Showing papers on "Bidding published in 1982"

General Bidding Model

Abstract: The general model of competitive bidding is not limited by the assumptions on which Friedman's and Gates' models depend. It is applicable to competition for which a contractor's cost distribution and opponents' bid distributions can be estimated. Historical data of contractor's cost and competitors' bids on different projects produce a distribution for the ratio between them, the bid/cost ratio. Standardized distributions for contractors' cost and competitors' bids, estimated to have respective means of one and the mean bid/cost ratio and to have equal variance, are inserted into the general model. Results are compared with Friedman's and Gates' models for competition against average competitors. Because markup adjustments are counterbalanced by shifts in probability of winning, contractor expected value is not very sensitive to markup, or its method of selection. However, the models vary considerably in their estimates of expected value. Gates' model is always more accurate than Friedman's model where variance of bids is due to variance of costs.

The case for facilitating competing tender offers

Abstract: Last year in this journal, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel advocated a rule that would require management to be passive in the face of a takeover bid, and argued that even resistance that triggers a bidding contest is undesirable. They reasoned that bidding contests curtail the search for takeover targets and thus are ultimately detrimental to shareholder welfare. In this Comment, Mr. Bebchuk maintains that bidding contests are consistent with a substantial level of search, and argues that facilitating competing bids is desirable for both target shareholders and society. Consequently, he endorses regulations that provide time for competing bids, and supports a rule that would allow management to solicit competing bids as long as it does not obstruct the initial or any subsequent tender offer.

Inflation and the Construction Industry

Abstract: Inflation has become a chronic problem whose effects permeate the entire construction industry Owners are not only paying for the increased costs of facilities and capital but also for premiums on construction prices because of the uncertainties of inflation and its side effects Contractors are faced with severe uncertainty in bidding and financing work on projects Productivity is affected because contractors cannot accurately forecast long-term returns on their investments and are required to divert necessary capital to meet resource costs Owners and contractors must plan for these effects and attempt to reduce the risks entailed In particular, the proper assignment of economic risks in contracting should reduce costs in the long term, although this would entail considerable change in construction industry operations

Equilibrium patterns of competition in OCS lease sales

Abstract: An equilibrium model of bidding behavior is developed that accounts for observed fluctuations in the degree of competition to acquire offshore petroleum leases. As one might expect, such fluctuations are related to the heterogeneity of geological prospects that are offered for sale, with a relatively high degree of competition to acquire tracts of the highest quality. The equilibrium configuration of bids is also shown to reflect structural characteristics, such as capital market constraints, that may restrict competition in the lease auction. Empirical evidence is presented which tends to confirm our general theory of bidding equilibria, but which contradicts the popular notion that capital constraints have restricted competition in OCS lease sales. Policy implications are discussed in the concluding section.

Automatic auction machine

Abstract: PURPOSE:To make the judgment of circumstances for a seller easy and to reduce the probability of unsuccessful bidding to operate an automatic auction machine efficiently, by providing means where a desired selling price and a market price are displayed respectively, a means where the state of bidders is displayed, and a clearing button which cancels the desired selling price CONSTITUTION:The desired selling price of an article to be sold by auction is inputted from an input device 41 of a desired price set device 4 and is stored in a desired selling price memory 36 of an auction machine body 3', and the price set is detected by an input detecting circuit 382 to set an FF 38 Contents of the memory 36 and an auction price in a price memory 35 are compared with each other in a comparing circuit 37; and when the auction price is lower than the desired selling price, the FF 38 is reset through an OR circuit 381 Contents of the memory 36 are inputted to a driving circuit 341 of a desired price monitor 43 and is displayed on the monitor 43, and the market price is inputted to a market price monitor 44 from a driving circuit 342 and is displayed Circumstances of bidding are displayed on bidding circumstance monitor 45 to reduce the probability of unsuccessful bidding

Optimum Bid Estimation on Fixed Cost Contracts

Abstract: The paper presents a competitive bidding model which can be readily implemented in a competitive bidding environment within the construction industry. A method of obtaining a fast and accurate approximation of the optimum bid for a class of bidding problems is developed. The Newton Approximation Method is employed in approximating the root of an equation which maximizes the expected monetary value of a contract. A bidding chart and an example application of the technique are presented.

Creating an efficient market for nursing home care.

Abstract: This paper reviews the theoretical foundations of the common Medicaid nursing home reimbursement systems: Reasonable cost related, fixed rate and negotiated rate reimbursement. Each reimbursement system is examined in terms of the four reimbursement system design goals: Allocative efficiency, appropriateness of care, quality of care and equity of economic rewards. None of the reimbursement approaches are found to be deficient on the theoretical level, but practical problems of implementation are shown to be very difficult. As an alternative, a competitive bidding system is proposed which would bring competitive market efficiency to the allocation of Medicaid funds for nursirig home-care. A mathematical programming model is developed to process the bidding information and to allocate Medicaid funds to nursing homes.