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ARTICLES

WHY DO THEY DO IT?: THE MOTIVES, MORES, AND CHARACTER OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS

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INTRODUCTION

Why do talented, bright, highly educated, successful people, who have "made it," risk it all by lying, stealing, and cheating, especially when what they're stealing is not much compared to what they have? The simple answer is, "because they can." This Article looks at the more complex answer. Based upon extensive interviews with seasoned prosecutors and accomplished defense counsel, we explore the views and perceptions traditionally held about white collar criminals.¹ From January through April 2007, we conducted lengthy interviews with forty-five nationally recognized experts in the area of white collar crime.² The

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
 $^{^1}$ See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2007). Approval from the University of Alabama Institutional Review Board, No. 06-0R-213 (on file with the Univ. of Ala. Institutional Review Bd.).

² The authors express their appreciation to the following individuals who participated in this survey: Daniel R. Anderson, Marcella B. Auerbach, Bernard S. Bailor, Raymond Banoun, James M. Becker, Robert S. Bennett, John T. Boese, Plato Cacheris, Leslie R. Caldwell, Peter W. Chatfield, Ian M. Comisky, Stephen S. Cowen, James E. Crowe III, Suzanne E. Durrell, Robert Fabrikant, Gerald A. Feffer,


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interviewees included federal prosecutors, qui tam relators' counsel, and private defense counsel who specialize in defending those accused of white collar offenses.³ The range of years of experience of study participants was vast. All interviewees had at least fifteen years of relevant experience;⁴ over half had between twenty-six and thirty-five years of experience; and

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Infra app. A.


almost one-fifth had thirty-six or more years of experience.⁵ Eighty-six percent of the defense counsel served as federal or state prosecutors prior to entering private practice.⁶ The interview questions in our study are contained in Appendix A; the responses are in Appendix B.

We tested the following hypotheses: (1) most white collar criminals fall into two categories: "leader" or "follower;" (2) those falling into each category display distinct personality profiles; and (3) the methods for deterring crime differ for each category. We found that our hypotheses were generally accurate. Our study results provide guidance, not reflected in current scholarship, for how to effectively deter white collar crime.

Part One of this Article begins with definitions. Part Two discusses our study results, comparing our findings to current scholarship. Part Three concludes with our observations and conclusions.

I. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND

For purposes of this study, "white collar crime" refers to nonviolent, business-related violations of state and/or federal criminal statutes.⁷ At the beginning of the twentieth century,



 5 Infra app. A. The participants also had a high caseload involving corporate defendants.

Infra app. A.

⁶ Infra app. A.

⁷ Almost without exception, study participants defined "white collar criminal" as someone who commits a non-violent, business-related crime. See infra app. B, \S I, question I. Word choice differed from one to the next, but the same general idea runs through each response. Some also described such perpetrators as being in positions of power or "high social standing," some cited specific crimes such as tax or stock

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crime was evaluated from the classical perspective, in which criminal theorists maintained that humans all held the potential to engage in force or fraud out of self-interest, making no distinction between what scholars today segregate into white collar and more violent crime.⁸ Criminal theory then evolved into the positivists' perspective, which took the classical theory even further by speculating that "crime is evidence of biological, psychological, or social pathology" and that force or fraud could only be explained by "special motive or compulsion."⁹ Positivists believed that such compulsion could be traced to "low social class, poverty, or inequality,"¹⁰ which left no room for the possibility that crime was committed by the wealthy in addition to the poor.

Perhaps in reaction to positivist theory, sociologist Edwin Sutherland changed the course of criminology when he coined the term "white collar crime" in a 1939 paper he presented to the American Sociological Society and later detailed in his book, *White Collar Crime*.¹¹ He defined white collar crime as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation."¹²

Statistical studies indicate that white collar crime occurs quite frequently. For example, according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ("CFE"), fraud accounts for 6% of corporate losses in America annually, totaling an estimated \$660 billion each year.¹³ Small businesses of less than 100 employees appear to be more frequent targets of white collar crime, with 46% of frauds being committed at these companies.¹⁴ The largest corporations experience the smallest percentage of fraud

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (Yale Univ. 1983) (1950).

¹² Id.

¹⁴ Id. at 6.

fraud, and several included the distinction that white collar criminals have not committed street crimes or drug crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I. Nearly all participants used the word "business," "financial," or "economic" when describing such crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I.

⁸ See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 181 (1990).

⁹ Id.

¹³ ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE, at iii (2004), *available at* http://www.cfenet.com/ documents/2004RttN.pdf. The CFE found that over 40% of the victimized corporations are privately-held, while just over 30% are public corporations (the balance is represented by government agencies and non-profit organizations). *Id.* at 5.

schemes, though on average fraud in these companies costs more than schemes in much smaller companies.¹⁵

II. STUDY RESULTS

A. White Collar Criminals: "Leaders" and "Followers"?

The notion that white collar criminals can be described as either "leaders" or "followers" is strongly supported in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which, in large part, prescribe sentences based on two factors: the offense conduct and the defendant's criminal history.¹⁶ The Guidelines provide stiffer sentences for those who actually commit a crime versus those who aid and abet, are accessories, or who participate as coconspirators.¹⁷ In this sense, the Guidelines recognize a distinction between those who lead the crime and those who assist in it.¹⁸

Most of the study participants (77.8%) agreed that white collar criminals fall into categories of either "leaders" or "followers."¹⁹ One-fourth of these respondents provided caveats to their responses,²⁰ for example, by identifying a third category as those who "retaliate" either by becoming whistleblowers or by agreeing to testify for the government in exchange for complete immunity, a reduced charge, or a reduced sentence.²¹ Another example would be those who wander unknowingly into white collar crime schemes, never realizing they are violating the law.²²

¹⁷ Id. § 3B1.2.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁵ Id. Corporations with more than 10,000 employees lose on average \$105,500 per scheme, corporations with 1,000 to 9,999 employees lose \$87,500 per scheme, corporations with 100 to 999 employees lose \$78,500 per scheme, and those with fewer than 100 employees lose \$98,000 per scheme. Id. Put further into perspective, employee theft affects 95% of all American organizations. See Christine A. Henle, Predicting Workplace Deviance from the Interaction Between Organizational Justice and Personality, 17 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 247, 247 (2005); see also MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME 23 (1983); GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 8, at 181; SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at 7.

¹⁶ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2005), available at http:// www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.

¹⁹ Infra app. B, § II, question II(a). Meanwhile, five (11.1%) fully disagreed and five (11.1%) saw different gradations of categories or thought there was only one type of white collar criminal—the principal. Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).

²⁰ Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).

²¹ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).

²² See infra app. B, § II, question II(a). One participant, intending to further

Some participants pointed out that the line between "leaders" and "followers" becomes blurred depending on the nature of the investigation and the charges brought against the criminal,²³ and that followers may morph or graduate at some point into principals.²⁴

Study participants who disagreed that white collar criminals fall into the two categories of leaders and followers suggested that it is difficult to fit such criminals into specific categories.²⁵ These respondents thought that the two categories were an "over-simplified view of the world," and that there was "more of a spectrum" and "not a sharp distinction between the two."²⁶ They tended to view white collar criminals as individuals who find themselves involved in schemes that are initially small in scale. but over which they quickly lose control.²⁷ One participant suggested that there are not usually "followers," but there are those who help in the scheme and eventually become principals in it.²⁸ This view is consistent with that of those participants who thought that some white collar defendants get involved in criminal activity before realizing that something is wrong and then stay with the scheme, either because they don't know how to get out or because they decide they can personally benefit from it.29

B. Motives for Committing White Collar Crimes

1. Motives of "Leaders"

Greed was the most commonly cited reason by study participants as to why "leaders" engage in white collar criminal acts.³⁰ Money, financial gain, and greed were cited by almost every participant in the study as the motive for committing crime

- ²⁴ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ²⁵ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ²⁶ Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ²⁷ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ²⁸ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ²⁹ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
- ³⁰ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

distinguish the various types of leaders and followers that exist among white collar criminals, identified four categories of offenders: (1) instigators/designers; (2) outside professionals, such as lawyers and accountants; (3) internal actors with some standing in the organization; and (4) low-level employees. *Infra* app. B, § II, question II(a).

²³ See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).

with some listing this as the sole motivator and others including it among top reasons.³¹ Beyond greed, participants noted opportunity, a sense of entitlement, arrogance, competitiveness, and rationalization as motivating factors.³² Some participants thought that "leaders" are often motivated by fear of failure or of losing one's job or lifestyle.³³ With such fear, desperation kicks in and overrides the individual's inner moral compass.³⁴ Other participants thought that white collar criminals cut ethical corners because of pressure from above to meet particular financial goals.³⁵ In so doing, these actors either convince themselves that the act is not really criminal or they believe their actions are a common practice in their field, and, therefore, they will not or should not get in trouble.³⁶ Interestingly, less than 5% of the study participants expressed the view that white collar criminals commit crimes because they are "amoral" or "evil."37

Convicted white collar defendants confirm these views. For example, Walt Pavlo, Credit Collections Manager at MCI Telecommunications, Inc., who falsified MCI accounts receivables and stole \$6 million from MCI,³⁸ spoke of greed, opportunity, and culture. Pavlo's journey into crime ended in the federal penitentiary. In 1995, Pavlo was a credit and collections manager at MCI whose job was to collect on debts owed to MCI by large corporate clients. Pavlo's job was not easy. MCI had liberally extended large lines of credit to high-risk customers and refused to write-off receivables as bad debt. Most of Pavlo's collection efforts were fruitless. Desperate to keep his job, he began to employ suspect accounting techniques to hide the unpaid debt. Pavlo also found a way to siphon off \$6 million for

- ³⁵ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
- ³⁶ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
- ³⁷ Infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

³¹ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

³² See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

³³ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

³⁴ See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).

³⁸ Interview with Walt Pavlo, Credit Collections Manager, MCI Telecomms. (Mar. 7, 2007). For more information, see MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & JOEL T. BARTOW, EXECUTIVE ROADMAP TO FRAUD: PREVENTION AND INTERNAL CONTROL 186–97 (2006); Greg Farrell & Jayne O'Donnell, Ethics Training as Taught by Ex-Cons: Crime Doesn't Pay, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2005, at 1B; Neil Weinberg, Ring of Thieves, FORBES, June 10, 2002, at 64; Nightline: Walt Pavlo: The Visiting Fellow of Fraud (ABC television broadcast Jan. 30, 2006).

himself. When Pavlo's house of cards finally came crashing down, he turned himself into the FBI and struck a deal.

Pavlo, who holds a Bachelors of Science degree in industrial engineering and a Masters degree in business administration, was a success story before his theft and fraud at MCI. Blond, boyishly handsome, a high school athlete, married with two children, and living in a palatial suburban home, Pavlo had it all—until he went to a federal prison for forty-one months on charges of mail fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice. When he was released from prison, Pavlo and his wife divorced, he found himself unemployable, and at age forty-one, was living at home with his parents and looking for work.

We asked Pavlo why he did it. Cash was certainly a reason. Pavlo admits. Making more money "felt good," and he thought he could "get away with it."³⁹ But, he also felt a lot of pressure from within MCI and did not know how to meet MCI's mandates without cheating. His performance reviews were based entirely on how much of MCI's bad debt he collected. At the time he began falsifying MCI's accounts, Pavlo thought MCI was rampant with fraud. Since everyone around him appeared to be acting unethically, he thought his fraudulent accounting of bad debt and theft of MCI's money would never be discovered. Pavlo admits that at first he was afraid but "[a]fter a while I went through a stage of being afraid ... then I became bitter about how life was going for me, so I was immune to how wrong it was to do what I was doing."40 Toward the end. Pavlo wanted an exit strategy from his scheme, but he had become hooked to the extra Also, he couldn't figure out how to get out without monev. getting caught.

Pavlo talks about how easy it was to cross the line:

I am a cautious person, but once someone opens the door I will charge through it. I have been known to be pretty aggressive. I don't have a lot of fear in taking business risks, though I have more now. I see things pretty quickly, act quickly and don't think things all the way through.⁴¹

⁴¹ *Id*.

³⁹ Interview with Walt Pavlo, *supra* note 38.

⁴⁰ Id.

2. Motives of "Followers"

Compared to the nearly unanimous view of our study participants that "leaders" engage in white collar crimes because of greed, there was less consensus among study participants about the motives of "followers."42 Four different themes emerged from our interviews.⁴³ One view was that "followers" are non-assertive, "weak" people who trail behind someone else, even into criminal schemes.⁴⁴ The second view was that followers are "convinced of the rightness of their cause."⁴⁵ If they have any doubts, they believe that no harm can come to them because they are following a leader whom they trust—or fear.⁴⁶ Followers tend to be naïve and unaware of what is really happening, or they are simply taken in by the personal charisma of the leader and are intensely loyal to that person.⁴⁷ The third view was that followers engage in criminal acts to make more money and because they desire a "piece of the action."⁴⁸ They want to increase their status or receive a promotion, and they believe that if they curry favor with the "leader," they will achieve their ambitions.⁴⁹ These followers believe that criminal acts are the only way to compete.⁵⁰ The fourth view was that the followers are motivated by fear of losing their job or of physical harm⁵¹

C. Personality Traits of White Collar Criminals

1. Personalities of "Leaders"

The study participants who thought that white collar criminals fall into two groups consistently described "leaders" as "Type A" personalities: intelligent, arrogant, cunning, successful, greedy, prone to take risks, aggressive, narcissistic, determined, and charismatic.⁵² Only fifteen percent of study participants

⁴² See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴³ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁴ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁵ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁶ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁷ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁸ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁴⁹ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁵⁰ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁵¹ See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).

⁵² See infra app. B, § II, question II(c). One participant said that

ventured to describe common demographic traits and without exception these participants stated that white collar criminals are most often men, not women,⁵³ and that "leaders" tend to be white, upper-middle class, and well-educated people.⁵⁴

Descriptions of recent high-profile white collar defendants bear out these descriptions. In 2001, news broke regarding massive fraud at Enron committed by CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, along with CFO Andrew Fastow, which had resulted in an overstatement of the company's value by \$1.2 billion.⁵⁵ The entire company eventually went out of business.⁵⁶ Trial observers described Ken Lay, CEO of Enron,⁵⁷ during his fraud trial as "arrogant and controlling from start to finish ... deeply resentful of the government's Enron investigation."⁵⁸ Lav was unapologetic and indignant throughout the trial, even after his conviction. Indeed, he died without ever showing remorse for his In 2002, the SEC began investigating spending actions.59 indiscretions by Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski.⁶⁰ Kozlowski was described as a "supreme narcissist who was also highly skilled in accumulating power by winning people to his point of view" whose actions were motivated by a "sense of entitlement."⁶¹ In 2002. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy as a result of accounting

principals/architects tend to think that the government is after them and that they are the true victims. Infra app. B, II, question II(c).

⁵³ See infra app. B, § II, question II(c).

⁵⁴ See infra app. B, § II, question II(c). It is worth noting that several participants said that there was absolutely no common denominator with respect to demographics among such criminals, and the vast majority (74.3%) said they had not noticed any common demographics. See infra app. B, § II, question II(c).

⁵⁵ Stephen Taub, Subtract Half a Billion: Enron Admits It Overstated Earnings, CFO.COM, Nov. 9, 2001, http://careers.cfo.com/article.cfm/3001976.

⁵⁶ The Rise and Fall of Enron, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/business/5018176.stm.

⁵⁷ Lay was convicted on ten counts of securities fraud. Enron Execs Found Guilty on Multiple Conspiracy, Fraud Charges, DEMOCRACY NOW!, May 26, 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/05/26/1410242.

⁵⁸ Alexei Barrionuevo, Lay Seems to Have Thought Courtroom Was Boardroom, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Atlantic), May 4, 2006, at 13.

⁵⁹ While the case was on appeal, he died of a heart attack and never served his prison sentence. See Shankar Vedantam, Forgive and Forget: Maybe Easier Said than Done, WASH. POST, July 10, 2006, at A02.

⁶⁰ See Press Release, Tyco, Investor Relations (Apr. 17, 2006), available at http://investors.tyco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112348&p=irol-

newsArticle&ID=843274&highlight=. Unlike Enron, Tyco did not collapse—but nine members of its Board of Directors were dismissed. *Id.*

⁶¹ Patricia O'Connell, *The CEO as Thief: A Psychological Profile*, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_51/b3813012.htm.

fraud led by its CEO Bernie Ebbers.⁶² Ebbers has been described as "arrogant and pompous...brusque and shorttempered...dismissive of everyone."⁶³

2. Personalities of "Followers"

This question received the fewest number of responses from our study participants with almost half (44.5%) of the participants either opting out of this question or reporting that they had not observed a typical personality type among followers.⁶⁴ Those who did respond, however, were consistent, describing "followers" as less confident, less aggressive, less ambitious,⁶⁵ passive, subservient, dominated,⁶⁶ gullible, prone to blindly follow others, and less likely to accept responsibility for their own actions. In the view of these study participants, followers tend to view their actions as less culpable since they are only doing what the "leader" asks.⁶⁷

3. Scholarship on Personality Traits of White Collar Defendants

There remains a principled debate among scholars as to what role personality plays in criminality. According to Edwin Sutherland, who first described white collar crime as a phenomenon different from street crime, a flaw of character is not the main cause of white collar criminal activity. Rather, in his view, it is the "situations and social bonds within an organization," that create an environment which encourages white collar crime.⁶⁸

Rational choice theorists largely concur with Sutherland's view, finding that white collar defendants, like other criminal participants, "pursue desired goals, weigh likely consequences, and select among options."⁶⁹ When "[c]riminal opportunity is

⁶² Ebbers Indicted, Ex-CFO Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY.COM, Mar. 2, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/02/technology/ebbers/index.htm.

⁶³ Profile: Bernie Ebbers, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ business/4352553.stm.

⁶⁴ Infra app. B, § II, question II(e).

⁶⁵ See infra app. B, § II, question II(e).

⁶⁶ See infra app. B, § II, question II(e).

⁶⁷ See infra app. B, § II, question II(e).

⁶⁸ Tage Alalehto, *Economic Crime: Does Personality Matter?*, 47 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 335, 335 (2003) (describing Sutherland's views).

⁶⁹ NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 109

attractive as a means of responding to desire to assist family crises or forestalling a fall,"⁷⁰ rational actors will choose it.⁷¹ Like Sutherland, rational choice theorists maintain that corporate culture encourages white collar crime when breaking the law is a rational choice under the circumstances.

Similar to rational choice theory is the view that white collar crime can often be attributed to managerial decisions that push employees to commit crimes out of fear and the pressure placed on them to perform.⁷² Noted scholar Marshall B. Clinard concluded that "[u]ndue corporate pressures upon middle management may lead to their becoming engaged in illegal or unethical behavior."⁷³ Like Sutherland and the rational choice theorists, Clinard concludes that the structure of an organization itself and the ethics it employs determines whether the employees will engage in white collar crimes.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Criminals under this theory are "purposeful, calculating, and instrumental agent[s] who constantly consider[] the pros and cons, risks and sanctions in every single crime opportunity." See Alalehto, supra note 68, at 336.

⁷² Nicole Leeper Piquero & Sally S. Simpson, Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 L. & SOC'Y REV. 509, 510 (2002).

 73 CLINARD, supra note 15, at 22. He conducted a study in which 25% of respondents, all middle managers, said that they themselves endured enough pressure from their employer that it could lead to illegal activities, and 90% said that they believed such pressures generally lead to unethical decisions. Id. at 95. His research further highlighted the extent to which senior management conduct affects the behavior of others in the corporation when more than half of the middle managers he interviewed reiterated that senior managers "dominate" the ethics of the business. Id. at 133.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Zabihollah Rezaee, The Three Cs of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Oct. 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi m4153/is 5 59/ai 93081905. Researcher Zabihollah Rezaee developed a similar theory specific to financial reporting frauds in which he proposed that the wrong combination of conditions, corporate structure, and choice (collectively referred to as the Three Cs) can create an environment that encourages white collar crime. Id. He described conditions as being "the motivations and pressure to engage in financial statement fraud," which frequently surface from outside investor and analyst pressure to meet certain financial targets. Id. A faulty corporate structure would be one in which corporate governance is not taken seriously and what governance exists is plagued by inadequacies. Id. Such structures may be characterized by "aggressiveness, arrogance, cohesiveness, loyalty, blind trust, control ineffectiveness, and gamesmanship." Id. Choice comes into play with managers who must make determinations of whether to employ ethical strategies to improve financial measurements and corporate growth. Id. When considered collectively, the Three Cs create a metric for understanding why financial reporting fraud may be, in fact, encouraged by the corporation itself through the ethics it endorses, the corporate governance structure it maintains, and the inability it has to withstand outside

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⁷⁰ *Id.* at 113.

The modern approach to studying white collar crime focuses more on the criminal's personality traits as a factor in the decision to commit the crime,⁷⁵ although there is disagreement as to how important personality may be,⁷⁶ and which specific personality traits are common among white collar criminals. In general, however, scholars have described eight personality characteristics that fuel white collar criminal activity: (1) need for control; (2) bullying; (3) charisma; (4) "fear of falling;" (5) company ambition; (6) lack of integrity; (7) narcissism; and (8) a lack of social conscience. Significantly, this scholarship, unlike our study participants, does not view white collar criminals as either leaders or followers. As discussed in Part III of this Article, this omission is a missed opportunity for developing effective deterrence strategies for white collar crime.

a. Need for Control

Sally S. Simpson and Nicole L. Piquero⁷⁷ suggest that the need-to-control is a characteristic among white collar criminals.⁷⁸ People with a high desire-for-control are "assertive, decisive, and active."⁷⁹ They usually seek leadership roles in group situations,

Sociological criminology takes the position that no trait of personality has been shown to characterize criminals more than noncriminals. Psychological criminology takes the position that many personality traits have been shown to characterize criminals more than noncriminals. We take the position that both views are wrong. The level of self-control, or criminality, distinguishes offenders from nonoffenders, and the degree of its presence or absence can be established before (and after) criminal acts have been committed. This enduring tendency is well within the meaning of "personality trait" and is thus contrary to the sociological view.

Id. at 108–09 (citations omitted). ⁷⁷ See Simpson & Piquero, supra note 72, at 509.

⁷⁸ See id. at 517-18.

⁷⁹ Nicole Leeper Piquero et al., Integrating the Desire-for-Control and Rational Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 257 (2005) (quoting Jerry M.

pressures to commit fraud in the name of financial success.

⁷⁵ Criminologists have speculated that Sutherland, and others who believe personality should not be considered, failed to understand that simply because white collar criminals do not generally have psychological defects does not mean that their personalities do not affect the crimes they commit. See Alalehto, supra note 68, at 336. Mental illness may not be endemic to white collar criminals, but they still may have personality traits that make them more likely to see crime as the best alternative to other consequences they may face in the workplace.

⁷⁶ See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 8, at 87 ("What [Sutherland's] classical theory lacks is an explicit idea of self-control, the idea that people also differ in the extent to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment."). These theorists further maintain:

accomplish more in the face of adversity, put forth more effort, and are able to visualize the end-goal.⁸⁰ They tend to not take personal responsibility for failure and blame failure on uncontrollable external factors.⁸¹ They also tend to have a perception of control when in fact they do not, and they tend to believe that goals can be attained that are impossible or unusually difficult.⁸² A natural consequence of this view is taking higher risks than otherwise necessary.⁸³

b. Bullying

Other researchers have highlighted executives' tendencies to bully subordinates into compliance with their demands so as to enhance personal gain.⁸⁴ For example, Qwest CEO Joe Nacchio apparently climbed the corporate ladder by seeking complete compliance among Qwest employees.⁸⁵ In describing Nacchio, one senior executive said, "[p]eople (were) just afraid of the man."⁸⁶ He created such "a culture of fear" that Qwest employees thought it was better to comply with his demands rather than question them, or fail to meet his demands and face his wrath.⁸⁷

c. Charisma

One group of modern researchers contends that personal gain motivates only a small majority of executives to commit white collar crimes.⁸⁸ Instead, these researchers suggest that charisma determines a person's propensity to engage in white collar crime.⁸⁹ Charismatic leaders motivate others to implement their vision, are extraordinarily self-assured, have strong

⁸⁹ See id. at 70–71.

Burger & Harris M. Cooper, *The Desirability of Control*, 3 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 381, 383 (1979)).

⁸⁰ See id. at 257–58.

⁸¹ See id. at 258.

⁸² See id.

⁸³ See id.

⁸⁴ See Greg Griffin, Criminal Charges Possible, DENVER POST, Mar. 16, 2005, at A01.

⁸⁵ See id.

⁸⁶ Id.

⁸⁷ Id.

⁸⁸ See Katherine A. DeCelles & Michael D. Pfarrer, *Heroes or Villains?* Corruption and the Charismatic Leader, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 67, 68 (2004).

convictions, and are enthusiastic.⁹⁰ When such leaders come into their position with gusto, others in the organization clamor to follow their direction.⁹¹ Charismatic leaders tend to push the envelope since no internal resistance arises to such efforts. Especially when the charismatic leader arrives at a time of corporate weakness with a mandate to get the company back on course, followers are so desperate for a new direction that they follow the leader, failing to raise concerns at questionable decisions the leader makes.⁹²

d. "Fear of Falling"

Scholars suggest that some white collar defendants commit crimes because "they... [are] fearful of loss of professional or financial status" and are motivated to make unethical decisions to preserve their material wealth, professional reputation, and institutional power.⁹³ Such people "would be reasonably happy with the place they have achieved through conventional means if only they could keep that place."94 As the economy changes or a firm falters, people who have reached the heights of wealth. power, and success grab what they can get before their achievements are washed away by the changing tide.⁹⁵ Thev "perceive this situation as a short-term threat that can be met through short-term fraud,"96 and view themselves as making a small decision that will maintain the status quo until the economy or the firm's course resumes its upward climb.⁹⁷ In short, fear of losing what they have gained, when such loss appears possible, motivates these business people to do what it takes to keep themselves from falling.98

e. The Need for Corporate Success

Other scholars suggest that perhaps it is not personal greed but corporate greed—the desire to "further the interests of the

- 97 Id.
- 98 Id.

⁹⁰ See id. at 69.

⁹¹ See id. at 74-75.

⁹² See id. at 73-74.

⁹³ Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 254 (1999).

⁹⁴ Id.

⁹⁵ See id.

