


ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CENTER



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The subject matter of economic development and political development intersect over a broad front. Economic policy is made by incumbent politicians in the context of political institutions. The analysis of the economic impact of alternative policies is the stock in trade of the economist. The choice of the alternative policies that are subjected to economic analysis is influenced by the agendas of political parties and interests. The subject matter of political science includes the political decision process by which policies are adopted and implemented. It also includes the social consequences and the public response to policy.

There is a deep fault line that divides scholarship in the two fields. Each field tends to treat the knowledge it draws on from the other as implicit rather than explicit. It seems apparent that the implicit theorizing by economists about political development and of political scientists about economic development should be replaced by more explicit attempts to develop an integrated theory of political and economic development. Political scientists and economists loosely grouped within the collective choice school of political economy have advanced our understanding of the processes by which economic resources are translated into political resources and political resources are translated into economic resources.¹ But a similar convergence of theory and analysis has not yet been achieved among students of political and economic development.

This paper represents an attempt to assess what development economists should learn from theory and research in the field of political development to advance knowledge and policy in the field of economic development. I proceed by first reviewing the contributions of several development economists who have attempted to give explicit attention to the political preconditions or conditions for economic development. I then review the evolution of thought in the field of political development. This leads me to a discussion of the central problem of the growth of political power and its relationship to economic growth.

Political Development in Development Economics

Economic development theory and analysis has concerned itself primarily with the surface patterns and proximate sources of economic growth. Patterns have been described in terms of the transformation of structure² and the succession of stages³. Sources of growth have been analyzed in terms of the response to investment in physical and human capital.

Relatively little attention has been given by economists to the political "preconditions" or "conditions" for economic growth. When development economics emerged as a subdiscipline in the 1940s and early 1950s there was a pervasive view among economists that the late industrializing countries required strong authoritarian state institutions in order to mobilize the resources required for growth.⁴ Democracy was a "luxury" that could not be afforded by poor states. This view drew on and was reinforced by the apparent success of centralized planning in Stalin's Russia. By the early 1970s there was increasing skepticism among development economists about the merits of forced draft mobilization and the efficacy of central planning. A view emerged that success in economic development could be more readily

achieved, or at least sustained, in an environment characterized by a liberal economic and political order.

In general, these views emerged more out of experience and casual observation rather than serious scholarship. A few economic historians and development economists did, however, attempt to explain the relationship between political and economic development in somewhat greater depth. In this section I refer to the work of Alexander Gerschenkron, Karl de Schweinitz, Jagdish Bhagwati, Walt W. Rostow, and Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris.

Gerschenkron

The theme that late-industrializing countries benefit from the evolution of strong state institutions with the capacity to directly intervene and participate in economic activities is a pervasive theme in Alexander Gerschenkron's studies of European economic history.⁵ A major organizing principle in Gerschenkron's work is the continuing tension between change and continuity in history. Industrialization occurs in rapid "spurts" along the lines suggested in the "take-off" or "big-push" views of economic development. The more backward the economy the more likely that industrialization would occur "discontinuously as a sudden great spurt."

In the case of the early industrializing countries it was sufficient for the state to pursue policies aimed at creating a suitable environment, through an appropriate legal framework and the supplying of physical infrastructure, for the growth of industrial enterprise. But in the more backward economies of Russia and of eastern and southern Europe "successful industrialization requires more than simply introducing the institutional framework that suffices for the purposes of industrialization in an advanced

country." The state must have the power to pursue "forced draft" industrialization--to extract surpluses from a reluctant peasantry and to direct capital into industrial development.

Gerschenkron displayed considerable caution in drawing the implications of his analysis for development policy. Other scholars who share Gerschenkron's historical perspective have been less reticent. In Industrialization and Democracy Karl de Schweinitz argued that while economic growth and democracy are complementary in the advanced western economies, this relationship is reversed during the early stages of modern economic development.⁶ The Euro-American route to democracy is closed to the presently less-developed countries. The impulse for industrialization must come from the center of political power and spread outward into society rather than, as was the case in the West during the nineteenth century, coming from society itself. If the underdeveloped countries are to grow economically they must limit democratic participation in political affairs--"Justice must take a back seat to growth objectives."⁷

Jagdish Bhagwati was even more explicit. In his introductory text, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, Bhagwati insisted that "socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union and mainland China, have an immense advantage: their totalitarian structure shields the government from the . . . reactionary judgments of the electorate. The Soviet government's firm control on expansion in consumption over the last few decades could hardly ever be attempted by a democratic government. Another advantage of the socialist countries is their passionate conviction and dedication to the objective of economic growth--which contrasts visibly with the halting and hesitant beliefs and actions of most democracies."⁸

I cite de Schweinitz and Bhagwati here, not to criticize their work from the vantage of the late 20th Century, but to emphasize the pervasiveness of the view that authoritarian regimes, whether capitalist or socialist, were more effective at mobilizing resources for development than democracies. The belief that authoritarian regimes are conducive to economic growth was pervasive, not only among students of economic and political development, but among the political elites and enterprise managers in developing countries and also among the officers and technocrats in the international financial institutions and assistance agencies.⁹

Rostow

During the 1950s, Walt W. Rostow elaborated and popularized a theory of stages of economic growth.¹⁰ The stages were denominated (a) traditional society, (b) preconditions for growth, (c) take-off into sustained growth, (d) drive to maturity and (e) high mass consumption. The stage characterization drew primarily on the history of western economies for their empirical support. Rostow extended the implications of the stage perspective for development policy in contemporary developing countries. This was followed, in the early 1970s, by an effort to relate his stage perspective to the process of political development.¹¹ In this effort Rostow drew on the experience of a broad range of developed and advanced developing countries (England, United States, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and Mexico). Rostow's approach was to explore the tension between traditional political culture and the new problems or tasks that the process of economic growth imposes on the polity as a society moves successively through the development stages.

Cycles in economic and political development emerge as the characteristic pattern in the traditional society. Custom and the elders rule in the clan and tribal societies--"but conflict and conquest lead to kingdoms and empires." The expansion of resources during the upswing leads to improvement in administration and security. But the growth of bureaucracy and the resources required to maintain security lead to the erosion of political freedom and imposes economic burdens on the peasantry that can not be maintained in the presence of static agricultural technology. During the period when societies are establishing the preconditions for growth the most dominant characteristic is political and economic insecurity. There is unstable competition among the aristocracy, the new entrepreneurs, the bureaucracy and the military--with the military often emerging in leadership roles because of their mastery of technology and organization.

During the take-off stage growth of agricultural and industrial production begins to generate new income streams. Competition between classes (labor and capital), and estates (military and civil bureaucracies) over control over the new income streams becomes a source of political stress and crisis. But, Rostow argues, by the time that the drive to maturity is well underway constitutional issues of justice and equity and economic policies toward growth and welfare become easier to manage and a liberal democratic order emerges as the most effective political system to sustain take-off.

