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Bidding

About: Bidding is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 15371 publications have been published within this topic receiving 294233 citations. The topic is also known as: competitive bidding.


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Patent
09 Nov 1995
TL;DR: In this article, a system for managing steel inventories in order to reduce the time and expense associated with selling prime and secondary steel that is no longer needed for the original intended application is presented.
Abstract: A system for managing steel inventories in order to reduce the time and expense associated with selling prime and secondary steel that is no longer needed for the original intended application. The system permits sellers to post detailed specification of an item for sale and permits buyers to browse or search the posted inventory to locate items filling specific needs. A buyer may bid on part or all of an item posted and the seller may accept or reject any bid. The buyer and seller engage in an auction by electronic mail and optionally by facsimile. The detailed specifications of the item may be expressed in a variety of unit of measure. Regardless, of unit of measure used by a seller in posting an item, the system performs the necessary conversions to display information to an interested buyer in a unit of measure set by the buyer. A hierarchial menu structure permits ease of use in selecting available options during posting or bidding an item.

544 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the rationale behind interlirm tender offers by examining the returns realized by the stockholders of firms that were the targets of unsuccessful tender offers and lirms that have made unsuccessful offers and concluded that acquisitions via tender offers are attempts by bidding firms to exploit potential synergies, not simply superior information regarding the true value of the target resources.

535 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of monotonic equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions is shown to hold for all bidders in a symmetric equilibrium, in which all buyers share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations.
Abstract: There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), Holt (1980), Cox, Smith and Walker (1988). A critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers' bidding strategies are monotonic in their types. This enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes, and to compare the welfare properties of the high-bid auction with those of other auction institutions. One case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers' types are distributed smoothly, independently and symmetrically. In this case, there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first-order differential equation.

529 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A survey of recent studies of internet auctions can be found in this article, where several methods have been proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets, most notably due to the winner's curse.
Abstract: This paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping, or last-second bidding behavior, in these auctions. Second, we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets, most notably due to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions. Finally, we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

525 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking is proposed, which generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory.
Abstract: This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on “level-k” thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) “cursed equilibrium,” and evaluate the model's potential to explain nonequilibrium bidding in auction experiments. The level-k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common-value auctions and overbidding in those independent-private-value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.

523 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20241
2023566
20221,134
2021637
2020708
2019830