Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

Analysis of Residential Demand Response and double-auction markets

Abstract: Demand response and dynamic pricing programs are expected to play increasing roles in the modern smart grid environment. While direct load control of end-use loads has existed for decades, price driven response programs are only beginning to be explored at the distribution level. These programs utilize a price signal as a means to control demand. Active markets allow customers to respond to fluctuations in wholesale electrical costs, but may not allow the utility to control demand. Transactive markets, utilizing distributed controllers and a centralized auction, can be used to create an interactive system which can limit demand at key times on a distribution system, decreasing congestion. With the current proliferation of computing and communication resources, the ability now exists to create transactive demand response programs at the residential level. With the combination of automated bidding and response strategies, coupled with education programs and customer response, emerging demand response programs have the ability to reduce utility demand and congestion in a more controlled manner. This paper will explore the effects of a residential double-auction market, utilizing transactive controllers, on the operation of an electric power distribution system.

Least-present-value-of-revenue auctions and highway franchising

Abstract: In this paper we show that fixed‐term contracts, which are commonly used to franchise highways, do not allocate demand risk optimally. We characterize the optimal risk‐sharing contract and show that it can be implemented with a fairly straightforward mechanism—a least‐present‐value‐of‐revenue auction. Instead of bidding on tolls (or franchise lengths), as in the case of fixed‐term franchises, in an LPVR auction the bidding variable is the present value of toll revenues. The lowest bid wins and the franchise ends when that amount has been collected. We also show that the welfare gains that can be attained by replacing fixed‐term auctions with LPVR auctions are substantial.

Optimization based bidding strategies in the deregulated market

Abstract: With the deregulation of electric power systems, market participants are facing an important task of bidding energy to an independent system operator (ISO). This paper presents a model and a method for optimization-based bidding and self-scheduling where a utility bids part of its energy and self-schedules the rest as in New England. The model considers ISO bid selections and uncertain bidding information of other market participants. With appropriately simplified bidding and ISO models, closed-form ISO solutions are first obtained. These solutions are then plugged into the utility's bidding and self-scheduling model which is solved by using Lagrangian relaxation. Testing results show that the method effectively solves the problem with reasonable amount of CPU time.

Competition, Negotiation, or Cooperation: Three Models for Service Contracting

Abstract: Contracting for public services from public or private suppliers is now a common prescription to improve government efficiency. The competitive bidding model is usually viewed as the ideal contracting process. However, this article explains that two other approaches—the negotiation model and the cooperation model—may be more appropriate under certain conditions. The primary factors that are likely to determine which of the three approaches is most suitable are (a) the characteristics of the external environment (especially the number of service suppliers), (b) the level of organizational resources (e.g., personnel, funds, time, and expertise), and (c) the degree of uncertainty about funding, future events, service technologies, and causal relationships between service outputs and desired outcomes. The main point is that there is no one best way to contract for services; rather, government units should adapt their contracting procedures to both internal external conditions to implement service contracting in an effective manner.