Abductive reasoning

About: Abductive reasoning is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1917 publications have been published within this topic receiving 44645 citations. The topic is also known as: abduction & abductive inference.

Multimodal Abduction: External Semiotic Anchors and Hybrid Representations

Abstract: Multimodal Abduction External Semiotic Anchors and Hybrid Representations Lorenzo Magnani (lmagnani@unipv.it) Department of Philosophy and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, Piazza Botta 6 27100 Pavia, Italy, and Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, 510275, Guangzhou, P. R. China, Keywords: abduction; hybrid representations; multimo- dal cognition; discovery; cognitive and epistemic media- tors; semiosis. Our brains make up a series of signs and are engaged in mak- ing or manifesting or reacting to a series of signs: through this semiotic activity they are at the same time engaged in “being minds” and so in thinking intelligently. An important effect of this semiotic activity of brains is a continuous process of “ex- ternalization of the mind” that exhibits a new cognitive per- spective on the mechanisms underlying the emergence of ab- ductive processes of meaning formation. To illustrate this proc- ess I have taken advantage of the analysis of some aspects of the cognitive interplay between internal and external represen- tations. I consider this interplay critical in analyzing the relation between meaningful semiotic internal resources and devices and their dynamical interactions with the externalized semiotic materiality suitably stocked in the environment. Hence, minds are material, “extended” and artificial in themselves. I have recently provided concrete examples relating my philosophical points to neuroanatomy and neuropsychology taking advantage of an analysis of some aspects of animal cognition (Magnani, 2007b) and of the concept of direct and indirect affordance (Magnani, 2007c). A considerable part of human abductive thinking is occurring through an activity consisting in a kind of reification in the external environment (that originates what I call semiotic an- chors) and a subsequent re–projection and reinterpretation through new configurations of neural networks and chemical processes. In my recent research I have illustrated how this activity takes advantage of hybrid representations and how it can nicely account for various processes of creative and selec- tive abduction, bringing up the question of how “multimodal” aspects involving a full range of sensory modalities are impor- tant in hypothetical reasoning. I maintain that abduction is the process of “inferring” certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that render some sentences plausible, that “explain” or “discover” some (eventually new) phenomenon or observation; it is the process of reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated. In (Magnani, 2001) I have introduced the concept of theoretical abduction, as a form of internal processing. There are two kinds of theoretical abduction, “sentential”, related to logic and to verbal/symbolic inferences, and “model-based”, related to the exploitation of internalized models of diagrams, pictures, etc. Theoretical abduction illustrates and cognitively integrates much of what is important in creative reasoning in science, in humans and in computational programs, but fails to account for many cases of explanations (for example occurring in science) when the exploitation of environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction (Magnani, 2001) aims at capturing a large part of agent’s thinking where the role of action (and, in science, of what I call epistemic mediators) is central, and where the features of this action are implicit and hard to be elicited: action can provide otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and by per- forming a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. The role of manipulative abduction and media- tors in moral reasoning is illustrated in the recent Magnani (2007a). Many commentators criticized the Peircian ambiguity in treating abduction in the same time as inference and percep- tion. It is important to clarify this problem – also consider- ing some perspectives that derive from the field of animal cognition – because perception and imagery are kinds of that model-based cognition which we are exploiting to ex- plain abduction: in (Magnani, 2006 and 2007b) I conclude we can render consistent the two views, beyond Peirce, but perhaps also within the Peircian texts, taking advantage of the concept of multimodal abduction, which depicts hybrid aspects of abductive reasoning. Abduction is fully multimo- dal, in that both data and hypotheses can have a full range of verbal and sensory representations. In my recent research I have illustrated some aspects of this constitutive hybrid na- ture of abduction – involving words, sights, images, smells, etc. but also kinesthetic experiences and other feelings. References Magnani, L. (2007a), Morality in a Technological World: Knowl- edge as Duty, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. Magnani, L. (2007b), Animal abduction. From mindless organisms to artifactual mediators. In L. Magnani and P. Li (eds.). Model- Based Reasoning in Science and Medicine. Berlin: Springer. Magnani, L. and Bardone, E. (2007c). Sharing representations and creating chances through cognitive niche construction. The role of affordances and abduction, in: Iwata, S., Oshawa, Y., Tsumoto, S., Zhong, N., Shi, Y. and Magnani, L. (eds.). Communications and Discoveries from Multidisciplinary Data, Series “Studies in Com- putational Intelligence”, Springer, Berlin/New York. Magnani, L. (2006). Multimodal abduction. External semiotic an- chors and hybrid representations. Logic Journal of the IGPS Magnani, L. (2001). Abduction, Reason, and Science. Processes of Discovery and Explanation. New York: Kluwer Aca- demic/Plenum Publishers. (Chinese version: [意] 洛伦佐·玛格纳尼 / 发现和解释的过程》，中国广州：广东人民出版社2006年. Trans- lated by Dachao Li and Yuan Ren, Guangdong People’s Publish- ing House, Guangzhou, 2006).

