# Why Do People Volunteer? An Experimental Analysis of Preferences for Time Donations

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# Why Volunteer?

- There are multiple reasons people volunteer rather donating money
  - 1. Self-investment (prestige, networking, signaling, social pressure).
  - 2. Enjoyment from the actual volunteering activity.
  - 3. Greater pleasure from the act of volunteering.
- We construct experiments which normalize the selfinvestment motivations and labor task.

## Questions

 Do subjects prefer working for charity (giving time) rather than donating an equivalent amount to charity (giving money), all else being equal?

YES.

By how much?

A LOT.

 Might greater solicitation in the act of donating time explain this result?

NOT ALL OF IT.

- Are time and money substitutes or complements?
   SUBSTITUTES.
- When relative wages aren't equal, do subjects correctly substitute between giving time and donating money to maximize donative impact?

NOT ENTIRELY.

# Subject 272: A flash-forward

- Male, Texan, Political Science Major
- Preferred charity: Doctors without Borders
- Faced experimental treatment with sliders: for each slider completed 3 cents go to charity OR 4 cents go to personal earnings.
  - Can switch at any time, as often as desired.
  - At end of experiment, could give out of personal earnings.
- Completed 1421 sliders in 75 minutes.
  - Chose to earn \$42.63 for charity at \$0.03/slider.
  - Better alternatives: make \$56.84 for oneself at \$0.04/slider.
    - Give \$56.84 to charity.
    - Give \$42.63 to charity, keep \$14.21 for oneself.

### Previous Research

## Experimental evidence on warm glow

- Crumpler and Grossman (2008): agents will donate to charity even under complete crowd-out.
- Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010): warm glow affects both genders (women more) under varying levels of crowd-out.
- Null (2011): warm glow leads to inefficiency with matching.
- Lilley and Slonim (2012): giving consistent with warm glow, donations of time and money are substitutes.

### Solicitation

 Has an impact on likelihood of giving (Andreoni et al., 2011; Meer and Rosen, 2011; Meer, 2011).

### Volunteering vs. Donations

- Mixed evidence on whether donations of time and money are substitutes or complements (Brown and Lankford, 1992; Bauer et al. 2012, inter alia).
- Individuals asked to calculate their hourly wage are less likely to volunteer (Pfeffer and Devoe, 2009).

### Theoretical Model


- Based on Andreoni, Gale, Scholz (1996)
  - Includes personal consumption and leisure.
  - Warm glow from monetary donation, opportunity cost of volunteering, and total impact of gift.
  - Warm glow is equal from donations and volunteering.
  - Impact of solicitation (from DellaVigna et al. 2012).

### Main Predictions

- 1. Giving is nondecreasing in solicitation.
- 2. If wages are equal, then monetary donations and volunteering are equivalent.
- 3. If wages are unequal, then all donations should be from high-wage activity.

## **Experimental Design**

- Conducted at the Economic Research Laboratory at Texas A&M University.
- 414 subjects chose a charity from a list of ten options.



# Experimental Design-First Study

 Performed a 75 minute slider effort task, earning 3 cents per slider plus a \$5 participation award.



- Five conditions:
  - 1. Donate at End (DE): Can only donate from earnings at the end of experiment.
  - 2. Continual Reminder (CR): Can only donate from earnings at the end of experiment; reminded of their charity choice.
  - 3. Continual Donation (CD): Can donate any amount of earnings at any time; reminded of their charity choice.
  - 4. Toggle (T): Can switch effort accrual at any time; reminded of their charity choice.
  - 5. Toggle and Continual Reminder (T+CR): T, along with the ability to donate at the end of the experiment

Earnings \$0.00

#### You will be able to donate to the Special Olympics.

68 / 0	68 / 0	14 , 0
17 , 0	10 ! 0	82 , 0
20 , 0	55 , 0	6 , 0
9 , 0	18 / 0	8 / 0
88 / 0	23 , 0	67 , 0
42 , 0	91 / 0	89 , 0
47 , 0	18 ! 0	45 , 0
31 , 0	83 / 0	65 , 0
30 , 0	54 / 0	47 , 0
88 , 0	88 / 0	24 , 0

	Earnings	Donated Earnings		0:03		
	\$0.00	\$0.00				
You may donate to Feeding America.						
	Donation Amount:	Confirm				
62 , 0	43	. 0	38	, 0		
27 ! 0	42	, o	27	, 0		
49 , 0	50	. 0	64 ,	, 0		
15 , 0	47	. 0	36	, 0		
99 , 0	5 -	, 0	9 /	, 0		
32 , 0	21	. 0	66	, 0		
27 , 0	94	. 0	42	, 0		
97 , 0	56	. 0	15	, 0		
41 , 0	53	, 0	34	, 0		
32 / 0	75	. 0	27	, 0		

Time Remaining: 0:02

Individual Earnings	Charity Earnings
\$0.00	\$0.00

#### You are working for yourself.

#### Switch to Work for Charity

53 / 0	2 0	77 ! 0
39 / 0	5 , 0	8 / 0
60 / 0	81 / 0	52 ! 0
73 ! 0	88 / 0	78 ! 0
68 / 0	17 - 0	77 , 0
16 / 0	74 . 0	31 , 0
59 ! 0	64 / 0	3 , 0
27 ! 0	46 ! 0	19 , 0
79	38 / 0	25 , 0
95 , 0	33 / 0	94 . 0

### **Predictions**

### Solicitation

- CR and CD provide non-actionable and actionable solicitation.
- Total donations increase with solicitation: DE < CR < CD.</li>


# Warm glow

- Volunteering and donating earnings are equivalent.
- Donative pattern: CD = T.
- Alternative: greater warm glow from volunteering causes more donations (CD < T).</li>


### Substitution

- Allowing for gifts of time AND money will not increase giving (T = T+CR)
- Shifting the wage ratio will shift giving towards the more effective mechanism


# Results: Giving



# Results: Percent of Earnings Donated Conditional on Giving



# Results: Percent of Earnings Given (By Source)



### Conclusions

- People have strong preferences to earn directly for charity rather than earning for themselves and giving to charity.
  - Preference exhibited with 33% wage differential.
- Actionable solicitation increases donative behavior.
- Gifts of time and money appear to be substitutes.