Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.

Understanding service uncertainties in industrial product–service system cost estimation

Abstract: The global transition towards service orientation is posing challenges in cost estimation for manufacturers driven by the uncertainties that arise at the bidding stage of long-lasting performance-based contracts (i.e. availability). Service uncertainty is driven by the quality of information flow and knowledge across a given service network; however, it commonly suffers from the unavailability of useful data to assist cost predictions. Currently, consideration of cost uncertainty for an industrial product–service system is lacking in literature. To fill this gap, this paper combines literature in service and uncertainty in cost estimation to propose the components of a service delivery system, classification of sources of uncertainty based on supply and demand and the suitable uncertainty modelling methods for service cost estimation. The paper categorises service uncertainties in a demand and supply approach, whilst also allocating the types of uncertainty into aleatory and epistemic to propose suitable uncertainty modelling approaches. For future research, various areas such as consideration of a holistic approach to account for service uncertainties and development of a framework to support inter-linkages across a service network are proposed.

Emotional Bidders-An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers' Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction

Abstract: E-commerce has proved to be fertile ground for new business models, which may be patented (for up to 20 years) and have potentially far-reaching impact on the e-commerce landscape. One such electronic market is the reverse-auction model popularized by Priceline.com. There is still uncertainty surrounding the survival of such new electronic markets currently available on the Internet. Understanding user behavior is necessary for better assessment of these sites' survival. This paper adds to economic analysis a formal representation of the emotions evoked by the auction process, specifically, the excitement of winning if a bid is accepted, and the frustration of losing if it is not. We generate and empirically test a number of insights related to (1) the impact of expected excitement at winning, and frustration at losing, on bids across consumers and biddings scenarios; and (2) the dynamic nature of the bidding behavior-that is, how winning and losing in previous bids influence their future bidding behavior.

Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Abstract: Combinatorial auctions, i.e., auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners so as to maximize revenue is NP -complete. First, existing approaches for tackling this problem are reviewed: exhaustive enumeration, dynamic programming, approximation algorithms, and restricting the allowable combinations. Then, we overview our new search algorithm for optimal anytime winner determination. By capitalizing on the fact that the space of bids is necessarily sparsely populated in practice, it enlarges the envelope of input sizes for which combinatorial auctions are computationally feasible. Finally, we discuss eMediator, our electronic commerce server that implements several techniques for automatically facilitating commerce, including an auction house with generalized combinatorial auctions. To our knowledge, our implementation is the first Internet auction to support combinatorial auctions, bidding via graphically drawn price–quantity graphs, and by mobile agents.

Combinatorial Auctions in Procurement

Abstract: Making the “right” pricing decision in sales or procurement is a complex task. While the types of pricing policies/methods used in the exchange of goods and services vary greatly, we can divide these mechanisms under two broad categories: posted price mechanisms and price discovery mechanisms. Under a posted price mechanism, a good is sold at a take-it-or-leave-it price determined by the seller. A posted price can be dynamic, i.e., the seller may offer different prices to different customers (customized prices) or change prices dynamically over time (intertemporal prices). In a price discovery mechanism, prices are determined via a bidding process.

Optimal Bidding on Keyword Auctions

Abstract: Pay per click (PPC) auctions are used to sell positions in search engines. These auctions have gained increasing commercial importance, and many companies offer software to bid on these auctions. We present a trading agent for PPC auctions that is the first in our knowledge to use an explicit profit objective function. The agent creates a look-ahead plan of its desired bids, which allows it to exhibit intelligent behaviour including the ability to hold back money during expensive periods. We tested the agent in the latter part of 2003 in a live Overture auction. The agent generated four times the number of visits as human managers, in addition to reducing cost and variability.