

What Is Happening out There?

The Representation of Perception in Daniel Defoe's Fictional Autobiographies*

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0. Introduction

Many literary critics have explored consciousness representation as an important literary practice in the novel. According to the narratologist Franz Stanzel, for example, representation of consciousness is “especially prominent in the novel”, although it has been involved in all literary genres (1984: 126-127). David Lodge, who is a literary critic as well as a novelist, regards literature as “the richest and most comprehensive” “record of human consciousness” (2002: 10), and says that the novel in particular can “[capture] the dense specificity of personal experience” (2002: 14). This characteristic of the novel is applied to the early novels in the eighteenth century, as Joe Bray clearly states that “From its *beginnings*, the novel has been associated with some kind of an attempt to render individual psychology, to delve into the minds of its characters” (2003: 1, my italics). This paper examines how consciousness is represented in the pioneering novels of Daniel Defoe.

Free indirect style has been of particular importance to the interpretation of fictional consciousness. Although this style does not seem to have come to its “final ripening” (Bakhtin 1984: 36) in the early eighteenth century, Defoe represents the consciousness of his characters by using varying free indirect modes in his first-person autobiographical narratives. Contrary to Monika Fludernik’s (1996: 171) claim that Defoe’s free indirect style “only represents *utterances*” (i.e. free indirect *speech*), I have pointed out in my articles that Defoe uses free indirect *thought* to represent the consciousness of his characters (Shigematsu 2015; 2016a). Defoe’s narrative techniques for representing consciousness are not limited to the use of free indirect speech and thought, however. What should not be disregarded in the analyses of fictional consciousness is, in Shigeyuki Kuroda’s words, “the problem of levels of consciousness” (1976: 123). Ann Banfield argues that “sentences representing consciousness” include sentences which represent not

* This paper is based on the proceedings of Kyoto Postgraduate Conference on English Historical Linguistics held at Kyoto University, 6-7 August 2016.

only “thought” but also “sense perceptions” (1981: 65). I call the inward consciousness such as thought and belief the conceptual level of consciousness, and the outward consciousness like sensory perception the perceptual level of consciousness. With due attention to the relatively unexplored perceptual level of consciousness, this paper suggests that there is another important narrative technique for representing fictional consciousness in Defoe’s first-person narratives. Termed *narrated perception*, this technique renders a character’s sensory perceptions of the external world as if they were directly experienced by that character. Narrated perception has received specific attention from some critics as having characteristic features in formal, functional and semantic terms, and in general, it is examined in the third-person narrative context (Brinton 1980; Fehr 1938; Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012).

As a case study, this paper focuses on some scenes in which the internal and external worlds of a character are blended in Defoe’s first-person autobiographical narratives. It will demonstrate that “I” as a narrator (the narrating self) can *relive* his or her past experiences by representing not only conceptual but also perceptual levels of consciousness of “I” as a character (the experiencing self), and that this in turn enhances the effect of what Stanzel (1984) calls “the illusion of immediacy” in the mind of the reader. Section 1 demonstrates the ways in which point of view shifts in first-person autobiographical narratives. Section 2 explores the narrative techniques for representing consciousness when the narrating self psychologically identifies with the experiencing self, focusing on the different levels (perceptual and conceptual) of consciousness. Section 3 illustrates the effect of using narrated perception and other related techniques in representing the consciousness of the experiencing self. Finally, the concluding section suggests that the representation of immediate perceptions of the experiencing self may be more significant for the narrating self’s reliving of its past experiences than that of immediate thoughts.

1. Shift in point of view in first-person autobiographical narratives

1.1. Narrative distance between the two selves

In first-person autobiographical narratives, narrator and character (hero/heroine) are the same person and they are conventionally referred to by the same pronoun “I”. These two I’s, that is, “I” as narrator and “I” as character, are termed “the narrating self” and “the

experiencing self” respectively in narratology.¹ Although these two selves are the same person, they are different phases of the self and thus do not share the same place, time and knowledge (Galbraith 1994: 125). In this sense, as Cohn argues, “a first-person narrator’s relationship to [his/her] past self parallels a narrator’s relationship to [his/her] protagonist in a third person novel” (1978: 143). The first-person and third-person narrative styles, however, are crucially different from each other in terms of the ontological relationship between narrator and character. In the case of third-person narratives, a narrator is “absent from the story [he/she] tells”, that is, he/she is ontologically outside the storyworld, whereas a narrator is always “present as a character in the story [he/she] tells” in first-person narratives (Genette 1980: 243-245).² Therefore, the relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self “imitates the temporal continuity of real beings, an existential relationship that differs substantially from the purely functional relationship that binds a narrator to [his/her] protagonist in third-person fiction” (Cohn 1978: 144).

