Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

Contractor’s Opportunistic Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Price Level in the Construction Market

Abstract: The competitive bidding system has been to blame for abnormally low bids, which are considered as one of the main causes of poor project quality. Previous studies have regarded the pricing of bidders as an optimum decision based on contractor’s cost and market competition level. However, the sell to produce characteristic of construction projects may induce contractors to offer a low bid and then make up the amount initially sacrificed from beyond-contractual reward (BCR) gained through cutting corners and claims. System dynamics was adopted in this study to develop a contractor’s pricing model with consideration of the dimensions of cost, market competition, and BCR. The model was then examined by statistical analysis of data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It was found that the equilibrium market price is significantly associated with BCR, which is assumed to be determined by the strictness of the owner’s construction management, including both soundness of contract and tightness in constr...

Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions

Abstract: Over the last few years, electronic auctions have become an increasingly important aspect of e- commerce, both in the business to business and business to consumer domains. As a result of this, it is often possible to find many auctions selling similar goods on the web. However, when an individual is attempting to purchase such a good, they will usually bid in one, or a small number, of such auctions. This results in two forms of inefficiency. Firstly, the individual may pay more for the good than would be expected in an ideal market. Secondly, some sellers may fail to make a sale that could take place in an ideal market. In this paper, we present an agent that is able to participate in multiple auctions for a given good, placing bids appropriately to secure the cheapest price. We present experiments to show; (i) Current auction markets on the web are inefficient, with trades taking place away from equilibrium price, and not all benefit from trade being extracted. (ii) Our agent is able to exploit these inefficiencies, resulting in it making higher profits than the simple strategy of bidding in a small number of auctions. (iii) As more participants use our agent, the market becomes more efficient. When all participants use the agent, all trades take place close to equilibrium price, and the market approaches ideal behaviour.

Dynamic bidding protocol for conducting multilink sessions through different physical termination points

Abstract: A stack group bidding protocol (SGBP) establishes systems as members of a stack group connected together through one or more networks. When an event, such as establishment of a point-to-point link, occurs on one of the systems, a bid request is sent to each stack group member. Each stack group member then bids for the event. The bid is based on dynamic bid weighting criteria that varies depending on the computation capacity of the member at the time the bid request is initiated. A multichassis multilink PPP (MLP) protocol utilizes the SGBP to conduct multilink PPP sessions for links that either originate or terminate on different physical systems. A L2F forwarding protocol is used in combination with multichassis MLP to forward the links from one system to another system and offers location transparency.