Abductive reasoning

About: Abductive reasoning is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1917 publications have been published within this topic receiving 44645 citations. The topic is also known as: abduction & abductive inference.

Runtime Addition of Integrity Constraints in an Abductive Proof Procedure

Abstract: Abductive Logic Programming is a computationally founded representation of abductive reasoning. In most ALP frameworks, integrity constraints express domainspecific logical relationships that abductive answers are required to satisfy. Integrity constraints are usually known a priori. However, in some applications (such as interactive abductive logic programming, multi-agent interactions, contracting) it makes sense to relax this assumption, in order to let the abductive reasoning start with incomplete knowledge of integrity constraints, and to continue without restarting when new integrity constraints become known. In this paper, we propose a declarative semantics for abductive logic programming with addition of integrity constraints during the abductive reasoning process, an operational instantiation (with formal termination, soundness and completeness properties) and an implementation of such a framework based on the SCIFF language and proof procedure.

On Peirce's Claim that Belief Should Be Banished from Science

Abstract: In this article I examine the ground and validity of Peirce’s claim that “belief has no place in science”. Contrary to the general view, such a claim should not be understood as merely an overreaction to William James’ thesis that there can be legitimate non-evidential reasons to believe. For Peirce, believing that something is the case implies, at least when believing takes a certain form, a kind of dogmatism incompatible with the proper conduct of inquiry towards truth. In this paper, I examine two ways in which Peirce argues for the “no belief in science” thesis. I first discuss ’his claim that belief is incompatible with the “Will to Learn”. Peirce argues that believing that p in such a way that one does not have any real doubts about whether p implies that one has a dogmatic attitude vis-a-vis possible future evidence that not- p ; I claim that this anticipates the line of reasoning that supports Kripke’s “paradox of dogmatism”. After having indicated how they can both be resisted, I examine a second way—which seems to have been overlooked in Peirce scholarship—in which the founder of pragmatism argues for the “no belief in science” thesis. Peirce often relates this thesis to his view of abduction and the nature of explanatory hypotheses: the conclusion of an abductive inference is not, and should not be, the belief that a given explanatory hypothesis H is true, probably true, or likely to be true, but rather that H is such that it is a possible explanation of fact F.

Explaining Novel Events in Process Control through Model Generative Reasoning

Abstract: This article discusses the application of an abductive reasoning method termed Model Generative Reasoning (MGR) to the construction of explanations for novel events in physical systems. The MGR algorithm progressively develops intensional domain descriptions (models) to cover problem assumptions, which are then evaluated against domain facts as alternative explanations of queried phenomena. Illustrations of the workings of the MGR approach are given using concepts from process control.

Consumers’ Abductive Inference Error as Cognitive Impairment

Abstract: This study examines cognitive impairment, which is one of the results from social exclusion and leads to various cognitive deficits such as logical reasoning disorders. This study also investigates how cognitive errors called abductive inference error occur due to cognitive impairment. This study was performed with 81 college students. Participants were randomly assigned to a group who experienced social exclusion and a group who did not experience social exclusion. We analyzed how the degree of error of abductive inference differs according to the experience of social exclusion by t-test. The group who experienced social exclusion had a higher level of abductive inference error than the group who did not experience it. The abductive condition inference value of the group who experienced social exclusion was higher in the group with the deduction condition inference value of 90% than in the group with the deduction condition inference value of 10%, and the difference was also significant. This study extended the concepts of cognitive impairments, escape theory, and cognitive narrowing, which are used to explain addiction behavior to human cognitive bias. Also this study confirmed that social exclusion experience increased cognitive impairment and abductive inference error. Implications and future research directions are discussed and suggested.