⁹⁶ Id.

firm itself,"⁹⁹ that drives some white collar defendants to commit crimes. This "corporate greed" may come from shareholder pressure to achieve new heights in corporate profitability or growth.¹⁰⁰ Notably, personal greed may often be linked to the interests of a firm, since decisions that propel a company often bring more personal rewards to high-level executives.

f. Narcissism

Australian psychologist Grace Duffield describes general attributes of entrepreneurs turned white collar criminals as "extremely ambitious...obsessed with enhancing power and control," having "a sense of superiority bordering on narcissism" which is fed by "admiration and attention" and which encourages a "sense of entitlement" to "special privileges and extra resources."¹⁰¹

These individuals "lack the ability to put themselves in the place of others,"¹⁰² or envision that the consequences of their actions may fall on the shoulders of numerous other people.¹⁰³ These are people with a great desire for gratification, risk, and personal success, whose need for power and control take on similar attributes to that of a drug addiction.¹⁰⁴ Feed them a little and they will become hooked, constantly wanting to test the waters even deeper and push to the outer limits of ethical behavior.¹⁰⁵

g. Lack of Integrity

Believing that not all behavior is innate but that some is learned, Mortimer Dittenhofer speculates that one identifying personality trait of white collar criminals is "the individual's personal code of conduct—ethics, honesty, morality and other

⁹⁹ Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 576 (1987).

¹⁰⁰ See DeCelles & Pfarrer, supra note 88, at 71–72.

¹⁰¹ David Litterick, *Rich—But by No Means Beyond the Dreams of Avarice*, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2005, at 33.

¹⁰² Karin H. Cather, It's Not an Airborne Virus: Dr. Stanton Samenow Challenges the Disease Model of Drug Addiction, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 2004, at 12.

¹⁰³ See id. at 12–13.

¹⁰⁴ See id. at 11–12.

¹⁰⁵ See id. at 11-13 (stating that all criminals and drug addicts have personalities that favor involvement in a thrilling but unsafe and unethical world in which responsible people refuse to participate).

such generators of integrity."¹⁰⁶ His theory holds that people who lack integrity justify crimes with ease whereas someone with substantial integrity struggles to commit those crimes.¹⁰⁷ These white collar criminals do not seem to fear being caught or what punishments may come their way. They dismiss whatever brief moments of ethical clarity they experience as they rationalize committing the crime.¹⁰⁸ This postulation is made more ominous by the observation of Professor Donald Langevoort that "[i]t is quite likely...that people with a particular facility for rationalization dominate organizational hierarchies."¹⁰⁹

A focus on integrity may be why the personal lives of business executives have come under more scrutiny in recent years. As one seasoned prosecutor noted, there is "a common thread running through some recent scandal-prone companies: Many top executives accused of betraying the trust of shareholders also betrayed the trust of their wives."¹¹⁰ He explained that philanderers and white collar criminals share traits: "If their life is a lie, it's not confined to their personal life."¹¹¹

h. Lack of Social Conscience: "Fish Rot from the Head"¹¹²

Similar to the view that those who succumb and commit white collar crimes have an undeveloped sense of personal integrity is the notion that some individuals lack "social conscientiousness."¹¹³ Professors Judith M. Collins and Frank L. Schmidt examined convicted white collar criminals and described five major components of these individuals' personalities that fueled their propensity to commit such crimes: performance; socialization; tolerance; responsibility; and extra-curricular activity.¹¹⁴ Collins and Schmidt focused on the fifth component,

¹⁰⁶ Mortimer A. Dittenhofer, *The Behavioural Aspects of Fraud and Embezzlement*, PUB. MONEY & MGMT., Jan.-Mar. 1995, at 10.

¹⁰⁷ See id.

¹⁰⁸ See id.

¹⁰⁹ Donald C. Langevoort, *Ego, Human Behavior, and Law*, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 874 (1995).

¹¹⁰ Jayne O'Donnell & Greg Farrell, Business Scandals Prompt Look into Personal Lives, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2004, at B1.

¹¹¹ Id. (quoting Thomas DiBiagio, U.S. Attorney, District of Maryland).

¹¹² Id. (quoting Robert Hogan, a management consultant and psychologist).

¹¹³ Judith M. Collins & Frank L. Schmidt, Personality, Integrity, and White

Collar Crime: A Construct Validity Study, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 295, 295 (1993). ¹¹⁴ Id. at 302–07.

extra-curricular activity, as a common strand connecting the first four components.¹¹⁵ Performance, socialization, tolerance and responsibility each contain this concept of "social conscientiousness," which is the ability to make decisions that are "prosocial."¹¹⁶

D. Guilty Corporations?

Our study participants have a wide range of experience with organizational defendants from caseloads dominated by corporate criminal liability to caseloads where it was almost non-existent. Almost every study participant (91.1%), however, has been involved with defendant or target corporations to some extent.¹¹⁷ Almost half of the participants (46.7%) have caseloads dominated by corporate defendants or targets.¹¹⁸ Just over 10% of the participants deal with criminal corporate liability issues in every case.¹¹⁹

1. Factors Prosecutors Consider in Deciding Whether to Prosecute Corporations

Of our 45 study participants, 80% have had prosecutorial experience at some point in their careers or are currently serving as federal prosecutors.¹²⁰ Their experiences demonstrate the dramatic trend toward prosecuting organizations in recent years. Of the former prosecutors, roughly one-third (37.5%) indicated that they rarely, if ever, charged a corporation criminally during their tenure as a prosecutor.¹²¹ Yet, none of the current prosecutors indicated a similar hesitancy toward prosecuting the corporate entity.¹²²

Interestingly, the factors considered by prosecutors in deciding whether to pursue fictional entities have not changed much over the years despite intense attention in recent years by the United States Department of Justice to developing and refining these factors.¹²³ The key factor mentioned by all of the

¹¹⁵ Id. at 308.

¹¹⁶ Id. at 307–08.

¹¹⁷ Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).

¹¹⁸ Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).

¹¹⁹ Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).

¹²⁰ Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.

¹²¹ Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).

¹²² See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).


¹²³ See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S.

current prosecutors and 40.6% of the former prosecutors was the pervasiveness of the illegal conduct within the corporate structure, including whether upper-level management was involved and whether there was corporate acceptance of the Other factors considered by current and former conduct.¹²⁴ prosecutors alike were: the level of cooperation with law enforcement by the corporation after the fraud was detected, the existing corporate compliance plan, and the harm done by the conduct.¹²⁵ When looking at the harm, current and former prosecutors examined the type of harm (financial or physical). the extent of the harm, and the impact on innocent shareholders and employees.¹²⁶ Other considerations included the level of intent present within the corporation, the deterrence factor, and the likelihood of a conviction.¹²⁷

Many of the defense counsel in our study tended to be somewhat jaded about current prosecutorial decision making. They viewed current prosecutorial decisions as motivated more by public perception or outside influences than the corporation's actions. Despite the continued focus on corporate cooperation and recent U.S. Department of Justice guidelines for prosecutors in charging corporations, only 10.2% of defense counsel thought

¹²⁶ See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).





Infra app. A.

Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm; see also Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.

¹²⁴ Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).

¹²⁵ See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).

current prosecutors consider these guidelines when prosecuting cases.¹²⁸ Rather, over one-fourth of defense counsel (28%) suggested that when choosing which cases to pursue, prosecutors were looking for "impact," were trying to send a message, or seeking publicity.¹²⁹

2. How to Keep Corporations from Being Indicted

Study participants currently in private practice discussed with us strategies a corporation facing potential prosecution should adopt to minimize exposure.¹³⁰ Their advice fell into three categories: (1) the importance of cooperating with the government; (2) distinguishing individuals from the corporate entity; and (3) pursuing and demonstrating internal efforts to address the wrongdoing.¹³¹

Almost half of the defense counsel (43.6%) stated that full cooperation by the corporation with the government was necessary to avoid prosecution or reduce its impact.¹³² As one participant noted, "[t]oday the strategy is complete and total cooperation."¹³³ Within this general strategy, however, there were nuances, with some defense counsel (10.3%) advocating a sliding scale of cooperation, depending on the circumstances.¹³⁴ Almost half of defense counsel interviewed (46.2%) stated that a

¹³¹ See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹²⁸ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b).

¹²⁹ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b). While a majority of the current and former prosecutors interviewed (72%) indicated that there was an impact on a prosecutor's legal career based on the type of cases that were selected to be prosecuted, they articulated the impact as creating expertise, not intentional career advancement. Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(b). While recognizing that prosecutors develop expertise through the cases they handle and to that extent their career is impacted, over one-fourth of the current and former prosecutors (27.8%) observed no career impact based on cases chosen for prosecution. Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(b).

Defense counsel variously mentioned the following as factors for prosecutors' choice: deterrence; political or policy concerns; the priorities of the executive and legislative branches as driving forces; Department of Justice guidelines; the likelihood of prevailing at trial; the merits of the case; the harm involved when making decisions regarding case selections, including the financial harm from the offense; the impact of prosecution on the victims; the ability to recover financially to mitigate the harm caused; and the egregiousness, clarity, and pervasiveness of the crime. See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b).

¹³⁰ See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³² Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³³ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³⁴ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

company should also pursue an "internal strategy," either instead of, or in concert with, the company's cooperation with the government.¹³⁵ Such an "internal strategy" includes compliance programs, internal investigations, and internal punishment of wrongdoers.¹³⁶

Over half of defense counsel (51.3%) spoke of the importance of separating the corporation from potentially culpable employees.¹³⁷ Doing so allows the company "to show [that the wrongdoings were] isolated incidents and that there was no knowledge or approval from upper management."¹³⁸

3. Characteristics of Organizations That Encourage Criminal Activity

While many of the study participants were quick to point out that most, if not all, legitimate companies do not actively encourage criminal activity, they did identify four corporate practices and policies that encourage fraud.¹³⁹

The first such policy was a corporation being driven by the bottom line.¹⁴⁰ Fully one-third of the participants (33.3%) thought that an overriding focus on profit and "meet[ing] the numbers" encouraged criminal activity.¹⁴¹ As one participant noted, corporations that "focus on the profits at the cost of activities that... ferret[] out wrongdoing and punish[] it" are ripe for fraud.¹⁴²

The second characteristic participants noted of companies where fraud occurs was lack of an effective corporate compliance plan.¹⁴³ Over one-fourth of the participants (26.7%) stated the

¹⁴⁰ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

- ¹⁴² Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
- ¹⁴³ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹³⁵ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³⁶ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³⁷ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³⁸ Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a). A small minority of the defense counsel (5.1%) indicated that distinguishing between individuals and the corporate entity was not a sound strategy, with one stating that "corporations should primarily present a united front rather than casting away employees." Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a). Five participants (12.8%) fell between these two positions, indicating that decisions regarding distinguishing individuals from the corporation to avoid prosecution should be made on a case-by-case basis looking to the effect on the corporation, both in the short and long term, and the "extent of the crime or fraud." Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).

¹³⁹ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴¹ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

lack of a strong compliance plan leaves a company vulnerable to criminal activity.¹⁴⁴ While many participants cited the complete absence of a compliance program as a problem, others noted that a compliance plan in name only can be equally problematic.¹⁴⁵ As one participant elaborated, a corporate compliance plan where the head of compliance does not have much power sends a signal that may well encourage fraud.¹⁴⁶

The third corporate policy participants viewed as encouraging fraud was lack of internal controls. Approximately one-third of the participants (31%) viewed ineffective internal controls as a problem.¹⁴⁷ Companies with a weak and dependent board of directors, lack of external and internal auditors, absence of appropriate checks and balances throughout the company, and a decentralized management structure were noted as being more susceptible to fraud.¹⁴⁸

The final characteristic mentioned repeatedly by participants as key to whether an organization encourages or discourages fraud was corporate culture.¹⁴⁹ Almost one-fourth of the participants (24%) indicated that when management sends the message that questionable behavior would be tolerated, the corporate environment is prone to fraud.¹⁵⁰

4. Characteristics of Organizations That Discourage Criminal Activity

The corporate characteristics identified by study participants as discouraging fraud are the flip-side of those that encourage fraud: corporate culture, effective compliance and ethics plans, and strong internal and external controls.¹⁵¹

The most consistently noted corporate policy to discourage and prevent fraud, cited by 66% of the participants, was an effective and well-implemented compliance and ethics program.¹⁵² According to the participants, the key components of an effective compliance program are: an anonymous hotline for

¹⁴⁴ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴⁵ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴⁶ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴⁷ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴⁸ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁴⁹ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁵⁰ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).

¹⁵¹ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

¹⁵² Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

reporting suspect behavior, routine training for employees. proper oversight, and swift punishment of those involved in detected fraud.¹⁵³ The second most consistently cited corporate characteristic, identified by almost half of the participants (47.7%), was the "corporate culture" dictated by strong management.¹⁵⁴ A true commitment to compliance and ethical conduct by upper management that permeates all levels of the company was continually cited by study participants as key in ensuring law-abiding behavior within an organization.¹⁵⁵ The third corporate policy identified as characteristic of corporations committed to preventing fraud, identified by one-fourth of the participants (25%), was the existence of strong internal and external controls, including an independent board of directors, outside counsel, and inside and outside auditors.¹⁵⁶

5. Qualities of Corporate Leaders Who Encourage Law-Abiding Behavior

A strong sense of personal integrity was the theme echoed by most study participants when asked what characteristics a CEO or member of upper management should possess to encourage law-abiding behavior within a company.¹⁵⁷ Over half of the participants (57.8%) indicated that they would look for integrity, honesty, and an intact moral compass when choosing a corporate leader.¹⁵⁸ Some participants expanded these criteria to include a demonstrated commitment to community service or social concerns.¹⁵⁹ One-third of the participants recommended looking to the candidate's track record, particularly how he or she handled difficult situations or weathered storms in the past.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, there was a recurring theme of choosing a candidate who focused on promoting integrity rather than simply increasing the bottom line; just over one-fourth of the participants (26.7%) cited an emphasis on compliance as a

¹⁵⁹ See infra app. B, § V, question V(a).

¹⁵³ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

¹⁵⁴ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

¹⁵⁵ See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

¹⁵⁶ Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).

¹⁵⁷ See infra app. B, § V, question V(a).

¹⁵⁸ Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).

¹⁶⁰ Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).

chief consideration when considering a candidate for upper management. 161

6. Corporate Compliance vs. What Others Are Doing

The majority of participants (60%) stated that, in their experience, emphasizing law-abiding behavior did not sacrifice competitive advantage, especially in the long-run.¹⁶² Of those who did recognize a competitive sacrifice (24%), many indicated that the competitiveness and accepted practices in certain industries, both domestically and internationally, put lawabiding companies at a disadvantage.¹⁶³ They suggested that the varying laws and common practices in foreign countries make it more difficult for a law-abiding multinational American company to compete in a global market place.¹⁶⁴ The remaining participants (16%) thought that law-abiding behavior could have a negative impact on a company's overall competitiveness.¹⁶⁵

The participants who stated that placing a premium on lawabiding behavior does or could sacrifice competitive advantage identified ways to implement a compliance culture without sacrificing competitiveness, at least domestically.¹⁶⁶ These included focusing on the long-run and a benefit-cost analysis of law-abiding behavior, instilling a "broader culture [of compliance with the rules] in the industry as a whole," and finding a "leader who is balanced and ethical."¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, one-fourth of the participants who recognized a competitive disadvantage to implementing compliance efforts (28%) could not readily identify ways to implement these steps without sacrificing a competitive position for a company.¹⁶⁸ As one participant noted, "Sometimes there is not [a way to implement the steps without sacrificing a

¹⁶¹ Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).

¹⁶² Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).

¹⁶³ Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).

¹⁶⁴ See infra app. B, V, question V(b). Participants suggested that the American concept of fraud differed from the accepted practices in foreign countries, leading to the possibility that an American multi-national company complying with international laws and customs could potentially violate United States anti-fraud laws, while a similar foreign company would go unpunished. See infra app. B, V, question V(b).

¹⁶⁵ Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).

¹⁶⁶ See infra app. B, § V, question V(c).

¹⁶⁷ Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).

¹⁶⁸ Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).

competitive advantage] because in some industries the successful competitive position is based on breaking the rules."¹⁶⁹

7. Salary Incentives and Fraud

Do salary incentives like stock options and bonuses tied to corporate profits provide an incentive to engage in fraud? Participants' views on this topic varied greatly, from "absolutely" to "no, not in and of themselves."170 Almost half of the participants (44.4%) stated unequivocally that salary incentives provide an incentive to engage in fraud; as one participant noted, salary incentives are "a blueprint for fraud."¹⁷¹ Other participants (40%) were less adamant but agreed that salary incentives tied to stock options or profits sometimes encourage fraud, but not necessarily in every instance.¹⁷² A common observation by participants was that salary incentives tied to profits should be "counterbalanced with incentives to engage in appropriate conduct."¹⁷³ As one participant stated, "everything should be tied to profits. Dedication to compliance and ethics, however, should also be part of the criteria. There should be a wide variety of factors that go into bonuses."174

E. Scholarship on Corporate Criminality

The chief characteristic of corporations that encourage and discourage fraud identified by our study participants was consistent with scholarship in the area—namely, that leadership from the top sets the tone for corporate behavior.

1. Internal Board of Directors and Senior Management Team

An independent and active board of directors is the key component identified by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and most corporate governance experts as necessary to healthy corporate governance.¹⁷⁵ To help ensure the independence of

¹⁶⁹ Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).

¹⁷⁰ Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).

¹⁷¹ Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).

¹⁷² Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).

¹⁷³ Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).

¹⁷⁴ Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).

¹⁷⁵ See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2004) [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL]; see also SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3, *20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003) (Corporate Monitor Richard C. Breeden's report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff on Corporate Governance for

directors, some companies require the election of at least one new director each year.¹⁷⁶ Others "declassify" board elections, effectively ending the staggered terms of directors.¹⁷⁷ To further enhance director independence and shareholder oversight, some corporations have switched from a plurality system, where a director need only obtain 20% of the shareholder votes in an uncontested election, to a true majority system, requiring more than 50% of the shareholders' vote to elect a director to the board.¹⁷⁸

Boards are also becoming increasingly active in day-to-day operations of corporations. Most corporate governance recommendations for deterring fraud call for an increased number of board meetings, both with and without senior level officers, in order to ensure that the board is aware of the current state of the corporation, as well as the actions of its officers and employees, and can operate without any undue influence by senior management.¹⁷⁹

In order to carry out this increased oversight, boards are appointing more robust committees that are actively involved in running all aspects of a corporation.¹⁸⁰ Additionally, some

¹⁷⁶ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *2.

¹⁷⁷ See William J. Holstein, Corporate Governance: The Other Elections, FORBES.COM, Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/leadership/governance/2006/11/06/ leadership-election-boardmember-lead-govern-cx_wh_1106directorship.html.

¹⁷⁸ Id.; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *2 (recommending that the WorldCom corporate governance standards be included in the Articles of Incorporation, which would require consent of the shareholders for any amendments to the governance structure or policies, as a way of increasing shareholder oversight).

¹⁷⁹ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.03; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 63. Under NYSE requirements, independent directors are regularly meeting in executive session to discuss issues ranging from CEO performance to new ideas for expanding the company. See George Anders, Private Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at R4; Henry et al., supra note 175, at 86.

¹⁸⁰ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires

the future of MCI, Inc.); TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, FINAL REPORT 12, 62 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159, 1170 (2005); David Henry et al., The Boss on the Sidelines: How Auditors, Directors, and Lawyers Are Asserting Their Power, BUS. WK., Apr. 25, 2005, at 86; Carol Hymowitz, What's Your Solution?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R.8. Some companies are turning to former regulators and prosecutors to serve as directors to ensure an independent board engaged in active oversight. Judith Burns, The Cop on the Board, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R.8.

corporations are now appointing a non-executive chairman of the board of directors.¹⁸¹ With the increasing concern that "management runs the board,"¹⁸² this separates the CEO from the leadership of the board completely.¹⁸³

2. Corporate Policies

For a Board to truly monitor¹⁸⁴ a corporation's financial status and eliminate incentives for fraud and abuse,¹⁸⁵ the Board's internal audit committee should regularly review both the company's financial statements and reports from its independent auditors.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, directors should meet

¹⁸¹ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; Julie Bort, Good Governance or Cheap Makeover?, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 21, 2003, at 67.

¹⁸² Bort, *supra* note 181, at 67 (quoting litigation partner on the corporate governance of a large New York law firm).

¹⁸³ See id.; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; Carol Hymowitz, How to Fix a Broken System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R1. The WorldCom report suggests such a separation with clearly defined duties for both the CEO and the chairman of the board. See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3. "In the board environment, the role of the chairman... is to create the kind of open, contributing and questioning environment.... The CEO's role is to speak for management." Seligman, supra note 175, at 1176 (quoting SEC Chairman Harold Williams) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¹⁸⁴ See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27, 31, 33; see also In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that first and foremost, directors and officers must assure that a reporting system exists which is "in concept and design adequate" to provide appropriate and timely information to them so that they may satisfy their monitoring responsibility).

¹⁸⁵ See Seligman, supra note 175, at 1170.

¹⁸⁶ See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.07(c)(iii)(F); see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 28; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 2, 11, 18–19.

an independent audit committee of the board of directors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). The NYSE listing standards require companies to maintain within their board of directors a nominating/governance committee, compensation committee, and audit committee, all of which must be comprised of independent directors. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 303A.04-.06. Both the Business Roundtable and the ABA recommend the establishment of these independent committees for all companies to facilitate active involvement by the board of directors in key aspects of the company. See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 63-70; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 16-17 (2005), http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/CorporateGov Principles.pdf [hereinafter BUS. ROUNDTABLE]; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3. Some privately held companies are voluntarily complying with Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations, often because "compliance is simply a good business practice." Steven Marlin, Sarbox Isn't Just for the Big Guys, INFO. WK., July 4, 2005, at 49.

with executives, employees, auditors, and ultimately shareholders to assess internal controls and discover "simmering problems."¹⁸⁷

To ensure that boards are truly independent,¹⁸⁸ informed and effective, corporations should provide comprehensive orientation programs for new directors,¹⁸⁹ regular training and education opportunities for directors, particularly independent directors,¹⁹⁰ and consistent performance review procedures for directors.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Companies may take additional steps to ensure that corporate policies support the independent oversight role of the board of directors and strengthen the relationship between the board and senior management. Internal regulations for choosing directors and controlling directors' actions, including strong policies regarding conflicts of interest, corporate opportunities, and fair dealing, are necessary to properly define the roles and relationships between officers, directors, and the corporation itself and to prevent dangerous or damaging behavior and decisions. *See Worldcom*, 2003 WL 22004827, at *18; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, *supra* note 175, § 303A.10. By reducing the opportunity for "related party transactions," these internal regulations "prohibit behavior that creates the most serious risk to shareholders." *Worldcom*, 2003 WL 22004827, at *18; *see also* Elizabeth MacDonald, *Crony Capitalism*, FORBES, June 21, 2004, at 140 (describing how self-dealing adversely affects investors).

¹⁸⁹ See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27 ("Common practices include briefings from senior management, on-site visits to the corporation's facilities, informal meetings with other directors and written materials."); see also NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09.

¹⁹⁰ See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09 (requiring "[d]irector orientation and continuing education" be addressed in the corporate guidelines for listed companies); see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27; Hymowitz, supra note 175; Joann S. Lublin, Back to School: If Directors Are Responsible for Finding Problems, First They Have to Know Where to Look, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R3.

¹⁹¹ See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09. The NYSE requires listed companies to include an "annual performance evaluation of the [board]" in the company's corporate governance guidelines. Id. Additionally, each of the board's three required committees, nominating/corporate governance, compensation, and audit, should also perform a yearly performance review. Id. §§ 303A.04(b)(ii), 303A.05(b)(ii), 303A.07(c)(ii). While these requirements only extend to listed companies, regular performance reviews of directors are a sound practice for companies of any size. See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 72; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 28; Lingling Wei, How Am I Doing? Peer-Based Evaluations Are Moving Slowly into the Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at R5. In addition to self-evaluation, the board should participate in annual performance reviews of the CEO and other senior officers. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.05(b)(i)(A); see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 28.

¹⁸⁷ Kaja Whitehouse, *Move Over CEO: Here Come the Directors*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at R1.

3. Compensation Practices

While some economists are skeptical about the actual impact compensation policies have on corporate fraud,¹⁹² the federal government,¹⁹³ private organizations,¹⁹⁴ and scholars,¹⁹⁵ like our study participants, recommended changes to the current practices, including eliminating or reducing stock options as part of the executive compensation package.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code). Under Sarbanes-Oxley, in the event that a company is required to file an accounting restatement due to misconduct, the CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the company for bonuses and any profits from the sale of company's securities during the year preceding the filing of the fraudulent report. *Id.* § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). The law also prohibits insider trading by the CEO or a director during the pension fund blackout periods, *Id.* § 306, 116 Stat. at 779–84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) and 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021, 1132 (West 2007)), and forbids the company from making personal loans to the CEO, directors, or other similarly situated executives. *Id.* § 402, 116 Stat. at 787–88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).

¹⁹⁴ See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 24–25. One significant change that has been advanced involves not only the directors in compensation decisions, but also the shareholders. Traditionally, directors have approved compensation packages for the CEO, with shareholder approval for most equity-compensation plans. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.05; see also N.Y. STOCK EXCH. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY & LISTING STANDARDS COMM., REPORT TO THE N.Y. STOCK EXCH. 17 n.14 (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf. Recently, however, the suggestion has arisen that shareholders approve entire compensation plans for executives, including salary and equity compensation. See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003); Holstein, supra note 177.

¹⁹⁵ See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 192, at 10, 12–13.

¹⁹⁶ See id. at 10. One of the most controversial compensation arrangements has been the issuance of stock options to executive officers. By providing officers with large volumes of stock options, companies have created an "incentive to manage and manipulate accounting numbers" to increase the value of the company's stock to reap the benefit. Id. at 12–13. These stock options are attractive to executive officers because they are liquid and come with few restrictions. Id. at 13. They are attractive to the corporation because they are not generally expensed, thus providing a "costfree" way to increase an executive's compensation package. Id. In many cases, however, these options are far from "cost-free," especially when they lead to inflation of earnings and other forms of mismanagement. Id. at 12–13.

¹⁹² See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 9–13 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100.

