Collision attack

About: Collision attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1093 publications have been published within this topic receiving 28389 citations.

Analysis of the Collision Resistance of RadioGatúnUsing Algebraic Techniques

Abstract: In this paper, we present some preliminary results on the security of the RadioGatunhash function. RadioGatunhas an internal state of 58 words, and is parameterized by the word size, from one to 64 bits. We mostly study the one-bit version of RadioGatunsince according to the authors, attacks on this version also affect the reasonably-sized versions. On this toy version, we revisit the claims of the designers and first improve some results. Secondly, given a differential path, we show how to find a message pair colliding more efficiently than the strategy proposed by the authors using algebraic techniques. We experimented this strategy on the one-bit version since we can efficiently find differential path by brute force. Even though the complexity of this collision attack is higher than the general security claim on RadioGatun?1 ?, it is still less than the birthday paradox on the size of the internal state.

Fast Password Recovery Attack: Application to APOP.

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a fast password recovery attack to APOP application in local which can recover a password with 11 characters in less than one minute, recover a password with 31 characters extremely fast, about 4 minutes, and for 43 characters in practical time. These attacks truly simulate the practical password recovery attacks launched by malware in real life, and further confirm that the security of APOP is totally broken. To achieve these dramatical improvements, we propose a group satisfaction scheme, apply the divide-and-conquer strategy and a new suitable MD5 collision attack to greatly reduce the computational complexity in collision searching with high number of chosen bits. The average time of generating an “IV Bridge” is optimized to 0.17 second on ordinary PC, the average time of generating collision pairs for recovering passwords up to 11 characters is about 0.08 second, for 31 characters is about 0.15 second, for 39 characters is about 4.13 seconds, for 43 characters is about 20 seconds, and collisions for recovering passwords as long as 67 characters can be theoretically generated. These techniques can be further applied to reduce the complexity of producing a 1-bit-free collisions for recovering the first 11 characters, whose main target is that to reduce the number of challenges generated in APOP attack, to about 2 MD5 compressions.

Preimage attacks on reduced steps of ARIRANG and PKC98-hash

Abstract: In this paper, we present the preimage attacks on step-reduced ARIRANG and PKC98-Hash. Our attacks find the preimages of 35 steps out of 40 steps of ARIRANG and 80 steps out of 96 steps of PKC98-Hash, faster than the brute force attack. We applied recently developed techniques of preimage attack. Our attack for ARIRANG is the improvement of the previous attack, and our attack for PKC98-hash is the first analysis result of its preimage resistance.

Collision Attack on 5 Rounds of Grøstl.

Abstract: In this article, we describe a novel collision attack for up to 5 rounds of the Grstl hash function. This signicantly improves upon the best previously published results on 3 rounds. By using a new type of dierential trail spanning over more than one message block we are able to construct collisions for Grstl -256 on 4 and 5 rounds with complexity of 2 67 and 2 120 , respectively. Both attacks need 2 64 memory. Due to the generic nature of our attack we can even construct meaningful collisions in the chosen-prex setting with the same attack complexity.