Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation

Abstract: We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids. We also perform a computational analysis of the auctioneer's task, exhibiting efficient algorithms for processing bids and calculating allocations.

Chapter 16 Property Value Models

Abstract: One of the only places where environmental quality is traded on explicit markets is real estate. There are several techniques that can be used to study the effects of environmental quality on property values and infer willingness to pay for improvements. The most commonly used method is the hedonic model. In environmental economics the hedonic model has mainly been applied to the prices of real property and to wages. It assumes that there is a schedule of prices for the differentiated product (i.e., houses) that can be estimated. An alternative set of models postulates that consumers' choices are discrete between houses rather than continuous in characteristics as in the hedonic model. Discrete choice models are applied to estimate consumer preferences. Recently a model has been developed that mixes discrete and continuous decisions and emphasizes the locational equilibrium. This chapter reviews these techniques, with an emphasis on methodological issues and recent developments. Section 2 describes the theoretical models that underlie these techniques. The theoretical hedonic model is developed first, and then the theoretical modifications that are necessary for the discrete choice models are described. The main models are developed for residential properties, but differentiated factors of production are discussed briefly. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical issues involved in estimating a hedonic price schedule. This is the most common type of estimation in property value models. Section 4 discusses the empirical application of the second stage of the hedonic model, the estimation of the underlying preferences. Section 5 covers the two types of discrete choice models that are used in environmental economics, random utility models and random bidding models. Section 6 briefly discusses the new locational equilibrium models, and the final section is devoted to conclusions and directions for further research.

Shareholder Benefits from Corporate International Diversification: Evidence from U.S. International Acquisitions

Abstract: Do international acquisitions—in contrast to their domestic counterparts—create value for the acquiring firms' shareholders? This study examines the valuation consequences of 276 U.S. international acquisitions made in the period 1975–1988, and provides direct evidence on the effect of international acquisitions on the market value of U.S. bidding firms. It is shown that, on average, international acquisitions create value for the acquiring firms. The study also finds that the value created is a function of the nature of the acquisition (e.g., related or unrelated); the nature of the bidding firm's industry (e.g., its concentration level and advertising intensity); the nature of the acquiring firm (e.g., its prior international experience and its current profitability); and the nature of the macroeconomic environment (e.g., tax regulations and the relative strength of the U.S. dollar).

Toeholds and Takeovers.

Abstract: Toeholds have an enormous impact in “common‐value” takeover battles, such as those between two financial bidders. This contrasts with the small impact of a toehold, in a “private‐value” auction, Our results are consistent with empirical findings that a toehold helps a buyer win an auction, sometimes very cheaply. A controlling minority shareholder may therefore be effectively immune to outside offers. A target may benefit by requiring “best and final” scaled‐bid offers or by selling a cheap toehold or options to a “white knight,” Our analysis extends to regulators selling “stranded assets,” creditors bidding in bankruptcy auctions, and so forth.