Ambiguity effect

About: Ambiguity effect is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 31 publications have been published within this topic receiving 8123 citations.

Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms

Abstract: Are there uncertainties that are not risks? There has always been a good deal of skepticism about the behavioral significance of Frank Knight's distinction between “measurable uncertainty” or “risk”, which may be represented by numerical probabilities, and “unmeasurable uncertainty” which cannot. Knight maintained that the latter “uncertainty” prevailed – and hence that numerical probabilities were inapplicable – in situations when the decision-maker was ignorant of the statistical frequencies of events relevant to his decision; or when a priori calculations were impossible; or when the relevant events were in some sense unique; or when an important, once-and-for-all decision was concerned. Yet the feeling has persisted that, even in these situations, people tend to behave “as though” they assigned numerical probabilities, or “degrees of belief,” to the events impinging on their actions. However, it is hard either to confirm or to deny such a proposition in the absence of precisely-defined procedures for measuring these alleged “degrees of belief.” What might it mean operationally, in terms of refutable predictions about observable phenomena, to say that someone behaves “as if” he assigned quantitative likelihoods to events: or to say that he does not? An intuitive answer may emerge if we consider an example proposed by Shackle, who takes an extreme form of the Knightian position that statistical information on frequencies within a large, repetitive class of events is strictly irrelevant to a decision whose outcome depends on a single trial.

Ambiguity and rationality

Abstract: Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows.

Semantic ambiguity effects in word identification

Abstract: The influence of semantic ambiguity on word identification processes was explored in a series of word naming and lexical-decision experiments. There was no reliable ambiguity effect in 2 naming experiments, although an ambiguity advantage in lexical decision was obtained when orthographically legal nonwords were used. No ambiguity effect was found in iexical decision when orthographically illegal nonwords were used, implying a semantic locus for the ambiguity advantage. These results were simulated by using a distributed memory model that also produces the ambiguity disadvantage in gaze duration that has been obtained with a reading comprehension task. Ambiguity effects in the model arise from the model's attempt to activate multiple meanings of an ambiguous word in response to presentation of that word's orthographic pattern. Reasons for discrepancies in empirical results and implications for distributed memory models are considered. Any comprehensive theory of mental representation and process must accommodate the complex means by which concepts are communicated through language. Through the course of history, humans have developed tools of communication that facilitate the relaying of ideas and concepts, such as a writing system or orthography. This mapping of concepts to orthography is not entirely one to one, however, resulting in some words that correspond to multiple concepts, which are known as semantically ambiguous words. When reading text, the context provided by preceding words and sentences provides a means of disambiguating such words. As a result, we may not even notice the ambiguity in words that we are reading in context. If, on the other hand, semantically ambiguous words are presented in isolation, their alternative meanings are readily accessible, and thus their ambiguous nature is noticed. In the research reported in this article, we compare performance on semantically ambiguous words with that of semantically unambiguous words in isolated word identification tasks and describe simulations of the empirical effects within the framework of a distributed memory architecture (Masson, 1995). The effect of semantic ambiguity on isolated word identification has usually been determined by comparing performance on unambiguous words (which are associated with only one