About: Conditionality is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 3635 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 80869 citation(s).
Papers published on a yearly basis
Abstract: Payments for environmental services (PES) are an innovative approach to conservation that has been applied increasingly often in both developed and developing countries. To date, however, few efforts have been made to systematically compare PES experiences. Drawing on the wealth of case studies in this Special Issue, we synthesize the information presented, according to case characteristics with respect to design, costs, environmental effectiveness, and other outcomes. PES programs often differ substantially one from the other. Some of the differences reflect adaptation of the basic concept to very different ecological, socioeconomic, or institutional conditions; others reflect poor design, due either to mistakes or to the need to accommodate political pressures. We find significant differences between user-financed PES programs, in which funding comes from the users of the ES being provided, and government-financed programs, in which funding comes from a third party. The user-financed programs in our sample were better targeted, more closely tailored to local conditions and needs, had better monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality, and had far fewer confounding side objectives than government-financed programs. We finish by outlining some perspectives on how both user- and government-financed PES programs could be made more effective and cost-efficient.
01 Jan 1983
Abstract: strengthened, IMF conditionality reformed, and World Bank, IDA and other official development assistance expanded. These are all well-known remedies, but it is important that they have been endorsed by a representative North-South group. The group also favours the establishment of a multilateral forum to discuss trade, money, finance and macroeconomic policies, and the inter-relationships between them. 'The IMF, World Bank, GATT and UNCTAD should jointly service a body functioning somewhat like the IMF's advisory Interim Committee, eventually evolving into the analogue of the decision-making Council authorised in the IMF's Second Amendment' (paragraph 7.36). This, says the report with somewhat less realism than usual, 'must not be or be seen to be an extension of the jurisdiction of the IMF into trade policy issues' (ibid). The report leaves it to be understood that the Bretton Woods system of weighted voting would apply, and it is this that would determine the character of the new mechanism, regardless of whether or not IMF jurisdiction were expanded. While there is a case for saying that any international institution possessing such extensive powers would have to be subject to weighted voting, the Bretton Woods weighting is so one-sided as to limit the incentive for the major powers to take the views of the Third World fully into account. Thus, a concentration of authority of the magnitude envisaged in the report could conceivably represent a step backwards for world trade and development. On the other hand, the group is to be commended for raising this problem, and there is probably no solution to it that would satisfy everybody.
Abstract: In the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of conditionality: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality.
01 Jan 2007
Abstract: 1. A Good Thing? PART I: THE COMPLEX WORLDS OF FOREIGN AID 2. The Origins and Early Decades of Aid-Giving 3. Aid-giving from the 1970s to the Present 4. The Growing Web of Bilateral Aid Donors 5. The Complexities of Multilateral Aid PART II: WHY IS AID GIVEN? 6. The Political and Commercial Dimensions of Aid 7. Public Support for Aid 8. Charity or Duty? The Moral Case for Aid 9. The Moral Case for Governments and Individuals to Provide Aid PART III: DOES AID REALLY WORK? 10. Assessing and Measuring the Impact of Aid 11. The Impact of Official Development Aid Projects 12. The Impact of Programme Aid, Technical Assistance and Aid for Capacity Development 13. The Impact of Aid at the Country and Cross-Country Level 14. Assesing the Impact of Aid Conditionality 15. Does Official Development Aid Really Work? A Summing Up 16. NGOs in Development and the Impact of Discrete NGO Development Interventions 17. The Wider Impact of Non-governmental and Civil Society Organizations 18. The Growth of Emergencies and the Humanitarian Response 19. The Impact of Emergency and Humanitarian Aid PART IV: TOWARDS A DIFFERENT FUTURE FOR AID 20. Why Aid Isn't Working 21. Making Aid Work Better by Implementing Agreed Reforms 22. Making Aid Work Better by Recasting Aid Relationships
01 Jan 2006
Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney 3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes 4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner 5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin 6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby 8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson 9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson 10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould 11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter Part IV. Directions for Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.