Topic
Bidding
About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.
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Patent•
08 Mar 2010
TL;DR: In this article, a system for receiving data associated with a mobile content is configured to calculate an expected value of the mobile content based at least in part on the data received, and determine a bid amount for a sponsorship of mobile contents based on the expected value.
Abstract: A system for receiving data associated with a mobile content is configured to calculate an expected value of the mobile content based at least in part on the data received, and determine a bid amount for a sponsorship of the mobile content based at least in part on the expected value.
167 citations
14 Apr 2013
TL;DR: This paper conducts the first work on a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly and designs a novel bidding language, wherein users' heterogeneous requirement on their desired allocation time, application type, and even how they value among different possible allocations can be flexibly and concisely expressed.
Abstract: The paradigm of cloud computing has spontaneously prompted a wide interest in market-based resource allocation mechanisms by which a cloud provider aims at efficiently allocating cloud resources among potential users. Among these mechanisms, auction-style pricing policies, as they can effectively reflect the underlying trends in demand and supply for the computing resources, have attracted a research interest recently. This paper conducts the first work on a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly. Our framework desirably supports a variety of design requirements, including (1) dynamic design for timely reflecting fluctuation of supply-demand relations, (2) joint design for supporting the heterogeneous user demands, and (3) truthful design for discouraging bidders from cheating behaviors. Concretely speaking, we first design a novel bidding language, wherein users' heterogeneous demands are generalized to regulated and consistent forms. Besides, building on top of our bidding language we propose COCA, an incentive-Compatible (truthful) Online Cloud Auction mechanism based on two proposed guidelines. Our theoretical analysis shows that the worst-case performance of COCA can be well-bounded. Further, in simulations the performance of COCA is seen to be comparable to the well-known off-line Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [11].
167 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors look at the possibility of creating a market for environmental goods and services in the countryside by awarding conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding, and show that bidding strategies are determined by the individual farmers' costs of implementing the conservation contracts and their beliefs about the maximum acceptable payment level, making the auction an imperfect cost revelation mechanism.
Abstract: The paper looks at the possibility of creating a market for environmental goods and services in the countryside by awarding conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding. Auctions have several theoretical advantages over alternative allocation mechanisms (such as standard-rate payments) because they allow the participants to deal with informational asymmetries and the uncertainty about the value of the (non-market) goods being traded. A formal model of bidding behaviour in ‘green auctions’ shows that bidding strategies are determined by the individual farmers' costs of implementing the conservation contracts and their beliefs about the maximum acceptable payment level, making the auction an imperfect cost revelation mechanism. Auctions can reduce the information rents accruing to farmers and can increase the cost-effectiveness of public goods provision. Strategic bidding behaviour in multiple-signup auctions as well as high transaction costs are potential sources of reduced efficiency.
166 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a stochastic formulation of a storage owner's arbitrage profit maximization problem under uncertainty in day-ahead and real-time market prices is proposed, which helps storage owners in market bidding and operational decisions and in estimation of the economic viability of energy storage.
Abstract: Electricity markets must match real-time supply and demand of electricity. With increasing penetration of renewable resources, it is important that this balancing is done effectively, considering the high uncertainty of wind and solar energy. Storing electrical energy can make the grid more reliable and efficient and energy storage is proposed as a complement to highly variable renewable energy sources. However, for investments in energy storage to increase, participating in the market must become economically viable for owners. This paper proposes a stochastic formulation of a storage owner's arbitrage profit maximization problem under uncertainty in day-ahead and real-time market prices. The proposed model helps storage owners in market bidding and operational decisions and in estimation of the economic viability of energy storage. Case study results on realistic market price data show that the novel stochastic bidding approach does significantly better than the deterministic benchmark.
166 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders were studied using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions and a model was proposed to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness.
Abstract: We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We propose a model, which extends the theory of private value auctions with heterogeneous bidders to capture participation decisions, that can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We then calibrate the model using parameters estimated from the data and show that the model can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
166 citations