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Who is Anti-American in the European Union?

Colin Lawson and John Hudson

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Who is anti-American in the European Union?

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ABSTRACT

The term anti-Americanism has become common in public and academic debate in the last decade. Yet we have only limited knowledge of those who hold such views. From 2003, 2005 and 2006 Eurobarometer data, almost 20% of EU respondents disapproved of USA policy *in all five dimensions* the surveys examined. Following the literature, this consistent opposition is defined as anti-American. Anti-Americans exhibit systematic differences in age, education, geographical location, policy preferences and nationality. In addition although anti-Americanism is associated with a preference for greater European independence, perhaps surprisingly it is also linked to a desire for a less federal and hence less powerful Europe. In both sets of attitudes, to the USA and to the EU, there is also a strong regional dimension within countries, which reinforces the view that it is too simplistic to describe a country as being anti-American or being pro European integration.

Keywords anti-Americanism; European Union; Federalism

JEL Classification: H100, F020, H770.

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Who is anti-American in the European Union?

‘...in Europe, there has been an anti-Americanism that at once can be casual but also insidious.’ Barak Obama speaking in Strasburg, April 2009.

Introduction

After the election of President G W Bush and especially after 9/11, it seemed to some that the United States (USA) adopted radically changed attitudes to its allies and to its enemies. Allies were to be led, not accommodated; alliances were temporary and purpose-specific. Enemies might be preemptively attacked, their regimes changed, and if possible democratized in an American approved style. The USA exhibited a new isolationism of perspective along with a wider, more vigorous projection of its power (Iwama, 2004).

Unsurprisingly this apparent major change created a European crisis of trust, which is now discussed openly by politicians, commentators, and scholars. We want to examine some solid data that could help us determine the strength of European citizens' views of the USA at this apparent point of change, and to allow an analysis of their different dimensions, and the characteristics of those who held them. In particular we want to

explore whether opposition to USA policies was accompanied by a desire for a more integrated and powerful EU, one that might become a countervailing economic and political power to USA influence. This leads us to try to link – at least empirically – two hitherto separate literatures: that on anti-Americanism with that on attitudes towards EU integration.

The data are drawn from three Eurobarometer surveys for the European Commission: those of March-April 2003; October-November 2005 and September-October 2006. The 2006 survey is the most recent available that includes the 2003 survey's questions on EU respondents' attitudes to USA policy. For the 2003 survey, during whose collection period the Iraq War began, some 23,000 citizens in the then 15-member union were questioned, using face-to-face home interviews in their national language. In the 2005 and 2006 surveys almost 27,000 citizens in the now 27-country EU were surveyed¹. The sample frame was those aged fifteen and above, but we wanted to study the views of those who could influence policy - that is voters - so we analyze respondents aged eighteen and over. The surveys' multi-stage random probability design ensures a representative sample with respect to metropolitan, urban and rural areas. For each interviewee, the data included age, sex, educational level, income and nationality, plus some attitudinal variables.

We focus on the EU electors' answers to two sets of questions:

1) Whether the respondent felt the USA played a positive, negative, or neither a positive nor negative role in a) the search for world peace; b) the fight against terrorism; c) the fight against world poverty; d) the protection of the world environment; and e) world economic growth. We are not so much interested in the responses to any one question, but in the totality of such responses. In particular building on Berman (2004) we define an anti-American mindset as one which consistently disapproves of USA policies across a range of different policy dimensions.

2) Whether the respondent felt that independent EU defense, security, and foreign policies were desirable; and possible links between these views and respondents' views on USA foreign policy.

We aim to answer three basic questions. (1) Is there clear evidence of the existence of anti-Americanism? (2) Is anti-Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal characteristics; for example nationality, or residence in a particular region of a country? (3) Do those with anti-American views also share an identifiably similar set of opinions on either the foreign or security policies of the EU or its future political development?

Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of anti-Americanism and surveys the literature. It also reviews the literature on voters' attitudes to European Integration.

Section 3 provides the justification for the model of attitude determination that underlies the empirics. Section 4 gives the results, and section 5 summarizes our conclusions.

Literature Review

Here we define anti-Americanism, and review the existing literature on its extent and causes.

Defining anti-Americanism

This term has been widely and loosely used. What is needed is a definition that corresponds to observable phenomena. For example Spiro (1988: 120) defines anti-Americanism as ‘a persistent pattern of gross criticism of the main values of the US Constitution.’ This is both too vague: the values need to be defined; and too specific. For example why is it confined to the Constitution?

Alternatively Krastev (2004: 6-7) defines anti-Americanism as ‘opposing any policy simply *because* it is endorsed by the US government’. This is not a good choice of definition, both because it is a causal definition: it includes the cause of the phenomenon under investigation, and because operationally it relies on a probably hard to distinguish preference distinction.

Berman (2004) provides a more tractable definition that focuses on opposition to specific American policies, or groups of policies. This leaves the motivation for the opposition open for investigation. It also allows a search for clusters of opposition, across policies, countries or respondents without prejudging their cause. Such a definition is value neutral, and it is possible to test for its presence.

We think it is worth extending the range of opinions that are used to assess the pattern of anti-Americanism, by including policy effects as well as policies. We also narrow our focus onto those who hold consistently negative views of USA policies or of their effects. We extend the range to both policies and policy effects, because it is not clear that respondents distinguish between them, and Eurobarometer questions involve both. We confine our description of anti-American to those who have consistently negative views in all five of the examined USA policy dimensions, because we want to explore links with their views on the EU. Opposition to an individual policy could arise for a myriad of reasons, and have little or no linkage to common concepts of anti-Americanism. In addition if there is nothing unusual in our narrowly defined anti-American group's pattern of views on the EU, then in the survey data there are likely to be few interesting links between the wider group of European voters' views of the USA and their views on the future of the EU.

The Literature on Attitudes towards the USA and its Policies

Opinion poll evidence for European anti-American views in the early years of this century, summarized by Linn (2004), revealed a growing negative view of the USA, though with marked differences across European states, and more positive views in recent EU members. Kohut (2003: 1-2) quotes a 2001 State Department survey ‘where 78% of Germans said they had a favorable view of the U.S. That fell to 61% in our (Pew Research Center) 2002 poll – and to 45% in the survey conducted (in spring 2003). Opinion of the U.S. in France has followed a similar track: 62% positive in 1999-2000, 63% (in 2002)...and 43% (in 2003).’

