Constitution

About: Constitution is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 37828 publications have been published within this topic receiving 435603 citations.

We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution

Abstract: Charles A. Bear's An Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution was a work of such powerful persuasiveness as to alter the course of American historiography. No historian who followed in studying the making of the Constitution was entirely free from Beard's radical interpretation of the document as serving the economic interests of the Framers as members of the propertied class. Forrest McDonald's We the People was the first major challenge to Beard's thesis. This superbly researched and documented volume restored the Constitution as the work of principled and prudential men. It did much to invalidate the crude economic determinism that had become endemic in the writing of American history. We the People fills in the details that Beard had overlooked in his fragmentary book. MacDonald's work is based on an exhaustive comparative examination of the economic biographies of the 55 members of the Constitutional Convention and the 1,750 members of the state ratifying conventions. His conclusion is that on the basis of evidence, Beard's economic interpretation does not hold. McDonald demonstrates conclusively that the interplay of conditioning or determining factors at work in the making of the Constitution was extremely complex and cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of any single system of interpretation. McDonald's classic work, while never denying economic motivation as a factor, also demonstrates how the rich cultural and political mosaic of the colonies was an independent and dominant factor in the decision making that led to the first new nation. In its pluralistic approach to economic factors and analytic richness, We the People is both a major work of American history and a significant document in the history of ideas. It continues to be an essential volume for historians, political scientists, economists, and American studies specialists.

The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment

Abstract: Leonard Levy's classic work examines the circumstances that led to the writing of the establishment clause of the First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...' He argues that, contrary to popular belief, the framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit government aid to religion even on an impartial basis. He thus refutes the view of 'nonpreferentialists,' who interpret the clause as allowing such aid provided that the assistance is not restricted to a preferred church. For this new edition, Levy has added to his original arguments and incorporated much new material, including an analysis of Jefferson's ideas on the relationship between church and state and a discussion of the establishment clause cases brought before the Supreme Court since the book was originally published in 1986.

Constitutionalism and Secession

Abstract: The Soviet Constitution guarantees a right to secede.' The American Constitution does not. Although some secessionists in the American South, invoking state sovereignty, claimed to find an implicit right to secede in the founding document, it was more common to invoke an extratextual and nonjusticiable "right to secede" said to be enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.2 In any case, no serious scholar or politician now argues that a right to secede exists under American constitutional law.3 It is generally agreed that such a right would undermine the Madisonian spirit of the original document, one that encourages the development of constitutional provisions that prevent the defeat of the basic enterprise.4 Eastern European countries are now deciding about the contents of proposed constitutions. They are often doing so in the context of profound cultural and ethnic divisions, both often defined at least roughly in territorial terms. These divisions have propelled

We, the Court : the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution : a critical reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty

Abstract: Part 1: the creation the constitutionalisation of community law - the legitimacy of the European Court of Justice and Community Law the European Court among reasons, rules and institutions framing the constitution 1 - legal reasoning framing the constitution 2 - litigation framing the constitution 3 - legal discourse and legal pluralism Part 2: the classical readings of Article 30 and the European economic constitution the classical readings of Article 30 - discrimination versus balancing the underlying conflict - economic liberalism versus anti-protectionism Part 3: the judicial model of the European economic constitution and Article 30 - majoritarian activism the expansion of Article 30 and the limits to state regulation of the market the European Court of Justice - majoritarian activism after Keck market maintenance and market building the European Court's market building and market maintenance - different approaches to the European economic constitution Part 4: the alternative models of the European economic constitution the debate on Article 30 and European regulation - institutional choices, constitutional models and the legitimacy of European law the centralised model of the European economic constitution (harmonisation) the competitive model of the European economic constitution (competition among rules) the decentralised model of the European economic constitution (state regulation under non-discrimination) Part 5: Article 30 and the European economic constitution - reforming the market or the state? constitutional models, goals and institutions economic due process versus anti-protectionism the open character of the European economic constitution the European economic constitution and anti-protectionism beyond anti-protectionism - the political aspects of European integration and the constitutionalisation of European Community law a constitutional law approach to Article 30 constitutional models and the legitimacy of European law

Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism

Abstract: While anti-liberal legal theorist Carl Schmitt has long been considered by Europeans to be one of this century's most significant political philosophers, recent challenges to the fundamental values of liberal democracies have made Schmitt's writings an unavoidable subject of debate in North America as well. In an effort to advance our understanding not only of Schmitt but of current problems of liberal democracy, David Dyzenhaus presents translations of classic German essays on Schmitt alongside more recent writings by distinguished political theorists and jurists. Neither a defence of nor an attack on Schmitt, "Law as Politics" offers the first balanced response to his powerful critique of liberalism.One of the major players in the 1920s debates, an outspoken critic of the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar Constitution, and a member of the Nazi party who provided juridical respectability to Hitler's policies, Schmitt contended that people are a polity only to the extent that they share common enemies. He saw the liberal notion of a peaceful world of universal citizens as a sheer impossibility and attributed the problems of Weimar to liberalism and its inability to cope with pluralism and political conflict. In the decade since his death, Schmitt's writings have been taken up by both the right and the left and scholars differ greatly in their evaluation of Schmitt's ideas."Law as Politics" thematically organizes in one volume the varying engagements and confrontations with Schmitt's work and allows scholars to acknowledge-and therefore be in a better position to negotiate-an important paradox inscribed in the very nature of liberal democracy. "Law as Politics" will interest political philosophers, legal theorists, historians, and anyone interested in Schmitt's relevance to current discussions of liberalism. The contributors are: Heiner Bielefeldt, Ronald Beiner, Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde, Renato Cristi, David Dyzenhaus, Robert Howse, Ellen Kennedy, Dominique Leydet, Ingeborg Maus, John P. McCormick, Reinhard Mehring, Chantal Mouffe, William E. Scheuerman, and Jeffrey Seitzer.