Perspective switching as event affordance: The ontogeny of abductive reasoning

Abstract: Abstract The present model identifies Index as the representational component driving children’s advances in abductive reasoning, capitalizing upon the means to subjunctivize within constructed events. As such, an essential semiotic device underlies the recognition of shifting perspectives to operationalize abductive reasoning within event profiles. Beyond using Index to establish the point of orientation (Origo), one “tries on” that Origo’s covert and overt orientation via deictic terms that encode Origo’s role as a conversational on-looker of an episode. This subjunctive competence entails taking note of cause-effect relations to anticipate the affective, social, cognitive, and physical viewpoints likely to be assumed by that Origo. Hypothesis-making then entails going beyond grounded experience to represent intermediate and final states of affairs for other Origos. Abductions require dynamically imaging how distinctive agents affect action schemes together with their relied-upon judgments to effectuate resultative states. The use of indexically grounded cognitions (given their role in preempting event relations) rivets the onlooker to the “why” of unexpected events and increases the likelihood that the guess of another within novel contexts is plausible. Shifting perspectives underlie abductions because they trigger defeasible but plausible explanations for puzzling events.

Approximate and Commonsense Reasoning: From Theory to Practice

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of present trends in approximate and commonsense reasoning. The different types of reasoning, which can be covered by this generic expression, take place when the available information is either incomplete, or inconsistent, or pervaded with uncertainty, or imprecise and qualitative. The conclusions which are then obtained are usually plausible but uncertain. Yet, approximate or commonsense reasoning is useful in practical problems such as prospect evaluation, diagnosis, forecasting and decision tasks, where better information cannot be got. Classical logic is insufficient for handling these types of reasoning. Different ideas of orderings play a role in these reasoning processes: plausibility orderings between interpretations or situations which are unequally uncertain, similarity orderings with respect to prototypical situations or cases, preference orderings between acts or situations when the problem is a matter of choice. These orderings can be encoded using purely ordinal scales, or scales with a richer structure (when it is meaningful and compatible with the quality of the available information). This general idea of ordering provides a kind of unification between the different reasoning modes and somewhat typifies approximate and commonsense reasoning. Advances in default reasoning, inconsistency handling, data fusion, updating, abductive reasoning, interpolative reasoning, and decision issues in relation with Artificial Intelligence research, are briefly reviewed. Open questions and directions for future research which seem especially important for the development of practical applications are pointed out. The paper is largely based on authors' research experience, and as such, presents a rather personal view, which may not be exempt from some biases.

Reasoning in Science through Representation

Abstract: In this chapter we argue that our analysis of student reasoning through constructing representations points to a range of informal and formal reasoning processes. This suggests the need for researchers and teachers to shift from an exclusive focus on formal syllogistic reasoning as the main or only reasoning resource for science learning.

Fear of knowledge: Clinical hypotheses in diagnostic and prognostic reasoning.

Abstract: Patients are interested in receiving accurate diagnostic and prognostic information. Models and reasoning about diagnoses have been extensively investigated from a foundational perspective; however, for all its importance, prognosis has yet to receive a comparable degree of philosophical and methodological attention, and this may be due to the difficulties inherent in accurate prognostics. In the light of these considerations, we discuss a considerable body of critical thinking on the topic of prognostication and its strict relations with diagnostic reasoning, pointing out the distinction between nosographic and pathophysiological types of diagnosis and prognosis, underlying the importance of the explication and explanation processes. We then distinguish between various forms of hypothetical reasoning applied to reach diagnostic and prognostic judgments, comparing them with specific forms of abductive reasoning. The main thesis is that creative abduction regarding clinical hypotheses in diagnostic process is very unlikely to occur, whereas this seems to be often the case for prognostic judgments. The reasons behind this distinction are due to the different types of uncertainty involved in diagnostic and prognostic judgments.