But according to both Linn and Kohut although EU public opinion has changed the US-EU ‘value divide’ is not widening. Linn (2004: 13) defines ‘basic values’ as ‘views regarding fundamental, life and death issues that are embedded in traditional culture and do not vary quickly or significantly over time.’ Such values might be the roles of the individual and the state; belief in God; or the necessary conditions for a just war. These he contrasts with “‘public opinion” (which although it) refers to views and perceptions mainly on matters of current politics or events...’ can and generally does ‘also cover and reflect basic values’ (ibid.). These authors believe that the recent growth in anti-

Americanism reflects changing European public opinion rather than a basic value change.

But even if there has been no profound change in European values, some American commentators have taken a very combative line. For example Ceaser (2003) claims that anti-Americanism in Europe influenced Islamic terrorists. He traces anti-Americanism back to the eighteenth century biological degeneracy thesis that all species, including human beings, thrived less well in the New World. By the late eighteenth century this then dominant view also appeared in a political variant that asserted the inferiority of the American political system because it was not grounded in tradition. For Ceaser (2003: 16) anti-Americanism ‘...is a construct of European thought...anti-Americanism makes rational discussion impossible, it threatens the idea of a community of interests between Europe and America. Indeed it threatens the idea of the West itself.’

One does not have to accept Ceaser’s extreme account to agree that the USA’s power, and hence its pervasive influence, has created the preconditions for distrust of its motives. The US response to 9/11, and especially the invasion of Iraq, produced widespread European opposition. The more radical criticism went beyond policy disagreement and purported to examine alleged flaws in the American psyche that led to

the violent and intimidating behavior that, some argued, has marked America since its inception (Sardar and Davies, 2002, 2004).

A common view in the literature argues that attitudes to the USA are strongly influenced by views of American leaders and what they do, but also by views of the American people (Chiozza, 2009:283). A related view claims that non-Americans can and do distinguish between ‘what America is’ and ‘what America does’ (Keohane and Katzenstein, 2007: 2). The latter argue that because America encompasses a very wide range of values and life styles it provides foreigners with many reasons for attraction and repulsion. This helps explain the phenomenon of those who may oppose its foreign policy but still wish to work there.

The degree of distrust of America varies across European countries, most plausibly because of past contacts. However opinions are constantly evolving. Germany and France provide two examples. Although relatively pro-American, Germans have recently become more distrustful. Berman (2004: 29-30) claims ‘...there is a specific German continuity from pre-1989 Communist anti-Americanism to post-Communist anti-Americanism, which has been particularly relevant, given the role of the former Communist Party – the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – and its ability to influence the larger German political landscape.’ Other influences he cites are the

‘...association of Americans with ‘capitalism in a negative sense’; a ‘...pre-democratic anti-Americanism (that) finds expression in contempt for aspects of American mass culture’, and a post-democratic anti-Americanism...driven by resentment that the United States has been unwilling to cede sovereignty to the structures of international governance.’

But French opinion is arguably the most anti-American. Meunier (2005:126) argues that ‘...France is the country with the deepest, most sedimented reservoir of Anti-American arguments.’ Toinet (1988), a French commentator sympathetic to the USA, argued that after its critical help to the US in the War of Independence, France looked in vain for a ‘special relationship’ with the new state. Instead relations were punctuated by intermittent tensions. For example France interpreted the 1898 American attack on the Spanish empire in the Caribbean and the Philippines as a threat to all European empires. The US did not forgive France its First World War debts. Roosevelt initially favored Vichy over the Free French, and wanted a retributive postwar military government for France. But even such an unpromising legacy cannot explain the severity of some criticisms. Toinet’s explanation is that French commentators see a clash between the ideals of French civilization and American advocacy of its view of democracy. For the commentators, American democracy has led to and entails an unacceptably rapacious and uncaring form of capitalism (Todd, 2003; Grunberg, 2005).

The Literature on Citizens` Attitudes to European Integration

Haas (1958) argued that supporting greater EU integration involved a cost-benefit calculation; a view empirically supported by Gabel (1998) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000).

There are two common reasons why people might wish power transferred to the EU from member states. First, if there are economies of scale, economies of cost, or externalities in implementing policy, it may be more efficient to operate the policy at an EU level. Second, EU and national redistribution policies may differ, and some voters may favor the EU policy in preference to their national policy.

Kritzinger (2003) presents an alternative view emphasizing the political, economic, cultural and historical contexts in which attitudes developed. The key role of national concerns in European parliamentary elections supports this hypothesis (Franklin et al., 1995). Lacking specific EU knowledge, voters use their evaluations of domestic politics (Anderson, 1998). Much of their general EU information is also filtered through national politicians. Garry and Tilley (2009) also argue that apart from a cost-benefit calculation, attitudes are influenced by national identity. But there is little agreement on the nature of this influence. Carey (2002) linked a strong sense of national identity with anti-integration views. Haesly (2001) finds the opposite. Garry and Tilley (2009) reconcile these conclusions by arguing that its impact depends upon the country's

situation, e.g. with respect to income per capita. In passing we note that their control variables included age; sex; employment status and education level, finding support for the EU to be associated with being relatively highly educated; middle class; male; and satisfied with the domestic economic performance.

Ordinary citizens may link their views of national and EU politics in one of two opposed ways. The 'equal assessments' hypothesis suggests that people interpret both from similar viewpoints, perhaps because national politicians also participate at inter-governmental meetings (Anderson, 1998). A counter perspective sees national and EU politics as alternatives, even rivals: those disillusioned with one may see the other as a more attractive way forward. Using 1994 Eurobarometer data Kritzinger (2003:237) concluded that 'The EU is used as a proxy for symbolic protest against the present national political and economic situation'.

