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What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline *and* Mutation

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We make a three-fold contribution to research on the European radical left. First, we will offer a clear and comprehensive definition of the term 'radical left'. Second, we will look at the main developments within the European radical left as a *whole*, and not just at one sub-set of political parties. Third, we will take a *pan-European* perspective, focusing on both Eastern and Western Europe. The radical left in Europe post-1989 is *both* in decline *and* in mutation. Decline is evident in both the marginalization and moderation of Communist organizations (notably parties), a direct result of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the fissiparous nature of many radical left groupings. But the end of the USSR has also given space for mutation, that is, the emergence of a New Radical Left employing 'new' ideological approaches (principally 'social-populism') and modern forms of trans-national cooperation (particularly through the European Parliament and the 'anti-globalization' movement). This mutation indicates future potential, however unrealized so far.

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Introduction

Since the fall of the so-called 'really existing socialist' regimes in the Soviet Bloc in 1989–91, the focus of most scholars of political extremism has shifted to the right of the political spectrum.¹ As the Soviet *Heilstaat* was dead, the general assumption was that the radical left in general, and communism in particular, had accompanied it into the 'dustbin of history'.

This has been reflected in research on the Left in both parts of Europe. Whereas the transition of the former Communist ruling parties into 'successor parties' has received ample attention, most studies have focused on those that have undergone full or partial social-democratization (e.g. Ishiyama, 1999; Racz and Bukowski, 1999; Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002). Studies of the 'radical left' in Eastern Europe have focused primarily on the orthodox Communists in a single country (e.g. Handl, 2002; March, 2002; Curry and Urban, 2003). Similarly, very few works since David Bell's early study have analysed the post-communist fate of Western European communist parties (Bell, 1993; Moreau *et al.*, 1998a).²



This article aims to make a three-fold contribution to the existing literature on the European radical left. First, we will offer a clear and comprehensive definition of the term ‘radical left’, which is sorely lacking from most studies in the field. Second, we will look at the radical left as *a whole*, and not just at (one subset of) political parties. Third, we will take a *pan-European* perspective, that is, focusing on both Eastern and Western Europe. What follows is necessarily a broad ‘bird’s eye view’ of the recent development of the pan-European radical left after 1989, and in no way claims to give the final answer to the question ‘what’s left of the European radical left?’ Rather, we aim to analyse the main developments within the European radical left *in toto*, and to identify and compare the key contemporary radical left political players, before addressing the current state and future prospects of the whole European radical left in Europe.

We will argue that the radical left in Europe post-1989 is *both* in decline *and* in mutation (cf. Waller and Fennema, 1988; Moreau *et al.*, 1998a). Decline is evident in both the marginalization and moderation of the old Communist organizations (notably parties), a direct result of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the fissiparous nature of many radical left groupings. But the end of the USSR has also given space for mutation, that is, the emergence of a New Radical Left, employing ‘new’ ideological approaches (principally ‘social-populism’) and modern forms of trans-national cooperation (particularly through the European Parliament and the ‘anti-globalization’ movement). This mutation indicates future potential, however, unrealized so far.

Defining the Radical Left

In using the terms ‘radical’ and ‘left’ to describe our chosen topic, we are entering a potential terminological minefield. Scholars have been involved in an ongoing debate over the utility of alternatives such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ in analysing the poles of the political spectrum. Although often used interchangeably by scholars, ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ are distinct and deeply value-laden in practical politics: whereas almost all parties and movements discussed here would wear the term ‘radical’ as a badge symbolizing a commitment to systemic change, opponents might clearly prefer the term ‘extremist’ with its overtones of inflexibility and intemperance.

Here we prefer to use the term ‘radicalism’ in a broad sense to denote an ideological and practical orientation towards ‘root and branch’ systemic change of the political system occupied by the radical actor. ‘Extremism’, in contrast, is an ideological and practical opposition to the values and practices of democracy, either as it exists in a particular system, or *as* a system, which may, but does not necessarily, involve a propensity to violence. Within a liberal democratic context, which applies to most, though not all, European countries,



extremists can be defined as anti-democrats *per se*, while radicals are anti-liberal democratic, but not anti-democratic *per se* (see Mudde, 2005a).

The term 'left' is a still blunter instrument with which to conceptualize the range of actors we are confronted with. The left–right distinction has always had a different significance at various times and in various national contexts (Eatwell and O'Sullivan, 1989). Moreover, it would appear to have lost much remaining universal significance now that traditional working-class loyalties have declined, the cold war polarity has ended, and many have asked 'what is left of the left?' (Sferza, 1999). But inasmuch as 'left' and 'right' are still understood as heuristic categories by most European voters (e.g. Dalton, 2002), and are part of the self-identification of many of the groups in focus, these terms will be used here, although with caution.

Accordingly, we identify a 'radical left', which is radical first in that it rejects the underlying socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices (ranging from rejection of consumerism and neo-liberalism to outright opposition to private property and capitalistic profit incentives). Second, such radicals continue to advocate alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of resources from the existing political elites. These groups are 'left' first in their identification of economic inequity as the basis of existing political and social arrangements, and their espousal of collective economic and social rights as their principal agenda. Second, anti-capitalism is more consistently expressed than anti-democracy, although a radical subversion of liberal democracy may be implicit or explicit in the redistributive aims of many groups. Finally, this left is internationalist, both in terms of its search for cross-national networking and solidarity, and in its assertion that national and regional socio-political issues have global structural causes (such as 'imperialism' or 'globalization').

In the analysis below, we have divided the radical left into three different categories: political parties, (non-party) organizations, and subcultures (cf. Mudde, 2005b). As Michael Minkenberg (2003) has persuasively argued for the radical right, political families are best studied as collective actors in all their constitutive parts. Obviously, there is substantial ideological and at times organisational overlap between the various categories, most notably within the various communist groups, but the distinction helps provide both a clearer and a more comprehensive picture of the contemporary European radical left, including where its main strengths and weaknesses lie.

Political Parties: From 'the Proletariat' to 'the People'

As in many works on European politics, the bulk of our article will focus on political parties. After all, European politics is party politics (e.g. Gallagher *et al.*, 2001). However, unlike most studies of the contemporary radical left, we



will not concentrate exclusively on (former) communist parties (e.g. Moreau *et al.*, 1998a; Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002). Instead, we will start by discussing the declining fortunes of the various communist parties, then address the moderation of the Green parties, the stabilization of democratic socialist parties, and the recent rise of social-populist parties.