The age of high mass consumption places new stress on political institutions. The demand for improvements in the quality of life replaces the older demand for commodities. This extends to the public sector where demand for the quality of public services confronts the use of public

resources to pursue security or other international political objectives. Experience with this stage is so limited, in Rostow's view, that it is difficult to adequately foresee either its political or economic implications.

Adelman and Morris

During the 1970s and 1980s Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris have pursued an exceedingly ambitious research agenda designed to explore the role of "initial institutions" on the pace and structure of economic development.¹² Their methodology is empirical rather than theoretical. A variety of statistical methods were employed to identify "salient configurations of economic and political change" and "for grouping closely related variables for different country types and groups." An attempt is made to capture the role of political institutions by variables measuring the (a) domestic economic role of government, (b) socioeconomic character of political leadership, (c) strength of national representative institutions, (d) political stability, (e) foreign economic dependence and colonial status.

The Adelman-Morris results for the 1850-1914 period are consistent with the perspective of the "modernization" school in sociology and political science.

"At critical junctions . . . political institutions mattered greatly. With rare exceptions, economic growth and its benefits did not diffuse far where domestic landed elites aligning with foreign export interest dominated the political process. In all countries undergoing substantial industrialization, domestic commercial and industrial classes had or gained significant power in national leadership. In more politically diverse country groups--for example, land-abundant dependent countries--economic growth spread far only when landed elites no longer dominated domestic economic policies."¹³

The emergence of a legal system that strengthened property and market institutions was important for market expansion, industrial development and agricultural development. In their earlier book, which focuses on more recent economic history, Adelman and Morris were not able to discover the close association between political and economic development that was revealed in their analysis of the 1850-1914 period. There was no systematic association between the form of the political system and the performance of the economic system. Indeed, the most striking pattern that emerges from their empirical analysis is the progressive differentiation and separation of the social, economic, and political spheres from each other. Furthermore, this differentiation begins to emerge relatively early in the development process.

It has been difficult to discover broad agreement among economic historians and development economists who have given explicit attention to political development. It does appear, however, that there would be fairly broad assent to the proposition that authoritarian regimes in which command over economic and political resources was relatively undifferentiated characterized the societies from which the presently developed market economies emerged. Furthermore, in these societies the emergence of capitalism preceded the emergence of democracy. Substantial disagreement remains, however, about whether sufficient concentration of political resources "to avoid the opposition of any sectional interest" is essential for economic development in today's poor countries.

Political Science and Political Development

The 1960s was a period of intense intellectual ferment in the field of political science. Insights based on advances in the understanding of

individual and group behavior, drawing on psychology, sociology, and economics were incorporated into the theoretical domain of politics. The concept of political system was elaborated and distinguished from the changes in the environment in which political activity takes place. New quantitative methods from statistics and economics were adopted to explore the relationships between the political system and its environment. The emergence of new states turned the attentions of political scientists to apply these advances in theory and methods to the problem of mobilizing and allocating political resources.¹⁴

One indication of the interest and ambitions of political scientists in political development was the major research effort organized by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics (SSRC/CCP) to "generate a doctrine of political development that would prove as powerful an analytical tool as economic theory had provided in its assault on problems of national poverty."¹⁵ Interest in political development was given further impetus in Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. The U.S. Agency for International Development (US/AID) was instructed: "In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of people in developing countries through the encouragement of democratic, private and local government institutions."¹⁶

By the mid-1970s, however, interest in issues of political development by political scientists was rapidly eroding. Scholarship in the field of political development found itself facing a series of methodological, empirical, and ideological challenges.

A review by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner vigorously challenged the methodological foundations of the research carried out under the auspices of the SSRC/CCP. They characterized the methodology employed in the research carried out under the auspices of the Committee as "persuasive discourse". The process by which the authors move "from the raw material to the theory is never made explicit. Rules of inference are not spelled out. Intuitive processes are apparently considered to be more important"¹⁷

Holt and Turner insisted that progress toward the objectives that the Committee set for itself, a collective effort to construct a theory of political development, could only be advanced by use of an analytic-deductive approach to theory construction and empirical analysis. While these criticisms were never explicitly acknowledged, it is clear that by the early 1980s there was increasing skepticism within political science about the usefulness of the concept of political development as the focus for a research agenda.¹⁸

The empirical challenge centered around the continued relevance of the Anglo-American linear model of political development. Prior to the mid-1950s, the literature was dominated by what Robert A. Packenham has termed the "legal-formal approach." Political development was identified with the attributes of English and American liberal constitutional democracy. The level of political development of a country could be measured by its linear distance from the Anglo-American model.¹⁹ Dissatisfaction with the Anglo-American model was stated as a challenge by Gabriel A. Almond in his 1966 presidential address to the American Political Science Association.

"Enlightenment theory began with the leviathan state and postulated as the legitimate problem of political theory that of bringing the leviathan under control through institutional and legal checks and balances, and through popular processes. Modern political theory

has to ask how the leviathan itself comes into existence, in order to cope with the intellectual problems of understanding the political prospects and processes of the new nations."²⁰

A second generation of scholars attempted to move away from what was regarded as the excessive parochialism of the linear model. Political development was defined in terms of multidimensional categories and analyzed as a dependent variable--a response to changes in economic, sociological and psychological variables.²¹ Political scientists working within the framework of the modernization paradigm, adapted from sociology, viewed the emergence of market exchange and economic development as an important requisite to political democracy. Changes in social structure and the erosion of traditional social institutions were emphasized. Changes in the political culture, at both the level of beliefs and attitudes and the level of personality, were held to play independent roles in the process of political development still largely associated with the transition to democracy.²²

These views were, in turn, criticized by a third generation of scholars who took their clue from the seminal article by Samuel P. Huntington on "Political Development and Political Decay."²³ Huntington defined "political development" as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Furthermore, he identified political development with the strength or capacity of government institutions--"whatever strengthens governmental institutions."²⁴ The level of institutionalization was measured by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of government institutions. He went on to argue that if these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their institutionalization.²⁵

Eckstein has suggested an even more ambitious agenda. He assigns to political development, as subfield of development theory, the task of "developing a theory of political stages . . . one that identifies distinct stages which link primal to modern society."²⁶ The political domain must be distinguished from other dimensions of modernization--"What grows in political development is politics--the political domain of society"²⁷--the domain that includes legitimate power, conflict management, and the regulation of social conduct.

Eckstein returns to the history of English polity to sketch out a prototype set of stages. These include: (a) primal polity--characterized by symbolic leadership; (b) substantive primacy--involving legal and extractive power; (c) "prophylactic" policy--including maintenance of order and management of dissent; (d) the polity of interests--involving the pursuit and granting of privilege; (e) the politics of incorporation--the virtual total politicization of social life; and (f) political society--in which the realm of privacy is minimized and political density is maximized--the role of power is pervasive.