Point of view usually shifts gradually in narratives. In first-person autobiographical narratives, point of view shifts between the narrating self and the experiencing self. As Stanzel points out, this shift in point of view between the two selves is “very important for the dynamics of the narrative in the first-person novel” (1984: 72). The shift in point of view is perceived from the change in narrative distance. Narrative distance includes psychological distance as well as spatio-temporal distance between the two selves. When the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, the narrative distance between the two selves is diminished, and this process is reflected in the mode of consciousness representation, which will be discussed in terms of what Chantelle Warner calls “our natural REMEMBERING schema” (2009: 16) in the following section.

1.2. REMEMBERING schemas: RECOUNTING and RELIVING

Retrospection is essential in autobiographical narratives. The better-informed narrating self remembers its past experiences in order to tell a story. According to Warner (2009),

¹ See, for example, Cohn (1978), Fludernik (2009), Galbraith (1994) and Stanzel (1984).

² In Genette’s terminology, therefore, a third-person narrative is called “heterodiegetic” and a first-person narrative “homodiegetic” (1980: 244-245). A first-person autobiographical narrative, in which a narrator and a hero/heroine of the story are the same person, is termed “autodiegetic” (1980: 245).

our natural story-telling schema of REMEMBERING can be divided into two distinctive types. When the narrating self detaches itself from the experiencing self and describes the past experiences with its language, the presence of the narrating self is foregrounded and the consciousness of the experiencing self is reported through the language of the narrating self. In other words, the narrating self *recounts* what it remembers from its own perspective. Warner calls this schema “REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING” (2009: 17). On the other hand, when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, and psychologically identifies with the experiencing self, the presence of the narrating self is backgrounded and the representation of past consciousness is filtered through the experiencing self. In Warner’s terminology, this schema is called “REMEMBERING AS RELIVING” (2009: 17), in which the narrating self *relives* the experiences it remembers through the consciousness of the experiencing self.

In RECOUNTING, the narrative distance between the two selves is widened and consciousness is represented indirectly or mediately through the point of view of the narrating self, whereas in RELIVING, the distance is shortened and consciousness is directly or immediately represented through the point of view of the experiencing self. The shift in point of view between the two selves parallels the transition in the REMEMBERING schema, narrative distance and mode of consciousness representation as Figure 1 shows:

<i>Point of view</i>	the narrating self	the experiencing self
<i>REMEMBERING schema</i>	RECOUNTING	RELIVING
<i>Narrative distance</i>	dissociation	identification
<i>Mode of consciousness representation</i>	indirect (mediate)	direct (immediate)

Figure 1. Shift in point of view in first-person narratives³

As mentioned earlier, shift in point of view is always gradual, and there are various transitional phases between RECOUNTING and RELIVING. The following sections focus on the transitional phases from RECOUNTING to RELIVING, and examine the ways in which this transition happens when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self.

³ Cf. Nakao (2016: 4).

2. RELIVING and representation of consciousness

2.1. Illusion of immediacy

What happens when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, or when the story-telling schema changes from RECOUNTING to RELIVING? When gradually identifying with the experiencing self, the narrating self re-experiences the past events. This reliving of experiences evokes psychological attachment to the past self on the part of the narrating self. What is important during this process is that the reader also feels as if he/she directly looks into the consciousness of the experiencing self and pseudo-experiences the events in the storyworld. Stanzel (1984) calls this effect “the illusion of immediacy”. The reader does not feel the presence of the narrating self, and the sense of mediacy – that is, the presence of the narrator as mediator – is suspended when the narrating self is reliving its past experiences. In other words, the narrating self’s reliving of experiences can be perceived by the reader through the illusion of immediacy (Nakao 2016: 3-4).

2.2. Levels of consciousness: free indirect thought and narrated perception

The narrative technique which has been considered of great importance in creating the illusion of immediacy is free indirect thought (FIT). FIT is used to represent thoughts of the experiencing self which may be on the “threshold of verbalization” (Cohn 1978: 103). Although many critics have pointed out that FIT can be found in first-person narratives, FIT tends to be examined in the third-person narrative context. FIT is generally considered to be a mixture of indirect thought (example (1), the original sentence from *Robinson Crusoe*) and direct thought (example (2), my adapted version of (1)). In FIT, person and tense are typically selected from the point of view of the narrating self as in indirect thought, but the expressive language of the experiencing self remains as in direct thought (example (3), my adapted version of (1)).