Communist parties

The most successful radical left parties in both halves of Europe for most of the 20th century were, of course, the (Moscow-loyal) communists, whose declared *raison d'être* was adherence to the revolutionary road to socialism that the parliamentary social democrats had (according to Lenin at least) renounced in 1914. In Western Europe, despite notoriety during the French Popular Front and Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, by 1939 communists were largely banned or isolated as political pariahs outside the USSR, losing legitimacy as they became instruments of Stalinist foreign policy (most notably with the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939) and failed to install revolutionary governments across the continent.

By the late 1940s in contrast, the Communist movement was reaching its high-water mark: the enhanced global status of the post-war USSR and its temporary membership of the victorious Alliance relegitimized communist parties, while those which had participated in the anti-fascist resistance profited most. In many West European countries, these parties gained their biggest ever electoral victories in the post-war aftermath and were, for the first (and often last) time in their existence, included in the first post-war 'Popular Front' governments, most notably in Italy, France and Austria. However, with the onset of the Cold War, their status and electoral success changed rapidly and radically: from defender of the nation and strong governmental partners they became (as before the war) the Soviet Union's 'fifth column' and weak pariah parties. There were some notable exceptions though: in countries like Finland, France and Italy the Communists were strong in terms of electoral support and membership, although they generally remained excluded from (national) political power (e.g. Tannahill, 1978; Lange and Vannicelli, 1981).

While Moscow's interference explains external pressures on the communist party, ideological commitment explains the persistence of a stable core of support, the political system influences incentives and competitors, and the subculture explains regional reservoirs of strength, protest voting helps explain how communist support fluctuated between elections (e.g. Tannahill, 1978; Guiat, 2003). Their exclusion from the governing elite and anti-bourgeois 'anti-system' doctrines allowed communists to attract the votes both of those dissatisfied with discrete political issues such as unemployment, and of those disaffected with the political system as a whole — the parties vocalized and



organized the interests of those who might otherwise be excluded from political attention. Since mainstream democratic socialist or social democratic parties usually drew their support from overlapping strata, the communists were happy to vocalize Lenin's theses about any real or imagined manifestations of their 'betrayal' of the working class.

What was becoming evident by the 1970s, however, was that despite the increasing 'polycentrism' of the international communist movement, no Western communist party had adequate domestic strength to offset the tarnishing of the Soviet socio-economic model. Quite the contrary; electoral, intellectual and membership support was in secular long-term decline, eventually prompting a full-blown crisis of ideology and organization (Lazar, 1988). The Eurocommunist tendency of the 1970s, headed by the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party, PCI) and the *Partido Comunista de España* (Spanish Communist Party, PCE), offered a brief reprieve as the Eurocommunists criticized the USSR, explicitly endorsed national democratic development, renounced revolutionary dictatorship and entered into 'historic compromises' with competitor parties (e.g. Lange and Vannicelli, 1981; Schwab, 1981). However, in most cases Eurocommunism accelerated the crisis it was designed to resolve, was treated with scepticism by opposition and supporters alike, and brought few electoral dividends.

The fall of the Berlin Wall destroyed at a stroke most communist parties' remaining legitimacy and electoral support. In Western Europe, they have developed four different responses (cf. Bull, 1994; Moreau *et al.*, 1998b): (1) many parties decided finally to renounce the 'communist' label and completed their development towards the democratic left, such as the Finnish *Vasemmistoliitto* (Left Alliance, VAS); (2) others transformed into full-fledged social democratic parties, such as the *Democratici di Sinistra* (Democrats of the Left, DS) in Italy; (3) some ceased to exist independently, re-emerging as parts of (often non-radical) 'new politics' parties, such as the *Communistische Partij Nederland* (Communist Party of the Netherlands, CPN), which became part of *GroenLinks* (GreenLeft) in 1989 (cf. Simon-Ekovich, 1998); (4) one group remained loyal to communism, such as the PCF and the *Kommunistiko Komma Ellados* (Communist Party of Greece, KKE).

In no Western European case has loyalty to orthodox communism proven to be a lasting defence against declining electoral support (see Appendix A). True, the major orthodox offshoot of the PCI, the *Partito Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party, PRC), regained some electoral and social strength in the mid-1990s, which culminated in its 'critical support' for the centre-left Prodi government of 1996–98 (Hudson, 2000). However, internal pressures to return to grassroots militancy aided the collapse of the Prodi government and a party split. The PRC's more pragmatic offshoot, the *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (Party of Italian Communists, PdCI), did join the



government of Massimo D'Alema (1998–2000), but in the 2001 parliamentary elections, the Italian electorate punished both communist parties severely.

The main exception is the Cypriot *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou* (Progressive Party of Working People, AKEL), whose electoral support has risen consistently since the late 1980s. Its success is explicable through specificities, such as a historically entrenched working-class constituency, a strong left–right cleavage, presidential patronage and finally, a moderate and inclusive cross-class strategy which is hardly orthodox communism, despite the party's insistence otherwise (Christophorou, 2001).

While parties such as the PRC have argued that the fall of the USSR re-opened the path to a 'refounded' Marxism un sullied by Stalinism, 'refounding' the communist image has proved problematic. One could clearly argue that communist success has come more from changes in the external environment than from internal party innovation: after the demise of the 'evil empire', communist parties were no longer considered as threatening and at last appeared acceptable coalition partners. They still seemed to benefit most when capitalizing on the protest vote and on disillusion with moderate left parties. However, continuing internal sectarianism, particularly over participation in government, ageing subculture and perceived conservatism has left them more exposed to radical left and right pretenders to their protest niche: a point graphically shown by the PCF's worst-ever vote in 2002. Symptomatically, many communist parties with the steadiest electoral support and parliamentary representation, such as the *Partido Comunista Português* (Portuguese Communist Party, PCP) and the PCE, have done so as part of semi-permanent non-communist coalitions — the red-green *Coligação Democrática Unitária* (Unitary Democratic Coalition, CDU) and the democratic socialist *Izquierda Unida* (United Left, IU), respectively).

In Eastern Europe the initial choices for the communists after 1989 were little different (e.g. Ishiyama, 1999; Bozóki and Ishiyama, 2002). Most of the successful former ruling parties have renounced the label 'communism' and have become avowedly social democratic; for example, *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSzP) or the Polish *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* (Alliance of the Democratic Left, SLD). These parties are far from radical, and one could even debate whether they are still 'left-wing', since they have been consistent proponents of privatization and integration into Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures (Nagle and Mahr, 1999).