4. Corporate Culture

The business world, scholars, and our study participants unanimously identify the corporate culture set at the top¹⁹⁷ and effective compliance programs¹⁹⁸ as essential for any well-run corporation. An effective corporate compliance plan should include a compliance officer who reports directly to the Board,¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ See generally Phyllis Plitch, Blowing the Whistle: Sarbanes-Oxley Requires That Companies Treat Internal Complaints—and Complainers—Seriously, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R6; Marc S. Raspanti & Gregg W. Mackuse, What's Really So Important About an Effective Compliance Program?, CHAMPION, May 2007, at 22. The framework for a corporate ethics program begins with the adoption of a code of ethics or business conduct. See Charles Fombrun & Christopher Foss. Business Ethics: Corporate Responses to Scandal, 7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 284, 286 (2004). Not only must the compliance program incorporate the code of ethics, see ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 21; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12, 34, but it must promote reporting of unethical or illegal conduct and enforce adherence to the standards through corrective and disciplinary action, see BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. Corporations must ensure that systems are in place through which all employees are able to confidentially report questionable behavior they observe. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996); BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12, 34; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. Sarbanes-Oxley requires covered companies to adopt a code of ethics for certain senior financial officers or explain why it has failed to do so in submissions to the SEC. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 63 (2003). Additionally, the NYSE mandates approval of a code of business conduct and ethics by listed companies that extends to all directors, officers, and employees. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.10.

¹⁹⁹ A focus on ethics can often be achieved by creating an ethics office and appointing a Chief Ethics Officer that reports directly to the board of directors. See Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at 286; see also Gaston F. Ceron, Staying Focused: Corporate Governance May Be Everybody's Responsibility; But at Some Companies,

¹⁹⁷ See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12. By setting a "tone at the top," senior management and the board can implement a dedication to ethics and compliance that will permeate the corporation, shifting the focus from winning at all costs to "doing the right thing." See id.; see also THE CONFERENCE BD., COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11, 24 (2003), available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/nyse/NYSE-Report.pdf. [hereinafter COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST]. Outward evidence of a corporation's internal commitment to an ethical corporate culture is best demonstrated by a sound and comprehensive set of corporate governance guidelines, which address qualification standards for directors, directors' responsibilities and compensation, board access to management and independent advisors, director orientation and education, management succession, and board evaluation. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09; see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 22-23. The NYSE requires listed companies to not only adopt, but also disclose, their corporate governance guidelines. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09. This is good policy for all corporations, however, regardless of size. See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 31 n.62; BUS, ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180. at 21-22.

employee training,²⁰⁰ hotlines for the reporting of unethical or illegal behavior,²⁰¹ prompt investigation of potential problems, and disciplinary action, when necessary.²⁰²

5. Internal and External Oversight: Legal Counsel and Auditors

Inside and outside corporate counsel and independent auditors play increasingly important roles in verifying ethical and legal compliance.²⁰³ To perform this task, corporate counsel should meet regularly with the board of directors, particularly the independent directors, to report on any material legal problems or current compliance issues.²⁰⁴ Boards of Directors,

²⁰⁰ See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003); COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, *supra* note 197, at 24. Some companies may choose to adopt employee training programs for ethics in general, while others focus on disclosure and accounting requirements and standards. *Worldcom*, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, *supra* note 197, at 24. Companies may choose to institute a comprehensive ethics training program or address individual ethics issues as they arise. Fombrun & Foss, *supra* note 198, at 285. Companies are also looking to annual ethics evaluations to encourage ethical behavior and monitor the impact education programs are having in the workplace. COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, *supra* note 197, at 24.

 201 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963; Plitch, supra note 198; see also COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24 (asserting that companies often find out about unethical behavior too late).

²⁰² See COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. This commitment to compliance can also be conveyed company-wide by an active oversight role by the board of directors and the CEO. See *id.*; see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 34. By appointing a compliance officer, perhaps at the senior management level, the company sends the message that ethical and legal conduct is of chief importance. See Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at 286.

²⁰³ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 14, 20–21; Henry et al., supra note 175.

²⁰⁴ See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 37–38. Both the ABA and the SEC have taken steps to encourage corporate counsel to report material violations of the law to senior management and the directors. See id. at 42–44; Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm [hereinafter SEC Press Release]. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct require a corporation's attorney to report illegal conduct to a higher authority in the corporation "[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

One Person Has More Responsibility than Others, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R7. This officer should report directly to the CEO, board of directors, or designated board committee on the ongoing compliance and ethics initiatives, any developing issues, and the status of any known ethical or legal violations. See Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at 286; see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 34; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24.

through their audit committees, should "engage an independent accounting firm to audit the financial statements prepared by management"²⁰⁵ and should consider rotating outside auditors on a regular basis, such as every ten years, or when concerns about compromised judgment arise.²⁰⁶

F. Trends

All 45 of our study participants described trends they had observed in the years they had been prosecuting and/or defending white collar crime.²⁰⁷ Collectively they identified four major The most frequently cited trend was an increase in trends. corporate criminal prosecutions,²⁰⁸ with one-fourth of the participants (24.4%) identifying this as a phenomenon.²⁰⁹ Α minority of participants (11.1%) fleshed this trend out with the related observation that there has been an increase in the criminalization of business activities: what was formerly considered legal activity has, in recent years, been viewed as Several participants suggested that increased illegal.²¹⁰ criminalization is a function of Congress's tendency to pass laws in response to current problems.²¹¹ With high profile corporate scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and the like, Congress has been unusually active in recent years in passing beefed-up criminal laws aimed at corporate crime.²¹² Also, participants noted that civil and administrative regulations have increasingly moved toward criminal litigation.²¹³

^{1.13(}b) (1983). The SEC requires attorneys "appearing and practicing before the Commission" to report material violations "up-the-ladder" within a corporation, including to senior officers and the board of directors. SEC Press Release, *supra*. These requirements serve as another check on the activities of employees and senior management within a company.

²⁰⁵ BUS. ROUNDTABLE, *supra* note 180, at 2.

 $^{^{206}}$ See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; see also COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24.

²⁰⁷ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²⁰⁸ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

 $^{^{209}}$ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c). Beyond this consensus, there was not a recurring response as to which types of white collar crime are being prosecuted. See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c). A full spectrum was mentioned, including defense spending fraud, disaster spending fraud, public corruption, healthcare fraud, identity fraud, and financial fraud. See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹⁰ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹¹ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹² See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹³ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

The second major trend identified was that white collar crimes and their investigations have become more complex.²¹⁴ Participants noted that in today's cases, there is more money at stake, the indictments charge more crimes, prosecutors target more high-profile corporate crime, and prosecutions are more sophisticated.²¹⁵ The government is viewed as having more power and resources at its disposal for white collar prosecutions, and prosecutors are viewed as having greater expertise in this area than in years past.²¹⁶ Participants also noted that it is more common today to find career prosecutors, perhaps due to the increased specialization in their practices.²¹⁷

Participants' discussion of the increasing complexity of white collar prosecutions brought out interesting differences in federal and state prosecutions. Of the thirty-five participants with experience in both the state and federal arena, thirty-four recognized differences in the two systems.²¹⁸ The most frequently cited difference, mentioned by a third of the participants (31%), was the greater amount of resources available in the federal system to prosecute complex cases.²¹⁹ These resources included increased investigative powers and time, fewer—but more complex—cases, greater adherence to legal procedure, more capable prosecutors and investigators, and harsher sentences.²²⁰

The third trend concerns the way in which white collar prosecutions are handled.²²¹ Participants noted that corporations and individuals have adopted more of a "cooperate and settle" mentality than in the past, due in part to the stiffer sentences that are now being handed down in white collar cases; cooperation is the only reliable way to minimize this exposure.²²² This "cooperate and settle" approach has made corporations more willing, however reluctantly, to conduct their own internal investigations and turn their findings over to prosecutors as part

²¹⁴ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹⁵ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹⁶ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹⁷ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²¹⁸ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).

²¹⁹ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).

²²⁰ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).

²²¹ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²²² See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

of their "cooperation" efforts.²²³ Participants noted that "deferred prosecution agreement[s]" are much more common today than in the past.²²⁴ In a deferred prosecution agreement, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") agrees to defer prosecution of a corporation for a specified amount of time, and then, usually, dismiss pending charges, in exchange for an admission by the company that the DOJ could prove its case.²²⁵ Deferred prosecution agreements are available only when a corporation agrees to cooperate fully with the DOJ in its investigation and implement management, reporting, and auditing reforms.²²⁶

The last trend noted by participants is that prosecutors increasingly are willing to pursue economic wrongdoing through civil remedies rather than relying exclusively upon criminal prosecutions.²²⁷ This may be due to the stiffer sentences that raise the stakes for criminal prosecution, the increased complexity and difficulty of proving white collar crimes, or the increase in civil federal and state whistleblower or qui tam cases.²²⁸

Half of the participants (48.9%) viewed this switch to civil prosecution, particularly against a corporation, as appropriate.²²⁹ These participants noted the severe collateral effects of criminally prosecuting a corporation, including harm to shareholders, innocent employees, and others.²³⁰ Yet, of those favoring civil remedies for corporations, a few (8.9%) viewed criminal sanctions as warranted when an individual was culpable.²³¹ Even with their clear preference for civil prosecution in many cases, study participants, most of whom are currently defense counsel, did not rule out criminal prosecutions in all A number of participants (13.6%) stated that civil cases.²³² prosecution of white collar crime should not be used to the exclusion of criminal prosecution and that criminal and civil

²²³ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²²⁴ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²²⁵ See Joshua G. Berman & Michael R. Sklaire, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: What Is the Cost of Staying in Business?, LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), June 3, 2005, at 1.

²²⁶ See id.

²²⁷ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²²⁸ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).

²²⁹ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²³⁰ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²³¹ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²³² See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

parallel prosecution of a case—both the corporation and individual—should be utilized.²³³ These participants noted the need to increase deterrence and incentivize compliance, which can often best be done through criminal prosecution.²³⁴

III. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

There are two key differences in the findings of our study and existing scholarship regarding white collar offenders. The first concerns the descriptions of white collar criminals. The overwhelming majority of our study participants described white collar offenders as generally falling into two primary groups: "leaders" and "followers," where each group has distinct personality profiles and motives. By comparison, the bulk of existing scholarship lumps all offenders together before dividing offenders into various personality profiles. The view by study participants appears to be more nuanced and likely more reflective of reality. There is, in fact, in most white collar crime, a hierarchy of participants made up of a few leaders and various levels of followers.

The insight that there are two general groups, "leaders" and "followers," is significant. Followers, who, by their very nature, tend to be passive, naïve, less confident, and non-aggressive people, are more susceptible to deterrence. Effective corporate governance, accepted and adopted by corporate boards and senior management, that educates, monitors, and rewards law abiding behavior is more likely to deter "followers" than leaders simply because of the personalities of followers.²³⁵ This is an important

Almost one year to the day that he was acquitted on the fraud charges, Scrushy was convicted on federal bribery charges. Michael Tomberlin, *Scrushy "Radioactive" After Trial Business*, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 30, 2006, at 6A. Scrushy was sentenced to 6 years and 10 months and ordered into custody upon the rendering of the sentence and before appeals.

²³³ Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²³⁴ See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).

²³⁵ Weston Smith, the Chief Financial Officer of HealthSouth, Inc., who blew the whistle on HealthSouth's \$2.7 billion accounting fraud, is one example. In the fall of 2002, upon learning of his criminal liability under the recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Smith decided he wasn't going to facilitate HealthSouth's fraud any longer. He walked into the United States Attorney's Office and revealed everything he knew. Ultimately, Richard Scrushy was acquitted on the fraud charges that resulted from the whistleblowing by Weston Smith and others. Russell Hubbard, "God Is Good," Scrushy Says After Verdict, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 29, 2005, at 1A.

finding, because in crime, as in life, there are a lot more followers than leaders. That followers are deterrable means that effective corporate compliance initiatives can make a difference.

The second significant finding in our study is the way study participants described effective corporate governance. Both existing scholarship and our study participants agree on several points. They agree that the key to deterring and detecting white collar crime is effective corporate compliance. Also, existing scholarship and our study participants similarly identify the ingredients of effective corporate governance: an informed, active Board of Directors with an adequate number of outside qualified directors and working committees; an effective corporate compliance plan; and vigorous outside and inside internal auditors.

Our study participants, however, unlike existing scholarship, addressed issues of how effective corporate governance should respond when criminality is suspected. Meaningful internal investigations, the separation of potentially culpable individuals from the corporate entity, full and complete disclosure to law enforcement, and cooperation with government prosecutors were the key steps study participants identified. These are not easy strategies for corporate leadership to take. Only a sophisticated Board that is fully aware of the problems illegal activities can create for a company will be willing to implement these steps. Foot-dragging, delays, obfuscation, and confused leadership can prove fatal to a corporation. The real-life experience of our study participants presumably accounts for this different emphasis than is found in existing scholarship. Because of their experience "in the trenches," our study participants know how quickly corporate criminal investigations can become serious, and therefore, are more attuned to what should be done when trouble is detected.

Our study participants noted the following facts about corporate responses to potential fraud. A full and complete internal investigation is expensive and often highly disruptive. It is time-consuming, expends all manner of resources, and diverts the business from its central corporate mission. A thorough investigation almost certainly will uncover a myriad of issues that will have to be dealt with by the corporation. Wrongdoing may not be isolated to any particular level of a corporation. It may permeate multiple levels of the corporation, including the CEO, CFO, and the Board. Dealing with the matter at hand and other newly discovered, unanticipated issues, is expensive and can be demoralizing for a company. Similarly, separating potentially culpable individuals from the organization is personally painful, especially when the individuals are colleagues and friends of current or former Board members. And, disclosing and cooperating with government prosecutors is counter-intuitive given corporate strategies in the recent past of "circling the wagons."

Navigating all of these issues requires considerable sophistication. The stakes are high for the company, its workers, shareholders, and sometimes for a town, or even an industry. The stakes are also high for the lawyer coordinating the corporate response. The unwary straddle the fence between malpractice and survival of the corporation.

In comparison to our study, existing scholarship does not address issues of how companies should deal with cataclysmic corporate fraud issues. This points to one of the key insights from our study. The selection of the Board of Directors and corporate leadership should include individuals who have some experience and expertise in fraud deterrence and response. If not, corporate leadership will be ill-suited to guide the corporation through a potential crisis. On-the-job training or a circle-the-wagons approach, which is appropriate for other types of corporate crises, places at risk the existence of the corporation experiencing fraud.

In conclusion, this study offers the following three key insights. First, there are two essential personalities who commit most white collar crimes: "leaders" and "followers." Second, "followers" are much more susceptible to deterrence, which effective corporate governance can provide. This is good news since leaders, who are less likely to be deterred, are far fewer in number than followers. It is also good news because corporate fraud, due to its complexity, cannot occur without help from "followers." Third, corporate Boards and leadership should include qualified individuals with real life experience and expertise in deterring and responding to corporate fraud crisis.

Respondent #	White Collar Crimes	Non-White Collar Crime	Years of Evaniance	Current Local	Prior Legal	Years of Current Prior Legal Non-Legal	Top 25
	Prosecuted or Defended	Prosecuted or Defended				rupioyment	02
1	Healthcare fraud, Very little	Very little	27	Defense	US Navy	N/A	No
	defense			Attorney	JAG, Federal		
	procurement fraud				Prosecutor		
	and public						
-	corruption						

Emphasis on tax	N/A	40	Defense	N/A	N/A	No
fraud, but also			Attorney			
antitrust charges,						
bank and credit						
charges, bank						
fraud, business						
misconduct,						
embezzlement,						
healthcare fraud,						
Medicare fraud,						
price-fixing, RICO						

2

ů

N/A

Assistant US Attorney

Defense Attorney

32

N/A

All types of fraud

က

4	Healthcare fraud	Some general	27	Dept. of	Federal	N/A	No
		commercial		Justice,	Clerkship,		
		litigation		Civil	Private		
				Division	Practice,		
					Assistant		
					State		
					Attorney		
					General		
5	Healthcare fraud,	All crimes that	26	Defense	US Attorney	N/A	No
	environmental	prosecutors		Attorney			
	and toxic torts,	handle - drugs,					
	antitrust, white	murder, etc.					
	collar criminal						
	defense, defense						
	procurement fraud						
_							
					4 <u>00</u> 00 0		

Yes	Yes
NIA	N/A
Federal Clerkship, US Attorney	Department of Justice, Assistant US Attorney
Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney
25	25
All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.
All types of fraud, security charges, enforcement issues, defense contracting fraud, environmental fraud, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations	Corporate fraud, securities fraud, fraud, environmental fraud, insurance fraud
ω	-

8	All types of fraud	All crimes that	27	Defense	N/A	N/A	No
		prosecutors		Attorney			
		handle - drugs,				-	
		murder, etc.					
6	Tax fraud, mail	All crimes that	33	Defense	Federal	N/A	Yes
	fraud, wire fraud,	prosecutors		Attorney	Clerkship,		
	money laundering	handle - drugs,			Assistant		
		murder, etc.			District		
					Attorney,		
					Assistant US		
					Attorney		
10	Heavy emphasis	N/A	40	Defense	Assistant US	N/A	Yes
	on tax fraud, but			Attorney	Attorney,		
	also healthcare				Assistant		
	fraud, securities				Attorney		
	fraud, anti-trust				General		
	issues, etc.						

 Healthcare fraud, False Claims Act charges, procurement fraud, public health and pharmaceutical compliance fraud	International trade, general litigation, business disputes	22	Defense Attorney	N/A	N/A	Yes
Healthcare fraud, securities fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud	Very little	90	Defense Attorney	Assistant US Attorney	N/A	No

13	Business fraud,	All crimes that	35	Defense	US Attorney	N/A	Yes
	securities fraud,	prosecutors		Attorney			
	federal anti-	handle - drugs,					
	kickback	murder, etc.					
_	prohibitions,						
	government						
	procurement						
	requirements,						
	foreign corrupt						
	practices rules,						
	campaign						
	violations						
14	Defense	All crimes that	30	Defense	Assistant US	Teacher	No
	procurement	prosecutors		Attorney	Attorney		
	fraud, healthcare	handle - drugs,					
	fraud, and tax	murder, etc., as					
	violations	well as espionage,					
		major economic					
		cases with					
		executives					

Yes	No	No	No
N/A	FBI	Marine Corps	N/A
Private Practice	Assistant US Attorney, District Attorney	US Attorney	N/A
Assistant US Attorney	Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney
22	24	40+	38
Terrorism and customs crimes, postal theft, weapons and drug trafficking	General litigation including breach of warranty, civil fraud, breach of contract, construction litigation, employment litigation	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.
All types of fraud, except for securities fraud cases; emphasis on healthcare cases	Healthcare fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, bribery, conspiracy associated with those charges	All types of fraud	Economic business offenses
15	16	17	18

WHY DO THEY DO IT?

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Yes	Yes	°N	Yes
Professor	Computer Programmer	N/A	N/A
Department of Justice, Assistant US Attorney	Department of Justice, Assistant US Attorney	Public Defender	Private Practice
Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney	Assistant US Attorney
	28	25	20
All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	Very little	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	N/A
Civil and criminal litigation in the healthcare industry, with an emphasis on antitrust and fraud and abuse issues	All types of fraud	All types of fraud	Healthcare fraud, bank fraud, defense fraud, environmental fraud
61	20	21	22

°N	Yes	Yes	No
N/A	N/A	Senator's office	Ρ/Ν
Department of Justice, Assistant US Attorney	Department of Justice	Assistant Attorney General, Assistant US Attorney	Assistant US Attorney; US Attorney
Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney	Qui Tam Attorney	Defense Attorney
18	28	29	34
Some organized crime cases	Some street crime	N/A	Very little
All types of fraud	Environmental criminal cases	False Claims Act violations, healthcare fraud, government procurement fraud	Bank fraud, healthcare, securities, tax, mail fraud, environmental crimes, anti-trust
23	24	25	26

WHY DO THEY DO IT?

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27	Healthcare fraud, False Claims Act charges, corruption, tax fraud, bribery	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	18	Defense Attorney	Department of Justice, Assistant US Attorney	N/A	No
58	Healthcare fraud, defense procurement fraud, and other types of procurement fraud	Breach of contract, various tort claims involving businesses, partnership disagreements, and employment cases	22	Qui Tam Attorney	Federal Clerkship, Department of Justice	Congressional Budget Office	Yes
29	Everything from civic corruption to stock fraud and Medicare fraud	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	21	Defense Attorney	N/A	Military	°Z

Yes	Yes
N/A	N/A
Federal Clerkship, Assistant District Attorney, Deputy US Attorney	Federal Clerkship
Defense Attorney	Qui Tam Attorney
62	20
All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	N/A
Emphasis on healthcare fraud, but also securities fraud, government contracting fraud, consumer fraud, conspiracy, and mail and wire fraud	False Claims Act, business torts and fraud, medical malpractice, civil RICO, products liability, and labor and employment fraud
0°	31

WHY DO THEY DO IT?

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Emphasis on defense contract fraud, healthcare fraud, tax fraud, and securities fraud	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	31	Defense Attorney	US Attorney	Federal Reserve	Yes
Bank fraud, government program fraud, IRS violations which include foreign bank fraudulent tax shelters, and money laundering	Drug cases, some postal service crimes and counterfeiting	27	Defense Attorney	Assistant US Attorney	Editor	Ŷ

Yes															 		
N/A																	
Department	of Justice														 		
Defense	Attorney											-				_	
30																	
All crimes that	prosecutors	handle - drugs,	murder, etc.														
Bribery, public	corruption, bank	fraud, securities	violations,	obstruction of	justice, perjury,	FDA violations,	espionage, civil	fraud, conspiracy,	theft of trade	secrets, and SEC	and other	administrative	enforcement	actions			
34																	

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37	FDA violations, healthcare fraud, anti-kickback violations, tax fraud, money laundering, etc.	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	29	Qui Tam Attorney	Qui Tam Circuit Court N/A Attorney Clerkship, Federal Prosecutor	N/A	Ŷ
38	All kinds of fraud, General civil public corruption, litigation and money laundering	General civil litigation	27	Dept. of Justice	State Clerkship	Military	No

°N N	Yes
Banking	Auditor Investigator with the Government Accounting Office
Assistant District Attorney	Department of Justice
Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney
15	37
All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.
All kinds of fraud including white collar defense, healthcare fraud, securities fraud, tax fraud, and defense procurement fraud	Tax fraud, securities fraud, government contract fraud, money laundering, organized crime, extortion, mail fraud, bribery
39	40

N	Yes
	λ
Journalist	Brookings Institute researcher
US Dept. of Health & Human Services	Assistant US Attorney, Private Practice, Department of Justice
Defense Attorney	Defense Attorney
30	29
N/A	All crimes that prosecutors handle - drugs, murder, etc.
Healthcare fraud, securities fraud, election fraud, bank fraud	Primarily healthcare, but also environmental fraud, government procurement, tax fraud, securities and antitrust fraud
41	6 4

43	Government	All crimes that	39	Defense	Federal	N/A	Yes
	procurement	prosecutors		Attorney	Clerkship,		
	fraud, anti-fraud	handle - drugs,			Private		
	provisions of the	murder, etc.			Practice,		
	securities and				Assistant US		
	commodities				Attorney		
	statutes, false						
	claims, insurance						
	and bankruptcy						
	fraud, Foreign		-				
	Corrupt Practices						
	Act charges,						
	export control						
	licensing						
	requirements and						
	technology						
	transfer						
	regulations					;	
	infringements, tax						-
	fraud, criminal						
	antitrust						
	enforcement,						
	healthcare fraud,						
	environmental						
	enforcement						

45	7
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44	Public corruption, All crimes that	All crimes that	26	Defense	US Attorney,	N/A	No
	fraud, and tax	prosecutors		Attorney	Department		
	violations	handle - drugs,			of Justice		
		murder, etc.		1.11			
45	Civil fraud,	N/A	34	Defense	Department	N/A	No
	criminal fraud,			Attorney	of Justice		
	debarment, and						
	exclusion federal						
	fraud cases						

* Top 25 ranking is per 2007 US News & World Report.

APPENDIX B Survey of Respondents' Determinations By Respondent

SECTION	DEFINITION
I	
Question I	How would you define the term "white collar criminal"?
1	It is primarily someone whose criminal conduct is tied to the performance of his or her profession.
2	It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-drug related crime or activity which the government has made into a crime.
3	It is someone who has committed an offense of a non- violent, usually economic nature exclusively.
4	It is someone who violates those laws that deal with financial institutions, and is typically a mover and shaker of the business sector who violates the laws to his or her benefit.
5	It is someone engaged in a non-violent criminal act for some financial gain usually in a business or commercial context.
6	It is not a precise term but is really intended to distinguish between someone who commits common law crimes of violence and other crimes.
7	It is someone who commits a financial crime without using violence or the threat of violence.
8	It is someone who commits an offense that occurs in the practice of business.
9	It is someone who commits a crime other than a street crime and more like a tax offense.
10	It is someone who commits business crimes.
11	It is someone who has violated laws involving regulatory or accounting types of non-violent matters.
12	It is someone involved with a business crime that is a non-violent, non-drug offense.

13	There are two categories. The first is someone who commits a non-violent fraud, which can run from
	boiler room operations trying to get money from old
	people to forgery and things like that. The second is
	someone who commits business fraud, which is the
	more sophisticated kind.
14	It is someone who commits a crime in a business
	setting, not street crime, and is employed by a
	business.
15	It is someone who commits crime in an office setting,
	including everything from an auditor to a CEO.
16	It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-drug
	related crime involving mostly papers, and who is in
	a position with fiduciary responsibilities.
17	It is someone who commits a crime that centers
	generally around allegedly corrupt business
	practices.
18	It is someone who commits a crime that is economic
	in nature and does not involve violence or passion.
19	It is someone engaged in fraudulent activities, in
	violation of the law, that don't result in physical
	harm to a victim.
20	It is someone who commits a crime with a pen as a
	weapon without force or violence.
21	It is someone who commits a financially motivated
	crime involving transactions that is not a street
	crime and not a crime of violence.
22	It is generally someone of relatively high social
22	standing who commits a legal violation in the course
	of his occupation.
23	It is generally a business person performing some act
20	
	for financial gain unrelated in any way to violence.
24	It is someone who is in management and is a
	decision-maker. It is anyone other than a street
	criminal.
25	It is someone who commits a financial crime, just as
	the name implies.
26	It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-street
	crime.
27	It is someone who has offended a regulation or a
	state or federal statute that involves fraud.

