Showing papers on "Concept of operations published in 2000"

A system, method and article of manufacture for managing an environment of a development architecture framework

Abstract: A system, method and article of manufacture are provided for managing an environment in a development architecture framework. Service of a system is managed based on service level agreements and/or operations level agreements. A plurality of system management operations are performed. The system management operations include start-up and shut-down operations, back-up and restore operations, archiving operations, security operations, and performance monitoring operations. Service is planned in order to anticipate and implement changes in the system.

Two Hats for the Joint Force Commander

Abstract: : Although the Persian Gulf War was waged a decade ago, it should continue to be studied. Joint doctrine has not resolved many contentious issues raised during that conflict. Among them is whether a joint force commander (JFC) should be dual hatted as a service or functional component commander. The following article assesses doctrine for organizing both joint force and component commands. It then considers organization for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Finally, it examines the ground operations planned and executed in 1990 and 1991. The campaign presented the Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT), with challenges that could have been avoided with a more dynamic theater command and control structure and prescriptive doctrinal guidance. Subordinate forces can be organized in many ways. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), declares that "a JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations." JFCs can establish functional component commands and designate commanders. The primary factors in selecting a functional component commander are the nature of operations, service force mix, and service command and control capabilities. Usually the service with the preponderance of forces provides the functional component commander. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, further defines conditions under which JFCs establish a functional component as when "the scope of operations requires that similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations."

Don't Go Downtown without Us: The Role of Aerospace Power in Joint Urban Operations

Abstract: : For many people, the term urban operations brings to mind the specters of Mogadishu, Hue City, and Stalingrad, where vicious, house-to-house infantry fighting was the order of the day. However, it is a mistake to view all urban operations through this bloody lens. Such operations fall all along the spectrum of military operations -- from humanitarian relief to peace support to major theater war. Aerospace power can play a major role in helping the joint force achieve its objectives with less risk in many scenarios across this operational continuum. From a historical perspective, urban operations are not a new phenomenon for the Air Force or our sister services. Joint aerospace power in various forms has contributed significantly to successfully executed urban operations in many recent conflicts and contingencies. Most urban operations will include five components. Arguably the most important component of our concept of operations, battle-space analysis encompasses preparing intelligence concerning the battle space and maintaining operational-level situational awareness during all phases of the campaign. The second component in a joint urban operation, isolation involves physically and psychologically separating an adversary from his urban support base, limiting his mobility and communication, and negating his ability to acquire useful intelligence on friendly operations. The decisive-engagement component involves gaining the initiative by applying friendly strengths against the key nodes, systems, and choke points identified during the JFC's battle-space analysis. The third component is sustainment. Prerequisites for its success are continuous, real-time analysis of the battle space; operational effects achieved against key nodes and systems; and adversary responses. The final component of our operational concept refers to a variety of long-term, peace-shaping operations that ultimately mark the termination of urban violence or armed conflict.

Situation Assessor Support System: A Knowledge-Based Systems Approach to Pilot Aiding

Abstract: The Situation Assessment Support System (SASS) seeks to demonstrate s knowledge-based subsystem that will provide a dynamic assessment of the operational context and generate recommendations to support COGPIT tactical decision-making. Extensive knowledge acquisition and validation has been undertaken with appropriate experts over four vignettes, leading to the production of the knowledge base document. This encapsulated all relevant expertise, for integration and aiding pilot tactical decision making in the proposed COGPIT simulation test environment. Prioritised areas of support agreed with MOD, focus on plan assessment, system-health checks, DAS, rerouting and target attack vignettes. A series of knowledge acquisition sessions were conducted to build the knowledge base with the involvement of RAF and RN aircrew. The individual task decompositions and detailed knowledge captured during this phase provides the basis for future architectural and software-design processes. By exploiting software and toolkits developed under MOD CRP funding, the work seeks to define, design and construct a decision support sub-system prototype to operate in scenarios associated with FOAS and FCBA, using Real Time Multi Agent Software. This paper will describe the concept of operation and technical development of SASS.

Representing the Cognitive Demands of New Systems: A Decision-Centered Design Approach

Abstract: : This report was developed under SBIR Contract for Topic No. AF99-089. As information technologies are becoming more central to weapons systems, the burden is shifting from conventional human factors requirements to the cognitive requirements. This report describes results of a Phase 1 SBIR to explore the feasibility of a tool to help Program Managers address the decision-making aspects of teams early in the design cycle. One outcome is the demonstration of a clear need for such a tool. Interviews with prospective users indicated that input about crew decision making would be valuable in developing the concept of operations and driving development of the system; including training, design, function allocation, and staffing. The feasibility of collecting this information has been demonstrated in the Airborne Laser domain. Information about cognitive requirements was collected via observations and Cognitive Task Analysis interviews. A scenario illustrates events and decisions of a potential Airborne Laser mission. This type of scenario is the basis for a tool to conceptualize the dynamics and tradeoffs that involve cognitive tasks. The prototype tool that would be developed in a follow-on effort is called CRITERIA (Cognitive Requirements for Individuals and Teams: Evaluations, Recommendations, Inspection, and Analysis). The intent of CRITERIA is to define and represent the cognitive criteria for tasks in complex systems.