Incomplete democratization, continuing opportunities for state patronage, and socio-economic or ethnic tension have made other parties' transformations less all-encompassing. Several parties have dallied more explicitly with nationalist particularism and clientelistic patronage politics and retained clear communist elements, most notably Milosevic's *Socijalistička Partija Srbije* (Serbian Socialist Party, SPS) and *Partidul Democrației Sociale din România*



(Social Democratic Party of Romania, PDSR). In the mid-1990s, the latter espoused a mixture of social-democratic, nationalist and anti-market slogans and has only latterly adopted a more openly 'modern centre-Left' stance (www.psd.ro; also Murer, 2002).³ Others still have taken a less authoritarian and more clearly democratic socialist orientation, although internal divisions and programmatic inconsistency muddy the extent of their transformation. Perhaps the clearest example of a 'democratic socialist' former ruling party is the Eastern German *Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus* (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS), which professes anti-capitalism but contains three main internal party groups; pragmatists, 'modern (Marxist) socialists' and the 'old Left', including a vocal Communist Platform (Segert, 2002).

Unlike the situation in the western part of the continent, an extreme left stance has often been viable further East. True, in many East European countries there are unsuccessful orthodox splits from the former ruling party, many of which have either repeatedly failed to get into parliament, such as Hungary's *Munkáspárt* (Workers' Party), or which have done so only when the mainstream left party has lost credibility; such as the *Komunistická Strana Slovenska* (Slovak Communist Party, KSS), which capitalized on the fatal split of the *Strana Demokratickej Ľavice* (Slovak Democratic Left, SDL) in the 2002 elections.⁴ In many other countries, communist parties have all but ceased to exist, as for example, in Croatia and Slovenia, and the Baltic states (where they have been banned since 1991).⁵

However, relatively unreformed communist parties have been among the largest and more electorally successful parties in several countries in Eastern Europe. The most notable are the *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, KPRF), the *Komunistychna Partiya Ukrainy* (Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU), and the Czech *Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy* (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, KSČM). Their success is explicable mainly by several factors not relevant beyond the former Iron Curtain. The socio-economic problems of 'transition' (rising unemployment, inflation and perceived personal and social insecurity) and the persistence of a 'socialist value culture' with lingering support for state welfarism and collectivism provide the general matrix for the return of the left in Eastern Europe (Mahr and Nagle, 1995; Curry and Urban, 2003). Former communists possess several 'portable skills' which help them recover electoral strength, particularly a culture of disciplined 'organizational communism' and managerial experience, continued personal and financial contacts, especially with the former party elite (Zubek, 1995; Grzymała-Busse, 2002).

When the ruling party's main successor has been a communist rather than a social democratic or democratic socialist party, this is best explained by a complex combination of the communist legacy, the mode of exit from



communism, and the post-communist political and institutional environment (Ishiyama, 1995; Kitschelt *et al.*, 1999). Generally, such parties emerge from 'patrimonial communist' regimes, in which little prospect of liberalization within the party structures existed and hardliners remained in dominant positions as the ruling party was collapsing, taking the initiative in founding successor party organizations.

On the face of it, these orthodox communist parties are completely unviable. They have been deliberately excluded from national political power, their electorate is ageing and their industrial and agricultural heartlands 'historically doomed' by marketization. Yet in the former Soviet bloc's unconsolidated party systems, newer party competitors have generally been still weaker. Moreover, like their Western European predecessors, the communists have been strongest where they have possessed 'red belts', such as Russia's agricultural south-west, where they maintained 'eco-systems' and exploited significant 'protest' tendencies against market and democratic reform, or as in the KPU's Donbas heartland, protected both traditional industry and Russophone identity. However, the post-communist elites' increasing ability to organize competing parties and patronage networks has loosened the parties' grip on their red belts and contributed to declining electoral performance (see Appendix A).

Most of these parties remain radical, even extremist, although their strategic direction is often very much in dispute within the parties themselves. Although regularly regarded as entirely 'unreformed', they have partially adapted to the post-communist context, espousing the rhetoric of democracy and constitutionalism and playing by the parliamentary rules of the game (Sakwa, 1998; March, 2001). However, the post-Soviet communists are still much more Marxist-Leninist than their Western European counterparts (despite the KPRF's more Russian nationalist rhetoric), remaining relatively uncritical of the Soviet and Stalinist legacy, vocally scornful of individual liberalism, and wedded to strict internal discipline based around 'democratic centralism' (which several other parties, such as the PCF, have now rejected). The KSČM, in contrast, rejects Leninism and democratic centralism in favour of a stance and symbols that are more akin to a Marxist democratic left (despite the 'communist' name), but is still regarded by many observers as at best ambiguous towards its repressive past (Handl, 2002; Hanley, 2002).

An important test case of communist radicalism is the *Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova* (Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova, PCRM), which won 50% of the votes in the February 2001 parliamentary elections, formed a one-party government dominating the Moldovan *Parlamentul*, and so gained the indirectly elected presidency. However, like AKEL, their 'communism' appears far softer in practice than in rhetoric. Indeed, although the party has authored divisive policies, such as promoting



Russian as a second state language and reintroducing Soviet administrative units, and has increased pressure on opposition media, its moderate wing is dominant and has backtracked on or ignored many of its more radical programmatic aims, while not yet fundamentally challenging democratic or market reform (March, 2004).

However, irrespective of individual cases, communism as a coherent international movement is no more. A plethora of overlapping and competing coalitions substitutes for the former Communist International, most still hidebound by historical links and arguments (see Gleumes and Moreau, 1998). For example, the *Soyuz kommunisticheskikh partii–Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuz*a (Union of Communist Parties–Communist Party of the Soviet Union, SKP-KPSS) acts as the main strategic forum for the former Soviet parties. Yet this organization only encapsulates the former Soviet space, has been superseded by bilateral links between communist parties and has been internally factionalized between USSR-restorationists and nationally orientated pragmatists.

Alongside the (more or less) Moscow-loyal communist parties other Marxist–Leninist communist parties have always existed, notably the Trotskyists and the Maoists. Although these parties felt less stigmatized by the fall of the Soviet bloc, given their long-standing hostility to it, they were nevertheless affected by it. Still, both Trotskyist and Maoist parties have always been marginal at best, so their decline has been less remarkable and relevant.

Having no strong state to back them up, or control them, the Trotskyists have always been (even) more divided than the Moscow-loyal communists. Many countries have at least two or three Trotskyist parties, not all contesting elections regularly. Additionally, there exist a multitude of Trotskyist Internationals; with the oldest, the IV International, now called the International Socialist Group, being the *primus inter pares* (Gleumes and Moreau, 1998). As far as Trotskyist parties have been electorally relevant, it has been at the local level (generally in parts of larger cities). However, recently some Trotskyist parties have gained some modest electoral successes at the national level, most importantly in the first round of the 2002 French presidential election (see Bell, 2002; Lazar, 2002). As we will argue below, their recent success could also be seen as part of a larger social-populist upsurge.

