Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on Ebay

Abstract: We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay's natural trading system provides bridges between lab and field environment that can be exploited to explore differences in behavior in the two environments. We find that many sellers do not make use of their commitment power as predicted by standard theories of both selfish and social behavior. However, a concern for equity strongly affects outcomes and reputation building in bilateral bargaining, while buyer competition effectively masks this concern and robustly yields equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy of behaviors mirrors observations in laboratory research. Furthermore, we find that behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully naturally occurring trading patterns in the market.

Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient.

Systems and methods for cloud-based brokerage exchange of software entitlements

Abstract: Embodiments relate to systems and methods for cloud-based brokerage exchange of software entitlements. A user can host on-premise software applications on physical hardware, and extend those applications to the cloud based on a set of entitlements developed in conjunction with the vendor(s) of the software. The set of entitlements enjoyed by the user and/or offered by the vendor(s) can be exposed to a bidding marketplace via a brokerage engine and associated bidding service, which can be hosted on a Web site. Other users, and/or other vendors interesting in consuming or supplying premise or loud-based images of the software, or related services, can be to obtain or supply those resources through the brokerage service. The license terms including usage rates, number of users or images, security constraints, and/or other terms of software delivery and usage can be recorded in a dynamically updated entitlement database.

Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions

Abstract: In uniform-price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction. We provide experimental evidence that, in uniform-price auctions, non-binding pre-play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, regardless of the opportunities for communication, in discriminatory-auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders' gains are equal to the smallest "tick size" in the bidding schedule. This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure.