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Showing papers on "Bidding published in 1969"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a mathematical model of the bidding process that deals explicitly with the uncertainty of the bidders about the value of the subject of the auction is presented, which obtains equilibrium strategies and profits as a function of the number of bidderers, the relative values they attach to the subject, and their accuracy in estimating it.
Abstract: This paper presents a mathematical model of the bidding process that deals explicitly with the uncertainty of the bidders about the value of the subject of the auction. By dealing with this often ignored factor, it obtains equilibrium strategies and profits as a function of the number of bidders, the relative values they attach to the subject of the auction and their accuracy in estimating it. Models are developed for both highest-bid-wins and lowest-bid-wins auctions.

190 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have different sources and amounts of information available about the value of the prize is analyzed.
Abstract: This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have different sources and amounts of information available about the value of the prize. The equilibrium pure strategies are characterized and computational methods are derived. A simple example is solved completely.

137 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Real-world application of the discrete probabilistic model of strategy for competitive bidding in the construction industry verified the thesis that such a bidding strategy can assist contractors in increasing their profit from lump-sum contracts obtained by competitive bidding.
Abstract: A discrete probabilistic model of strategy for competitive bidding in the construction industry is formulated and tested. The model is applied to actual past bidding data obtained from a construction contractor. This real-world application of the model verified the thesis that such a bidding strategy can assist contractors in increasing their profit from lump-sum contracts obtained by competitive bidding. A general computer program, OPBID (OPtimum BID), is developed that will enable the contractor to utilize this model.

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used the Marschak bidding procedure to estimate the fair costs of information that will reduce the risk of a decision in time, effort, or money.

40 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A construction management game in which the market demands are predetermined is presented in this paper, where the game is programmed for computers to simulate the competition for the market by five general contractors who are required to make managerial decisions at 12 successive time periods for a total simulated time of 3 years.
Abstract: A construction management game in which the market demands are predetermined is presented. The game is programmed for computers to simulate the competition for the market by five general contractors who are required to make managerial decisions at 12 successive time periods for a total simulated time of 3 yr. The decisions include the evaluation of available information, choice of jobs to bid, selection of subcontractors, the determination of profit level, and the expansion and contraction of capital. At the beginning of each period, jobs available for bidding will be generated by the computer, and at the end of each time period, each company will submit its decisions as input to the computer. After the decisions are processed according to the programmed game model, the computer will output the contract awards, the cost of performing work, and a statement of earnings for each general contractor. The company which shows the largest relative gain at the end of 3 yr will be the winner.

32 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a competitive bidding policy can be formulated if prior probability distributions of competitors' bids for future contracts have been determined, where the identity of each winning company and its bid are assumed to be available to competitors and other customers so that the market reacts quickly to changes.
Abstract: A competitive bidding policy can be formulated if prior probability distributions of competitors' bids for future contracts have been determined A method for determining these prior probability distributions is described for markets where there are a large number of customers The identity of each winning company and its bid are assumed to be available to competitors and other customers so that the market reacts quickly to changes A real example of the use of the method is given The suppliers' general levels of bidding and their variation with individual types of customer are evaluated quantitatively The results are consistent with qualitative knowledge of the market

22 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used the pay-off table technique to determine whether or not to enter bidding competition and determine the probability of success for different bid alternatives, and found that only about one-third of the firms engaged in competitive bidding use the technique.

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of overhead allocation to bids was incorporated in a laboratory bidding experiment designed to study oligopolistic behavior in the marketplace, and the behavior of an oligopolist depends not only on the actions of his competitors but also on the way he feels he must cover his overhead.
Abstract: Cost accountants generally allocate fixed overhead to activities and thence to units of product according to the amount of total capacity budgeted or actually used. When a firm's fixed overhead must be covered by accumulated contributions from specific jobs that are won in competitive bidding, the additional question arises as to whether to allocate overhead before-the-fact to jobs when bids are computed. The problem of overhead allocation to bids was incorporated in a laboratory bidding experiment designed to study oligopolistic behavior in the marketplace. The behavior of an oligopolist depends not only on the actions of his competitors but also on the way he feels he must cover his overhead. In turn, the way his competitors feel they must cover their overheads influences their behavior, and the result of all these influences is manifested in the total overt behavior in the marketplace. In oligopolistic markets where jobs are won by bids, the classical problem of overhead allocation is directly related to revenue generation and provides a structure rather easily simulated in the laboratory. The laboratory experiment reported here simulated a 3-firm automobile repair industry. Each automobile repair firm consisted of one subject who begins the exercise with a given balance sheet, two jobs in his shop, and weekly fixed expenses of $262, representing such things as advertising, supplies, rent, utilities, insurance, taxes, and depreciation. Job opportunities for which each of an industry's three subjects may bid represent automobile repair jobs. Each firm may also have to use some of its capacity on jobs that come back for additional repairs. However, the firm cannot charge for these returned jobs. Job opportunities