Attitude Determination

Respondents' Attitudes towards USA policies

Because anti-Americanism, the key variable that we analyze, is binary we use probit regression. The literature review showed that there has been only limited empirical research into anti-Americanism; much of it focusing on differences between countries

rather than on individuals within countries. The novelties in this paper are that it provides the first large-sample regression models using multi-country individual citizen data; and that it includes the first empirical analysis that explores a possible link between EU citizens' opinions on US policies and their opinions on EU integration.

The primary independent variables of interest are those relating to the country fixed effects, the regional variables and the individual's policy preference variables. We focus on four policy issues: terror, the economy, defense and the environment, using a simple measure that reflects whether the individual thought they were important. These are included because for example individuals' attitudes to US policies may in part depend upon the relative importance they place on the environment as compared to terrorism as policy issues. Country specific attitudes will differ and again memory will be relevant, although this time it is likely to be the collective memory of a nation that, as noted above, determines attitudes to the USA. Within a country there may be regional differences in attitudes, perhaps linked in part to the presence of American military bases or US multinationals in particular regions.

Following common practice in analyzing political attitudes our control variables include the socio-economic variables of age; education; sex; occupation; a measure of the respondent's household income relative to their country's average household income;

and a variable that reflects respondents' trust in big business. Not all these variables are available for all three surveys.

The variables are defined in the Appendix. A brief rationale for their inclusion is as follows.

The literature survey indicated that views of USA policy or its effects may be influenced by respondents' views of the USA's government, people, culture, power, and social and economic systems. Attitudes towards these factors have changed over time and location. Attitudes may be partly influenced by knowledge, including personal experience. To some extent they may be related to social norms and hence reference groups, conventional wisdom, and even irrational bias. In turn these influences can sometimes be linked to the independent variables used here.

For example educated people may be more aware of issues such as the violation of human rights in Abu Ghraib, or climate change, which in turn could fuel a blanket opposition to US policies. Variables such as age, sex and education may be related to direct experience of American culture, including music, films or fast food outlets that may be factors influencing respondents' attitudes to America. Age may also be relevant in providing a direct memory of periods such as the Cold War and the Second World War² when American power was often viewed more favorably than in the Bush era.

Location can also influence exposure to American culture: for example exposure to fast food outlets or US multinationals is more likely in large cities than rural areas.

Respondents' Attitudes to European Integration

The focus is on policies with international spillovers; defense related foreign policy and also the EU constitution. We follow Hass (1958) and others and assume those who favor greater European integration feel that they will benefit from it – individually or altruistically, or both. Their views are uninfluenced by the appropriate service delivery level (Oates, 1999), because this is a given. International influence and defense capability increase with economic size. Hence a united EU voice has more impact than any single member country, and possibly more than the sum of all members. But integration also entails a loss of sovereignty and a country may become committed to support and finance policies it opposes.

Individual differences towards EU integration will thus arguably largely depend upon how the individual perceives the national interest and the extent to which they are willing to trade national sovereignty for a greater global role. Such attitudes are likely to be driven by national pride and identity, and therefore we include the socio-economic factors that are standard in this type of analysis as well as country-fixed effects. But as with our analysis of EU citizens' views of USA policy, and similar studies of Central

and Eastern European attitudes to the EU and to NATO (Caplanova et al., 2004), we include regional variables, in this case to pick up any effects of localized EU investment.

In addition we also include attitudes to the USA. There are two possibilities. The first and most obvious is that anti-Americanism will drive European integration. This is consistent with an analysis of the institutional choices of EU constitutional delegates in the area of EU foreign policy (Jensen et al., 2007). They found that delegates from states that had not deployed troops in support of the US-led Iraq invasion were more likely to support EU integration. Their explanation was that such states would be more interested in creating a European foreign policy capable of counterbalancing the USA because they are more opposed to US policy. But with individual citizens' attitudes there is also the reverse possibility: that people are opposing a superpower and will not want to see a second superpower grow from the nations of Europe, even though, or perhaps especially as, they will be part of that superpower.

Data and Analysis

We have already described the Eurobarometer sample frame and interview procedures. Our probit regressions use the survey's attitudinal and characteristics data to explore their inter linkages. The variables are defined in the appendix. The key variable is, of

course, the one relating to anti-Americanism, and it is measured by sustained opposition to American policies across five dimensions of policies: peace, terrorism, poverty, the environment, and world growth.

Attitudes to the EU are measured in relation to voter support for a greater co-ordination of defense policy, foreign policy, an EU military rapid reaction force, a common crisis response position and greater independence of foreign policy from the USA. In the two recent surveys, data on the last three were not available, but there was information on support for an EU constitution. The constitution apart, these are predominantly foreign policy and defense issues that could be addressed by inter-state agreements. Hence greater EU co-ordination implies a reduction in national sovereignty. Of course to an extent this is also the case for the EU constitution. In our analysis of the 2003 survey, the individuals' incomes were approximated by the mid point of the income range in which the survey placed them. Their relative income was calculated as the ratio of this approximation to the country average. In the later surveys data on income was not reported, but data on life satisfaction and in the 2005 survey on individual personal circumstances in the recent past were available and were used.

Insert Table 1 about here

4.1 Voters' views on US policies

Table 1 reports attitudinal variables. The first column in the top half of Table 1 records the proportion classified as anti-American in 2003, i.e. disapproving of US policy with respect to all five policy areas of peace, terror, poverty, environment and growth. The alternatives include positive views and respondents with neither positive nor negative feelings. The proportions are quite high, and much higher than would be the case if views were randomly distributed between alternatives across the different issues. Thus in France in the 2003 sample, randomly distributed attitudes would lead to 9.6%³ disapproving of US policy on all five dimensions, not the 34.7% we see, and in the UK we would have seen less than 0.1% defined as anti-American not 9.2%.

There are also considerable differences between countries for (2003; 2005; 2006). At the one extreme we have France (34.7%; 28.1%; 27.4%), Spain (33.2%; 36.3%; 30.0%) and in particular Greece (68.0%; 64.1%; 62.9%) with a very high proportion of people classified as consistently disapproving of American policies. At the other extreme Denmark (7.5%; 8.0%; 9.7%) and Sweden (10.2%; 8.2%; 10.4%) have only small minorities classified as anti-American. But across the three years an average of seven EU15 countries had more than 20% of respondents holding negative views on all five issues.