Modern democracies, in the historical perspective of the Eckstein stages, "simply are the gentler twins of totalitarian rule, mitigated by open competition, free communications, and a sense of rights and liberties--which compared to earlier times, no longer really divides the public from the private, but is a sense of political decency"²⁸--in Huntington's terminology--a softer form of institutionalization.

The ideological challenge grew out of the profound disillusionment on the part of many younger social scientists with the impact of western cultural, economic, political, and military penetration into non-western societies. It

was reinforced by the political fallout resulting from intellectual commitment of a number of leading scholars in the field of political development to influence the direction of political development in countries such as Vietnam, Chile, Brazil, Egypt, and others. The consequences of U.S. interventions in Vietnam contributed to the discrediting of both the subdiscipline and of the scholars who had contributed to the development of the field.²⁹

The intellectual climate created by these experiences contributed to the rapid diffusion of what came to be known as "dependency" or "underdevelopment" or "world systems" theory as an alternative to the modernization paradigm as a lens through which to interpret political, social, and economic change in Third World countries. The dependency perspective initially drew on the work of the Latin American structuralist school of economists for its empirical support. It turned to neo-Marxian theories of imperialism, particularly to the work of Paul Baran for its theoretical foundations. But it was the colorful rhetoric employed by Andre Gunder Frank in his attacks on the modernization school that was most influential in diffusing the underdevelopment perspective among a new generation of students of comparative politics.³⁰

The central theme in Frank's polemic was that world capitalism, and particularly trade between the countries of the center and the periphery, rather than being an "engine of growth," was responsible for "underdeveloping" the Third World. The same historical processes responsible for the development and expansion of capitalism at the center was responsible for underdevelopment--and for political and economic dependency--in the periphery.

By the mid-1980s commitment to the dependency perspective was rapidly eroding--particularly in its centers of origin in Latin America. This was in

part due to the criticism of scholars committed to classical Marxism. More important, however, was the widening discrepancy between some of the more extravagant implications of the theory and the record of economic and political development in the 1970s and 1980s. The assertion that external economic linkages resulted in economic and political regression in the periphery was not sustained by the historical record.³¹

I find myself dissatisfied with both the modernization and dependency reformulations. Huntington's identification of political development with the strengthening of governmental institutions is unduly restrictive. His emphasis on institutionalization focuses on process rather than outcome. And while Eckstein emphasizes the final outcome of political development his linear sequence of stages hardly pass the test that he imposes on earlier theories of political development. "What is absent . . . is a theory of the fundamental forces . . . that brought us to our political condition and continues to push us through political turns."³² He is not able to escape the criticism that has been made of economic staging--a convenient rather than an analytical way of slicing historical time. Dependency theory had painted itself into a cul de sac from which it is attempting to escape by jettisoning much of the baggage it acquired during the 1970s. It had, however, diverted a generation of younger political scientists from the more rigorous theory construction and testing that Holt and Turner had called for in the mid-1970s.³³

The Political Basis of Economic Development

To what extent is economic development conditioned by or even dependent on political development? Must political and economic development processes be highly articulated? There is a strong theme in political development

literature to the effect that the "overall level of political institutionalization and the degree to which those institutions are democratic or undemocratic affect the rate and character of economic growth and the distribution of wealth and income."³⁴ Political theorists working in the Marxian tradition have viewed political development primarily in terms of its impact on economic organization and development.³⁵ Kwame Nkrumah put the same point more dramatically: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto it."³⁶

In the following subsections I attempt to assess, drawing on the political development literature, what political scientists have been able to infer about the implications of political development for economic development. I focus on three bodies of literature: (a) quantitative studies; (b) historical studies; and (c) studies of political culture.

Quantitative Studies

During the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of efforts, using cross country statistical analysis, to test assumptions about the impact of political institutions on economic growth were made by political scientists. Three major generalizations emerge from this body of research.³⁷

1. Low income countries characterized by low levels of political institutionalization--newly independent, low institutional density, political instability and violence--were characterized by low rates of total and per capita economic growth.
2. Low income countries with authoritarian political systems experienced more rapid rates of economic growth than countries characterized by more democratic political systems. The generalization appeared to hold both for authoritarian regimes of the left and the right.
3. At higher levels of per capita income, (roughly to \$250 in 1960 or \$750 in 1985 dollars), the positive relationship between

authoritarian political organization and the rate of economic growth tended to disappear.

Most of the earlier studies summarized by Huntington and Dominiques involved little more than attempts to establish statistical association between indicators of political and economic development. More recent studies have attempted to estimate more complex causal models that specify the mechanisms by which different types of political regimes influence (or are influenced by) economic development. One early example was an attempt by Robert M. Marsh to test the "authoritarian model" of the relationship between political and economic development using data for 1955-1970.³⁸ He interprets his analysis as providing "some support" for the authoritarian model-- "Political competition/democracy does have a significant effect on later rates of economic development; its influence is to retard the development rate rather than to facilitate it."³⁹ One has the impression, reading the Marsh paper, that he is somewhat reluctant to accept the results of his own statistical results. He emphasizes that his static model provides less support for the authoritarian model than the tests of his dynamic model.

However, in a more recent quantitative study Abbas Pourgerami finds a recursive relationship between democracy and development--a growing market oriented economy has a positive impact on the strengthening of democratic institutions and democracy, in turn, has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴⁰ A number of countries which appeared in the 1960s to be characterized both by relatively stable authoritarian regimes now appear to be characterized by cycles of both (a) political stability and instability, and (b) rapid and slow economic growth. In authoritarian regimes of both the right and the left, the successful transition to more open political systems characterized by multiple centers of power has been exceedingly difficult.

Autonomous centers of power, in either the public or the private sector are viewed as potential threats to political regimes that are attempting to husband the limited political resources available to them at the center.⁴¹

It is difficult to be certain, from this distance, whether the results of the empirical studies were a source of the shift in interest among political scientists in the late 1950s and 1960s toward problems of political order and stability or whether the studies were, themselves, a reflection of the shift. Nevertheless, they tended to be quite consistent with the conclusions reached by the economists who addressed the same issue during that period. Perhaps the strongest inference that should be drawn from the quantitative studies is that a poor country that fails to establish a reasonable degree of political stability imposes a severe burden on the forces conducive to economic growth.

Historical Studies

One of the more ambitious attempts to explore the political basis for economic development was made in the mid-1960s by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. In their book, The Political Bases of Economic Development,⁴² they accepted the Rostow stage model of economic development as a working hypothesis and attempted to examine the political developments in the "preconditions" stage that proceeds the "take-off" stage. According to Holt and Turner:

"In order to manipulate in a desired manner the variables that concern us, we have concentrated attention upon France, 1600-1789; China, 1644-1911; Japan 1603-1868; and England, 1558-1780. Shortly after the final dates listed, Japan and England entered upon a period of rapid industrialization, whereas France and China lagged behind in varying degrees. If there are significant political requirements for economic growth, and if there was no obvious technological factors at work we should expect to find certain

political similarities between France and China, on the one hand, that distinguish them from Japan and England on the other."⁴³

It is difficult to capture the richness of the Holt-Turner analysis. Yet a major conclusion that emerges from their work is that the premature aggregation or concentration of political resources represents a constraint on economic development. The governments of France and China were much more active in infrastructure development than in Japan and England. They had greater fiscal capacity, provided a more secure legal framework for economic activity, and were more active in the organization and regulation of economic activity. But the contributions to development that derived from the aggregation of political and economic power became a constraint on local or regional political development and on private economic activity.