Is There a Military Utility to Information Operations

Abstract: (2000). Is There a Military Utility to Information Operations? Defense Analysis: Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 277-297.

NASA Earth Observing System Mission Operations Center development using COTS products

Abstract: The original NASA EOS Terra Spacecraft ground command and control system development started as a custom product but was failing to meet the requirements. Less than six months before launch a replacement system was developed. The new development tested COTS products offering the best potential for a low cost, successful delivery. Some difficulties encountered with using the COTS product were that operations concepts varied considerably from the EOS missions. In this case the EOS Flight Operations Team was well established and had settled on a concept of operations. No single standard exists for space-to-ground communications and the ground interfaces were unique to NASA so new interfaces had to be developed. Another consideration was the mission life cycle of 10-to-12 years COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) product life cycles tend to be much shorter. Our approach involved the operations team and selected COTS products that closely matched the original operations concepts. Requirements were scrubbed to identify those critical to launch and which could be deleted or modified. Multiple builds were made to support mission rehearsal requirements and incorporate critical requirements early to allow the greatest amount of test time. The first build was delivered and installed less than 45 days after the initial contract and the first mission rehearsal was more successful than any previous EOS rehearsal on the original system. A subsequent build 90 days later supported all launch critical requirements and the system was declared launch-ready on time to support the planned launch. COTS products can be used to accelerate development schedules, but tailoring of the product is often unavoidable. If extensive tailoring is required, consideration should be given to a custom development. Upgrades to the COTS products can introduce new problems and must be carefully managed.

The Friction of Joint Information Operations

Abstract: : Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations was published in 1998 to provide clarity and guidance for conducting joint information operations. This paper seeks to answer if the doctrine proved sufficient at the Joint Task Force Level. Outlining information's role throughout the levels of war and the requirement for information at the JTF level, this paper uses the hierarchy established by previous keystone joint publications to determine if the joint information operations doctrine expanded on the established framework. During this process, the friction caused by the focus of Joint Publication 3-13 is contrasted against the hierarchical joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13 created a great deal of friction. The publication did not sufficiently clarify the role or the value of information across the spectrum of conflict. It did not link the national instrument of power called information to military information operations to provide unity of effort. There was no discussion expanding the fundamentals of operational art from the joint information operations perspective. Technically oriented, Joint Publication 3-13 did not provide guidance for JTF Commanders to include information operations in their intent statements, concept of operations, or commander's critical information requirements. These omissions contribute to the friction of integrating information operations into JTFs.

Potential Global Partners for Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Abstract: : This document is intended as an analytical resource to assist staffs at both DoD headquarters and operational commands to understand and take into account the capabilities that global partners can contribute to contingency operations. This information should enable DoD senior leaders and staff to assess better the planning and programmatic impacts of future SSC operations. The research focused on the organizations and resources outside of the DoD that are likely to be employed in SSC operations. The document is a compilation of the extensive research of historical and ongoing operations and the mandates and capabilities of the organizations that have participated in these operations, including many in which the U.S. military was not involved. The discussions attempt to provide greater understanding by grouping the disparate entities that share common characteristics and describing their capabilities and limitations. The community is dynamic and this document provides a "snapshot" in time, but sources are listed to enable readers to locate more current information as required.

Tactical Payloads for UAVs

Abstract: : The Tactical Systems Program Office of tile Program Executive Officer Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles PEO(CU) is developing and refining Payload Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) based on demonstrated capabilities new technology and emerging operator needs. The Tactical Systems Program Office continues to expand technical and operational capabilities for increased Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) applications. To support future military operations the Tactical Systems Program Office foresees UAVs as a complement to manned and space based systems. Traditionally UAV Payload operations focused on the Electrooptical/InfraRed (EO/lR) reconnaissance role. While still the highest priority requirement new technologies have expanded potential payload applications. Aware of the importance of newly maturing technologies, the Tactical Systems Program Office continuously monitors technologies sponsored by the Government and industry to determine their direct application to UAV airborne platforms and ground stations. The following discussion addresses the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle functional priorities.