The bottom half of the table also extends the number of countries to the EU27 for (2005; 2006). The new member countries except for Cyprus (45.0%; 53.3%) and Slovenia (29.7%; 21.9%), are much less critical of the US than ‘old Europe’.

Insert table 2 about here

Table 2 reports the 2006 distribution of the population disagreeing with US policies in terms of the number of issues. Ordering the distribution in this way reveals the wide range of approval or disapproval patterns across countries. Greece and Cyprus again stand out as having high levels of disagreement with the US on all issues and the East European countries and Malta as having very low levels of disagreement. Ireland and Italy have high levels of zero disagreements, but a growing number of multiple disagreements. France, Germany, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg have few who are strongly supportive, but large numbers who are unsupportive on multiple issues. Austria, the UK, Spain, Portugal, and Slovenia show varying degrees of polarized disagreement patterns, with 0 and 5 disagreements the two modes. Spain and Portugal are strikingly polarized. Sweden exhibits the opposite pattern, with 2 as the mode; and the Netherlands views are almost equally distributed across the categories.

Insert table 3 about here

Table 3 gives the regression results for attitudes to US policies. The use of squares of ages allows different age cohorts to have different reactions, perhaps reflecting the history of US involvement in Europe. Note that because of the variation in some questions across the three surveys, replication of results cannot always be tested.

Table 3 shows

1. In 2005 and 2006 age has a non-linear impact, significant at the 1% level, which indicates that consistent opposition to American policies first increases and then declines with age. Based on equations 2 and 4 from the Table, in 2006 and 2005 the turning points are 50 and 48 years respectively.
2. In 2005 and 2006 more educated people were significantly more hostile than less educated people.
3. In 2003, as income increased hostility to American policies declined. In 2005 and 2006 people who were dissatisfied with their life and whose personal situation had recently deteriorated tended to be more hostile to American policies.
4. People who lived in villages and rural areas tended to be less hostile to US policies than those who lived in small towns, who again were less hostile than those who lived in cities.

Both the income and age impacts might have been expected, with richer voters and those with memories from the height of the cold-war more supportive towards the USA. The USA's association with capitalism may attract the wealthy.

Attitudinal variables are significant along several dimensions. Concern with terrorism tends to increase broad support for USA policies. The environment is also a key issue of increasing salience, with those who felt the environment to be important disapproving of American policies. But even more than the environment, attitude to big business is a defining issue. In the two years for which we have data, mistrust of big business is highly significant in increasing disapproval for American policies. Apart from individual preferences and characteristics, people are also influenced by factors specific to their region. When anti-Americanism in the region is high this tends to influence an individual's views. This suggests either that people are influenced by those around them, or that there are specific factors relevant to a region.

The country coefficients reflect differences in attitudes compared to a base country - here Finland. The choice of Finland has no substantive impact on the results. Choosing a different country would have altered the size of the country dummy coefficients, but not their relative ordering. These country fixed effects are not shown in the tables, but Figure 1 reflects their average values from the regressions in columns 1 and 3 of Table

3⁴. Hence, given all other variables, it reflects an attitude to the USA which characterizes the country as a whole. Of the EU15 the least favorable to the USA are Greece, Spain, Luxembourg and France. Sweden and Denmark are more favorable. In general the new entrants are more favorable to the USA with the exception of Slovenia and Cyprus. But it is clear on this that ‘new Europe’ is less disapproving of the USA than ‘old Europe’. The difference between France and the UK narrowed throughout the three years, with both countries showing some convergence. Nonetheless, based on the third regression from the Table, for a ‘representative individual’⁵ the probability of being opposed to US policies on all five issues is 0.18 in the UK and over 50% greater at 0.28 in France. In Greece and Lithuania the probabilities are 0.64 and 0.04 respectively.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Insert Table 4 about here.

Voters` views of EU policies

Table 1 also shows basic data on respondents` attitudes towards EU policies.

Specifically it shows the proportion who approved of greater EU integration or co-operation out of all those surveyed, including ‘don’t knows’. In 2003 a large majority of

respondents in all EU countries favored foreign policy independence from the USA. Other foreign and defense issues follow a similar pattern. The only exception was UK respondents' views on a more coordinated foreign policy, with slightly less than half of those questioned in favor. This general pattern of support was largely repeated in 2005 and 2006 even amongst the new EU entrants.

In Table 4, we focus on the relationship between respondents' attitudes to the USA and their support for European integration. In the 2003 sample regressions, the binary variable, 'anti-American', reflecting negative attitudes along the five dimensions of support for the USA, is significant. That is, those classified as anti-American are more likely to support an EU foreign policy more independent of the USA's. They are however *less* likely to support EU defense policy co-ordination and also foreign policy co-ordination, the creation of a rapid reaction force and holding common positions in the face of crises⁶.

Turning to the other variables, support for greater EU independence from the USA increased with the level of education, and was higher for men. Men were also more favorable to an expanded EU role in foreign and defense issues, including a rapid reaction force. Country dummies (not shown) suggest that Denmark and Finland were the most hostile to the force, with Greece and Spain being the most favorable.

Responses reflect both attitudes to integration and willingness to project military force. On the individual policy preferences, concern with the economy tended to be associated with support for a stronger EU, as was to a lesser extent environmental concern. Finally, mistrust of national governments and also big business was linked to reduced support for a stronger EU.

In the 2005 and 2006 samples there were questions on attitudes to defense and foreign policy but not on the other issues. However, there was an additional question on the EU constitution. The results were largely consistent with those for 2003 with respect to the impact of anti-Americanism. They were also similar with respect to education and attitudes to the economy. In addition those whose personal situation had deteriorated tended to be more hostile to a strengthening European union. Distrust of big business also tended to reduce support for EU integration. Finally again there were significant regional impacts: where there were high levels of mistrust of the EU, the individual was also less likely to be favorable to EU integration⁷. This could again be due to peer group influence or to specific factors unique to the region such as EU regional aid. However in a region characterized by high levels of anti-Americanism, individuals were more likely to exhibit positive views on issues relating to EU integration, especially on the constitution. This slightly compensates for the reverse impact of individual views.

