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Ambiguity aversion

About: Ambiguity aversion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2117 publications have been published within this topic receiving 79935 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
Daniel Ellsberg1
TL;DR: The notion of "degrees of belief" was introduced by Knight as mentioned in this paper, who argued that people tend to behave "as though" they assigned numerical probabilities to events, or degrees of belief to the events impinging on their actions.
Abstract: Are there uncertainties that are not risks? There has always been a good deal of skepticism about the behavioral significance of Frank Knight's distinction between “measurable uncertainty” or “risk”, which may be represented by numerical probabilities, and “unmeasurable uncertainty” which cannot. Knight maintained that the latter “uncertainty” prevailed – and hence that numerical probabilities were inapplicable – in situations when the decision-maker was ignorant of the statistical frequencies of events relevant to his decision; or when a priori calculations were impossible; or when the relevant events were in some sense unique; or when an important, once-and-for-all decision was concerned. Yet the feeling has persisted that, even in these situations, people tend to behave “as though” they assigned numerical probabilities, or “degrees of belief,” to the events impinging on their actions. However, it is hard either to confirm or to deny such a proposition in the absence of precisely-defined procedures for measuring these alleged “degrees of belief.” What might it mean operationally, in terms of refutable predictions about observable phenomena, to say that someone behaves “as if” he assigned quantitative likelihoods to events: or to say that he does not? An intuitive answer may emerge if we consider an example proposed by Shackle, who takes an extreme form of the Knightian position that statistical information on frequencies within a large, repetitive class of events is strictly irrelevant to a decision whose outcome depends on a single trial.

7,005 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another.
Abstract: This paper concerns utility functions for money. A measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another. Risks are also considered as a proportion of total assets.

5,207 citations

Book ChapterDOI
John W. Pratt1
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: In this paper, a measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another.
Abstract: This paper concerns utility functions for money. A measure of risk aversion in the small, the risk premium or insurance premium for an arbitrary risk, and a natural concept of decreasing risk aversion are discussed and related to one another. Risks are also considered as a proportion of total assets.

2,616 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In subjective expected utility (SEU), the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events as discussed by the authors, and it has been shown that people prefer to bet on events they know more about.
Abstract: In subjective expected utility (SEU), the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961) and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when their beliefs are held constant. (They are averse to ambiguity, or uncertainty about probability.) We review evidence, recent theoretical explanations, and applications of research on ambiguity and SEU.

1,702 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker evaluates acts according to the expectation (over a set of probability measures) of an increasing transformation of an act's expected utility.
Abstract: We propose and axiomatize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker evaluates acts according to the expectation (over a set of probability measures) of an increasing transformation of an act's expected utility. This expectation is calculated using a subjective probability over the set of probability measures that the decision maker thinks are relevant given her subjective information. A key feature of our model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective information, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. We show that attitudes towards risk are characterized by the shape of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, as usual, while attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape of the increasing transformation applied to expected utilities. We show that the negative exponential form of this transformation is the special case of constant ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity itself is defined behaviorally and is shown to be characterized by properties of the subjective set of measures. This characterization of ambiguity is formally related to the definitions of subjective ambiguity advanced by Epstein-Zhang (2001) and Ghirardato-Marinacci (2002). One advantage of this model is that the well-developed machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes. The model is also distinct from many in the literature on ambiguity in that it allows smooth, rather than kinked, indifference curves. This leads to different behavior and improved tractability, while still sharing the main features (e.g., Ellsberg's Paradox, etc.). The Maxmin EU model (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) with a given set of measures may be seen as an extreme case of our model with infinite ambiguity aversion. Two illustrative applications to portfolio choice are offered.

1,475 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202350
202291
202192
202094
201999
201878