Abductive reasoning

About: Abductive reasoning is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1917 publications have been published within this topic receiving 44645 citations. The topic is also known as: abduction & abductive inference.

A Query-Driven Anytime Algorithm for Argumentative and Abductive Reasoning

Abstract: This paper presents a new approximation methodfor computing arguments or explanations in the context of logic-based argumentative or abductive reasoning. The algorithm can be interrupted at any time returning the solution foundso far. The quality of the approximation increases monotonically when more computational resources are available. The methodis basedon cost functions andreturns lower and upper bounds.

The Role of Abduction in Production of New Ideas in Design

Abstract: The pragmatist philosopher Peirce insisted that besides deduction and induction there is a third main form of inference, abduction, which is the only type of inference capable of producing new ideas. Also he defined abduction as a stage of the methodological process in science, where hypotheses are formed to explain anomalies. Basing on these seminal ideas, scholars have proposed modified, widened or alternative definitions of abduction and devised taxonomies of abductive inferences. Influenced by Peirce’s seminal writings and subsequent treatments on abduction in philosophy of science, design scholars have in the last 40 years endeavoured to shed light on design by means of the concept of abduction. The first treatment was provided by March in 1976. He viewed that abduction, which he called “productive reasoning”, is the key mode of reasoning in design. He also presented a three-step cyclic design process, similar to Peirce’s methodological process in science. Among the many other later treatments of design abduction, Roozenburg’s definition of explanatory and innovative abduction is noteworthy. However, an evaluation of the related literature suggests that research into abduction in design is still in an undeveloped stage. This research shows gaps in coverage, lack of depth and diverging outcomes. By focusing on the differences between science and design as well as on empirical knowledge of different phenomena comprising design, new conceptions of abduction in design are derived. Given the differences of context, abduction in design shows characteristics not yet found or identified in science. For example, abduction can occur in connection to practically all inference types in design; it is a property of an inference besides an inference itself. A number of the most important abductive inference types as they occur in design are identified and discussed in more detail.

Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Abstract: We consider the connections between belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning, using as a foundation the approach to theory change developed by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (the AGM approach). This is first generalized to allow the iteration of theory change operations to capture the dynamics of epistemic states according to a principle of minimal change of entrenchment. The iterative operations of expansion, contraction and revision are characterized both by a set of postulates and by Grove’s construction based on total pre-orders on the set of complete theories of the belief logic. We present a sound and complete conditional logic whose semantics is based on our iterative revision operation, but which avoids Gardenfors’s triviality result because of a severely restricted language of beliefs and hence the weakened scope of our extended postulates. In the second part of the paper, we develop a computational approach to theory dynamics using Rott’s E-bases as a representation for epistemic states. Under this approach, a ranked E-base is interpreted as standing for the most conservative entrenchment compatible with the base, reflecting a kind of foundationalism in the acceptance of evidence for a belief. Algorithms for the computation of our iterative versions of expansion, contraction and revision are presented. Finally, we consider the relationship between nonmonotonic reasoning and both conditional logic and belief revision. Adapting the approach of Delgrande, we show that the unique extension of a default theory expressed in our conditional logic of belief revision corresponds to the most conservative belief state which respects the theory: however, this correspondence is limited to propositional default theories. Considering first order default theories, we present a belief revision algorithm which incorporates the assumption of independence of default instances and propose the use of a base logic for default reasoning which incorporates uniqueness of names. We conclude with an examination of the behavior of an implemented system on some of Lifschitz’s benchmark problems in nonmonotonic reasoning.

Abduction and Analogy in Chance Discovery

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce abduction and analogy as a discovery reasoning. Second, we show a hypothetical reasoning system, Theorist, as an example of computational abductive reasoning. This hypothetical reasoning system can be applied to explanatory reasoning such as design and diagnosis. However, it can not generate new hypotheses. In our explanation of hypothetical reasoning, we also show the possibilities and the limitations of conventional abduction when we use it in the context of chance discovery. Third, we show abductive analogical reasoning (AAR), which can generate new hypotheses. AAR is an extension of hypothetical reasoning that is achieved by combining abduction and analogical mapping. Finally, we show AAR as a tool for chance discovery and explain the roles of abduction and analogy in chance discovery.

The Abductive Theory of Method: Scientific Inquiry and Clinical Practice

Abstract: Clinical reasoning is one of the central components of psychological assessment. The identification of a client's psychological difficulties and the subsequent depiction of their onset, development, and interrelationships enables clinicians to plan treatment in a systematic and effective manner. In an article (Ward, Vertue, & Haig, 1999), we outlined the abductive theory of method (ATOM) and argued that it offered a useful framework for highlighting and integrating the major phases of psychological assessment. These phases involve detecting clinical phenomena, postulating psychological mechanisms, developing a case formulation, and evaluating a case formulation. In this article we present a revised version of the adaptation of ATOM and elaborate on the related clinical dimensions of assessment.