Topic
Collision attack
About: Collision attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1093 publications have been published within this topic receiving 28389 citations.
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03 Oct 2022TL;DR: In this paper , the authors present the attack, along with background mathematics, an example, and the experimental results reached by a team led by Carlson, with the suggestion that the side channel attack renders modes futile.
Abstract: Presently the cipher system that is considered to be the industry gold standard is the Advanced Encryption Standard paired with the Cipher Block Chaining cryptographic mode (AES with CBC). The key space and randomization create such a large problem that even a Brute Force attack is thought to be mathematically infeasible. However, separate research by McGrew and Carlson has resulted in an attack known as either the Improbability or Collision attack that shows that the system can be broken with a reasonable amount of input data. In this paper, we present the attack, along with background mathematics, an example, and the experimental results reached by a team led by Carlson. Extensions to other modes are also presented, with the suggestion that the side channel attack renders modes futile. In fact, applying modes reveals so much information that employing them may even compromise the security of the transmitted message.
1 citations
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11 Feb 2016
TL;DR: It is shown that distinguisher on CBC-MAC can be applied to Encrypted Message Authentication Code (EMAC) scheme and second-preimage attack is successfully performed on truncated AES-EMAC.
Abstract: In this paper we show that distinguisher on CBC-MAC can be applied to Encrypted Message Authentication Code (EMAC) scheme. EMAC scheme in general is vulnerable to distinguishing attack and second preimage attack. Distinguishing attack simulation on AES-EMAC using 225 message modifications, no collision have been found. According to second preimage attack simulation on AES-EMAC no collision found between EMAC value of S1 and S2, i.e. no second preimage found for messages that have been tested. Based on distinguishing attack simulation on truncated AES-EMAC we found collision in every message therefore we cannot distinguish truncated AES-EMAC with random function. Second-preimage attack is successfully performed on truncated AES-EMAC.
1 citations
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TL;DR: Here a hash function is constructed by using the idea of cayley graph, hash function based on computing a suitable matrix product in groups of the form SL2(F2 n ).
Abstract: We constructed a hash function by using the idea of cayley graph, hash function based on computing a suitable matrix product in groups of the form SL2(F2 n ). We found collision between palindrome bit strings of length 2n+2 for the new construction. Here we reinforce the hash function by adding key to it and we claim that it will resists palindrome collision. Keywords - Cayley graph, Group, Hash function, Irreducible polynomial, Message Authentication Code, palindrome collision.
1 citations
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TL;DR: This paper contains techniques for enhancing the strength of any cryptographic hash function, and constructions are presented where collisions are harder to find.
Abstract: This paper contains techniques for enhancing the strength of any cryptographic hash function. For an ”ideal”, traditional hash function with an m-bit result, the complexity of a collision attack is approximately 2^m/2. Here constructions are presented where collisions are harder to find.
1 citations
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15 Dec 2015TL;DR: A side channel attack that uses processor flag information to speed up message recovery by a factor of 2.6 is presented.
Abstract: Streebog is the cryptographic hash function standard of the Russian Federation. It comprises two hash functions corresponding to two digest sizes, 256 bits and 512 bits. This paper presents a side channel attack that uses processor flag information to speed up message recovery by a factor of 2. Success is nearly guaranteed if the flag is set; the probability is 0.668 otherwise.
1 citations