Maoist parties, finally, have been even more negligible in European politics. Although most of these parties pledged allegiance to the People's Republic of China, neither Mao himself nor the Chinese Communist Party ever even tried to establish a Maoist version of the Komintern.⁶ Consequently, various Maoist Internationals have existed parallel to each other, often involved in bitter feuds. The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), founded in 1974, is probably the least insignificant today, uniting some 15 of



the surviving orthodox Maoist parties today (Gleumes and Moreau, 1998; Alexander, 2001).

Green and New Politics Parties

'Green' or ecologist movements emerged in Western Europe in the late 1960s, most notably those opposing nuclear energy. They were part of a broader world of the 'new social movements', which included a network of groups concerned with animal rights, peace, women's rights, and Third World solidarity (see below). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Green parties gained their first electoral successes, of which the (West-) German *Die Grünen* (The Greens) became the ideal type (e.g. Poguntke, 1993; Raschke, 1993).

Although the Green parties possess *sui generis* characteristics (such as the white collar nature of their electorates), and there is an ideological and strategic distinction between 'red-greens' (such as *GroenLinks*), and 'green-greens' (such as the French *Les Verts*, The Greens), there are grounds for putting most Green parties on the political left — on the basis of the egalitarianism of their ideology, the self-placement of their supporters and their alliances with other parties of the left (e.g Richardson and Rootes, 1995). Indeed, within right-wing circles green parties have sometimes been referred to sarcastically as 'melon parties': green on the outside, yet red on the inside. Green parties have been considered 'radical' on the basis of their (a) ideology; (b) organization; and (c) strategies and actions.

Ecologism, the core ideological feature of the original Green parties, was initially a very radical ideology, rejecting capitalism and questioning (liberal) democracy. While some Greens mainly expressed frustration with the alleged undemocratic nature of representative democracy, and argued for the introduction or expansion of direct democracy (through measures such as referendums), more extremist voices, sometimes referred to as 'eco-fascists' or 'eco-authoritarians', argued that the environment was all-important and could only be truly protected against capitalism and multinationals by an ecodictatorship (e.g. Carter, 1999).

In terms of party organization, the early Green parties were true to their belief in *Basisdemokratie* or grass-roots democracy (cf. Poguntke, 1989). Rejecting all authoritarian and bureaucratic power structures, Green parties were extremely open and fluid. *Die Grünen* held party meetings that were open to all interested people, including non-party members, while various Green parties stated explicitly that their elected representatives could not be re-elected, to protect them against the 'perversion of power'.

Finally, regarding strategies and actions, Green parties originally remained true to their new social movement roots, focusing most of their attention on non-electoral activities and extra-parliamentary actions. Indeed, many within



the broader movement, and even factions within the parties themselves, looked at party politics with great distrust. In many cases, this led to a continued tension between the broader movement and the party: for example, in Flanders, the movement *Anders gaan leven* (Live Differently, Agalev) of Father Luc Versteyleen has always remained one of the most vocal critics of the party Agalev (now *Groen!* or Green!).

However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, *Basisdemokratie* contributed to an acute 'radical dilemma', as most Green parties suffered internal conflict. Simply stated, the struggle was between the so-called *Fundis* and *Realos*. The *Fundis*, or fundamentalists, wanted to remain loyal to their radical roots and rejected any compromise or coalition. The *Realos*, or realists, on the other hand, were lured into moderation and coalition by increasingly warm overtures, most notably from the social democratic parties, who saw a more moderate Green party as a way to increase their coalition options and political power. In most cases the *Realos* won and transformed their parties into moderate left-wing parties: capitalism and (liberal) democracy were broadly accepted, party organizations were hierarchized, and electoral strategies became dominant (cf. Burchell, 2001; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2002). So, despite non-traditional programmatic emphases, at the beginning of the 21st century, Green parties no longer play a significant role within the radical left of Western Europe.

Greens have fared rather more poorly in Eastern Europe. As in Western Europe, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Green parties were believed to be the parties of the future. Most parties were founded in 1989–91 and were the product of highly successful new social movements that had operated in the late 1980s in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (e.g. Fisher, 1992; Baker and Jehlicka, 1998). Environmentalist movements had been among the few tolerated opposition groups in Communist Eastern Europe, which also meant that many non-Greens mobilized under their protective umbrella. Like most opposition forces, they were part of the anti-Communist bloc in the 'founding elections', that is, the first free elections after the fall of communism.

After this, most followed their own path, but without obvious success (Frankland, 1995). Societies emerging from Soviet industrialization and collectivism had a weak post-materialist social base; internal divisions and a poorly developed NGO sector intensified this weakness, while economic stress during transition meant that the population valued employment more than the environment. Few Green parties were even represented in parliaments and those that were, such as the *Latvijas Zālā Partija* (Latvian Green Party, LZP), were either very small and/or part of a broader coalition.⁷ Moreover, their stance was moderate-left or even centrist, working with social-democrats and centrists while generally rejecting cooperation with the communists.



Democratic Socialist Parties

Although 'democratic socialism' was long considered synonymous with social democracy, since 1989 it has come to denote a strategy differing both from mainstream social democracy and the theories and practices of former Communist regimes (Hudson, 2000). Democratic socialists see themselves as to the 'left' of social democracy, accept parliamentary democracy, but retain a radical commitment to systemic transformation, usually through a commitment to grass-roots democracy and (especially) through a rejection of capitalism.

Democratic socialists have certainly retained some influence in Europe, albeit often as a diminished 'left' wing in social democratic parties, or a still influential 'old guard' in parties such as the centre-left Greek *Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima* (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK), whose class-based and redistributionist message retains a resonance in one of Europe's poorer states.⁸ As noted above, democratic socialism has also been an option for former communists.

The 'radicalism' of these democratic socialists can clearly be questioned, particularly in the East, where the passivity of the post-communist working class dictates a predominately parliamentary strategy, and governing parties have been compelled by economic decline and international pressure to further market reform even if they are ideologically sceptical. For example, the *Balgarska Socialisticheska Partija* (Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) promoted incoherent policy preferences in government from 1994 to 1997: balancing its internal party divisions, it argued for Marxism's continued relevance to Bulgarian society, and sought to oppose outright market liberalism but simultaneously (grudgingly) cooperated with the IMF and World Bank (Murer, 2002).

Similarly, as mainstream social democrats have become neo-liberal or social liberal, some West European democratic socialists have become *de facto* social democrats. This is particularly true of Scandinavian parties who have adopted a libertarian, green left parliamentary strategy, and (in the case of the Finnish VAS) have joined social democratic parties in government (Arter, 2003).