Conclusions

We defined anti-Americanism as consistent opposition to USA policy, and focused our study on those EU voters who took a negative view of that policy in all of the five dimensions covered in the Eurobarometer surveys. Our three questions were: (i) Is there clear evidence of the existence of anti-Americanism in the EU electorate? (ii) Is anti-Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal characteristics? (iii) Do those who consistently disapprove of US policies also share an identifiably similar set of opinions on the foreign policy or future political development of the EU?

Our results show strong evidence of anti-Americanism linked to age, education, policy preferences, national origin, and in particular mistrust of big business. The latter strongly suggests that a root cause of anti-American attitudes is anti-capitalism. If so the financial crisis and recession of 2007-10 is unlikely to increase support for the USA, notwithstanding the considerably greater popularity of President Obama outside America, compared to that of his predecessor.

In 'old Europe' anti-Americanism is less common in the UK⁸, Italy, Ireland and Sweden. Greece, France and Spain stand out in having consistently more unfavorable attitudes. As we noted this pattern is consistent with these countries historical experiences. However, attitudes to the USA are in general considerably more positive in

‘new’ than in ‘old Europe’. EU expansion does appear to have made its members, at least on average, less hostile to USA policy.

Excepting Ireland, this pattern of country support also matched explicit initial support for the Iraq war. It may also have adversely affected American multinationals and US exports (Anholt and Hildreth, 2004). The lesson is that a ‘hard power’ victory can come at the expense of a ‘soft-power’ defeat (Nye, 2004).

European hostility to America also has implications for the EU. We showed that EU voter anti-Americanism leads to a demand for less dependence on the US, though not for an EU to rival America. Indeed the reverse is the case – disapproval of American policies was not linked to a desire for greater European defense and foreign policy integration, nor for an EU constitution. In the main, EU voters who feel American policies have been bad for the world do not want a more powerful EU. Finally it is important to stress that there are important differences within the regions of countries and between urban and rural areas. Therefore it can be an oversimplification to label a country as being pro-EU integration or anti-American policy: some regions are, some are not.

The conclusions we have reached provide an extensive and nuanced answer to the question in our title “Who is anti-American in the European Union”. We relied on large scale and repeated surveys of public opinion. But it is worth recalling an important limitation of this type of analysis. The data does not allow us to distinguish opinion from distrust or indeed bias and prejudice. That limitation can be important if the views we have recorded influence EU or EU member states` policy. The obvious extension to our research would be to explore the impact of European anti-Americanism on European policy and relations with the USA.

Notes

We are grateful to Alice Leonard and to Roger Eatwell for comments and suggestions.

1. As well as a small number in potential EU countries that we do not analyze.
2. Memories of both periods may vary across EU countries.
3. There are several ways of calculating expected anti-Americanism that incorporate the assumption that each outcome is equally probable. For example the quoted figure for France is based on the assumption that the 72.9%, 48.3%, 53.9%, 73.4% and 69% who had negative views on USA policy with respect to peace, terror,

growth, the environment and poverty were distributed randomly across the population, with individual views not being correlated across policies.

4. These relate to 2005 and 2006, the two years for which we have a full complement of countries.
5. Defined here as a forty year old town based woman with a university degree, who is fairly satisfied with her life and whose personal situation has improved.
6. It seems unlikely that endogeneity – for example, that respondents' attitudes to greater coordination of EU defence policies contribute to their disapproval of American policies – will be a problem. But to test this hunch we included an independent variable representing respondents' mistrust of the EU, in regressions where the dependent variable was anti-Americanism – as in Table 3. In 2005 and 2006 at the regional level mistrust of the EU had strongly impacted on respondents' attitudes to EU policies. So if attitudes to EU policy integration do impact on anti-Americanism, this variable should be significant. In fact in none of the regressions was this true, even at the 20% level of significance.
7. Trust in the EU was not included for the individual as it is too closely related to the independent variable, rather than being a causal factor impacting on it. A measure of life satisfaction was also excluded because of a potential endogeneity issue if dissatisfaction with EU integration decreased individual wellbeing. Its inclusion had

little impact on other variables though there was evidence that greater dissatisfaction reduced support for integration.

8. Although evidence suggests it has been increasing in the UK, particularly since 2003.

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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS

Individual Independent Variables:

Male: female=0, male=1.

Age: Respondent`s age in years.

Village/Town: Coded 1 if the individual lived in a village or rural area/ town, otherwise zero.

Education Age an individual finished full time education. Coded: 1 for <16 years; 2 for 16-19 years; 3 for >19 years.

Self-employed, unemployed, house person, manual worker Coded 1 if the respondent fell into any of these categories; otherwise zero.

Household income relative to country average Measured by the ratio of household income to average income in a respondent's country. Income data uses a twelve-point scale. Its proxy was the mid point of the range corresponding to the scale point.

Attitudes to Terror, the economy, defense and the environment: a question that asked for the two most important issues then facing the country; from a choice of

twenty four. Coded 1 if mentioned and zero otherwise. Used as independent variables in the regressions.

Trust in big companies and also in the national government. Coded 1 for no trust, and zero for trust or do not know.

Personal Situation: coded 1 if the individual believed their personal situation had improved over the previous five years; 2 if it was unchanged; and 3 if it had worsened.

Life satisfaction: Coded from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not at all satisfied).

Attitudes to US Policy

Anti-American A binary variable taking a value of one when negative responses were given to all five questions on attitudes to the USA. These were in response to the question ‘In your opinion would you say that the United States tends to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role regarding’ The questions covered (i) world peace; (ii) the fight against terrorism; (iii) the fight against world poverty; (iv) protecting the world environment and (v) growth of the world economy.

Attitudes to EU Policy:

Independent of USA Responses to the question ‘The European Union already has a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend

to agree or disagree with each of the following statements? European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States Foreign Policy'. Coded 0 (tend to disagree), 1 (don't know) and 2 (tend to agree).

Defense and Foreign Policies Responses to questions on whether the EU should have common defense and foreign policies. Coded 0 for against, 1 for don't know, and 2 for in favour.

