Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

A Competitive-Bidding Strategy

Abstract: A method is presented that determines optimum bids in a competitive-bidding situation where each competitor submits one closed bid. The number of bidders may be large or may be unknown. This method makes use of the previous “bidding patterns” of all possible opposition bidders and in the case where the bidding is on contracts, the estimated probability distribution of the cost of fulfilling the contract. The case where a number of bids are to be submitted simultaneously is also discussed.

Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity

Abstract: This chapter is concerned with the economics of organization and management, a relatively new area of study that seeks to analyze the internal structure and workings of economic organizations, the division of activity among these organizations, and the management of relations between them through markets or other higher-level, encompassing organizations. The dominant approach to this subject is transaction-cost economics, as introduced by Coase (1937, 1960) and developed by several others since, most notably Williamson (1975, 1985). The main tenet of Coase's theory is that economic activities tend to be organized efficiently – that is, so as to maximize the expected total wealth of the parties affected. In this context, two sorts of costs are customarily identified – those of physical production and distribution and those of carrying out necessary exchanges. Because these are typically treated as distinct and separable, the efficiency hypothesis becomes one of transaction-cost minimization: The division of activities among firms and between a firm and the market is determined by whether a particular transaction is most efficiently conducted in a market setting or under centralized authority within a firm. This approach has two conceptual problems. First, the total costs a firm incurs cannot generally be expressed as the sum of production costs – depending only on the technology and the inputs used – and transaction costs – depending only on the way transactions are organized. In general, these two kinds of costs must be considered together; efficient organization is not simply a matter of minimizing transaction costs.

Bidding Strategy of Virtual Power Plant for Participating in Energy and Spinning Reserve Markets—Part I: Problem Formulation

Abstract: This paper addresses the bidding problem faced by a virtual power plant (VPP) in a joint market of energy and spinning reserve service. The proposed bidding strategy is a non-equilibrium model based on the deterministic price-based unit commitment (PBUC) which takes the supply-demand balancing constraint and security constraints of VPP itself into account. The presented model creates a single operating profile from a composite of the parameters characterizing each distributed energy resources (DER), which is a component of VPP, and incorporates network constraints into its description of the capabilities of the portfolio. The presented model is a nonlinear mixed-integer programming with inter-temporal constraints and solved by genetic algorithm (GA).

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice

Abstract: Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auction-based solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have non-additive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduce iBundle, the first iterative combinatorial auction that is optimal for a reasonable agent bidding strategy, in this case myopic best-response bidding. Its optimality is proved with a novel connection to primal-dual optimization theory. We demonstrate orders of magnitude performance improvements over the only other known optimal combinatorial auction, the Generalized Vickrey Auction.