Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the hockey-stick bidding strategy in the electricity markets, and the most important result was transfer of the demand side assets to the supply-side.
Abstract: With the advent of restructuring in the electricity markets, the Supply-side quickly adapted to the new environment, whereas, the story in the demand side has been different. Demand side dealt with the electric energy as a commodity available to the necessary extent. This caused the Supply-side to realize that the demand side would admit to purchase electric energy at any price, and this resulted in the advent of bidding strategies in the Supply-Side, known as “hockey-stick bidding”. The most important result was transfer of the demand side assets to the Supply-side. After a while, the demand side noticed the self-sloppy condition, therefore looked for tools to deal with these threats. This subject is examined in this paper.
85 citations
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28 Sep 2001
TL;DR: In this article, a method for an economic bidding process which enables retailers to generate competition for merchandising space or inventory investment between suppliers of items in branded, replenished categories is presented.
Abstract: The present invention is a method for an economic bidding process which enables retailers to generate competition for merchandising space or inventory investment between suppliers of items in branded, replenished categories. This process enables a retailer's acquisition, evaluation, and comparison of economic bids from multiple suppliers through the merchandise optimization and collaboration technology also disclosed. In the economic bidding process the use of the same set of data, financial metrics, and economic model by all parties facilitates comparison of bids based on a wide variety of variables, as opposed to comparison based on cost alone as in traditional bidding. Suppliers can propose bids, and retailers evaluate them, based on an economic picture that is larger than cost alone. Hence, the bidding process enabled by the present invention is termed an “economic” bidding process.
85 citations
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18 Apr 2005TL;DR: This paper presents a combinatorial bids based multi-robot task allocation method that provides an explicit cooperation mechanism to the bidding robots so that they can form a group to bid for complex tasks.
Abstract: How to coordinate several robots to cooperatively accomplish relatively complex tasks is not an easy issue. This paper presents a combinatorial bids based multi-robot task allocation method. The proposed method provides an explicit cooperation mechanism to the bidding robots so that they can form a group to bid for complex tasks. Some carefully designed simulations indicate that this method is more efficient than the typical auction based one in some situations.
85 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that in a competitive electricity pool, DSB and other forms of flexible generation can cause sharp and unwarranted price increases if the production schedule is established on the basis of a minimization of the total production cost.
Abstract: Demand-side bidding (DSB) provides a very flexible way of meeting the peak load in a production schedule. This paper demonstrates that, in a competitive electricity pool, DSB and other forms of flexible generation can cause sharp and unwarranted price increases if the production schedule is established on the basis of a minimization of the total production cost. Furthermore, the competitiveness of DSB is artificially inflated if the load recovery periods which accompany these load reductions are not taken into consideration by the scheduling program. It is argued that the actual value of DSB should be re-examined in the light of these findings.
85 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a standard divisible-good auction with either uniform or discriminatory pricing, and place it in the context of a secondary market for interbank credit.
84 citations