Showing papers on "Agency (philosophy) published in 1981"

Kingship and authority in South Asia

Abstract: This text does not "institutionalize" kingship within a reified political domain abstracted from its social and cultural contexts. Instead, its methodological approaches situate kingship within the normative concepts of hierarchy prevalent within a society at specific periods of time. As a part of larger authoritative structures in society, the articles in this volume address the manner in which kingship was both a product of the society which contributed to it, and a regenerative agency which, in its ideal form, stabilized the existing social order.

The Relationship between Moral Thought and Moral Action: Implications for Social Studies Education

Abstract: This article focuses upon the question “Does level of moral reasoning increase the likelihood of moral behavior occurring?” Through a review of the literature on this subject, the author draws thes...

Referring to the unconscious: a philosophical critique of Schafer's action language.

Abstract: Schafer's attack on metapsychology and his attempt to erect an alternative to it depends on a strategy of replacing other sources of agency (for example, introjects, the superego, resistance, the emotions, and so on) by translating these terms into discourse about the person. This process of elimination appears to leave the person as sole agent who acts for reasons and who is not acted upon by these fragmentary psychic agents which, rather, are viewed as aspects of the person's own activity. However, the concept of the person is inadequate for the purpose. Conceptually, it is confused because its sphere of application cannot be circumscribed, and because the "translation" of unconsciously-determined acts is only metaphorical. Empirically, "the person", regarded as general explanatory theory applicable to all behaviour other than that which is biologically or reflexively induced, cannot cope with commonplace clinical phenomena. The scheme of Schafer's argument makes it appear that there are few alternatives to the kind of redescription he advocates, but an examination of his treatment of the emotions reveals that the philosophical assumptions underlying his argument profoundly restrict the range of psychological questions which may be asked and the kind of psychoanalytic theory which might be constructed.

Bridging the gap between theory and practice in graduate training

Abstract: The article focuses on specific elements of a master's level program which represent practical applications of open-humanistic and dialectic theory to professional training. Emphasis is placed on innovations which demonstrate how the concept of praxis can be applied to education. Specific innovations discussed include: (a) The traditional core curriculum, oriented toward an academic discipline, was replaced by a focus on a specific social problem (development of young children); (b) The program operates as a community service agency linking the campus to the service-delivery system. This change fosters an interdependent relationship with community agencies which allows trainees to become involved in genuine professional activity; and (c) The program has moved away from a hierarchical student/teacher relationship to a reciprocal model.

Moral Personhood: A Tentative Analysis

Abstract: The paper is an attempt to provide a brief analysis of moral experience and moral agency set firmly within an experiential analysis of the human person. The approach yields a set of ‘moral components’ that the moral educator should take into account, but also enables him to understand their significance in human life. The analysis stresses the importance of ‘moral character’, which is seen partly in terms of the blind development of innate psychic capacities or powers in response to environmental factors and the deliberate policies of educators, partly in terms of the free acts of the spiritual‐rational self. Much importance is attached to the inner life, and to the individual's responsibility to achieve autonomy in relation to the lower parts of his soul.

A Note on the Theory of Democratic Organization

Abstract: Professor C.J. Calhoun, in a most stimulating paper (Sociology 14 (3) 1980) has sought to cast doubt upon the effectiveness of what he terms 'democratic' and 'individual-orientated' organizations. In particular he finds himself in disagreement with Bennis and Slater (1968) in their insistence, within a democratically structured organization, on 'full and free communication' amongst organization participants. Professor Calhoun argues forcibly that 'communication' among individuals is not adequate to the conduct of business of even relatively simple organizations and, thus, either formal channels (i.e. hierarchy) or sub-groups are inevitable. Furthermore, since communication (i.e. the generation and transmission of information) is not a costless enterprise, an ordering of priorities for communication is organizationally necessary. I wish to argue that though Professor Calhoun is correct in both these assertions they do not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the concept of democratic organization. Although Professor Calhoun does not provide us with an explicit definition of what he means by a democratic organization it is, I think reasonably clear that he has in mind something akin either to 'direct democracy' a situation of one participant one vote on all organizationally relevant decisions or a fairly extensive system of representational (or delegate) democracy. Be this as it may, he finds persuasive arguments to show that such structures are at odds with the effective organization. I think it is important, however, to be a little more explicit concerning the principles underlying the concept of a democratic organization. Once these principles are made clear it can, I believe, be shown that hierarchy (i.e. formalized and limited communication channels) and priorities in the transmission and generation of information are both compatible with organizational democracy. But before I embark upon such a venture I think we should keep in sight a very important point originally made by Simon and recently emphasized by O. E. Williamson (1975): it is that organization (i.e. the administrative coordination of exchanges) only becomes necessary because of 'bounded rationality'. In a world of free and perfect information there would be no need for organization at all, all exchanges could be optimally coordinated through the agency of markets. There is, thus, within the very concept of organization itself an implication of information restriction and in a literal sense Bennis and Slater must be wrong and Calhoun right. If we view an organization as a decision-making body concerned to accomplish some goal or goals (there need not be consensus about these) then what are the democratic principles which should underpin the distribution of decision-making amongst the members of the organization? I have set these out more fully elsewhere (Abell 1979) but briefly they are (slightly modified):