28	It is someone who commits a crime involving the
	theft of money through means other than the threat
	of violence or physical burglary.
29	It is someone who commits a business-related crime.
30	It is someone who is convicted of engaging in
	regulatory or business crimes.
31	It is someone who commits a business crime, a crime
	that is non-violent and more economical.
32	It is someone who violates the law through use of
	non-violent means.
33	It is someone who commits a non-violent crime for
	financial gain.
34	It is someone who commits a non-violent criminal
	activity that is usually business related.
35	It is someone who is involved in crimes committed in
	a business setting, as part of a business transaction.
36	It is someone who commits non-violent offenses that
	are generally related to business transactions.
37	It is someone who has committed a violation of law
	in any one of certain enumerated crimes such as tax
	fraud, stock fraud, etc. The Department of Justice
	provides a specific definition.
38	It is someone who commits theft of money or
	property by non-violent means.
39	It is someone, generally speaking, who has
	committed a type of fraud case and who has money.
40	It is someone who commits a financial or economic
	crime where the objective is to obtain money.
41	It is someone who engages in fraudulent and
	deceptive activity that can take the form of a
	transaction, submission of claims, or deceiving other
	parties for financial gain.
42	It is someone who commits crime in the business
	setting.
43	It is someone who commits business fraud.
44	It is someone outside of a labor-type position who has
	used deception or fraudulent techniques to gain an
	advantage of some sort.

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45	It is someone who engages in conduct that is
	otherwise legal but is illegal based on the laws of the
	state or federal government.

SECTION	IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II	COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question	Based on your experience and using your
II(a)	definition, do you believe it is accurate to view
	white collar criminals as falling into two basic
	groups: principals/architects and
	facilitators/followers?
1	Yes.
2	Yes.
3	You cannot categorize it because there are so many
	people who are unique. Sometimes people fall into a
	pattern and may be the more culpable person, but
	sometimes there is not a well-defined architect.
	Generally, the public perceives the white collar
	offender as a greedy executive who sets out on a path
	to violate the law, but typically it is someone who
	gets involved in conduct that gets beyond him or her.
	They usually get involved for a variety of reasons.
	Some people are cheaters and have always been
	cheaters and get caught. More typically, it is
	someone who starts by cutting corners and then
	violates a few more rules and regulations and starts
	down the slippery slope toward a criminal offense.
4	Yes, but in addition there are businesses that
	incentivize bad conduct by trying to make the
	company as profitable as possible. This incentivizes
	conduct that leads to crime. For example, a
	pharmaceutical company may expect its sale
	representatives to make X dollars in a year by
	pushing a particular drug, which indirectly
	encourages the sales representatives to then on their
	own engage in illegal conduct to meet those goals.
5	Generally speaking, yes. Sometimes people move
	from being a follower to becoming a principal.
6	In most white collar cases there are always one or
	more people who are the major players and others
	who go along with the program, but there is not a
	sharp distinction between the two. There are always
	people who are guiltier than others.
7	Yes.

8	There is not that clean of a line. Decisions are made
	by clusters of people in the business setting.
9	Yes, but there is a third category that consists of
	those who violated the law but did not know they
	were doing that.
10	Yes.
11	Yes, that is pretty fair.
12	Not really because neat classifications do not apply
	in many cases.
13	No. There is more of a spectrum than that. There
	are some people who are sophisticated leaders and
	those who are followers, but there are other kinds of
	fraud where there is the boss who is making the
	most money and underlings making less money and
	so forth, with different gradations of responsibility.
	This gets back to those two different types of fraud—
	con artists and business fraud.
14	Yes.
15	I have never really thought about it, but that is
	probably fair.
16	Yes.
17	That is probably accurate. It is similar to the
	sentencing guidelines, which includes organizers,
	leaders, and minimal players.
18	Yes, probably.
19	A brightline distinction has some validity, but it is
	often a blurred line in specific investigations.
20	Roughly yes.
21	Yes.
22	Not exactly. There are 4 separate groups. The
	instigators/designers, the outside professionals
	(lawyers, accountants, and others who turn a blind
	eye or participate), internal people with some
	standing in the organization (allow it to happen or
	participate; in a position to stop it but do not), and
	the low-level employees.
	Yes, that is probably fair.
24	Yes.

25	Yes, but there are also those people who cover up the
	crime and the people who retaliate, such as
	whistleblowers.
26	Probably.
27	Yes.
28	Yes, but it is not that easy to make the distinction
	because a typical scenario involves an organization
	that is financially driven at the top and focused on
	reaching targets that are not necessarily
	manageable. The top manager may not know, and
	he may or may not care. So is the person at the top a
	follower? Probably not, but it is still difficult to
	distinguish from a principal.
29	Yes, though it depends upon the white collar crime
	that is being charged.
30	No, that is an over-simplified view of the world.
31	Yes.
32	Yes, but there is also a third group—people who
	unwittingly get involved in it and then seize the
	opportunity. This individual sees his
	contemporaries, or people he identifies with, doing
	well financially, and that they are taking advantage
	of an opportunity that exists. They are motivated by
	peer comparison and think that it cannot be so bad if
	everyone is doing it and the opportunity is there.
33	Yes
34	Yes, but there are also those who are willing to
	testify on behalf of the government in exchange for
	lenient treatment, and there are corporate executives
	who just work there and who are not facilitators or
	otherwise.
35	Yes, but this is true of every enterprise, including
	street crime and lawful transactions.

36	That is one way to divide them, but you could probably divide any criminal enterprise that involves multiple actors into those two categories. The white collar world can be divided into two categories, one being the people with institutional authority (the leadership) and the other being people on the front lines (the ones making the deals). Principals and followers can be found in either category.
37	Yes.
38	Yes, but perhaps it is more that there is a group of essentially good people who make mistakes on the one hand and perpetuate those mistakes, while another group consists of corrupt people who by virtue of education can do it without violence. They get into it and there's no way out, plus they get used to the money.
39	Yes, I suppose so.
40	There are not really followers. Instead, a lot of
	people may assist the scheme, often times unknowingly, and once they do it knowingly they become principals.
41	Yes.
42	Yes.
43	No, it is difficult in business fraud to distinguish between a lead person and people who assist by not coming up with the idea but rather by executing it. White collar business fraud tends to involve people getting into a frame of mind and doing certain things in concert. It tends to be more of a conspiracy, using that word loosely. It is difficult to distinguish between the higher ups and people lower in the conspiracy. Those involved tend to work in concert, so there are less gradations than there are in street crime. Unlike a street crime, fraud is much more complicated.
44	Yes. There may be co-equals in a situation, but basically yes.

45	No. Much of white collar crime starts out innocently and either a group of people figure out it could be wrong or figure out how to use it in a different way. Rarely is it only one person or only at one level of the
	company. Occasionally there will be people who take it too far.

SECTION	IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
	COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question	If yes, then in your opinion, why do
II(b)	principals/architects engage in criminal acts?
1	It varies. Some people are fundamentally amoral
	and tend to have narcissistic personalities and do not
	view their conduct as criminal. However, most
	people just make poor judgments.
2	They do it for a variety of reasons, but if there is one
	overriding reason it is plain greed. They want to get
	ahead, make money, accomplish something, and they
	are willing to bend the rules to do that.
3	N/A
4	The most obvious answer is that it is because of
	money, but desperation and the arrogance of power
	(which makes these criminals think they are smarter
	than everyone else and won't be caught) can also
_	cause such criminal acts.
5	Money, profit, greed, power, and general financial
	gain are all motivators. Sometimes the fear of losing
	what they have or the fear of financial distress
	allows them to justify in their own minds what they
	are doing with the belief that they have not crossed
	the line into criminal behavior. Often they do it to
	gain a competitive advantage of some type for the
	company or themselves.
6	N/A
7	They do it for money, because of greed, because of
	their ego, and sometimes out of fear of failure.
8	They are generally motivated by what they think will
	help the business appear more prosperous than it is.
	Often it revolves around ego more than greed. They
	are attempting to justify decisions and go too far
	trying to make them or their business look
	successful. Often they do it unintentionally because
	it is not clear that it is a crime.
9	It is impossible to figure out. For some of them it is
	because of greed, but that is not across the board and
	it takes a psychiatrist to determine the various
	motives.
L	

10	They do it out of greed.
11	There are three possibilities—financial gain, career
	advancement, or an insufficient understanding of the
	law.
12	There are many different reasons, including pressure
	to achieve positive financial results quarter after
	quarter and other economic decisions. They engage
	in criminal activity to gain some type of advantage
L	because they think it is necessary or desirable.
13	N/A
14	They do it primarily for the money.
15	They do it to get money.
16	It is because of greed, sometimes poor judgment, and
	sometimes a false sense of power and control.
17	Greed is the number one reason. They often have
	the mentality that there is never enough money.
[Also, ignorance, lack of sensitivity, and naïveté play
	a role. Flexible and elastic criminal laws that leave a
	lot of leeway can create a reason for committing
	white collar crime because the person does not know
	he or she is doing anything wrong.
18	There are a number of reasons, including greed,
	desperation, and general acceptance in business. For
	some, they do it because it is a generally accepted
	practice in the industry, not an intentional criminal
	activity.
19	They do it to make money and promote their status
	in life
20	There are people who are sociopaths and want vast
	amounts of money. But a large number of people do
	it because they experienced a setback in business
	and tried to turn it around, which led to fraud.
21	The main reason is for financial gain. For some it is
	an act of desperation that they do not recognize as
	criminal. They have built a successful business and
	are in desperate shape trying to save the business
	and they overextend themselves thinking it will all
	work out in the end. They do not view it as a crime
	and think there will be no victims because they will
	pay everyone back in the end.

22	Greed is a reason, but it is not the whole story.
	There is also a game aspect and it becomes a
	challenge. They also do it because of the power and
	influence associated with it. The final piece is moral
	blindness. They adopt the attitude that "everyone is
	doing it" and that is how the world works.
23	There are a number of reasons, including greed,
	competition, and superiority—believing the law does
	not apply to them.
24	They are often motivated by profits and other
	shortcuts to regulatory or statutory restrictions on
	an activity.
25	They engage in criminal acts out of greed, because
	there is an opportunity, and the system is either not
	regulated or not regulated heavily enough to prevent
	such acts. The pressure particularly for publicly
	traded companies to perform, to grow revenues, meet
	shareholder expectations, etc., also causes such
	criminal acts. There may also be a lack of fear of
	getting caught, but that goes back to how much law
	enforcement there really is. They engage in a risk-
	reward analysis, and if the risk of getting caught is
	not very great or the consequence is not so bad, they
	will do it.
26	It runs the gamut from those who know what they
	are doing is wrong and think they are not going to
	get caught to the ones who do it but rationalize it by
	saying that everyone else is doing it, so why not (like
	speeding). There are those who appreciate that it is
	wrong but rationalize it out of business pressures
	and demands to satisfy shareholders, superiors, or
	directors. There are those who know what they are
	doing is wrong but think there is some action they
	can take in the future to make it alright. Then there
	are those who know it is a gray area and are not sure
	if it is right or wrong but are willing to take the risk.

27	Almost always, they do it because they see an
	opportunity to take advantage of someone or
	something. For example, they see an opportunity to
	defraud or steal from a person or take advantage of a
	regulatory scheme. It is almost always about
	money—saving it, obtaining it, or retaining it.
28	They do it for money and power.
29	Even though they would deny it, the reason is greed.
	The money out there that can be obtained is the fuel
	that drives the engine of the scheme.
30	N/A
31	It is usually for financial or positional gains. They
	are trying to move up the corporate ladder or
	increase their bonuses, or both.
32	It is a combination of greed and opportunity.
33	There are two types of principals. First, there are
	those people who might be labeled by psychological
	experts as sociopaths because they do not have the
	same ethical belief system that others generally
	have. They think they should have whatever they
	want and can use whatever means to get it, and they
	are singularly unconcerned with the impact of their
	behavior on others. Second, there are people who
	have been very successful in their line of work and
	who find themselves in a circumstance where it looks
	like they will not succeed, so they start cutting
	corners and thinking that they will make a comeback
	and make it right. It gets out of control and goes on
	for so long that they get to the point that the balls in
	the air come crashing down.
34	A lot of them do not believe that they are engaging in
	criminal acts, particularly in the corporate arena.
	These tend to be aggressive individuals who feel they
	can do things their way, that they are not violating
	the law, or they are not concerned about violating
	the law. The personality of the corporate executive is
	one who is aggressive, arrogant sometimes, and
	believes he knows the way to do things. Money is a
	factor in espionage cases, but there are other factors
	such as resentment by those individuals of the FBI
	or CIA, which motivates them.

35	They do it for a variety of reasons. First, often the lines are not very clear or bright. Sometimes society rewards people for pushing the envelope and then sends mixed messages by prosecuting that behavior. Second, society condones a great deal of impropriety without making it criminal and people may not realize that they are exposing themselves to criminal sanctions when they cross the line. Third, human beings are not perfect and people may become blind as to where the line is. Fourth, some people just
	have evil intent.
36	They generally have some financial incentive to do so, either an ownership interest in the company, an incentive arrangement, or institutional aspirations or career advancement goals. Many are also worried about keeping their jobs and are managing to a number (trying to hit a certain performance goal).
37	It is definitely because of the greed factor. Even though they make lots of money, it's not enough and they want more. They already have power and they want more money.
38	They engage in such acts for money.
39	They do it for a variety of reasons, including greed,
	arrogance, sense of entitlement, and thrill-seeking.
40	They engage in such criminal acts to obtain money.
41	Greed certainly is one important motivating factor. Ignorance can also be a motivating factor, especially where they have no true insight into where the lines are drawn and what the rules of the road might be, which is not a-typical.
42	Sometimes it is because of greed and financial gain. Sometimes it is to advance short-term business objectives even if it does not necessarily mean immediate financial gain, or any financial gain at all. Sometimes it is just mistakenly believing that it is a legitimate business transaction that happens to violate the law. Sometimes there are relatively innocent motives but by themselves are caught up in breaking the law.
43	N/A

44	Greed is a primary motivator. But other reasons include status and the need for something where one event leads to another.
45	In general, most people who commit white collar offenses decide that they have the right to operate very close to the line. There are two ways that can end up in real criminal conduct—they move to the other side of the line into illegal conduct, or what they are doing stays the same and the line gets moved (by the government).

SECTION	IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II	COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question	Have you seen a typical personality type for
II(c)	principals/architects? Any common
	personality or demographic traits?
1	Not really. Some tend to be amoral and narcissistic.
2	They tend to be risk-takers. They are just basically
	doing business that has an illegal feature about it,
	and they know that, but they do not view it as
	anything other than business.
3	No.
4	They are definitely arrogant and tend to be men
	more often than women.
5	They tend to have confidence, a determination to
	succeed, and often a willingness to disregard reality
	in order to justify their actions. Demographically
	there are no common factors.
6	N/A
7	They have very large egos, are very narcissistic, have
	an inflated sense of self, and are generally very
	charismatic and smart.
8	In general, the typical personality trait is
	intelligence. As for demographic traits, they tend to
	be white males who are generally conservative,
	patriotic, law-and-order types who are critical of the
	criminal justice system until they get mixed up with
	it. They tend to be upper-middle class.
9	No.
10	They are people who are willing to take a risk, but
	the line between what is criminal and what is not is
	not always clear.
11	No.
12	Yes and no. They tend to be professional, intelligent
	people who sometimes think they are too intelligent
	or think they are smarter than they really are.
	Usually they do not view themselves as criminal or
	exposed to criminal penalties.
13	N/A
14	No.

15	They tend to be people who do not think they will get
	caught or that the rules do not apply to them. They
	think they can ignore the rules or get around them.
16	They are individuals who are highly successful,
	articulate, have advanced in their careers, and get
	into it for the wrong reasons, some just to cover up
	mistakes.
17	Not really. As in anything else, leaders tend to have
	certain leadership characteristics.
18	No.
19	There are relatively few African Americans. White
	collar offenses are generally committed by people in
	upper level positions. A lot of defendants are Jewish.
20	There is no one personality trait or type in white
	collar crime, but there is a tendency to claim it is
	always someone else's fault.
21	They are largely Caucasian and male.
22	They generally have relatively high social standing—
	middle class or above.
23	Not really, except that they all tend to be educated
	and are normally responsible.
24	They are individuals who have otherwise been
	successful in their endeavors but who believe the
	restrictions do not apply to them or if they do apply,
	then by virtue of the success they have enjoyed they
	will overcome and be able to explain their activities if
	they get caught.
25	They are arrogant and think that they will not get
	caught, but there are no common demographic traits.
26	No. It pretty much covers the spectrum of
	educational background, gender, etc.
27	Not really. Principals seem arrogant or reckless.
	Also, men are much more likely to commit white
	collar crime than women.
28	No.
29	A Type A personality is likely to be a violator more
	than a withdrawn individual because it requires
	planning and action.
30	N/A

31	They tend to be Type A personalities, usually pretty
	aggressive, and self-confident.
32	No.
33	They tend to be highly educated white males with Type A personalities who have previously been very successful. Examples include bank presidents, other lawyers, accountants, and public officials.
34	They are greedy, have superior attitudes, believe that they are above the law, and that they know better than anyone else.
35	They are people who have been more likely to succeed in business endeavors. They have risen through the ranks and are mostly self-made. They tend to be entrepreneurs, risk-takers, and overachievers.
36	They all have leadership qualities. They tend to be people who have a strong dictatorial approach to management and do not like others to question them or their decisions.
37	They are usually very successful, bright leaders in companies who are lacking in moral character. There are no consistent demographic traits.
38	They tend to be take-charge people, and they are usually people with good levels of education, typically college graduates. They are people who could be your next-door neighbors.
39	They tend to be almost all upper-middle class white men in their 40s and 50s. They have a common personality trait of high intelligence and are often easily deluded into thinking what they were doing was not a crime.
40	They are greedy and cunning. They also have a tendency to wonder why the government picks on them. They feel victimized when under investigation.

 41 There certainly is the principal who just has a criminal mind, who more or less knows what he is doing and meets the standard of intent in criminal law. The more frequent personality type is the kind that is described as someone who believes there is a shortcut to every goal, and believes that there is a way to cut corners and get where you want to be. Then there are those people who do it out of necessity to meet other obligations, and that is like those who engage in intentional conduct but they may not have the true criminal mind. The other category is someone who does not recognize the dangers of conflict of interest. Many fraud cases start with some underlying conflict of interest and from that grows a whole pattern of activity. 42 No. Like the rest of the human condition, they run the gamut. 43 N/A 44 They usually have a strong ego and confidence that they are smarter than their peers. They appear to be strong personalities. They are people who convince themselves that they are doing right. For some, there is a psychopathic component. 45 They are political prisoners. 		
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SECTION II	IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question	In your opinion, why do facilitators/followers
II(d)	engage in criminal acts?
1	Generally, they feel pressure to do so.
2	In most cases they are worried about their jobs or
2	they are true followers and believe in what they do.
	They did not think it up or set it up, but they believe
	in it enough that they are willing to go along with it.
3	N/A
4	They are incentivized to do so to make more money,
-	they are convinced of the rightness of their cause,
	they think this is the only way they can compete in
	the marketplace, they fear that they will lose their
	job if they do not do it, and they are not assertive
	enough to say no.
5	They do it for many of the same reasons as
	principals, for example the financial gain, however,
	they are often motivated by a confidence in the
	principal or a sense of intimidation by the principal.
	They fear losing their jobs or feel they have no
	choice. Sometimes they do not have the full
	information and go along for other reasons. Often
	they have been promised something in return—
	either a piece of the action, a financial gain, or a
	commitment that the principal will take care of
	them.
6	N/A
7	They do it out of greed, but also to be part of the
	group mentality and because they are too weak to
	say no or because they will be steamrolled if they do.
	They may be afraid of losing their jobs, or they may
	think they can advance their own careers by doing
	what the leader wants.
8	N/A
9	Each one is different.
10	They do it out of greed, and because they are risk-
	takers.

11	They do it because of a fear of retribution, for career
	advancement, and/or because of a lack of
	understanding of the law.
12	N/A
13	N/A
14	Loyalty is the best word for it. They turn a blind eye
	to the consequences out of loyalty, and they may also
	fear being terminated.
15	In the corporate context, those lower on the totem
	pole do it to curry favor or advance their career.
	They are also often concerned about losing their jobs.
	In another context, the follower might really like the
	principal and see it as a way to get more money. For
	instance, they believe they are hitching their wagon
	to the rising criminal star and will get benefits from
	it.
16	They do it because of concerns over their job, threats,
	poor judgment, and to a lesser degree greed. Most
	often it is because they do not have control over the
	whole pie most of the time. They get caught up in it
	to keep their job, make their bosses happy, and for
	longevity with their occupations.
17	They do it generally for the same reasons that
	principals do it. Greed is the main reason, including
	wanting a bonus, a bigger salary, or fear of losing a
	job. They often have a bravado or belief that they
	will not get caught.
18	They do it because of greed, maintaining a job, or
	because it is the general business practice of the
	industry.
19	They do it as a way to make money and promote
	their status.
20	For many reasons, many followers think they are not
	doing something bad because it is just something
	they do at work and they are not personally
	profiting. Others simply do not see it as wrong.
	Often, people do their jobs and go home and are not
	necessarily thinking about what they are doing as a
	crime. Then after a while, they are in so deep there
	is nothing they can do about it.

21	They do it for a variety of reasons. Some can engage
	in it without understanding it because it is more
	complex than they can comprehend. They think they
	are doing nothing wrong and are only minimally
	involved because their actions are trivial or
	ministerial. Sometimes they are doing a personal
[favor for someone. There is almost never a great
	financial motive for followers.
22	They usually do it because they feel like this is their
	life and they need the position to support their
	families and lifestyle.
23	They generally do it for the same reasons as the
	principal—greed, competition, and superiority.
24	Often it is the result of enhancing their status or
	maintaining their current status. There is pressure
	to do what they otherwise would not do by virtue of
	the instructions or subtleties of a principal
	encouraging them to do so.
25	They are afraid of retaliation or bodily harm
	(particularly if unions are involved), and they have
	the incentive of getting promoted and achieving
	personal gain. There are also some who simply may
	not know how wrong it is and think that if the higher
	ups are saying to do it then it must be ok.
26	Usually they do it because they think that if they
	don't, their superiors are going to give them such a
	difficult time that they are willing to run the risk
	and take the out that "I was directed to do it and had
	no choice." They think the career advancement is
	worth the risk.
27	They do it for many reasons, but mostly to align him
	or herself with the principal.
28	They fear losing their jobs and they are unable to
	believe that the company they work for would be
	violating the law. They respect the authority of the
	company.

29	There are two answers. One is that they do not know any better and they are kept deliberately ignorant, and the other is that they are duped or befuddled. In the hierarchy of our life, employees are very much inclined to accept almost as gospel that which is told to them by an employer.
30	N/A
31	They engage in those acts either to go along, to get along, or because they feel that they have to in order to keep their jobs.
32	They do it to please, to get along with, or to benefit from the principal.
33	There are three types of facilitators. First, there are sociopathic personalities who do not think it is wrong. Second, there are people who get taken in by the charisma of the main perpetrator, particularly in instances when the principal is one of these sociopathic personalities and tends to be charismatic. They are gullible, do not use common sense, and do not look at things objectively. Third, there are those who, because of personal circumstances, are desperate financially and would not do these things ordinarily.
34	They feel that if they do not obey the instructions of their superiors they will be replaced, and by following the orders of their superiors, they earn more money and positions in corporations that are of significance. A lot of them will say that they would have been fired had they not followed their instructions.

35	They do it for the same reasons as the principals. They do it for a variety of reasons. First, often the lines are not very clear or bright. Sometimes society rewards people for pushing the envelope and then sends mixed messages by prosecuting that behavior. Second, society condones a great deal of impropriety without making it criminal and people may not realize that they are exposing themselves to criminal sanctions when they cross the line. Third, human beings are not perfect and people may become blind as to where the line is. Fourth, some people just have evil intent.
36	Sometimes, especially in antitrust cases, it amounts to sheer laziness. Other reasons include an institutional fear where they do not want to say "no," a financial incentive in that they do not want to be fired, they want to get ahead or get a direct financial gain, or some particular loyalty to the principal.
37	They engage in such acts because that is the nature of their mindset. They are followers anyway and this is just one more way to follow. Usually the brains behind these schemes are bright and very influential, and it is easier for these people to fall into the fold. They tend to follow the supervisor types and not their peers. Many of these people do it because they are followers and not because they will benefit financially.
38	They also do it for money. However, it could be that they are drawn into it and are just saving their jobs and preserving their positions. At other times they try to get a piece of the action, but as soon as they start taking the money greed enters into it.
39	A lot of times it is because they are weak people.
40	N/A
41	They do it out of greed, naïveté, not understanding the rules of the road, denial, or if they facilitate something, the promise of a reward that can compensate for some other issue they need to address.

42	They go along with some superior thinking that legitimizes what they are doing. Someone above them directs how things will go and they follow along thinking that somehow significant harm cannot come to them because they are following the leader.
43	N/A
44	The person they are following is in a position of authority and their personal advancement may depend on them doing what the principal wants. They may share some of the same aspirations and they may be frustrated with their advancement. They may also have the mentality that "everybody is doing it."
45	N/A

SECTION II	IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question	Have you seen a typical personality type for
II(e)	facilitators/followers? Any common
	personality or demographic traits?
1	They tend to be followers who are perfectly
	comfortable being in a subordinate role and
	accepting the rewards.
2	They are not as aggressive and they tend to be
	people who do what they are told to do. Sometimes
	they are willing to go along for reasons that do not
	have anything much to do with the project, but they
	just like the individuals leading the scheme. They
	are the kind of people who just go along and do what
	they are asked to do or what they perceive they need
	to do to carry about their part of the deal.
3	None.
4	No, it cuts across all lines.
5	They are generally easily manipulated and used by
	the principal. They tend to be less independent.
	However, there are no common demographic
	features.
6	N/A
7	No. They range from very ambitious people who
	think they will get advanced to those who are very
	weak and just follow.
8	N/A
9	No
10	There is no common demographic, but they all want
	to score and punch in with those who are leading the
	way. The almighty buck motivates them; however,
	the motive in healthcare crimes is different—it may
	not be money that motivates. But where money is
	the end result, it is greed.
11	No.
12	N/A
13	N/A
	They are usually more passive than the principals.