5 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the advantages and disadvantages of competitive bidding for obtaining professional marketing research services and suggest that this traditional approach is in need of reform, in particular, in terms of efficiency and fairness.
Abstract: Is competitive bidding currently an effective means of securing professional marketing research services? Or is this traditional approach in need of reform?This article discusses the advantages and...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a computerized game used to simulate the competition among several subcontractors bidding and planning for the foundation of a building construction project subjected to the imposed constraints of the environment is described.
Abstract: A computerized game used to simulate the competition among several subcontractors bidding and planning for the foundation of a building construction project subjected to the imposed constraints of the environment is described. The entire process includes three periods representing three different types of decisions, namely: (1) Contract bargaining; (2) preliminary engineering investigations; and (3) planning and scheduling. The game will be played according to computerized procedure composed of a collection of subroutines which has a prescribed sequence of access. The performance of the players is evaluated on the basis of a scoring system reflecting the consequences of the decisions made by the players.

Journal Article
TL;DR: A data structure framework that would make possible the integration of the different data sources involved in data processing into a management information system for a construction company.
Abstract: THE OBJECT OF THIS PAPER IS TO OUTLINE A DATA STRUCTURE FRAMEWORK THAT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE INTEGRATION OF THE VARIOUS DATA INVOLVED IN DATA PROCESSING INTO A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR A CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. THE SCOPE OF CONSIDERATION OF A CONSTRUCTION COMPANY SYSTEM IS LIMITED TO THE FOUR BASIC OPERATIONS OF ACCOUNTING, PAYROLL, CPM, AND ESTIMATING. CPM IS ENVISAGED AS BOTH AN UPDATING AND MONITORING TOOL FOR THE ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS A PLANNING AND SCHEDULING TOOL. THE DATA STRUCTURES IN THE FOUR OPERATIONS ARE DESCRIBED WITH EMPHASIS ON THE HIERARCHICAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE DATA. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DATA STRUCTURES ON A COMPANY-WIDE BASIS IS DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF THE COMPANY ACTIVITIES OF BIDDING AND PRE-PROJECT PLANNING, PROJECT CONTROL, AND GENERATION OF HISTORICAL DATA. THE DATA STRUCTURE PRESENTED DEALS ONLY WITH THE FORMAT OF THE DATA, AND DOES NOT DEPEND IN ANY WAY ON THE CONTENTS OF THE DATA. THE VALUE OF THE SYSTEM TO THE USER DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON HIS ABILITY TO FORMULATE HIS PARTICULAR REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE STRUCTURE. /AUTHOR/



Journal Article
TL;DR: The algorithm Efficient Resource Allocation using Multi Bidding Model with User Centric Behavior Analysis is implemented and system is designed in such a way to provide better allocation of cloud resources which ensures bidding, user behavior.
Abstract: Number of resource allocation and bidding schemes had been enormously arrived for on demand supply scheme of cloud services. But accessing and presenting the Cloud services depending on the reputation would not produce fair result in cloud computing. Since the cloud users not only looking for the efficient services but in major they look towards the cost. So here there is a way of introducing the bidding option system that includes efficient user centric behavior analysis model to render the cloud services and resource allocation with low cost. The allocation of resources is not flexible and dynamic for the users in the recent days. This gave me the key idea and generated as a problem statement for my proposed work. An online auction framework that ensures multi bidding mechanism which utilizes user centric behavioral analysis to produce the efficient and reliable usage of cloud resources according to the user choice. we implement Efficient Resource Allocation using Multi Bidding Model with User Centric Behavior Analysis. Thus the algorithm is implemented and system is designed in such a way to provide better allocation of cloud resources which ensures bidding and user behavior. Thus the algorithm Efficient Resource Allocation using Multi Bidding Model with User Centric Behavior Analysis is implemented & system is designed in such a way to provide better allocation of cloud resources which ensures bidding, user behavior. The user bid data is trained accordingly such that to produce efficient resource utilization. Further the work can be taken towards data analytics and prediction of user behavior while allocating the cloud resources.