International Crisis Responses to a question on whether in a crisis the EU member states should have common position. Coded as above.

Military Reaction Force (MRF) Response to a question on whether the EU should have a military rapid reaction force for international crises. Coded as above.

European Constitution Whether the respondent favored a constitution for the European Union; Coded as above.

Regional Variables:

Averages calculated for education; for trust in the EU and for the anti-American variable for the region the individual lives in. The average excludes the individual. In 2006 the EU had 334 regions, ranging from just one for Malta to 28 for Bulgaria, 21 for France and 17 for Spain. In 2005 there had been 328 regions, with unchanged numbers for most countries, but fewer regions for Bulgaria. In 2003, with a smaller number of

EU members there had been only 194 regions, but again with unchanged numbers for most countries.

Table 1: Attitudes to US and European Integration

2003	<i>EU Policies:</i>								
	Anti-American	Foreign Policy	Defense Policy	MRF	International Crisis	Independent of USA			
Austria	28.2	66.5	62.0	56.4	75.0	77.0			
Belgium	26.4	73.8	80.6	75.2	85.4	75.0			
Denmark	7.5	55.3	57.7	53.9	80.3	75.5			
Finland	14.9	56.1	51.8	50.8	76.4	88.5			
France	34.7	68.8	77.3	76.4	87.1	79.1			
Germany	19.2	76.7	80.4	58.4	85.3	84.2			
Greece	68.0	81.9	84.7	75.2	85.9	88.0			
Ireland	13.1	61.3	51.7	60.8	72.7	74.5			
Italy	16.7	78.7	86.4	72.4	87.9	74.5			
Luxembourg	21.0	85.2	93.1	71.2	93.8	80.3			
Netherlands	13.6	69.9	78.1	68.6	83.3	76.0			
Portugal	23.6	63.2	74.8	69.4	76.5	68.9			
Spain	33.2	70.3	77.0	69.4	78.6	75.0			
Sweden	10.2	55.7	55.5	67.3	83.6	87.1			
UK	9.2	40.9	50.0	70.2	72.9	67.4			
2005	<i>EU Policies:</i>				2006	<i>EU Policies:</i>			
	Anti-American	Foreign Policy	Defense Policy	Consti-tution		Anti-American	Foreign Policy	Defense Policy	Consti-tution
Austria	22.0	63.6	62.7	49.0	19.3	63.4	62.6	51.5	
Belgium	30.4	62.0	70.5	61.5	38.6	57.8	67.2	61.3	
Denmark	8.04	60.3	69.3	45.4	9.7	61.6	68.8	46.3	
Finland	20.1	59.2	60.5	47.5	18.9	60.8	61.8	53.1	
France	28.1	71.4	82.4	66.9	27.4	69.6	81.2	64.6	
Germany	18.5	79.0	87.3	74.2	17.9	78.1	84.7	73.6	
Greece	64.1	74.0	77.7	68.2	62.9	80.0	82.2	72.1	
Ireland	14.5	58.8	57.3	57.5	18.4	58.9	51.9	57.3	
Italy	15.5	71.7	77.0	72.8	15.6	70.3	76.0	69.8	
Luxembourg	21.8	72.0	86.3	69.0	31.0	73.8	86.0	70.8	
Netherlands	14.0	69.9	82.1	63.0	17.8	69.1	78.7	58.3	
Portugal	23.6	56.2	66.6	57.9	29.9	55.1	63.5	55.1	
Spain	36.3	63.3	69.3	61.2	30.0	64.0	68.5	60.1	
Sweden	8.2	54.9	62.5	44.5	10.4	53.0	57.3	45.4	
UK	17.6	49.8	58.3	46.5	19.0	49.5	57.8	43.3	
Bulgaria	7.5	69.8	77.6	65.2	8.8	70.0	76.2	63.9	
Cyprus	45.0	80.7	87.8	73.1	55.3	76.7	86.9	73.0	
Czech R.	4.9	68.9	87.3	49.1	5.2	67.1	85.8	55.3	
Estonia	5.0	69.8	81.6	47.2	5.3	66.7	79.8	52.8	
Hungary	9.8	72.4	82.3	75.3	10.9	71.9	80.0	73.0	
Latvia	6.5	72.7	87.3	56.0	5.8	72.2	85.9	57.2	
Lithuania	3.3	70.6	81.7	63.5	2.9	70.3	81.9	65.9	
Malta	6.6	50.2	56.8	56.0	7.4	51.2	59.8	57.0	
Poland	5.3	74.9	83.6	58.7	4.3	77.3	83.2	62.8	
Romania	3.9	70.8	75.4	69.8	4.7	69.9	75.5	67.0	
Slovakia	9.7	72.3	87.4	64.1	9.6	74.1	85.7	66.1	
Slovenia	29.7	76.8	84.3	73.5	21.9	79.4	84.8	77.7	

For each year figures in the first column show the percentage classified as anti-American, i.e. disapprove of American policy on all five issues; and in the second and subsequent columns, those in favor of greater European co-operation or independence from the USA on various issues.

Table 2: Percentage Disagreeing with (0 to 5) US Policies in 2006

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Austria	21.46	13.58	15.55	15.94	14.17	19.29
Belgium	10.37	11.17	12.96	19.64	23.63	22.23
Bulgaria	51.50	15.65	11.11	7.73	5.22	8.79
Cyprus	11.33	5.17	5.57	10.14	12.52	55.27
Czech	49.40	16.87	14.30	8.80	5.41	5.22
Denmark	16.75	19.64	19.84	16.55	17.55	9.67
Estonia	42.20	19.80	17.10	11.10	4.50	5.30
Finland	13.60	12.50	16.80	17.90	20.30	18.90
France	10.33	10.63	13.31	16.39	21.95	27.41
Germany	10.23	11.22	13.48	20.87	25.84	18.36
Greece	6.60	2.90	6.30	10.40	10.90	62.90
Hungary	38.81	16.82	13.23	13.03	7.16	10.95
Ireland	31.40	9.30	15.60	12.90	12.40	18.40
Italy	39.46	11.53	12.13	11.23	10.04	15.61
Latvia	44.24	20.00	16.85	8.18	4.93	5.81
Lithuania	63.80	14.00	10.70	5.50	3.10	2.90
Luxembourg	15.20	10.40	13.00	15.20	15.20	31.00
Malta	53.60	14.40	11.40	6.60	6.60	7.40
Netherlands	13.95	16.80	17.68	16.50	17.29	17.78
Poland	47.30	17.90	17.00	7.60	5.90	4.30
Portugal	30.55	7.64	13.07	9.65	9.15	29.95
Romania	64.85	13.47	7.93	5.54	3.53	4.68
Slovakia	36.85	16.13	17.11	13.10	7.23	9.58
Slovenia	19.40	11.54	17.26	15.62	14.26	21.92
Spain	38.68	5.48	7.48	9.57	8.77	30.01
Sweden	13.62	15.50	21.22	19.84	19.45	10.37
UK	20.71	16.79	14.53	14.67	13.97	19.34