15	Usually they are people who will act without
	questioning.
16	No. They are all over the board.
17	No.
18	No.
19	N/A
20	They generally have "follower" personalities and
	tend to be more employee-minded than
	entrepreneurial. Sometimes they are family
	members or others who have misguided loyalties for
	various reasons.
21	They are largely caucasian, largely male.
22	They are usually hard workers, high school
	graduates, and want more money and more
	responsibility.
23	Not really. Sometimes they have some type of
	personality weakness or a follower mentality in
	general.
24	They are usually those who do not feel there is any
	other option available to them and they succumb to
	pressure.
25	No.
26	No.
27	They tend to lack courage and have a follower
	mentality. They do not think for themselves and are
	easily manipulated. They have a blind allegiance
	and are meeker and less secure in their ability to
	peel off from the scheme or resist.
28	No, but they are more common than whistleblowers.
	It takes a real unusual person or event to create
	whistleblowers.
29	No. They are dominated because they are in the
	position of being subject to it because of their
	employee status, not because of a particular
	personality trait.
30	N/A
31	They tend to be more Type B personalities. They are
	afraid to go against the grain of what is expected of
	them by their bosses.

00	(The see being a second
32	They have a weakness of character and are unable to
	say no.
33	They are gullible.
34	They are more subservient, not quite as aggressive,
	and are more prone to follow orders rather than give
	them. They are not initiators.
35	They tend to be less likely to be leaders in anything,
	including their family, job, and social life. They are
	more insecure and feel like they have fewer choices.
36	They tend to be a more diverse group with different
	personality types. It is less likely that they will have
	a strong personality. They are usually people who
	want to get along and do not want to make waves.
	They want to keep their job and usually have less
	initiative or ambition.
37	They are certainly the less confident, less
	independent types who are dependent on others.
	There is not a common demographic trait.
38	Just as with principals, they are usually people with
	good levels of education, typically college graduates,
	and they are people who could be your next-door
	neighbors. However, these are also people who are
	weak but basically otherwise well-meaning. They
	allow themselves to get caught up and do not say no
	to criminal activity under the guise of it being sharp
	business practice.
39	They tend to be people who do not accept
	responsibility.
40	N/A
41	They are not distinguishable from architects except
	that they may be facilitators instead of leaders.
42	No, other than that by definition of position they are
	a follower so they are more passive than the person
	orchestrating the crime.
43	N/A
44	They have a weaker personality type and are more
	easily persuaded. Since they are not the originator
	of the idea, then they think they are somehow less
	culpable and are just following directions. They have
	a more pliable personality.
45	N/A
	

SECTION III	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
Question III(a)	What percentage of the white collar cases that you've been involved with concerned organizations/corporations as defendants,
	targets, or potential defendants/targets?
1	100%
2	100%
3	50%
4	90%
5	50%
6	75%
7	Nearly 100%
8	Minimal
9	33%
10	50%
11	99%
12	80%
13	80%
14	0%
15	80%
16	50%
17	Several
18	75–85%
19	100%
20	Minimal
21	25%
22	Significant number
23	90%
24	80%
25	90%
26	Large percentage
27	50%
28	100%
29	50%
30	95%
31	0%
32	20%

33	0%
34	Minimal
35	Handful, mostly individuals
36	85%
37	90%
38	0%
39	33%
40	20–30%
41	60–70%
42	75%
43	80%
44	50%
45	100%

SECTION	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III	
Question III(b)	Prosecutors
(1)(a)	What were/are key considerations to you in
	deciding whether to prosecute corporations?
1	I tried to determine if what was being represented constituted corporate culture or just the conduct of a few individuals.
2	N/A
3	There is a palpable difference in attitude from US Attorney office to US Attorney office. I looked to the individual and not the corporation because despite people's best efforts, an offense may occur. Also, if you charge the executive and the corporation, then the jury may come back and say the corporation is guilty and then find the executive not guilty. It is easier to find the corporation guilty. That is a reason not to charge the corporation.
4	We are worried about having proof that in fact it was a corporate scheme (it went far up the chain and the board knew or should have known of the bad conduct). Criminal prosecutors consider whether the people who really suffer are the shareholders of the corporation and whether they should be penalized for the bad behavior of the corporation. They often consider deferred prosecution agreements to avoid such scenarios.
5	I looked at the nature of the crime at issue—how serious it was and how pervasive the wrongdoing was within the company. If it was a big company with only a few bad actors, then that would mitigate against prosecuting the company. Also, whether the corporation had some sort of compliance program in place affected the prosecution and whether it was a real effort at compliance. I also considered whether the company had allowed the fraud to continue or disregarded or ignored the actions of its employees.

6	I prosecuted mostly individuals and only a very few
	corporate cases. But in those days prosecutors
	exercised more discretion than they do today. The
	seriousness of the crime, whether or not the
	individual had a prior criminal record, and what the
	consequences of the prosecution might be were all
	considerations.
7	Key considerations were how high up the conduct
'	
	went, how pervasive it was, if there were previous
	sanctions, what the corporate culture was like (good
	corporate citizen or not), and how it reacted to
	investigation (whether it cooperated or put up more
	roadblocks).
8	N/A
9	We only prosecuted individuals.
10	We did not prosecute many corporations.
11	N/A
12	I was not interested in prosecuting corporations by
	and large. By punishing the corporation, we would
	punish shareholders who had no role in the fraud.
	Additionally, the shareholders at the time of the
	prosecution were not necessarily the shareholders
	during the criminal activity. Prosecuting the
	corporation does not result in much deterrent value
	because individuals commit the acts. Deterrence
	efforts are best focused on individuals.
13	The key consideration was whether there was
	involvement at the top of the corporation.
14	I considered the level to which they were complicit in
	the criminal activity and whether there was
	deliberate ignorance where they would not take steps
	to reign in employees who were doing bad things.
15	I consider whether the corporation benefited and if
	the participants involved in the criminal activity
	were upper-level managers. If it only involved lower-
	level employees who were not in a position to direct
	the corporation, then it is unlikely that I will
	prosecute the corporation. If upper-management is
	involved and they are in a position to direct the
	company, then I am more likely to prosecute.

16	I looked at what impact charging the corporation would have on the existence of the corporation, the community, and the employees.
17	I looked at how pervasive the conduct was, how high
11	up the corporate ladder it went, and what the
	corporation did. A key consideration was whether
	the corporation worked with the government, even
	before the Thompson Memo. It depends on who is
	doing the wrongful conduct.
18	N/A
19	We considered whether we could obtain a conviction
	as the main factor.
20	I looked at whether the corporation was riddled with
	bad things or whether some people had committed
	the crime in question. I focused on the pervasiveness
	of the wrongful conduct.
21	N/A
22	I look at the McNulty Memo and the series of factors
	contained in it. In the health care arena, if an entity
	is indicted it is excluded from participation in the
	Medicare program. Therefore, I have to consider
	that effect. Also, whether the company has an
	effective internal compliance program is a very
	persuasive factor when deciding not to prosecute a
	corporation. Also, how pervasive the fraud was-
	how far up in the corporation the wrongdoing went—
	is also important. I also consider what the
	corporation did after the fraud was discovered.
23	First, I looked to see if a crime was committed and if
	the defendant committed it. Second, I considered
	whether I would be able to present sufficient
	evidence to make me reasonably comfortable that a
	conviction would ensue.
24	I considered if they had an understanding of what
	the law prescribes and their willingness to do it
	anyway. I looked to see if there was a failure to
	institute procedures that would have uncovered or
	stopped the activity. I also considered the
	pervasiveness of the activity in the corporation.

25	How high up the misconduct went and who had knowledge (collective knowledge as to corporations
	applies) were key factors. We looked for knowledge
	going as high up in the organization as possible, or at
	least acquiescence or looking the other way.
26	I was more concerned with the prosecution of
	individuals and would only prosecute the corporation
	if it was clear that the action was rampant
	throughout the organization.
27	I looked at the intent to the extent I could divine it. I
	would prosecute if the corporation or the people
	involved knew (not just that they should have
	known). It was very important that they absolutely
	knew it was wrong. Statutory wrongness was not
	good enough. The person had to do something
	inherently wrong and the corporation had to know
	about it.
28	I consider whether they have money, whether the
	alleged fraud was a clear violation, whether the
	violation causes substantial monetary harm to the
	US, and whether there was an ancillary harm to the
	US (threat to health and safety of public, military,
	threat to reputation of the country).
29	N/A
30	We looked for criminal intent.
31	N/A
32	We consider whether there is enough information to
	show that people within the organization each have a
	little bit of knowledge and that they know what they
	did was a violation of the law. All the factors can be
	combined to show that if everyone had a little
	knowledge, the corporation can be prosecuted on the
	basis of what everyone collectively knew. If there is
	not enough information to pursue an individual or if
	what they did alone was not an offense, then
	prosecutors go after the corporation. On other
	occasions there might be enough evidence against
	one person.

33	I did not prosecute corporations, but the strength of
	the documentary evidence, whether the defendant
	had a plausible explanation for the conduct
	(innocence), whether the behavior was repetitive,
	and what his conduct was once he became aware of
	the investigation (if we uncovered evidence that he
	was trying to influence other witnesses or destroy
	documents) were all factors for prosecuting
	individuals.
34	There was not much emphasis on prosecuting
	organizations. There are guidelines now that the
	Department of Justice has published suggesting that
	corporations can be prosecuted if they do not
	cooperate fully with such investigations. I think
	those are wrong-headed and I hope they will be
	amended, but I did not have those factors in front of
	me, and as a defense attorney I very much resent the
	government's attempt to indict corporations just
	because the corporations want to fight.
35	I was not actively involved in the decisions, but we
	looked at whether there was a bright line between
	legal and illegal conduct established by society and if
	the corporation stepped over that line.
36	I was very faithful to the Department of Justice's
	guidelines and the Thompson Memorandum.
37	Those were set forth by the Department of Justice,
	which had minimums such as a certain amount of
	loss (substantial), and certainly there were
	exceptions if the behavior violations were something
	that needed to be made an example of to deter bad
	conduct. The crime had to exceed a certain level of
	loss or the case would be sent to the state or handled
	in another manner.
38	The factors that are in the sentencing guidelines and
	include the culpability of the corporate entity,
	pervasiveness, how high up it goes, overall harm (is
	it physical or monetary harm), and how endemic to
	the corporate structure is the criminal activity. If it
	is really heinous we might charge individuals.
39	N/A

40	Prosecuting corporations was very rare. There would
	have to be an overriding motivator for the
	government to prosecute a corporation, such as
	collection of taxes, seizure of assets, etc.
41	We did not prosecute many corporations back then.
	That was not a common prosecutorial practice in
	health care.
42	There was less of a willingness to prosecute
	corporations based on straight respondeat superior
	theory, and there was greater emphasis on truly
	wanting to find evidence that would link someone
	high in the company directly to criminal conduct.
43	The emphasis was to avoid going after a company
	because that harmed more people than not going
	after the company, so we tried to resolve it civilly
	rather than criminally. We might get them to agree
	to an SEC enforcement action instead because
	otherwise people other than the culprits would be
	harmed. It was more important to be more
	imaginative. The idea was not so much punishment
	as it was to create a remedial environment.
44	The degree to which the conduct was sanctioned by
	the company was important. Also, I considered
	whether the conduct of the employee was outside the
	scope of his responsibilities, which would mitigate
	against charging the company. If it appeared that
	there was collective knowledge and a number of high
	level employees were aware of the conduct, that
	would favor prosecution.
45	N/A

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SECTION	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III	
Question III(b)	Prosecutors
(1)(b)	Was/Is there a career impact from the choice of
	cases that are taken?
1	Absolutely—a positive one.
2	N/A
3	In some way there was. I was one of the first people to enter the private practice with an expertise in white collar crime, so it had little impact on me. However, now there is a greater chance that a high profile prosecutor will go into private practice at a good law firm.
4	No, because we have almost all of our cases driven by whistleblowers. They file complaints under the False Claims Act, and the government has a set period of time to investigate. If we choose not to go forward, the whistleblower can go forward with the allegation. We review cases very seriously and do not have the luxury of picking and choosing what comes in the door.
5	No.
6	Yes. High-profile cases that bring the prosecutor to the public's attention are either career boosters or breakers depending on how he or she performs.
7	Taking one type of case over another did not seem to advance my career because I prosecuted all kinds of cases, many of which were high profile cases.
8	N/A
9	Yes, it can create a niche practice for the prosecutor.
10	Prosecutors enjoy high profile cases because they get press and can have an impact on deterrence.
11	N/A
12	Absolutely.
13	No.
14	No.
15	The high profile prosecution of corporations can benefit a prosecutor's career.

16	Yes, most prosecutors would love to be involved in a
	high profile case because they know that handling a
	case like that and doing a good job gives significant
	exposure. Whether or not that translates into
	advancement in a career inside or out of the
	prosecutor's office, the exposure has an impact on
	professional standing.
17	Yes. The higher the profile of the case, the more
	credit the prosecutor gets.
18	N/A
19	Yes, there can be a career impact, especially if you
10	want to take a case that your supervisors do not
	want to take a case that your supervisors do not want to.
20	Yes.
20	N/A
21 22	
	Yes—both positive and negative.
23	Sure.
24	Yes—in a positive way.
25	Yes, it can create an expertise that carries over into
	private practice.
26	Probably.
27	Yes.
28	Not generally.
29	N/A
30	Yes. For example, I do not do cases involving violent
	crime and that is a conscience crime. I have always
	had a focus on business and regulatory violations on
	both the civil and criminal side.
31	N/A
32	It is important when hiring someone to know
	whether they can generate business, which is
	affected by the choice of cases they take as
	prosecutors.
33	There were people who took particular cases in the
	hopes that it would have an impact, but they were in
	the minority.
34	Yes. The types of cases one prosecutes may develop
	into a niche that becomes a primary source of
	business once one moves to private practice.

35	Of course, every lawyer's career is defined by the
	cases he or she is involved with.
36	I did not think about it that way. That never crossed
50	
	my mind.
37	The headliner cases would help if the prosecutor was
	successful, but frankly there was enough for
	everyone, so that alone would not be why someone
	was promoted.
38	Yes, but it is career impact in the sense of enhancing
	publicity and visibility, and of developing an
	expertise. No one chooses white collar cases simply
	for career purposes.
39	N/A
40	No. Prosecutors frequently did not have a choice of
	cases. Investigative agencies came in with a case
	and the Department of Justice had to handle it.
41	Yes. A prosecutor can develop a reputation for
	handling particular cases and become high profile as
]	a result.
42	Yes. There is more visibility with higher profile
	cases. Prosecutors who gain experience working on
	complicated corporate fraud cases are more likely in
	the private practice to work in those areas than
	prosecutors who spend most of their careers working
	on drugs or other crimes.
43	Yes. The higher the profile of the case, the more
	impact it has on what will happen to the prosecutor
	with respect to future job prospects (in private
	practice).
44	Yes.
45	N/A

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SECTION III	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
Question III(b)	Prosecutors
(1)(c)	Was/Is there a career impact from the outcome
	of cases you prosecute(d)?
1	Yes, a positive one.
2	N/A
3	Yes, but less so. Many times the prosecutions are high profile regardless of whether you win or lose.
4	No. Some prosecutors have lost big cases and they are still given high profile cases. Prosecutors lose cases most often not through incompetence but other issues that come into play. Messing up by not doing one's homework would have a career impact, but the government does not have bonus programs for good results.
5	It could have an impact, especially if it is a high profile case. However, if the prosecutor does a good job and acts fairly, then the outcome of the case matters less.
6	It is not just so much whether the prosecutor wins or loses, but rather it is coming to the public's attention by virtue of a high-profile case. However, having a lot of success on top of that makes a difference. It helped my career that I won a couple of very big cases and my name got out there.
7	No.
8	N/A
9	No, because it was the same as it is now. The government wins 80–90% of the cases, and everyone is supposed to win their cases.
10	No.
11	N/A
12	Not necessarily, but if you mishandle a high profile case it can have a career impact.
13	No, because most prosecutors win their cases.
14	The more successful the prosecutor, the more cases come through the door.

15	Absolutely. If a prosecutor brings a lot of cases and
10	loses them all, then it is a poor reflection on his or
	her judgment and will hurt his or her career.
16	No. Prosecutors win the vast majority of their cases,
10	and if they do their job most of the time they will be
	successful. A slip up here and there will not have a
	significant impact on their career unless they do a
	really poor job or their ethics are questionable.
17	Yes, at least as to the notoriety of the prosecution.
18	N/A
19	Yes. If you win, it is positive. If you lose, it is
	negative.
20	Probably. If you lost a huge case, there could have
21	been a career impact.
21	N/A
22	There is some impact. If you lose a trial, it can really
	hurt your career.
23	If you continue to lose there would be a negative
	impact.
24	The outcome does have some impact.
25	Yes, though the impact was largely on the reputation
	one developed inside and outside of the office.
	Prosecutors who did well got awards.
26	If you lost a huge case, that could have a career
	impact.
27	No
28	Absolutely. There is a large range of cases and
	prosecutors have to decide what cases to pursue with
	little interference by their supervisors.
29	N/A
30	No.
31	N/A
32	As long as it is not a tremendous debacle, it does not
	matter if you win or lose, though it is always better
L	to win.
33	No.
34	Yes, there is a career impact. In fact I think
l	prosecutors think on those terms, although I think
	the majority assesses the case as to its merits.
35	Yes.

36	N/A
37	Yes. It does help to get convictions, so to a certain
	extent there is a career impact, but not to a huge
	extent. It all depends on knowledge and experience,
	particularly since there might have been a good
	reason why convictions were not secured.
38	Yes. Anyone would think that is true over the long-
	run, even though it is rare for a single loss to be
	singularly important.
39	N/A
40	Absolutely. There were attorneys who consistently
	lost cases and they were advised to go somewhere
	else. I prosecuted a very high profile case and was
	promoted solely because of that.
41	No, not really because representing the federal
	government in the early 1980s generally resulted in
	favorable verdicts, but even then winning or losing in
	that capacity did not affect one's career.
42	These days there are people who tend to stay in the
	government longer, and being successful leads to
	opportunities if they stay. Now it is more likely that
	if prosecutors want to leave, they can as an
	attractive candidate.
43	Yes, if they are big cases the prosecutors become
	known and start getting other big cases, so they are
	likely to do well when they leave the government.
44	Yes.
45	N/A

SECTION III	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
Question III(c)	Defense Counsel
(1)(a)	In your opinion, what strategy should target organizations pursue to avoid prosecution? Do you recommend distinguishing corporations from culpable individuals? Is that a wise public policy?
1	Corporations need to generally try to convince the government that prosecuting the company would have an adverse impact on innocent people and there are alternatives to prosecution. Corporations have to distinguish themselves from individuals because it is consistent with the obligation to the corporation to put the company first.
2	Cooperation is a strategy which enables the corporation to say that this is not something the company is about, that these people acted without any authority, and that the company is willing to do everything to make it right. To make this defense one would really have to show that the company was a victim and that the company did not benefit from the crime. Distinguishing corporations from culpable individuals is difficult because it is impossible to have a corporate intent that is formulated any other way than by the officers and employees. The government generally pursues individuals and the higher up the individual is, the better the prize. If it gets the individual it will also get the company. There may be an aberrant situation where there is an officer who acted without the knowledge of the corporation and with no connection to it, and that separating the two might be appropriate, but for the most part what the government is interested in is individuals.

3	The corporation has no rights. When the
	government tells a corporation that they are
	investigating it, the corporation has to tell the
	government it will do anything to help them and
	then do whatever the government wants. Based on
	the factors in the Thompson Memo, the corporation
	has to show that it did everything to evidence
	cooperation and avoid indictment, including firing
	culpable people. If the government indicts the
	company anyway and it is a health care entity, it
	should plead guilty and try to work out a deal to
	avoid Medicare debarment. The corporation should
	work with prosecution to try to get the company the
	best deal. The primary goal of a prosecutor should
	be to bring culpable individuals to justice and not to
	always go after the corporation.
4	N/A
5	They need to make contact with the prosecutor
	through counsel and try to learn as much about the
	nature of the investigation and the concerns of the
	prosecutor as possible. They should open a good line
	of communication with the prosecutor's office and
	take the initiative to convey that the company is
	going to quickly evaluate if it is in a position to
	cooperate and then move down that path. The
	company does not have to turn over everything
	mentioned in the Thompson Memo at that point, but
	the best way to ensure a corporate entity will not be
	indicted is to move towards cooperation. It needs to
	move down the path slowly and give the government
	information after careful consideration about what to
	disclose. There is also a need to distinguish between
	the corporate entity and the culpable individuals to
	avoid indictment of the entity.
6	Publicly held corporations today have no choice but
	to cooperate with the government by sharing the
	findings of their internal investigations and firing
	employees who committed a wrong. They cannot
	afford to take the risk of not taking some kind of
	deal, even if that means accepting a corporate plea.
	deal, even il that means accepting a corporate plea.

7	Corporations and culpable organizations are
	typically distinguished and corporations do not
	generally get prosecuted. It is appropriate to
	prosecute corporations if they are not responding
Í	appropriately, but prosecution should usually be of
	individuals, though there are times when it is good
	public policy to prosecute the company. If it is a
	federal case, the Department of Justice has
	guidelines and the corporation should be familiar
	with what those guidelines suggest companies
	should do in those situations. They should do their
	best to adhere to them and make sure they are not
, ,	running afoul of too many of them.
8	They should make a disclosure immediately and get
	an independent investigation started by a respected
	law firm, headed by someone with integrity beyond
	reproach. They should also self-report.
9	Corporations must be distinguished from
[individuals, and now corporations are forced to waive
	their privileges so they have to cooperate enough to
	avoid prosecution.
10	Every case depends on the facts, but generally
	prosecutors are against throwing individuals to the
	wolves. Corporations should be defended separately
	if that is what the facts indicate is appropriate.
11	That question cannot be answered in the abstract
	because it depends on the case. Sometimes
	cooperation with the government helps and
	sometimes it becomes a huge penalty. It depends on
	the circumstances.

12	It boils down to corporate cooperation with the
	government. A corporation that cooperates stands
	the best case of avoiding prosecution, including
	internal investigations and waiving attorney client
	privilege. As for distinguishing between individuals
	and corporations, it becomes a difficult decision for a
	corporation because the government wants
1	everything and does not want the corporation to
	protect individuals. However, turning over
	individuals creates a huge problem for the
	corporation from the functioning point of view. The
	corporation must run a business and people have to
1	feel secure. Today corporations and people are
	spending an enormous amount of time covering
	themselves and worrying about liability, which
	makes it difficult to run a company.
13	If there is a large company, publicly held, it must
	almost always be separated from culpable
	individuals. But when it is a private company where
	the company and its owner have very similar
	interests, this may not be appropriate. Large
1	corporations can be distinguished from individuals
	and earn credit for taking remedial steps, but when
	the company and the owner are almost one and the
	same, that strategy cannot be used.
14	Today the strategy is complete and total cooperation.
	Corporations and culpable individuals should be
	distinguished.
15	N/A
16	Organizations should have very strong compliance
	programs, very involved compliance officers,
	consistent training, and consistent recognition by the
	management that fraudulent activities will not be
	tolerated within the organization. Distinguishing
	corporations from culpable individuals is a good
	strategy.
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17	They should conduct an internal investigation and
	determine whether the conduct was actually
	committed and punish the culpable employees. They
	should improve their code of ethics and the teaching
	of the ethics code. Additionally, they should
	cooperate with the government.
18	They should seek outside counsel in the criminal
	field.
19	Generally, maximum cooperation with the
	government is necessary. Also, maximum effort to
	comply with applicable laws and regulations is
	important. Too little attention is paid to prosecuting
	culpable individuals as opposed to leveraging the
	cooperation into making a large financial settlement.
20	It depends on the type and size of the company.
	Some large companies are able to make an argument
	against prosecution based on their size ("too big to
	fail") or the strength of their compliance program.
	Small companies are much more likely to be
	prosecuted because they lack economic and political
	power. Basically, corporations should put a strong
	compliance program in place, get everything in order,
	behave well, and demonstrate to the government
	that they have done well and worked to correct the
	problem.
21	Cooperation with the government is a ticket to
21	
	prison. They should hire good counsel, investigate
	the situation, find out what happened and then tell
00	the government what they are missing.
22	N/A
23	There are so many variables. It depends on the
	substance of the offense and the procedure. For
	instance, whether or not you can affect the outcome
	can depend on when you are contacted. Also,
	corporations should primarily present a united front
	rather than casting away employees.
24	They should make sure there is a strong compliance
	plan in place that is sincere and intended to ferret
	out wrongdoing. They need to send a clear message
	from the top that wrongdoing will not be tolerated
	and respond accordingly.

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25	Yes, it is important to distinguish corporations from
	culpable individuals to try to show those were
	isolated incidents and that there was no knowledge
	or approval from upper management. Corporations
	want to try to show that they had a corporate culture
	and policies that promoted and encouraged honesty
	and compliance, that employees were trained in that,
	and that any wrongdoing was taken care of
	internally.
26	Hopefully the board of directors and senior
	executives would not be involved, so they could point
	to lower level employees doing something outside the
	scope of their employment. The corporation should
	distance itself from the activity and the culpable
	person(s) and claim no knowledge or encouragement
	of it.
27	Corporations should act in their own self-interest by
21	identifying the problem and deciding what the
	corporation would do under ordinary circumstances,
	absent the threat of criminal prosecution, and then
	pursue that strategy. It is a mistake to cooperate
	with the government immediately and may not be in
	the long-term best interests of the company.
	Complete cooperation and supplication may be
	necessary if the corporation is a public company, but
	it should not automatically be the first step. The
	decision to distinguish between culpable individuals
	and corporations depends on the extent of the crime
	or fraud. However, society should not deputize
	corporations by requiring them to investigate their
	employees.
28	N/A
29	Distinguishing corporations from culpable
	individuals is a wise policy, particularly when
	dealing with public corporations because otherwise
	there are truly innocent people being hurt in a
	horrible fashion. The threat of prosecution of the
	corporation tends to keep those who are working
	there in line because they can lose a lot if the
	corporation goes down.

