Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of merger bids on stock returns is investigated, and it is shown that increases in the probability of merger benefit the stockholders of target firms, and decreases in the likelihood of merger harm the stock shareholders of both target and bidding firms.
954 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the efficiency of different incentive schemes for the development of renewable energy sources, both from a theoretical point of view by comparing price-based approaches with quantity-based approach, and from a practical view by looking at concrete examples of how these different instruments have been implemented.
877 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a unique data set of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior, and specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay.
Abstract: Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique data set of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of eBay auctions. Next, we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner’s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices.
872 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn't understand the subtleties of competitive bidding, and they also demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed-bid auction, in which the auctioneer/seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid, and the Dutch auction, where the auctioneers/seller begin by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until
Abstract: Maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different, but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid. Our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn't understand the subtleties of competitive bidding. The phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor, known as the " Winner's Curse," is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions. Another is the theoretical proposition (supported also by some experimental evidence) that, for example, a sealed-bid Treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the Treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid. There are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed-bid auction, in which the auctioneer/seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid, and the Dutch auction, in which the auctioneer/seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until
864 citations
TL;DR: A review of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control can be found in this article, where the authors argue that corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.
Abstract: This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. With the exception of actions that exclude potential bidders, it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm shareholders. Finally, we argue the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.
851 citations