Social-Populist Parties

The most dynamic contemporary radical left politics appears to be a newly emerging 'social-populism'. Scholars have noted that newer forms of the 'extreme right' rely on strategic flexibility based around 'muted radicalism, anti-system attitudes and a right-wing populism' (Taggart, 1995). Populism itself and its underlying causes (e.g. a demystification of the political elite, political resentment and external challenges to identity) is now so



mainstream in Western democracies that we can talk of a populist *Zeitgeist* (Mudde, 2004). In Western Europe, parties like the Dutch *Socialistische Partij* (Socialist Party, SP), or the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) possess similar features, articulate similar themes and have gained a niche in their respective party systems.

These parties stem from different backgrounds, but they do share a clear ideological core and a distinct political style.⁹ Their ideological stance echoes democratic socialism's acceptance of parliamentary democracy and rejection of capitalism. However, whereas traditional socialists' egalitarianism and 'proletarian' anti-elitism might seem to lend themselves towards populism, their concern with doctrinal principle and the correct class politics did not. The social-populist parties are less overtly Marxist, and as concerned with extending their vote as constituency representation. They are populist in terms of juxtaposing 'the moral people' against 'the corrupt elite' (Mudde, 2004).

Typical of this social-populist discourse were the SP election campaigns of the 1990s. Their slogan was 'Vote Against!' (*Stem Tegen!*), while their symbol was a flying tomato — campaign posters showed Dutch politicians such as Wim Kok, then Prime Minister and leader of the social democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (Labour Party, PvdA), squashed by a tomato. In his books and speeches, popular SP leader Jan Marijnissen 'bit back', attacking the political elite as 'neo-liberal Ayatollahs' who lived by different rules to the majority of the population (e.g. Marijnissen, 1996).

In its 2003 campaign for the Scottish parliamentary elections, with the slogan of 'Dare to be different', the SSP promised an 'Independent socialist Scottish republic', with radical spending pledges, funding which would be Westminster's problem (www.scottishsocialistparty.org). This was accompanied by virulent rhetoric against the 'boring clone' parties (particularly the Labour Party and Scottish National Party) in the 'spineless [parliamentary] cesspit' (www.edinburgh-east.ssp.org). Moreover, in Tommy Sheridan the SSP had an overtly populist leader: charismatic, high-profile, and prone to making ostentatious gestures such as taking an 'average worker's' salary to prove that he was 'with the people'.

Parts of the French radical left have begun to develop similar traits. Polling around 10% combined, various social-populist parties have begun to outflank the PCF as anti-EU and anti-elite protest parties. The key parties are *Lutte Ouvrière* (Workers' Struggle), a traditional Trotskyist organisation, secretive, proletarian and isolationist. Alain Krivine's *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire* (Revolutionary Communist League, LCR), while still Trotskyist in inspiration, has adopted a less theoretical orientation, aiming to found a new left alliance alongside *Réfondateurs* in the PCF (e.g. Lazar, 2002). Other smaller left parties are from Christian milieux or 'unclassifiable' but all share distaste for 'mainstream' politics (see Bell, 2002).



Now that these parties no longer profess to be the 'vanguard' of the proletariat, but rather the *vox populi*, they place particularism before internationalism, with a much less theoretical and more inclusive style than hitherto. SSP Member of the Scottish Parliament Carolyn Leckie has talked of reaching 'people who wouldn't know who Trotsky was from Lulu [a Scottish pop star of the 1960s]' (Preston and Peart, 2003).

In Eastern Europe, the East German PDS would be the ideal type. Its famous 1994 election slogan was: 'Election Day is Protest Day' (*Wahltag ist Protesttag*). Its success is attributable to its ability both to harness cross-class *Ostalgie*¹⁰ and to present itself as a principled critic of the federal political system. Similarly, elements of social-populism can also be found in some of the 'orthodox' communist parties. For instance, the KPRF (especially) and KSČM have toned down their references to international class struggle, the communist future and even a socialist present. Instead, increasing social stratification, post-Leninist anti-political sentiment, the survival of elements of the former communist oligarchy (*nomenklatura*), and dependency on Western influences has produced even more overt and radical populist rhetoric of 'the (deceived) people' against 'the (anti-national) elite' (Mudde, 2001). This is neatly encapsulated in the KSČM's slogans of 'Others are about people, we are with people' (*Jiní o lidech, my s lidmi*) and 'With people, for people' (*S lidmi, pro lidi*).

The left parties in the Baltic States also echo this, as they have become the self-acclaimed defenders of both indigenous Russian speakers and the former Soviet regime. Consequently, parties such as the (left-centrist) Estonian *Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei* (United People's Party, EÜRП) and *Latvijas Sociālistiskā Partija* (Latvian Socialist Party, LSP) combine national and populist rhetoric with leftist ideology; particularly the more radical LSP, which in classical populist style calls for ending elite 'pillage of the state...deception, and flogging off its people to a cabal of foreign capitalists' (www.vide.lv/lsp/kongress_ru.htm).

The decline of communism as both ideology and movement and the rightwards drift (particularly in office) of many social democratic parties, especially the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party, SPD) and the British Labour Party has clearly opened up a space for competitors (including the 'extreme right') to battle for the traditional blue collar vote on the vacant 'left' of the political spectrum. The social-populists' specific discourse helps them exploit this vacuum: they supplement muted class analysis with identity issues more commonly associated with the right: protest against the perceived identical nature of the establishment political parties, addressing regional (SSP, PDS) and ethnic (LSP, KPRF) sentiments.



Non-party Organizations: Paralysed Unions and Uncovered Fronts

The radical left has seldom been exclusively or even mainly a working class phenomenon. In 1968, for example, only 35 percent of the working class supported the PCI (Tannahill, 1978, 110). Nevertheless, workers' support was vital in strengthening communist dominance in certain regions (such as the French industrial north, and the Paris and Marseilles suburbs). Moreover the self-proclaimed status as the elite vanguard of the proletariat has remained a core component of post-Marx radical left ideology.

Traditionally, also the communists sought to institutionalize their working class leadership through cultivation of trade unions, either through fostering affiliated trade unions such as the Spanish *Comisiones Obreras* (Labour Commissions, CC.OO), or attempting to infiltrate nominally independent trade unions through the practice of 'entrism'. Even at their peak, Western European communists only maintained a leading influence over trade unions where social democrats were weak (e.g. in France and Italy) and the crisis of their trade unions in terms of falling membership, leadership divisions and decreasing political influence was one of the most visible symptoms of the wider crisis of West European Communism (Lazar, 1988).