Cultural Endowments

The assumption that cultural endowments play a fundamental role in political development is so pervasive that it often remains implicit rather than explicit in the political development literature. This is in sharp contrast to the treatment of cultural endowments in economics, where cultural considerations have been cast into the "underworld" of development thought and practice.⁴⁴ It would be hard to find a leading scholar in the field of development economics who would commit themselves in print to the proposition that, "In terms of explaining different patterns of political and economic development . . . a central variable is culture--the subjective attitudes, beliefs, and values prevalent among the dominant groups in the society."⁴⁵

In American political thought, it is assumed by almost all schools from the adherents to the older legal-formalist tradition, to the more recent behavioral and public choice schools that the ideas embodied in the United

States constitution were a product of the political culture of the enlightenment. This is illustrated by the 1976 exchange about constitutional choice between Vincent Ostrom and William Riker.⁴⁶ Ostrom argued that the design of the United States constitution, with a federal structure, separation of powers, and democratic election of the legislature and the executive as central elements, has been responsible for the maintenance of a system in which broad areas of political and economic activity remain outside the direct purview of public authority. Riker argued, in contrast that we are not free because of constitutional design but that the constitutional design was a reflection of the political culture of a free people. He argues, more broadly, that constitutional design is derivative of political culture rather than its source. But there is greater agreement between Ostrom and Riker than either concedes. Ostrom did not argue that United States constitutional design was cut from "whole cloth." The political culture of the enlightenment was the product of several centuries of thought and practice in the evolution of systems of governance that could function effectively without the unlimited exercise of sovereign authority.⁴⁷

The view that political culture forms a coherent pattern that informs political thought and governs (but does not determine) political behavior in any society represents the central core of the research program pursued by Lucian W. Pye beginning with his studies of politics and personality in Southeast Asia, his active role in the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, and his more recent analysis of the relationship between cultural endowment and political development in Asia.⁴⁸

Pye argues that it is possible to characterize Asian political culture in a way that distinguishes it from the political cultures of Latin America,

Africa or the West. The most significant is the Asian tendency to place more value on the collective and to be less sensitive than the West to the values of individualism. "Western belief that progress should result in ever greater scope for individual autonomy is not taken as self evident by most Asian, who are more inclined to believe that greater happiness comes from suppressing self-interest in favor of group solidarity.⁴⁹ This results in a style of political leadership that is, at least from a Western perspective, highly paternalistic. Ritual plays a particularly strong role in assuring the legitimacy of political power--either in the ethical-moral sociopolitical sense characteristic of the Sinic cultures; the cosmic origins of ritualized power in South Asia; or the patron-client style of personal power in Southeast Asia.

Pye also argues that the drive toward modernization requires and imposes change in personality and culture. Cultures do converge during the process of modernization. Yet he insists, the political cultures of Asia will retrain strong parochial dimensions. Economic growth will be associated with polities in which the structure of political power will reflect very different attitudes toward power and authority than in the West.

Political Power and Political Development

It is hard to escape the conclusion that the scholars who have been engaged in advancing knowledge in the field of political development have been reluctant to confront the central question of political development. Unless political development has little meaning, other than political change, it is necessary to answer a central question--what is it that grows in the process of political development? In the case of economic development, the answer is fairly straightforward. What grows is socially productive economic

capacity measured in terms of its physical, institutional and human resources. If instead of the development of a society's economy we are concerned with the development of its polity, we must also attempt to identify what grows. I will argue that the most obvious candidate for what it is that grows in political development is power!

But what is power? Power occupied a central role in the literature of political science in the 1950s.⁵⁰ It was viewed as an instrument or a resource to be used in advancing other objectives or values. It was also viewed as the central phenomena to be explained by political science. But the concept of power has also been the subject of considerable professional controversy. Some scholars have suggested that the concept is so ambiguous that it should be abandoned. More recently Lucian W. Pye has argued that power should serve as the central concept in a revitalization of scholarship in the field of political development.⁵¹

The traditional definitions of power share a view of power as an instrument that enables agents to alter the behavior of other agents. "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."⁵² This definition has been extended to include not only overt constraint but also indirect or latent constraints.⁵³ To paraphrase--"A has power over B if A can effect the incentives facing B in such a way that it is rational for B to do something he would not otherwise have chosen to do." It has served as the conceptual foundation for efforts to develop empirical measures of power.⁵⁴

This instrumentalist (or manipulative) approach to the definition of power has been criticized as excessively empirical.⁵⁵ Jeffrey C. Isaac argues, on methodological grounds, for a "thicker" structuralist or realist

approach to the nature of power. Theories of power should not depend on the unique characteristics of individuals, but "their social identities as participants in enduring, socially structured relationships."⁵⁶ Isaacs argues that social or political power should be defined in terms of the capacities to act--the "power to"--possessed by social agents.⁵⁷ Isaac does not, however, provide us with a contemporary road map to guide investigation along the research agenda he has proposed.

In searching for an approach to understand the role of power in political development, I find it useful to draw on an important paper by Talcott Parsons,⁵⁸ that was neglected by Isaac. The significance of Parson's paper for the analysis of political development is that he regards power as a system resource that is capable of expansion or growth. He directly challenges the "limited good" or "zero sum" definition of power implicit in the work the instrumentalist schools as well as in the work of later critics. In Parson's view, the political system or the polity of a society is composed of the ways in which the relevant components of the total system are organized to achieve effective action--that is the "power to" achieve both collective and individual goals.⁵⁹

Parsons also raises the question of whether the hierarchical organization of political systems necessarily implies that political resources must, by their very nature, be distributed more unequally than economic resources? Parsons does not believe so. He suggests two constraints on the hierarchial ordering of power. One is the franchise. In "the leadership systems of the most 'advanced' national societies, the power element has been systematically equalized through the device of the franchise."⁶⁰ Arendt, writing from an intense normative perspective, makes

the same point more elegantly, "Under conditions of representative government, the people are supposed to rule those who govern them."⁶¹ In a democratic system, the franchise is the one resource that is distributed equally.⁶² And even in authoritarian systems, as Pye as noted in his study of Asian political systems, it is a great illusion of politics to assume "that power flows downward from the ruler through the elite to the masses, whereas in actual fact the process is precisely the reverse."⁶³

The second constraint stems from the interpretation of economy and polity. The interpenetration of economy and polity plays a critical role in the expansion or growth of political resources or power.⁶⁴ The structural requirements for the organization of a productive economy places limits on the ability of the political system to obtain control over commodities and services. The productivity of the economy is in turn dependent on an economic organization that is capable of mobilizing the productive effort or the competence of its constituents. Parsons argues that this requires equality of opportunity--the equalization of opportunities for citizens to participate meaningfully and effectively in the shaping of the polity of which they are a part.⁶⁵

We are now ready to return to the question that was posed at the beginning of this section--What is it that grows in the process of political development? It seems clear that my initial intuition has a solid basis in the literature of political science if not in the literature of political development. What grows in political development is power! Furthermore, its growth may be measured in terms of both its concentration and its distribution.

