Challenge–response authentication

About: Challenge–response authentication is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4541 publications have been published within this topic receiving 95216 citations. The topic is also known as: challenge response authentication & Lamport's scheme.

Password authentication with insecure communication

Abstract: A method of user password authentication is described which is secure even if an intruder can read the system's data, and can tamper with or eavesdrop on the communication between the user and the system. The method assumes a secure one-way encryption function and can be implemented with a microcomputer in the user's terminal.

Entity authentication and key distribution

Abstract: We provide the first formal treatment of entity authentication and authenticated key distribution appropriate to the distributed environment. Addressed in detail are the problems of mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange for the symmetric, two-party setting. For each we present a definition, protocol, and proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming only the existence of a pseudorandom function.

Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems

Abstract: Because biometrics-based authentication offers several advantages over other authentication methods, there has been a significant surge in the use of biometrics for user authentication in recent years. It is important that such biometrics-based authentication systems be designed to withstand attacks when employed in security-critical applications, especially in unattended remote applications such as e-commerce. In this paper we outline the inherent strengths of biometrics-based authentication, identify the weak links in systems employing biometrics-based authentication, and present new solutions for eliminating some of these weak links. Although, for illustration purposes, fingerprint authentication is used throughout, our analysis extends to other biometrics-based methods.

A logic of authentication

Abstract: Authentication protocols are the basis of security in many distributed systems, and it is therefore essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly. Unfortunately, their design has been extremely error prone. Most of the protocols found in the literature contain redundancies or security flaws.A simple logic has allowed us to describe the beliefs of trustworthy parties involved in authentication protocols and the evolution of these beliefs as a consequence of communication. We have been able to explain a variety of authentication protocols formally, to discover subtleties and errors in them, and to suggest improvements. In this paper, we present the logic and then give the results of our analysis of four published protocols, chosen either because of their practical importance or because they serve to illustrate our method.

Kerberos: an authentication service for computer networks

Abstract: When using authentication based on cryptography, an attacker listening to the network gains no information that would enable it to falsely claim another's identity. Kerberos is the most commonly used example of this type of authentication technology. The authors concentrate on authentication for real-time, interactive services that are offered on computer networks. They use the term real-time loosely to mean that a client process is waiting for a response to a query or command so that it can display the results to the user, or otherwise continue performing its intended function. This class of services includes remote login, file system reads and writes, and information retrieval for applications like Mosaic. >