30	They should have an effective compliance program.
	They should also use their lawyers as lawyers and
	listen to their lawyers. Distinguishing corporations
	from culpable individuals is a wise public policy
	because the whole experience with some recent
	prosecutions suggests that many innocent people get
	very badly hurt when the government fails to
	distinguish between the two.
31	Corporations should be distinguished from culpable
	individuals. Also, it makes sense for the corporation
	to cooperate with the government as quickly as
	possible, to conduct internal investigations and, if
	appropriate, turn over the results, and to start
	remedial measures before the government has taken
	action (create own compliance programs, fire those
	who need to be fired, etc.).
32	It depends on what stage the litigation is in. If the
	question is how to avoid getting prosecuted, do not
	violate the law. And it depends on for whom you are
	advocating, the corporation or the individual.
	Frequently corporations are really an individual, and
	there is no benefit from making the corporation take
	the hit. If it is a big corporation, it is important that
	the US Attorney and the SEC do not proceed. If it is
	announced that there is an open investigation
	regarding securities fraud, the corporation will get
	hit with derivative lawsuits, making the corporation
	a target and if it is convicted or pleads guilty, it will
	lose those lawsuits. At that point is would be
	important to keep the corporation from pleading
	guilty or being convicted because then the
	shareholders will be hurt by the wrongdoing of one or
	a few people. In those instances it might be best to
	navigate the litigation so the corporation takes the
	hit because the corporation cannot go to jail and the
	bad press will go away. Depending on the
	circumstances, if it is a large corporation it is best to
	strongly recommend ways to keep the prosecution
	from securing a conviction.

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33	It is critical that they conduct their own internal investigation of the conduct and use outside lawyers to conduct that investigation who are not lawyers that the company normally uses. Whether or not to distinguish corporations from individuals depends on how pervasive the conduct is and how far up the hierarchy the people are. This is an area where prosecutors have to exercise sound discretion because of the potential impact on employees and investors who are innocent. The basic strategy is to try to persuade the prosecutor that the indictment of the corporation will
	cost a lot of innocent people their jobs and their livelihood. Some companies and lawyers work very closely with the prosecutor and, in effect, tell individuals in the corporation that the corporation will pay legal fees only if those individuals cooperate. These are not particularly good strategies because corporations should have the right to defend themselves.
35	The company needs to respond quickly, accurately, and cooperatively. The company needs to have a wide disclosure program and a process for reviewing corporate actions. The corporation must show that the entity is independent of the people.
36	They have to get their arms around the issue as soon as possible and act in the corporation's best interest, especially if it is a public company. The corporation ought to be in dialogue with the government to resolve the situation in a non-criminal manner. Cooperation with the government is a significant component to get the government to decline prosecution or use a civil remedy or to convince the government to go after the individuals. Pursuing the culpable individuals as an alternative to prosecuting the company is the right approach. This can be more difficult in a closely held company if it is controlled by the individual the government believes is the principal wrongdoer.
37	N/A
38	N/A

39	In most instances, the corporation ought to
	determine the extent of the culpability and try to
	protect itself, even if it means throwing the culpable
	people out. The notion of a company circling the
	wagons and protecting wrongdoers is risky.
40	It is important to distinguish the corporation from
	the individual, particularly if it is large, because the
[impact of prosecution on a corporation can be large
	on innocent people. This is not a consideration when
	individuals are involved. Generally there are more
	effective tools that can be used to force a corporation
	to comply with the law, and penalize them
	(administrative fines) that cannot be used on
	individuals. So yes, it is wise public policy to use a
	great deal of discretion when prosecuting a
	corporation.
41	It is important to look at in each case, at least
	initially, a strategy of cooperation with the
	government authorities and cleaning the
	corporation's house. That is a balancing act that
	should be done on a case by case basis. It is nearly a
	fait accompli to engage in cooperation and
	investigation of the corporation's own wrongdoing
	and then get credit for cleaning up. Distinguishing
	corporations from culpable individuals is the general
	play in most circumstances.
42	Distinguishing corporations from culpable
	individuals is a strategy that can be important. It
	shows where the law is on corporate criminal
	responsibility, and more importantly it points out
	harm that will come to shareholders even if there is
	a bad apple individual that can technically hold the
	corporation liable.

43	Companies have to be extremely proactive, being
	very assertive in compliance and in governance and
	in discovering violations. They must disclose
	violations, take the lead, and clean things up. A
	company can distinguish itself from culpable
	employees only for purposes of mitigation, not for
	purposes of strategy in terms of corrective action or
	disclosure. Companies do have to be much less
	considerate than they used to be in dealing with
	violators because there is much more at stake than
	there ever was, and they cannot afford the baggage.
44	It is important to know what conduct the company
	engaged in and to find out what happened.
	Therefore, the company needs to conduct a full
	investigation, which empowers the company to talk
	to the government. The core thing to do is to reach
	out to the government and make contact as soon as
	possible. The company, through counsel, should offer
	to meet with the government to try to get pre-
	indictment discovery from the prosecutor.
45	They must be sure they have an operational and real
	compliance program complete with a hotline program
	and an internal audit program.

SECTION	PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III	
Question III(c)	Defense Counsel
(1)(b)	What do you think prosecutors' considerations are in selecting cases?
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1	It is always a matter of deterrence. They try to select cases with the greatest deterrence value.
2	They look for some cases purely as a matter of policy (i.e., if Congress has decided that it thinks water pollution is a big problem and the prosecutors target those violations). They pick higher profile cases, but they also take into consideration the capability of counsel representing the defendants. Sometimes the government decides someone is a bad person and is motivated to go after him for everything possible, and sometimes it is just a matter of the personality of the prosecutor and what kinds of cases he or she likes.
3	A corporation should be charged if it has engaged in conduct beyond mere guilt of an individual. It seems unfair to penalize the shareholders because someone did something way off the reservation. The corporation deserves to be prosecuted if it is significantly culpable and there is repeated and condoned conduct.
4	N/A
5	They look at the pervasiveness and level of wrongdoing associated with the crime. They are also looking for a real compliance program and training effort.
6	They look at the magnitude and are always conscious of how they can better spend their money, so they prefer to go with cases that involve the Department of Justice. Politics may also come into place if there is a high-profile hearing and they need to respond to that. The political process itself may encourage one type of crime to be pursued more than another during a particular president's administration.

7	Criminal prosecutors like to prosecute something
	that a jury will see as a crime, an intentional bad act,
	and not some misunderstanding of the law or
	accounting rules. Prosecutors want to show that the
	corporation or individuals did something on purpose
	and that they knew what they were doing was
·	wrong.
8	Many prosecutors want to make an example of high
	profile individuals. The more visible the individual
	or corporation, the more likely they are to be
	prosecuted. Visibility leads to indictment.
9	In certain districts they are so desperate to bring a
	case that they bring any case that comes across their
	desk. There may be no distinction of whether it is
	important enough to be brought federally or at all.
	To some extent they bring whatever case they think
	they can make. No judgment is made about whether
	the charges should be brought as opposed to whether
	they can get a conviction.
10	They look for high-profile cases that will have an
	impact and make the headlines.
11	They look at egregiousness of the conduct and the
	level within the corporation at which the conduct
	occurred. They also consider the dollar value
	involved, the likelihood of achieving some sort of
	notoriety, and perhaps the amount of cooperation by
	the corporation.
12	They look to the McNulty Memo and consider those
1	factors and the egregiousness of the harm.
13	They are always looking for significant impact on
	victims and whether it is a minor or major crime.
	They also consider how clear the evidence of criminal
	conduct is, and the greater the impact on victims the
	more tempting it is to bring a case even without
	overwhelming evidence of criminal misconduct.
14	They consider the magnitude of the fraud, and the
	larger the target the more likely they will prosecute.
15	N/A
L	

16	They select cases based on the recognition of the
	case, its importance, the publicity surrounding it,
	who is involved, and what corporation is involved.
	The bigger the fish, the bigger the eyes.
17	They use a case-by-case determination of whether
	prosecution is better or if the conduct can be taken
	care of by civil action. The Thompson/McNulty
	Memo lays out the factors the prosecutor should
	consider when deciding to bring a case. They must
	decide if the evidence is sufficiently clear that they
	firmly believe they can obtain a conviction and
	sustain it on appeal.
18	It is often agent-driven and depends on what appeals
	to the agency, which is in turn pushed to the US
	Attorney's office.
19	First and foremost, they consider the likelihood of
	winning. They also consider how it will affect their
1	career.
20	They look to the impact on the economy. Often, the
	decision of whether or not to prosecute is not up to
	the lone prosecutor but is determined by the
	government's priorities and policies.
21	Often there is overreaching by prosecutors and
	simple business transactions get charged as a crime.
	The government decides what to call a crime even if
	it is not one.
22	N/A
23	It varies. I think they are looking for impact. Also,
	it can be good because it puts people on notice.
24	They generally consider the same things. They look
	to see whether the corporation had an understanding
	of what the law prescribes and its willingness to
	break the law anyway. They look to see if there was
	a failure to institute procedures that would have
	uncovered or stopped the activity. They also
	consider the pervasiveness of the activity in the
	corporation.

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25	They are looking for cases that will make the biggest
	impact in terms of recovering money for the
	government or other victims. They also look for
	cases that will send a deterrent message within an
	industry. And if the case involves a safety issue,
	even if it is a smaller dollar case, they will go for it.
26	They generally look at the level of the employees
1	involved, how pervasive the activity is in the
	corporation, the dollar value or impact, the public
	policy served, and any deterrence factor. Mainly,
	they consider whether the activity is replete through
	the upper management and what a prosecution
	would do to the company itself.
27	They make decisions based on headlines.
28	N/A
29	If the corporation is a public name, prosecuting
	anybody that brings front page coverage is very
	tempting. Prosecutors have always been accused of
ł	looking beyond their offices to the governor's office or
	the bench, and they will get that public support if
	they have obtained convictions. They look to the
	harm to the public, and the potential harm to the
	public, so that the prosecution may serve as a loud
	warning to others engaged in the same or similar
	practice.
30	They are presumably following the principles of
	federal prosecutions. Some decisions are probably
	being driven by where the government can make
	some money, particularly in the health care setting,
	which means the government is focusing
	disproportionately on some industries and not on
	others.
31	They select them based on the strength of the
	evidence, the amount and type of impact on the
	victims (more likely to prosecute those who injure or
	kill someone than if the crime is purely economic),
	and the clarity of violations in terms of what the
	rules are that were broken. They look for cases that
	can be easily understood in terms of the essence of
	what occurred—the more complex the fraud, the less
[likely it is to be prosecuted.
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32	They look at the facts and make an assessment as to
	whether the criminal activity involved individuals
	acting for their own benefit or individuals within the
	context of a corporate atmosphere.
33	They take cases based on the merits of the case.
34	They certainly consider the visibility of the case, the
	notoriety of it, and some may have visions of
	enhancing their careers by picking cases that have a
	high profile. Other than that, merits of the facts are
	what govern.
35	They look at what will make the biggest impact and
	have the greatest deterrent effect. If the conduct is
	blatantly over the line or the evidence is very strong,
	then they will likely prosecute.
36	They look to the impact of the criminal behavior and
	how pervasive it is in the corporation. They also look
	to see whether there is a need for general deterrence.
	There is a focus on both specific and general
	deterrence. Also, the severity of the criminal
	behavior and the ability to provide restitution to the
	victims is considered.
37	N/A
38	N/A
39	They indict cases they think they can prove.
40	Most evaluate a case on whether it can get to the
	jury (prima facie case) and what the likelihood of
	success may be.
41	They consider whether they can win, sometimes
	public policy, and what is brought to them by
	whistleblowers in terms of fact.
42	The largest consideration is the dollar amount of the
	harm involved.
43	They want to send a message, and they want to show
	the victims that they are doing something.
44	Often it depends on the skill set of the prosecutor.
	Prosecutors today are more specialized and may be
	handling more complex and technical cases. There
	are also political considerations that factor in,
	because it often depends on where the government
	allocates resources. It depends on the priorities set
	by the Department of Justice and Congress.

45	The number one issue in criminal prosecutions is if they can get a conviction. If they can, then they will prosecute. They all believe that the defendant is guilty, but if they cannot get a conviction, they will
	not bring the case. Political pressure bears a role in that—more and more the demise of Arthur Andersen demonstrated to the prosecution that there are real human tolls in prosecuting a corporation.

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SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONS & CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Question IV(a)	What would you identify as the characteristics of organizations that encourage criminal activity?
1	Corporations that inadvertently encourage criminal activity usually have a decentralized management structure and control, which permits individuals who are so inclined to engage in inappropriate conduct.
2	There can be a corporate culture that plays a major role in it. If employees see the president doing illegal things, they may be inclined to think they can do it too.
3	It is very rare to find a corporation that encourages unlawful activity. It is more common to find a corporation that would condone unlawful practices, although this is becoming rare. There are some anti- trust concerns with some multi-national companies that have strong anti-trust compliance policies and training in the US but the same rules do not apply overseas. Some companies become ensnared with criminal prosecutions in the US, based on actions of overseas employees.
4	They are often less structured and are driven by one or two strong personalities with no compliance programs. They have a weak board of directors, weak auditors, and the result is that there are no checks and balances within the organization.
5	There is a complete lack of a compliance program or one that is in name only. They do not have an active compliance program and what they do have is controlled by the person doing the fraudulent acts. Usually there is also direct involvement by management in the criminal activities and a good amount of reckless disregard of what is happening at different levels of the company.

6	Very few companies really encourage criminal
	activity. Most of the time it is the absence of
	adequate controls to catch it that encourages
	criminal activity. Corporations want to make money,
	and they may not have the proper controls to catch
	the actions of dishonest people. Greed and the
	pressure to meet the expectations of Wall Street also
	encourage cutting corners. There may be managers
	who people are afraid to challenge. Convictions are
	often the result of a bad business plan, negligence,
	even gross negligence, but not criminal conduct.
7	Not many affirmatively encourage it. It is more
	likely that they tacitly allow things to happen by
	inattention or by not taking compliance seriously.
	The head of compliance may not have much power at
	all, and may be in a back office where no one takes
	him or her seriously. Corporations must send a
	message from the top of the company that there is no
	tolerance for that kind of bad behavior. They must
	show employees that they are serious about it
	because if management does not respond
	appropriately then others get the idea that bad
	behavior might be ok.
8	Usually they tend to have a failure of oversight at
_	the board level.
9	Organizations may have a single rogue employee and
	the whole corporation gets tagged. Even if it is
	trying to encourage compliance, it can still have
	problems if the employee is committing the crime
	independently.
10	I have not seen corporations that encourage criminal
	activity. But for those that do, it is likely that
	controls have not been in place and the executives
	have not taken steps to bring individuals in line.
11	It varies from a corporation that is bottom-line
	driven to a company that fails to give appropriate
	guidance and direction to employees.
	_ Buluance and uncerton to employees.

12	They focus on the pressures in corporate America to
	produce favorable financial results consistently.
	Ramifications of this lead to potential
	encouragement of white collar crime. A focus on
	short-term gains, favorable reporting, and consistent
	success leads to all manner of problems.
13	Generally speaking they are not in legitimate
	businesses and are not making their money by
	delivering real service or good products.
14	They are corporations that will condone such
	criminal activity, overlooking flaws to maximize
	profits and turning a blind eye to the activity.
15	The existence of a culture that belittles the
	regulatory framework that the business is supposed
	to operate within and where there is little
	accountability and emphasis on compliance with
	business regulations are good examples of such
	organizations.
16	Poor compliance and ethics from the management
	can translate down to rank and file. If management
	or decision makers show poor ethics and cut corners,
	that permeates down into the company.
17	They do not have a strong code of ethics or do not pay
	attention to the one they have.
18	They are companies that are set up as a fraud in the
	first place. Most companies have no intention of
	breaking any laws.
19	Corporations who deal in areas with inherent
	difficulty in complying with the law run the risk of
	encouraging fraud. Also, if the company does not
	have adequate resources to comply sufficiently with
	the government's expectations, it is vulnerable to
	criminal prosecution.
20	They have lousy internal controls usually. Some
	types of companies are more likely to facilitate fraud,
	especially those that sell business opportunities.
	However, most companies are not set up to
	participate in criminal behavior, they simply do not
	have the internal controls in place to prevent it.

21Large corporations encourage criminal activity by putting too much pressure on middle management t achieve unrealistic financial goals.22They usually do not have an effective compliance program. Often it is just a paper compliance plan. They have strong central leaders and a weak organizational culture. Capital intensive industries are more prone to fraud. Organizations with weak general counsels and weak internal accounting/ auditing structures are more likely to latently encourage crime. Organizations in areas that are rapidly changing are also prone to fraud.23They tend to be companies that have a short-sighted financial emphasis where employees' conduct is	5
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being judged by short-term goal results. That	
atmosphere encourages people to take shortcuts in	
order to meet the numbers, for example.	
24 They focus on the profits at the cost of activities tha	it
are not profit-making but would assist in ferreting	
out wrongdoing and punishing it. There is generally	- 1
a tone set at the top that focuses on cost-cutting and	1 E
profit-making.	
25 Sometimes there are smaller companies founded by	a
certain person with good intentions, then they grow	,
and become successful, and there is a corporate	
culture of cutting corners that has developed, and	
they get away with it. They realize if they keep	
doing it they will make more money, so it becomes	
engrained in the corporate culture.	
26 It is a company whose leaders did not feel constricte	be
by business ethics and adopt the philosophy that the	
ends justify the means. The dollar is their ultimate	
goal and they have employees that do not have	
ingrained in them a high sense of ethics.	1
27 They focus on the bottom line and the have a desire	
to make more money faster. Often it is a result of	
ruthless competition, not greed, but they have a "do	'
anything to win" attitude.	
28 They are intensely profit-oriented and really	
pressure the organization to meet financial targets.	

29	The personalities encourage criminal activity
	because the organization reflects the personalities of
_	the people within it.
30	They are organizations that do not have a strong
	ethical corporate culture, the tone of which is set at
	the top.
31	They are really focused more on getting ahead and
	making their numbers for shareholders, earning as
	much as possible, and growing as fast as possible.
	The real strategy is based on maximizing profit.
32	They do not openly encourage the activity, but when
	they make a point of emphasizing the bottom line of
	every transaction and every activity to promote
	success only on the basis of dollars without any
	ethical override, or any sense that good people make
	out fairly well, it suggests to the employees that the
	way to make money is to play fast and loose with the
	rules to make more money. Some people who are
	inclined to benefit personally could look at that and
	say that the company is asking them to make money
	and will not ask questions. This does not inhibit the
	wrongdoing traits that individuals might otherwise
	have
33	They do not have strong internal audit functions and
	corporate compliance plans that are actually
	supported by management, and they do not have
	strong and independent board members.
34	Organizations generally do not clearly encourage
	white collar crime. However, there are individuals
a	who are in positions of power who are aggressive and
	decide to go ahead and have their company do things
	that are in violation of the law.
35	They are organizations that are insular and that do
	not cycle independent, new people through
	leadership and oversight positions. They do not have
	outside auditors or independent boards.

36	Commention that any many to have any laws
30	Companies that are more prone to have employees
	engaged in wrongdoing tend to have the following
	factors: weak ethical leadership that tolerates
	unethical behavior, lack of auditing and monitoring,
	lack of a good compliance and ethics program, lack of
	educational programs for the workforce, weak
	punishment or reaction to wrongdoing, lack of a
	consistent message to employees regarding
	wrongdoing, failure to encourage employees to report
	wrongdoing, and lack of an anti-retaliation policy.
37	It depends who is at the top, who is setting the
	example, who is on the board of directors, and who is
	in a position of responsibility. Such organizations
	have powerful and intelligent people at the top, but
	who lack moral and ethical character.
38	It comes down to a question of leadership because
	the corporate ethic is established by those in upper-
	most management. If there are people who are angle
	shooters at the top, that sends the message all the
	way down the line. In bigger scale scams, the only
	way that happens is if there is someone on the
	management level signing on to it.
39	They have leadership that has lost its moral
	compass.
40	They do not exercise good management oversight.
40	They only look at whether a profit was made and this
41	very hands-off approach can create a problem.
41	These are organizations which are in the chewer
	with respect to their responsibility and best
	practices, that collectively act like an ostrich with
	their head in the sand, and who think compliance is
	a joke or something they should not elevate to a
	higher priority. They also do not understand
	sentencing guidelines for effective compliance
	programs.

42	Not many try to encourage such activity. However,
	smaller and mid-sized companies where financial
	issues are hugely significant may be more at risk. At
	those companies management might pay lip service
	to compliance but when it comes to marshalling
	resources to meet compliance standards, they are
	strapped for funds, which leads to riskier behavior.
43	These are very rare. What typically happens is that
	an organization finds itself floating into illegal
	conduct because that is the way business has been
	done, that is the expectation, it is easier, it is a grey
	area, and no one thinks they will get caught.
44	One characteristic is rapid growth of the
	organization. Also, a lack of internal controls, lack of
	strong leadership in the area of compliance, and
	signals being sent that the company wants economic
	gains at all costs are things to look for. They also
	tend not to worry about obligations to follow the law
	and have a looseness in the top of the organization.
	The leadership is motivated only by the short-term
	financial well-being of the company, not the long-
	term viability.
45	Corporations do not encourage criminal activity.
	There are policies, like "heads on beds" or bonuses
	based on the percentage of occupied beds in the
	hospital setting, that are asking for trouble and
	essentially encouraging fraud. Most organizations
	should understand what practices almost force
	people to violate the law.

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONS & CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Question IV(b)	What would you identify as the characteristics of organizations that discourage criminal activity?
1	Primarily, they create a culture from the top down that promotes ethical conduct coupled with a strong compliance program.
2	There can be a corporate culture that plays a major role in it.
3	A compliance program is the beginning, but it must be a real program and there must be a sincere effort to make it work. There must be a commitment to do things the right way. If the executives have a sincere attitude and commitment to compliance, then that attitude will flow down to everyone.
4	They are more structured, have compliance programs, and have a strong board and auditors.
5	They have a strong compliance effort that is real and that signals that they do not want any violations of the law. They require all employees to go through compliance training and provide an anonymous hotline for reporting. They encourage revelations of wrongdoing and fraud in the company. There is an effort by the company to set up a culture of compliance among employees at all levels. They also have strong internal audit programs with true cooperation with outside auditors.
6	They have adequate controls in place.
7	They have people who are well-compensated and are respected in the compliance department. The head of compliance is empowered.

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8	They have an active board and insist on education on a regular basis for middle-management and above.
	They should have mandatory seminars about
	compliance and the intricacies of it. They need to
	have people with experience with prosecutions to
	inform them of how vicious a prosecution can be so
	they make sure they do not cross the line. They
	should also have in-house counsel and independent
	counsel present for any close call. They should be
	transparent and forthcoming and invite criticism of
	the decisions they make so they can see what others
	think of those decisions.
9	The best a corporation can do is have a culture of
	compliance, but that may not stop it either.
10	They conduct proper training, oversight, education,
	and they set the tone from the top that it will not be
	tolerated.
11	They tend to be corporations that have extensive
	ethics and compliance programs and give more than
	lip service to ethics and compliance. They repeatedly
	emphasize the significance of the ethics and
	compliance program at the high levels of the
	company, and there are ongoing training efforts.
	They respond to and publicize any incident of non-
	compliance that they identify.
12	They create a culture of compliance through strict
	compliance programs, ongoing compliance education,
	and structures in the company that emphasize
	compliance. They have a separate person or group
	that audits behavior and compliance and reports
	directly to a high level corporate officer.
13	They conduct legitimate business and are not
	motivated to encourage misconduct because the risks
14	are too great.
14	They have active and aggressive compliance
1 5	programs.
15	They encourage following the rules and fire or
	discipline people who do not follow the rules. They
	also have a corporate compliance department that
	reports to the CEO or someone on the board.

16	Companies are more compliant if management puts
10	resources and manpower into compliance issues.
17	
	They have a good corporate culture with a detailed,
	explicit code of conduct. They also ensure that all
	employees are aware of the code of conduct they are
	expected to maintain and have seminars to teach
	employees what good conduct is expected and how to avoid conflicts.
18	They have outside review by a team of criminal
	defense and accounting specialists.
19	They have an effective compliance program and
	maximize avoidance of criminal conduct.
20	They have a strong compliance plan in place and are
	not in a questionable type of business. Their
	compliance program is active and not a meaningless
	code of ethics. They also do searching reviews of
	employees' and management's activities.
21	They should avoid a culture that the stock must
	always go up. It helps to have an ethics officer and a
	reporting structure. They need a culture that says
	"we reward honesty," even if it is bad news.
22	They have a strong internal compliance program and
	a strong auditing program. They have strong board
	oversight of senior executives and have an effective
	and visible response to fraud.
23	The companies that foster a humanistic/family tone,
	rather than a numbers tone, do better in preventing
	criminal behavior. They are ones that establish a
	moral and ethical environment.
24	In part, it is the tone that is set and in part, it is the
	training individuals are given. Corporations should
	avoid hypocrisy by talking and living the same thing.
	A rigid and sincere internal compliance program
	with support from senior management is also
	important. There should also be support for those in
	the organization who uncover wrongdoing and a
	willingness to accept news even when it is bad.
25	They have a corporate culture and policies that
	promote and encourage honesty, compliance, and the
	employees are trained in these policies.
L	pool are trained in those ponotoo.

26	They make it a practice to have an ethics policy that
	does not just exist on paper but is ingrained in all
	employees, at all levels, and provides protocols for
	reporting suspicious behavior. They are proactive
	with their ethics policy.
27	They put standards and the integrity of the process
	first. It starts with the board of directors and a
	carefully chosen management team. Corporations
	should look for CEOs with core values.
28	They emphasize ethics even at the expense of
	financial success.
29	The larger corporations do have various methods of
	supervision and of verification of certain practices
	that are built-in brakes against wrongdoing. The
J	Sarbanes-Oxley Act also has a good element, which
	is the requirement of "reporting up," even though it
	imposes an inappropriate burden upon smaller
	companies. Corporations should have a structure
	which reviews what is going on or what has raised
	questions.
30	They are organizations that do have a strong ethical
	corporate culture, the tone of which is set at the top.
31	They are more focused on being good public citizens
	in their respective work. They treat their employees
	and the environment well, and have strong business
	ethics. They recognize that there has to be a balance
	between profit making and fair practices.
32	They have oversight and an ongoing sense of the
	ethics of the business, the industry, and what it
[means to be a citizen. The government has been
	enamored with corporate compliance programs, but
	these are not very convincing.
33	They have strong internal audit functions and
	corporate compliance plans that are actually
	supported by management, and they have strong
	and independent board members.
34	They usually have policies set that tell their
	employees what they should not do.