If this is correct, the distribution of political power must be given much more attention than in the political development literature of the 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁶ By conceptualizing power in terms of both its amount and its distribution, it is possible to make two important theoretical propositions about its growth: (1) Power that is closely held, or highly concentrated, faces severe constraints on its growth; (2) Power that is loosely held, that is equally distributed, also faces severe constraints on its growth. In both cases the growth of power, primarily along a single dimension, runs into diminishing returns. If one accepts these two propositions, it is then possible to maintain that political development has advanced (a) if the amount of power available to a society grows with no worsening of the distribution of power; or (b) if the distribution of power has become more equal with no decline in the amount of power available to a society.

Huntington was surely correct in insisting that the concept of political development should be reversible--that it should be broad enough to cover the possibility of political decay. The above definition meets this test. If rapid political mobilization is not accompanied by sufficiency rapid institutionalization of political processes greater equity in the distribution of political power may be accompanied by loss of aggregate political power.⁶⁷ Conversely the aggregation of political power at the center may be acquired at the expense of a reduction in political "density"--or less equal distribution of political power. In both cases political decay can be said to occur.

A further advantage of this definition is that it can incorporate the effects of geographic expansion (or contraction) of states and empires as well as changes over time. If geographic expansion, in addition to aggregating power, improves the distribution of power by creating new

opportunities for the population incorporated into the larger unit geographic expansion can be said to contribute to political development. The creation of the European Economic Community may be an example. In some cases political development may be associated with a reduction in the geographic extent of a nation or an empire. It could be argued, for example, that the break up of the French colonial empire contributed to the political development of France. But did it contribute to political development or decay in Algeria?

Some Analytics

It may be useful to attempt a simple diagrammatic exposition of the relationship between changes in the concentration, the distribution and the growth of power. In Figure 1 let the concentration of power be measured along the Y axis and the distribution of power along the X axis, and the level or amount of power along a vertical axis. The level of power, and the willingness of a society to make trade-offs between power concentration and distribution of power is described by the family of iso-power curves, P_1 , $P_2 \dots P_N$. A society characterized by iso-power curve P_2 has available to it more power than a society described by P_1 . Societies characterized different cultural endowments can be expected to have different "tastes" for concentration and distribution of power. This could be depicted by a family of iso-power curves with different slopes than the family depicted in Figure 1.

The capacity of a society to achieve a particular level of power can be illustrated by the family of iso-power capacity or transformation curves C_1 , $C_2 \dots C_N$. The power transformation curve measures the trade-off between concentrated or centralized state power and power distribution or decentralized individual or community power. C_1 on the Y axis depicts a

situation in which growth in political and economic resources would be focused on achieving greater concentration of power; C_1 on the X axis depicts a situation in which growth in political and economic resources would be focused on achieving greater distribution of power. The institutional resources available to a society to transform centralized into decentralized power (or the reverse) as described by a family of iso-capacity curves, is shaped by a polities institutional history. It may be easier for some societies to expand power along the Y rather than along the X axis. Movement along either the power distribution or power concentration axis can, as noted above, be expected to run into diminishing ratios.

Given a societies cultural endowments, the optimum mix of concentration and distribution of power is where P_1 and C_1 intersect at L_1 . At this point a society achieves consistency between its taste and capacity for power. Furthermore, its optimum or least cost growth path is along OL_n unless the factors that determine the societies capacity or taste for power change. A polity that is able to devote more resources to the accumulation of power can be described by the iso-capacity curve C_2 . C_1 and C_2 may also be used to describe the same societies iso-capacity curves at two different points in time. In this case one can say that the polity has experienced a growth in power between t_1 and t_2 and that there has been an increase of power at both the level of the state ($Y_2 - Y_1$) and the community or individual ($X_2 - X_1$).

Figure 2 illustrates how differences in the iso-power curves, which reflect a polities capacity to generate power, can result in different power growth paths. Assume, for example, two new states, both with balanced or "neutral" preferences toward authoritarian or libertarian polity described by $P_1, P_2 \dots P_n$. One of the new states has, however, inherited an institutional

structure that makes it easier for power to grow along the concentrated rather than the dispersed dimension. This is depicted by the set of iso-capacity curves $C_1, C_2 \dots C_n$. In contrast the iso-capacity curves $C'_1, C'_2, \dots C'_n$ depict a polity that has inherited a set of institutions that make it easier to expand power by widening its distribution. Thus, in spite of the same "taste" for concentration and distribution of power the two polities will exhibit quite different paths of political development (G_1 and G_2).

One might characterize path G_1 as an "authoritarian" path; G' as "corporatist" and G_2 as a "pluralist" path. Centrally planned authoritarian societies (as in the case of the USSR) would lie to the left of G_1 . Social corporatism (as in Austria) would occupy the space slightly to the left of G' ; liberal corporatism (as in the case of the Netherlands) would lie slightly to the right.⁶⁸ A recent article by Cynthia Taft Morris suggests that one might associate Argentina with the inherited political institutions represented by $C_1, C_2 \dots C_n$. Canada might be associated with the inherited political institutions represented by $C'_1, C'_2 \dots C'_n$.⁶⁹ Other stylized examples can also be suggested. A poor society ruled by an authoritarian ruler (such as Ethiopia in 1750) might be located at the intersection of G_1 and C_1 while a poor society with a less authoritarian system of governance (such as the Iroquois Federation in 1750) might be located at the intersection of G_2 and C'_1 in Figure 2. In spite of differences in the concentration and distribution of power only very limited power to achieve personal or societal goals was available to either individuals or government in the two societies.

The analytical framework suggested in this section is quite flexible. Different paths of political development can also be generated by assuming two different polities with the same iso-capacity curves and different iso-

power curves to reflect different tastes for power concentration and distribution. Or if one enjoys geometry, one can approach reality more closely by constructing a set of curves in which the two polities differ in additional dimensions. The important point is that different societies can be expected to follow different paths of growth and distribution of power. In the 1950s, as noted earlier, it was popular to assume convergence toward the G_1 path.