(1) I consider’d also that I could by no Means tell for certain where I had trod, and where I had not; (*Robinson Crusoe*: 134)

(2) I thought, “I can’t possibly tell for sure where I walked, and where I didn’t!”

(3) I couldn’t possibly tell for sure where I had walked, and where I had not!

When it comes to content of consciousness, however, the narrating self can represent at least two levels of consciousness. On the one hand, the narrating self can represent

internal thoughts and beliefs which are formed in the mind of the experiencing self. On the other hand, the narrating self can also represent sense perceptions of the external world which the experiencing self undergoes. It is not possible to clearly demarcate these two levels of consciousness, because their relationship is continuous and there are some overlapping areas between perception and conception.⁴ In the reliving of experiences, therefore, the narrating self uses not only FIT, but also a narrative technique called “narrated perception”⁵ to represent sense perceptions as if they were immediately perceived by the experiencing self. As pointed out by Brinton, these two techniques are the “complementary parts of one coherent style” (1980: 363) used to represent the immediate consciousness of the experiencing self in a text.

Due to the formal similarities between FIT and narrated perception, some critics who do not delve into “the range and depth of a character’s consciousness” (Brinton 1980: 364) tend to confuse narrated perception with FIT or examine narrated perception as a mere aspect of FIT.⁶ Following other critics, however, I will give particular attention to narrated perception as having distinctive features in formal, functional and semantic terms.⁷ Formally, narrated perception and FIT share some features such as the subjective use of the past progressive, proximal deictics and evaluative and epistemic expressions, but unlike FIT, parentheticals, questions and exclamations are rare in narrated perception (Brinton 1980; Pallarés-García 2012). In terms of narrative function, narrated perception can represent a character’s immediate consciousness and at the same time describe events in the external world, whereas FIT can only represent the consciousness of characters (Pallarés-García 2012: 175). Semantically, as Pallarés-García (2012: 175) explains, narrated perception captures what Chafe (1994: 32, 195-211) calls “extroverted

⁴ See Yoro (2005: 120-123) and Fludernik (2009: 82-83). Fludernik argues that there is a need for “an alternative sliding scale” which is different from “the formal scale from narratorial language to characters’ internal discourse” of thought representation when considering the content of consciousness, because these two sliding scales do not completely agree with each other (2009: 82-83).

⁵ It has also been called “substitutionary perception” (Fher 1938; Hernadi 1972; McHale 1978), “represented perception” (Banfield 1982; Brinton 1980; Rundquist 2014), or “free indirect perception” (Chatman 1978; Palmer 2004; Schmid 2010). Following other critics (Cohn 1978; Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012), I use the term “narrated perception” in this paper, because, as Pallarés-García (2012: 184) argues, it implies the close relationship between narration and perception, which is what makes narrated perception different from FIT.

⁶ See, for example, Chatman (1978), Ikeo (2007), Leech & Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), Pascal (1977), and Semino & Short (2004).

⁷ See, for example, Brinton (1980), Fehr (1938), Fludernik (1993), and Pallarés-García (2012).

consciousness” or “immediate” conscious experiences, and on the other hand, FIT can also portray “introverted consciousness” or “displaced” conscious experiences. In other words, narrated perception is a narrative technique which “essentially portrays what is happening in the immediate environment of a character, as well as his/her awareness of ongoing bodily sensations and mental states” (Pallarés-García 2012: 175). FIT in contrast can “represent a wider range of cognitive processes, not necessarily stemming from the character’s direct sensory experience of his/her physical reality” (Pallarés-García 2012: 175). Although they have these formal, functional and semantic differences, both narrated perception and FIT are important narrative techniques for representing consciousness in the process of the narrating self’s reliving of experiences. As with the conceptual level of consciousness (principally thought representation), the perceptual level of consciousness can be represented in various ways according to the narrative distance between the two selves:

(4) ... when I came nearer to him, I saw something hanging over his Shoulders ...
(*Robinson Crusoe*: 24)

(5) I come nearer to him. Something is hanging over his shoulders.

(6) I came nearer to him. Something was hanging over his shoulders.

