PRBG, an attacker needs to obtain 2^{26} consecutive keystream bits, and the online time complexity to recover the state of WG-PRBG is $2^{47.88}$. As WG-PRBG does not generate more than 2^{18} bits per seed, an attacker is unable to collect enough consecutive bits to launch a DFT attack.