In the 1980s it has become increasingly popular to assume convergence toward the G_2 path.⁷⁰ Francis Fukuyama, in an article that has achieved considerable notoriety, has characterized the political changes underway in Eastern Europe and the USSR as "an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism."⁷¹ John R. Freeman argues, largely on theoretical grounds, that corporatist mixed economies are capable of superior economic and political performance.⁷² It is possible that the several paths will converge toward some L_n (Figure 1). At present, however, I would be reluctant to assume convergence toward some equilibrium path in either the G_1 or the G_2 direction (Figure 2).⁷³

On Measurement

A continuing puzzle in the political development literature is why so little effort has been devoted to attempts to model and measure the political development process. The importance of measurement has been widely emphasized. Some of the conceptual problems of measuring power, conceived as a reciprocal but asymmetrical relationship between two parties, were outlined by Simon in 1953.⁷⁴ The measurement of community power was the subject of considerable disagreement, centering on the work of Dahl and Mills, in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁷⁵ Huntington stressed the importance of

developing a definition of political development that would lend itself to quantification in his classic analysis of "Political Development and Political Decay."⁷⁶ Attempts have been made to measure particular dimensions of political development along one or more of the dimensions of development of the Parsonian structural functionalist model. One of the more successful attempts has been the sectoral approach employed by Peter Flora and his associates to quantify differences in the growth of the welfare state among the western democracies.⁷⁷ But the only broad scale frontal assault on the problem of measurement have been the determinedly atheoretical efforts by Morris and Adelman.⁷⁸

How important is the issue of measurement? Economists have found the concept of utility analytically useful even though there continues to be substantial disagreement about its measurement. Can power be treated in political science in a way that is analogous to the way utility is treated in economies? The inputs into the power function (analogous to a production function) that determines the focus and form of the iso-capacity curve, for a particularly society at a particular time, are largely institutional.⁷⁹ Whether the iso-capacity curve is biased toward the power concentration or power distribution axis will depend on the traditions and strength of a nation's civil and military bureaucracies, of its judicial system, and the degree of centralization or decentralization of its governance structure. But the problem of measurement of the growth and distribution of power, or of reasonable proxies, should not face unreasonable difficulties.

An important advantage of the model outlined in Figures 1 and 2, which incorporates the relationship between changes in the concentration, distribution and growth of power is that it does advance the possibility of

constructing a productive dialogue between measurement and theory. It should not, for example, be too difficult to design measures of the degree of decentralization of power--conceived in terms of "power to"--among the several levels of government. Nor should it be too difficult to measure the extent to which power is concentrated within a small political elite. And with measures of the variables on the vertical and horizontal coordinates of Figures 1 and 2, it should be possible to plot the location of different societies on the iso-power maps of Figures 1 and 2 and estimate elasticities of substitution between the concentration and distribution of power.

What Have We Learned?

I am forced to conclude that efforts to identify the political preconditions or conditions for economic development have not been as fruitful as I had hoped. The only empirical generalization that appears relatively secure is the apparent association between authoritarian political organization and rapid economic growth at the beginning of the development process for the presently developed countries. Reasonably firm evidence to support this view is found in both the economic development and political development literature. It also seems apparent, although the empirical basis for the generalization is less secure, that highly centralized political systems become an obstacle to economic growth as countries evolve toward middle income status. The economic and political crisis experienced by Germany, Italy, and Japan in the interwar period and by the USSR and the Eastern European centrally planned economies at the present are consistent with this generalization.

The policy implications of the authoritarian growth model seem far less secure than a generation ago. This is because of the internal stress that

authoritarian political systems undergo as they attempt to make the transitions to a polity in which political resources are more equitably distributed. Spain may be cited as a country in which this transition occurred while maintaining both political stability and rapid economic growth. But the number of examples are relatively few. Korea, Taiwan, and Chile will represent important test cases among the authoritarian economies. Poland will represent an important test case among the centrally planned economies. A central issue that will influence the success of the transformation will be whether it will be feasible to make the transition to a decentralized economic system without also making the transition to a political system in which there is a wider distribution of political resources.⁸⁰

What are the implications of these conclusions for scholarship in economic and political development--particularly for collaboration between scholars working in the fields of political and economic development? The last two decades have seen exceedingly fruitful collaboration between political scientists and economist in the modeling of economic and political activity and in sub-fields such as public choice. Common familiarity with the rational choice paradigm has provided the two disciplines with an increasingly common analytical language--shared even among those who disagree about the value of the paradigm. But as yet, there are few linguistic or analytical bridges between the subdisciplines of political and economic development.

What inferences should be drawn from this observation? One inference might be that economists should continue their search for the sources of economic development--measured in terms of the growth and distribution of income--without too much help from the field of political development.

Similarly, political scientists should continue their search for the sources of political development--measured in terms of the growth and distribution of power--without expecting too much help from the discipline of economics.

An even more pessimistic inference might be that both disciplines abandon their attempts to understand the processes of political and economic development and re-focus their attention, using the tools of rational and public choice, on the analysis and design of public policy. The daily lives of people in both the developing and developed countries, whether characterized by authoritarian or liberal polities or by market or centrally planned economies are conditioned by the policies being pursued by their governments. Whether a society is pursuing an import-substitution or an export-oriented trade policy has immediate implications for economic growth and the distribution of the dividends from economic growth.

I am, however, reluctant to come to either of these conclusions. While the cross elasticity between the growth of economic resources and political resources may be less elastic than Parson suggested, it is clearly very high. Economic resources are continuously translated into political resources and large political resources are employed by most societies to obtain greater access to economic resources. I am forced to conclude that scholars working in the field of economic and political development must begin to develop research agendas that will facilitate greater collaboration if they are to be successful at understanding the growth of either the economic or political resources available to a society.




FIGURE 1. The Taste and Capacity for Power




FIGURE 2. Alternative Political Development Paths

ENDNOTES

¹See, for example, Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), pp. 291-303; Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

²One of the great traditions in economic development is the quantitative analysis of structural transformation. The classical treatment is Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (London: MacMillan, 1st ed., 1940; 2nd ed., 1951; 3rd ed., 1957). Other major works in this tradition are Simon S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Simon S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Walter W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Angus Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

³Stage theories occupied a prominent place in the work of the German historical school. Marx employed a system of five stages. During the 1950s and 1960s the stage system proposed by Walt W. Rostow became both a permanent feature of the language of development and the subject of substantial professional debate. See Walt W. Rostow, "The Take-off Into Self-Sustained Growth," Economic Journal 66 (March 1956), pp. 25-48; The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

⁴Kuznets notes, for example, that ". . . clearly some minimum political stability is necessary if members of the economic society are to plan ahead and be assured of a relatively stable relation between their contribution to economic activity and their rewards. One could hardly expect much economic growth under conditions of turmoil, riots and unpredictable changes in regimes." Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 451. Other economists have noted that political instability and corruption may have a more negative impact on industrial development, which requires long-term investment in fixed capital than on commercial development where much of investment, in inventories for example, is short term.

⁵See Alexander Gerschenkron, Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 77-97 and 257-280. Also Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). Gerschenkron's views on the importance of strong central government were strongly influenced by his analysis of the failure of the government of Ernest von Koerber to sustain the program of internal economic development initiated during the first two years of his

tenure as Prime Minister of Austria (1900-1904). See An Economic Spurt That Failed: Four Lectures on Austrian History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

⁶Karl de Schweinitz, Industrialization and Democracy (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1964).