Source: Calculated from the Eurobarometer survey, September-October 2006

Table 3: Regression Analysis: Attitudes to the US:

Variable	2006		2005		2003	
Age	0.0116** (3.56)	0.011** (3.34)	0.0108** (3.18)	0.0078* (2.28)	0.0063 (1.30)	0.005 (1.01)
Age ²	-0.0116** (3.56)	-0.0109** (3.32)	-0.0113** (3.31)	-0.009* (2.46)	-0.006 (1.14)	-0.0045 (0.89)
Male	0.0278 (1.35)	0.030 (1.44)	0.0184 (0.87)	-0.0208 (0.97)	-0.0574 (1.91)	-0.0632* (2.07)
Village	-0.0969** (3.78)	-0.0803** (3.02)	-0.1143** (4.35)	-0.0797** (2.86)	-0.0284 (0.75)	-0.0199 (0.50)
Town	-0.0540* (2.10)	-0.0418 (1.58)	-0.0693* (2.18)	-0.0320 (1.17)	0.0196 (0.55)	0.0072 (0.19)
Education	0.0774** (5.01)	0.0726** (4.63)	0.0613** (3.87)	0.0489** (3.01)	-0.0012 (0.05)	-0.0147 (0.62)
Self-employed	-0.0558 (1.43)	-0.0552 (1.39)	0.0091 (0.22)	0.0110 (0.26)	0.1231* (2.17)	0.1279* (2.22)
House Person	-0.0435 (1.17)	-0.0226 (0.61)	-0.077* (2.07)	-0.0527* (1.39)	-0.0054 (0.10)	0.0135 (0.25)
Un-employed	0.0337 (0.79)	0.0376 (0.87)	0.0249 (0.56)	-0.0315 (0.70)	0.073 (1.17)	0.0736 (1.17)
Manual Worker	-0.0178 (0.64)	-0.0198 (0.07)	-0.0151 (0.54)	-0.0152 (0.54)	0.0021 (0.05)	0.0057 (0.15)
Income					-0.0991** (3.22)	-0.0706* (2.26)
Life satisfaction	0.1089** (7.51)	0.105** (7.16)	0.0677** (4.51)	0.0401** (2.62)		
Personal situation			0.0875** (6.15)	0.0784** (5.41)		
<i>Policy Issues</i>						
Terror		-0.1572** (4.24)		-0.0813* (2.10)		-0.1528** (3.11)
Economy		0.0067 (0.28)		-0.0274 (1.13)		0.0092 (0.26)
Defense		-0.0478 (0.73)		-0.0186 (0.24)		0.1098 (1.74)
Environment		0.180** (3.82)		0.136* (2.55)		0.073 (1.05)
Trust big Business				0.3275** (15.30)		0.2986** (10.02)
<i>Regional</i>						
Education		-0.0798 (1.21)		-0.073 (1.02)		0.0343 (0.35)
Anti American		2.371** (19.11)		2.223** (17.63)		2.602** (15.32)
Constant	-1.448** (13.94)	-1.729** (9.34)	-1.370** (13.02)	-2.081** (10.68)	-1.073** (7.77)	-1.684** (6.16)
Observations	25656	25656	25234	25234	10755	10755
Log likelihood	-10467	-10263	-10126	-9814	-5110	-4924
X ²	2976	3384	3027	3651	1143	1518


Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. **/* denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels of significance. Equations estimated by probit in STATA. Country fixed effects included. X² denotes the likelihood ratio statistic. The policy issues relate to respondents' concerns with these topics as issues, and so differ from their perceptions of the USA on similar policy areas (see the data appendix).

