Anthrax vaccines

About: Anthrax vaccines is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 685 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21495 citations.

[Characteristics of the anthrax vaccinal strain STI-1 preserved for 30 years in the form of lyophilized spores].

Abstract: A study was made of the biological properties of the spore culture of anthrax vaccine strain STI-1 lyophilized in 1944 and kept for 30 years without any passages. This dry culture contained not less than 29% of live spores; the culture growth in the nutrient broth and on the agar medium was typical for the strain. Immunogenicity tested in experiments on guinea pigs and rabbits was not reduced and corresponded to that of the reference STI-1 vaccine.

From the Editor-in-Chief: A Is for Anthrax

Abstract: In the months leading up to the 10th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks, I was asked by various colleagues to address anthrax in my editorial. I deferred for several reasons. First, the journal was in receipt of a commentary on the work of the Bipartisan WMD (weapons of mass destruction) Terrorism Research Center by former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, who are leading that endeavor.1 Having served as an advisor to the center on their “report card” project, I believed the commentary would be a more appropriate vehicle for highlighting the important work that is being done—and not being done—on anthrax and other potentially serious infectious diseases since the events of September 11, 2001. Second, Dr Tom Zink addressed several important issues concerning anthrax that the editors believed would not be articulated well in an editorial.2 Finally, although the letter(s) that initiated the anthrax attack in 2001 may have been postmarked in September of that year, to those of us who dealt directly with the medical and public health consequences of that event, the true 10th anniversary is not September 11 but October 4, 2001. That was the day of the press conference at JFK Medical Center in Atlantis, Florida, announcing what would prove to be the first diagnosed case of anthrax resulting from the “Amerithrax” attack.3

AIDS research cut to pay for anthrax vaccine.

Abstract: Erika Check,Washington The Bush administration is to proceed with plans to skim more than $200 million from research grant programmes to pay for the rapid production of an anthrax vaccine, brushing off the protests of biologists. As a result of the decision, 375 AIDS researchers and other grant-holders at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) will this year lose the initial six months of funding on their awards. The NIAID will spend $233 million on the research, development and purchase of a ‘next-generation’ anthrax vaccine by 2004, the White House Office of Management and Budget says. The transfer of money from the NIAID’s civilian research programmes for the vaccine work is just 2% of its total research budget. But research organizations say they are afraid that the decision is a harbinger of how the NIAID’s swelling biodefence mission may compromise its research programmes. “I don’t think anyone opposes doing research to make a better anthrax vaccine — but that work should be funded out of the bioterrorism budget,not by raiding the AIDS budget,” says Daniel Kuritzkes, director of AIDS research at the Partners AIDS Research Center in Cambridge,Massachusetts. Congress and the administration have been wrangling over the anthrax-vaccine project since February last year, when President Bush’s budget request asked for $233 million for the NIAID to spend on a vaccine. Congress denied the request and divided up the money between several parts of the National Institutes of Health. But the White House then demanded that the NIAID find a way to fulfil its request anyway. In a letter sent to legislators on 2 July, White House budget director Joshua Bolten said that the NIAID would spend up to $117 million this year and $116 million next year on the “advanced development” of an anthrax vaccine, including the purchase of up to 9 million doses of vaccine. The decision disappointed the Infectious Diseases Society of America, which says that the vaccine purchase could endanger the NIAID’s larger research mission. The group argues that another branch of government, such as the Department of Homeland Security, should be paying for the vaccine. On 11 July, Congressman Henry Waxman (Democrat,California) and Senator Jeff Bingaman (Democrat, New Mexico) wrote to the president protesting against the decision,which they called a “serious mistake”. But NIAID officials are putting on a brave face.“The Office of Management and Budget’s position is that there is a critical need for the nation to rapidly develop a vaccine and there’s nothing else out there to support this now,” says Ralph Tate, the NIAID’s budget director. Janet Shoemaker,public-affairs director at the American Society for Microbiology, says NIAID officials are making the best of a difficult situation.“The anthrax issue has become less urgent in most people’s minds, but in the minds of the people making the decisions it is still a very high priority,”she says. ■ At the sharp end: anthrax vaccines for US troops are a high priority for the Bush administration.

Health Risk Communication in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program: Lessons for the Future

Abstract: : When Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that all military service members would be vaccinated with the anthrax vaccine, few anticipated the widespread reluctance to accept his directive. Service members were already required to take several vaccinations and this new force protection measure involved a vaccine that had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1970. In response to the unanticipated opposition on the Internet and in the press, an extensive information campaign was developed. This paper suggests that a more proactive educational program with a greater utilization of health risk communication techniques could have reduced much of the negative reaction to the anthrax vaccine. Such techniques as early use of focus groups and surveys could have measured the effectiveness and comprehension of the message. Early evaluations could have identified challenges involving trust, credibility, and organizational biases, which appeared as the program matured. More focused application of effective health risk communication techniques in the creation of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program would have reduced the amount of controversy generated by the program. Lessons learned by studying the development and implementation of health risk communication in the anthrax program can be applied to other military programs, including not only those involving vaccines, but also those having to do with controversial issues such as depleted uranium rounds or toxic exposure standards.