Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
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01 Apr 2007
TL;DR: This work proposes a real-time spectrum auction framework to distribute spectrum among a large number wireless users under interference constraints and concludes that bidding behaviors and pricing models have significant impact on auction outcomes.
Abstract: We propose a real-time spectrum auction framework to distribute spectrum among a large number wireless users under interference constraints. Our approach achieves conflict-free spectrum allocations that maximize auction revenue and spectrum utilization. Our design includes a compact and yet highly expressive bidding language, various pricing models to control tradeoffs between revenue and fairness, and fast auction clearing algorithms to compute revenue-maximizing prices and allocations. Both analytical and experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed approach. We conclude that bidding behaviors and pricing models have significant impact on auction outcomes. A spectrum auction system must consider local demand and spectrum availability in order to maximize revenue and utilization.
328 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making-bidding strategy and auction design-in real transactions is presented, and a general theme of enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making.
Abstract: In analyzing bidding, modeling matters. This paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making-bidding strategy and auction design-in real transactions. After an introductory overview, this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise, reviews the "mainstream" theory of single, isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory. In doing so, it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments. The paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers. A general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making.
328 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare auctions with negotiations in the context of private sector building contracts and find that auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders.
Abstract: Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of auctions.Auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex,contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders.Furthermore,auctions may still be communication between buyers and sellers,preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed.
326 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the set of incentive-compatible and individually rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently.
Abstract: Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually- rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.
323 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) approach that can be used to analyze and assess project risks during the bidding stage of a construction project and to overcome the limitations of the approaches currently used by contractors.
Abstract: Construction projects often fail to achieve their time, budget, and quality goals. This is frequently due to the failure of the contractor to analyze and assess all risk factors. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is an approach that can be used to analyze and assess project risks during the bidding stage of a construction project and to overcome the limitations of the approaches currently used by contractors. The AHP provides a flexible, easily understood way to assist the decision-maker in formulating a problem in a logical and rational manner. A review of the AHP and a description of its application in the assessment of the riskiness of constructing the Jamuna multipurpose bridge in Bangladesh are included. >
320 citations