Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
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26 Jul 2015TL;DR: This paper seeks to answer the following question: how can a time-shiftable load, that itself may comprise of several smaller time- shifts, submit its demand bids to the day-ahead and real-time markets so as to minimize its energy procurement cost?
Abstract: Time-shiftable loads have recently received an increasing attention due to their role in creating load flexibility and enhancing demand response and peak-load shaving programs. In this paper, we seek to answer the following question: How can a time-shiftable load, that itself may comprise of several smaller time-shiftable subloads, submit its demand bids to the day-ahead and real-time markets so as to minimize its energy procurement cost? Answering this question is challenging because of the inter-temporal dependencies in choosing the demand bids for time-shiftable loads, and also due to the coupling between demand bid selection and time-shiftable load scheduling problems. Nevertheless, we answer the above question for different practical bidding scenarios and based on different statistical characteristics of practical market prices. In all cases, closed form solutions are obtained for the optimal choices of the price and energy bids. The bidding performance is then evaluated in details by examining several case studies and analyzing actual market price data.
86 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders' utility function within a private value framework, which leads to a nonparametric estimator.
Abstract: Estimating bidders’ risk aversion in auctions is a challeging problem because of identification issues. This paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders’ utility function within a private value framework. In particular, ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values, while first-price sealed-bid auction data allow us to recover the bidders’ utility function. This leads to a nonparametric estimator. An application to the US Forest Service timber auctions is proposed. Estimated utility functions display concavity, which can be partly captured by constant relative risk aversion.
86 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed 101 projects that have been awarded using this method and compared the results to the cost and the time of similar projects that were bid using conventional methods (cost only).
Abstract: In the last decade, many departments of transportation around the United States have experimented with using the A+B bidding method. In this method contractors bid on the cost (part A) and on the time (part B), and the lowest combined bidder (A+B) is awarded the project. This paper analyzes 101 projects that have been awarded using this method and compares the results to the cost and the time of similar projects that were bid using conventional methods (cost only). The conclusions from the research show that substantial savings in construction time have been achieved when using the A+B method with almost no addition in cost. This was achieved by better planning and management of motivated contractors that were using the time element as part of their bidding strategy. The paper includes details on several case studies that demonstrate these results.
86 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an optimization framework to evaluate revenue opportunities provided by multi-scale market hierarchies and to determine optimal participation strategies for individual participants, which can be used to identify which market layers and products offer the greatest economic potential for different energy technologies.
86 citations
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TL;DR: In some uniform price auctions, the auctioneer decides how much to sell after the bidding, and the expected profit and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all equilibria given such "adjustable supply" than given any fixed quantity and reserve price as discussed by the authors.
86 citations