In the post-1989 era, these trends have only increased. Communist influence over the traditional trade unions has declined markedly; except in Southern Europe where there is a strong syndicalist and reform-revolution cleavage (cf. Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000). For instance, in 1997 Bernard Thibault became the first general secretary of the French *Confédération Général du Travail* (General Federation of Work, CGT) not to hold a leadership position in the PCF. There have certainly been modest signs of trade union revitalization after disorientation and marginalization in the 1980s. Trade union morale has been restored by popular discontent with the neo-liberal free-trade consensus of the early 1990s, particularly since the 'Asian contagion' of 1997-98, and they have sought new forms of international cooperation (cf. Munck, 2002). There have been incidences of formerly reformist trade unions radicalizing, as when sections of the Labour-affiliated Communication Workers' Union (CWU) and Rail Maritime and Transport Union (RMT) have forged links with the Scottish Socialists. However, to date, where trade unions have sought new allies it has tended to be among anti-globalization movements (such as ATTAC, for which see below), rather than with radical left parties themselves, although the growing trade union influence of Trotskyists in France must be noted.

In the East, the general quiescence of organized labour given the depth of socio-economic crisis is remarkable (Crowley and Ost, 2001). Particularly in the former USSR, the larger, more established trade unions have struggled to overcome their past as 'transmission belts' for the directives of the Communist Party, and have often been coopted in quasi-corporatist deals with the state.



Newer trade unions tend to be weaker and more divided still, while all unions struggle with public distrust or apathy. Most trade unions have shunned structured political alliances except with more moderate forces such as the social democratic successor parties of Poland and Hungary. That is not to say that radical workers' protest has been absent: miners and teachers have been among the most militant and active and the (relatively reformed) trade unions even helped remove the Bulgarian government in 1997 (Robertson, 2004). However, radical left parties have not been able to harness this protest except sporadically and locally.

It is a similar story with wider affiliated organizations. Traditionally, Communist and Trotskyist parties aimed to build up a broader social influence through front organizations, that is, organizations that were not officially communist but were nevertheless controlled by communists. Most of these organizations were focused on extending the communist subculture. Classic front organizations of communists of all persuasions have been the Western peace movements and various anti-fascist organizations, such as the German *Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes — Bund der Antifascistinnen und Antifascisten* (Association of the Persecuted of the Nazi Regime — League of Anti-Fascists, VVN-BdA). In recent times, communists (most notably Trotskyists) have worked through anti-racist front organisations, including the British Anti-Nazi League and Youth against Racism in Europe, as well as anti-globalization organizations, such as Globalize Resistance. However, like their infiltration attempts, notably within ATTAC France and Germany, communists have been largely unsuccessful in establishing or infiltrating broader radical left organizations.

By and large, mass radical left wing front organizations no longer exist in the post-Soviet space. True, most communist parties still have an affiliated communist youth wing, but their membership is generally negligible. Even the youth organization of the highly successful KSČM, the *Komunistický Svaz Mládeže* (Communist Youth Union, KSM), has a mere 200 members (www.ksm.cz). A large number of militant (and usually tiny) radical left youth wings do exist in the wider subculture, particularly in the East, increasingly communicating and coordinating activity through the Internet, and occasionally succeeding with 'flash-mob' demonstrations, or incidences of violence. However, these groups seldom coordinate their actions with established political parties except under an 'anti-globalization' banner (indeed they often oppose them as insufficiently militant) and are best seen as part of the 'new fringe' outlined below.

Radical Left Subcultures: Towards a 'New Fringe'

The 1970s and 1980s were the heydays of the West European new social movements, which included a network of groups concerned with animal rights,



peace, women rights, and Third World solidarity. Many a mass demonstration was organized against nuclear energy and weapons, against South African apartheid, in favour of unilateral disarmament, or of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Within academia a true wave of studies appeared declaring the end of political parties and the new reign of new social movements (e.g. Lawson and Merkl, 1988). In the end though, (Green) parties prevailed and the new social movements increasingly lost prominence.

Since the 1990s we have seen the beginnings of a new radical left sub-culture and social movement. Among the main issues that this 'new fringe' addresses are animal rights, environmentalism, and opposition to globalization (Mudde, 2002). Like the 'classic' new social movements of the past decades, the new fringe is a network of networks. This new fringe is a ragbag of groups and individuals, such as the 'eco-warriors' (e.g. Earth First!), animal right activists (e.g. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), gay and lesbian activists (e.g. OutRage), anti-fascists (e.g. Anti-Fascist Action), *Autonomen* ('autonomous' people), and anti-globalists (e.g. Mayday 2000).

To date, these groups have not been able to mobilize mass support on a national or international scale, though some of their actions have caused havoc in major cities — such as the annual *Chaos Tage* (Chaos Days) in the German city of Hannover, or the 'Carnival against Capitalism' in May 2000 in London, where demonstrators burned cars, clashed with police, and caused major traffic disruption. However, a greater tendency towards common mobilization and violence in high profile anti-globalization protests such as in Seattle (1999) or Genoa (2001) has created a sense of momentum. Hence, we can expect increasing activities within Europe, directed against the alleged elitism and neo-liberalism of the EU, such as the violent demonstrations in Thessaloniki in June 2003.

Nevertheless, the new fringe remains extremely diverse. While it has become a significant political factor in some countries, like France, Germany and Great Britain, it hardly exists or is very weak in others (most notably in the East and South of Europe). In general, one can observe that where the movement is stronger, organizational structures are weaker. In these cases, the social movement is more important than any of its constituting organizations. One reason is the inherent belief in *Basisdemokratie* of many new fringe groups, most evident in rather incoherent 'decentralized' or 'swarm' tactics in demonstrations (pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj88/harman.htm).

Moreover, while its direct effect is difficult to measure, the new fringe's exploitation of the possibilities of the Internet has certainly allowed a whole array of new radical groups of all persuasions to enthuse, network, co-operate, and organize as part of umbrella movements (Rash, 1997). The new fringe has been especially active through umbrella websites related to the



anti-globalization World Social Forum (WSF), held first in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Moreover, many fringe groups (such as Reclaim the Streets and Earth First!) have developed a 'counter-culture', often referred to as the 'Do It Yourself culture' or 'DiY culture' (McKay, 1998), which rather than opposing the dominant culture tries to create an alternative culture outside it (e.g. Jordan and Lent, 1999). In some ways, the ideas are similar to the famous 'parallel polis' of East European dissidents like Václav Havel (e.g. Kopecky and Barnfield, 1999).

However, a partial institutionalization of the new fringe movement has occurred. Over the past two decades, new social movements have split into two groups: those accepted by, and often coopted into the political elite, and those fundamentally opposed to the elite. It is in part the alleged 'betrayal' of the old leaders of the moderate(d) social movements that have radicalized a small minority that is increasingly resorting to violent actions to further their cause (Wall, 1999). Small but well-organized terrorist cells have developed both within and outside the broader movement. Groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF) have damaged property and threatened people in name of animal rights and the environment, respectively (e.g. www.fas.org/irp/threat/com74e.htm; Monaghan, 1997). Although often rejected by the leaders of the larger movements, such as Earth First! or the more moderate Friends of the Earth, these small terrorist groups can count on sympathy among parts of the wider subculture (e.g. Wall, 1999).