⁷de Schweinitz, Ibid., p. 277.

⁸Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 203.

⁹John R. Freeman, The Politics of Indebted Economic Growth (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1985).

¹⁰Rostow, 1956 and 1960.

¹¹Walt W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

¹²The major landmarks are Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973); Cynthia Taft Morris and Irma Adelman, Comparative Patterns of Economic Development, 1850-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

¹³Morris and Adelman, 1988, p. 211.

¹⁴Almond, Gabriel A., "Political Theory and Political Science," The American Political Science Review 60 (December, 1966): pp. 869-879; Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Macropolitical Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1973), pp. 1-113.

¹⁵Montgomery, John D. "The Quest for Political Development," Comparative Politics 1 (January 1969): p. 287.

¹⁶Ralph Braibanti (1969), "External Inducement of Political-Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy" in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press: 3-106. Cited p. 15. Title IX was introduced by Representative Donald M. Fraser (Minnesota) and co-sponsored by Representative Clement G. Zablocki (Wisconsin). Braibanti, in a burst of enthusiasm, characterized Title IX as "the most important element of doctrine in U.S. foreign assistance policy" (p. 13). It is somewhat surprising that the political development research agenda of the 1960s gave so little attention to lessons and attempts after World War II to redirect or "force" political development in Japan and Germany along democratic lines. See John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

¹⁷Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "Crisis and Sequence in Collective Theory Development," American Political Science Review 69 (September 1975), pp. 979-994, (p. 987). For a more detailed discussion of the methodological perspective that Holt and Turner brought to bear in their review, see Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "The Methodology of Comparative Research," (pp. 1-20), and Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," (pp. 21-24) in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (eds.), The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

¹⁸Eckstein, Harry, "The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency," World Politics 34 (July 1982): 451-486; Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Nonethnocentric Theory of Development: Alternative Concepts from the Third World" in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), New Directions in Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 127-150.

¹⁹Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) pp. 195-240.

²⁰Almond, 1966, p. 877.

²¹Lucian W. Pye has listed ten different approaches to the definition of political development: (1) Political development as the political prerequisite of economic development. (2) Political development as the politics of industrial societies. (3) Political development as political modernization. (4) Political development as the operation of a nation state. (5) Political development as administrative and legal development. (6) Political development as mass mobilization and participation. (7) Political development as the building of democracy. (8) Political development as stability and orderly change. (9) Political development is mobilization and power. See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 33-45. See also Howard J.

Wiarda (ed.), New Directions in Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1985).

²²Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America, pp. 195-240. The modernization "paradigm" that became the dominant organizing concept of both the scholars associated with the SSAC/CEP project and the wider community of scholars working in the field of comparative politics, drew very heavily on the work of the structural functionalist school in sociology, particularly the work of Talcott Parsons and his associates. The studies by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1958) was particularly influential. For a useful review of the sociological literature on modernization, see David Harrison, The Sociology of Modernization and Development (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987). Also Vernon W. Ruttan, "The Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment: Are There Lessons for Development Economists," (Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, August 1989, mimeo).

²³Huntington, Samuel P., "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 17 (April 1965): 386-430. Huntington identified four sets of terms or categories that were used to characterize political development: rationalization, national integration, democratization, participation, pp. 386-430.

²⁴Huntington, 1965, p. 393.

²⁵Huntington, 1965, p. 412.

²⁶Eckstein, 1982, pp. 467,468.

²⁷Eckstein, 1982, p. 470. For an alternative approach to stage theories in political development, see Stein Rokken, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building," in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: D. Von Nostrand, 1966), pp. 39-50.

²⁸Eckstein, 1982, p. 476.

²⁹The perspective that was widely prevalent in the 1960s has been aptly summarized: "Modernization poses . . . three major challenges to political systems. In the first phase, the need exists to break down traditional institutions and practices and to inaugurate modernizing reforms designed to rationalize and secularize the systems of authority, to develop and efficient

bureaucracy and military force, to equalize the relations of citizens to government, and to extend the effective reach of the state. Achieving these modernizing reforms usually requires the centralization of power One can think of political modernization as involving successively the concentration, expansion, and dispersal of power." Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development" 1973, p. 53. For a stronger statement, in a memorandum attributed to James Eichelberger in the context of political advice to the Government of Egypt, see "Power Problems of a Revolutionary Government" in Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), pp. 71-75. For a vigorous defense of political development scholarship against the charge of ethnocentrism and ideological bias, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Development of Political Development" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), pp. 437-490.

³⁰See particularly Paul A. Baran, "The Political Economy of Backwardness," Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies 20 (January 1952), pp. 66-84 and The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly Review 18 (September 1966), pp. 17-31 and Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967. For a fuller discussion of the intellectual sources of the dependency perspective see Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 34-39. For a review of the attack by the dependency and related underdevelopment and world systems schools on the modernization paradigm, see David Harrison, The Sociology of Modernization and Development (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 62-148.

³¹One response to the lack of congruence between the theory and economic history was to argue that dependency theory was intended to connote a general "frame" rather than a precise "data container" and hence, cannot be subject to the normal empirical tests. See Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependence Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument," International Organization (Winter 1978), pp. 51-78. For several attempts to test dependence theory against historical experience, see the several papers in Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

³²Eckstein, 1982, p. 468.

³³It is rather remarkable that in Deyo (ed), The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialization, the index does not carry a single reference to the work of Frank.

³⁴Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Macropolitical Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1973) p. 59.

³⁵"For all the theorists we have encountered, the state ultimately stands in the service of the economy." Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 146.

³⁶Quoted from Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 10.

³⁷For a more detailed summary of the results of the early quantitative studies, see Huntington and Domínguez, "Political Development," pp. 59-66.

³⁸Robert M. Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in Latecomer Developing Nations" Comparative Social Research 2 (1979), pp. 215-248.

³⁹Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development," p. 244.

⁴⁰Abbas Pourgerami, "The Political Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth Hypothesis" Public Choice 58 (1988), pp. 123-141. Pourgerami would seem to be going beyond his data, however, when he argues that his results imply a rejection of any trade-off between political democracy and economic growth.

⁴¹"The rulers of developing countries are discovering very rapidly that the development they seek to promote tends to undermine the rule they wield." Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Development and Objectives of Modern Government" in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 133.

⁴²Holt, Robert T. and John E. Turner, The Political Bases of Economic Development in Comparative Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: D. Von Nostrand, 1966).

⁴³Holt and Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development, p. 5.

⁴⁴Vernon W. Ruttan, "Cultural Endowment and Economic Development: What Can We Learn from Anthropology," Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (April 1988), pp. 265, 266.

⁴⁵Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 22.

⁴⁶Vincent Ostrom, "The American Experiment in Constitutional Choice," Public Choice 27 (Fall 1976), pp. 1-12; William Riker, "Comments on Vincent Ostrom's Paper." Public Choice 27 (Fall 1976), pp. 13-15; Vincent Ostrom, "Response to William Riker's Comments," Public Choice 27 (Fall 1976), pp. 16-19.

