Showing papers on "Collision attack published in 1993"
19 Jul 1993
TL;DR: The security of group-theoretic hash functions for cryptographic purposes is discussed, and it is shown why the first such proposal given in [Zem91] is not secure, by giving a probabilistic algorithm for finding collisions.
Abstract: We discuss the security of group-theoretic hash functions for cryptographic purposes. Those functions display several attractive features: they can be computed quickly, and it can be shown that local modifications of the plaintext necessarily change the hashed values. We show why the first such proposal given in [Zem91] is not secure, by giving a probabilistic algorithm for finding collisions. However, our attack is based on the special form of the matrices which were originally chosen. We propose alternative schemes which seem to be immune to such attacks.
51 citations
01 Dec 1993
TL;DR: A differential attack on several hash functions based on a block cipher with the emphasis on the results for cases where DES [8] is the underlying block cipher.
Abstract: This paper describes a differential attack on several hash functions based on a block cipher. The emphasis will be on the results for cases where DES [8] is the underlying block cipher. It will briefly discuss the case of FEAL-N [19, 21].
24 citations
09 Dec 1993
TL;DR: A general free-start attack, in which the attacker is free to choose the initial value, and a real attack on a large class of hash functions, both of which are presented.
Abstract: Attacks on double block length hash functions using a block cipher are considered in this paper. We present a general free-start attack, in which the attacker is free to choose the initial value, and a real attack on a large class of hash functions. Recent results on the complexities of attacks on double block hash functions are summarized.
6 citations
TL;DR: A simple construction for a CIHF that is based on the hardness of factoring large composite numbers is presented, which can be expected to provide a theoretical breakthrough to the construction for an CIHF under a general assumption.
Abstract: To design a reliable system, it is very important to protect data stored or transmitted from intentional forgery in communications network. As a practical means of protecting data or software, it is pointed out by Naor and Yung that a family of one-way hash functions is useful and can be classified into a universal one-way hash function family (UOHF) and a collision intractable one-way hash function family (CIHF). The construction for a UOHF is possible under a weak assumption, i.e., one-way functions exist. However, the construction for a CIHF is not known to be possible under such a weak assumption.
This paper presents a simple construction for a CIHF that is based on the hardness of factoring large composite numbers. The idea on the construction here is completely different from those reported so far and can be expected to provide a theoretical breakthrough to the construction for a CIHF under a general assumption.