Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction, where sellers form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer, and buyers form belief that a bid will not be accepted, and traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus.
Abstract: We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus. The trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is suffcient to achieve transaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market effciency after several periods of trading.
310 citations
Patent•
24 Feb 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, an auction service is provided that stimulates competition between energy suppliers (i.e., electric power or natural gas), where a bidding moderator receives bids from the competing suppliers of the rate each is willing to charge to particular end users for estimated quantities of electric power and gas supply (separate auctions).
Abstract: An auction service is provided that stimulates competition between energy suppliers (i.e., electric power or natural gas). A bidding moderator (1) receives bids from the competing suppliers of the rate each is willing to charge to particular end users for estimated quantities of electric power or gas supply (separate auctions). Each supplier receives competing bids from the bidding moderator (1) and has the opportunity to adjust its own bids down or up, depending on whether it wants to encourage or discourage additional energy delivery commitments in a particular geographic area or to a particular customer group. Each supplier's bids can also be changed to reflect each supplier's capacity utilization. Appropriate billing arrangements, including transmitting data from end user meters (12) over the public telephone network (13), are also disclosed.
310 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal bidding strategy of a price-taker producer is obtained by estimating the probability density functions of next-day hourly market clearing prices, which are then used to formulate a self-scheduling profit maximization problem.
Abstract: This paper provides a framework to obtain the optimal bidding strategy of a price-taker producer. An appropriate forecasting tool is used to estimate the probability density functions of next-day hourly market-clearing prices. This probabilistic information is used to formulate a self-scheduling profit maximization problem that is solved taking advantage of its particular structure. The solution of this problem allows deriving a simple yet informed bidding rule. Results from a realistic case study are discussed in detail.
309 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposes a two-stage two-level model for the energy pricing and dispatch problem faced by a smart grid retailer who plays the role of an intermediary agent between a wholesale energy market and end consumers and proposes a heuristic method to select the parameter in disjunctive constraints based on the interpretation of Lagrange multipliers.
Abstract: This paper proposes a two-stage two-level model for the energy pricing and dispatch problem faced by a smart grid retailer who plays the role of an intermediary agent between a wholesale energy market and end consumers. Demand response of consumers with respect to the retail price is characterized by a Stackelberg game in the first stage, thus the first stage has two levels. A risk-aversive energy dispatch accounting for market price uncertainty is modeled by a linear robust optimization with objective uncertainty in the second stage. The proposed model is transformed to a mixed integer linear program (MILP) by jointly using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition, the disjunctive constraints, and the duality theory. We propose a heuristic method to select the parameter in disjunctive constraints based on the interpretation of Lagrange multipliers. Moreover, we suggest solving an additional linear program (LP) to acquire a possible enhanced bidding strategy that guarantees a Pareto improvement on the retailer's profit over the entire uncertainty set. Case studies demonstrate the proposed model and method is valid.
309 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine and the value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally.
Abstract: This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
309 citations