⁴⁷The impact of enlightenment political thought was tempered by American political practice. Alex de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966 [1835]), noted that "The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people came out of the townships and took possession of the state . . . the township was organized before the county, the county before the state, and the state before the nation" (p. 59).

⁴⁸See Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). There was an apparent decline of interest in the political culture research agenda for about a decade following the critical review by Holt and Turner of the research program of the Committee on Comparative Politics. In his criticism of the critics, Pye notes that most scholars of comparative politics have not been attracted by "convoluted ways of elucidating the obvious by mathematical formulas," Asian Power and Politics, p. 10. It is hard to avoid the inference that the leaders of the SSRC/CCP school of political development and their critics were unable to join issues because of fundamental disagreement about how to advance knowledge in political science.

⁴⁹Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 26.

⁵⁰Harald D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) p. xiv. Lasswell and Kaplan distinguish between (a) political science--the study of the shaping and sharing of power; and (b) political doctrine--the justification of existing or proposed political structure; (c) political philosophy--the logical analysis of political science and doctrine; (d) political theory--which includes political science, doctrine, and philosophy (p. xi).

⁵¹Lucian W. Pye (with Mary W. Pye), Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

⁵²Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2 (July 1957), pp. 202, 203. This perspective was shared by both the "power structure" or "elitist" school associated with C. Wright Mills and the "empirical" or "pluralism" schools. For the distinctions between the two schools, see Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," Journal of Politics 22 (August 1960), pp. 478-484.

⁵³The suppression of conflict as an aspect of power is emphasized by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962), pp. 942-952. The exercise of power to influence the "objective interest" rather than the perceived interest of an agent has been emphasized by Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan, 1974), pp. 22-23. These several extensions have been reviewed and criticized by Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique," Polity 20(1987), pp. 4-31; also Jeffrey C. Isaac, Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁵⁴Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Power," Journal of Politics 15:4 (November 1953), pp. 500-516. Also Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2 (July 1957), pp. 201-215. For discussion of the role of power in economic analysis, see the papers in the book of readings by K. W. Rothschild, Power in Economics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971). See particularly the paper by J. C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two Person Bargaining Games" Behavioral Science 7 (January 1962), pp. 67-80 (also in Rothschild, pp. 77-96). Also Pinhas Zusman, "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review 17 (June 1976), pp. 447-461. I have not found the limited literature on the role of power in economics particularly helpful. Mainstream economics has generally taken the power system as either appropriate or institutionally sanctioned. In the neoclassical model homogenous units--firms and households--try to improve their lot within the constraints of existing technological and market conditions. Nor have attempts to recast the analysis of individual and group behavior in a broader rational choice perspective given explicit attention to the role of power. The dominant framework for policy analysis treats policy makers as intervening to maximize a "social welfare function." Attempts to build endogenous policy models have generally assumed that the costs and benefits to the participants' efforts to change the distribution of resources and the partitioning of income streams could be evaluated in terms of economic outcomes.

⁵⁵Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique." "The behaviorist foundations constrained (the instrumentalists) from conceiving power as anything more than a behavioral regularity and prevented them from seeing it as an enduring capacity (p. 19). In the realist view, social science would be...concerned with the construction of models of the social world and its lawful structure. The primary object of theoretical analysis would not be behavioral regularities but the enduring social relations that structure them" (p. 18).

⁵⁶Isaac, "Beyond the Three Faces of Power," p. 24.

⁵⁷Isaac, p. 23. See also Terrence Ball, "Power, Causation, and Explanation," Polity 8 (Winter 1975), pp. 189-214. Ball insists that power is traceable not to some (set of) antecedent events, but is better described in terms of . . . capacity." (p. 210) Thus we can speak of "the President's power to veto legislation and the Senate's power to pass legislation over a Presidential veto. This does not readily translate into the President's power over the Senate or its power over him." (p. 210)

⁵⁸Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power" Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society (June 1963), pp. 232-262. Reprinted in Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969). Also in Steven Lukes, Power (New York: New York University Press, 1985), pp. 94-143.

⁵⁹Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," p. 96. A similar view has been expressed by J. C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," Behavioral Science 7 (January 1962), pp. 67-90. "The common-sense notion of social power makes it an ability to achieve certain things--an ability that the person concerned is free to use or to leave unused. It seems to me that this notion of power is better captured by our concept of power in a schedule sense than it is by the concept of power in a point sense" (p. 73).

⁶⁰Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," p. 118.

⁶¹Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Florida: Harcourt Brace, 1969). Reprinted in Steven Lukes (ed.) Power (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 62.

⁶²Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 197.

⁶³Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 283.

⁶⁴Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," p. 130.

⁶⁵Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," pp. 122-125.

⁶⁶Montgomery argues that political scientists have traditionally been more interested in the distribution than in the growth of political power. In commenting on the literature on political development he notes that "it is surprising for political scientists, whose traditional concern in the liberal West has been the distribution or counter-balancing of power, to concentrate on the accumulations of power" (Montgomery, 1969, p. 290).

⁶⁷"Social mobilization and political participation are rapidly increasing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These processes, in turn, are directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these areas." Huntington, 1965, p. 405.

⁶⁸Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

⁶⁹Cynthia Taft Morris, "Politics and Economic Development in Land-Abundant Countries in the Nineteenth Century" (Department of Economics, Smith College, 1988, mimeo).

⁷⁰Leonard Binder, "The Natural History of Development Theory," Comparative Studies in Society and History 28 (January 1986), pp. 3-33.

⁷¹Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," The Natural Interest (Summer 1989), p. 1.

⁷²John R. Freeman, Democracy and Markets: The Politics of Mixed Economies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁷³In this paper I do not attempt to explore the cultural endowments or historical experiences that may induce a society to follow particular path of political development. See however, Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami, "Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation" Journal of Development Studies 20 (July 1984), pp. 203-223; Vernon W. Ruttan, "Cultural Endowments and Economic Development: What Can We Learn from Anthropology" Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (April 1988), pp. 5247-5272.

⁷⁴Simon "Notes on the Observation and Monument of Power".

⁷⁵Polsby, "How to Study Community Power."

⁷⁶Huntington, 1965, p. 412.

⁷⁷See particularly Peter Flora and Jens Alber, "Modernization and Development of the Welfare State in Western Europe," in Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 37-80.

⁷⁸Morris and Adelman, Comparative Patterns of Economic Development, 1900-1914.

⁷⁹This point has been made with respect to individual power by J. C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two Person Bargaining Games" Behavioral Science 7 (January 1962), pp. 67-80. "Power in a schedule sense can be regarded as a production function describing how a given individual can 'transform' different amounts of his resources into social power of various dimensions." (p. 73)

⁸⁰There is substantial historical literature on (a) the transformation from feudalism to capitalism and (b) the transformation from authoritarian rule. See for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). It is tempting to anticipate that the next decade will give rise to substantial literature on the transition from authoritarian socialism.