Perception can be reported from the point of view of the narrating self as in (4). Perception is by nature non-verbal, so direct replication of perception in the form of direct discourse such as direct thought is not plausible (Fehr 1938: 102). However, the so-called dramatic present as in my adapted sentence (5), for example, can be explained in terms of the reliving of past experiences through the immediate perception of the experiencing self.

Narrated perception is usually introduced by narration or report of a preceding perception, which is called a “perception indicator” or “window opener” (Fehr 1938: 98-99). In my adapted sentence (6), “I came nearer to him” is a perception indicator, and it implies that the following sentence, “something was hanging over his shoulders”, represents the immediate perception of the experiencing self. The use of the past progressive (“was hanging”) in this sentence signifies ongoing perceptions of the experiencing self, so it is one of the most important linguistic markers of narrated perception. The next section looks into other linguistic markers of narrated perception and their effects in Defoe’s narratives.

3. Narrated perception in Defoe's narratives

This section looks closely into narrated perception in Defoe's narratives. Even Monika Fludernik (1996), who goes back to the medieval period to explore the use of free indirect style, states that Defoe's free indirect style is limited to the rendering of utterances:

Not only are these novels [novels of Godwin, Brown and Richardson] important in the history of free indirect discourse, providing the first instances of FID for the representation of consciousness *in a first-person context* (Behn's examples of FID are all in third-person passages, and Defoe's first-person FID only represents *utterances*); they also initiate a development of poetic sensibility in the history of the novel which attains its appropriate perfection in Austen and Scott.

(Fludernik 1996: 171)

However, as Mikhail Bakhtin suggests, new narrative techniques "prepare themselves slowly, over centuries" and "a given epoch can do more than create optimal conditions for the final ripening and realization of a new form" (1984: 36). Contrary to Fludernik's claim, FIT is used to represent consciousness in Defoe's narratives, and so is narrated perception, although they are not always indicated by clear linguistic markers as in the novels in the later periods. In the following analyses, I will investigate the pioneering use of narrated perception in Defoe's narratives, and demonstrate that representation of immediate perceptions also contributes to creating the illusion of immediacy in the mind of the reader.

The following example is from *Moll Flanders*, in which Moll's first adventure as a thief is described. The narrating self blames her wrongdoing on the Devil, because she was not conscious of what she was doing back then. But the ways in which the experiencing self reacts to the bait which the Devil laid, or in other words, her *conscious* perceptions, are represented in the passage in detail:

(7) I am very sure I had no manner of Design in my Head, when I went out, I neither knew or considered where to go, or on what Business; but as the Devil carried me out and laid his Bait for me, so he brought me to be sure to the place, for I knew not whither I was going or what I did.

Wandering thus about I knew not whither, I pass'd by an Apothecary's Shop in *Leadenhall-street*, where I saw Iye on a Stool just before the Counter a little Bundle wrapt in a white Cloth; beyond it, stood a Maid Servant with her Back to it, looking up towards the top of the Shop, where the Apothecary's Apprentice,

as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter, with his Back also to the Door, and a Candle in his Hand, looking and reaching up to the upper Shelf for something he wanted, so that both were engag'd mighty earnestly, and no Body else was in the Shop. (*Moll Flanders*: 160)

The participle construction in the second paragraph includes the word “thus”, which implies that the narrating self still emphasizes that she was induced to steal. The present participle “wandering” implies that the younger Moll is walking without any purpose, without knowing where she is going. However, in the following main clause, the experiencing self’s apparent perceptions of her whereabouts are indicated. Her action “I passed by” means that the experiencing self sees the shop and recognizes that she is passing by it. She perceives, probably visually, what kind of shop it is and which street it is located in (“an Apothecary’s Shop in *Leadenhall-street*”). In the next relative clause, her visual perception is explicitly reported with the perception verb “saw”. This clause functions as perception indicator, and thus the following clauses are likely to be narrated perception rather than pure narration.

