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Adversary

About: Adversary is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2432 publications have been published within this topic receiving 39877 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is argued that to change this state of affairs, security departments need to communicate more with users, and adopt a usercentered design approach.
Abstract: Many system security departments treat users as a security risk to be controlled. The general consensus is that most users are careless and unmotivated when it comes to system security. In a recent study, we found that users may indeed compromise computer security mechanisms, such as password authentication, both knowing and unknowingly. A closer analysis, however, revealed that such behavior is often caused by the way in which security mechanisms are implemented, and users’ lack of knowledge. We argue that to change this state of affairs, security departments need to communicate more with users, and adopt a usercentered design approach.

1,458 citations

Book
11 Sep 1980
TL;DR: Mansbridge's "Beyond Adversary Democracy" as mentioned in this paper explores the abstract subject matter by close studies (using ethnographic, documentary, and questionnaire methods) of two small actual democracies operating at their most elemental American levels (1) a New England town meeting ("Selby," Vermont) and (2) an urban crisis center ("Helpline"), whose 41 employees shared a New Left-Counterculture belief in participatory democracy and consensual decision-making.
Abstract: ""Beyond Adversary Democracy" should be read by everyone concerned with democratic theory and practice."-Carol Pateman, "Politics" "Sociologists recurrently complain about how seldom it is that we produce books that combine serious theorizing about important issues of public policy with original and sensitive field research. Several rounds of enthusiastic applause, then, are due Jane Mansbridge . . . for having produced a dense and well written book whose subject is nothing less ambitious than the theory of democracy and its problems of equality, solidarity, and consensus. "Beyond Adversary Democracy," however, is not simply a work of political theory; Mansbridge explores her abstract subject matter by close studies (using ethnographic, documentary, and questionnaire methods) of two small actual democracies operating at their most elemental American levels (1) a New England town meeting ("Selby," Vermont) and (2) an urban crisis center ("Helpline"), whose 41 employees shared a New Left-Counterculture belief in participatory democracy and consensual decision-making. [Mansbridge] is a force to contend with. It is in our common interest that she be widely read."-Bennett M. Berger, "Contemporary Sociology"

1,162 citations

Book ChapterDOI
17 Aug 2003
TL;DR: This paper proposes several efficient techniques for building private circuits resisting side channel attacks, and provides a formal threat model and proofs of security for their constructions.
Abstract: Can you guarantee secrecy even if an adversary can eavesdrop on your brain? We consider the problem of protecting privacy in circuits, when faced with an adversary that can access a bounded number of wires in the circuit This question is motivated by side channel attacks, which allow an adversary to gain partial access to the inner workings of hardware Recent work has shown that side channel attacks pose a serious threat to cryptosystems implemented in embedded devices In this paper, we develop theoretical foundations for security against side channels In particular, we propose several efficient techniques for building private circuits resisting this type of attacks We initiate a systematic study of the complexity of such private circuits, and in contrast to most prior work in this area provide a formal threat model and give proofs of security for our constructions

968 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
22 Aug 2004
TL;DR: This paper views classification as a game between the classifier and the adversary, and produces a classifier that is optimal given the adversary's optimal strategy, and experiments show that this approach can greatly outperform a classifiers learned in the standard way.
Abstract: Essentially all data mining algorithms assume that the data-generating process is independent of the data miner's activities. However, in many domains, including spam detection, intrusion detection, fraud detection, surveillance and counter-terrorism, this is far from the case: the data is actively manipulated by an adversary seeking to make the classifier produce false negatives. In these domains, the performance of a classifier can degrade rapidly after it is deployed, as the adversary learns to defeat it. Currently the only solution to this is repeated, manual, ad hoc reconstruction of the classifier. In this paper we develop a formal framework and algorithms for this problem. We view classification as a game between the classifier and the adversary, and produce a classifier that is optimal given the adversary's optimal strategy. Experiments in a spam detection domain show that this approach can greatly outperform a classifier learned in the standard way, and (within the parameters of the problem) automatically adapt the classifier to the adversary's evolving manipulations.

944 citations

Book ChapterDOI
27 Aug 1995
TL;DR: In order to guarantee the availability and integrity of the secret, this work provides mechanisms to detect maliciously (or accidentally) corrupted shares, as well as mechanisms to secretly recover the correct shares when modification is detected.
Abstract: Secret sharing schemes protect secrets by distributing them over different locations (share holders). In particular, in k out of n threshold schemes, security is assured if throughout the entire life-time of the secret the adversary is restricted to compromise less than k of the n locations. For long-lived and sensitive secrets this protection may be insufficient.We propose an efficient proactive secret sharing scheme, where shares are periodically renewed (without changing the secret) in such a way that information gained by the adversary in one time period is useless for attacking the secret after the shares are renewed. Hence, the adversary willing to learn the secret needs to break to all k locations during the same time period (e.g., one day, a week, etc.). Furthermore, in order to guarantee the availability and integrity of the secret, we provide mechanisms to detect maliciously (or accidentally) corrupted shares, as well as mechanisms to secretly recover the correct shares when modification is detected.

842 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20231,111
20222,125
2021116
2020157
2019135
2018130