Table 4: Regression Analysis: Attitudes to European Integration

Variable	2006			2005			2003			Military Re- action force	Crisis position	Independent of USA
	Foreign Policy	Defense policy	Constitution	Foreign Policy	Defense Policy	Constitution	Foreign Policy	Defense Policy	Constitution			
Age	0.0114** (4.40)	0.0046 (1.66)	-0.0019 (0.77)	0.0172** (6.37)	0.0136** (4.63)	0.0079** (3.05)	0.0064 (1.52)	-0.0011 (0.25)	-0.0144* (3.40)	0.0078 (1.62)	0.0012 (0.25)	
Age ²	-0.0116** (4.49)	-0.0077** (2.77)	-0.0012 (0.48)	-0.0161** (5.95)	-0.016** (5.37)	-0.0087** (3.34)	-0.0042 (0.96)	0.0018 (0.41)	0.0136** (3.44)	-0.0059 (1.19)	-0.0008 (0.16)	
Male	0.116** (6.84)	0.118** (6.48)	0.0948** (5.82)	0.1395** (8.11)	0.1380** (7.34)	0.0808** (4.93)	0.1187** (4.53)	0.0911** (3.34)	0.162** (6.26)	0.1603** (5.35)	0.0741* (2.53)	
Village	-0.0467* (2.18)	-0.0109 (0.48)	-0.0055 (0.27)	-0.0147 (0.66)	-0.0088 (0.37)	-0.0501* (2.35)	0.0792* (2.31)	0.0868* (2.42)	0.1099** (3.26)	0.1774** (4.59)	0.0247 (0.66)	
Town	-0.0337 (1.57)	-0.0028 (0.12)	-0.0131 (0.64)	0.0582** (2.63)	0.0709** (2.95)	0.0184 (0.87)	0.0542 (1.71)	0.0315 (0.96)	0.1317** (4.23)	0.1483** (4.17)	0.0179 (0.51)	
Education	0.1504** (11.77)	0.1567** (11.47)	0.149** (12.10)	0.1505** (11.46)	0.1452** (10.23)	0.1256** (10.02)	0.100** (4.85)	0.081** (3.80)	0.0112 (0.55)	0.0289 (1.22)	0.1124** (4.91)	
Self- employed	0.0708* (2.11)	0.0765* (2.12)	0.0611 (1.91)	0.007 (0.19)	-0.0086 (0.23)	-0.0228 (0.70)	-0.0662 (1.26)	-0.0523 (0.95)	-0.0823 (1.61)	-0.0999 (1.70)	-0.0679 (1.16)	
House Person	-0.0692* (2.31)	-0.0421 (1.32)	-0.101** (3.46)	-0.0359 (1.18)	-0.0548 (1.68)	-0.0363 (1.23)	-0.0401 (0.85)	-0.0796 (1.61)	0.0325 (0.69)	0.0789 (1.45)	-0.0724 (1.44)	
Un- employed	-0.0501 (1.45)	-0.0766* (2.06)	-0.0603 (1.80)	-0.0525 (1.49)	-0.0956* (2.48)	-0.0254 (0.75)	-0.094 (1.75)	-0.0414 (0.74)	-0.1349* (2.54)	0.0085 (0.14)	-0.0151 (0.25)	
Manual Worker	-0.0334 (1.49)	-0.0431 (1.78)	-0.044* (2.03)	-0.104** (4.62)	-0.0610* (2.46)	-0.0713** (3.31)	-0.0696* (2.07)	-0.034 (0.98)	-0.0031 (0.09)	-0.0053 (0.14)	-0.069 (1.85)	
Income							0.110** (4.17)	0.110** (4.01)	0.0840** (3.19)	0.145** (4.76)	0.1385** (4.56)	
Personal situation				-0.1013** (9.05)	-0.1050** (8.58)	-0.1142** (10.68)						
Trust Government	-0.238** (14.06)	-0.2485** (13.68)	-0.3026** (18.52)	-0.201** (11.09)	-0.163** (8.25)	-0.252** (14.52)	-0.131** (4.92)	-0.1035** (3.73)	-0.0968** (3.69)	-0.0701* (2.30)	-0.022 (0.74)	
Trust big Business				-0.0898** (5.12)	-0.0753** (3.93)	-0.0923** (5.52)	0.0011 (0.04)	-0.0539 (1.94)	-0.0325 (1.24)	-0.0051 (0.17)	0.113** (3.83)	
Anti American Policy Issues	-0.1167** (5.14)	-0.1726** (7.24)	-0.124** (5.66)	-0.112** (4.82)	-0.1533** (6.20)	-0.0783** (3.50)	-0.1607** (4.94)	-0.2264** (6.72)	-0.2752** (8.71)	-0.2342** (6.50)	0.2369** (6.24)	

Terror	0.0664*	0.0811**	0.0719*	0.1157**	0.0998**	0.0938**	0.0241	0.1232**	0.132**	-0.0557	-0.1006*
	(2.24)	(2.57)	(2.51)	(3.72)	(2.99)	(3.15)	(0.59)	(2.85)	(3.19)	(1.22)	(2.36)
Economy	-0.0234	-0.0255	0.0263	0.1026**	0.1084**	0.0948**	0.1698**	0.1246**	0.0373	0.1459**	0.1732**
	(1.19)	(1.20)	(1.39)	(5.19)	(4.96)	(5.04)	(5.40)	(3.81)	(1.24)	(4.02)	(4.89)
Defense	0.0726	-0.0879	0.1127*	0.0753	-0.0461	0.0501	0.0699	0.1384*	-0.0257	-0.0091	-0.0352
	(1.31)	(1.55)	(2.11)	(1.17)	(0.69)	(0.82)	(1.29)	(2.44)	(0.48)	(0.15)	(0.60)
Environment	0.115**	0.0465	0.1673**	0.0331	-0.1257**	0.1206*	-0.1169	0.0143	-0.1536**	0.043	0.1387
	(2.78)	(1.07)	(4.16)	(0.72)	(2.65)	(2.72)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(2.61)	(0.61)	(1.95)
<i>Regional</i>											
Education	-0.0491	0.0398	0.1713**	0.2159**	0.1453*	0.0367	0.0219	0.0175	-0.0976	-0.1588	0.2459*
	(0.90)	(0.69)	(3.30)	(3.60)	(2.25)	(0.63)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(1.14)	(1.57)	(2.51)
Anti American	0.4155**	0.401**	0.2626*	0.0119	-0.1114	0.2862*	0.231	-0.0079	-0.2899	0.161	0.319
	(3.58)	(3.29)	(2.35)	(0.63)	(0.90)	(2.54)	(1.41)	(0.05)	(1.81)	(0.87)	(1.74)
Trust EU	-0.6727**	-0.819**	-0.6098**	-0.3271**	-0.3978**	-0.393**	-0.5071**	-0.225	0.0517	-0.0371	-0.4237*
	(6.24)	(7.25)	(5.88)	(3.13)	(3.55)	(3.90)	(3.14)	(1.32)	(0.33)	(0.20)	(2.37)
Observations	26776	25776	25776	25331	25331	25331	10775	10755	10775	10755	10755
Log likelihood.	-20942	-17582	-22928	-20274	-16420	-22619	-8655	-7865	-8970	-6120	-6592
X ²	1458	2242	2123	1667	2429	2244	871	1251	697	410	480

Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. **/* denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA. Country fixed effects were included. X² denotes the likelihood ratio statistic. The policy issues relate to people's concerns with these topics as issues, and so differ from their perceptions of the US on similar policy areas (see the data appendix).



Note: This reflects the average of the country fixed effects in the regressions in Table 3 from columns 1 and 3. They have been normalized to a lower bound of 0.