Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes, based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions.
Abstract: We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies.
286 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors considered a sealed-bid auction with one bidder having private information and the others having access only to public information, and determined the equilibria of the bidding game and showed that at equilibrium the informed bidder's distribution of bids is the same as the distribution of the maximum of the others' bids.
285 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a parlor game where the auctioneer auctions off a dollar bill to the highest bidder, with the understanding that both highest bidder and the second highest bidder will pay.
Abstract: There is an extremely simple, highly amusing, and instructive parlor game which can be played at any party by arranging for the auction of a dollar. This game illustrates some of the difficulties with the noncooperative equilibrium concept and games in extensive form (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1945). The game is simplicity itself and is usually highly profitable to its promoter. The auctioneer auctions off a dollar bill to the highest bidder, with the understanding that both the highest bidder and the second highest bidder will pay. For example, if A has bid 10 cents and B has bid 15 cents, then the auctioneer will obtain 25 cents, pay a dollar to B, and A will be out 10 cents. Suppose that bids must be made in multiples of 5 cents. Furthermore, suppose that the game ends if no one bids for a specific length of time. Ties are resolved in favor of the bidder closest to the auctioneer. These rules completely specify the game except for a finite end rule; i.e., as specified, bidding could conceivably never cease. We could add an upper limit to the amount that anyone is permitted to bid. However, the analysis is confined to the (possibly infinite) game without a specific termination point, as no
283 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This article examined the institutional details of the school milk procurement process, bidding data, statements of dairy executives, and supply characteristics in Ohio during the 1980's and found that the behavior of each of the firms differs from that of the control group.
Abstract: We examine the institutional details of the school milk procurement process, bidding data, statements of dairy executives, and supply characteristics in Ohio during the 1980's. We compare the bidding behavior of a group of firms to a control group. We find that the behavior of each of the firms differs from that of the control group. We argue that the behavior of these firms is consistent with collusion. The estimated average effect of collusion on market prices is about six and one half percent, or roughly the cost of shipping school milk about 50 miles.
283 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996, which were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously.
Abstract: This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
282 citations