35	They have a wide disclosure program and a high
	level of independent oversight, including auditors,
	accountants, and lawyers. They ensure that there is
	ample review of corporate actions and not simply a
	series of yes-people.
36	They are companies that have strong ethical
	leadership and set an ethical tone at the top. They
	have strong ethical management at all levels of the
	company, including the department heads. They
	have a good compliance and ethics program and
	educate employees about it. They quickly react to
	evidence of wrongdoing and punish violators,
	sending a consistent message of intolerance for
	wrongdoing to employees. They audit and monitor
	consistently to make sure there is not a problem.
37	Such organizations have powerful and intelligent
	people at the top who have a strong moral and
	ethical character.
38	It comes down to a question of leadership. The
	corporate ethic is established by those in upper most
	management. If they set the right tone and treat
	their people right, that sets a tone for the employees
	to do the right thing.
39	They have strong leadership with a sense of right
	and wrong.
40	When there is a strong compliance ethic coming from
	the top, rarely does one find a corporation doing
	something wrong. Any kind of criminal conviction
	can have a dramatic impact on the corporation, so
	there is a very strong compliance ethic among some
	that creates the atmosphere of non-violation of the
	law.
41	They understand the importance of compliance as an
	integral part of their culture and activity, they
	allocate sufficient resources for compliance, they are
	effective in protecting criminal activity, and they
	have audits and monitors that identify risk areas to
	ensure that they are not engaging in that type of
	activity. They also understand the sentencing
	guidelines for effective compliance programs.

42	Putting money into compliance efforts discourages criminal activity. Companies must have someone at the top who is committed to compliance rather than have it take a back seat to the bottom line.
43	N/A
44	They have employees with the right moral and ethical compass. They have annual evaluations and a compliance plan. There is a strong enforcement policy with penalties for bad behavior, which sends a message from leadership of why compliance matters. The leader sets the tone for the company.
45	They have got to have an operational and real compliance program with an operational and real hotline program, real internal audit program, and a program that says to employees "if you find anyone violating the law, come to us first."

SECTION V	MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
Question V(a)	Assuming appropriate background/training for the job, what would you look for in hiring a CEO/upper management who would encourage law abiding behaviour within the corporation?
	Look to see if they have had any prior issues in past positions. Look to see that they are guided by a sense of moral propriety.
2	Look for someone who will lay down rules, who will establish that anything other than strict compliance will not be tolerated and would be reported to appropriate authorities for official action.
3	Look for someone with a significant degree of self- confidence and a good, solid compass. Look for someone who will not hesitate to tell people not to even think about committing fraud. They need to be "rock solid."
4	Look for someone with an open mind, a willingness to hear bad news and take good advice, and who is willing to reach out in the organization and get conflicting views.
5	Look for someone who has a personal background of integrity and a good reputation for integrity. Look for someone who has some prior experience with compliance issues and understands the importance of compliance and has a willingness to commit adequate resources toward compliance.
6	Look for someone with a solid reputation and whether he or she has spoken on the subject. Also look at his or her history at former companies, etc. Yet, it goes beyond the CEO because a fertile ground for wrongdoing is created if the CEO or board of directors only cares about making money and the employees feel that if they do not match the expectation they will be fired.

7	Look for someone who will send the message that
	employees are expected to perform at very high
	levels with integrity. That person must make sure
	that people in the company are doing what they are
	supposed to be doing, and when not, that there are
	appropriate sanctions. Taking compliance seriously,
	taking employees seriously, and valuing and
	rewarding ideas and enthusiasm is necessary.
	Everything must be done with integrity.
8	Look for moral fiber first and for people who
0	understand how business can work successfully
	without breaking the law. Look for someone who is
	not afraid of criticism and wants to operate in a
	transparent way. Look for someone who is open to
	new ideas and is committed to educating the
	workforce about federal regulations and compliance.
9	Look at the person's track record to see if there have
5	been regulatory violations in his or her past.
	Otherwise it is just whether the person seems to
	have enough backbone that if management puts
	pressure on him to increase revenues, he will not
	bend. The person must have enough strength of
	personality to fight such suggestions off as opposed
10	to just agreeing to them.
10	Look for someone with an ethical background who is
	a strong leader and cares about values.
11	Look for someone with a sense of social and
	moral/ethical obligation. Look for an individual who
	is willing to not only pursue the financial objectives
	of the company, but demonstrates, by example, that
	it has to be achieved with appropriate means.
12	Look at the person's background and track record,
	including whether he or she has faced important
	issues and weathered a storm. Look for a person
	who has been exposed to and managed a crisis in the
	past so that he or she is sensitized to it and
	prioritizes compliance.

13	Look for someone who seems to be forthright and has
	what most people would view as the attributes of
	being an honest person who is willing to take
	responsibility. Look for someone whose overall tone
	and approach to business indicates that he or she is
	honest and does not try to cheat.
14	Look at the training the person has had in enforcing
	ethics, making sure that they are not just number
	crunchers but that they understand compliance
	programs.
15	Look for someone with good ethical standards.
16	Look at the person's history, where he or she has
	come from, and some of the mechanisms that were
	incorporated in prior places of employment. If the
	person came from a culture where compliance is
	important and expected, there is a good chance that
	he or she will have the same mentality at a new
	company.
17	Look for honesty, a person who recognizes that
	success is playing by the rules. Also look for some
	religious or secular humanism and a commitment
	not to cut corners.
18	Look for honesty, integrity, knowledge of the
	industry's regulations.
19	Look for someone with a track record with companies
	who have avoided criminal conduct.
20	Look for intelligence, integrity, and initiative.
	Generally, you know it when you see it.
21	Look for a CEO who can talk about his or her
	failures as well as successes. Look for someone who
	is honest, talks regular talk, and is not an
	overbearing or egocentric personality. Look for
	someone whose business plan is to conduct the
	business better, not someone with an imaginative
	accounting background.
22	Look at what organization they came from and why
	they left. Do a background check to ensure there are
	no criminal convictions, lawsuits, or suspensions.
	Look to see what kind of fights they have been in
	before and what position they took. Make sure they
	have a commitment to ethical standards.

23	Look for past experience in a business sense, a belief
	in creating a law-abiding environment. Also look for
	someone who is strong-willed.
24	Look for an individual that demonstrated empathy
	with the employees and an understanding that the
	employees themselves are the backbone of the
	company. Look for scrupulous compliance with the
	law and a concern about the broader impact on
	society as opposed to a narrow, profitmaking
	interest.
25	Look at the other positions the person has been in
	and do due diligence on how those companies did and
	why. If there was tremendous growth in revenue it
	would be important to know whether something
	illegal, ethical, or immoral was done to make that
	happen.
26	Look for someone who comes to the job with a
	background of demonstrated ethics and
	understanding of business ethics. Look for someone
	who is not starting from scratch and has been doing
	it for years, and who has a willingness and
	understanding of the importance of actually having
	ethics, not just a policy.
27	Look for core values and commitment to more than
	the bottom line. Look for integrity at every level and
	for people who feel strongly that character is
	paramount. Look for someone who wants to build a
	team, not make a lot of money.
28	Look for someone who is committed to doing things
	right, has an ethical approach, and who makes no
	exceptions that the law has to be obeyed.
29	Look for someone who knows the general principles
	of accounting, is knowledgeable of the body of law
	that regulates or applies to the business of a
	corporation, and who does not stand beholden
	personally or professionally to the management of
	the corporation.
30	Look for evidence in the person's background that he
	or she is a leader and not a follower and is someone
	who is balanced and secure.

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31	Look for someone who has a personal code of ethics
	that he or she likes to apply and expects of those who
	work for him or her. It should be someone who has a
	good understanding of the pressures that middle
	management are under when they are given rigid
	profitability or growth guidelines, and when they are
	being judged purely on the basis of meeting the
	numbers.
32	Look for someone with personal ethics.
33	Look for someone who is willing and interested in
	putting his personal stamp of approval on the
	corporate compliance plan of the company, being
	visible, and encouraging other employees to comply.
	Look for someone who recognizes that appropriate
1	resources have to be allocated to the compliance and
	audit divisions of the corporation, and someone who
	would see that there are policies and procedures
	instituted for what to do when an employee comes
	under suspicion, such as when the company will pay
	for the services of lawyer to represent the employee.
34	Look for someone with integrity, and who wishes to
	conduct the organization in a lawful manner.
35	Look to the sum of his or her career to that point and
	his or her track record at other companies. Look to
1	their views on independent oversight and a
	commitment to full disclosure.
36	A CEO must be a great leader, and that is the most
	important characteristic. They have to be strong,
	ethical leaders who are confident enough to be open
	to hearing about problems in the organization that
	need to be addressed. They are able to inspire people
	that ethical conduct is the cornerstone of the
	corporation. They need to have a detailed knowledge
	of the industry that allows them to understand the
	areas of risk so they can keep an eye on those areas.
	It helps to have someone who is savvy in matters of
	finance and understands the importance of correctly
	handling the information that goes to the market.
L	nananing the mormation that goes to the market.

37	In addition to the person's mind, look at the person's
	heart and see the sorts of activities with which the
	person is involved. Community service and some
	sort of quality that shows that they have heart would
	be something to look for because it would show some
	sort of moral compass.
38	Look for someone who has credibility, not someone
	who cuts corners and is lazy. People who try to make
	money on the cheap and do not have the skills to
	compete, or simply want to get more than there is to
	get, will cheat. Lack of skill will also lead to
	cheating. Look for someone who has the business
	acumen, skills, understanding of the industry,
	fortitude and inherent integrity to do it right.
39	Look for someone who has demonstrated character in
	the past and shown that they are not going to
	sacrifice the company's accounting standards for the
	next quarterly report. Look for someone who will
	reach beyond technical experience and look for
	character.
40	Look for someone with a sense of integrity and who
40	understands that while the object of a corporation is
-	to make money, it needs to be made lawfully.
41	Look for someone who has a sense of not only
41	
	obligation for ensuring client activity, but someone
	who understands how to effectively accomplish that
	and what they should or should not be doing in that
40	regard.
42	Look for someone who is honest, has good judgment
	and can see that the long-term benefits of a
	consistently compliant company outweigh the short-
	term gain from cutting corners.
43	Look for someone who puts compliance and proper
	governance above profitability, and who recognizes
	that the damage to a company's reputation, even
	where there is no prosecution, would have such
	severe impact on the financial bottom line that
	compliance has to be a top priority.

44	Their record would speak for itself. Look for a track
	-
	record of competence and compliance—someone who
	is a hands-on leader. Look for someone who is not
	unwilling to delegate but makes it clear that he or
	she is setting high standards and does not want to be
	surprised. Look for good leaders who are giving the
	company and board complete and accurate
	information and are engaged with the board and the
	audit committee. Look for a person whose goal for
	the company is to be productive within the confines
	of the law and has zero tolerance for misconduct.
45	Look for one who has been through a criminal
	investigation in the past so they know how
	dangerous it is and how important ethics and
	compliance are.

SECTION V	MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
Question V(b)	Do these steps sacrifice competitive position?
1	No.
2	Yes, depending on particular businesses.
3	Not in the least. The entity that does not cheat is better off in the long-run by far.
4	Sometimes they do. There have been instances of white collar crime in the pharmaceutical industry where a number of organizations break the law by performing a common practice in the industry (e.g., "off-label" promos), and the company we prosecuted did it because the officers knew others were doing that practice. Opting out of such behavior would be fine, but the disadvantage would be theirs.
5	Not necessarily. Any impact would be modest.
6	No.
7	No. At the end of the day companies that are really good companies that are well run do much better than those who cheat and fudge things.
8	I don't think so. A company that is visibly transparent will receive better treatment from analysts.
9	No. I do not think that this is an extra criterion. It is just more important now.
10	Possibly, because a person with that background may be less risk adverse. He or she may not want to get as close to the line as other people will.
11	Not in the long run.
12	They could because compliance is expensive and many companies cannot afford it.
13	No. In today's environment companies like that are not really sacrificing much because it could be so costly if the company makes a mistake.
14	No.
15	No, at least it shouldn't.

16	In the past not as much emphasis may have been
	placed on those issues, but in today's environment,
	having that infrastructure in place is crucial, and as
	there are issues that come up, it will have a far
	greater impact on the corporation than if those
	qualities were considered in the beginning. It is a
	critical component of a company's longevity to have
	done everything to ensure that the corporation is
	compliant and as fraud-free as possible.
17	If the corporation wants to last a long time, then no.
18	No.
19	No.
20	They might, but those are the general risks and
	rewards. If the company commits a crime and gets
	caught, then the fact that it did not sacrifice a
	competitive advantage does not really matter
	anymore.
21	No. In the end, an honest CEO will make the
	company more profitable.
22	It depends on the industry, but yes in some
	industries.
23	Yes.
24	Yes.
25	It depends on the industry, but in the
	pharmaceutical industry there is a mentality that
	everyone is doing it, so it is possible that if one
	company decided it would not do it, the executives
	would worry about losing marketshare.
26	Unfortunately in the real world it might, but
	hopefully everyone would ascribe to those virtues.
27	It can, but the focus should be on sportsmanship, not
	winning.
28	It may, it may not. An honest living can be made,
	but it means being willing to sacrifice the
	opportunity to make larger profits. It also requires
	taking a long-term approach rather than a short-
	term approach.

29	No. Corporations should want management to have
	these qualities as something that comes with the job.
	In today's world it is important to make sure the
	company is constructed in such a fashion that when
	a regulatory agency comes it does not see something
	that gives rise to questions.
30	Not necessarily.
31	Yes, they probably do to some degree. It is more
	difficult to compete when other corporations are not
	playing by the rules. They have to be more creative
	to come up with advantages within the rules.
32	No. Putting a premium on personal ethics does not
	hurt. It promotes the competitive position by
	making people within the organization feel like they
	work in a place that plays by the rules and fairly.
33	No. If every single company were to do this, it would
	be a cost of doing business that would be borne by
	everyone.
34	No. Competition should not override integrity.
	Looking for integrity should not diminish the
	integrity of the individual.
35	No. Corporations can be profitable while being more
	careful.
36	No, just the opposite.
37	Not at all. It enhances it.
38	They should not at all.
39	No, because the effect of getting involved in a
	criminal investigation is so devastating.
40	Yes, they do to some extent in the international
	arena but not domestically, although that is
	changing rapidly too.
41	No. It does not have to at all. In some sectors,
	organizations that engage in compliant conduct
	sometimes find that they are more competitive. In
	the long run there is a relationship between
	compliance and profitability.
42	In the short term they can and do, but top company
	executives must look long-term, and so they need to
	have the foresight to see that they will be better
	positioned in the long-run by following the law.

43	Yes. Very often a company has to decide that it is not going to do this and therefore will not compete for a particular project.
44	In the short term, it probably does, but it is the equivalent of not having insurance on a house. It can be significantly bad for the company if it has not taken all the necessary protections. The risks are huge, but the rewards are limited.
45	They can affect a company's competitive position, especially when competing with overseas companies.

SECTION V	MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
Question	Is there a way to implement these steps
V(c)	without sacrificing competitiveness?
1	N/A
2	It depends on what particular policy is at issue.
	There may be certain activities that can be
	accomplished in legal ways as opposed to illegal
	ways, and the corporation must work at it to find the
	legal route.
3	N/A
4	Yes. Companies that are successful are innovative,
	and the idea that they would have to engage in
	fraudulent behaviors is just a fallacy. The do not
	need to break the law.
5	N/A
6	N/A
7	N/A
8	N/A
9	N/A
10	If the right culture is encouraged in the corporation,
	in long run the corporation will be in a better place
	and business will thrive, but it may be difficult in
	short run.
11	N/A
12	N/A
13	N/A
14	N/A
15	If the employees feel like the people at the top care
	about following the rules, then they will follow the
	rules, too.
16	Everyone is supposed to be doing these things and
	certifying compliance. The only way to do that is to
	be able to demonstrate that the corporation
	understands its obligations and is willing to support
	that
17	The corporation should look to the long-run and
	recognize that it is better to do the right thing.
18	N/A

19	N/A
20	N/A
21	N/A
22	Sometimes there is not because in some industries the successful competitive position is based on breaking the rules.
23	You could find someone who has the ethical qualities and a good business sense, but it is difficult. Most people have a limited number of qualities.
24	In environmental crimes, environmental compliance in the long-run benefits the bottom line by reducing the amount of waste.
25	Yes. One of these companies can make itself the posterchild, and if it has a good product, that would help build the case for ethical business practices.
26	N/A
27	Yes. Corporations should find people who have the right balance and character.
28	No.
29	That is not a fair consideration.
30	Yes. If corporations have a leader who is balanced and ethical, they can still be competitive.
31	The more other companies comply with the rules, the less the obedient company sacrifices. Also, the better the enforcement of the rules, the more deterrence there is so that it does not make it worth the risk to disregard the rules. The overall best way is to try to instill a broader culture like that in the industry as a whole.
32	N/A
33	N/A
34	N/A
35	N/A
36	N/A
37	N/A
38	N/A
39	N/A
40	That type of conduct is not a problem domestically.
41	N/A

42	Companies cannot control what their competitors are doing, so one company acting by itself cannot fix that.
43	Everyone says that if the business is run legitimately it will be more competitive, but the reality is that the only way to become more competitive is to not have to spend as much to clean things up all the time.
44	They should focus on the long-run and cost-benefit analysis.
45	N/A

SECTION V	MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
Question	Do salary incentives like stock options and
V(d)	bonuses tied to profits provide an incentive to
	engage in fraud?
1	Yes, they do provide an incentive.
2	They can. If illegal actions are taken to make that
	stock go up, then yes, to that extent the options have
	served as an incentive to violate the law. This
	happens in overstating earnings.
3	Only in an extraordinarily minor way.
4	Yes, they provide huge incentives. In the corporate
	world this is often what causes the fraud. Meeting
	goals requires that the sales staff meet sales goals,
	which leads to sales fraud. However, a lot of
	companies have changed the way they provide
	incentives because they are catching on that they
	have to be careful what they incentivize.
5	They can, but good compliance efforts can balance
u ·	this.
6	No, not in and of themselves. They are designed to
	get some of the most talented people who are
	successful because of good business sense.
7	They can, depending on what they are linked to. If
	stock options are linked to a particular quarter's
	performance, executives might be tempted to play
	with the numbers. Those incentives are valuable
	and important but must be linked to long term goals.
8	They can be if misused. They ought to be open to
	criticism. Shareholders ought to be totally informed
	of compensation packages and the bonus system.
	They can be a big motivator as long as it is
	transparent.
9	They should not but they might provide an incentive.
	It is impossible to know what is sitting in the back of
	a guy's mind when he is making these decisions.
10	They can and they certainly have. There has been a
	big inducement over the years as an incentive to get
	ahead. Greed persuades people to cross that line.

11	They could if they are not counterbalanced with
	incentives to engage in appropriate conduct (not
	necessarily financial incentives, but could be proper
	training).
12	They can, but not always.
13	No. We are in a capitalist system so business is
	designed to make profit and money for the people in
	those businesses.
14	No, not necessarily, though they might.
15	No.
16	They can.
17	Definitely. Not everyone will take advantage of it
	but it can provide motive. If handled properly,
	bonuses and stock options are good.
18	Perhaps. It is a financial advantage that may tempt
	some but would not tempt others.
19	Sure, but they are inherent in a capitalist system.
20	Yes.
21	Yes. Corporations should change incentive programs
	by banning stock options because they encourage
	people to cut corners to make the numbers go up.
22	It can but it depends on the kind of fraud. No matter
	what you call the incentives, the problem is why
	people go along with these schemes at the middle
	level. Stock options can work as a motivator for
	people who are looking for success that is connected
	to achievement in the marketplace.
23	Absolutely. It is like a blueprint for fraud because it
	is a short-term financial outlook.
24	Yes.
25	Absolutely.
26	I do not think so. Bonuses and stock options for
	performance have their place if one plays according
	to the rules.
27	Yes.
	Absolutely
28	Absolutely.
25	Absolutely. I do not think so. Bonuses and stock options for

30	Certainly the government always argues that they
	do, but sometimes incentives are not provided and as
	a consequence work does not get done that should get
	done. Having performance measures and rewarding
	performance is not an evil thing. Problems only
	come where there is a disproportionate focus on
	those things to the exclusion of other priorities.
31	Yes.
32	Yes.
33	Not necessarily, but we have enough evidence of
	instances where that has potentially been the case to
	know that they can provide such incentives to engage
	in fraud.
34	Yes. That goes back to one of the motivations as
	being money. But it is not as simplistic as that since
	everyone wants to be more successful, which is
	another incentive.
35	They can, but not necessarily. Greed does factor in,
	but it is not the main reason.
36	Not if they are done right. It is appropriate to
	reward leaders for how well their organization
	performs, however, they must be part of a well-
	drawn incentive package. Perhaps there should be a
	restriction on when they can be exercised, so that
	they are linked to the long term effects of
	management's decisions.
37	Yes, they do provide such incentives for the people at
	the top.
38	Yes, they probably do provide such incentive.
39	Yes, without a doubt.
40	No. If people are going to engage in fraud, they will
	do it with or without such a bonus.
41	Yes, but it is not a per se incentive.
42	Yes, they probably do provide some incentive to
	engage in fraud.
43	Of course. The more compensation is tied to
	profitability, the more management is going to want
	to show greater profitability. That is why
	compliance officers cannot be investors in the
	company, compensation cannot be tied to their
	performance, and they can never get stock options.
	

44	They are good to have and a lot of society is built around the notion that people are incentivized by compensation for hard work. It is difficult to move away from a model with benefits tied to profits, but they should be evaluated by the boards.
45	No, everything should be tied to profits. However, dedication to compliance and ethics should also be part of the criteria. There should be a wide variety of factors that go into bonuses.

SECTION	TRENDS
VI	
Question	What would you identify as the key differences
VI(a)	in state versus federal handling of cases?
1	N/A
2	The capability of the investigating agencies is the
	main difference. That is why there is so little of it on
	the state side.
3	There are differences in the jury trial system and the
	ability of the government to request a jury trial. In
	state court, there is a higher percentage of bench
	trials. State cases tend to be more run-of-the-mill
	street crime. While the federal government can
	spend six months prosecuting doctors for technical
	violations, the state has to prosecute violent crimes
	and does not have a lot of time. There is less
	recognition of state crime outcomes.
4	Federal system cases are much larger, both in terms
	of complexity of the schemes and dollars involved,
	and the federal courts are more rigid in the
	application of the rules of procedure and process
	than state courts are. Going into state court is easier and less formal.
5	There are far more white collar investigations at the
	federal level than at the state level.
6	The federal system has prosecutors who are more
	capable, more thorough, and much less political.
	Very often in the states, politics plays a bigger hand
	in how cases are handled and brought. Also, there
	are more career prosecutors in the federal system
	whereas in states they see it as stepping stone to
	politics.

7	With limited exceptions, the federal system is much
	better equipped because it has the resources,
	expertise, and time to deal with white collar crime.
	States do not have the ability to develop expertise in
	white collar crime because of a lack of resources.
1	States have to take in everything and the federal
	system does not because it gets to pick and choose
	what cases it wants to bring. Also, federal statutes
	are much better vehicles of white collar crime
	prosecution than most state statutes.
8	There is a greater chance at picking a fair jury on the
	state level. The federal jury selection process needs
	reform.
9	State systems have much more plea bargaining, and
	more willingness to cut a deal. There is a lot more
	backdoor channel work in states.
10	N/A
11	N/A
12	None
13	Typically in large cities the local prosecutors have
	their hands full with violent crime and so as a
	general rule they are not investigating business
	crimes. Also, the subject matter is different from
	federal prosecutors' offices. Furthermore, while
	there are exceptions, generally federal enforcement
	is better at building a fraud case involving
	sophisticated business fraud because it has the
	resources.
14	The magnitude of the case is much larger in federal
	courts, and violations are usually far more ranging in
	the federal system since they cross state lines
	(interstate issues).
15	There is much more time spent on the process and
	ensuring that it is done fairly in federal court.
	Additionally, there are fewer cases overall in federal
	court and more time can be spent on each case from
	start to finish.
16	There are probably more stringent rules and
	procedures in federal court than in state court cases.

17	State court has a much greater case load and fewer
	resources on any particular case. The types of crimes
	handled are also different because state court sees
	more street crime. Federal courts have enormous
	resources, including a plethora of agencies, fewer
	cases, and different types of cases.
18	The state system is more likely to have crimes of
	passion and crimes of violence.
19	Federal prosecutors tend to be more educated and
	more open to alternative methods of disposition.
20	N/A
21	Federal level crimes generally get a better
	investigation and a worse sentence. Sentencing
	guidelines cause innocent people to plead guilty in
	plea bargains.
22	N/A
23	N/A
24	N/A
25	The state does not have as many resources as the
	federal government. A lot of these bigger frauds go
	across state boundaries, so it is difficult for one state
	to try to take on those fraud cases.
26	N/A
27	The judges in the state system are much savvier on
	the rules of evidence, are quicker to make decisions,
	and are more courageous. Justice is speedier on the
	state level.
28	There is a huge difference in experience, and a lot
	depends on the assignment of the trial attorney in
	the federal system because some are better than
	others.
29	In the white collar crime area the cases are more
	thoroughly investigated and more carefully
	investigated on the federal level. Most states do not
	have the facilities to bring the professionals who are
	needed.
30	The states continue to focus on violent crime and
	public safety, but they have to because they are the
	front line in those types of issues. The federal
	government instead focuses to some extent on
	traditional white collar crime.

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31	As a general matter under the False Claims Act,
	there is probably a lower level of sophistication in
	the state than in the federal system. Complex
	crimes on the state level are handled more often by
	people who do not know how to handle them.
32	The federal system is much more deliberate, more
	comfortable with paperwork, and much more
	structured. Most state prosecutors in big cities are
	people from large law firms who act as they did when
	they were in those law firms. They are inclined to be
	courtroom people where the written word is not as
	important as it is in the federal system.
33	The state system has such a dramatic number of
	street crimes that the number of prosecutors who can
	be devoted to white collar crime is fairly minimal.
34	The federal system has guidelines, even though they
1	are not mandatory anymore. Most states do not have
	them so the ability of the defense attorney to secure
	a sentence that is more palpable is easier in the state
	system. In the federal system, the prosecutors have
	the ability to marshal a lot of experienced
	investigators, whereas there is not as much
	assistance in the state system.
35	N/A
36	There is more institutional latitude in dealing with
	prosecutors at the state level. By and large, white
ſ	collar crimes are handled more severely at the
	federal level than the state level.
37	States usually have fewer guidelines in terms of
	what they will handle than the federal system has.
	Also, while there is a complimentary relationship
	between the state and federal systems,
	jurisdictionally there are key differences. For
	example, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
	over certain crimes.
38	State systems do very little white collar crime. They
	only handle basic theft on occasional white collar
	cases because they are just not prosecuting white
	collar crime. Also, the federal system can put more
	resources on big cases than states can.