At the same time, globalization, free-trade and global inequalities have provided a common enemy for many groups. The WSF is now an annual event held in different countries, encompassing thousands of workshops, seminars and rallies, although some key figures and groups have become more prominent. Figureheads of the new fringe include the Filipino analyst Walden Bello, the intellectuals Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky and George Monbiot, and French sheep farmer José Bové, whilst the French-founded ATTAC (The Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens) has a 30,000 strong membership in France alone and has helped coordinate the movement internationally, being at the fore in anti-globalization demonstrations at the G8, WTO and an organizer of the WSF (e.g. Moreau, 2002). While this has given the movement a greater sense of coherence and organization, many remain sceptical about any attempt to centralize the movement into a global campaign synchronized with more traditional organizations. Indeed, parties and government officials are officially excluded from the WSF's organization and programme (e.g. Bello, 2002).

We could hardly claim that the new fringe is an exclusively radical left or even left-wing phenomenon. Although many activists come from (radical) left-wing circles, many others are entirely new to politics and do not share



traditional left-wing doctrines (Wall, 1999). The plethora of programmes espoused by different trends (particularly single-issue groups, animal-rights activists and environmentalists) barely fits a traditional left-right schema. Indeed, various extreme right groups have long defended the environment and animal rights (e.g. Schikhof, 1996; Olsen, 1999). Moreover, the nationalism of the national populists puts them at the ideological fore of the anti-globalization struggle (Mudde, 2006). So far, however, the new fringe and the 'extreme right' groups have not been able to unite. One of the main reasons is that they increasingly define themselves as a negation of the other, since much of the new fringe is deeply involved in *antifa* (anti-fascist) activities, while the extreme right has become increasingly focused on *anti-antifa* activities.

Many of the more left-wing activists are indeed anti-Marxist. With their origins in the student movements of the late 1960s, they have long seen 'old left' parties like the PCF as 'Stalinist', reactionary and authoritarian (Lent, 2001). Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that several new fringe groups have roots in older left-wing organizations; for example, the *Autonomen* and anti-fascists have clear ties to the now largely defunct militant squatter scene (e.g. Buijs, 1995; Pfahl-Traughber, 1998), while members and issues from (former) Third World organizations are prominent among anti-globalization groups (e.g. Starr, 2000).

One powerful impulse for the anti-globalization movement is the decline in organized opposition to capitalism, especially from labour unions in the West (Heartfield, 2003). Indeed, for many 'anti-globalization' is a new twist on older radical left-wing themes of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist internationalism; in this sense they claim to *support* more socially orientated globalization processes. Some see the movement as not reactive or negative, but united by left-wing themes of inclusion and social justice (e.g. Graeber, 2002; Ashman, 2004). Moreover, many on the radical left now argue that they can only succeed in opposing neo-liberalism if they coordinate actions with the anti-globalization movements on a pan-European level (e.g. Bertinotti, 2003). Accordingly, they have sought to become prime movers in such events as the annual European Social Forum (an extension of the World Social Forum), and the large European protests against the Iraq war in 2003, such as the UK's 'Stop the War Coalition'.

Conclusion: Towards a New Radical Left?

If in 1988 the radical left in Europe looked like a retreating army (Lazar, 1988) and by 1991 its defeat appeared total, there are now signs of regrouping, if not yet a sustained counter-attack. In short, the European radical left has been both in decline and mutation since 1989.



The evidence of a significantly New Radical Left is still less clearcut than some authors have claimed (notably Hudson, 2000). At the parliamentary level, (true) communist parties have virtually disappeared as electorally successful organizations, the Greens have consolidated their position in the democratic mainstream by shedding their radicalism, and democratic socialist parties are moving increasingly towards (old-style) social democracy. There are some signs of successful mutation and a new radical left party challenge though, most notably in the form of social-populist parties that present themselves as the voice of the people rather than the vanguard of the proletariat.

European international solidarity has been helped by integrative processes, most significantly the formation in 1994 of the 50-strong EU parliamentary group 'United European Left-Nordic Green Left' (Bell, 1998). This bridges the divide between democratic socialists, former communists, and outright communists. Interparty links are further consolidated by the affiliated New European Left Forum, which regularly brings together a similar array of parties in seventeen European countries (Gleumes and Moreau, 1998; Hudson, 2000). Together, such organizations have helped forge common policy platforms espousing opposition to neo-liberalism and demands for democratization of the EU, and have furthered contacts with extra-parliamentary groups such as the European Social Forum.¹¹ However, the EU-level party political 'radical' left is hardly cohesive yet, ranging from mildly radical Eurosceptic green-left parties such as VAS to more extreme Euroreject radical left parties such as KKE.

At the extra-parliamentary level the picture is less clearcut. Non-party level radical left organizations have probably suffered the most decisive defeat. As far as radical left trade unions still exist within Europe, they have been confronted with severe drops in membership, leadership paralysis, and almost total marginalization in national and international politics. Similarly, communist front organizations have all but disappeared, while recent attempts at overtaking successful progressive organizations (like ATTAC) have failed.

In the radical left subcultures, initially also hit hard by the fall of the Berlin Wall, a profusion of 'new fringe' groups is emerging and mobilizing, and these have also been the most prominent international manifestations of a 'New Radical Left' through umbrella movements, many anti-globalization *causes célèbres*, and, increasingly through the Internet. Despite massive media attention around some mass demonstrations, the 'anti-globalization movement' is still in its infancy, struggling to come together on positive appeals and largely marginalized from party politics (including much of the radical left).

In conclusion, the collapse of the USSR has created both significant problems and potential opportunities for the radical left. Most damagingly, the radical left lacks a clear meta-narrative, a financially strong infrastructure, and



an alternative developmental model.¹² But on the positive side, the decline of the Communist International has allowed the New Radical Left to free itself from the ideological constraint and taint of the Soviet model and orient itself towards national conditions without the risk of censure (or competition) from Moscow. This new environment could create opportunities for (at least) two new radical left actors, the parliamentary social-populist parties and the extra-parliamentary anti-globalization movement.