The preposition “beyond” clearly represents the visual perception of the experiencing self. It indicates that she moves her eyes from the bundle to the maid. The word order is inverted in the clause beginning with “beyond”. According to Fludernik, “the order of perception may be mirrored iconically by the word order” (1993: 305). Here, the younger Moll moves her eyes from the bundle, sees someone standing, recognizes that it is a maid servant, that the bundle is behind her, and that she is looking up, and so forth. The word “something” signifies the experiencing self’s inability to name what she is seeing (Fludernik 1993: 306). The use of the past progressive and epistemic words, such as “mighty earnestly”, also indicates the ongoing or evaluative perceptions of the experiencing self. They all convey a sense of subjective consciousness of the past self.⁸

Such a passage that represents immediate perceptions has the effect of undermining the narrating self’s claim that the past self was not aware of the circumstances of the theft. The vivid representations of immediate perceptions of the experiencing self evoke RELIVING schema and imply that the narrating self is entering into the past consciousness and reliving her sensory experiences as they were experienced before. The reader thus also feels as if he/she were looking at the bundle as perceived by Moll in the

⁸ See Shigematsu (2016b: 28-29) for more detailed explanation of this passage regarding the function of narrated perception.

storyworld.⁹

The following passage from *Robinson Crusoe* shows the effective use of mediate perceptions (report of perception) and immediate perceptions (narrated perception) of the experiencing self. Put differently, the narrating self effectively switches the REMEMBERING schemas between RECOUNTING and RELIVING. Crusoe is observing the cruel ritual of the savages from a place where he cannot be found by them:

(8) ... here [the Top of the Hill] I ovserv'd by the help of my Perspective Glass, that they were no less than Thirty in Number, that they had a Fire kindled, that they had had Meat dress'd. How they had cook'd it, that I knew not, or what it was; but they were all Dancing in I know not how many barbarous Gestures and Figures, their own Way, round the Fire.

While I was thus looking on them, I perceived by my Perspective, two miserable Wretches dragg'd from the Boats, where it seems they were laid by, and were now brought out for the Slaughter. I perceived one of them immediately fell, being knock'd down, I suppose with a Club or Wooden Sword, for that was their way, and two or three others were at work immediately cutting him open for their Cookery, while the other Victim was left standing by himself, till they should be ready for him. In that very Moment, this poor Wretch seeing himself a little at Liberty, Nature inspir'd him with Hopes of Life, and he started away from them, and ran with incredible Swiftnes along the Sands directly towards me, I mean towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation was. (*Robinson Crusoe*: 170)

In the first paragraph in (8), it is explicitly reported that the younger Crusoe is observing what the savages do (“here I ovserv'd by the help of my Perspective Glass, that they were no less than Thirty in Number, ...”). Note, however that the place where he hides is referred to as “here” at the beginning of the paragraph. It reflects the point of view of the experiencing self, and implies that the narrating self is gradually entering into the consciousness of the experiencing self. The report of perception and the use of the proximal deictic “here” indicate that the next sentence represents the ongoing perceptions of the experiencing self. In the next sentence, what he could not see is topicalized to stress his inability to see and understand everything (“How they had cook'd it, that I knew not”),

⁹ Note, however, that the narrating self appears in the passage in the parenthetical clause “as I suppose”. The reliving of experiences or the illusion of immediacy seems to be temporarily suspended by the use of this parenthetical, but in terms of RELIVING schema of first-person autobiographical narratives, this existential relationship or the temporal continuity between the two selves shown by the use of the present tense is important to make the narrating self's reliving more plausible and natural. See the related explanations in the analyses below, in which I suggest the effect of the use of the present tense in (8) and (9).

and his ongoing perception is represented through the past progressive (“they were all Dancing”). When mentioning his inability to understand the second time, the narrating self uses the present tense “know”, which reflects the fact that the older Crusoe still cannot understand the ways in which the savages danced. It is the privileged ability of the narrating self to freely “slide up and down the time axis that connects [his/her] two selves” as the relationship between the two selves imitates the continuity of a real being (Cohn 1978: 145). The temporal shift is thus regarded as “one of the most common deictic shifts” in first-person autobiographical narratives (Warner 2009: 15): the narrating self can naturally move between the present and the past when telling a story. In other words, as the REMEMBERING schema evokes “seemingly unmediated access to past experiences”, “the use of the present tense” is generally perceived as “*natural*” in autobiographical narratives (Warner 2009: 16). It is this natural existential relationship and internal tension between the two selves that make the reliving of experiences possible in the autobiographical narrative style.