Intranet-based management of satellite control center operations

Abstract: Operational management of a multi-vendor fleet of satellites requires the ability for satellite controllers and subsystem engineers to be thoroughly trained in each unique spacecraft as well as having the ability to quickly access accurate operational procedures and technical data. This challenge is especially critical within the Satellite Control Center at INTELSAT. INTELSAT owns and operates a global communications satellite system providing capacity for voice, video, corporate/private networks and Internet services to more than 200 countries and territories. INTELSAT owns 17 geosynchronous satellites, and currently operates another six for other companies. The INTELSAT Satellite Control Center (SCC) operates satellites made by five different manufacturers, creating a unique environment in the management of day-to-day and launch operations. The Satellite Control Center Training and Intranet Services group is responsible for information management and operational system solutions to support the specific needs of both operations and engineering personnel. Utilizing state-of-the-art Instructional Systems Design models and taking advantage of the significant improvements in Internet browser capabilities, HTML, Java Script, C++, and other web-development tools, we provide services, tools, and configurable software to simplify the management of satellite operations. Consistent with the INTELSAT Concept of Operations, the Training and Intranet Services department has provided Intranet access over the past five years to support the following key operational areas: Control Segment Operations, Space Segment Operations, and Launch Operations.

By Land or By Sea: An Analysis of National Missile Defense Options

Abstract: : In conformance with the National Missile Defense (NMD) Act of 1999, the United States is pursuing the path to fielding a system capable of providing protection for all of the United States against a limited ballistic missile attack. The proposed land-based system is scheduled for a Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) in June 2000. As currently envisioned, the land-based system will rely on silo-based interceptors (most likely in Alaska) receiving guidance from a network of land-based radars, and eventually space-based sensors, to destroy incoming missiles. There are alternatives to the land-based system, the most prominent being a sea-based system building upon the Aegis Weapons System. With advocates both in and outside the Navy, the sea-based approach for many years has also been championed by The Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington, DC-based think tank with influence on Capitol Hill and beyond. This paper examines the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the current NMD plan and the proposed sea-based NMD system to determine their relative capability, deployability, and overall viability. The paper opens with a brief history of NMD, followed by a definition of the threat, and a summary of the current status of U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts. Recommendations of The Heritage Foundation are then analyzed in some depth, followed by a comparison of the two systems in the following categories: sensor performance, boosters and kill vehicles, projected timelines and costs, testing, technical hurdles, programmatic risk factors, capabilities against the threat, probability of kill, effectiveness against countermeasures, areas the systems can defend, operational security, and challenges relating to both Command and Control and Concept of Operations. Although not each of the above categories should be weighted equally nor is the decision decisive in all cases, the land-based system was evaluated as superior in 11 of the 14 areas.

Joint Strike Fighter Virtual Air-to-Air Combat Analysis For the Joint Operational Requirements Document

Abstract: The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program conducted two virtual air-to-air combat effectiveness Aircrew System Advisory Panels (ASAPs) at WPAFB in support of the Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD). In December 1998 the program sponsored a collateralSECRET level simulation to evaluate possible avionics configurations. Trade studies were conducted on proposed radar, infrared, and other weapons system attributes to determine their impact on JSF combat effectiveness in the Defensive Counter Air mission. Pilots from the JSF Operational Advisory Group (OAG), tasked to write the JORD, participated in the event. In September of 1999, Simulation and Analysis Facility (SIMAF) conducted an additional virtual event to further explore the concepts and tactics of the Close Escort and the Self Escort mission scenarios. The focus of the event was to allow the foreign partners of the JSF program to evaluate the performance of the JSF with their legacy aircraft, the F-16. Concept trade studies included various levels of threat and threat capabilities, and for the first time the addition of a surface-to-air threat. The simulations featured medium to high fidelity modeling of radar, infrared, data fusion, and weapon system effects. Pilots flew both JSF and threat aircraft to explore tactics and CONOPS. Analysts collected data to evaluate weapons system performance and gather tactical concepts to guide in the future employment of the weapon system. This multimedia presentation will feature the important UNCLASSIFIED findings of the analytic results. The results have particularly significant implications to the modeling and performance of sensor fusion systems. Finally, the presentation will comment on the role of air-to-air operator-in-the-loop modeling in simulationbased acquisition.

Warfighter Needs in the 21st Century: Linking Fleet Operations to Required Capabilities

Abstract: What the warfighter needs is not what he is getting in terms of responsiveness to the emerging threat, interoperability among systems, and systems readiness and training. This disconnect between Fleet operations and the acquisition requirements process is becoming more pronounced as systems grow larger and more complex and as warfighting becomes more joint Knowing what the warfighter wants and how he envisions using it in a concept of operations is fundamental to the requirements process. The source of this information is the commander in chief's (CINC's) operations plan (OPLAN), which contains the concept of operations (CONOPS) for each warfighting theater. It is critical that the CONOPS be used as the basis for determining performance requirements, because it contains the military judgment, context, and authority of the theater CINC. The defunct Arsenal Ship program, which was rightly vetoed by the theater CINCs because it would not meet their warfighting needs at acceptable risk, is a recent example of the mismatch between what is being asked for and what is being provided.