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Constitution

About: Constitution is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 37828 publications have been published within this topic receiving 435603 citations.


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Book
05 Dec 1985
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relationship between the rule of law and its underlying values in the United Kingdom and its relationship with the devolution of the UK to Scotland and its effect on the UK's legal system.
Abstract: PART 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1. The rule of law and its underlying values 2. The sovreignty of parliament - form or substance? 3. Human rights and the British constitution 4. Britain in the European Union 5. The internationalization of public law and its impact on the United Kingdom 6. Models of democracy: from representation to participation? PART II THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 7. The 'modernization' of the United Kingdom parliament? 8. The executive: towards accountable government and effective governance? 9. Scottish devolution: developing practice in multi-layer governance 10. Northern Ireland and British constitution since the Belfast Agreement 11. Devolution and the changing constitution: evolution in Wales and the unanswered English question 12. The new local government PART III THE REGULATION OF POWER 13. Courts, tribunals, ombudsmen, ADR: administrative justice, constitutionalism and informality 14. Regulations, markets and legitimacy 15. The control of public expenditure 16. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 - a sheep in wolf's clothing? 17. Standards of conduct in public life

95 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: The United States Constitution, as signed by the Convention on 17 September 1787, and transmitted by Congress to the States, contained many of the republican elements already embraced by earlier American frames of government.
Abstract: The United States Constitution, as signed by the Convention on 17 September 1787, and transmitted by Congress to the States, contained many of the republican elements already embraced by earlier American frames of government. It also included some of the modifications suggested by John Adams and other modern commentators to remedy the weaknesses that led the English Commonwealth and Roman republic eventually to fail. The document as a whole is more self-consciously republican1 than any of its predecessors, not only in establishing a senate2 but also in claiming to secure the ‘Blessings of Liberty’3 and to ‘guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government’.4 The President and Senate both had to concur in legislation, as Adams would have wished, but the Senate had long, six-year terms, to preserve the dignity and stability of its Roman model.5

95 citations

Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: A biography of Tom Paine, the author of "Rights of Man" and "Common Sense", is described in this article. But the focus of the book is on his early life in England as well as his role as a key pamphleteer in the American Revolution.
Abstract: A biography of Tom Paine, the author of "Rights of Man" and "Common Sense". It describes his early life in England as well as his role as a key pamphleteer in the American Revolution. It also covers his part in the drafting of France's 1772 constitution and his narrow escape from the guillotine.

95 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Rubenfeld as discussed by the authors argued that the problem of counter-majoritarian difficulty is not the major difficulty in constitutional theory, because its solution depends on resolving an even more basic question of constitutional law, in his opinion-how and why the Constitution, drafted and ratified over two centuries ago, should bind the nation and continue to be regarded as legitimate long after the deaths of those who drafted it.
Abstract: Book Review THE END OF THEORY FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CoNSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT By Jed Rubenfeld. Yale University Press, 2001. INTRODUCTION Imagine how you would answer the following question: "What is the central problem in constitutional law?" This question is routine to constitutional scholars, whose most common answer is the "counter-majoritarian difficulty,"' Alexander Bickel's classic phrase for the dilemma posed by unelected federal judges' interference with the decisions of democratically elected, politically accountable authorities. Imagine, however, that the answer to this difficulty turns out to depend on the resolution of an entirely different issue-the legitimacy of the Constitution's binding authority over time-that can be answered only by reference to a source other than any of those conventionally consulted, like the text, original understanding, or structure of the Constitution. Such imaginative leaps, difficult as they may be to follow, await the readers of the new book by Yale Law School Professor Jed Rubenfeld. There is more, much more, to Rubenfeld's constitutional vision, but many readers, including some scholars in the field, likely will be put off by his attempt to base his claim of judicial primacy in interpreting the Constitution not on any sources of constitutional meaning that are commonly regarded as authoritative, but rather on a blend of abstract principles derived primarily from the fact that the Constitution is written.3 In this book, as in his prior writings, Rubenfeld boldly rejects the attempts of virtually all other constitutional theorists to make sense of constitutional law. He argues IMAGE FORMULA7 that these scholars, including such luminaries as Alexander Bickel and Charles Black, have misdiagnosed the counter-majoritarian difficulty as the central question in constitutional law.4 Rubenfeld suggests that they all have failed to understand that this problem, as conventionally conceived, is not the major difficulty in constitutional theory, because its solution depends on resolving an even more basic question-the truly fundamental question of constitutional law, in his opinion-how and why the Constitution, drafted and ratified over two centuries ago, should bind the nation and continue to be regarded as legitimate long after the deaths of those who drafted and ratified it.5 In Rubenfeld's opinion, answering this fundamental question requires developing a political theory of legitimacy derived independently from the text of the Constitution or any other conventional source of constitutional authority. The text of the Constitution provides no guidance on how it should be interpreted; if one were to consult the Constitution for such guidance, one merely would be engaged in the circular exercise of interpreting the Constitution in order to determine how to interpret the Constitution. Instead, Rubenfeld suggests, one should derive a non-native theory of legitimacy from the fact that the Constitution is written. The fact of its "written-ness," in Rubenfeld's terminology,6 gives rise to some very significant inferences, including the Framers' objective of securing a revolutionary form of democratic self-government that would endure over time. Another equally if not more important inference is the identity of the institution best situated to elucidate and preserve constitutional meaning over time. By Rubenfeld's reckoning, this institution is the judiciary, because of its special training and because it is the least prone to the whims of present majorities. Thus, the counter-majoritarian difficulty dissolves-any tension between judges and present majorities turns out to be illusory-because only judges can maintain our system of self-government over time by steadfastly discharging their special functions of elucidating and enforcing constitutional commitments. In short, the counter-majoritarian difficulty dissolves because the legitimacy of the Constitution over time is possible only by virtue of judicial review. …

95 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints and conclude that the variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes.
Abstract: The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted--election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform--are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies.Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.Contributors:John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hlya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjrn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast

95 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20241
20232,090
20224,774
2021860
20201,213
20191,262