In the first sentence in the second paragraph, the perceptions of the experiencing self are again reported from the point of view of the narrating self, but at the same time, the point of view of the experiencing self is mingled with it, which is indicated by the use of the past progressive (“While I was thus looking on them”) and the proximal deictic “now” (“[they] were now brought out for the Slaughter”). The narrating self uses the epistemic verb “seem” in the present tense (“where it seems they were laid by”). This haziness of memory on the part of the narrating self indicates that he is entering more deeply into the past memory. In the following sentence, the narrating self continues to report his past perceptions, and as in the previous report, the point of view of the experiencing self is reflected in the use of the *-ing* form (“being knock’d down”). The phrase “two or three” also reflects the haziness of past perceptions. The parenthetical clause, “I suppose with a Club or Wooden Sword”, is expressed in the present tense, and thus represents the consciousness which is continually in the mind of the older self. In the last sentence, the prepositional phrase “in that very moment” functions as perception indicator, and the subsequent main clause represents the immediate perceptions of the experiencing self, which is indicated by the use of deictic or evaluative words, such as “this poor” and “incredible”. The prepositional phrase “towards me” also reflects the deictic centre of the experiencing self, because the narrating self rephrases it to make it clear which direction

the poor wretch is moving in (“I mean towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation was”). The clause, “Nature inspir’d him with Hopes of Life”, is a representation of thought, which is inserted in narrated perception. This simultaneous representation of perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness promotes the effect of the reliving of experiences and the illusion of immediacy.

In the following passage from *Roxana*, the immediate perceptions of the experiencing self lead to her thought. After she parted with the French Prince, Roxana decided to sell the jewels which her late husband left for her to a jeweler through a Dutch merchant. As she refers to it as “my Folly” (112), this attempt puts her into considerable fright:

(9) As soon as the *Jew* saw the Jewels, he falls a jabbering in *Dutch*, or *Portuguese*, to the Merchant, and I cou’d presently perceive that they were in some great Surprize, both of them; the *Jew* held up his Hands, look’d at me with some Horrour, then talk’d *Dutch* again, and put himself into a thousand Shapes, twisting his Body, and wringing up his Face this Way, and that Way, in his Discourse; stamping with his Feet, and throwing abroad his Hands, as if he was not in a Rage only, but in a meer Fury; then he wou’d turn, and give a Look at me, like the Devil; I thought I never saw any thing so frightful in my Life.

(*Roxana*: 112-113)

In the first sentence, the perceptions of the experiencing self are reported (“As soon as the *Jew* saw the Jewels” and “I cou’d presently perceive that ...”). Though they are a report of perception, the point of view of the past self is mingled with it. For example, the use of the present tense “falls”, rather than the past tense “fell”, implies a vivid recollection of the *Jew*’s action on the part of the experiencing self. The expression “*Dutch*, or *Portuguese*” represents the experiencing self’s unclear recognition of the language spoken at this moment. The use of epistemic “some” and the extraposed “both of them” also reflect the consciousness of the past self. These reports of perception function as perception indicators, and thus the subsequent clauses represent the immediate consciousness of the experiencing self. She can clearly recognize what language the *Jew* speaks now (“then talk’d *Dutch* again”). The repetition of the *-ing* form (“twisting”, “wringing”, “stamping”, and “throwing”) has a similar effect of representing ongoing perceptions to the past progressive. Similes with “as if” and “like”, according to Brinton (1980: 377), are also markers of reflective perceptions. These linguistic markers embody the auditory and visual fright of the experiencing self.

In the last sentence, perceptions of the experiencing self lead to her thought, which is introduced by the reporting clause, “I thought”. It may look like indirect thought, but the past tense “saw” is not back-shifted, so the reported clause is represented from the deictic centre of the experiencing self, that is, this is the immediate thought of the experiencing self. The reporting clause (“I thought”) not only indicates that the representation shifts to the conceptual level, but also that the presence of the narrating self becomes less backgrounded, which indicates that the narrating self is existentially related to the experiencing self. The use of a reporting clause might create the appearance that the narrating self interferes with the reliving of experiences, but it actually helps to signify the internal tension between the two selves. This is what makes first-person narratives different from third-person narratives. The existential continuity between the two selves is one of the important conditions of RELIVING.

4. Summary

As the analyses have shown, the reliving of experiences and the illusion of immediacy are achieved by representing immediate perceptions as well as immediate thoughts of the experiencing self. Although it had not fully matured in the early-eighteenth century, the pioneering use of narrated perception is one of the important narrative techniques for representing immediate consciousness of the experiencing self in Defoe’s first-person autobiographical narratives. It is also possible to suggest that the use of narrated perception has more significant semantic effect on RELIVING than FIT does, because with the representation of immediate perceptions, the reader can virtually experience what the character actually experienced not only through his/her mind but also through his/her bodily senses. As for the representation of perception in the novel, more investigation into other modes (e.g. report of perception) than narrated perception is required to deepen the understanding of the fictional consciousness.

Texts

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