scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Topic

Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.


Papers
More filters
Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate, a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates.
Abstract: Recently, Toyota sought a plant location in the United States. The $800-million plant will employ 3000 workers, and numerous states offered Toyota generous investment incentives, hoping this would induce Toyota to select their state. The Commonwealth of Kentucky won this competition, but the price was high: the present value of the payments exceeds $125 million. The payment of investment incentives for the Toyota plant is not unique. In 1976 Pennsylvania paid $75 million to attract a Volkswagen plan,; Nissan, Honda, and Mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the United States. And this bidding is not limited to states. To attract the headquarters of the Presbyterian Church (USA), with its 1300 jobs and $38 million annual payroll, civic leaders in Louisville, Kentucky, offered the church a warehouse and $6.2 million for renovation of the structure, bidding the church away from Kansas City, Missouri.' In this paper, we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services.2 When the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate, a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates. Thus, this competition for industry is not a zero-sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm. Rather, these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry.

232 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In an attempt to uncover the underlying factors that characterize the bidding decision-making process, a questionnaire survey was conducted among general contractors as discussed by the authors, which revealed that bidding decisions are greatly influenced by subjectively evaluated criteria, such as type of job, location, size of jobs, need for work, Owner, subcontractors, degree of hazard, and degree of difficulty Competition and profitability are not the topranked factors.
Abstract: Bid decisions are heuristic in nature as they are made on the basis of experience, judgment, and perception In an attempt to uncover the underlying factors that characterize the bidding decision‐making process, a questionnaire survey was conducted among general contractors This paper contains results based on the response obtained from 400 of the top general contractors in the United States Characteristics of the group, factors affecting bid/no‐bid and percent‐markup decisions, and policies and practices of the contractors are reported The study reveals that bidding decisions are greatly influenced by subjectively evaluated criteria, such as type of job, location, size of job, need for work, Owner, subcontractors, degree of hazard, and degree of difficulty Competition and profitability, although significant, are not the topranked factors

232 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize efficient design of scoring auctions for highway construction and show that when the scoring design was used, contracts were completed 30-40% faster and the welfare gains to commuters exceeded the increase in procurement costs.
Abstract: In public procurement, social welfare often depends on how quickly the good is delivered. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion inflicts a negative externality on commuters. In response, highway departments award some contracts using scoring auctions, which give contractors explicit incentives for accelerated delivery. We characterize efficient design of these mechanisms. We then gather an extensive data set of highway projects awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008. By comparing otherwise similar contracts, we show that where the scoring design was used, contracts were completed 30--40% faster and the welfare gains to commuters exceeded the increase in procurement costs. Using a structural model that endogenizes participation and bidding, we estimate that the counterfactual welfare gain from switching all contracts from the standard design to the efficient ApB design is nearly 22% of the total contract value ($1.14 billion). Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

232 citations

Proceedings Article
04 Aug 2001
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a simple threshold scheme, which gives surplus to agents with payments further than a certain threshold value from their Vickrey payments, which is able to exploit agent uncertainty about bids from other agents to reduce manipulation and boost allocative efficiency.
Abstract: Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategy-proof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However it is well-known that it is impossible for an exchange, with multiple buyers and sellers, to be efficient and budget-balanced, even putting strategy-proofness to one side. A market-maker in an efficient exchange must make more payments than it collects. We enforce budget-balance as a hard constraint, and explore payment rules to distribute surplus after an exchange clears to minimize distance to Vickrey payments. Different rules lead to different levels of truth-revelation and efficiency. Experimental and theoretical analysis suggest a simple Threshold scheme, which gives surplus to agents with payments further than a certain threshold value from their Vickrey payments. The scheme appears able to exploit agent uncertainty about bids from other agents to reduce manipulation and boost allocative efficiency in comparison with other simple rules.

231 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
11 Aug 2013
TL;DR: An empirical analysis and measurement of a production ad exchange is provided, observing that periodic patterns occur in various statistics including impressions, clicks, bids, and conversion rates, which suggest time-dependent models would be appropriate for capturing the repeated patterns in RTB.
Abstract: The real-time bidding (RTB), aka programmatic buying, has recently become the fastest growing area in online advertising. Instead of bulking buying and inventory-centric buying, RTB mimics stock exchanges and utilises computer algorithms to automatically buy and sell ads in real-time; It uses per impression context and targets the ads to specific people based on data about them, and hence dramatically increases the effectiveness of display advertising. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis and measurement of a production ad exchange. Using the data sampled from both demand and supply side, we aim to provide first-hand insights into the emerging new impression selling infrastructure and its bidding behaviours, and help identifying research and design issues in such systems. From our study, we observed that periodic patterns occur in various statistics including impressions, clicks, bids, and conversion rates (both post-view and post-click), which suggest time-dependent models would be appropriate for capturing the repeated patterns in RTB. We also found that despite the claimed second price auction, the first price payment in fact is accounted for 55.4% of total cost due to the arrangement of the soft floor price. As such, we argue that the setting of soft floor price in the current RTB systems puts advertisers in a less favourable position. Furthermore, our analysis on the conversation rates shows that the current bidding strategy is far less optimal, indicating the significant needs for optimisation algorithms incorporating the facts such as the temporal behaviours, the frequency and recency of the ad displays, which have not been well considered in the past.

230 citations


Network Information
Related Topics (5)
Empirical research
51.3K papers, 1.9M citations
80% related
Probabilistic logic
56K papers, 1.3M citations
78% related
Sustainable development
101.4K papers, 1.5M citations
77% related
Information system
107.5K papers, 1.8M citations
77% related
Government
141K papers, 1.9M citations
76% related
Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20241
2023566
20221,134
2021637
2020708
2019830