Notes

- 1 The article originated as a lecture by one of the authors at the 'Workers and Punks University', Ljubljana, 21 May 2001. The authors wish to thank Karoline Lundholdt for research assistance, Uwe Backes (TU Dresden), Cyrille Guiat (Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh), Séan Hanley (SSEES, London), Marc Lazar (Sciences-Po, Paris), and the anonymous referees of CEP for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
- 2 The only recent book to concentrate on the radical left more broadly is problematic, using both Western European communists and East European social democratic successor parties as evidence of a 'revived' (but undefined) New European Left, and taking a highly partisan Marxist approach (Hudson, 2000).
- 3 The Social Democracy Party of Romania merged with the Romanian Social Democratic Party in June 2001 to form the *Partidul Social Democrat* (Social Democratic Party, PSD).
- 4 In some cases, the communist parties can get some seats by joining larger electoral coalitions, in which they play a minor role. This is the case, for example, with the *Komunisticheska Partija na Balgarija* (Bulgarian Communist Party), which is one of more than 10 minor parties in the BSP-led *Koalicija za Balgarija* (Coalition for Bulgaria).
- 5 The exception is the *Latvijas Sociālistiskā Partija* (LSP), headed by Alfreds Rubiks, a former member of the Soviet Communist Party's governing Politburo, which has participated in a four-party coalition *Cilvēka Tiesībām Vienotā Latvijā* (For Human Rights in a United Latvia) that won 24 seats in the parliamentary elections of 2002.
- 6 Some Maoist parties turned away from the Chinese model and followed the Albanian model of Enver Hoxa instead (see Alexander, 2001).
- 7 The LZP, currently the most successful Eastern European Green party, won 12 seats, three ministries and the chairpersonship of parliament in the 2001 elections in coalition with the centrist *Centriskā Partija-Latvijas Zemnieku savienība* (Centre Party-Latvian Peasants Union, LZS).
- 8 However, in July 2003 then PASOK Prime Minister Costas Simitis ousted many remaining members of the 'old guard' including party General Secretary Costas Laliotis.
- 9 The SSP emerged from a union of the Scottish Socialist Workers' Party and the Scottish Socialist Alliance in 1998, while it has older origins in the Militant tendency of the Labour party in the 1980s. The SP emerged as a small Maoist group out of the *Kommunistische Partij Nederland/marxisitisch-leninistisch* (Communist Party of the Netherlands/Marxist-Leninist, KPN/ml) in 1972.
- 10 *Ostalgie* is a play of words that combines *Ost* (East) and *Nostalgie* (nostalgia) and refers to a nostalgia for (life in) the former East Germany (i.e. the communist German Democratic Republic).
- 11 One such proposal, the Berlin Appeal for the Founding of the European Left Party of 2004 (esteri.rifondazione.co.uk/internazionale/i0017.html), comes from the communists and former communists, headed by PRC, another, the European Anti-Capitalist Left Manifesto for a



Different Europe of the same year (e.g. www.scottishsocialistparty.org/elections/euro04/eacl.html), from the Trotskyites and former Trotskyites such as the SSP and LCR, although several groups have participated in both initiatives.

12 Unless one counts ailing Cuba and North Korea, or increasingly capitalistic China, none of which are touted as models except by the very old left (see Gleumes and Moreau, 1998).

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Appendix A

The communist parties of the 1989–2004 European parliamentary elections are shown in Table A1.

Appendix B

The non-communist radical left parties of the 1989–2004 European parliamentary elections are summarized in Table B1.

Table A1 Significant communist parties in European parliamentary elections 1989–2004^a

		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Cyprus	AKEL			30.6					33.0					34.7			
Czech Republic	KSCM		13.2		14.0				10.3		11.0				18.5		
Denmark	EL ^b		1.7				3.1				2.7			2.4			
France	PCF				9.2					9.9					4.8		
Greece	KKE	13.1, 11.0 ^c	10.3 ^c			4.5			5.6				5.5				5.9
Hungary	<i>Munkáspárt</i>		3.7				3.2				4.0				2.2		
Italy	PRC				5.6					8.6				5.0 (PdCI 1.7)			
Luxembourg	KPL	5.1															0.9
Moldova	PCRM						22.0				30.1			49.9			
Portugal	CDU			8.8				8.6				9.0			7.0		
Russia	KPRF					12.4		22.3				24.3					12.6
Slovakia	KSS				0.8		2.7				2.8				6.3		
Spain	IU	9.1				9.2			9.2				5.5				5.0
Ukraine	KPU						12.7				24.7				20.0		

^a'Significant' in this table and in Table B1 is defined as obtaining at least 3% of the vote AND gaining parliamentary seats in at least one election.

^bEL: Enhedslisten — De Rød Grønne (Unity List — The Red-Greens).

^cKKE as part of coalition with Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left, SYN).

Source: <<http://www.parties-and-elections.de/europe.html>>

Table B1 Significant non-communist radical left parties (excluding Greens) in European parliamentary elections 1989–2004

		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Bulgaria	BSP		47.2	33.1			43.5			22.0				17.1			
Denmark	SF		8.3				7.3				7.5			6.4			
Finland	VAS			10.1				11.2				10.9				9.9	
Germany	PDS		2.4				4.4				5.1				4.0		
Greece	SYN ¹	13.1*, 11.0*	10.3*			2.9			5.1				3.2				3.3
	DIKKI ²					4.4			2.6								
Iceland	VG ³											9.1					8.8
Latvia	LSP		21.5 ¹⁰			5.8*		5.6		14.2*					19.1*		
Macedonia	SPM ⁴		4.7				30.8*				4.7				2.1		
Moldova	PSM-UE ⁵						22.0										
Netherlands	SP						1.3				3.5				5.9	6.3	
Norway	SV ⁶	10.0				7.9				6.0				12.4			
Romania	PDSR ⁷				22.7				21.5				36.6				
Russia	Rodina																9.0
Scotland	SSP											2.0					6.9
Serbia	SPS				28.8	36.7				34.3				13.8			7.6
Sweden	VP			4.5			6.2				12.0				8.3		
Ukraine	SPU ⁸						2.7				8.2				6.3		
	PSP ⁹										4.1				3.2		

Notes: * Signifies part of a coalition. ¹SYN: *Synaspismos* (Coalition of the Left); ²DIKKI: *Dimokratiki Kinoniku Kinima* (Democratic Social Movement); ³VG: *Vinstrihreyfingin - grænt framboð* (Left - Green Movement); ⁴SPM: *Socialisticka Partija na Makedonija* (Socialist Party of Macedonia); ⁵PSM-UE: Socialist Party of Moldova-Unity Movement; ⁶SV: *Sosialistisk Venstreparti* (Socialist Left Party); ⁷PDSR ran in 1992–96 as Party of Social Democracy); ⁸SPU: *Socialistychna Partiya Ukrainy* (Socialist Party of Ukraine); ⁹PSP: *Progressivnaya Socialistychna Partija* (Progressive Socialist Party); ¹⁰ran as Latvian Communist Party.

Source: As Table A1.