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39	The crimes are more complex on the federal level,
	however the volume of cases is greater on the state
	level.
40	Federal courts spend more time on white collar crime
	than states do, and states do not have the necessary
	resources (except NY). The federal system also
	spends more time on significant financial crime, and
	states on smaller crimes.
41	The federal system seems to have much more
	experience in prosecuting crime against business
	organizations whereas state agencies are much more
	individual oriented. The federal system is also more
	mature and sophisticated and effective than state
	systems.
42	The most significant is the approach to sentencing.
	States have guidelines that are much looser and not
	mandatory, and while the federal guidelines are not
	mandatory, it still remains to be seen whether they
	will become as flexible. It is far harsher to be in
	federal court as compared to state court.
43	State and local prosecutors are more political at
	every level. Also, they place greater emphasis on
	street crime than white collar crime because there is
	more pressure to get quick results. They must get to
	the bottom of the crime and get results, and this is
	more difficult with fraud where it takes more time to
	discover the motives and whether the intent exists.
44	The resources are greater on the federal level and
	the caseload is smaller. The law enforcement agents
	are not as sophisticated at the state level. The time
	to prepare is longer on the federal side and the
	penalties are more severe at the federal level,
	especially for white collar offenses.
45	N/A

SECTION VI	TRENDS
Question	For most white collar cases, does civil
VI(b)	prosecution under fairly punitive statutes (ex:
	civil False Claims Act, civil RICO, SEC
	prosecution) versus criminal, make sense?
1	It depends on the circumstances, however, it is not
	nearly as effective at deterring fraud as criminal
	prosecution. But with the appropriate circumstances
	and the appropriate company it may actually have a
	greater deterrent effect.
2	It is appropriate to distinguish corporations from
	culpable individuals in those cases where very
	clearly the employees were acting for the benefit of
	the company. Punishment should be on the
	corporation that benefited, and that can only be done
	through civil penalties.
3	Theoretically, yes, but that is not the way it works.
	If there is truly a criminal violation, then it ought to
	be treated criminally and it is. If it is truly a
	criminal violation, then it should be treated
	criminally, but not to the exclusion of the civil action.
	All too often the threat of a criminal prosecution is
	used in an extortionist way by some prosecutors.
4	In some instances this makes great sense because
	there are times when a criminal conviction will
	result in debarment of a corporation that may be
·	very necessary to maintaining healthcare. Getting
	the money back may be the appropriate remedy.
	Furthermore, it is the shareholders who ultimately
	lose everything in debarment. The company should
	not be put out of business with criminal cases.
5	In many cases, especially where there is not criminal
	intent, civil remedies are an appropriate course of
	action and can be the only appropriate course of
	action. However, if there is criminal intent, then it is
	not necessarily better to go with civil rather than
	criminal or vice versa. In those situations, you
	typically see parallel tracks. This is true for
	individuals and corporations.

6	Yes, frequently the crime should not be prosecuted criminally because the wrongdoing was not evil. There should not be vicarious liability unless the evidence shows that it is truly a corrupt organization because this has consequences that go beyond the criminal law—big worldwide companies want to come to the US because the capital markets are here, but now other countries are in that same arena, and companies are going elsewhere because of our aggressive law enforcement practices against companies.
7	It depends on the facts. Some crimes are sufficiently egregious and criminal prosecution is sufficiently punitive. But it is always better not to bring criminal cases in gray areas because it is important that it be a clear crime where the person knew it was wrong but intentionally did it anyway.
8	Most of the major white collar offenses ought to be civil cases. A civil case is easier to try in a fair manner, especially with discovery procedures, and is more likely to render just results. Civil avenues ought to be pursued when it is difficult to determine what crime was committed and who did what. Civil actions are better for complex business litigations because discovery is needed to determine who did what.
9	No response.
10	It depends on what kind of crime it is, and it is tough to apply across the board. There need to be criminal sanctions because companies with lots of money are not going to be deterred by civil fines. Only criminal sanctions effectively deal with that misconduct.
11	Yes. Although, since individuals do not typically have the financial resources to pay that level of award, suing individuals on a civil basis is not going to result in a high award and may not yield the desired results. In the vast majority of cases, civil remedies are more appropriate. However, if the conduct is so knowing and harmful it might be appropriate to pursue criminal remedies.

12	There are cases that arguably do not need to be
	prosecuted criminally and where the government has
	various options, which it often under-uses. However,
	the government has a bias toward seeking criminal
	charges.
13	Yes, though it is not a substitute for criminal
	prosecution. Doing so puts some cost on the
	corporation for the misconduct that should help
	incentivize it to have strong compliance. It is not a
	good idea to have punitive civil statutes because that
	punishes the entity for the misconduct of individuals,
	which can be very costly and unfair. There should be
	some consequence for individuals, though sending
	them to prison may not be as punitive as taking back
	the money.
14	Yes, but only against corporations. It does not make
	sense against individuals because there is a limit as
	to what they can pay on the civil side. However, civil
	remedies do have a significant role as well as
	criminal prosecution of corporations.
15	If it is difficult to prove what happened, then the
	civil route is better because of the lower burden of
	proof.
16	Yes, it makes sense when there is a more culpable
	CEO or management with little to no involvement by
	the staff underneath those individuals. To indict a
	corporation can be a death knell for those
	corporations; they cannot often recover once indicted.
	But if only punitive damages are levied, they do have
	a chance of survival. Pre-trial diversion is used by a
	lot of prosecutions when they recognize that an
	indictment could put it out of business. However,
	the prosecutor may also want to send a message that
	he expects the corporation to be fully compliant, and
	they may suggest an agreement whereby they will hold in advance further consideration for an
	indictment. This is utilized more today to send the
	maintenant. This is utilized more today to send the message, to get the monetary smack while keeping a
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	hammer over the corporation's head to ensure it is compliant.

17	Sometimes a prosecutor will look to see if it is better
	handled civilly. Often it is better handled civilly
	rather than criminally, however, frequently the
<u> </u>	government will pursue both avenues.
18	Yes, especially when the conduct is an industry
	standard that may violate a regulation without any
	criminal intent.
19	In many cases it is better to pursue civil remedies.
20	Yes. It is particularly offensive when some cases go
	the civil route and others are prosecuted criminally.
	Criminal prosecutions are always bad.
21	FCA makes sense but RICO seldom does. Criminally
	prosecuting a corporation is idiotic because the
	corporation is not corrupt, but rather a person is.
22	It depends on the facts and circumstances. The
	concern with civil avenues is if less people feel a
	threat of criminal prosecution of individuals, it
	creates less of a deterrent effect. Criminal
	prosecutions promote awareness.
23	Not exclusively. Civil remedies are good to use
	against corporations and individuals, but there is
	still a need to use federal criminal law in this area.
	The civil remedies should not be used to the
	exclusion of criminal avenues, even with
	corporations.
24	It depends on the wrongdoing involved. The
	advantage of using criminal prosecutions is to pierce
	the corporate veil.
25	Those civil statutes are not punitive, so both should
	be used particularly as to corporations, and for
	individuals, it makes sense if they have the resources
	to pay the judgment.
26	Yes, for both corporations and individuals. This
	country has gone too far in criminalizing activities
	that at their worst are a tort of some kind.

27	Yes, because the burden of proof is lower. Almost every corporate prosecution lends itself to civil remedies unless the wrongdoing is rampant within the corporation. Due to the wide breadth of corporate criminal liability, the government can prosecute the corporation, hurting a good number of innocent people, for the bad conduct of a few individuals. Since most white collar crime is about
	money, the ends can be achieved civilly without turning to criminal prosecution.
28	These are not fairly punitive statutes because they can be used punitively or in a compensatory way. When used more as compensatory measures, there is a greater chance of success. But if it is used punitively as an alternative to a criminal case, the prosecutor is asking for trouble because cases with small or no damage to the government end up disastrously for the government. The relator does best when the government has suffered serious financial harm. When a court characterizes the False Claims Act as a punitive statute, the government will lose, yet when the government characterizes it as compensatory, the government will win.
29	In one sense, yes. If a person has profited from illegality and wrongdoing, that person should be compelled to disgorge that which he or she obtained. But I have problems when frequently the defendant gets whipsawed between the civil and the criminal prosecutions. As a result they take the course of action that seems the easiest, and they compromise the civil case to protect their liberty, or vice versa. This also presents problems of irate citizens pounding on the prosecutor's door because they lost a few thousand dollars, which is not necessarily appropriate.

30	Yes, but I would not call it civil prosecution but
	rather civil enforcement. It is better to focus on civil
	enforcement against corporations and criminal
	prosecution of individuals because when the
	government uses the hammer of criminal prosecution
	against corporations, the collateral consequences
	against innocent stockholders can be grave.
31	Yes, it makes sense where the crime is very complex
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	or very prevalent, and where the key to being able to
	stop the fraud is to make people think that there is a
	good chance they will be prosecuted, which is easier
	in the civil context.
32	Yes, it makes sense in the healthcare and defense
	contractor areas. In either case the ultimate
	objective is to take money that is wrongfully obtained
	and multiply it so that this person is out of pocket
	more than they took. There is a punitive impact on
	both the corporation and individuals.
33	There are not very punitive civil laws for most of the
	criminal activity being prosecuted in federal courts.
	If there were civil laws that also had employment
	ramifications instead of monetary fines, maybe, or if
	coupling monetary and employment action was
	possible, it might make sense. However, it might be
	good policy to have more civil actions available
	against corporations since downstream criminal
	ramifications are so punitive to innocent people.
34	Yes, but it depends on the facts. Such prosecution is
	appropriate in cases where the evidence is not quite
	as strong that the defendant intended to violate the
	law and that the conduct was more on the reckless
	side than criminal side.
35	Yes, because our society tends to over-criminalize
	any number of things to pander to public opinion,
	which often leads to over-incarceration. Often these
	types of behavior are better dealt with through civil
	or regulatory avenues.

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41	Yes. Criminal culpability for an organization may
	not accomplish much more than a strong civil
	judgment because after all, business organizations
	can really only be hurt by losing money. In the
	health care context, they also can be excluded from
	Medicare and Medicaid programs. The difference is
	something that is driven by the facts and perception
	of the prosecuting authority, and often times it is not
	so obvious what sense it makes to hold corporations
	criminally accountable when a civil penalty can
	extract a large pound of flesh along with an
	agreement by the corporation to comply. For
	individuals, the government is much more likely to
	charge one with a crime as well as fine them, but
	since they do not usually have the resources to pay a
	fine, it makes them more susceptible to criminal
	culpability as a penalty.
42	They both have significant effects on the company
	and they have deterrent effects. The logic behind
	having both of them is not any loftier than that more
	than one separate government agency is wanting to
	have its piece of the action and get its credit for
	taking enforcement action. Criminal action drives
Į	the train and civil goes along. Civil could be settled
	quickly were it not for the criminal prosecution, but
	separate civil prosecution does not add much. It only
	harms the company financially.

43	Yes, I think civil prosecution of corporations does
	make more sense because it provides an alternative
	that has an impact in terms of making the point, but
	does not have as much of a destructive impact on the
	company. There are not as many civil prosecutions
	of individuals since it is easier for a prosecutor to go
	against the corporation because it will not go to trial,
	and because such prosecution of individuals has no
	impact—individuals cannot pay. The only thing
	prosecutors have against individuals is jail time or
	affecting their lives, so for them criminal prosecution
	makes more sense, whereas the only way to affect
	corporations is through monetary means, so civil
	prosecution makes more sense for them. Ultimately,
	civil versus criminal prosecution depends more on
	how a company responds than on what types of
	violations have occurred because the goal is to
	encourage companies to police themselves, to
	implement good practices, and to have directors
	really do their job. The more intelligent way to
	approach a company is to prosecute those upon
	which prosecutors can have the greatest impact and
	that have thumbed their nose at the system and
<u></u>	have not tried to correct themselves.
44	In many white collar offenses, there may be conduct
	that is hard to attribute to one individual or it may
	not be easy to show conduct, which makes civil
	options better. Financial penalties are very effective,
	particularly where there is the possibility of a
	criminal indictment for the company. If lots of
	people were not involved and the company needs to
	remain viable, then the civil route may be better
	than criminal.

45	Prosecuting a corporation is stupid and is not
	allowed in many countries. Perhaps it would be
	more appropriate if we had a corporate criminal
	liability standard that only found liability if senior
	management knew and approved the conduct.
	Corporations should be liable civilly, but not
	criminally. Criminal prosecutions destroy the
	shareholders, bondholders, and employees and
	families.

SECTION VI	TRENDS
Question VI(c)	In the years you've been prosecuting/defending white collar crimes, what trends have you seen in such prosecutions?
1	The prosecution has become more aggressive and more willing to bring criminal charges against white collar defendants. It has also become exceedingly difficult to mount an effective defense in white collar cases because of the plethora of criminal violations. Due to the over-criminalization of corporate behavior, prosecutors have an unlimited list of potential violations to choose from, which makes it exceedingly difficult to defend such cases.
2	There are far more activities classified as criminal than there were in times past. It is a growing industry, so to speak. Anything Congress does not like it makes a crime instead of a civil remedy.
3	Some districts have become extraordinarily hyper- technical and complex with charging white collar offenses. The laws are now being used in imaginative and technical ways.
4	The dollars are so much more than they were previously, and the complexities of the schemes have grown. There has also been an increase in defense and disaster spending, so there is now a focus on those areas.
5	There is certainly a greater trend toward white collar cases in general. There is also a trend toward prosecuting more corporations than 20 years ago. There are still more individuals prosecuted for white collar offenses, but now there is a higher percentage of corporations involved as compared to 20 years ago.
6	More companies are being prosecuted, and more are being prosecuted based on things which in the past were handled civilly. Also, agencies now work more together.

7	Before Enron there were fewer corporate
	prosecutions. There were only certain venues where
	there was an active prosecution of white collar crime
	in the corporate context. It was pretty random in
	most parts of the country. Many more districts
	became involved in white collar cases. The DOJ
	encouraged that and there were mixed results, and it
	became clear that these are very resource-intensive
	cases. The trend now is that there are not as many
	corporate prosecutions as in the wake of Enron, but
	still more than before Enron.
8	Unfortunately more and more prosecutions are
	politicized and a habit has developed of getting into
	the special prosecutor task force type of prosecution.
	Prosecutors now have already made up their mind
	before examining the facts. There is a tendency by
	any administration to show how tough they can be
	on crime without stopping to determine if there
	really is a crime.
9	The government has more power in the federal
	system and more tools so that it is tough for all but
	the wealthiest defendants to resist prosecution.
10	Today the types of cases are far different. There are
	more Enron-type prosecutions. Activity which was
	treated in the civil arena is now being criminalized,
	and financial fraud cases are prosecuted more often
	now.
11	The major trend has been the emphasis on giving up
	privilege as a condition of avoiding prosecution. The
	Kaplan decision has slowed things down and the
	current trend is being looked at again.
12	There has been an increase in the criminalization of
	regulatory conduct. The government is more willing
	to prosecute corporate employees and officers at all
	levels in an attempt at increasing deterrence. Now,
	people go to jail much more frequently due to
i	sentencing guidelines.

13	The long-term trend is to prosecute individuals and
	not corporations, and to impose all of these lesser
	forms of supervision on the company. In the 1980s
	there was a big rise in prosecution of defense
	contracting fraud, and then in the 1990s health care
	fraud was the prosecution emphasis. There is less of
	that today and more of an effort to go after
	individuals and do something less than a formal
	prosecution against a company, such as a deferred
	prosecution agreement.
14	The trend is the extent to which lower level people
	are prosecuted in order to flip them against higher
	individuals. They are more likely to be prosecuted
	than to receive immunity as in the past.
	Additionally, the sheer magnitude of the size of the
	indictment has grown since there are many more
	charges now.
15	Twenty years ago, bank fraud was a big problem.
	However, now it is less of a problem. The type of
	fraud that is prevalent changes, but cheaters are
	clever and will find a new, clever way of cheating
	until the justice system addresses it. Currently, the
	most unaddressed area of cheating is in the health
	care system because the government is the easiest
	person to steal from. In Medicare, there is rarely an
	upfront effort to ensure people are really providing
	services, which makes committing fraud easier.
16	There has been an increase in public corruption
	cases. Right now it is the #1 criminal priority of the
	FBI and the trend seems to be refocusing on public
	corruption cases.
17	There are more white collar crime prosecutions now
	and much more severe sentences for white collar
	offenders. The sentencing guidelines and
	elimination of parole have changed all aspects of the
	criminal justice system.
18	The government is prosecuting more and prosecuting
	over less.

10	These has been an increase in the second of the second sec
19	There has been an increase in the use of criminal
	prosecutions of corporations. There have also been
	attempts to deputize company counsel to investigate
	on behalf of the government.
20	There is a trend toward focusing on corporations,
	including a rise in forfeiture or other "money
	making" actions by the government. The problems
	with health care fraud have become pervasive.
	Additionally, the creation of the sentencing
	guidelines is a problem.
21	There is greater sophistication in investigation and
	tremendous overreaching by government. The focus
	is on convincing corporations to cooperate by
	threatening things that may not be fair.
22	The government is much better at going after the
	organization than 10–15 years ago. They are better
	at encouraging compliance and stemming fraud than
	before. Due to compliance programs, there has been
	a significant advance in addressing the problems at
	their source rather than down the road, which is
	good for everyone. A trend in the opposite direction
	is the rise of the winner-take-all attitude, which
	makes more room for entrepreneurial players. There
	is also a decline in a lifetime commitment to a
	company and people are more willing to cheat.
23	Sentencing has really changed dramatically from 30
	years ago to now. White collar offenders get much
	bigger sentences than they used to.
24	The most alarming trend is the use of techniques and
	tactics by prosecutors that were historically reserved
	for street crimes, which confront constitutional
	restrictions and other matters, like waiver of
	attorney client privilege. Now there is no limitation
	on the powers of the government to prosecute and
	convict in a criminal case.

25	More parallel civil and criminal prosecution together
	is being done in the federal system, and in certain
	areas like healthcare. The government position on
	attorney-client privilege and corporate cooperation
	has also changed so there is less regard for such
	concepts. There are also more qui tam and
	whistleblower cases.
26	One enormous trend has been the health care fraud
	prosecutions. The government has gone way too far
	in calling civil actions criminal. The health care
	coding system is beyond complex and the
	government has taken cases of innocent acts of
	miscoding and made them into health care fraud
	cases.
27	There are trends in what is being prosecuted at any
	particular moment based on politics. The Reagan
	administration was focused on fraud and abuse in
	the defense contracting arena. Clinton focused on
	health care fraud, and Bush is focused on accounting
	fraud. However, the focus is turning back to
	procurement fraud. At the beginning of the Bush
	administration there was a focus on prosecuting
	corporations, now there is a trend toward
	prosecuting individuals.
28	There are two big trends. One is that up until the
	mid-1990s the False Claims Act was an
	overwhelming defense procurement fraud law. Since
	then it evened out with healthcare fraud, and now it
	is overwhelmingly used in healthcare fraud cases.
	With defense spending increases, but not
	corresponding increase in oversight, it is harder to
	pursue fraud even though the government is
	spending unprecedented amounts of money to find it.
	The second trend is that with the popularization
	with the qui tam provisions, while the risk for
	defendants has not changed in the last couple of
	years, the risk for relators has changed. It is much
	more difficult to be successful now because there is
	competition from other relators. Those second in
	time lose those cases.
	time lose those cases.

29	Over the years white collar crime prosecutions have
	become more complex as the civil and financial laws
	have become more complex, and every scheme does
	hatch a response if it is a criminal scheme from law
	enforcement, which brings about more laws and
	regulations. As a result, business law prosecutions
	have become more pressing and more difficult to
	defend than they were years ago. A fraud was a
	fraud, and no matter what kind of label was put on
	the prosecution, it was a fraud. But now they are
	quite different.
30	There has been an increased emphasis by
	prosecutors on trying to intrude in the attorney-
	client relationship and work product doctrine. There
	have been more situations where people's
	constitutional rights were being violated. Certainly
	there has also been a greater emphasis on going after
	corporations against which the government can
	extract large settlements. More cases are being
	brought, and I worry that the government is using
	exclusion as a hammer to extort settlements.
31	Courts, especially appellate courts, are more lenient
	with white collar criminals. Whereas if it was a
	violent crime, courts bend over backwards to keep
	people in jail, in white collar crime if it is a criminal
	prosecution, the courts tend to bend over backwards
	to let people off even where it is clear they violated
	the law. As appellate courts let people off,
	prosecutors look for more straight forward cases to
	prosecute or those that have a huge impact. On the
	civil side, False Claims Acts cases involve more cases
1	and more patterns of cases against industries so that
	it is not a defense to say that everyone does it since
	often everyone does do it.

32	There are cycles of cases that are the hot cases,
	which changes every 3 to 4 years, and when changes
	have been made they really are not permanent
	changes. The backdated option cases are now the
	new trend. Most white collar crime work is reactive
	to what is happening in the economy. People have
	also become more involved with larger cases and
	there are more corporate prosecutions.
33	There has not been much of a change with respect to
	individuals versus corporations. The statistics for
	non-prosecution agreements with corporations do not
	show a huge increase in those since Enron. There is
	any number of districts around the US where
	corporations have very seldom, if ever, been targets.
34	There has been a tendency for prosecutors to be more
	aggressive in prosecuting corporations than they
	were previously.
35	There is more criminalization of behaviors today. In
	the past, the Department of Justice would make a
	deal with the corporation that included the directors
	and officers. Now, that is not the case. Corporations
	are now performing more internal investigations and
	turning the results over to the government, which
	makes the corporation do the work for the
	prosecution. There has also been a change in the
	penalties white collar defendants face. Twenty years
	ago, white collar offenses were presumed not to end
	up in long jail sentences and that is not the case now
	due to the sentencing guidelines.

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36	The Department of Justice continues to be really
	aggressive in handling white collar offenses. To
	some extent, the DOJ's approach to corporation
	defendants has moderated since Enron and Arthur
	Andersen due to the fallout from the prosecution of a
	large entity for the acts of a small group of people,
	including the impact on large numbers of innocent
	individuals. There is now more incentive for
	corporations to be cooperative with the government,
	and we are seeing more corporate cooperation
	agreements and non-prosecution agreements. There
	is a deferred prosecution approach as to the
	corporation in order to go after the individuals.
	There is also a trend to squeeze the corporation to
	get deals in order to go after the individuals.
	However, we are seeing a trend away from such
	aggressive approaches following the KPMG decision
	and the McNulty Memo. The government is
	loosening its grip on corporations and is using less
	aggressive approaches to cooperation.
37	There is definitely a trend towards more corporate
-	high-end white collar crime. There are more complex
	schemes which have reached the highest levels
	within corporations. Previously such schemes did
	not involve the heads of corporations (it was usually
	managers) but it is unclear whether that is because
	it has truly spread to the top or because today there
	are better investigative techniques to uncover the
	schemes.
38	Identity fraud has grown dramatically, but in terms
	of trends, more investigations have been done in the
	last 15 years, and the growth in expertise of federal
	prosecutors is one of the reasons for that. In the last
	30 years there are lots of prosecutors who have
	gained more confidence and expertise, so there is no
	question that there are more complex fraud
	investigations. Also, the notion of the career
	prosecutor was just beginning to grow in 1970s, and
	now there are many more people doing criminal
	cases. The trend really is a change in the
	prosecutorial team that is looking at these things.
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39	2002 was a watershed moment for white collar
	defense, since then the focus on corporate and
	corporate-based criminal behavior is a large trend
	that is rolling itself out now. There are more
	corporate-related crimes, like securities fraud cases,
	and more cases dealing with significant corporations,
	like the pharmaceutical marketing cases. Sizeable
	corporations are being prosecuted rather than
	smaller, individual defendants. There is also more
	willingness by the government in trying to make big
	cases against big defendants.
40	There has been an increase in the criminalization of
	business activities. The scope of the mail fraud and
	securities fraud statutes has been expanded well
	beyond what they traditionally were, so conduct that
	would not have been criminal 30 years ago is now
	routinely prosecuted. There has also been an
	increase in corporate criminal prosecutions triggered
	by the fact that civil sanctions are almost guaranteed
	once a criminal conviction has happened.
41	There is definitely a trend in health care on the
	federal government side to attack Medicaid fraud,
	and the government has taken a greater role in that
	enforcement so federal tactics may translate over.
	There are generally more prosecutions of
	corporations, and the impact of whistleblowers has
	grown.
42	There are much stiffer sentences, largely because of
	the guidelines and an irrational reaction to overly
	punitive drug sentences, which ratchets up penalties
	for white collar offenses. There is also a greater need
	for enforcement agencies to address every issue with
	a criminal prosecution. There was greater discretion
	exercised previously. Also, more prosecution of
	companies happens today.

43	The government now does not accept joint defense
	agreements, and companies are required to cooperate
	and settle. However, the most important change is
	the waiver of attorney-client privilege. Fifteen years
	ago no prosecutor would have asked for the results of
	internal investigations or anything that was
	privileged. Also, generally speaking there are more
	prosecutions of corporations these days.
44	The pendulum swings back and forth. Today, more
	individuals are being prosecuted and corporations
	are pretty much open to the government and give the
	government information to avoid prosecution. Before
	the company and the individual stood together, now
	they are divided. Terrorism has had a major impact.
	There are limited resources at the federal level and
	they have been moved to anti-terrorism efforts.
	Now, there is a trend back toward more resources
	available for white collar crime as compared to the
	years after 9/11.
45	Now there is more of a willingness by the
	government to prosecute cases that are not as clear
	cut. In the past, a case had to be very clearly
	fraudulent to be prosecuted criminally. Then as
	environmental crimes came to the forefront, there
	was no intent standard and prosecutors have gotten
	to where they can push the envelope more.

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